# SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

**LOUIS STOKES**, Ohio, *Chairman*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member</th>
<th>State/Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RICHARDSON PREYER</td>
<td>North Carolina</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WALTER E. FAUNSTROY</td>
<td>District of Columbia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE</td>
<td>California</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHRISTOPHER J. DODD</td>
<td>Connecticut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HAROLD E. FORD</td>
<td>Tennessee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLOYD J. FITHIAN</td>
<td>Indiana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROBERT W. EDGAR</td>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Subcommittee on the Assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member</th>
<th>State/Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WALTER E. FAUNSTROY</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAMUEL L. DEVINE</td>
<td>Ohio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STEWART B. McGINNERY</td>
<td>Connecticut</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHARLES THONE</td>
<td>Nebraska</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOUIS STOKES, ex officio</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAMUEL L. DEVINE, ex officio</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Subcommittee on the Assassination of John F. Kennedy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Member</th>
<th>State/Position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RICHARDSON PREYER</td>
<td>Chairman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHRISTOPHER J. DODD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHARLES THONE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOUIS STOKES, ex officio</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAMUEL L. DEVINE, ex officio</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Narration/Testimony</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September 18, 1978</td>
<td>Narration by G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Testimony of Sr. Eusebio Azcuez Lopez, former Cuban Consul in Mexico City</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 19, 1978</td>
<td>Testimony of Eusebio Azucue—(Resumed)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Testimony of Sr. Alfredo Mirabal Diaz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 20, 1978</td>
<td>Narration by G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Testimony of James J. Rowley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 21, 1978</td>
<td>Narration by G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Testimony of former President Gerald R. Ford</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Testimony of John Sherman Cooper and John J. McCloy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 20, 1978</td>
<td>Testimony of James R. Malley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 21, 1978</td>
<td>Testimony of James H. Gale</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 21, 1978</td>
<td>Testimony of J. Lee Rankin, former general counsel of the Warren Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Testimony of Nicholas Katzenbach, former Attorney General of the United States</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(III)
INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF
PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 1978

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The select committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 9:15 a.m., in room 345, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Louis Stokes (chairman of the select committee), presiding.

Present: Representatives Stokes, Devine, Preyer, Fauntroy, Thome, Sawyer, Dodd, Ford, Fithian, and Edgar.

Staff present: G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel and staff director; Gary Cornwell, deputy chief counsel; Michael Goldsmith, senior staff counsel; and Elizabeth L. Berning, chief clerk.

Chairman Stokes. A quorum being present, the committee will come to order.

The Chair recognizes Professor Blakey.

NARRATION BY G. ROBERT BLAKEY, CHIEF COUNSEL

Mr. Blakey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Cuba was an important concern of John F. Kennedy during his brief administration. It prompted the occasion of his "darkest hour"—the aborted Bay of Pigs invasion. In the missile crisis, it also brought the United States—and the world—to the brink of a nuclear holocaust. Understandably, therefore, among the many efforts to understand the assassination, those that include a Cuban element have been very prominent. Indeed, no less a figure than President Lyndon B. Johnson expressed his private view that John F. Kennedy might well have been the victim of the Cuban plot.

The Warren Commission explored the Cuban element in the assassination of the President from two perspectives.

First, it considered the extent to which Oswald "might have been motivated in the assassination by a desire to aid the Castro regime, which President Kennedy so outspokenly criticized."

In the months preceding the assassination, left-wing literature to which Oswald subscribed—chiefly "The Militant" and "The Worker"—reflected an extremely critical attitude toward the Kennedy administration's policy toward Cuba. Indeed, much of what appeared in these papers seemingly called for violent solutions to Cuban problems with the United States.

The possibility that Oswald may have been influenced by this literature seems real. Apparently in all seriousness, he told Michael Paine, the individual in whose home Marina was then living, that "You could tell what they wanted you to do * * * by reading
between the lines." Ultimately, however, the Warren Commission decided that it could not ascribe to Oswald any one motive or a group of motives.

Second, the Commission considered the extent to which Oswald's trip to Mexico in late September and early October 1963—a trip during which Oswald visited the Soviet Embassy and the Cuban consulate in Mexico City—may somehow have been related to the assassination. Based largely on the testimony of Sylvia Tirado de Duran, a Mexican national employed at the Cuban consulate, the Commission concluded the following about the visit:

Oswald first visited the Cuban consulate on September 27, 1963. He requested an in-transit visa to permit him to visit Cuba en route to the Soviet Union.

He was informed he could not obtain a visa to Cuba unless he first got one to enter the Soviet Union, and he was told at the Soviet Embassy he should not expect an answer to his visa application for about 4 months.

He carried with him newspaper clippings and other documents, some authentic and some forged, in an attempt to demonstrate he was a "friend of Cuba."

He used these documents, his previous residence in the Soviet Union, and his marriage to a Soviet national to curry favor at the Cuban consulate.

He persisted in his demand for a Cuban visa, resulting in a bitter argument between him and the Cuban Consul, Eusebio Azcue Lopez. Eventually, his request was denied, and he left, apparently in anger.

Ultimately, the Warren Commission expressed its satisfaction with the Duran account, noting that it had—

Reliable evidence from a confidential source that Senora Duran, as well as other personnel at the Cuban Embassy, were genuinely upset upon receiving the news of President Kennedy's death.

It also indicated that—

* * * confidential sources of extremely high reliability * * * establishes that her testimony was truthful and accurate in all material respects.

The Commission also checked out a number of specific conspiracy allegations stemming from Oswald's trip to Mexico City, most of which alleged that he had been enlisted by Cuban agents in a plot to carry out the assassination. Nevertheless, the Commission concluded:

Without exception, the rumors and allegations of a conspiratorial contact were shown to be without any factual basis, " * * "

History has not permitted so simple a resolution of the complex questions surrounding the assassination, Cuba, and Oswald's trip to Mexico City. Ironically, too, it was the Premier of Cuba, not the President of the United States, who was revealed and documented in Senate Intelligence Committee hearings in 1976 as the target of deadly serious assassination schemes.

Between 1960 and early 1963, the committee concluded, the CIA conspired with known underworld figures to assassinate Premier Castro. Following the missile crisis in October 1962, the CIA-Mafia plots were brought to an end, or so we are told. But other assassination plots continued. Indeed, on November 22, 1963, a CIA case
officer was planning the killing of Castro with an official of the Cuban Government.

The revelation in 1976 that the Premier of Cuba was the target of an unsuccessful assassination planned by the United States served to fuel the fires of speculation that Cuba had been the perpetrator of the successful effort against the President of the United States in 1963. It was recalled that Premier Castro himself, in an interview with Associated Press reporter Daniel Harker on September 7, 1963, seemed to be warning that U.S. leaders who approved terrorist attacks on Cuban leaders could themselves be vulnerable.

The AP story was carried in the New Orleans Times Picayune on September 9. Consequently, it could have been read by Lee Harvey Oswald himself. But the evidence of Cuban intentions may be interpreted in various ways. The Cuban delegate to the United Nations was in contact on September 5, 1963 with William Atwood, a U.S. delegate, to begin talks with the view toward starting the process of normalizing relations. And Jean Daniel, a French journalist, was with Premier Castro on November 22. He described Castro’s reaction to the news of the Kennedy assassination as one of genuine surprise and deep regret.

The critics of the Warren Commission, too, have persisted in their questioning of its conclusions, offering the theory that Oswald met with Cuban agents and various additional allegations.

The most serious is the charge that it was, in fact, not Oswald who visited the Cuban consulate, but an imposter. Critics cite as evidence a photograph published by the Commission and thought by the critics to have been taken by a surveillance camera outside the Cuban consulate. It shows a burly man who bears no resemblance to Oswald, but who was identified as the individual who visited the consulate at the time Oswald was supposed to have done so.

Mark Lane, in his “Rush to Judgment,” raised the issue of the mysterious photograph and asked, “Was someone posing as Oswald?”

Another widely circulated story after the Warren report was published is that Oswald, in a burst of anger on learning at the Cuban consulate that he could not secure a visa to visit Cuba, expressed an intention to assassinate President Kennedy.

The select committee has sought to explore a number of questions in connection with Oswald’s trip to Mexico City. Committee members and staff made two separate trips to both Cuba and Mexico. The cooperation of the Governments of Cuba and Mexico was sought and secured. The committee and the staff expresses its thanks to each government and those officials and citizens of each country that helped the committee in its investigation.

Comment, however, must be made on the lack of cooperation by the Soviet Government. The select committee, both informally and through personal contacts and formally through the State Department, sought the cooperation of the Soviet Government, not only on Oswald’s alleged trip to Mexico City where he is supposed to have visited the Soviet Embassy, but also in the period of time Oswald lived in the Soviet Union. Various documents and files not made available to the Warren Commission but which the commit-
tee had a reasonable basis to believe existed were requested. The most important were the KGB surveillance files on Oswald. It was hoped that these files particularly might have been assistance to the committee in the crucial area of trying to ascertain Oswald's motive in the assassination. Ironcally the KGB may well have the most complete file in the world on this crucial aspect of Oswald's personality.

In addition, a request was made to interview officials and Soviet citizens who had contact with Oswald. The Soviet Government denied any relationship with Oswald or complicity in President Kennedy's death but declined to be of assistance, saying that it would be inappropriate for a great power to put itself in the position of having to defend itself against possible suspicion of complicity in the death of the leader of another country.

The committee posed to itself in its investigation in this area, that is, Oswald's trip to Mexico, as the following:

Was the man who visited the Cuban consulate in fact the man later accused of assassinating President Kennedy?

When did the man alleged to be Oswald visit the Cuban consulate?

What transpired at each visit?

Who were the Cuban officials who dealt with him?

Did he in fact express an intent to assassinate the President?

Did the man alleged to be Oswald have any companions in Mexico City?

The first witness who had been scheduled to be heard on Oswald's alleged trip to Mexico City was Sylvia Tirado Bazan, previously Sylvia Tirado Duran.

Ms. Tirado was employed in September 1963 as secretary to the Cuban consul in Mexico City.

Ms. Tirado was born November 22, 1937, in Mexico City. She is presently employed by the Mexican Social Security Office.

Mr. Chairman, I understand that it has not been possible to secure the appearance of Senora Tirado. I understand, however, with your permission, Mr. Cornwell has a short presentation on her testimony.

Chairman Stokes. The Chair will recognize Counsel Gary Cornwell.

Mr. Cornwell. I might state, Mr. Chairman, that through the assistance of the Mexican Government, three members of the staff did interview Sylvia Tirado, whose present name is Sylvia Tirado Bazan, on June 6, 1978.

The Mexican Government thereafter agreed that she could come to the United States and testify at these hearings today. Mrs. Tirado Bazan also agreed to come. However, an unexpected business engagement of hers prevented her appearance here today.

There is a photo which was made of her at the time of the interview, which is being displayed on the easel and marked JFK exhibit F-433, and we also have a transcript of the interview marked for identification as JFK exhibit F-440A, and a tape recording of excerpted portions of that interview which we have marked for identification as JFK exhibit F-439.

Although the tape recording was not made for the purpose of playing it at these hearings—it was simply at the time intended as
a record of her statements—the staff has learned over the course of the investigation that it is often possible to gain a better understanding of a witness' testimony if you can hear or speak to the witness. Thus, with your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would ask that at this time each of those exhibits be admitted into evidence, and that we play for the committee selected portions of her statement.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, they may be entered into the record at this point, and you may proceed to play the recording.

[The tape recording mentioned above, JFK exhibit F-439, is being retained in committee files.]

[The information follows:]
Interview:
Cornwell: Would you state your name?
Tirado: Silvia Tirado Bazan.
Cornwell: And where's your present home address?
Tirado: Avenida Universidad 1900 Edificio 12 Departamento 402 Colonia Numero De Terranos
Cornwell: For the record, my name is Gary Cornwell, and with me here is Ed Lopez, Harold Leap and Dan Hardway. We represent the House Select Committee on Assassinations of the Congress of the United States. Also with us here today representing the Mexican Government is Honorio Escondon, Dr. Alfonso Orozco Contreras. Today is June 6, 1978 and the time is approximately 6:46 in the afternoon.
Would you tell us what your date and place of birth is?
Tirado: 22nd of November, 1937.
Cornwell: You speak English so if you like my questions
Interviewer Signature __________________________
Typed Signature Gary Cornwell
Date transcribed br 6-13-73
translated we'll be happy to, and likewise, if you'd like to answer in English that would be fine, or if you'd rather answer in Spanish, we'll translate it.

Tirado: I try to speak in English.
Cornwell: All right. If you have any question about the way I phrase something or you don't understand it, simply ask and Mr. Lopez will translate it for you.

Your name in 1963 was what?
Tirado: Silvia Tirado de Duran.
Cornwell: And your husband at that time was who?
Tirado: Horacio Duran.
Cornwell: Are you presently employed?
Tirado: Yes.
Cornwell: Where's that?
Tirado: Social Security.
Cornwell: Prior to that, what jobs did you hold?
Tirado: A long while, Social Security. I used to write.
Cornwell: And any other jobs? Have you held any other jobs?
Tirado: No.
Cornwell: At one time you worked for the Cuban Consulate.
Tirado: Yes.
Cornwell: Is that the only other job you ever held?
Tirado: No.
Tirado: I don't remember exactly, but uh, I used to work for the Olympic Games. I was a translator for two months. And uh, another three months I used to work for the, I don't know, it was an Exhibit of Hispanic Art that was, I don't know he went all over the World and I helped him to choose the pieces and as translator. I was married in 1960. I separate in '63, July '68 and I start working.

Cornwell: During 1963, did you hold any jobs during that year other than your employment at the Cuban Consulate?

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: When did you first obtain the job at the Consulate and how did you obtain it.

Tirado: Well, because I was uh, coordinating the Cuban, the Mexican-Cuban Institute, the cultural Institute in '62, I think, and that's where I met some people. Yes.

Cornwell: That was a private organization, is that correct?

Tirado: It's not exactly private. I don't know because all the countries have--there is the American there is the Russian Institute, Institute, there is the French Institute. It's cultural relations between the countries.

Cornwell: Was that associated with the Mexican Government?
Silvia Tirado Interview
Page 9.

Tirado: I don't know exactly, but I think— you know that. (Asks Orozco)

(Translation) The objective is to present culturally the different embassies and consulates that are here in Mexico.

Cornwell: What was your job with that organization?

Tirado: Coordinator.

Cornwell: And in connection with that, did you know any of the employees at the Cuban Consulate?

Tirado: Yes, at the Cultural Attache.

Cornwell: And what were the names of those persons?

Tirado: Teresa Procenza and Luis Alberu.

Cornwell: And who?

Tirado: Luis Alberu

Cornwell: Did you in any other way know any of the other employees at the Consulate?

Tirado: Yes, well I knew Eusebio Azcue who was a consul, and uh, Maria Carmen Olivari — she's dead.

Cornwell: She, in the summer of 1963, was a secretary. Is that correct? (If you nod your head, the recorder will not make any record of what your answer is.)

Tirado: Yes.
Cornwell: Would you then explain to us how it was that you obtained the job at the Consulate?

Tirado: Because my friend Maria Carman, she was dead—she had an accident, and during the funeral I told Azcue that if he wants me to help him, for some people come from Cuba, just to help him. And of course he says yes. They need some people they can trust, and I'd been working in the Institute. So...

Cornwell: How was it that you knew Eusebio Azcue by this time?

Tirado: I don't remember, because he was uh, he was an Architect and he knew a lot of people, friends of ours. I mean my husband and I.

Cornwell: Had he lived in Mexico for a long period of time?

Tirado: Yes, yes.

Cornwell: And, because of his occupation, he would have known your husband. Is that correct?

Tirado: Yeah, more or less.

Cornwell: Your husband Horacio was also an architect at that time.

Tirado: Industrial designer. Yes, sir.

Cornwell: Approximately when was it that you first obtained the job?

Tirado: The end of July or August, early August. I don't
Silvia Tirado Interview
Page 5.

remember exactly.
Cornwell: And for how long did you continue to work there?
Tirado: Three or four months.
Cornwell: How long after the assassination of President Kennedy did you work there?
Tirado: Only two days.
Cornwell: During that period of time what were the hours of operation of the Consulate?
Tirado: It was about 9:30 or 10:00 to 2:00 and in the afternoon about 5:00 to 8:00 or something. If we have a lot of work, we stayed longer.
Cornwell: The hours were 10:00 to 2:00 and then 5:00 to 8:00. Is that correct?
Tirado: Yes, that's true.
Cornwell: Was the Consulate open for visitors during both of those sets of hours?
Tirado: No, it was just in the morning.
Cornwell: Would you mind sketching for us what the physical layout of the Consulate looked like at that time? (pause) You have drawn a rectangular shape. What formed the outside of it? Was it a solid wall around the outside? Was the outside of the premises a wall?
Tirado: Yes.
Cornwell: All right. And we'll just mark it the way you
draw it. In the lower left-hand corner, there is a small box you drew. What is that?

Tirado: The consular.

Cornwell: That's the consulate's office?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: All right. We'll just put a one in that box, so we'll know that's the consulate's office. Then, the door was... where on the corner?... you remember the name of the streets, still today?

Tirado: This is Tacubayo. This is Francisco Marquez.

You want me to write it down?

Cornwell: If you remember, yes.

Tirado: Here were the houses.

Cornwell: All right. You've labeled three sides of the building with street names and on the fourth side, which on the top of the drawing, you said they are houses. Correct?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: What is in the long triangular shape on the drawing above the Consular office?

Tirado: It was the commercial office.

Cornwell: All right. We'll just put a two in there. That's...

Tirado: And here was the cultural office.

Cornwell: And behind that, we'll mark it with a three, was the cultural office. In the center of the drawing
Silvia Tirado Interview
Page 3.

is what?

Tirado: The Embassy.

Cornwell: All right. We'll put a four in that. That's the Embassy. And what's the small box in the lower right-hand corner?

Tirado: I don't know how to say it in English.

Cornwell: An entryway?

Lopez: Housekeeper.

Cornwell: Oh, a housekeeper? Okay. We'll put a five in there.

What is all the rest of the space inside the premises?

Tirado: Garden, it was garden. And here was the entrance for the cars.

Cornwell: And where you indicated there was an entrance for cars, we'll mark that seven. And all the interior space which was garden, we'll mark with an eight.

Tirado: Down here there was a movie room.

Cornwell: Where, behind the...?

Tirado: Behind the cultural room?

Cornwell: Want to draw that?

Tirado: No, because this is the first floor.

Cornwell: Oh, it was on the second floor.

Tirado: Yeah. On the first floor was a projection... movies.
Silvia Tirado Interview
Page 3.

Cornwell: Were the space which we marked one, two, three and also four, were they all two-story?

Tirado: Yeah.

Cornwell: Okay. And above the space marked one, what was there?

Tirado: The Consulate.

Cornwell: So it was on two floors.

Tirado: No, there was another floor over here but it was belongs to the commercial. Only on the first floor was the Consulate.

Cornwell: I see. What would be behind the Consulate on the first floor? In this area marked two?

Tirado: I don't remember.

Cornwell: You don't remember. So, where we marked two, that was a second story in that area. Correct?

Tirado: Warehouse perhaps.

Cornwell: Just a storage area or something like that, perhaps, in the lower area marked two.

In the space marked number one, which was the Consular's Office, who all occupied that area?

Tirado: Well, Consul, the Vice Consul and the secretary.

Cornwell: Which was you.

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: During the time that we're interested in.
Silvia Tirado Interview
Page 11.

The Consul's name of course was Eusebio Azcue.
The Vice Consul's name was what?

Tirado: I don't remember.
Cornwell: All right.

Tirado: This was Consulate.
Cornwell: All right. You have divided the area that we
originally marked number one into two units.
The smaller unit indicates where the Consul sat
and you sat in a larger reception area in the
front?

All right. And then, behind the Consul's office,
was there another door? You marked that with
a heavier area, and that would be where he could
walk out into the courtyard. Is that correct?
So if you wanted to get into the Consul's office,
including the reception area from the courtyard,
you needed to walk through the Consul's Office.
Is that accurate?

Tirado: Yes.
Cornwell: Now, what kind of a door was at the corner, the
lower left-hand corner here, so that if
one were to walk from your office to the street,
what kind of door was that? Glass, wood, solid,
could you see through it?

Tirado: No, it was solid. I don't remember exactly, but
perhaps it was wood. But it was solid.
Silvia Tirado Interview
Page 11.

Cornwell: You don't remember being able to see out on the street?

Tirado: No, no.

Cornwell: Okay.

Lopez: You enter the Consulate right, in here?

Tirado: Uh huh.

Lopez: And your office would be right around here. Right?

Tirado: My desk was here.

Cornwell: You have drawn a small box now inside the larger half of the area we originally marked area number one, that's where your desk was?

Tirado: Yes.

Lopez: From where you sat to the entrance into the office where you were, where would the entrance into the office be? Not into the whole consulate, but just into your office?

Tirado: It was open.

Lopez: Okay, it was open.

Tirado: You would enter here. Here was the stairs for the second floor, No? -- and here I think there were chairs, or something like that. For the people who were waiting. And the desk was here.

Lopez: Okay. Where would the entrance to your office be?

Tirado: Here, or here.

Lopez: Just to your office, not to the Consul's office. Not the Consulate, but just to your office.
Silvia Tirado Interview
Page 12.

It would be at the same entrance?

Tirado: Yes.

Lopez: And from where you sat, you couldn't see outside at all?

Tirado: No.

Lopez: You couldn't see any area in the yard? There was no glass?

Tirado: No. I can remember glass, a window, yeah. I can remember windows here, and perhaps here, but I don't remember.

Cornwell: Okay. There may have been windows for you to see out in the street?

Tirado: Yeah, but I couldn't see outside because perhaps they were very high.

Cornwell: While Mr. Lopez was asking you questions, he drew a diagonal line across your office space. Does that represent anything? That line should not have been drawn, is that correct?

Tirado: Yeah. (Laughs.)

Cornwell: Now, did you know a Teresa Proenza? Was she employed at the Consulate or the Embassy?

Tirado: The Embassy. She was the Cultural Attache.

Cornwell: She would have worked in the area marked number four? Is that correct?

Tirado: Well, yes. But this was, this construction was uh, afterwards. This was the Embassy and the Consulate and this building was under construction,
constructed. A building.

Cornwell: Constructed?

Tirado: Later. It was the old buildings.

Cornwell: Did she work there during the same period of time you did?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: At that period where did she work? What area?

Tirado: Here.

Cornwell: That's the area we marked number three on the diagram.

Did you know a Louisa Calderon?

Tirado: Louisa? Yes, she was in the commercial.

Cornwell: And where would that be on the diagram? In the area we marked number two?

Tirado: I think her office was exactly above mine.

She was a secretary. And I think it was above.

Cornwell: Either above the area we marked one, or the area marked two, but on the second level.

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Do you know the names of any other employees who worked there at the time?

Tirado: No, I don't remember.

Cornwell: The man named Mirabal, he was to replace Eusebio Azcue, is that correct?

Tirado: Yes.
I think it was in September. There was the
Table: 3am to 7am and there was a little table.
Consultant: You had one at your desk?
Table: Yes.
Consultant: Yes, some larger receptions in the offices?
Table: Yes.
Consultant: Yes.
Perhaps September, or something like that.
Table: Yes, so the music was selected in late summer at
Consultant: reasonably, at the consultant.
Table: Yes, so the music, when I started working at the
Consultant: "consultant.
Table: Yes.
Consultant: Yes.
Yes, it was already there when we met you
Table: in the morning, you were in the offices,
Consultant: I think it was a conference to discuss what you
Table: meant.
Consultant: Yes, some weeks afterwards, I don't remember.
Table: And then we were in the work room.
Consultant: So you remember exactly what you had at
Table: that time?
Consultant: Could you take to the team business meeting?
Table: in Mexico City and begin to learn the job so on.
Consultant: And do you recall approximately when you started?
safe box. And here was the Archivo.

Lopez: Archives.
Cornwell: So you've drawn two smaller boxes next to your desk. One of them was like a filing cabinet, or for storage of records?
Tirado: Yes. This one. The Files.
Cornwell: And the other one was a table.
Tirado: No, here was the safe box.
Cornwell: Oh, a safe. I see, a safe.
And there was a phone at the desk?
Tirado: Yes.
Cornwell: And did Azcue also have a telephone?
Tirado: Yes, it was the same but with an extension.
Cornwell: Extension.
Tirado: Here was the door.
Cornwell: All right. 1963, where were you living? Did you have more than one residence?
Tirado: Yes. Constituyentes 143.
Cornwell: And during what part of 1963 was that?
Tirado: When I moved there?
Before I started working, at the Embassy. But just a few weeks... 
Cornwell: So sometime in the summer of 1963? Did you have
Selvia Tirado Interview
Page 16.

a telephone at your home?

Tirado: Not at the moment that Oswald came. Because we had just moved. I think we moved in July because we were separated in July, also, July '68 and it is when the contract finished. So perhaps...

Cornwell: I see. Your rent contract ran out in July of '63?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: About the same time that you and Horatio were divorced?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Did you, you say that because of your move, it took some time to get a telephone in your home?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: And do you remember approximately when it was that you finally got that in?

Tirado: At the assassination we had, a, let me see, we didn't have telephone—days later.

Cornwell: It was sometime after the assassination that you first got a telephone in this residence.

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: And do you by any chance recall the telephone number at the Consulate?

Tirado: Oh, so many times I write it down. Perhaps it was 11-23-45, perhaps?
Silvia Tirado Interview
Page 17.

Cornwell: Could it have been 11 28 47?
Tirado: Perhaps.
Cornwell: When were you first advised that we wanted to speak to you?
Tirado: Last week.
Cornwell: And since that time, of course, last Wednesday, I believe it was, we spoke to you informally, and told you basically what we were interested in. And learned most of what you could remember about the events we were interested in. Correct?
Tirado: Yes.
Cornwell: Apart from that, have you had any other opportunities to read anything, or speak to anyone, in order to refresh your memory about the events?
Tirado: Yes. In October of '76 some journalist from the Washington Post came to interview me.
Cornwell: We are familiar with the story that appeared in the Washington Post at approximately that time. Apart from that, have you for instance read the Warren Commission Report?
Tirado: Yes.
Cornwell: When did you last have an occasion to read that?
Tirado: Uh, when Horacio told me you were coming, I was writing, and I try to remember exactly and I'm starting saying that again, the nightmare came, and so on.
and so on, and I wanted to check the dates.

**Cornwell:** So, last week sometime, you had a chance to read it over again?

**Tirado:** No, not everything just the one little thing.

**Cornwell:** Just the part that dealt with Mexico City and your testimony and that sort of thing. Correct?

**Tirado:** Yes.

**Cornwell:** Let me ask you, when you read that, was there any part of it that seemed to you to be inaccurate?

**Tirado:** Inaccurate?

**Cornwell:** Not correct.

**Tirado:** Not correct? Yes, but with the Warren Commission, I get angry when I start reading it because they make some afirmaciones (ph).

**Lopez:** Allegations or conclusions.

**Tirado:** Yes. I don’t like it. So I tried to erase it.

**Cornwell:** Okay. What specifically about the report was it that makes you angry?

**Tirado:** That I was a -- let me see how to say it--, I don’t remember exactly, but uh, I did more to Oswald when he was here than was my job, that it was extra.

**Cornwell:** You mean part of the report that suggests that you went beyond your duties at the Consulate, that you exceeded your authority, and you thought that you did not do so. Is that correct?
Tirado: Correct.

Cornwell: Is there anything else about the Warren Commission Report's resume of the facts that you felt was inaccurate, that made you mad?

Tirado: I cannot answer that because I only read at that time two pages. I didn't read the whole thing.

Cornwell: Okay. In addition to looking at that in order to refresh your memory, have you had a chance to speak to anyone else?

Tirado: No, it was just for checking my writing.

Cornwell: What writing was that?

Tirado: Well, I was trying to remember everything that happened in the interrogatory. It was not hard, I mean, what I felt, but uh, what the police had done to me, so it was my but I'm writing, I'm writing an autobiography how do you say that, and this is a chapter.

Cornwell: I see.

Tirado: (Laughs.)

Cornwell: Directing your attention then to approximately late September of 1963, as we learned from you the other day, a man came to the Consulate, a man who you later associated with pictures in the newspaper and a name in the newspaper of the alleged assassin of the President. Is that correct?
Silvia Tirado Interview
Page 20.

Tirado: Yes.
Cornwell: Do you remember how many times he came to the
Consulate?
Tirado: Three times.
Cornwell: Do you remember the date or dates upon which those
three visits occurred?
Tirado: No, I saw the application.
you showed me the other day, and in the Warren
Commission was September 27, but I didn't remember,
of course, until I read it.
Cornwell: All right. Do you have a recollection whether it
was all on one day or on separate days.
Tirado: The same day.
Cornwell: On the very first visit, would you describe to us
what the man said and did, and what you said in
response?
Tirado: Yes, he, well, he enter and he ask me if I speak
English and I say yes, and then he start asking me about requirements to go to Cuba, to get a
visa to go to Cuba, and I explain it.
Cornwell: What did you explain?
Tirado: Well, that he needed to, he said that a
transit visa so that he needs a visa to the
country that he was going from; if it was a
Socialist country, the visa was given, as soon
as he gets the other visa, and uh... 

Cornwell: When he first asked about the requirements for a visa, did he tell you that his objective was to go to Cuba or to another country?

Tirado: To the Soviet Union.

Cornwell: Did you ever suggest to him that there was any alternative means to acquire a visa other than the in-transit visa requirement which you just described?

Tirado: I don't remember, I mean I hardly remember. But what I used to say is if you want to go to Cuba, you need or you have to have friends in Cuba, so they may, what do you say, take responsibility, if you get the visa. That was one way, no? And the other way was in-transit.

Cornwell: Okay. If I understand then, you don't have a distinct recollection about exactly what you said to Oswald, but you assumed it was what you said to everyone who came in, which was that you explained both processes, that they either must have friends in Cuba or the in-transit visa could be granted if they got a visa from another country.

Tirado: No, if only they asked me. Because they usually go there and say, "I want to go to Cuba." But if they say I'm just in transit, then I explain...
Silvia Tirado Interview
Page 22.

Cornwell: Okay, then. Let me see if I can rephrase it and get what's in your mind as best we can. Is it your best recollection that you did explain both alternatives to Oswald?

Tirado: I don't remember exactly, because I think he immediately says that he wants to go to Russia, and he was in transit to go to Cuba. I think he immediately says so.

Cornwell: Okay. So then your best recollection that you may have only explained the in-transit visa process. Is that correct?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: But, I gather from the way you have answered the question, there is still the possibility that you also discussed with him going to Cuba if he had friends, but you're not sure about that second one. Is that accurate?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Now, after this first basic explanation, what if anything did he say or do?

Tirado: Well, I don't remember exactly. He show all the paper that he had, when he gave me the application when he came back, . . .

Cornwell: Okay. Wait a minute. Just the first visit. Is there anything else about the first visit? Or,
did he leave at that time and if he left, why did he leave?

Tirado: To have photographs of himself.

Cornwell: Okay. So your memory is that on the first occasion you also explained to him that he needed photographs and he left shortly thereafter to obtain them.

Tirado: Yes, and perhaps, but I'm not very sure, that, uh, he said that he was a friend of the Cuban Revolution, and when he showed me all the scrap paper that he has.

Cornwell: All right. You don't remember if that was on the first or the second occasion. Correct?

Tirado: Yeah, I don't remember.

Cornwell: Nevertheless, he did leave to go get photographs, and he did return?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Did he return with the photographs?

Tirado: With four photographs.

Cornwell: Four of them.

Tirado: Yeah.

Cornwell: Were they all the same? To the best of your memory, was he wearing the same kind of clothes that he was wearing that day in the photographs?

Tirado: Yes.
Cornwell: So, from all the circumstances, did it appear to you that he just went somewhere locally and had the pictures made?

Tirado: Yeah. I think that I already explained (to) him where he could take the photographs.

Cornwell: You told him some locations in town where he could go? Were there some right in the neighborhood of the Consulate there?

Tirado: That I don't remember.

Cornwell: All right. But at any rate you knew of some place at the time, mentioned one or two places to him?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Correct? . . . Did you look at the photos when he brought them back, careful about to be sure that it was the same man who was standing in front of you?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: And what did you do at that time?

Tirado: I filled out application.

Cornwell: You personally typed it, and did you type it in duplicate or triplicate or just one copy?

Tirado: Duplicate.

Cornwell: And was the second copy a carbon?
Silvia Tirado Interview
Page 25.

Tirado: Carbon?
Cornwell: Did you have it twice or did you type one and make two copies?
Tirado: Only one.
Cornwell: And made two?
Tirado: Yes.
Cornwell: And what did you do with the photographs?
Tirado: Stapled them.
Cornwell: Stapled them?
Tirado: Yes.
Cornwell: On top of the application.
Tirado: Yes.
Cornwell: The application has a place on it for a date, is that correct?
Tirado: Yes.
Cornwell: Did you type in the date that was in fact that day?
Tirado: Yes.
Cornwell: Let's just talk hypothetically for a moment. Is there any chance that he was at the Consulate on more than one day?
Tirado: No. I read yesterday, an article in the Reader's Digest, and they say he was at the Consulate on three occasions. He was in Friday, Saturday, and Monday...That's not true, that's false.
Silvia Tirado Interview
Page 31.

Cornwell: All right. Let's try a different hypothetical.
If the one in the Reader's Digest is definitely
wrong, is it possible that he first came on like
a Thursday, and then came back on a Friday?

Tirado: No, because I am positively sure about it. That
he came in the same day.

Cornwell: Let me ask you then something about just the pro-
cedures for the Consulate at the time.
Would it have been consistent with your normal
procedures for you to have typed the application
on his first visit, even though he didn't have a
photograph to put on it?

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: In other words, before you started the process of
typing it, you were sure you had everything you
needed to make it complete.

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Did he tell you where he was staying at the time?

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: Did you recall any problem with him not knowing
any address, where he was staying in Mexico City?

Tirado: No, because he say that he has no time to wait,
he was in a hotel and uh, I didn't ask the address,
in Mexico City because I mean didn't care.

Cornwell: You didn't have a need to know that?
Silvia Tirado Interview
Page 27.

Tirado: No.
Cornwell: Do you recall any problem coming up where he needed to know it? For any other reason?
Tirado: Me to know his address?
Cornwell: No, for him to know. Did he have any problem, did he have any need to know it himself? Do you remember anything along those lines? TIRADO: No.
Cornwell: Going back to the second visit, is it your memory that you typed the application in duplicate, you stapled the pictures at the top of each copy, is that correct?
Tirado: Yes.
Cornwell: Then what did you do with the application?
Tirado: Well, I used to put it in a file, and uh, I used to keep one copy, another to send, the original, we used to send to Cuba. And I think I have another file.
Cornwell: Was he required to sign the application?
Tirado: He signed it, yes.
Cornwell: Did he sign one or both of them?
Tirado: I think both, it has to be.
Cornwell: Was there any requirement in the Consulate that he do it in any particular person's presence? Anyone have to watch him while he signed it?
Tirado: I don't know, I mean I just don't remember.
Cornwell: As a hypothetical, did Azcue have to watch people sign the applications?

Tirado: No. He was in his office.

Cornwell: So you could handle that all by yourself.

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Did he sign it in your presence?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Did anything else occur on the second visit, any other conversation, or any other event?

Tirado: No, but I told you, it's uh, he said that he was a friend of the Cuban Revolution. He show me letters to the Communist Party, the American Communist Party, his labor card, and uh, he's working in Russia, I don't remember exactly, but he said on his application, his license number...

Cornwell: Marriage license?

Tirado: (Spoke in Spanish.) Se dice serup los recortes del periodico

Cornwell: Okay, we had to pause for a second to turn the tapes over. As I recall, you were explaining the kinds of things he brought with him.

Tirado: Yes, it was his labor card, from Russia, his uh, marriage pact, yes, that he was married with a Russian, and uh, a clipping that he was with two policemen taking him by his arms, that he was in a meeting to support Cuba. And a card saying that he was a member of the Fair Play for Cuba in New
Silvia Tirado Interview
Page 29.

Orleans. And

Cornwell: Do you recall what was said or what occurred that caused him to produce all of these documents about his having a Russian wife and his Fair Play for Cuba activity?

Tirado: Just a minute. (Spanish—what means recall?)

Lopez: Recordar.

He showed me all of these papers to demonstrate that he was a friend of the revolution.

Cornwell: But did you say anything to him or did anyone else say anything to him that made him feel he needed to produce this kind of documentation?

Tirado: No, I don't think so. What I said is that when he said he was a member of the Party, of the Communist Party, the American, I said why don't they arrange, the Party, your Party with the Cuban Party, and he said that he didn't have time to do it.

Cornwell: Did you ask him why he didn't just have the Communist Party arrange his trip to Cuba?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: The Cuban Communist Party? He just said he didn't have time?

Tirado: Yes. Because there was a manner to do it. I mean, we get, for instance, the visa directly
from Cuba and saying give the visa to this people that's coming and somebody say oh, yes, you have your visa here.

Cornwell: Do you recall anything else happening on the second occasion? Or have you related all that's in your mind on that?

Tirado: No. It was strange. I mean because if you are a Communist and you're coming from a country where the Communist Party is not very well seen, and in Mexico City that the Communist Party was not legal at that moment -- crossing the border with all of his paper, it was not logical. I mean, if you're really Communist, you go with anything, I mean just nothing, just your passport, that's all. And that was something that I didn't like it but...

Cornwell: So, you were a little suspicious of the amount of documentation he brought?

Tirado: Yeah.

Cornwell: Did you say anything to him about that?

Tirado: Perhaps I told him, what are you doing with all of this? And he said to prove I'm a friend of yours

Cornwell: Did you discuss your suspicions with anyone else?

Tirado: With the Consul.

Cornwell: With Azcue?
Silvia Tirado Interview
Page 31.

Tirado: Yes.
Cornwell: Do you remember when that discussion occurred?
Tirado: It was afterwards.
Cornwell: Was that after his second visit as you recall?
Tirado: It was during his third visit.
Cornwell: During his third visit. All right.

Let's back up again for just a moment.

What time of day as best as you recall did he come to the Consulate the first time?

Tirado: Perhaps it was eleven o'clock or something like that, ten thirty.
Cornwell: And the second time?
Tirado: About twelve, or eleven, no, about one o'clock.
Cornwell: Okay. The first one was roughly late morning, and the second one was early afternoon.
Tirado: Yes.
Cornwell: And then, why did he leave the second time?
Tirado: To get his Russian visa.
Cornwell: Would it have been the standard procedure in the Cuban Consulate, to take the application, have him sign it, and have it ready to go in the file if the request was an in-transit, for an in-transit visa, even though he did not have the visa from the third country. Or from another country?
Tirado: Uh, huh.
Cornwell: All right.
Tirado: Yes, I did send it to Cuba.
Cornwell: All right. Okay. So, then you sent him, in effect, to the Russian Embassy. And it was at that point after he left that you spoke to... 
Tirado: No.
Cornwell: No, you didn't speak to the Consulate at all yet.
Tirado: No.
Cornwell: Had there been any problem at all yet? No.
Cornwell: So far, it's like any normal visa application.
Tirado: Yes.
Cornwell: Would it have been consistent with the procedures in the Consulate for you to have allowed him to take one or both of the applications typed up outside the Consulate?
Tirado: I don't remember very well if uh, there were only two copies. I mean, one original and one copy, but uh, it could have happened, but I don't remember.
Cornwell: Okay. To the best of your memory then, the person who made the application was not permitted to have a copy.
Tirado: I don't know. I don't remember.
Cornwell: Okay. You're not sure. But your tentative memory is that would not have occurred.
Silvia Tirado Interview
Page 33.

Tirado: No.
Cornwell: Is that correct?
Tirado: Yes.
Cornwell: Would you have ever allowed a person to take all of the applications outside and attach the photos or sign them themselves?
Tirado: Yes, because you may come, ask for the application and you may keep it.
Cornwell: You, on occasion, would allow someone just to have a blank copy. Is that correct?
Tirado: Yes. But he was different because he did not speak in Spanish so I have to fill it.
Cornwell: I see. If he would have spoken Spanish or professed to having someone with him who did speak Spanish, you might have allowed him to take the applications and fill them out.
Tirado: Perhaps.
Cornwell: At least on other occasions you have done that, with other people.
Tirado: That's something that I really don't remember.
Cornwell: There, at least, there was no requirement that you type it there in the office, as long as it got filled out.
Tirado: I think I have to type it. I have to type it because I have to make some observations, always.
Cornwell: Down at the bottom?
Tirado: Yes.
And I think that if you fill it in in handwriting, I have to type it, for, to send it to Cuba.

Cornwell: So, at most, you would allow someone to fill it out and bring it in so you could type it?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: If that procedure was employed, allowing someone else to fill it out, would you still be required to check the photograph to be sure it was accurate?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Would you still require the person to sign it in your presence?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Just so we can keep our documents straight, let’s just mark as Exhibit Number 1 the diagram you drew earlier. And we will mark now on the back a photograph and we’ll ask you some questions about it. We’ll mark it as Exhibit Number 2. This is a photograph of what would appear to be a visa application. Does it appear to be basically the type of visa application that we have been speaking about?

Tirado: Yes. The numbers, I think they’re mine.

Cornwell: The numbers in the upper right-hand corner which are hand-written?

Tirado: I think so.
Silvia Tirado Interview
Page 35.

Cornwell: Those appear to you to be in your handwriting.

Tirado: Yeah, because when I file I write in the number, the following number?

Cornwell: Okay. And on the very bottom of the application, where it says "para uso de la mision" that means it's filled in by someone associated with the Cuban Government. Is that correct. Or the Consulate?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Who, according to the usual procedure, filled out that portion.

Tirado: Me.

Cornwell: The other day when we talked to you informally, you read through the words in that section. Is that correct?

Tirado: Yes. I remember.

Cornwell: And you memory is that you in fact typed that section on this application.

Tirado: Yes. I used to do this with all the applications.

Cornwell: And under that, there is a signature.

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Are you able to tell whose signature that is?

Tirado: No, I was thinking it was Mirabal, but no-- I couldn't sign any papers.

Cornwell: Okay. So it was definitly not your signature?

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: Do you know whether, according to normal procedure,
any particular person routinely placed his
name at that location?

Tirado: No, only the Consulate. People in the Consulate.

Cornwell: What would be the purpose of a signature in the
lower right-hand corner?

Tirado: I don't know, perhaps to check that it was right
as it was written.

Cornwell: Did you ever see the Consulate or any other
employee routinely sign the applications at
the location?

Tirado: I don't remember, but what I used to do was
put the originals in one packet and that was
with a letter to the Minister, de Relaciones
exterister (Spanish), How do you say that?

(Lopez - Minister of Foreign Relations), and I
used to give to the Consul so he sign the papers
and send it to Cuba.

Cornwell: Okay. One copy stayed in the Consulate and one
was mailed to Cuba, to the Minister of Foreign
Relations.

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Is it possible then that the signature in the
lower right-hand corner is someone in Cuba?

Tirado: Perhaps that one that get it.

Cornwell: That receives it in Cuba. All right, the stamp,
which appears slightly over the name, the handwritten name, Lee H. Oswald, when did that get placed on the application if you know?

Tirado: Perhaps in the moment that he sign?

Cornwell: Was that part of the normal procedure? Did you have a stamp as you recall to do that?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: And was that a means of authenticating the signature, that you would stamp on top of it like that?

Tirado: I think so. Because let me see. This was signed by Cuba, I think, because this was October 10. This was the answer, perhaps.

Cornwell: So there's a date you just pointed to, around the middle of the application reading 10-OCT. 1963 and you are assuming, I take it, that that was the date placed on the document in Cuba?

Tirado: Perhaps but I don't know. I don't know the date of when we send the application.

Cornwell: Or it was placed on there when you mailed it?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Do you know which?

Tirado: I don't know.

Cornwell: You don't remember which? Could it have been the date upon which the application was received

Could it have been the same time?

Well, let's depend on the situation if we have to do, let's keep in touch with each other and from Cuba to Mexico and from Mexico to Cuba, and remember to that time, if we were there tonight. We'll let depend on the situation if we had, I don't.

It would have been mad to copy this because of an application and there were three times that the concrete would have to be taken between the


Guess, there are only three on here of concrete that's been received. So I guess the bear we can do to say that you don't.

Could it have been the same time you received it?

You, because I was the same case.

Okay, the only date on here of concrete that's been received.

That's only one near the top, the second time,
Cornwell: Would there have been some usual amount of time? How much could it vary?

Tirado: The flights were Monday, Wednesday and Friday, I think. And uh, well, we send a bunch if, I think, I don't know, when what day in the week was the 27th? Perhaps if it was Wednesday, we would send next Friday, or next Monday. Or...

Cornwell: I have another photograph of just the upper left-hand corner of the same document, which we'll mark as Exhibit J on the back, and ask you if, to the best of your recollection, that is a photograph of the man whom you saw on or about the 27th of September?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: I don't understand. A moment ago, did you say that there was a normal time of the week that mailings to Cuba occurred?

Tirado: Would you please repeat the question?

Cornwell: Was there a usual day, did the mailings to Cuba usually occur on one given day of the week?

Tirado: Yes, I don't remember exactly, but I think it was on Friday, perhaps, that we make, we send applications. Yeah, it was one day to send all the applications.

Cornwell: All right. So, if we were to tell you the 27th of
Silvia Tirado Interview

Page 45.

September was a Friday, then, the usual routine would have been either for you to have mailed this application on the very day that you received it, or to have to wait until at least the next Friday. Is that correct?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Now. You have told us that after the second visit, he went apparently to attempt to obtain a visa from the Soviet Embassy.

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: When do you recall him returning?

Tirado: He came in the afternoon.

Cornwell: About what time?

Tirado: Five or six.

Cornwell: And that would have been, according to what you told us earlier, not normal visiting hours? Is that correct?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: How were you able to speak to him on this occasion?

Tirado: Because when somebody came to the doorman and was speaking in another language that wasn't Spanish, he used to call me and say somebody's here that doesn't speak Spanish, someone sent me to you, so he takes the people to the Consulate.

Cornwell: And the doorman came and got you.

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Did you go outside to the main gate?

Tirado: No.
Cornwell: What happened?

Tirado: Somebody took them to the Consulate.

Cornwell: Okay. You said the main gate. Was that the area that, on Exhibit One, you marked as being the door to your office, or some other area?

Tirado: He was closed. In the afternoon he was closed. But perhaps he came...

Cornwell: The door on Area One was locked up. Okay?

Tirado: Yes. And then he was open.

Cornwell: Over near Number Seven, is that correct?

Where they let the cars in?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: There was a door there too?

Tirado: Yes. It was the garage and another door.

Cornwell: And the doorman from that area brought him to your office?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: What occurred on that occasion?

Tirado: What?

Cornwell: What happened on that occasion?

Tirado: Well, he came in and he said that he already have his Russian visa and uh, he want to get his Cuban visa. And I said that that was not possible because he has to be first sent to Cuba and then
wait for the answer, no, it was necessary
that he has to have first a Socialist visa, the
Russian visa. And, uh, . . .

Cornwell: Did he show you his passport with a visa in it?
From the Russian Embassy?

Tirado: No, No. I don't remember exactly but what I remem-
ber is he says that he already has his Russian visa
and I said I don't see it and well, I don't remem-
ber exactly what we discussed in that moment. But,
he was very stubborn. So, I say, well, I'm going
to call to the Russian Consul, so I called the
Russian Consul and I said hey, listen, here's a
man that, he say that he already got his Russian
visa. And he said, yes, I remember it. He came
to us for visa but uh, the answer will be in three
or four months, that was the usual time.

Cornwell: So as you recall, then, the person at the Russian
Embassy said in effect, no, he doesn't have it yet,
he's only applied for it. Is that right?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Okay. Go ahead.

Tirado: And uh, and I told him what the Russian Consulate
says and then, he was angry. He get angry. And
he insisted that he was a friend of the Cuban Re-
volution, that he has already been in jail for
the Cuban Revolution, that uh, oh, that he
wanted that visa and that he couldn't wait for
so long time because uh, his Mexican visa was
finished in three days. So he was insistent and uh,
I didn't have time and well, I couldn't make him
understand that. So, I went to the Consul's
office and I explained to him, and would you please
come and talk with him? Azcue came, Mirabal I
think he didn't speak English, so Azcue came and
told him those things, all the requirements that he
needs to fly to Cuba, and he was really angry. He
was red and he was almost crying and uh, he was
insisting and insisting so Azcue told him to go away
because if he didn't go away at that moment he was
going to kick him, or something like that. So,
Azcue went to the door, he opened the door and
told Oswald to go away.

Cornwell: Okay. So he went to the door which was in the
area we marked 'one,' which was the Consulate
Office?

Tirado: Yes...Remember, I was feeling pity for him
because he looked desperate.

Cornwell: He looked desperate?

Tirado: Yes.
Cornwell: So, you felt kind of sorry for him?
Tirado: Yes.
Cornwell: At any time during these three contacts, did he indicate to you that he could speak or understand Spanish?
Tirado: No.
Cornwell: During this period was your normal work week, did it include Saturdays?
Tirado: Yes.
Cornwell: Is it possible that, in addition to his visits on Friday, he also came back the following day on Saturday morning?
Tirado: No.
Cornwell: How can you be sure of that?
Tirado: Because, uh, I told you before, that it was easy to remember, because not all the Americans that came there were married with a Russian woman, they have live(d) in Russian and uh, we didn't used to fight with those people because if you, they came for going to Cuba, so apparently they were friends, no? So we were nice to them with this man we fight, I mean we had a hard discussion so we didn't want to have anything to do with him.
Cornwell: Okay. I understand that but I don't understand how that really answers the question. In other
words, the question is, what is it about the
events that makes you sure that he did not come
back on Saturday, and have another conversation
with you?

Tirado: Because I remember the fight. So if he (come)
back, I would have remembered.

Cornwell: Did Azcue work on Saturdays?

Tirado: Yes, we used to work in the office, but not for
the public.

Cornwell: Was there a guard, was there a guard out here at
the corner near number seven on your diagram on
Saturdays?

Tirado: Excuse me?

Cornwell: Was there a doorman out near the area that you
marked as number seven, on the diagram?

Tirado: Yes, but on Saturday he never let people. . .

Cornwell: Never let people in.

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: Not even if they came up to the doorman and didn't
speak Spanish? And were very insistent?

Tirado: No, because they could answer or something. They
could ask me for instance, no? by the inter-phone.

Cornwell: They could do that on a Friday, though.
Tirado: But what I remember is that Oswald has my telephone number and my name and perhaps he show to the doorman (Spanish).

Cornwell: When did you give him the telephone number and name?

Tirado: In the second visit, perhaps.

Cornwell: Okay.

Tirado: I used to do that to all the people, so they don't have to come and to bother me. So I used to give the telephone number and my name and say "give me a call next week to see if your visa arrived."

Cornwell: Well. Are you saying that based on your memory the guard was allowed to bring people in during the five till eight o'clock at night uh, sessions during the week but not on Saturdays?

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: Is that correct?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Do you have a distinct recollection with respect to telephone calls to the Russian Consulate, was it just one call or was it more than one call?

Tirado: Only one.

Cornwell: Just one.

The . . .I believe I asked you this, but just to be sure, although the application was typed with
a carbon to make two copies with one typing, did he have to sign both independently? Or did you allow them to use a carbon to sign the paper?

Tirado: No, no. It was the original.

Cornwell: Two original signatures. All right.

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Was anything said that you recall at this time which looking back on it indicated the possibility, even on that date, Oswald had on his mind some intention of killing the President of the United States?

Tirado: No, I don't think so.

Cornwell: Let me read something to you, and ask you if it all refreshes your memory or if you have a memory of a conversation similar to this? I don't believe I read this to you before, when we talked the other day, or did I? Did I read an excerpt from Daniel Schorr's book to you?

Tirado: No, you told me.

Cornwell: Okay. I'll read it to you then at this time. It's an excerpt from a book called *Clearing the Air*, written by Daniel Schorr, published in the United States in 1977. And page 177 reads as follows:

"In an interview in July 1957 with a British journalist, Comer Clark, Castro
(meaning Fidel Castro) said that Oswald had come to the Cuban Consulate twice, each time for about fifteen minutes. The first time, I was told, he wanted to work for us. He was asked to explain but he wouldn’t, he wouldn’t go into details. The second time he said he wanted to free Cuba from American imperialism. Then he said something like ‘Someone ought to shoot that President Kennedy.’ Then Oswald said, and this is exactly how it was reported to me, maybe I’ll try to do it.”

Do you recall any conversation like that in either what was said to you by Oswald or that was said by Oswald to Azcue or anyone else that you might have overheard?

Tirado: No, I don’t remember.

Cornwell: Did any part of that conversation occur?

Tirado: No, because I don’t remember that he says he was to go to work in Cuba because he only that he wanted to go in-transit. That’s what I remember.

Cornwell: What do you think, well, first let me ask you, do you think that conversation could have occurred and you just forgot it? In other words, is that the kind of conversation which, if it occurred, you would definitely remember it?

Tirado: Yes. Because in the fight with Azcue there was shouting and crying and things like that. I could miss something, but not, because even if would say so, I mean, I could have heard, no, I mean
Silvia Tirado Interview

Page 49.

If you kill President you're not going to change the whole system.
You see, that's why I give you answer, even Azcue. I mean that's not the, I don't think so, that he had that conversation with anyone. He was arguing.

Cornwell: Do you remember any part of the conversation indicating that Oswald blaming the United States or President Kennedy for his inability to get to Cuba?

Tirado: I don't remember but that could be possible.

Cornwell: In other words, if he's frustrated and he comes to the Cuban Consulate, he might feel animosity or anger towards various people. He might be angry at you, or Azcue, or at the Cuban Government or at the Russian Government or perhaps the United States Government, depending on how the conversation went. What do you recall about that? Who was he angry at when told he couldn't go to Cuba?

Tirado: He was angry at us. That's why I called Azcue. Because he was not a strong man but anyway. I didn't like to fight with him. He was very angry and he was blaming me and Azcue because he thought it was in our hands to give the visa immediately, and he couldn't understand that the visa has to
Silvia Tirado Interview

Page 30.

You mentioned earlier that you had discussed with Azcue on this, as I understood this, during the third visit with Oswald, the suspicion that you had about the documents. Is that accurate or did I misunderstand?

No, it was the third time when I told Azcue that there was a man that bother me, that when I told him about this man, I mean because it was normal, I used to that was my job, to attend people who come in so I didn’t have to bother the Consul for every man who came, because there was a lot crazy men from the United States that they wanted to go to Cuba.

Okay. So, from what I understand then, when you went in to Azcue to bother him, since you normally didn’t do that sort of thing, you gave him a sort of background resume of your dealings with Oswald. Is that correct?

Yes.

And was it at that point that you told him of your suspicion about the documents?

I think so.

What was his reaction? Azcue’s?

He was worrying. When he went to my office,
he was very tranquil, he was very polite, he was explaining things, very polite. And uh, he was starting to get angry when he saw that he was a stubborn man, that he didn't want to understand, and he said uh, I remember now, he said 'you're not a friend of the Cuban Revolution, because if you are a friend, you have to understand that we have to take care, to be very careful with the people that are going to Cuba, and if you don't understand this, you are not friend of the Cuban Revolution.' And he was shouting and, I don't remember how long was this conversation, but uh, they got really angry, both.

Leap: May I call you Silvia?
Tirado: Yes.
Leap: At any time during your conversation with the Consul, did you discuss the possibility that Oswald was a penetration agent? Intelligence agent for a foreign power? Did you discuss that possibility?
Tirado: No. I don't think so because we didn't have time. Because this man was in my office and I was in Ascue's office so I couldn't leave him many times alone.

Leap: Did you ever have conversations with Ascue outside of Oswald's presence relative to the issue?
Silvia Tirado Interview
Page 52.

Tirado: Repeat the question please.

Lopez: Did you ever have a conversation with Azcue when Oswald was not in the office about the possibility that he was an intelligence agent for some country?

Tirado: No, no. I don't think so. We only thought that he was a crazy man, an adventurer, or something like that.

Leap: Did it ever enter your mind that he was a penetration agent?

Tirado: Perhaps. Perhaps, because it happened, it happened sometimes that somebody came and say this is a policeman or something like that.

Leap: That's all the questions that I have.

Tirado: The only thing that I can say, it was that it was strange, travelling with all of his documents just to prove one thing.

Lopez: Do you think now, looking back on what happened then, that he may have been an intelligence agent?

Tirado: Perhaps.

Cornwell: Did anything else ever come to your attention?

That caused that suspicion? Other than just his presentation of the documentation? Anything else ever happen?

Tirado: With him? No, no. The only thing that was strange is that if you belong to the Communist Party,
any party. Your French, but French could get Cuban Visa but Mexico, for instance, if you’re Mexican and you’re a member of the party, of the Communist Party, you don’t have to go and ask for application Visa because the party writes to the Cuban Communist Party, and they arrange everything. That was the strange thing. There’s no need. At first, he said that he was a Communist. That was strange. Because it would be really easy for him to get the visa through the Communist Party.

Cornwell: At any point in the conversations that you have told us about, did Oswald say anything indicating that he really wanted to stay in Cuba?

Tirado: No. He just wanted to go and visit and saw what was the Revolution.

Cornwell: Okay. That’s sort of what I meant. In other words, he did indicate that he didn’t just want to pass through, that he wanted to spend some time there. Is that correct?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: What do you recall about that part of the conversations?

Tirado: I told him that he get to Cuba, for instance, at two o’clock, and there was a plane going to
Silvia Tirado Interview
Page 34.

Russia at five o'clock, he has to stay in the
airport, in the Cuban airport. That he couldn't
go out.

Cornwell: Why didn't you tell him that?

Tirado: Because he was saying that he wanted to go to
Cuba to visit and to see what the revolution
had made.

Cornwell: Did you ever see him again, after the argument
with Azcue?

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: Did you ever talk to him again?

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: Not in person nor by telephone.

Tirado: No, he never call.

He could have called when I wasn't there, but I
used to get the message, if somebody answer, I
used to get a message.

Cornwell: Did anyone else overhear any of the conversations
you have described? Other than the one time in
which Azcue was involved?

Tirado: Yes. Could be that people from the Commercial
Office, could be Mirabal.

Cornwell: Was there anyone else physically present in the
Consulate's Office during those conversations as
you can recall?
Silvia Tirado Interview
Page 55.

Tirado: I can't remember. The only thing that I remem-
ber is that it was only Mirabal.

Cornwell: And did Mirabal come out in the reception
area during the conversations as you recall?

Tirado: No, I think he stay in his office.

Cornwell: But he could have overheard it at the time.

Tirado: Yes, everybody who was passing through, even in
the streets, they were shouting, really!

Cornwell: Were the windows up as I guess they might have
been at that time of year?

Tirado: (Didn't understand.)

Cornwell: The windows would have been up? The windows to
the Consulate Office would have been open?


Cornwell: In other words, you're saying people on the street
might have overheard it?

Tirado: Yes, yes. If you were here and there was always a police
here, they could have heard the shouting, the crying.

(Lots of noise in background, unintelligible.)
Interview:

Cornwell: You told us previously when we discussed informally with you that you were sympathetic towards the Cuban Revolution during the early 1960's--

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Did you ever overhear any conversation either in the Consulate or among any of the people you may have associated with concerning the possibility of killing the President?

Tirado: No, because I think the people I used to know during that time, they think like me, and I think the death of a man doesn't make anything good, I mean, you have to change the structures, I mean, it's just like a building, no? The President is like, I mean, for instance, a roof--not the top, but if you take the top, the building still stands. You have to destroy the whole building, not one man. If you kill the man, you make a hero. So, is no good.

Cornwell: What were your own feelings towards President Kennedy? Interviewer Signature

Typed Signature ________ Gary Cornwell

Date transcribed 6-26-73

By: ___ Form #4-1
Tirado: Well, I like him. I mean, he was very nice, he was very intelligent. And I think of the relations with Mexico, as I remember now, they were very good in the commercial area, the cultural area. He came to Mexico and he was very acclamation. They loved him. They liked him very much.

Cornwell: And, what you're saying is, you're describing what you understood to be the basic reaction of the Mexican people? Is that correct?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Was that feeling the same even among the part of the Mexican people who were sympathetic towards the Cuban Revolution?

Tirado: Uh, translate, please, Ed. I want to be sure of the question.

Lopez: Would you repeat the question, please?

Cornwell: Was the feeling that you just described as being that of the Mexican people?

Lopez: (Translated question.)

Tirado: In general.

Cornwell: The same with respect to that part of the Mexican people like yourself who were sympathetic to the Cuban Revolution?

Lopez: (Translated.)

Tirado: Well, yes, more or less. Because I mean, if you're uh, how can I explain this, uh, if you're a President
Silvia Tirado Interview
Page 1.

of a country that is against uh, against Latin America, undeveloped countries, you don't love
them, of course, but you may see that is different,
that he has been a good President, that he was, I
think he was ingenious with his Alliance for Progress,
that he tried to have more friends, not like Dulles
who said we don't have friends, we have interests,
things like that. Do you know that phrase?

Cornwell: One more time.

Lopez: (Speaks to Tirado in Spanish.) Dulles.

Tirado: He said once the United States has no friends, they
have interests. (Speaks in Spanish.) And Kennedy
tried to destroy that phrase, saying we want to have friends. And he was changing the politics of Latin
America, Kennedy.

Cornwell: So, you're saying that because of President Kennedy's
policies towards Latin America, that even the part
of the Mexican people who were sympathetic to the
Cuban Revolution, they also very much liked President
Kennedy?

Tirado: I think so. Now, I'm not sure, I mean I--

Cornwell: At least--

Tirado: Yeah, but you make difference with one President and
another.

Cornwell: I understood your answer to my question a moment
ago but let me ask it one more time, nevertheless.
I asked you if at any time during the early 1960's you had overheard any conversations among people who were in favor of the Cuban Revolution to the effect that they would consider killing the President, and you answered with a statement on the logic of the situation, that you don't change the system by changing the President. Nevertheless, let me ask you again, more pointedly. Did you, nevertheless, ever overhear any such conversations?

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: Did you ever overhear them within the Cuban Consulate or outside it?

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: I'm sorry, go ahead.

Tirado: No, but I'm Mexican and I was in Mexico and I was working there and you have to see that uh, even though the Cuban people know I was a friend, they would not say things like that in front of me, of course, no?

Cornwell: When the news came over the television and in the newspapers that President Kennedy had been killed, and then you heard the name Lee Harvey Oswald, and saw the picture, I guess you immediately reflected back on your contact, correct?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: At that time, did anything come into your mind
in connection with those contacts that you could have read as foreknowledge, in other words, did it totally surprise you that that was the alleged assassin, or was there anything about your contact with him which him it understandable?

Tirado: No. No, even now I don't think that he would have done it.

Cornwell: You still don't think that he killed him?

Tirado: No, because I think that he was a weak man. I saw that he could get angry, but uh, for me, he was not a man that could kill the President, because even when I saw him on television and he said all the time, "I'm innocent" and if I kill someone very important, I would be proud. I mean, because even if I'm with police I know that I'm going to be killed or die or something like that, I'd say, "Yes, I killed the President" and I don't think so.

Cornwell: So based on all of your contacts with him, you do not think that he killed the President?

Tirado: I don't think so.

Cornwell: Let me ask you just some miscellaneous questions about the nature of your contact with him. Was there ever any conversations or indications about money problems that he had? Was that ever the sub-
Silvia Tirado Interview
Page 5.

ject of a conversation?

Tirado: No. The thing that I remember only that he was very in a hurry because his visa was finished and I think he said, he mentioned that he only had three days to stay here in Mexico City.

Cornwell: Did he ever indicate that he hoped the Cuban Government would finance his trip?

Tirado: I don't think so.

Cornwell: Had you ever done that before? Had the Consulate ever done that sort of thing?

Tirado: No, no. We used to do that but they were visitors and we had instructions from Cuba, from the Cuban Government.

Cornwell: Only visitors from Cuba, is that what you mean?

Tirado: No, no. For instance, your--the Cuban Revolutionary Anniversary, they invite people, they do have everything paid.

Cornwell: In other words, it was persons that had been invited to go to Cuba by the Cuban Government?

Tirado: Yes, yes.

Cornwell: Well, even though, then you would not, or the Cuban Government would not have financed this trip, did he ask for such assistance?

Tirado: At the time that I was working there, it never happens.

Cornwell: Specifically Oswald.
Silvia Tirado Interview
Page 7.

Tirado: No.
Cornwell: Did he ask for monetary assistance?
Tirado: I don't remember. I don't think so. But I don't remember.
Cornwell: Did he ever say anything or did you ever observe anything to indicate that he had travelling companions in Mexico City?
Tirado: No, he didn't mention it.
Cornwell: Did he ever say anything or do anything that indicated that he knew other people in Mexico City?
Tirado: I don't know. I don't remember.
Cornwell: To the best of your knowledge he knew no one, is that correct?
Tirado: Yes.
Cornwell: Do you know when he left Mexico City?
Tirado: No.
Cornwell: By what form of transportation?
Tirado: No.
Cornwell: Did anyone ever call or come by the Consulate on his behalf?
Tirado: No.
Cornwell: Did they ever deliver anything to the Consulate for him?
Tirado: No.
Cornwell: There have, let me ask you this—Has any allegation ever been brought to your attention that you met
Silvia Tirado Interview

Page 3.

with Oswald outside of the Consulate?

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: On—let me show you two books, one of which is labeled photo ident book and has roughly three inch by five inch pictures in it and the other one which is labeled JFK Document 7549 and has smaller pictures in it, and I'll turn the recorder off for a second and give you a few minutes to look through them and ask us, and I will ask you if you recognize any of the people in these photos.

Recorder turned off.

Cornwell: Okay. We've turned the tape recorder back on and you've had five minutes, maybe ten, I don't know, to look through the two books. In the first book, you only picked out photograph--

Tirado: This looks like Fidel. But not exactly.

Cornwell: Which one: Number 12?

Tirado: Yeah.

Cornwell: Who does that look like?

Tirado: Fidel but not exactly.

Cornwell: All right. Just a little.

Tirado: Yeah.
Your memory is that there were three books you described as three
books. But, here it looks very, very flat, not that flat.

When you recall to be the color of the title, I found
an example, number 266 at 266, would there be basically

Corrected: All right. Looking in the second book, I'll take a

Corrected: Yes.

Corrected: Second book... isn't it you jump in the third book,
Corrected: I see if we can find an example. Looking in the
Corrected: There.

Very flat.

Corrected: When you say jumped there, where color is there. It is
Corrected: Yes.

From, corrected.

Since the red color blue or green eyes and things
were that looked like a book shape as you described
seen in the flat shoe in the book, you determined
the book the red shoes, of course. Where you
Corrected: The happy rainbow, how many of the characters in
Corrected: Corrected.

Corrected: Yes.

Corrected: And you can do that again to the
Corrected: Okay. And you also I believe polish to number 7.

Page 3

STUDY THREE INTERMEDIATE
light as that?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Okay, but the tape recorder was back away from us so just to make sure we got that answer, you picked out in the first book photograph #57. You stated that it looked like the way you recalled the man who came to the Consulate except that he had blue or green eyes and blond hair. And then we were trying to determine what shade you recall the blond hair being, and I asked you--all these are black and white--if it would be similar to photos #266 and #263 in the book 7343? And you said in those pictures that it looks very light and that it would not have been that light, quite that light to your memory. Is that right?

Tirado: Yes.

(Long break.)

Cornwell: I don't know how, working with black and white photos, we can do much better than that? But--

Tirado: A little lighter than your eyebrows.

Cornwell: A little lighter than my eyebrows? There's another photo... In the second book, number 26 or 27. You also pointed to those photos when you went through the book. Would the color of that hair approximate the way you remember it?
Silvia Tirado Interview
Page 11.

Tirado: No, because he had very light, almost white. . .
Cornwell: Okay, again, it would be not as light as that?
Tirado: No.
Cornwell: All right. Then going to the second book, you
told me you looked at the book the first time. What is your memory about
that?
Tirado: He reminds me of Mirabal, he reminds me but not
exactly.
Cornwell: All right. He looks a little like Mirabal?
Tirado: Yes.
Cornwell: If I skip a photograph you remember looking at, let
me know, but I jotted down some notes as you came to
them when you looked at the book. You next pointed
to number 26 and 27. Does that appear to you to be
the same man?
Tirado: Yes.
Cornwell: And who was that?
Tirado: Ernesto Lefel. He used to work with my husband.
Cornwell: Ernesto Lefel. And what's the nature of the associa-
tion between he and your husband?
Tirado: He was working with him.
Cornwell: In the architectural business?
Tirado: Yes, yes. He's a designer.
Cornwell: He's a designer?
Silvia Tirado Interview
Page 12.

Tirado: He started working with us. He learned some--

Cornwell: Is he a social acquaintance of yours in addition?

Tirado: Is what?

Cornwell: Do you know him on a social basis in addition to his being a business associate of your husband?

Tirado: No business associate. He was working for him, for Horacio.

Cornwell: Okay. That's what I meant. He was an assistant.

Tirado: Assistant.

Cornwell: All right.

Tirado: No social. Sometimes he came to our house to dinner, or something like that.

Cornwell: Next, you I believe pointed to Number 37. Is that correct? Fifty-seven?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Who does that look like?

Tirado: He looks like Gavino Fernandez.

Cornwell: What's the first name?

Tirado: Gavino.

Cornwell: Gavino? And who is he?

Tirado: Well, he's uh, dignitary, and he used to go to the Cuban Institute.

Cornwell: He was a dignitary of what?

Tirado: He was working for the Social Security and he was working, not in this Government period, in the last
one, and he was working even with the President.

Cornwell: I see, so he was a dignitary of the Mexican Government.

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Okay.

Tirado: But when he was going to the Cuban Institute, no, he didn't?

Cornwell: You also knew him from the Cuban Institute?

Tirado: He's an economist.

Cornwell: He's a what?

Tirado: Economist.

Cornwell: Economist. You then pointed to Number 55.

Tirado: Perhaps.

Cornwell: And that's a face that you're not sure you recognize?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: But looks a little bit like who?

Tirado: Solchi Vargas.

Cornwell: Solchi Vargas?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Okay. And who was she?

Tirado: She's Mexican lady who was married with a journalist, he used to work for the Cuban press, and she used to live in Cuba. And now she's at the Cuban Institute.

Cornwell: I believe you next pointed to Number 11--
Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: And that's a sort of a three-quarter shot from behind.

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Of a man you think you might recognize, is that correct?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: I'm sort of trying to recall the way you stated it when you first looked at the photographs, so if I misstated it, just correct me.

Who do you think that man may be?

Tirado: The attache, the Cuban Cultural Attache at that time, Luis Alberu.

Cornwell: Alberu?

Tirado: Alberu.

Cornwell: And then I believe you next indicated that you may recognize Photograph 115?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: And who is that?

Tirado: Luis Alberu.

Cornwell: That of course is a front and you can clearly recognize him from that photograph, is that correct?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Then, you next pointed to Photograph 133. Do you recognize that man?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Who is he?
Silvia Tirado Interview
Page 15.

Tirado: The doorman. Now I don't remember the name.

Cornwell: But he's the doorman who left Lee Harvey Oswald into the Consulate on his third visit?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: That's accurate?

Tirado: Um? ... I said yes.

Cornwell: Okay. And then I believe you pointed to photograph 138?

Tirado: Numbers 137 and 138.

Cornwell: 137 and 138. Who was that?

Tirado: I think that he was working at the Consulate in Vera Cruz?

Cornwell: And do you know what his position was at the Consulate?

Tirado: I think he was Vice Consul but I'm not really sure.

Cornwell: And which Consulate is that?

Tirado: In Vera Cruz, Cuban, the Cuban Consulate.

Cornwell: The Cuban Consulate in Vera Cruz. And I believe finally you recognized possibly the center man in the group photograph labeled 275.

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: And who do you think he is?

Tirado: An American.

Cornwell: Do you remember anything more about him?
Silvia Tirado Interview
Page 16.

Tirado: No.
Cornwell: Do you remember where you saw him?
Tirado: No.
Cornwell: Do you think you recognized the photo from a personal contact or from a picture?
Tirado: From a picture I think. I think he was an American Ambassador.
Cornwell: American Ambassador?
Tirado: Or something like that.
Cornwell: All right. And you don't have any memory what his name might be?
Tirado: No.
Cornwell: Okay. Uh... Tirado: But tell me, who is it? (Laughter.) For a change.
Cornwell: Do you recognize the man in photo 266? Yes, that's the one I want. 266?
Tirado: No. He looks like Russian.
Cornwell: Do you recognize the man in 265?
Tirado: No.
Cornwell: Do you recognize the man in 213?
Tirado: No. You're not going to tell me who's that man?
Cornwell: Not right now. (Laughter.) But maybe later.
When the assassination occurred, do you remember where you were, when you first heard the news reports?
Tirado: At the Consulate.
Cornwell: And do you know what you did at that time?
Tirado: No, it was almost noon. I mean the lunch hour, about two o'clock, or near two o'clock, and somebody came and said Kennedy was killed, and all was confusion and, uh, well, we were really sorry. Everybody came in and went out and there was confusion. All over. And then I went home to have lunch.
Cornwell: Did you speak to Horatio or anyone else prior to going home?
Tirado: I don't remember, really.
Cornwell: When you went home, was he at home?
Tirado: We used to have lunch.
Cornwell: And? As you recall, was he there on that day?
Tirado: It was my birthday so he had to be there. (Laughter.)
Cornwell: What if any conversation do you recall having with him at that time about the assassination?
Tirado: No, I don't remember. I only remember at night.
Cornwell: All right. You had a birthday party planned that night. Is that correct?
Tirado: Yes.
Cornwell: During the day, prior to the birthday party, had you received or heard as part of the news broadcast the name Lee Harvey Oswald?
Tirado: No, only in the afternoon.
Cornwell: In the afternoon, after lunch?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: After you returned to the Consulate, is that correct?

Tirado: Perhaps.

Cornwell: And at that time, did you think you remembered the name?

Tirado: It was, I think, at night, because it was in the afternoon, perhaps when they start saying about Oswald. Right? And, it was at night and uh, I don't know if I call my husband or we were in the kitchen mixing some drinks or food, I don't know, but we were in the kitchen and I told him, I think this man went to the Embassy to ask for a visa.

Cornwell: And at that time, had you heard his name?

Tirado: His name?

Cornwell: His name, seen his picture, or both?

Tirado: No, no. The picture was in the newspapers the next day.

Cornwell: Okay. So you only thought that you might have recalled the name. Is that correct?

Tirado: No, not the name, but when they say Lee Harvey Oswald, married to the Russian woman and he live in Russia, and things like that.

Cornwell: Okay. Did you have any other discussion that you can recall with him about it? Based on that news
Silvia Tirado Interview
Page 19.

report? About your contact?

Tirado: With my husband?

Cornwell: Yes.

Tirado: I only told him, I think this man came to the Em-
bassy.

Cornwell: Then, the next morning you saw a newspaper.

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Were you sure at that time that that was the man?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Do you remember who was at the birthday party that
night? Do you remember whether or not you discussed
these events with any one else at the party?

Tirado: Yes, we were talking about it.

Cornwell: Whoever was at the party.

Tirado: The whole night, yes.

Cornwell: What was the tone of the party?

Tirado: Sorrow. And speculation, what's going on? Because
with Kennedy we knew what was going on, but now,
what will happen?

Cornwell: The next morning what did you do?

Tirado: I show the paper to Horatio and told him this is the
man that went to the Embassy and I went to the Consu-
late and I look in the Archivos and I saw the ap-
plication, I saw that it was the man and I went to
the Embassy and I talked to the Ambassador and I told
him that this . . . .
Cornwell: What was the nature of your conversation with the Ambassador? Just to tell him that that was the man?

Tirado: Yes, I think so.

Cornwell: What was his name?

Tirado: Fernandez Armes (or Hernandez).

Cornwell: And, did you do anything else? Did you pull the file on him or make any other attempts to put the facts together?

Tirado: I think I leave the file with him.

Cornwell: Pulled the file and left it with the Ambassador?

Tirado: Yeah, the whole bunch.

Cornwell: What would have been in the file besides the application, if anything?

Tirado: Another applications.

Cornwell: I see, you pulled the whole file which included his application?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Did anything else happen that morning at work?

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: Then, did you go home for lunch again?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: And what occurred at that time?

Tirado: Uh, my brothers-in-law, servant, maid came and when she saw me, she cried, she started crying, and she said "You're alive?" And I say "why?" because some man
came to the house and says that uh, you had an accident and you were dead and they take away Senor Ruben to identify you." Then we went to Ruben's house and it was full of men and they catch me.

Cornwell: They caught you. Okay. And the men were representatives of the Mexican police, is that correct?

Tirado: Yeah, but they never told me.

Cornwell: What happened when you walked into the house, to Ruben's house?

Tirado: I saw my brothers-in-law, wife, and the same thing. She cries, and says "Silvia, you're okay?" "Yes, I'm okay." She was between two men and she couldn't get near to me, but I was walking and I saw in the bedroom, it was Ruben, and full of photographs on the bed and he said the same thing--"Silvia, you're okay, you're all right?" and I say "Yes" and "What happened?" Then I saw the telephone and I try to get the telephone and a man hold my hand and he says you can't call because you are under arrest, and they say, I don't remember, but they say, ah, this is the accomplice of Kennedy. I thought that's what they told but I say I don't remember. They told me, "You're under arrest." I sat down on the bed and I said "You have to show me an order signed by a judge that I am under arrest." Then they hold
I don’t know, and when they took me out of the house and I was crying, "Call the police, call the police!" I don’t know, and when they took me out of the house and I was crying, "Call the police, call the police!"

They looked at me and said, "No, I’m not the police station, the police station..."

"Why do you have an airliner in your garage?" they asked, and then they turned and left me there, and I..."
Cornwell: And who else was taken down there besides you?

Tirado: The whole—my brother-in-law, his wife, my sister-in-law, a friend of hers, another woman that was there, and me, but they were taken in another car.

Cornwell: And, at the police station, what inquiries were made of you? What did they ask?

Tirado: Everything. Everything. They asked me my name, where was I born, my jobs, when I married, my status, everything. They have my fingerprints, photographs of myself, everything. And uh, well, they ask me where I was working, if I had been in Cuba, some people that I saw in Cuba, and what I was doing at the Consulate, that there was a tunnel, that makes me laugh, it was a tunnel from the Cuban Embassy to the Russian Embassy, and uh, well, a lot of foolish questions.

Cornwell: Specifically, what did they allege that you had done?

Tirado: Nothing. They never said—

Cornwell: During the questioning on all the subject matters that you had mentioned, did they make a verbatim transcript? Did they record the conversation, or transcribe it?

Tirado: They used a little machine. They say it is a stenograph or something like that.

Cornwell: They made a stenograph record.

Tirado: Yeah, and a man was writing.
Silvia Tirado Interview
Page 24.

Cornwell: All the questions and all the answers?
Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Did any of the procedures that we have asked you about cause you to say anything to the police that was not the truth?
Tirado: No, I don't think so. I don't have nothing to hide. So...

Cornwell: Everything that you told them was the truth?
Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: At any time during the questioning did they ever allege that you had met with Oswald outside the Consulate?
Tirado: Yes. A lot of times.

Cornwell: Did they ever ask you any questions about a Negro?
Tirado: I don't remember.

Cornwell: You don't remember anything about that?
Tirado: No.

Cornwell: Did you ever know, during this same period of time, any Negroes?
Tirado: Yes. At the Commercial Attache was a Negro.

Cornwell: Anyone else?
Tirado: The doorman.

Cornwell: Anyone else?
Tirado: The wife of the Commercial Attache. And the children.

Cornwell: Is that all? Did they ask any specific questions about them?
Tirado: No.

Cornwell: What was his name?

Tirado: I don't remember. I even don't remember if he was there when Kennedy was shot.

Cornwell: Were they from Cuba?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Did you know any other Negroes from Cuba outside the Consulate?

Tirado: I don't think so. Well, this man, the boy at Consulado at Vera Cruz. He was a Negro, not completely, but--

Cornwell: The one you showed us in the photograph?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Did you know any Negroes who had red hair?

None of the ones you described did?

Tirado: No, we used to call "Red" to a boy who was working there but he was like Spanish; I mean he was white and--

Cornwell: Not even very dark skinned?

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: Remember his name?

Tirado: Rogelio, Rogelio Rodriguez, I think, something like that.

Cornwell: After the questioning, first, how did that terminate? When did they finally release you?

Tirado: About one o'clock.

Cornwell: Did you meet again with your family, your husband?
Silvia Tirado
Page 26.

Tirado: Yes. Well, they were waiting for me and... we went to have lunch, something to eat because we haven't had. And well, we talk about it.

Cornwell: Remember where you went?

Tirado: No. Horacio told me we went to Sanborn's. I don't remember. I even don't remember when I got home and what happened. Next day everyone know.

Cornwell: Did the officers from the Security Department ever suggest to you during the questioning that they had information that you and Oswald had been lovers?

Tirado: Yes, and also that we were Communists and that we were planning the Revolution and uh, a lot of false things.

Cornwell: What happened the next day?

Tirado: Well, we stayed home and at night a friend of ours came and we didn't say anything.

Cornwell: Why was that?

Tirado: Why?

Cornwell: Why did you not say anything?

Tirado: Because these people told me to keep quiet.

Cornwell: The police?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Or the officers?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Did you then go back over to the Consulate either Sunday or Monday?
Silvia Tirado
Page 27.

Tirado: On Monday.
Cornwell: Okay. What happened then?
Tirado: When I got there everybody ask me what happened?
And I say "Why?" And in the newspaper was the
this part of the question that I told you about,
Azcue telling Oswald to go away.
Cornwell: It was in the newspapers?
Tirado: Yes.
Cornwell: How did the newspapers get that story?
Tirado: I don't know.
Cornwell: You never had any idea?
Tirado: Well, of course. The police gave it to Excelsior.
It was the first government newspaper.
Cornwell: So you just always thought they got it from the
police?
Cornwell: But the people at the Consulate said they had read
the newspaper and asked you what had happened, right?
Tirado: Yes.
Cornwell: Did you discuss that with anybody that you can remem-
ber specifically?
Tirado: With the Ambassador.
Cornwell: And what was the nature of that conversation?
Tirado: I tried to repeat all the questions.
Cornwell: Okay. Uh. . .would that have been a violation of
what the police asked you to do? To talk to the
Silvia Tirado Interview
Page 23.

Ambassador about that?

Tirado: Huh?

Cornwell: Was that a violation of what the police asked you to do? Was that...?

Tirado: Well, of course. They told me to keep quiet. I never says anything about what happened on Saturday. Never. But when I saw in the papers I couldn’t say "Well, nothing happened." It was all in the paper and it was exactly what I said to the police.

Cornwell: What did the Ambassador say to you?

Tirado: That he was going to write a report and he sent it in the plane.

Cornwell: What if anything did you consider doing at the time?

Tirado: What?

Cornwell: Did you consider taking any course of action at the time?

Tirado: Oh. I was going to make a protest to the Mexican Government. We went to a friend of mine was a daughter of the Chief of Tincrath and we could reach the President and we were going to ask to explain what happened and you know, there was an illegal (tape stops)....

Cornwell: Did, in addition to your considering filing formal protest with the Mexican Government, did you also consider taking a trip out of the country?

Tirado: No.
Cornwell: Did you consider going to Cuba?

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: What happened after that?

Tirado: Well, I told to the Ambassador all that happened during the questioning and I told him also about the protest that we wanted to make and I asked him, "Don't do anything because we are trying to do something here, against these police." And after that, uh, Tuesday, I went to work and Wednesday morning when I was going to have breakfast the police came again, two agents, and they asked me, very polite, if I want to go with them, just to answer some questions. They wanted to know something. And, uh, it was unnecessary to take my car because they were going to take me and bring me back. So I called uh, the Consulate. That's why I remember I already had the telephone and I said I'm coming in late because I'm going to the police station. Okay, don't worry, we wait for you. And they keep me two days and a half.

Cornwell: And why did they tell you that they kept you this time?

Tirado: Uh, to protect me.

Cornwell: Did they tell you anything in any more detail? Was there a specific threat?
Silvia Tirado Interview
Page 10.

Tirado: No. They were very rough this time. They were very angry with me, the man that I told you, that I kicked him in his balls. He was very angry, and they repeat the same questions but they were more, how you say, how do you say anticipito?

Lopez: They anticipated her.

Tirado: And they were, wanted to know exactly what I have done in Cuba, the people that I met there, everything. They were asking me questions about all the people that were working in the Embassy and uh, this time I wanted to go to the bathroom and they wouldn't take me and it was longer, because it was about 10:00 from 10:00, I think almost 6:00, they questioned me.

Cornwell: Were you afraid during the two periods they held you?

Tirado: Yes. I don't know exactly what happened but I was uh, I was innocent. So I said, what am I doing here, no? And uh, the only thing that I have, I had the feeling that I was going to die and I said okay, if I'm going to die, I'm going to die, how you say it, with pride, my child will not be shamed. I remember I do anything that--I was very dramatic in those moments. So, sometimes I lost my temper. I never say no bad words or nothing. I cry sometimes, I shout and things like that but then I sat down again.

Cornwell: As I understand it, they tried to scare you, is that correct?
B7Z 2ZZ TT :a..SCS CO
.om :oppaT,
P'e>:SP'laUlZ'eu! Z aemsur c paPe'r-7
eaeAas
AaeA
a
aa^
s;o7;psnoDE
LLuTYp2
AaLl
al; ;c asnpoaq may mom uo7;pIzao;uT Aup pTouuqTm
noA pip os 'poo;saapLnsTt 'pena;suoos7lz aApu ;1457la
Aauq 'quaoouuT uLnou;ip 'auop ppt no) buTu;amos
ZS anoA go ;apd Au's plot
,PIP PTSC;a noA aaam ,:L-70
_1;;TmnoA p7 'ucTl25aii5 au c earlu a:; spm qpu
esnpoaq
pa;saae;u7 aaa, Ais ;pt,m spm ;ru 2S—eDaETTaMU_C,^
.saA .oppaTL
•AzapE;sTunw=D au, uT zou
aaam pup ;uap7saad au TIT'kCI paaTdsaoo zou pay noA
asouz go quaoou07 aaam noA q5no uaA2 ApNo:Tia,.;lcD
'GCZZZOUSPYZT 'aS:1000 gO
spm 1 pup
•3.u7T
.;a;aod,_T7 AaaAspm T wau
'ApauuGYTT7>cz 5uTof aaam em ;st; pup 's;sTun=woD
up;Taalut a'.3 pup s;sTunwwoDuS=zxap so s;s-u''amoo
au CC T..7'rT
91Z
TPUOTZCZZU1
UPqC au=--SZETI:CU=CD
au
';L,ax-uaaAoE
upc
au
1 ;pl; pup zua=aaAoD
SEN Z'OUZ
.ZaCZ
pGZSTSUT
ZC ZidOed ZU'eZZO01:7
;no „2sTip0oosu7 eZ1ETTaC
puP =sTunulaoDv =00
'sa.7 zI.:sTI27Dosu7 aAaTTacnoA ;no ;s7unc,=D
.V
=FCCal 7T:3Z
ZOU
ZETUnWUCD
c;5:71
;2I4 s,;pl;L
Aeqz au:7 al;Z Tip esnpoas ;L5no14
noA ;Pu mau>no ;pull
ZmauZTTez CZ PeS7;al
sLT= ;sa7g al;a :Tia.-ac
spm
ape
:o
aaau
asnpoaE
5u70;Aup
ZS-7T alqZ1 'Sap :CZ,Z.7

T6


Silvia Tirado Interview
Page 32.

Cornwell: You understand though, the kind of question I'm asking you?

(Tirado spoke to Lopez in Spanish, who asked Cornwell to repeat the question.)

Cornwell: Okay, let me just ask you a hypothetical. Sometimes, a person has done something completely innocent but then they are confronted with a very severe accusation. They may think that their innocent act will be misunderstood by their accusers so they might withhold the innocent act simply to be sure that they don't get into more trouble--

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: Simply to be sure they don't get into more trouble than they apparently are already in.

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: There was no thing that you had done or seen or knew about that you withheld because of that?

Tirado: No. No, I explain everything that they wanted to know and uh, I think sometimes they were fools.

Cornwell: They were what?

Lopez: Fools.

Cornwell: Fools.

Tirado: Tonto. Fools.

Cornwell: After they finally released you, they held you for another two, two and a half days. Did you make any
Silvia Tirado Interview
Page 11.

trips out of the country then?

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: How long did you continue to be married to Horatio after that?

Tirado: Five years.

Cornwell: Why were you finally divorced?

Tirado: We separate and we divorce perhaps four years after.

Cornwell: Why was that?

Tirado: Why? Why we divorce four years after?

Because we don't like.

Cornwell: Go ahead.

Tirado: Because he did not want to get legal problems and he said that it was a lot of problems to get divorced.

He was married once so he said that it was nonsense.

Cornwell: Why were you separated?

Tirado: Because I used to believe in the romantic love, and even we have a very, how you say that, uh, we loved each other very much but it was not the passionate love that I used to believe in, so I thought it better to divorce, get divorced. It is very difficult to explain.

(Tirado speaks to Lopez in Spanish.)

Lopez: They were incompatible, had incompatible characters.

Cornwell: You have not spoken to anybody in the news media or any official investigating body since 1963 about these events, is that correct, except for the
Washington Post and that was approximately a year or so ago, a year and a half ago?

Tirado: Yeah.

Cornwell: You indicate that you read some part of the Warren Commission Report recently. Do you recall anything about that that was inaccurate other than what you have already related? The part that you read.

Tirado: What?

Cornwell: Was there any part of that which was inaccurate that you can recall?

Tirado: What I said. That I was exceeding my duties.

Cornwell: Had you either done anything or offered to do anything for Oswald other than what you have already described to us?

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: And was that all within the scope of your responsibility?

Tirado: It was. . . .?

Cornwell: Was it all within the scope of your authority?

Tirado: Scope?

(Cornwell translates.)

Tirado: Yes.

(Cornwell speaks to Lopez in Spanish.)

Cornwell: Did you ever have any of the people at the Cuban Consulate attend parties in your home? Was there
Silvia Tirado Interview
Page 35.

a social relationship with any of them?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Which ones?

Tirado: Azcue, Maria Carmen. I think Luisa, she went once.

Cornwell: Who is that? Luisa?

Tirado: Luisa Caldaron, the one you ask me.

Cornwell: Okay. Azcue, Luisa, and the secretary who was killed, is that correct?

Tirado: Before, before this, before I used to work at the Embassy, uh, and before we move to Constituyentes we make some parties, for instance, when Armando Hart (Ph.) was here, he was the Minister of Education, and with the Ambassador he was in that time and Organa, who was Director of the Movies Institute. Some people who came from Cuba. We used to invite.

Cornwell: Okay. How about Theresa Proenza?

Tirado: Perhaps she came.

Cornwell: Did you ever receive any indication from them that any of them had ever had a contact with Oswald?

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: Did Elena or Elinita Garro de Paz ever come to those parties? In your home?

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: Or in the home of Ruben?
Tirado: Once, but it was, I think it was before that I was in the Cuban Embassy.

Cornwell: Would it have been approximately around '63?

Tirado: I don't know because when they came from France...

Cornwell: Approximately 1963?

Tirado: I only, perhaps, I don't know.

Hardway: Did you say that it was when they came from France?

Tirado: Yes.

Hardway: It was after they returned from France that they came to one of the parties?

Tirado: Yeah, to Ruben's house.

Hardway: At Ruben's house.

Tirado: Yeah. That was the whole family there.

I only saw Elena a few times. One was the day that I got married and another time was somewhere else, I think three times I only saw her.

Cornwell: Did you know General Clark Flores?

Tirado: Yeah, but not very well.

Cornwell: Was he ever at those parties?

Tirado: I don't remember. Perhaps once, at Ruben's house but not at my house.

Cornwell: Did you know Emilio Carbillido?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Did he ever attend those parties?

Tirado: I don't remember.
Silvia Tirado Interview
Page 37.

Cornwell: Did Devaci?
Tirado: Devaci. Elena's sister.
Cornwell: Did she attend those parties?
Tirado: No, she went, I think I saw her sometimes at the Embassy.
Cornwell: How about Eunice Odio?
Tirado: No. I know her, I mean I met her sometime. But, no. She was not a close friend.
Cornwell: Over the years, have any of those people ever indicated to you that they had any knowledge of Oswald's trip to Mexico City?
Tirado: No.
Cornwell: Have they ever professed to have either seen him or heard any stories about any one who did see or meet with him?
Tirado: No.
Cornwell: Has anyone else ever come to you since 1963 and professed to have knowledge of Oswald's trip to Mexico City?
Tirado: No.
Cornwell: Would you have any reason to believe that if we spoke to any of those people they could have information of help to us?
Tirado: I don't know.
Cornwell: Have you ever had any association with any intelligence agency of any country, including our own?
Tirado: Once I met a Russian when I was working at the Press Agency but he was from the Russian Press, and they say that he was from the police, the Russian Police but I don't know.

Cornwell: But you just met him one time?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: I don't have any additional questions.

Lopez: I have a few questions of Ms. Duran. As normal procedure, when a person came to the Cuban Consulate, do you explain to them that there are different types of visas?

Tirado: No.

Lopez: So they would normally come to you and ask you for a special type of visa, and then you would get that kind of application?

Tirado: Uh, huh.

Lopez: Okay.

Tirado: The application was the same.

Lopez: Same application. But they were different visas.

Tirado: There were only two visas. Transit visa and normal visa.

Lopez: You didn't normally explain to people whether there were two different types of visas when they came to you until after--

Tirado: Perhaps.
Lopez: Okay. I just wanted to read to you a couple of sections of what was recorded in the Warren Commission Report. What happened was, there was a report given by the Mexican authorities to the Warren Commission and it was published in the report and let me read you one sentence, okay?

The declarant complied with her duties, took down all the information and completed the appropriate application form, and the declarant admittedly, exceeding her responsibilities, informally telephoned the Russian Consulate with the intention of doing what she could to facilitate issuance of the Russian visa to Lee Harvey Oswald. Is that statement accurate?

Tirado: It's that one and I don't like it. The other one?

Lopez: That part about admittedly exceeding her responsibilities?

Tirado: Uh huh.

Cornwell: That's the part you had reference to earlier when you told us that you had read something--

Tirado: Yes.

Lopez: It says here that you telephoned the Russian Consulate.

Tirado: Yes.

Lopez: Did he ever telephone you back?

Tirado: No.

Lopez: Okay. And it says here with the intention of doing what she could to facilitate issuance of the Russian visa. Did you ever do anything else to facilitate the issuance of the visa?
Silvia Tirado Interview
Page 40.

Tirado: No, nothing. I couldn't do anything.

Lopez: Did you ever explain to him that in order to get a visa he could have a recommendation letter from a fellow Communist or a fellow Cuban citizen, and then if he had that letter, he could get a visa?

Tirado: Yeah, that was one of the requirements.

Lopez: And then, did you ever send him to anyone, give him the name of anybody?

Tirado: No, never. I mean I never did that.

Lopez: I see. Okay. Then there's another section here that says:

However, they told her (this is the Russian Consulate) that there would be a delay of about four months in processing the case.

Was that the first time that you explained to Lee Harvey Oswald that it would take him about four months to get a visa?

Tirado: Yes, I didn't know it.

Lopez: Was that when he became angry?

Tirado: More or less.

Lopez: More or less. And that would have been on his third visit?

Tirado: Yes.

Lopez: Okay. Then there's one other section here. It says:

The Consulate who came out and began a heated discussion in English with Oswald, that concluded by Acue telling him that if it were up to him he would not give him the visa and a person of this type was harming
the Cuban Revolution rather than helping it. It being understood that in the conversation they were talking about the Russian Socialist Revolution and not the Cuban.

Is that correct?

Tirado: No.

Lopez: What is your understanding of that?

Tirado: The conversation that he had with Azcue, was exclusively with the Cuban Revolution.

Lopez: Exclusively with the Cuban Revolution.

I wanted to ask you, in this report here, they don't say how many times Lee Harvey Oswald visited the Cuban Consulate. Did you ever tell the Mexican officials how many times he had visited?

Tirado: I think so.

Lopez: And it was probably taken down by a stenographer.

Tirado: Yes.

Lopez: Do you consider this report which is about a page long to be completely fair and accurate and complete?

Tirado: No, because about exceeding my duties and about Azcue speaking about the Russian Revolution, that's not true.

Lopez: But, my question is, they interrogated you from about four in the afternoon until about twelve at night, and in that process you spoke to them for eight whole hours and yet the whole conversation, interrogation, has been reduced to one page. Do you consi-
Silvia Tirado Interview
Page 42.

der this accurate? Is it complete?

Tirado: No, of course not. Because they ask me a lot of
questions that has not been in the Warren—about my
trip to Cuba, about my job at the Institute, the
Cuban Institute, about why I have been Communist, as
they say, and I say I'm not a Communist, and it takes
hours to explain them. And as you explain you are not
a Communist, if you are a member of the Communist
Party, things like that, and where did you take
your beliefs, no? I say at the University, oh, at
the University, and then there's a discussion and
uh, the classes I take at the University, and things
like that.

Lopez: Okay. You do remember telling the Mexican officials
when they questioned you how many times Oswald visited
the Consulate?

Tirado: I think so. And I, they asked me I don't know how
many times, the way that I used to give my name and
telephone number and they made me write and they take
the paper out and then again, they ask me, how do you
do this, and I write it down, and I give the paper.
I think I did it five or six times.

Lopez: And did they ever ask you to describe Oswald?

Tirado: Yes.

Lopez: Would you do me a favor and describe him for me now?
Silvia Tirado Interview
Page 42.

Tirado: Yes.

Lopez: For example, let's start at the beginning. Was he tall, short?

Tirado: Short.

Lopez: Short. Could you stand up for a minute, Gary?

(Laughter.)

Would you say he was as tall as Gary?

Tirado: Yeah, more or less.

Lopez: Would you say he was taller than Gary?

Tirado: No, I think just the same. He was about my size.

Lopez: About your height?

Tirado: Yeah.

Lopez: Okay. And what's your height?

Tirado: 160. I think 160 or 162.

Lopez: Was he skinny?

Tirado: Yes. Skinny.

Lopez: Could you estimate how much he weighed?

Tirado: About your weight, more or less.

Lopez: About my weight. We already went over... .

Tirado: He has stronger shoulders, perhaps, than yours.

Lopez: Just for the record, my weight is 119 pounds. You told us before he had a suit on.

Tirado: That I don't remember very well. I think he was wearing a jacket but what I can remember is that he was not wearing nice clothes, expensive clothing.
He was cheap, perhaps.

Lopez: Do you remember what his nose looked like? Was it skinny? Fat?

Tirado: No. He was normal. There was nothing that you may remember. The eyes were small.

Lopez: Small eyes.

Tirado: Smaller than yours.

Lopez: Smaller than mine, for the record. I can't do that.

Tirado: If you describe, you say small eyes.

Cornwell: Okay. In sum, you identified a picture in the book as being as best as you can remember his face and hair. Was there anything about that which in your memory was different from the picture other than the fact that you do remember his eyes being blue or green and his hair being very light colored or blond but not as light as some of the other pictures look.

Tirado: And he has not very much. He was, has few, poco pelo.

Lopez: He didn't have very much hair.

Cornwell: Is there anything else about that picture in the book which does not look like your memory of him?

Tirado: No, but because even when I saw the television when he was shot, I used to remember him. I mean it was the same that I remember.

Lopez: I understand. If you bear with me just a few more minutes--his hair line, was it receding?
Tirado: Yeah, yeah. Quite a bit.
Lopez: Okay. And his cheeks, were they high cheek bones or low cheek bones? Do you remember that?
Tirado: Well, I remember that he was a little, I don't know what you call it (spoke with Lopez in Spanish.)
Lopez: An elongated face.
Tirado: Uh huh.
Lopez: Did he have a long chin?
Tirado: No.
Lopez (To Cornwall): Do you have any more questions about his description?
Lopez (To Duran): Just wanted to ask you a few other questions. Did Luis Aparicio ever attend any of those twist parties that you had, or that Ruben had?
Tirado: No. Ruben never, Ruben never have parties for the people at the Embassy.
Lopez: Did he ever attend?
Tirado: Aparicio, he was, I don't remember, where he was, I think he works in the Commercial Office. I don't remember.
Lopez: You don't remember if he went to any parties?
Tirado: No. But he was at the Cuban Embassy.
Lopez: Okay. Do you know a person named Eunice Odio?
Tirado: Yes.
Lopez: What was your relationship to Eunice Odio?
Tirado: It was not close. I know her because she's a poetess and uh, well, I know a lot of painters, things like that, but just hello and... perhaps if I meet her now I don't know if I could recognize or even she recognize me.

Lopez: I see. And did she ever attend any of those parties?
Tirado: No.

Lopez: Do you know a person named Ricardo Guerra?
Tirado: Yes.

Lopez: And what was your relationship to him?
Tirado: Very close.

Lopez: Very close. Could you elaborate?
Tirado: Well, when I was unmarried I had a lot of friends and his sisters were friends of mine, that's when I met him, before I got married. And when I married, we continued our friendship and uh, he got married with a writer, but I admire her very much, and he was a very close friend of mine, and we continue the relation all the time that we were married. Both. And uh, he was professor at the philosophy faculty, he was my teacher also. I mean he was a close friend.

Lopez: I see. He was a professor, you said.
Tirado: Yes.

Lopez: Did you ever attend any seminars at the University of Mexico where he was lecturing?
Silvia Tirado Interview
Page 47.

Tirado: No, we used to have in our house.
Lopez: What were those seminars about?
Tirado: Marxism seminar.
Lopez: You never, though, attended any seminars at the University of Mexico?
Tirado: No, he was a teacher and I used to take lessons with him. Existentialism, you know? (Spoke in Spanish.) Only two courses.
Lopez: Do you know if he ever held seminars at the University of Mexico?
Tirado: He had to.
Lopez: By any chance do you remember if he would ever hold seminars on Saturdays?
Tirado: No.
Lopez: No, he did not or no, you do not remember?
Tirado: I don't know, I don't know.
Hardway: I've just got a few questions that if you'll bear with me...
During the three times that you met Oswald, did you ever hear him speak any language other than English?
Tirado: No.
Hardway: In general, in the Consulate's Office, was it common for any other language other than Spanish to be spoken?
Tirado: No.

Hardway: Was Russian ever commonly spoken at the Consulate's Office?

Tirado: No.

Hardway: Do you remember anyone having spoken Russian in that office?

Tirado: No.

Hardway: At any time?

Tirado: No, I don't think. The only language they speak, it was English, and not everybody, just a few of them.

Hardway: When Oswald came back the third time, did he tell you that he had a Russian visa or that the Russians had told him that there wouldn't be any problem?

Tirado: That he was going to get the Russian visa, that there was no problem.

Hardway: Did he tell you that he was going to get it, or that he already had it?

Tirado: He said I already got it.

Hardway: And he told you that he already had it as opposed to telling you that they had assured him that there was no problem?

Tirado: Yes.

Hardway: Could you tell me what Eusebio Azcue thought about John Fitzgerald Kennedy, President Kennedy?

Tirado: What he thought? About the assassination?
Silvia Tirado Interview
Page 49

Hardway: No, about President Kennedy.

Tirado: I don't know, I don't remember.

Hardway: Did you ever discuss President Kennedy with

Consul Azcue?

Tirado: No, he was not here when Kennedy was killed.

Hardway: I'm asking not about the assassination but about

Kennedy and his policies and things like that.

Tirado: No.

Hardway: Did you ever hear Azcue discuss it with anyone

else?

Tirado: No.

Hardway: Did--

Lopez: Have you seen Azcue since 1963?

Tirado: I don't remember if he came. His son came, and

I don't remember if he came once to Mexico and he

told me about the conversation that he had with

Fidel Castro but I told you the other day what

Fidel says and all of that and the way they write

a protest to Mexico, to the Mexican Government,

but I'm not really sure if he was his son, or if he

was Azcue.

Lopez: Would you have seen Azcue at any time during the last
two years?

Tirado: No, I think that I never saw him again.

His son, he came, I saw him, but, Azcue, I don't remember.

Lopez: Do you know if Eusebio Azcue is still in Cuba?
Silvia Tirado Interview
Page 50.

Tirado: I think so. I don't know.

Hardway: Did you ever discuss with Consul Azcue the policies of United States towards Cuba? Or other Latin American countries?

Tirado: Perhaps we did, but I don't remember.

Hardway: Do you remember by chance what Azcue's views would have been on that? Did you ever discuss Azcue's views on changing that policy?

Tirado: What I remember is that during the blockade (spoke to Lopez in Spanish.)


The strike. I'm sorry. The economic blockade.

Tirado: What I remember but I don't remember exactly if it was Azcue, the Commercial Attache, the Ambassador, but what I remember, it was all the people, they have expectations and they were how you say, trusting, that with Kennedy, the policy of the American Government was changing. They were hoping...

Hardway: Did you or anyone else at the Consulate ever offer Lee Harvey Oswald any aid of any kind?

Tirado: No.

Hardway: Did you ever know a person by the name of Guillermo Ruiz?

Tirado: No.

Hardway: Just for the record, when you were arrested on that Saturday afternoon, what time that arrest was, approximately?
Tirado: About three o'clock.

Hardway: Was the interrogation that was conducted at that time transcribed or taped?

Tirado: It was written and when I sign I read it.

Hardway: Was it written out in a summary form or was it written out as you said it?

Tirado: They change, because once it was a man with a little machine, and another moment it was a man writing, typing.

Hardway: But most of it was taken down literally, as you said it?

Tirado: And with the typewriter.

Hardway: Did you sign that which was taken down as you said it? Or did you sign a summary of that?

(Lopez translated.)

Tirado: No, no, no. They were typing, all the time. They were typing all the time, even once, I don't know how many times, they told me, slow, because he was writing. But they didn't write exactly what I said sometimes because when I read all of that bunch of papers they say, come on, it's one o'clock, here, sign this. I said, no, I'm not going to sign this if I not read it. And sometimes I said this, I didn't say that. For instance, no? For instance, I'd remember, they say she was very, very glad when Kennedy came. And I say no. I said I like it but I didn't say that I was
very, very glad. Things like that, no? But almost, it was what I said. But they didn't want
to change anything.

Hardway: Okay. Did you ever discuss the allegation that
they made that you had been Lee Harvey Oswald's lover
with your husband?

Tirado: Well, I told him almost all what happened. He told
me what they did to him and I told him what they did to me.

Hardway: Do you remember specifically talking about that spe-
cific allegation with your husband?

Tirado: No, it was not important.

Hardway: Going back to when you recognized Oswald, the
man whose picture you had seen in the paper as the
man who had been at the Embassy three times. Were
you certain that the man in the papers was the same
man, before you checked your records at the Archives?

Tirado: Yes. Immediately I saw the paper, I told him. This
was the man that I want to check.

Hardway: To your knowledge, was Horatio ever a member of the
Communist Party?

Tirado: I think that he was, I don't know if he was exactly
member, but he was sympathizer and we had a lot of
friends that they were members of the Communist Party.

Hardway: Uh, to your knowledge, was Horatio ever a member of
any intelligence organization?
Silvia Tirado Interview
Page 113.

Tirado: I don’t remember exactly. I think he was working
for the, how you say that? I think he was in a cam-
paign. Against the drugs.

Hardway: Do you know when that would have been?

Tirado: No.

Hardway: Do you know when he would have been a sympathizer
for, with the Communist Party?

Tirado: I think it was before we got married.

Tirado: Well, I’m completely sure. Being Communist, being
policeman. All of that, it was after I meet him.

Hardway: Do you know why--

Tirado: I mean before I meet him.

Hardway: Do you know why they asked you to keep quiet after
the first interrogation?

Tirado: No, I don’t.

Hardway: Did you ever attend a party where Lee Harvey Oswald
was present?

Tirado: The party where Lee, no, I don’t know that he attends
some parties.

Hardway: The question was, did you ever attend a party where
he was present?

Tirado: No.

Hardway: That’s all I’ve got.
Sylvia Tirado Interview
Page 114.

Cornwell: Just two brief matters and I promise we will end this very long questioning session.
The questions which were just asked you about which languages he spoke, by Mr. Hardway, when the call was made to the Russian Embassy, what language was spoken there?

Tirado: Spanish.

Cornwell: Did the Russians speak Spanish too?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Did at any point in that conversation Russian-speaking people get involved? Did anyone at the Russian Embassy speak Russian to you?

Tirado: I don't speak Russian.

Cornwell: Well. I understand that. Did you at any point put Oswald on the phone and let him talk?

Tirado: No, no.

Cornwell: The reason I'm asking of course is to try to jog your memory. Did he at any point in that transaction speak Russian? Did Oswald speak Russian that you recall?

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: The second question, just to be sure that we've got your memory as accurate as we can on it, have you not spoken to Azcue at all since 1963?
Silvia Tirado Interview

Page 33.

Tirado: That's something that I don't exactly remember. If he came once or if he was with his son, but I knew all about Fidel's and Azcue's conversations.

Cornwell: So you do remember either talking to Azcue or his son about the Oswald trip?

Tirado: Not the Oswald trip, the Fidel, what he says. Because Azcue was called by Fidel Castro in that day when the Cuban Ambassador sent my report. That's what I told you the other day. In the same day they speak to Azcue, Fidel, they spoke, they have a conversation, and then on the second day, that Sunday present, they protest to Mexican Ambassador.

Cornwell: You described to us earlier how the Ambassador filed a report. Did you ever see the report?

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: Do you know what was in it by any other means? To the best of your knowledge, it would at least have

(Tape ends.)
Sylvia Tirado (Duran)
Page 1.

Cornwell: Okay. The first part of your memory is that, as I understand it, the Ambassador filed a report within three days or so after the assassination and your arrest, right?

Then you mentioned something about Fidel talking to Ascue. Is that correct?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: How did you learn that?

Tirado: That's what I don't remember.

Cornwell: Okay. At any rate, what can you remember about the nature of that contact? Between Ascue and Fidel?

Tirado: Fidel asked him what happened exactly that day in the Consulate and Ascue tried to remember everything and he said what he knew, that Fidel was afraid of uh, if I was going to say something false to, because I was threatened by the police, and uh, Ascue says that no, that I was honest and I was not going to do anything false. That that was not the right thing, the truth.

Cornwell: Okay. In other words, Fidel was worried about the possibility that you would say something against the Cuban Government?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: And that's because you were a Mexican citizen, is that correct?
Tirado: And I was, . . . (asked Lopez how to translate) threatened.

Cornwell: Okay. So he was afraid that the Mexican authorities might threaten you and that you might say something against the Cuban Government?

Tirado: Yeah. Because the police many times told me, you have to say the truth. Remember that you have a little child. And . . . remember, you have a daughter. And remember you have a daughter. All the time they were telling me this.

Cornwell: Okay. Did you possess any information that might have incriminated the Cuban Government?

Tirado: No.

Cornwell: And you can't remember how it is that you learned about this questioning of Azcue by Fidel, is that right?

Tirado: Yeah.

Cornwell: Then, several years later, you had another conversation with either Azcue or his son, is that correct?

Tirado: Yes.

Cornwell: Do you think it might have been Azcue?

Tirado: Could be.

Cornwell: Is that when you learned about his conversations with Fidel?

Tirado: Yes.
Did you have any reason to believe the means you spoke of with the police were correct?

No, I don't know. I only knew what I heard from the police.

You believe in the man who has been seen about the area with a specific description and who has been seen in the neighborhood with a specific description?

Yes, I believe in the man who has been seen about the area with a specific description and who has been seen in the neighborhood with a specific description.

There was a man who was not on television news. Did he say anything about that?

Yes, Mr. Cornell, three years later.

Do you think a case like this one is a common occurrence?

Yes, I do think a case like this one is a common occurrence.

I don't think a case like this one is a common occurrence.

Yes, I think a case like this one is a common occurrence.
Sylvia Tirado
Page 4.

Cornwell: Did you see him being killed by Ruby on television?

Tirado: Yes, yes.

Cornwell: Was there anything about him that looked different to you?

Tirado: No. It was black and white. So I couldn't see the color. But he looks like the one that I met.

Cornwell: Guess that's all the questions and thank you again for being so patient with us and answering all of our endless questions.

Lopez: It is 9:15 p.m.

br 7-6-73
Mr. Cornwell. Also there is a diagram which is made reference to in the transcript. We might mark that separately as F-440B, and with your permission, also enter that in the record, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the record.

[The information follows:]
Exhibit #1
Prepared by Sylvia Duran, 6/26/78.
Mr. CORNWELL. The early portion of the transcript simply established her present name, that her name in 1963 was Sylvia Tirado Duran, the fact that the tape recording of the interview began at 5:45 in the afternoon, and that her birthday is November 22, 1937.

We might ask that those who have transcripts—there were copies provided both for the press and the public and to the committee, if you would turn to page 5, we will begin the tape recording at the top of page 5 of the transcript.

[Tape recording was played.]

Mr. CORNWELL. At that point, Mrs. Tirado did make a sketch of the consulate which is now part of the record. We would ask, however, that we now move to page 19 of the transcript and continue her testimony at that point, near the bottom of page 19.

[Tape recording was played.]

Mr. CORNWELL. At this point, Mr. Chairman, we would ask that we turn to page 25 of the transcript, beginning near the bottom.

[Tape recording was played.]

Mr. CORNWELL. We next ask, Mr. Chairman, that we turn to page 45, or 40, excuse me, near the top of the page.

[Tape recording was played.]

Mr. CORNWELL. At this point, Mr. Chairman, I would ask that we turn to page 47, near the top portion of the page.

[Tape recording was played.]

Mr. CORNWELL. I next ask, Mr. Chairman, that we turn to page 54, toward the middle or slight upper portion of the page.

[Tape recording was resumed.]

Mr. CORNWELL. And the final portion of the tape recording, Mr. Chairman, begins on the following page, which is labeled page 1 of tape 2.

[Tape recording was resumed.]

Mr. CORNWELL. Mr. Chairman, we also, while we were in Mexico, spoke to Mr. Horacio Duran. That is the man who is displayed in the blue coat, in JFK exhibit F-432, and who was Sylvia Duran's husband in 1953. We also spoke to Ruben Duran, who is Horacio's brother, and who is displayed in the white shirt in JFK exhibit F-431. And to Betty Serratos, the lady on the left in the array of JFK exhibits, numbered F-430, and who was the wife of Ruben.

Each of those individuals was, of course, around Sylvia, spoke to her during the traumatic events after the assassination of the President. And each of them provided information to us of substantially the same nature in all significant respects as that which you have just heard in the tape recording of Sylvia Duran.

We would ask at this time that those three exhibits be placed into evidence.

Chairman STOKES. Without objection, they may be entered into the record at this point.

[The information follows:]
Mr. Fauntroy. Would the gentleman yield, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from the District of Columbia.
Mr. Fauntroy. I take it that their statements are also a part of the record, a part of our files.
Mr. Cornwell. They are part of the files of the committee, that is correct.
Mr. Fauntroy. Thank you.
Chairman Stokes. Is counsel finished?
Mr. Cornwell. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Stokes. The Chair recognizes Professor Blakey.
Mr. Blakey. Mr. Chairman, the next witness to be called is Eusebio Azcue Lopez. Mr. Azcue was the Cuban consul in Mexico City in September 1963 who informed the individual who visited the consulate and gave his name as Lee Harvey Oswald that he would not be issued a visa to Cuba. Senor Azcue is presently living in retirement in Cuba. It would be appropriate at this time, Mr. Chairman, to call Senor Azcue.
Chairman Stokes. Prior to calling the witness, the Chair will once again advise that this particular witness, due to security reasons, we are requesting that all persons remain in their seats any time the witness comes into the hearing room or at any time that the witness is leaving the hearing room. We ask that all persons please cooperate with those arrangements with the committee.
At this time the committee calls Mr. Azcue.
The Chair requests first that the interpreter please stand and be sworn.
Sir, do you solemnly swear that the testimony you interpret before the committee will be a truthful and accurate interpretation of the testimony of the witness to the best of your ability?
Mr. Anthony J. Hervas. I do.
Chairman Stokes. Thank you. I would ask that the witness be sworn.
Mr. Azcue, please raise your right hand. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you will give before this committee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Senor Azcue [through the interpreter]. Yes, sir.
Chairman Stokes. Thank you. You may be seated.
Does counsel desire to be heard prior to the witness testifying?
Mr. Standard. Yes; with the Chairman's permission. My name is Michael Standard of the law firm of Rabinowitz, Boudin & Standard of New York.
Mr. Cornwell. Excuse me, Mr. Standard. Would you mind moving the microphone so we can make a record of your statement.
Mr. Standard. For the past 17 years the office has represented the legal interests of the Government of Cuba in the United States.
To my immediate left sits Sr. Eusebio Azcue, the witness. To his left sits Sr. Ricardo Escartin, first secretary and consul of the Cuban Interest Section in Washington; and to his left, Capt. Felipe Villa, of the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Cuba.
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I appear here today in two capacities. One, to reflect the view of the Cuban Government that the assassination of President John F. Kennedy
was an act of the vilest kind, an act unacceptable by any standards of human and political behavior.

Both at the time of the convening of the Warren Commission and today, the Cuban Government has cooperated to the fullest extent in providing what information it has at its disposal to the U.S. authorities investigating the event.

Second, to accompany two former consuls of the Republic of Cuba who were present in Mexico City in the period September 1963 through August 1964, both of whom appear today of their own volition, and as a result of the Cuban Government's decision to provide the Congress of the United States with the testimony of such witnesses as may aid in the process of gathering evidence regarding the assassination.

On the day following the assassination, President Castro, in a speech televised to the people of Cuba, and devoted exclusively to the implications for his country, said, and I quote:

"It is in the interest of the American people and all the people of the world that it be known that it be demanded what is really behind the Kennedy assassination, that all the facts be revealed.

On April 3, 1978 members and staff of this committee had an extensive interview with President Fidel Castro in Havana. President Castro made it abundantly clear, and I quote from the transcript of the interview:

"We are very much interested in having Kennedy's assassination clarified because in one way or the other attempts have been made to try to have Cuba involved in it. We have our conscience clear. There is nothing as important as having your conscience clean—absolutely clean. That's why it is not a matter of conscience, but rather a matter of political, historical interest to have all these problems clarified.

It is in that context, and with that hope, that Senors Azcue and Mirabal appear here today. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you, counsel.

The Chair at this time recognizes Mr. Gary Cornwell.

TESTIMONY OF SENOR EUSEBIO AZCUE LOPEZ, FORMER CUBAN CONSUL IN MEXICO CITY

[The examination of Senor Azcue was conducted through the interpreter.]

Mr. CORNWELL. Would you state your name for the record.

Senor Azcue. Eusebio Azcue Lopez.

Mr. CORNWELL. Senor Azcue, you are presently a resident and a citizen of Cuba, is that correct?

Senor Azcue. Yes, sir.

Mr. CORNWELL. What is your age?

Senor Azcue. 67.

Mr. CORNWELL. And where were you born?

Senor Azcue. Havana, Cuba.

Mr. CORNWELL. You are presently retired?

Senor Azcue. Yes, sir, I am retired.

Mr. CORNWELL. In 1963, what was your occupation?

Senor Azcue. Consul of Cuba in Mexico, Mexico City.

Mr. CORNWELL. Senor Azcue, when did you first go to live in Mexico prior to 1963?

Senor Azcue. In 1944.
Mr. CORNWELL. What was the basic nature of your occupation between that date and 1963?

Senor AZCUE. I was an architect in Mexico before the triumph of the revolution. At the time the revolution triumphed, I was requested to take charge of the Cuban consulate in Mexico City.

Mr. CORNWELL. For how long a period of time or until what date did you hold that position?

Senor AZCUE. Until November 18, 1963, though since the month of September of 1963 I had started to turn over affairs to the new consul who was to replace me, Mr. Alfredo Mirabal.

Mr. CORNWELL. And on November 18, 1963, when you did ultimately turn over that position to Senor Mirabal, where did you go?

Senor AZCUE. I went directly and definitively to Havana.

Mr. CORNWELL. I would like to direct your attention to an exhibit which has been marked for identification as JFK exhibit F-408. That exhibit is provided in an enlargement form, and a photograph of it in a smaller form has been handed to the witness.

Can you tell us what type of document that is?

Senor AZCUE. This form is a request that was given to foreigners who approached the consulate requesting a visa to travel to Cuba.

Mr. CORNWELL. May we have that exhibit admitted into evidence, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman STOKES. Without objection, it may be entered in the record at this point.

[The information follows:]
Mr. CORNWELL. Senor Azcue, can you tell us, do you recognize that document?

Senor AZCUE. Yes; it is a document that we used at the consulate to be completed at the request of the applicant.

Mr. CORNWELL. The document bears the date 1963. Would you tell us what function that document served during that period of time.

Senor AZCUE. This document?

Mr. CORNWELL. That is correct.

Senor AZCUE. We had large amounts of printed forms of this nature, of these applications, and they had to be completed in sextuplicate, that is to say six copies of this document, to which were attached their photographs. They had to affix their signatures, as well as provide all the detailed information that was required to accompany the request.

Mr. CORNWELL. Senor Azcue, this particular document bears the name Lee Harvey Oswald, and the date September 27, 1963. Do you recall the occasion upon which this application was filed with your consulate?

Senor AZCUE. Fine. This gentleman wants me to narrate the antecedents of the visits of this individual to the consulate. Is that the nature of the question?

Mr. CORNWELL. That is correct. If you recall the occasion on which this specific application was filed, would you describe that occasion for us.

Senor AZCUE. Certainly, with pleasure. Yes, this gentleman appeared on the date indicated at the consulate, requesting a visa to travel to Cuba. This gentleman was referred to, as was the usual practice in the consulate, to Mrs. Sylvia Duran, a Mexican citizen, who was responsible for handling these contacts with persons applying for such visas.

Mr. CORNWELL. Senor Azcue, in a previous interview with the staff you stated that the very first occasion to your memory on which you saw this individual was 1 to 2 days before the date on this application. Is that still accurate to the best of your memory?

Senor AZCUE. It is something that I cannot state categorically. I cannot state whether it was on the very same day, a day before, or several days before, and I am in a position to explain why.

Mr. CORNWELL. Please do.

Senor AZCUE. He approaches us. The secretary normally takes care of the case. There is no need for me personally to go out to see him unless he specifically requests that I do so, as a special case, that he requests either my presence or the presence of another Cuban consul responsible. He did so. He requested my presence because when he initially formulated the application with the secretary, the secretary explained to him all of the requirements that he would have to fulfill in order to obtain the visa. And as he was carrying along certain documents which he believed would be sufficient for the visa, and the secretary could not resolve the case, he then calls upon me to see whether I, upon examination of those documents, can proceed to issue the visa immediately. I answered negatively.

The documents that he submits are not enough. He is exhibiting or producing documents such as, one, attesting to his membership
in the U.S. Communist Party. Also another indicating that he is a member of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. Also another document indicating his residence in the Soviet Union, as well as a marriage certificate to a Soviet citizen.

Upon presentation of these documents, he thinks that I will be able to solve his problem and grant him a visa.

I at that time tell him that this is not sufficient; that I must request authorization from the Cuban Government. And at that point he agrees to proceed to fill the application out in order to process the visa.

At that point, he leaves the consulate, conceivably to look for some photographs. One could think whether he returned on that very same date with the photographs; it is possible that he might have returned on that very same date with the photographs, or that he might have returned the following day.

As far as the date that appears herein, and bearing in mind that I received him on three occasions, maybe it would be possible to determine that on this very same date, it is possible, I cannot fully guarantee this, it is possible that on that same day he might have made the first two visits to the consulate; one during the morning very early, and the second one a little later, bringing the photographs in order to complete the application.

There is a sufficient time for such a thing.

Mr. CORNWELL. Was the first visit of this man that you have just described to us during the normal working hours at the consulate?

Senor Azcúe. Yes, without a doubt. The consulate opened at 10 in the morning and closed at 2.

Mr. CORNWELL. Directing your attention, then, to the second occasion on which, as you have just described, the individual returned with photographs which could be attached to the visa application, what occurred on that second occasion?

Senor Azcúe. I did not assist. I was not present at the very time when the secretary receives the photograph and fills the documents. That is a function that pertains properly to her. He very probably insisted once again on the need to proceed urgently to Cuba or to transit Cuba.

As the amount of time required to process this document by our own Government was one that I could not predetermine, it could be a matter of 15 days, 20 days, or the response could be negative, during this second visit that he makes to me I bring up or note that if he already had a visa to go to the Soviet Union, I would be in a position to grant him a visa to Cuba without the need to consult my Government, in terms of a transit to the Soviet Union.

This should have been clearly stated or established during the course of the second visit that he made. Whether it might have been on the same day or 2 days thereafter, I tend to believe that it will have been on the date that appears on the application, that is to say on the 27th.

Mr. CORNWELL. So the second occasion that you have just described would have been the date on the visa application, September 27, is that correct?

Senor Azcúe. That is very correct.

Mr. CORNWELL. At the termination of the conversation on this occasion, what if anything did the individual do?
Senor Azcue. I believe, and this is something I think, that he left or withdrew from the consulate, and we can imagine or conclude that he attempted to obtain a visa from the Soviet Union, because he was a resident of the Soviet Union and he was married to a Soviet citizen, according to what he stated.

Mr. Cornwell. After he left on this second occasion, did you have any conversations with the Soviet Embassy about this routine, in other words, about the possibility of him obtaining a visa from the Soviet Embassy?

Senor Azcue. I don’t know whether it was that very same day or on the following day. A few years have gone by since, and it is very difficult to determine or recall exactly the manner in which the events occurred exactly. It is possible to reconstruct a sequence.

It could have been that very same day or the following day. But obviously if the first two visits took place on the 27th, the third visit would have had to take place on the following day, because in and during the same day it is not possible to complete three visits that are separated by time, and at the same time to undertake the necessary actions to obtain the photographs we needed.

In fact, after he left the consulate, I received a telephone call from the consulate of the Soviet Union. I cannot guarantee whether it was on that very same day or on the following day. But whatever day it might have been, the consulate of the Soviet Union gets in touch with me over the phone. And the consul tells me that apparently the documents that he is exhibiting or producing attesting to his residence in the Soviet Union and his marriage certificate with the Soviet citizen are apparently legal, are correct, and he believes that they are correct. But without a doubt he cannot issue the visa without consulting Moscow.

Consequently, I cannot, in turn, grant him a visa to transit Cuba without consulting the Government. That was the content of my telephone conversation with the Soviet consulate.

Mr. Cornwell. After that conversation, did you again see the individual, did he return to the consulate?

Senor Azcue. Yes, sir. That was the third and last time I saw him. He possibly thinking that his documents had been legalized orally, verbally, that I would consequently change my attitude and in view of the legality of the document would grant him the visa; these were his hopes. And in addition one noticed that he was very anxious that we grant him the visa, because we never had any individual that was so insistent or persistent, in spite of our refusals which were logical and legal.

Mr. Cornwell. Did all three of these visits occur during normal working hours at the consulate?

Senor Azcue. We never received anybody, any individual, outside these regular office hours.

Mr. Cornwell. As I understood your testimony, the first visit may or may not have been on September 27. The second visit was most probably on September 27. And the third visit would have been most probably on a day afterward, is that correct?

Senor Azcue. That is correct. I believe that on the 27th, that was the day that the application was completed. I have no doubt about it.
The first visit, however, could have been that very same day, earlier in the day. And the third visit could have taken place the following day or could have been on the same 27th if the first visit had taken place on the 26th.

But my private opinion, the first two visits took place on the 27th and the last one, after my conversation with the Soviet consul, was on the following day, that is to say September 28.

I believe this would be the most reasonable thing if one were to analyze it.

Mr. CORNWELL. September 27, 1963, was a Friday. Does that mean that the third visit could have occurred on the following Saturday?

Senor AZCUE. On Saturday, exactly.

Mr. CORNWELL. The consulate was open on Saturday.

Senor AZCUE. Saturday morning—not open to the public.

Mr. CORNWELL. Would you tell us how the conversation on the third visit ended.

Senor AZCUE. He had great hopes that I would grant him the visa in transit. When I told him no, that if the Soviet Union does not grant him the visa as destination of his trip, I cannot grant him an in-transit visa to Cuba without consulting my government.

He always had a face which reflected unhappiness. He was never friendly. He was persistent. And he was not pleasant.

So on the last visit, when he loses the opportunity to obtain the visa, he gets very worked up. And then in English, which is a language that I have not full command, and all our conversations took place in English, and with great effort on my part because it is a language that I do not have full command of, but I do hear him make statements that are directed against us, and he accuses us of being bureaucrats, and in a very discourteous manner.

At that point I also become upset and I tell him to leave the consulate, maybe somewhat violently or emotionally. Then he leaves the consulate, and he seems to be mumbling to himself, and he slams the door, also in a very discourteous manner.

That was the last time we saw him around.

Mr. CORNWELL. Was he with anyone on any of these occasions?

Senor AZCUE. With my colleague, Mirabal, who probably was always with me, because I was together with him. I was the exiting consul and he was the new consul. I am handling this case because I had a better knowledge of the English language than he did. But we were both handling the case, he in order to become more familiar with the situation and I also in order to train him.

So this was a colleague of mine who saw him, how many times I don't know, whether on one or two or all three occasions; he was a colleague who was present there, and I know that he also saw him.

And in addition to Consul Mirabal, he was also seen by the secretary, because she was the one who took care of his application.

The three of us were the only ones who were able to see Oswald, nobody else. He could not have seen anybody else, because the business that brought him to us was one that was of the exclusive responsibility of the consulate. And therein the only ones present were the three of us.
Mr. CORNWELL. Was the individual who came to your consulate on these three occasions accompanied by any other persons? Did anyone come with him?

Senor Azcue. I never saw. The private area of the consulate, from this private area it is difficult to observe who comes in from the street. My secretary from the chancery, maybe she was able to see. But whenever I emerged from that area, and to the chancery, I always saw him alone.

Mr. CORNWELL. Did he say anything in any of the conversations with you which would have indicated that he either had a companion with him in Mexico City or that he knew any persons who lived in Mexico City?

Senor Azcue. No, never. We did not hold any conversations other than those directly related to the visa.

Mr. CORNWELL. If I could direct your attention again to the JFK exhibit F-408, I would like to ask you first, was the document signed in your presence?

Senor Azcue. No. It is not necessary. It is never necessary. This is a document that is provided to him by the secretary. It is filled in by the secretary. She affixes the photograph, turns it over to him, and right there he signs, until it is sent, forwarded to Cuba, through the pouch.

Mr. CORNWELL. Would it have been necessary, under the usual custom and practice of your office at that time, for the document to have been signed on the premises of the consulate?

Senor Azcue. This document or this application does not leave the desk of the secretary. She types it out and places the photograph, places the seal, and hands it over for the individual's signature.

Mr. CORNWELL. You told us earlier that the normal procedure for the preparation of such applications was that more than one copy of the document was made, is that correct?

Senor Azcue. Yes, six. Six photographs, six signatures, and six copies of the application is complete.

Mr. CORNWELL. Do you feel certain about your memory today as to the number of copies that are made or were made in 1963?

Senor Azcue. Yes, absolutely. There was never an exception made. They come already together in a bunch.

Mr. CORNWELL. The copies as opposed to the original, the carbon copies, were they signed separately or was the carbon paper used to transfer a signature from one to the other?

Senor Azcue. No, one by one, because the paper is very thick. This is mimeograph-type paper.

Chairman Stokes. Will counsel suspend for a moment? I think this would be an appropriate place for us to take a 5-minute recess at this time. The Chair requests that as the witness departs from the room, that all persons remain in their seats please until the witness has left the room after which we will have a 5-minute recess.

[A brief recess was taken.]

Chairman Stokes. The committee will come to order.

All persons in the hearing room are requested to remain in their seats while the witness is being brought in to the witness table.

The Chair recognizes counsel for the committee, Mr. Cornwell.
Mr. CORNWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Before we begin again, I believe that we neglected to have the interpreter identify himself for the record.
Would you do so?
Mr. HERVAS. My name is Anthony J. H-e-r-v-a-s.
Mr. CORNWELL. Thank you.
Senor Azcue, I would like at this time to show you JFK exhibit F-407. For the record, that would appear to be a carbon copy of the previous JFK exhibit F-408. The previous JFK exhibit, F-408, is a photograph of a visa application which the staff of this committee took while they were in Cuba this year. It was taken of a document which was provided to us by the Cuban Government in an original form. We were allowed to inspect the original and to photograph it.
The exhibit which we just placed on the easel, JFK F-407, is a photograph of a visa application which was provided to the Warren Commission in 1964 by the Cuban Government. As you can tell, the writing on JFK F-407 appears to be somewhat displaced on the lines; part of it sitting directly on top of lines instead of resting over them as you would expect, and otherwise its content appears to be virtually identical to 408.
Would the two documents in that form have been expected, based upon the usual procedures in effect at the consulate in 1963?
Mr. HERVAS. May I ask a question? Did you say would the two documents have been expected or inspected?
Mr. CORNWELL. Expected to be in that form with those type of variations based upon the procedures in effect at the consulate in 1963?
Senor Azcue. Do you have some other copy of the actual size that I could be able to look at or analyze because from this distance it is for me very difficult to see the exhibit on the easel.
Mr. CORNWELL. Senor Azcue, would you like to go to the easel to get a better picture of the blowups? Do the representatives from the National Archives have a small photograph of that document with them here today?
OK, we do have a smaller photograph we will show the witness. It is also marked for identification as JFK F-407.
Senor Azcue. As I stated before, the paper on which the application is printed is a very thick or heavy paper. So it is not possible to prepare six copies at one time, not even three in an ordinary typewriter such as the one Sylvia Duran had in the consulate. Conceivably, she prepared them two at a time, an original and one copy, an original and one copy, an original and one copy.
So conceivably it is possible that there be some differences between some of them, between three, for instance.
Mr. CORNWELL. But at any rate your examination of the two documents would indicate that JFK F-407 is a carbon copy of the original JFK-408; is that correct?
Senor Azcue. I am not an expert on these matters, but any one of you could—and I cannot see very well either and the quality of the copy is not very clear. However, in looking at these two documents I note that the words appear exactly one on top of the other in both documents in the same places.
So, consequently, it seems reasonable to conclude that the copy, that the second exhibit constitutes a copy of the first one. It would be very difficult to place them in separate.

In spite of my limitations, I believe I can affirm that this one is the original and this other one is the copy. One does notice, if one analyzes the margin on the right side, that the text on both copies coincides perfectly one with the other. That is very difficult to do otherwise.

Mr. CORNWELL. Senor Azcue, the pictures on the upper lefthand portion of each document would appear to be of the same individual; is that correct?

Senor AZCUE. Yes, sir.

Mr. CORNWELL. Do those pictures of that individual appear to you to be the same individual who visited the consulate in Mexico City on the occasions you have previously described to us?

Senor AZCUE. Truly, this photograph is one that I saw for the first time when the honorable U.S. committee members came to Cuba in April of this year, and I was surprised that I believe that it was not the same person. Fifteen years had gone by so it is very difficult for me to be in a position to guarantee it in a categorical form.

But my belief is that this gentleman was not, is not, the person or the individual who went to the consulate.

Mr. CORNWELL. Directing your attention to the period of time immediately after the assassination, the day of the assassination or the day after the assassination, did you during that period of time have an occasion to see pictures of the alleged assassin in the newspapers or to observe on television the man identified at that time as Lee Harvey Oswald?

Senor AZCUE. Yes, sir, not so close to the date, not in the first few days, not immediately thereafter. Some time I calculate approximately—and I say this because I am not a great movie fan, but it was in mid-December approximately—I saw at that time the film in which Ruby appears assassinating the Oswald who was there, and I was not able to identify him and only 2 months had gone by since I had seen the Oswald who appeared at the consulate. And I had a clear mental picture because we had had an unpleasant discussion and he had not been very pleasant to me and I did not recognize when I first saw him. I did not recognize Oswald.

The man who went to the consulate was a man over 30 years of age and very thin, very thin faced. And the individual I saw in the movie was a young man, considerably younger, and a fuller face.

Mr. CORNWELL. What color hair did the individual have to the best of your memory who visited the consulate?

Senor AZCUE. He was blond, dark blond.

Mr. CORNWELL. Did the individual you saw in the movie, the person who was killed by Jack Ruby, resemble more closely the individual in these photographs to your memory than the individual who visited the consulate?

Senor AZCUE. I believe so.

Mr. CORNWELL. I would like to show you JFK exhibit F-434. Do the representatives from the National Archives have the original or a small photograph of that exhibit?
While they are looking, Mr. Chairman, I believe we neglected to ask that JFK exhibit F-407 be admitted into evidence.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection it may be entered into evidence.

[The information follows:]

JFK EXHIBIT F-407

Mr. Cornwell. That is a passport. May we have that exhibit admitted into evidence, Mr. Chairman, JFK F-434?

Chairman Stokes. Without objection it may be entered into evidence.

[The information follows:]
Mr. CORNWELL. Did the individual who visited the consulate look like that individual?

Senor AZCUÉ. No.

Mr. CORNWELL. What differences were there?

Senor AZCUÉ. Many differences. The individual who visited the consulate is one whose physiognomy or whose face I recall very clearly. He had a hard face. He had very straight eyebrows, cold, hard, and straight eyes. His cheeks were thin. His nose was very straight and pointed. This gentleman looks like he is somewhat heavier, more filled, his eyes are at an angle with the outside of his
eye, at an angle with his face. I would have never identified him or recognized him.

I believe I can recall with fairly good accuracy the individual in such a way that I could recognize him now in a group of 100, that is better than a photograph of him because obviously during a period of 15 years he might change. I think I could recognize him, and this is not him.

Mr. CORNWELL. We would like to show you what has been previously admitted into evidence in this case as Exhibit 194. As you can see, Senor Azcue, the pictures on the right are simply blowups of the same visa application, but I would like to direct your attention to the two pictures on the left which come from photographs taken by the Dallas Police Department.

I ask you if that individual looks like the man who visited the consulate?

Senor AZCUE. I would have never recognized him as I did not recognize him in the movie where he dies, and I can, however, identify him as or think of him as the person who was killed or assassinated by Ruby. It is a question of personal evaluation on my part. But it is very clearly imprinted.

Mr. CORNWELL. The staff of the committee has had an opportunity to speak to Mrs. Sylvia Duran, and during the interview with her she expressed no doubt about the fact that the person who was killed in Dallas by Jack Ruby was the individual who visited the consulate.

Do you have any reason to question her memory or the reason that her memory might differ from yours?

Senor AZCUE. Categorically, I could not affirm it without any doubt. However, it is possible that she might be more susceptible to impression or more impressionable than I. I remember what I saw on the film and also what I saw on TV later or maybe before. I remember that moment when he was killed and I remember I did not recognize him. I did not have any prejudices or preconceptions.

I wanted to recognize, however, only 2 months had gone by. It was between September and November. At that time I was much younger. That was 15 years ago, and I think that because of my own profession I probably had better eyes. And because of the impression that was made by this person who visited the consulate, for these reasons, maybe my version is correct or more correct.

Mr. CORNWELL. Thank you. I have no further questions.

Chairman STOKES. At this point the procedure will be as follows: The Chair will recognize the gentleman from North Carolina, chairman of the Kennedy subcommittee, Mr. Preyer, for such time as he may consume, after which the committee will operate under the 5-minute rule.

The Chair recognizes Mr. Preyer.

Mr. PREYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Azcue, it is good to see you again.

As I understand it, at the time Lee Harvey Oswald visited the consul in Mexico there were three people who could have seen him: yourself, Sylvia Duran and Mr. Mirabal. Is that correct?

Senor AZCUE. That is correct.

Mr. PREYER. And you were the consul at that time and Mr. Mirabal was in training to replace you as consul?
Senor Azcue. I would say it was the opposite. The consul who was already functioning as such was Mirabal. From the very time he arrived as a designated consul. When the consul arrives—of course, there could be two or three consuls—but when the consul arrives, he takes over the functions, the responsibilities, and I was turning over the official business of the consulate to him.

Mr. Preyer. What I was getting at was, you had been the consul before Mr. Mirabal arrived?

Senor Azcue. Yes.

Mr. Preyer. Mr. Mirabal came to replace you as consul?

Senor Azcue. Yes.

Mr. Preyer. At the time of the assassination on November 22, you were no longer in Mexico and Mr. Mirabal remained as the consul at that time; is that correct?

Senor Azcue. I had already returned to Cuba and Mirabal had assumed the position of consul there alone.

Mr. Preyer. You returned to Cuba, as I understand it, on November 18, which was, of course, after your encounters with Oswald and before the assassination; is that correct?

Senor Azcue. That was the case. I returned on November 18.

Mr. Preyer. Did your return to Cuba have anything to do with your encounters with Oswald or did it have anything to do with the assassination of President Kennedy?

Senor Azcue. It was not related to any of those things. I returned to Cuba because all of my family was already there. As of June of that year I had been awaiting a consul to replace me because I already had a son studying in Havana and a son working there and already in June they had given me permission to return permanently to Cuba.

I was not able to return before because they were not sending me a consul to replace me, and the reason I did not leave immediately upon Mr. Mirabal's arrival was, first, because I had to train him. He did not have any experience in the handling of consular affairs there, and, second, because there was a meeting or congress of consuls being held at that time and I was asked to stay. This was because of my connections developed over the 5 years that I had spent there.

Mr. Preyer. So that it is fair to sum up your answer by saying you were not recalled by the Cuban Government, but, you, at your request, returned to Cuba?

Mr. Hervas. Excuse me, sir, did you say at your wish?

Mr. Preyer. Yes, at his wish.

Senor Azcue. I cannot say it was at my wish exclusively. I need the permission of the Government of Cuba, but I had requested my return in June because, as I noted previously, my sons were back in Havana. One was already working. One was studying there. I was then alone in Mexico with my smaller daughter, and I also wanted her to study in Cuba. I wanted to return there.

Mr. Preyer. I would like to turn to the visa application, the JFK exhibit F-408, for a moment.

In the middle of that document, over on the right-hand side, there is a printed date that says October 10, 1963. I don't believe there has been any discussion about that as yet.

Could you tell us what that date is?
Senor Azcue. I will relate the manner in which I believe that appeared. We sent, of the six copies of the application with photographs, five to Havana. Those are distributed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to different organizations in government, different entities, and these receive different copies of the document. Immigration possibly receives two copies. The Interior Ministry receives a copy. Each organization receiving a copy might possibly stamp the date of receipt of the document on such a document. One organization in this case must have stamped that date on the document. On the other document, the organization probably did not have its routine practice to date such document because it was not a rigid requirement.

Mr. Preyer. So that this was a date stamped on the document in Cuba.

Senor Azcue. I believe that that is so, because if we received the reapplication on 27th, we never hold on to or retain, in order to protect the interest of the applicant, the document for such a long period of time before forwarding it to Cuba. We will be mailing it in the next mail departure, 2 or 3 days at most, and this date, October 10, corresponds more closely to what I had just indicated, that is, to the distribution of the correspondence to the different entities, where they are supposed to receive copies of this document, that is, 13 days thereafter.

Mr. Preyer. So it does not indicate that Lee Harvey Oswald was in Mexico on October 10.

Senor Azcue. No; in no manner. He never returned to the consulate. We never saw him again. This date is completely independent of Mr. Oswald. This is an internal matter.

Mr. Preyer. Looking again at this document, the visa application form, doesn’t it indicate on this form how long Oswald wanted to stay in Cuba?

Senor Azcue. Here it should be stated. Sometimes we included it, 2 weeks, and, if possible, a longer period of time.

Mr. Preyer. Does it also indicate when Oswald wanted to leave for Cuba?


Mr. Preyer. That was just 3 days after he applied for the visa, and I believe you have testified earlier today that you had never seen anyone so persistent in seeking a visa.

Did Oswald tell you why he was in such a hurry to get to Cuba?

Senor Azcue. None whatsoever. He arrived there convinced that with the documents that he exhibited at the time I would issue the visa immediately, and one can analyze the fact that if he had a great need to go to the Soviet Union, he would have chosen the shortest route, and that was not through Cuba.

Mr. Preyer. But he gave you no explanation of why he was in such a hurry, why he was so anxious to go to Cuba?

Senor Azcue. I do not recall it, and it is hard to find a reasonable explanation, because if he is in a hurry, he can go through any other country.

Mr. Preyer. Down in the right-hand corner of the visa application there is a signature.

Is that your signature?
Senor Azcue. No.
Mr. Preyer. Is it Sylvia Duran's signature?

Senor Azcue. It is a signature, and we have been able to check it thereafter, of Alfredo Mirabal, who, as I have already mentioned earlier, he already was empowered as a consul. He had already been named or appointed consul.

Mr. Preyer. So it is Mr. Mirabal's signature.

Just above that signature there is a section, a printed section, that has the title "Observations."

Now you have testified, in general, as to what those observations were, but I wonder if you could read out loud for us, for the sake of the record, what that section says.

Senor Azcue. The applicant states that he is a member of the U.S. Communist Party and also the secretary of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee in New Orleans, and that he lived in the Soviet Union from October 1959, that he is married to a Soviet citizen. He showed documents certifying that he was a member of the organizations mentioned, as well as a marriage certificate.

He went to the Soviet Embassy in this city requesting that his visa be forwarded to their embassy in Cuba. We called the Soviet consulate, and they responded that they had to obtain, they have to await authorization from Moscow to issue the visa, and that it would take approximately 4 months.

This is the very same thing I told the members of your committee in Havana in April without having seen this document before.

Mr. Preyer. This section of the application was not filled in by you?

Senor Azcue. No, no, I had never seen it. This was made or prepared by Sylvia Duran, and it was signed by Mirabal, as it appears here. I repeat once again that the first time I saw this document was when the committee showed it to me in April.

Mr. Preyer. Is there anything in those observations that would make you think that the person who wrote them believed that Oswald would be given a visa?

Senor Azcue. Probably no, this is something that is written or addressed to Cuba, all of the information that we can provide Cuba, but we do not prejudge what Cuba is going to determine, even if we may have an interest in seeing something resolved.

Mr. Preyer. Incidentally, to clear up one point on that, I believe you testified this morning that you initiated the call to the Soviet Embassy.

No, I'm afraid I have that just reversed. I believe this morning you testified that it was the Soviet Embassy that called you, but in the observations it states you initiated the call to the Soviet Embassy.

Would you like to clarify that point?

Senor Azcue. It is relatively easy, I believe, if one analyzes it. Conceivably, I was under the impression that the Soviet Embassy had called me because I was told to pick up the telephone. I did not call. It is possible, however, that at Oswald's request, Sylvia might have called the Embassy and then would have transferred the call to me, and thereafter I was under the impression that it was the Soviet Embassy that had called me, and I was always under that
impression. But it is possible that she might have initiated the call and thereafter transferred the call to me.

Mr. PREYER. One final question.

Going back to the observations written on the bottom of the application, written by Sylvia Duran, in your opinion, did Sylvia Duran ever pressure you to grant the visa or encourage you to grant the visa to Oswald?

Senor AZCUE. She, the poor woman, was in no position to pressure me. She might have been in a position to make a personal recommendation, and the recommendation was not a personal matter.

Yet she might have believed that because of the fact that he was a resident in the Soviet Union and he was a member of the North American Communist Party, she might have believed that we might have been in a position to make an exception, but this is simply as a comment, a possible comment. She did not exert pressure or any such thing.

Mr. PREYER. Did she make any personal recommendation or did she evidence any unusual interest in Oswald’s case?

Senor AZCUE. No; she might have thought that we might be in a position to grant him a visa because of his personal conditions or circumstances, not for any reason of friendship. It wasn’t any such thing. She never spoke again about him, nor did we ever speak about him. As in the case of many of the hundreds of applicants who come through a consulate, we see them at that time, and thereafter we never remember them again or discuss them again. And if it hadn’t been for the unfortunate incident, I would have by now completely forgotten about this gentleman.

Mr. PREYER. After Oswald visited you the first time, that visit ended when you sent him out to have a photograph taken, as I understand it.

Was there a place nearby where he could have had the photograph taken?

Senor AZCUE. Yes, yes, about four or five blocks away in a street known as Calzada de Tacubaya. There are photographic studios. Possibly Sylvia might have pointed out to him where he could obtain the photographs, or maybe he already had the photos.

Mr. PREYER. Well, in the photographs on the application, and also in the passport, Oswald appears to have on a tie and a sweater. How was he dressed when he came to the Embassy, to the consulate?

Senor AZCUE. I always imagine him or visualize him as wearing a suit, coat and pants, trousers, with a pattern of crossed lines, not very clear design. Blue, some reddish. I never conceived of him or visualized him wearing a light sweater.

When I saw this photograph in April of this year, I also noticed that the clothing he was wearing was not the same.

Mr. PREYER. So that the clothing he was wearing in the photographs was not similar to that which he was wearing when he actually visited you in the Embassy.

Senor AZCUE. I am almost in a position to assure that.

Mr. PREYER. When he returned with the photographs and with his application, visa application form, and his passport pictures,
would you have looked at the pictures on the visa application and on the passport?

Senor Azcue. No, I did not see the photograph, nor did I witness the preparation of the form. I did not see the photograph at that time. I only saw this photograph last April, when they came to Cuba.

Mr. Preyer. So that at the time of processing his visa and the passport, you never looked at the photographs, you never compared them with the man standing before you.

Senor Azcue. No, I was never present during the preparation of this form nor of the affixing of the photograph. And it is also signed by Mirabal. And in the normal course of business this is a matter that goes to Cuba. It is generally kept until it is prepared for shipment in the next plane, outgoing plane, and there was no reason for me to go back searching for this form.

Mr. Preyer. You have indicated to us that you don't believe the man whose photograph appears on the visa application and the passport was the same man who appeared before you in the consulate. Have you ever seen a photograph of the man you believed to have appeared before you in the consulate?

Senor Azcue. Never. I shall explain. The committee brought to me an album with many photographs. I shall try to explain. It is very possible that amongst all of those photographs which were made available to us by those persons who took pictures of every person that went near the consulate or the Embassy and that were contained in those that I was shown, it is very difficult when I consider all of the photos that I saw, that anyone could escape being photographed if he approached the consulate during working hours, that is, escape without having his photograph taken.

It would be easy for them, having at hand the photographs and the dates, to facilitate or make available the photograph of the person who went to the consulate, be it the decedent or the dead man or the other person that I think I saw went to the consulate.

It is indeed curious that they did not provide that photograph, because if it were the same man, you would have recognized him in that photograph. And if I remembered the face, I would have recognized it amongst those photos. And there was no photo of either.

This is very curious, that something like that should happen, especially among individuals or men who are so efficient and who spied on our consulate and our Embassy.

Mr. Preyer. I would like to ask if we could have exhibit 437 displayed. Mr. Azcue, I will ask if that is a picture of you in Cuba looking through the album of photographs which the committee made available to you.

Senor Azcue. Right. That is a photograph of myself with the photo album that you provided me.

Mr. Preyer. And I believe you recognized none of the photographs in that album as being the man whom you feel you saw in the Embassy. Have you ever seen that man again, the man who you believe you saw in the consulate?

Senor Azcue. No, never. This is what I stated before.

Mr. Preyer. I believe you said that the man who signed the visa application did not sign it in your presence, as far as you recall.
Senor Azcue. No; the secretary is the one who takes care of all of this. And we are normally in our private office while she is having the applicant provide the information and fill the forms and attaching the photograph. During all of that time we are in our offices working.

Mr. Preyer. If analysis of that handwriting, of that signature on the visa application showed it to be Lee Harvey Oswald's signature, would you still believe that the man who visited you in the consulate was not Oswald?

Senor Azcue. Under such circumstances I would have to accept that I was being influenced or that I was seeing visions.

Mr. Preyer. Mr. Chairman, I am at a point now at which there are two other areas that I wanted to ask Mr. Azcue some questions. It will probably take about 15 minutes. Would you prefer to go forward or to recess until after lunch at this time?

First, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask that JFK exhibit F-437 be admitted into evidence at this point.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the record at this point.

[The information follows:]
Chairman Stokes. The Chair thinks this is a good time for us to take a recess. Accordingly, the committee will recess until 2 p.m. this afternoon.

I request at this time that all persons remain in their seats until the witness has been escorted from the hearing room, after which we will declare a recess.

[Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., a recess was taken until 2 p.m.]
AFTERNOON SESSION

Chairman Stokes. The committee will come to order.

All persons in the hearing room are requested to take their seats and to remain seated while the witness is being brought into the room and to the witness table. Thereafter you may move about if you please, but then once again, whenever the witness departs the room, you are also further requested to remain in your seats for security purposes.

You may bring the witness in.

The Chair at this time recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Preyer, for such time as he may further consume.

TESTIMONY OF EUSEBIO AZCUE—(Resumed)

Mr. Preyer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to ask that JFK exhibit F-428 be placed on the easel, please.

Do we have JFK exhibit F-428?

In the earlier testimony that was read to the committee today from Sylvia Duran, mention was made of a newspaper article by a reporter named Comer Clark which appeared in an American paper. This is a copy of that article.

I would like to read you about the first five or six paragraphs of that article, Mr. Azcue, and get your comments upon it.

I would suggest to the translator that I might read by sections of it and give you a copy of the article and you can translate it directly, in the interest of time.

The article reads in the first paragraph, it begins in quotation marks:

"Yes, I heard of Lee Harvey Oswald's plan to kill President Kennedy. It's possible that I could have saved him.

"I might have been able to—but I didn't. I never believed the plan would be put into effect."

These were the dramatic words spoken to me by Cuba's Prime Minister Fidel Castro in Havana on July 15.

"Lee Oswald came to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City twice," Castro went on. The first time—I was told—he wanted to work for us.

"He was asked to explain, but he wouldn't.

"He wouldn't go into details.

"The second time he said he wanted to 'free Cuba from American imperialism.'

"Then he said something like: 'Someone ought to shoot that President Kennedy.'

"Then Oswald said—and this was exactly how it was reported to me—'Maybe I'll try to do it.'

"This was less than 2 months before the U.S. President was assassinated."

Mr. Azcue, would you comment on that statement?

Senor Azcue. I have already commented to you, in the course of previous conversations, that Mr. Oswald did not see nor could he have seen, either at the consulate or the Embassy, any persons or individuals other than we. He did not have any contact other than contact with us, consul Mirabal, I as consul, and Sylvia Duran as a secretary. He did not mention any such thing to any of us, and much less would we have passed this information on to Fidel.

So I see no way in which our Commander in Chief could have been aware of a conversation that Oswald says he held with one of our agents. The only agents present were those three I have mentioned—the two consuls and the secretary.
First of all, I would have never tolerated a conversation of that nature because, without any doubt, that would have constituted a provocation, and we do not allow ourselves to be provoked, and our revolution never dealt with anything related to terrorism, much less so the death of President Kennedy.

What would become of us should we have intervened? This is ridiculous that we should attempt to walk into the mouth of the lion, and this has been repeatedly asserted by our Commander in Chief. We have never used terrorism. We have never supported terrorism, and we have never even supported terrorism even in those cases in which we sympathize with the views of those who did practice it.

Mr. Preyer. So that the man who appeared before you in the consulate did not say these words as set out in the article, nor anything that sounded like those words.

Senor Azcue. I repeat once again that I would not have tolerated it because I would have taken this as a provocation, and our behavior in this context is extraordinarily clear and clean.

Mr. Preyer. Moving to another area, Mr. Azcue, Sylvia Duran and her husband often entertained, I believe, in Mexico City.

Did you socialize with the Durans from time to time? Did you attend their parties?

Senor Azcue. Yes; in Mexico naturally it is a custom to have social gatherings in the home of one or another friend. They did host them, not as frequently as the question you have formulated would imply, but they did, and I in turn have attended some of those gatherings, and I believe that whenever they did have a party, they always invited me because I was very friendly to both.

Mr. Preyer. Do you know if they had any parties in September of 1963; that is, the time when Lee Harvey Oswald was in Mexico?

Senor Azcue. It is possible, but it is difficult that they would have held such a party without inviting me, a person that was so close to them. And I recall that the last gathering that I attended at the Duran home was one that was carried out in order to bid me farewell in preparation for my return to Cuba, and it was during the month of November, a few days before my departure from Mexico.

Mr. Preyer. Do you know Elena Garro de Paz?

Senor Azcue. Yes. I have seen her on some occasions in the home of one of her sisters, whose husband is a Mexican painter, Horácio, whose name is Guerrero Galvan, and who was a friend of mine.

Mr. Preyer. I believe her husband is Octavio Paz, the Mexican poet?

Senor Azcue. Yes, Octavio Paz, who was also Mexican Ambassador to Paris and a distinguished poet, was her husband at the time I met her.

Mr. Preyer. Elena Garro de Paz was a friend of the Durans and also a friend of yours, I believe; is that correct?

Senor Azcue. That is correct; yes. She was related to Horácio Duran.

Mr. Preyer. And did I understand you to say that the painter, Guerrero Galvan—is that the way you pronounce that?—was a
friend of yours and was married to the sister of Elena Garro de Paz?

Senor Azcuer. Exactly.

Mr. Preyer. Perhaps I should get the blackboard out and draw some lines to spell out the family tree there.

But let me just sum up by asking: You knew Elena Garro de Paz fairly well?

Senor Azcuer. Not very well. I have met her on two, maybe three opportunities because she was living at that time in her sister's home, the home of Mrs. Guerrero Galvan, the home that I used to visit with a certain frequency, but we were not intimate friends. It was simply a social acquaintance.

Mr. Preyer. Would you describe her as an emotionally stable person?

Senor Azcue. She appeared to me to be a delicate person, a refined person, a cultured writer.

Mr. Preyer. Did she have what we might call a vivid imagination about things other than her writing?

Senor Azcue. I believe it is very difficult in the course of two or three visits to be able to fully understand the character of a lady without being a close or intimate friend, and her writings I have only read from the standpoint of literary criticism or review. I would not attempt to make a critical evaluation of her personality or character because I am not a psychologist.

Mr. Preyer. Let me put it this way. If she told you a story about something that had happened, would you be apt to believe her?

Senor Azcue. It would depend on the kind of story she would be telling me.

Mr. Preyer. If she told you something of a serious nature, would you be apt, likely to believe that she would be telling the truth about it?

Senor Azcue. I repeat once again that it will depend on the subject matter. It depends on the issue itself, not who is telling the story. If it has some viability or credibility, I would accept it. If not, I would not.

Mr. Preyer. Did you ever hear that Lee Harvey Oswald had attended one of the Durans' parties when he was in Mexico?

Senor Azcue. No, never, and that is one of the things I would not believe, no matter who would tell me, because I knew the Durans well, and I knew that this gentleman, I know that this gentleman who turned up at the consulate to request a visa had no other activities or purpose while there. He came to the consulate and thereafter we never talked about him or saw him any other time. And I repeat once again that I wouldn't believe that either Sylvia or Horacio would host a gathering during those days without inviting me.

Mr. Preyer. Did you ever hear a man named Emilio Carbellido, a Mexican writer, I believe?

Senor Azcue. Yes, of course, very well known in Mexico. He is a well-known writer, and well known in Cuba also, because he has visited there repeatedly.

Mr. Preyer. Did you ever discuss President Kennedy with Mr. Carbellido?
Senor Azcue. It is my prior practice not to discuss with anyone outside of my own group, members of my own Embassy, or of our own group, any of these issues of foreign policy or policy of other nations. We are very careful regarding our own views, especially in the presence of a gentleman who was not such a great friend of mine.

Mr. Preyer. Would Mr. Carbellido have been at the parties or some of the parties that the Durans gave from time to time?

Senor Azcue. It is possible. I do not recall his presence at any specific one, but it is possible that he might have attended.

Mr. Preyer. I have asked you some questions earlier, Mr. Azcue, about Miss Elena Garro de Paz, and as to whether you would be likely to believe a story if she told it to you.

Miss Garro has told us that on one occasion she was at a party at one of the Durans' houses, and that you and Oswald were both at the party. She has told us that at another party at one of the Durans' homes she overheard a conversation in which you and Emilio Carbellido were discussing President Kennedy. She says that at the conclusion of that conversation, you stated that there was no alternative than to kill President Kennedy.

Would you care to comment on her allegations?

Senor Azcue. Yes; first, because it is not possible or conceivable in my own mind to kill anyone, much less so the President of the United States, and much more so because of the possible implications or effects upon our own revolution, which I would defend with every effort that I could muster. It would be necessary to ask this lady why she makes such statements; it is incredible. Because, I repeat, I have seen her only two or three times in my whole life, and much earlier than the time when this gentleman showed up at our consulate. With some analysis, I could probably even determine the date of these meetings with her. And I know that the last time I saw her was much before Mirabal arrived at the consulate, and Mirabal arrived on September 2. I can almost fix the date.

The previous secretary, the one who preceded Sylvia Duran, was a relative of mine who died on July 19. And I clearly recall that the son of Guerrero Galvan, the painter, who was a student of medicine, was discussing with me the unfortunate death of my secretary, who was, in turn, my relative, as a result of a car accident in a Volkswagen, and he was explaining to me how dangerous it was to be in an accident in a Volkswagen because of the shortness of the car and the proximity of the riders to the windshield, and it was a date so close to July 19 that he was telling me that, during that same period, those same days, there had been three fatal accidents similar to the one in which my secretary had died, and that was the last opportunity on which I saw Elena Garro.

What did they offer Elena Garro to make such absurd statements or declarations?

Mr. Preyer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have no further questions at this time.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Dodd.

Mr. Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
How are you again?
Senor Azcue. Glad to meet you, sir.
Mr. Dodd. I am not going to speak in Spanish. My Spanish isn’t that good.

Could you please tell me, Mr. Azcue, how long you had been the consul in Mexico prior to your departure in November of 1963?

Senor Azcue. When the revolution achieved its victory, I was appointed consul the beginning of January 1959. Thereafter they called upon me, thereafter the Government of Cuba recalled me to put me in charge of the reconstruction of housing for peasants in our country, and who were members of the rebel army, and housing that had been destroyed during the course of the war. So at that point I returned to Cuba in June of 1959 and was working in the Sierras, in the mountains, in charge of construction, work, probably until 1960. I do not recall the exact date. Then I returned to Mexico as an attaché, a diplomatic attaché, to the Embassy, and shortly thereafter I had to take over or take charge of the consulate, and on this occasion until November of 1963.

Mr. Dodd. Am I to understand, then, that you assumed the duties of consul in 1960, some time early in 1960, the end of 1960? What period of time did you assume those responsibilities?

Senor Azcue. Yes, it was in April of 1961, after the Bay of Pigs.

Mr. Dodd. Now, did I understand your testimony correctly, that you were not aware of how the photograph on the exhibit, the visa application, you are not aware of how that photo got on that application? In fact, you had not seen the photograph on the application?

Senor Azcue. That is the case. Sylvia Duran was handling that area. She typed in the form, affixed the photo, had the applicant sign the forms. In the meantime there was no reason for us consuls to be present there observing the procedure. We were simply in our private offices. We had a lot of work.

Mr. Dodd. The reason I asked you that question, is that when several of us had the opportunity to interview you in Cuba a few short months ago, on page 14 of our interview, which I hope you have a copy of, I was questioning you and I asked you:

Going back to the physical appearance of Lee Harvey Oswald, apart from having a receding hairline, was there any gray in Lee Harvey Oswald’s hair?

You responded:

You know he had blond hair. It is all very interesting. You see this picture, I really did not study carefully. The picture was taken by the secretary and she applied it to the application.

It would seem from your response to my question then that, one, you did see the picture on the application or that you did not see the picture on the application then, but were merely looking at it when it was in front of you, and that you had very specific knowledge as to how the picture got on the application, that in fact Sylvia Duran stapled it to the application.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The Chair will permit the witness to respond to the question.

Senor Azcue. Yes; it is a matter of routine. She is the one who handles all of these detailed operations. I could assure that she was the one who did it without having seen her do it. There was no one,
Mr. Dodd. All right, then.
May I ask unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman, just to proceed and finish this line of questioning, which should take just a couple of minutes? I will try to make my questions brief for the translations.
Chairman Stokes. Without objection, the gentleman may proceed.
Mr. Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Based on the testimony you have given, if we are to believe your testimony with regard to the description of the individual that you said you saw that day, it would vary quite significantly, or significantly from the actual photographs of Lee Harvey Oswald, the one on the visa application and the photograph that you see to your left over here. They would be different than the person that you saw in the Cuban Consulate, isn't that correct?
Senor Azcuenaga. For me, yes. When I saw in April the photograph placed on the application, I was surprised by his looks or similarity with the Lee Harvey Oswald who had been killed. This was my reaction in front of you. You were the ones who showed me that picture. That was the first time that I saw that application completed with the photos and all of the other information.
Mr. Dodd. But what you saw was someone that was very different looking from the person that you met in the Cuban Consulate in September of 1963?
Senor Azcuenaga. Yes, as different as I found him when I saw him in film. The image I had of the individual who showed up at the consulate was the man in his thirties, maybe 35 years old, and with the very thin face. You will recall that he had very natural lines, very thin straight nose, except for all of the items I mentioned, and this gentleman appeared to me to be much younger and with a much fuller face. That is the evaluation I have with absolute certainty. It is my truth.
Mr. Dodd. My question is this, after having gone through that, I am left with two choices that I perceive that caused this to occur, since according to your testimony and the testimony of others, there were three people who were working in the consul's section. There was Mr. Mirabal, there was yourself and there was Sylvia Duran. It was either a terrible mistake on the part of Sylvia Duran, who also saw this individual come into the office and who stapled this on here, or there was complicity in placing the photograph on the application at the time. If the two people were that different, then the only people who could have been involved would have been people at the consulate.
Would you please help me out with that possible contradiction?
Senor Azcuenaga. Well, I am sure that it was not a case of complicity. It is possibly a matter of what I see as the truth and what she sees as the truth, my image of the individual present there, her image of the individual there, and whether she carefully studied the photo. These types of photographs are not necessarily that precise. They are not as regular passport pictures which have to be very clear. And there is, of course, one other possibility, and I cannot guarantee that this is the case, but it is conceivable that
while writing down all the information on the application, that she might not have checked exactly the picture against the individual who was applying, that, occupied as she was, she most probably proceeded to place the photograph on the application without this check.

Mr. Dodd. In effect suggesting that there was an enormous error.

Senor Azcue. It is a mistake that results very often in the case of the course of one’s work, in the normal or ordinary case.

Mr. Dodd. And that also, if I understood you, the third option being is that you could be mistaken as to separating the identity of the two people.

Senor Azcue. It is possible. We are all exposed to error or mistake. It is not, however, my view. My view is that I am right.

Now I have to say I am not infallible.

Mr. Dodd. I wasn’t suggesting that.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the additional amount of time.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Sawyer.

Mr. Sawyer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am just curious. You had been in Mexico from 1943; am I correct in that?

Senor Azcue. 1944.

Mr. Sawyer. You were a Cuban by birth and had lived in Cuba before that time, I understand.

Senor Azcue. Yes, many years.

Mr. Sawyer. Why had you spent so long a time in Mexico as opposed to being in Cuba?

Senor Azcue. I first left Cuba during the time of the government of Machado in 1931. I lived for about 10 years almost in Europe. At that time I wanted to return to Mexico, to conclude my studies. Because I did not agree or follow the politics in Cuba during the time, I never felt at home with Batista, I never felt well. I preferred to live in a country that offered me opportunities to study and to work, and I built my life there. It was my second homeland, as is the case with so many other Cubans who at that time had to be bouncing around from one place to another.

Mr. Sawyer. So then since about 1931, up until about 1959, you were what you might say a political refugee, or political exile, in effect, from Cuba.

Senor Azcue. A voluntary exile. Nobody forced me not to live in my country. I did not find it pleasant because of the political climate in my country to live there.

Mr. Sawyer. Thank you. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Thone. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I could ask just one question in line with the gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Dodd, on which I am a little confused.

Chairman Stokes. Certainly. The gentleman is recognized.

Mr. Thone. Consul Azcue, did I understand, and I may not have gotten it right this morning, that when you went back to Cuba you saw a film which depicted the shooting by a Mr. Ruby of Lee Harvey Oswald, and at the time you were concerned that this wasn’t the same person at all that was at the consul applying for a visa?
Senor Azcuen. Exactly. Only 2 months back I had seen the individual who appeared at the consulate. So I had his image clearly engraved in my mind, and I did not recognize him in the movie.

Mr. Thone. Exactly. Now my question. Did you report this to the Cuban Government, and if so to whom and what happened on your report in this regard?

Senor Azcuen. I reported this to some of my friends in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But in fact, in truth I was aware of the fact that it was testimony of my own, it was of my own imagination. And that the conditions under which I had seen him in the film at the time he was killed, with distorted features as a result of pain, it is conceivable that I might be mistaken.

I reaffirmed my view when Attorney Garrison of New Orleans stated that the Oswald who visited or was at the consulate was not the one who allegedly killed Kennedy, because of the date he departed New Orleans and the date he had visited the consulate in Cuba. So that confirmed my own view, and at that point I believed that as being the truth. And then I communicated this. And that was probably filed, recorded.

I did not write a report. I made an oral report. But it would be necessary to investigate whether such a report in writing exists or does not.

But that was the time when I saw my own views confirmed in my opinion that there were two Oswalds. Garrison shares the same opinion.

Mr. Thone. Senor Azcuen, I don't want to be too repetitious. But just a quick followup question. Again, to whom in the Foreign Division, or Service, down in Havana, did you report this after you had seen the Ruby film, and at what time?

Senor Azcuen. These were colleagues of mine in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But at that time all three of us were working in the National Council for Culture. And it was Mr. Lechuga and Mr. Otero.

Mr. Thone. And when did you make that report?

Senor Azcuen. Immediately after reading Garrison’s statements in the newspaper. Possibly at the end of 1964. That would be something very easy to check out. Or maybe beginning of 1965.

Mr. Thone. Last this, and it is probably a question you cannot answer. Do you know what action at all was taken within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on your report in this regard?

Senor Azcuen. Honestly, I do not know that.

Mr. Thone. Because this is quite a startling development here. You would have thought that your government would have done something with the report from the consul who supposedly had three confrontations with the man reported to be Lee Harvey Oswald. And when you came up with this information that this was not the same person that was down there, you would have thought something would have happened. Just a comment. I don’t know that it needs a response, Mr. Consul, unless you would have a thought on it.

Senor Azcuen. Yes. It is very possible, it is a possibility that they did not believe me at all, that they might have thought that this was simply my own impression or evaluation. And moreover, that
it might be with reference to a matter that was not one of immediate concern in terms of current events at that time for us.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Ford. Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time to the Chair.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Fithian.

Mr. Fithian. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Azcue, you testified that Oswald produced a document showing his membership in the U.S. Communist Party. To your knowledge was that document valid?

Senor Azcue. I did not concentrate much of my attention on the documents themselves. And I could not see whether they were authentic or not. The person who saw them, or the person who made the notations might have been Sylvia. But she had no way of telling whether they were authentic or not, any of the documents. That is the reason that he addresses himself to the Soviet Embassy, so that they in turn could tell us whether the Soviet documents are or are not valid.

Mr. Fithian. Thank you. At your consulate, whose responsibility was it to compare the applicant in person with the picture on the application, or the picture offered to be put on the application, to assure that the photo was indeed the photo of the person applying for a visa?

Senor Azcue. The first one that should have checked that out was Sylvia. And I feel that we also should have checked. But fatally I did not make the comparison or that check. I had not seen that photograph until April of the present year.

Mr. Fithian. May I direct a question to counsel, Mr. Cornwell. Would the passport, the application that we have on the display board, would we have gotten that from Havana, or the consulate in Mexico City?

Mr. Cornwell. The passport and the passport application came from New Orleans. Are you talking about the visa application?

Mr. Fithian. I am talking about the visa application that was submitted to the Cuban consulate in Mexico City, the large display on the board.

Mr. Cornwell. Two visa applications; No. 408 is the one on the right, that is a photograph of an original visa application which was provided to us for inspection during our trip to Cuba by the Cuban Government. The one on the left, No. 407, is a photograph of a visa application provided by the Cuban Government to the Warren Commission, and would appear to be a carbon copy.

Mr. Fithian. My question, Mr. Cornwell, goes to the stamping of October 10 on it. Obviously if it were from the Cuban consulate at Mexico City, and it had a date of October 10 on it, that is one thing. It is quite another, obviously, if it is a photo of a copy that has been sent on down to Havana to one of the other bureaus.

Mr. Cornwell. I don't believe there is testimony solving that issue yet. The only testimony I believe we have had is with respect to the exhibit 408, and as I recall, Senor Azcue provided information about his understanding of the date October 10 on that document. He was not asked why there was no similar date on document 407, to my memory.
Mr. Fithian. Thank you. Mr. Azcue, Lee Harvey Oswald was a radar operator in the Marines and was familiar with the U.S. spy plane, the U-2. Did Oswald ever mention to you his service in the Marines or in the military in the United States during your conversation with him as he was trying to get a passport to Cuba?

Senor Azcue. He did not provide any information on his own background other than the presentation of the documentation that he had brought forth in connection with his application. It was clear, and I was able to check out from the first time, that his only intent was to obtain a visa immediately. Therefore his background, especially his nonrevolutionary background, was of a nature that he had no interest at all in communicating to us.

He was interested in telling me that he was a member of the Communist Party, that he was a resident of the Soviet Union. In other words, that which he believed would be sufficient to obtain the visa. And our conversations were always extremely brief, because I used to put an end to these conversations, referring to the instructions I had from my government of a need to obtain their prior authorization before issuing any visa, either the final destination visa to the Soviet Union, so that I may be in a position to provide him, without prior consultation to Cuba, with a transit visa, but with the visa of the Soviet Union already affixed to his passport. Everything went around that very issue.

He did not speak a single word outside of that issue.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired. Does counsel have anything further? Excuse me. The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Dodd.

Mr. Dodd. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to pursue one other line of questioning, if I may, and I will try and be brief on it.

Could you tell me, Mr. Azcue, what the Cuban surveillance of the Cuban consulate in Mexico might have shown during those days in September 1963? Did you conduct or have photographic surveillance of people who came into your Embassy, or did you keep any sort of surveillance mechanism by which you could keep a record of those people who came to your Embassy or stopped in for whatever business?

Senor Azcue. We were very young, maybe trusting. We did not have great experience. And we had great trust in our neighbors. At first we did not mistrust anyone. Intuitively we might have had certain reasons to be concerned or to fear certain individuals, but we did not take any photographs, nor did we have any mechanisms or systems. We simply took measures to protect ourselves from some possible aggression or aggressive act. But it was a result of our own action. And with some small security protection or guard that the Mexican Government provided outside the premises, and our own colleagues within the Embassy, who might be able to react to outside aggression, but with nothing much other than their own physical ability to do so, with their bodies.

Mr. Dodd. As I understood your testimony, you were in Cuba on November 22, 1963. You had returned from Mexico.

Senor Azcue. I left on the 18th.

Mr. Dodd. I presume once it became—once the knowledge was acquired in Cuba that the alleged assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald, had applied for a visa in your consulate in Mexico, that there was
then an investigation in Cuba, that it was then a concern, I pre-
sume, of Premier Castro and his government to inquire as to those
people who had knowledge of that particular circumstance as to
actually what in fact happened in Mexico in September of that
year. Is that a fact?

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has again expired.
The Chair will permit the witness to answer the question.

Senor Azcue. Immediately, as soon as I saw the name, I commu-
nicated it, or got in touch myself with the Foreign Ministry, and
after a quick interview with the Minister and with the Chief of the
Bureau, I was immediately sent to the person responsible for such
matters in the Interior Ministry, and that was Commandante Pin-
eiro. Naturally this event constituted a great commotion for us
because we feared that we might be involved in that dirty business.

At that time the Commander in Chief, in his speech of November
27, he is already informed in advance of all those points on which I
had personally reported, reported to Commander Pineiro of the
Ministry of the Interior. Therefore it is in that speech that Fidel
comments or reflects and states what I have always stated.

Mr. Dodd. Did you make any effort or are you aware of any
effort that was made to also talk to either Sylvia Duran, Mr.
Mirabal, anyone else that could possibly shed any light as to what
actually happened in the consulate in Mexico, other than talking
to yourself?

Senor Azcue. Our colleague, Sylvia Duran, was arrested by the
Mexican Government in order to obtain from her clarification or
other types of statements from her.

Regarding other possible investigations on the part of the Cuban
Government, I am not aware of them, because I am not an intel-
ligence agent of the Cuban Government. I provide the information I
hold so that it might be processed or acted on.

Mr. Dodd. So am I to understand that you gave oral testimony,
there was no written statement, there was no tape recording or
any stenographer that took your statement at the time?

Senor Azcue. No. Commander Pineiro and I were alone in his
office. But a few days thereafter I heard the speech of Fidel and I
realized that the Commander in Chief was fully informed of all
points. So the precise report summarized in brief form is incorpo-
rated in the speech of Prime Minister Castro. All of the informa-
tion is contained therein, and consequently printed in the press
and televised and transmitted through radio.

Mr. Dodd. Mr. Chairman, I just want to ask whether or not we
as a committee have asked the Cuban Government for any and all
documentation which they may have prepared or have at their
disposal as a result of their investigation of this particular aspect
of the case at the time that they became aware of Lee Harvey
Oswald's visa application in Mexico. Have we made that request,
and, if so, have we had a response?

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Dodd, we have indeed asked the Cuban Govern-
ment to provide us with any written reports filed at that time by
either Mr. Azcue or any of the people with whom he dealt. And
they have informed us that this was handled orally; that no writ-
ten reports were made at that time.
Mr. Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no further questions.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Azcue, at the conclusion of a witness' testimony before this committee, the witness is entitled, under the rules of this committee, and of the House, to have extended to him 5 minutes in which he may comment upon the testimony he has given before our committee, and I would extend to you 5 minutes for that purpose at this time, if you so desire.

Senor Azcue. Thank you very much. I will use the 5 minutes or possibly less.

First, I want to thank you for the good reception that we have had in this visit here during our trip, for all attentions extended. It has been more than we could have expected. And at the same time I want to state or express that it is in our greatest interest that this entire issue be clarified to the utmost, and that we have always cooperated, and that you must have been able to note it as a result of statements made by our own Prime Minister reflecting our sincere cooperation, without holding back any information, an attitude which we have consistently maintained.

We have the greatest interest in seeing that the issue is clarified, possibly an interest equaling your own interest in having it clarified.

At any and all times we are available to you and at your disposal within the context of our possibilities.

We have always played with clean decks, with clean cards, as has always been our custom.

Once again, thank you very much.

Chairman Stokes. Mr. Azcue, I want to also say to you it is nice to see you again. We enjoyed the visit we had with you in Cuba, the testimony we took from you at that time. And on behalf of the committee, we want to also thank you for the cooperation you have given this committee and for you voluntarily appearing here today as a witness.

So on behalf of the committee and the House of Representatives, we thank you for the cooperation you have given this committee.

You are now excused.

Senor Azcue [in English]. You are welcome, Mr. Stokes. Can I go?

Chairman Stokes. Yes, you may go. All persons are requested to remain in their seats until the witness has departed from the hearing room.

Mr. Standard. Mr. Chairman, if I may, for a moment.

Chairman Stokes. Yes, counsel.

Mr. Standard. The witness has made reference today to two speeches of Prime Minister Fidel Castro of November 23 and November 27, 1963, and I ask they be incorporated as part of this record.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, your request is granted. JFK exhibit F–684 may be entered into the record at this point.

[The exhibit follows:]
Texto del Noticiero de la TV cubana. En la noche del sábado, el primer ministro del Gobierno Revolucionario y primer secretario del Partido, Camilo José Cienfuegos, en un acto público de la Radio y Televisión Cubana, anunció que el Presidente de la República, Fidel Castro, había sido baleado durante un viaje en el oeste de Cuba. El Ministro de Estado, Raúl Castro, dijo que el Presidente se encontraba en grave condición de salud, pero que estaba consciente y no había sufrido ningún daño cerebral. La noticia causó una gran conmoción en el país, ya que Castro había sido un líder popular y un símbolo de la Revolución cubana. La noticia también fue un fuerte golpe para el régimen de la Unión Soviética, que había apoyado a Cuba durante la Guerra Fría. La noticia fue transmitida por la TV cubana y fue seguida de una serie de noticias sobre la situación en el país.
De la correspondencia de Fidel podemos tomar pública una investigación del crimen si se verifica en una ocasión en la que sus manifestaciones den un carácter llamativo a la misma. Hay que hacer hincapié en que los hechos que han sido denunciados por el senador son de trascendencia internacional, y que de allí resulta la necesidad de que se hagan las debidas medidas para que se investigue y se haga justicia.

Se indica en el informe que hay un número considerable de jóvenes que están en libertad, y que han sido arrestados por la policía, sin que se les haya dado tiempo para que se les compare en el juicio. Se indican además que hay individuos que están presos en lugares donde no hay condiciones adecuadas para el tratamiento de los mismos. Es necesario que se hagan las debidas medidas para que se investigue y se haga justicia.

Se indica en el documento que hay un número considerable de jóvenes que están en libertad, y que han sido arrestados por la policía, sin que se les haya dado tiempo para que se les compare en el juicio. Se indican además que hay individuos que están presos en lugares donde no hay condiciones adecuadas para el tratamiento de los mismos. Es necesario que se hagan las debidas medidas para que se investigue y se haga justicia.

Se indica en el documento que hay un número considerable de jóvenes que están en libertad, y que han sido arrestados por la policía, sin que se les haya dado tiempo para que se les compare en el juicio. Se indican además que hay individuos que están presos en lugares donde no hay condiciones adecuadas para el tratamiento de los mismos. Es necesario que se hagan las debidas medidas para que se investigue y se haga justicia.

Se indica en el documento que hay un número considerable de jóvenes que están en libertad, y que han sido arrestados por la policía, sin que se les haya dado tiempo para que se les compare en el juicio. Se indican además que hay individuos que están presos en lugares donde no hay condiciones adecuadas para el tratamiento de los mismos. Es necesario que se hagan las debidas medidas para que se investigue y se haga justicia.

Se indica en el documento que hay un número considerable de jóvenes que están en libertad, y que han sido arrestados por la policía, sin que se les haya dado tiempo para que se les compare en el juicio. Se indican además que hay individuos que están presos en lugares donde no hay condiciones adecuadas para el tratamiento de los mismos. Es necesario que se hagan las debidas medidas para que se investigue y se haga justicia.

Se indica en el documento que hay un número considerable de jóvenes que están en libertad, y que han sido arrestados por la policía, sin que se les haya dado tiempo para que se les compare en el juicio. Se indican además que hay individuos que están presos en lugares donde no hay condiciones adecuadas para el tratamiento de los mismos. Es necesario que se hagan las debidas medidas para que se investigue y se haga justicia.

Se indica en el documento que hay un número considerable de jóvenes que están en libertad, y que han sido arrestados por la policía, sin que se les haya dado tiempo para que se les compare en el juicio. Se indican además que hay individuos que están presos en lugares donde no hay condiciones adecuadas para el tratamiento de los mismos. Es necesario que se hagan las debidas medidas para que se investigue y se haga justicia.

Se indica en el documento que hay un número considerable de jóvenes que están en libertad, y que han sido arrestados por la policía, sin que se les haya dado tiempo para que se les compare en el juicio. Se indican además que hay individuos que están presos en lugares donde no hay condiciones adecuadas para el tratamiento de los mismos. Es necesario que se hagan las debidas medidas para que se investigue y se haga justicia.

Se indica en el documento que hay un número considerable de jóvenes que están en libertad, y que han sido arrestados por la policía, sin que se les haya dado tiempo para que se les compare en el juicio. Se indican además que hay individuos que están presos en lugares donde no hay condiciones adecuadas para el tratamiento de los mismos. Es necesario que se hagan las debidas medidas para que se investigue y se haga justicia.

Se indica en el documento que hay un número considerable de jóvenes que están en libertad, y que han sido arrestados por la policía, sin que se les haya dado tiempo para que se les compare en el juicio. Se indican además que hay individuos que están presos en lugares donde no hay condiciones adecuadas para el tratamiento de los mismos. Es necesario que se hagan las debidas medidas para que se investigue y se haga justicia.

Se indica en el documento que hay un número considerable de jóvenes que están en libertad, y que han sido arrestados por la policía, sin que se les haya dado tiempo para que se les compare en el juicio. Se indican además que hay individuos que están presos en lugares donde no hay condiciones adecuadas para el tratamiento de los mismos. Es necesario que se hagan las debidas medidas para que se investigue y se haga justicia.

Se indica en el documento que hay un número considerable de jóvenes que están en libertad, y que han sido arrestados por la policía, sin que se les haya dado tiempo para que se les compare en el juicio. Se indican además que hay individuos que están presos en lugares donde no hay condiciones adecuadas para el tratamiento de los mismos. Es necesario que se hagan las debidas medidas para que se investigue y se haga justicia.

Se indica en el documento que hay un número considerable de jóvenes que están en libertad, y que han sido arrestados por la policía, sin que se les haya dado tiempo para que se les compare en el juicio. Se indican además que hay individuos que están presos en lugares donde no hay condiciones adecuadas para el tratamiento de los mismos. Es necesario que se hagan las debidas medidas para que se investigue y se haga justicia.
INDEPENDIENTE
LA POLÍTICA
DE I. URRUGNE

Pero aunque de determinadas estructuras políticas la intervención en ellas, hasta donde pueda hacerlo libremente cada ciudadano, no puede ser efectiva hasta el momento, la acción de un papel central en la lucha por la libertad, que dé lugar justamente, al poder de que es de la política democrática, de desarrollar y de desarrollar hasta la política que debe ser alcanzada por él. Es la lucha por la paz, para los derechos de la humanidad.

Hoy en día, en todos centros económicos y sociales, en todos rincones del mundo, se desarrolla un debate que debe ser el de la política. Se desarrolla una lucha por la paz, un debate que debe ser el de la humanidad.
HAYNOS HISTÉRICA CONTRA LA TRAÍA ES LA RIVAL

Por ejemplo, si para nosotros se derroga la amenaza de agravarse el conflicto, nos damos cuenta de que se ha producido un fenómeno de fiestas que no existe en la realidad. En la realidad, el conflicto sigue siendo la misma amenaza que antes. En el exterior, en cambio, ha cambiado. Ahora el problema es como lidiar con este conflicto, y no con la amenaza que lo ha provocado. En el exterior, se ha producido un cambio que nos permite enfrentarnos de manera más constructiva a la situación actual.

La histeria de la polémica es el resultado de un fenómeno de estigma que no existe en la realidad. En la realidad, el problema es como lidiar con este conflicto, y no con la amenaza que lo ha provocado. En el exterior, se ha producido un cambio que nos permite enfrentarnos de manera más constructiva a la situación actual.
Desde luego que aunque es extraordinariamente dolido haberse hecho esta 출력, acabo viendo que debe pensar en su caso objetivo, con el que hemos procedido ahora con justicia, porque, como dices a todos, hacerla estaba lógicamente que se escusaba. Es decir, una historia de la cual, como una historia de nuestra historia, debe ser escuchada. En el otro lado, como una historia de nuestro mundo, nos encontramos en ella con un caso que estén en todos los casos, que no se corresponda con la época que estamos creando.

Vamos a hacer que "Marxista para 1937" - las opiniones del Presidente Kennedy es un reconocimiento que posiblemente creó, que fue una época en la historia y en una época que estamos creando. La nueva forma de proteger el mundo por el presidente de Estados Unidos.

Por tanto, ya una herramienta de importancia y la vida a suelo.

La fórmula es fundamentalmente como H. Orwell. En el libro, "Un ensayista por el jefe de la información".
"Están muertos, la política continúa"

"Estados Unidos, la política continua"..."Están muertos... la política continúa..."

"Estén muertos, la política continúa."

"Están muertos... la política continúa..."

"Están muertos... la política continúa..."
La crisis de Cuba en la industria de Hollywood

En el momento en que los gestores de la industria de Hollywood se encontraban en Cuba, las tensiones entre el gobierno soviético y el de Cuba aumentaban. La crisis diplomática y política que se desencadenó llegó a un punto crítico dado el alto perfil del viaje de la industria a Cuba.

El gobierno de Cuba siguió y controló los medios de comunicación y la censura en el país. Esto llevó a conflictos con las empresas cinematográficas, que buscaron liberarse de las restricciones y censura que eran impuestas por el gobierno cubano.

Los problemas surgieron en el momento en que el gobierno de Cuba tenía su propia censura y controlaba todos los medios de comunicación. Esto llevó a conflictos con las empresas cinematográficas, que buscaron liberarse de las restricciones y censura que eran impuestas por el gobierno cubano.

La crisis de Cuba siguió y controló los medios de comunicación y la censura en el país. Esto llevó a conflictos con las empresas cinematográficas, que buscaron liberarse de las restricciones y censura que eran impuestas por el gobierno cubano.
Hemos visto que hay una serie de creencias y actitudes que pueden influir en las decisiones políticas. Estas creencias y actitudes pueden estar basadas en varios factores, como la educación, la cultura, la religión y la experiencia personal. Adicionalmente, las condiciones de vida y la situación económica también pueden influir en las decisiones políticas.

El análisis de las opiniones de los ciudadanos puede ser realizado a través de encuestas, encuestas telefónicas y entrevistas cara a cara. Estos métodos permiten recopilar datos sobre las opiniones de una población específica y realizar un análisis detallado de las mismas. Adicionalmente, la utilización de herramientas de análisis de datos permite agrupar y comparar los resultados de las encuestas, lo que permite identificar tendencias y patrones en las opiniones de la población.

En términos de las implicaciones de las opiniones en la política, los gobiernos pueden utilizar las opiniones de la población para tomar decisiones políticas que sean más acordes con las necesidades y preferencias de la población. Además, los gobiernos pueden utilizar las opiniones de la población para diseñar políticas que sean más efectivas y eficientes.

En resumen, el análisis de las opiniones de la población es crucial para tomar decisiones políticas que sean más acordes con las necesidades y preferencias de la población. Además, el análisis de las opiniones de la población permite identificar tendencias y patrones en las opiniones de la población, lo que puede ser útil para diseñar políticas que sean más efectivas y eficientes.

¿Qué opinas sobre el papel de las opiniones en la política? ¿Crees que el análisis de las opiniones de la población es importante para tomar decisiones políticas efectivas? ¿Qué otras implicaciones crees que puede tener el análisis de las opiniones de la población en la política?
Discurso del Primer Ministro, comandante Fidel Castro, en la Universidad

Ni ahora ni nunca nuestro heroico pueblo debe ser tolerante con los vicios ni con el delito.

La revolución es hoy un entusiasmo organizado, preparado y concreto.

Borraremos las bocas de fuego, pero no las bocas de fuego.

UNA HORA DE ORACION

La revolución es hoy un entusiasmo organizado, preparado y concreto.

Borraremos las bocas de fuego, pero no las bocas de fuego.
Mr. Standard. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I have one other request, if I may.

Chairman Stokes. You may proceed.

Mr. Standard. Congressman Thone addressed himself to what in fact happened to the discussion which Senor Azcue had, and I would refer him to what I believe is part of the interviews of your committee and your staff with Mr. Otero, which is not yet part of this record as far as I know; and second to the transcription of the 4-hour interview with President Castro, which I understand will be made part of this record by reference when the witnesses have completed their testimony.

Chairman Stokes. That is correct. The full transcript of the statement with President Castro will be made and incorporated into the entire record.

Mr. Standard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you, counsel. At this time, Mr. Azcue, you are excused. All persons are requested to remain in their seats while the witness leaves the room.

Mr. Standard. Mr. Chairman, the witness would like to remain in the room; if I could provide a chair for him, I would.

Chairman Stokes. Professor Blakey.

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Chairman, in light of the questions raised as to the identity of the man who visited the Cuban consulate, that is whether or not he was Lee Harvey Oswald, the committee decided to test by handwriting analysis the authenticity of the signature on the visa application. The committee was advised by the Cuban Government that the visa applications had to be typed in duplicate and that the applicant had to sign both copies.

In 1964, one of the forms allegedly signed by Mr. Oswald was turned over to the Warren Commission.

In 1978 the committee obtained the second copy, which has been incorporated in the record, in Havana.

Consequently, there are two checks to be made in a handwriting analysis of this question, one, to determine that both visa application forms were signed by the same person, and two, to determine if possible whether the signatures were in fact or are in fact identical with the other writings attributable to Lee Harvey Oswald.

For the purposes of verification, the committee asked its handwriting experts to compare the signatures on the two forms which are part of the record with two other writings. Those other writings were the signature on Oswald's fingerprint card at the time of his arrest in New Orleans in August 1963, and his passport application dated June 24, 1963.

Mr. Chairman, the committee's panel of handwriting experts have in fact made that analysis, and a representative of it will be with the committee on Monday to report in full on those findings. In essence, however, it is that Lee Harvey Oswald signed both of the visa applications.

That representative of the handwriting panel will be Mr. Joseph P. McNally. The committee will recall that Mr. McNally has already testified before the committee and will be available again on Monday to be fully cross-examined on this and several other issues that have arisen in the handwriting area.
At this time, Mr. Chairman, it would be appropriate to note that another member of the Cuban consulate staff who was present when Oswald allegedly applied for a visa was Senor Alfredo Mirabal Diaz. Senor Mirabal succeeded Senor Azcue as Cuban consul in Mexico City. Senor Mirabal was born August 11, 1923.

It would be appropriate at this time, Mr. Chairman, to call Senor Mirabal.

Chairman Stokes. Will the witness please stand. Raise your right hand and be sworn.

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you give before this committee is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God.

[The testimony of Senor Mirabal was given through the interpreter.]

Senor Mirabal. I do.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you. You may be seated.

TESTIMONY OF SENOR ALFREDO MIRABAL DIAZ, ACCOMPANIED BY MR. HERVAS, INTERPRETER FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT

Chairman Stokes. The Chair recognizes counsel, Michael Goldsmith.

Mr. Goldsmith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Mirabal, when did you assume your position as Cuban consul in Mexico City?


Mr. Goldsmith. How long had you worked in that capacity?

Senor Mirabal. Eleven months.

Mr. Goldsmith. What hours of the day was the Cuban consulate open to the public?

Senor Mirabal. Ten in the morning to two in the afternoon.

Mr. Goldsmith. And what days of the week were these hours observed?

Senor Mirabal. Monday through Friday.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was the consulate open to the public on Saturdays and Sundays?

Senor Mirabal. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Mirabal, while you were Cuban consul in Mexico City, did you ever see Lee Harvey Oswald?

Senor Mirabal. Twice, on two occasions, when he was at the consulate processing his visa application.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did anything unusual happen when Oswald was applying for his visa?

Senor Mirabal. Yes; since he first came for the visa, I must note that I do not know English, and therefore it was my colleague Azcue who took care of him, though he had in fact concluded his responsibilities in the position. When I arrived, he stayed on to help me out and he, together with the secretary, took care of this visitor.

From inside my private office I could hear loud voices, and I came out of my office several times to see what was happening in the area where the secretary worked. I asked my colleague, Azcue, who was taking care of the visitor, I did not know who the visitor was. But my colleague Azcue told me that the visitor was in need
of an urgent visa, that he was in a great hurry to travel to Cuba. However, as our own procedures dictated, and as our instructions from the Ministry of Foreign Relations provided, we were not authorized to issue a visa, and therefore the visa was not issued.

He continued in this discussion.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did Mr. Oswald get involved in arguments with Mr. Azcue on both occasions that he, Oswald, visited the consulate?

Senor Mirabal. Yes; on both occasions there were discussions or arguments to such an extent that from the very first moment it appeared to me as if this instance could be a case of a provocation. I sensed that there was an intent to create some kind of a scandal, of a disturbance. That was my feeling.

The second time the same thing happened.

Mr. Goldsmith. Approximately how long did these arguments last?

Senor Mirabal. Today I could not be exact or precise; 15 years have gone by since then. Some time, 15, 20 minutes.

Mr. Goldsmith. And you had occasion to see Mr. Oswald on both of these occasions?

Senor Mirabal. Yes. I had an opportunity to see him. But it was from my private office where I stuck my head over and had a look at him from that vantage point.

Mr. Goldsmith. How far away from you was Mr. Oswald during these two visits?

Senor Mirabal. About 4 meters away.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall when Mr. Oswald made his visits to the Cuban consulate?

Senor Mirabal. It was at the beginning or shortly after my arrival.

Mr. Goldsmith. At this time, Mr. Mirabal, I would like to refer your attention to what has been marked as JFK exhibit F-408. That is the second exhibit from the right. And I believe you have just been handed a copy of that exhibit.

Mr. Mirabal, does the date on that application refresh your memory as to when Oswald visited the Embassy?

Senor Mirabal. Yes; it is close to the date of my arrival. Yes, in addition the visa applications are filled in at the very time that they are being requested, and this would be on the second occasion.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Mirabal, please look at the picture that appears in that application. Is the person whose picture appears in this visa application the same Lee Harvey Oswald who visited the Cuban consulate requesting a visa?

Senor Mirabal. I really did not observe him with any great deal of interest. He for me was one of many who visited the consulate. The image that I have of him, I believe that the answer is yes, that he is the same person.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Mirabal, after the assassination of President Kennedy, was there ever any discussion at the Cuban consulate or Embassy concerning whether the Oswald arrested in Dallas was actually the same person identified as Oswald who visited your consulate requesting a visa in September 1963?

Senor Mirabal. Yes; on the day following the assassination it is my own secretary that communicates this information to me in the morning when I arrive at the consulate. At that point, she advises
me of the fact that the assassination has occurred. Later, and I cannot recall exactly how late or how soon thereafter, she communicates to me the fact that the alleged assassin is the same person that came to the consulate.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Mirabal, at this time I would like to read to you a quotation from Comer Clark’s article. He attributes the quotation to President Castro. I believe that Mr. Hervas has been given a copy of that.

“Lee Oswald came to the Cuban embassy in Mexico City twice,” Castro went on. “The first time—I was told—he wanted to work for us. ‘He was asked to explain, but he wouldn’t. ‘He wouldn’t go into details. ‘The second time he said he wanted to ‘free Cuba from American imperialism.’ ‘Then he said something like: ‘Someone ought to shoot that President Kennedy,’ ‘Then Oswald said—and this was exactly how it was reported to me—‘Maybe I’ll try to do it.’

Mr. Mirabal, do you recall Mr. Oswald making the remarks that are allegedly attributed to him?

Senor Mirabal. I feel that what has just been read is totally absurd, it is incredible. In addition, it is completely false, it is a lie, and it is impossible to imagine that that has been stated.

Mr. Goldsmith. Thank you very much, Mr. Mirabal.

I have no further questions at this time.

Chairman Stokes. Does any member seek recognition?

Mr. Dodd. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Dodd.

Mr. Dodd. Mr. Mirabal, let me just follow up the one line of questioning I had for Mr. Azcue, and that is with regard to how the photo on the visa application got there.

Can you enlighten us at all as to how that photograph got on the application, what either the normal operating procedures were or if there were any unique operating procedures in this case which would explain how that photograph ended up on that visa application?

Senor Mirabal. The entire matter of the processing of the paper work relating to the application was entrusted to the secretary. I did not participate in any manner. She was most efficient, and we trusted her in this task.

Mr. Dodd. In other words, you never saw the visa application when it was in the consulate in Mexico.

Senor Mirabal. Yes, I did. In fact, there is a footnote with a series of remarks or a remark or observation that I included or I made.

Mr. Dodd. Do you recall that photograph as the photograph of the man that you saw, granted not all that clearly, during the 30 minutes or so, the total period of time that he was in your office back in September of 1963?

Senor Mirabal. I know that this was the photograph that was affixed to the request of the application, but at no point did I verify whether this photograph was in fact that of the person who submitted the application, because this was not a matter that I took care of. It was the secretary who was responsible for this, and when she brought these documents to me, I assumed that everything was in order.

Mr. Dodd. Fine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Sawyer.
Mr. Sawyer. Yes, I just have one question.
You stated that the statement attributed to President Castro as
to the statements made in the consulate by Lee Harvey Oswald
were not correct and were a lie or something to that effect.
At that time, I understood you could not speak English and did
not understand English; is that correct?
Senor Mirabal. Yes, it is true. I did not speak English at that
time. However, my colleague, Senor Azcue, and the secretary
would, without any doubt, have informed me if he had stated
anything of such a nature. I have complete trust in my colleague,
Azcue, and in the secretary, and obviously because of the unusual
and extremely alarming nature of any observations or statements
of that kind, I feel sure that they would have advised me had they
heard them.

Mr. Sawyer. I just wanted the record to be clear that you are
repeating what the other two told you rather than stating an
observation as to what he said yourself. You are nodding your head
yes.

Senor Mirabal. Yes; I don't understand English. Even if I heard
it in English, I wouldn't have understood it—yes, it was my col-
league, Azcue, and the secretary who took care of the application
submitted by Lee Harvey Oswald. It was also them who provided
me with all of the information that enabled me to add the observa-
tion contained in that footnote to the effect that he was requesting
at the same time a visa to go to the Soviet Union.
In fact, I noticed that he presented a card or credentials as
belonging to the Communist Party of the United States. I under-
stand, or it is also my understanding, that the Communist Party of
the United States stated that he never belonged to the party. I was
surprised by the fact that the card seemed to be a new card.
I must say that I also have been a Communist for a number of
years and that generally we do not use credentials or a card to
identify ourselves as members of the party. Rather, we are identi-
fied to ourselves as Communists by our own behavior and by our
own ideas. I was surprised by his unusual interest in using identifi-
cation as a Communist.

I would think it would be interesting to know how he obtained
the card. It did have his name, and it did coincide with the same
name that appeared in the other document. And, as I indicated, it
was my colleague, Azcue, who brought all these documents and all
this information to my desk for my report. It is then that I talked
with the Soviet consul, and when I mentioned this to him, he told
me that Oswald had in fact requested a visa for the Soviet Union
but that he had been told that it would take about 4 months to
obtain a response, and that is the reason that I included that
information in the footnote that was to be sent to Havana.

Mr. Sawyer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. Mirabal, was it standard operating procedure for an appli-
cant to affix his signature to the application in the presence of a
consulate official?
Senor Mirabal. That was normal. And it was always applied in
that manner.
Chairman Stokes. Were there ever any occasions when an application form would be signed in blank?

Senor Mirabal. During the 11 months that I was there, that was never done.

Chairman Stokes. And under the procedure as you knew it, were applicants ever permitted to take the application forms out of the consular office?

Senor Mirabal. To my knowledge, no. The ministry did not allow that to be done. I could not authorize it, and as far as I know, it was never done.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you, Mr. Mirabal. Is there anything further?

The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ford.

Mr. Ford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Could I get Mr. Mirabal to describe Mr. Oswald's demeanor, please?

Senor Mirabal. What I recall, and this, of course, is not only an image that time has eroded, but also I looked at him without concentrating great attention on him. At that time his appearance was not a cause of concern, but rather the events that were taking place at that time, the loud conversation, et cetera.

As I recall him, he was a rather small man, medium height or somewhat less, narrow shoulders. I believe he was wearing a coat, short hair. I do not recall him having a moustache. He did have a serious expression on his face. He appeared hard or tough, someone who is upset or unhappy. That is the image that I retain of him.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired. Is there anyone else seeking recognition?

Mr. Mirabal, at the conclusion of a witness' testimony before our committee, he is entitled under the rules of this committee and of the House to address the committee for a period of 5 minutes in the event he desires to in any way clarify his testimony or expand upon it or explain it. I would at this time extend to you 5 minutes for that purpose if you so desire.

Senor Mirabal. Thank you. I would like to state to the members of the committee that in connection with this entire process of the two visits that he made to the consulate, my impression from the very first moment was that it was in fact a provocation. He insisted on the urgency of his need for a visa. He indicated that he was being persecuted. He indicated that he could not stay long in Mexico, that he had an urgent need to travel to Cuba and thereafter to go to the Soviet Union.

On the first day he was not given the visa because he did not fulfill the necessary requirements, requirements that are asked of all individuals who are visa applicants.

On the second time he came to file the application, and yet he insisted that he needed to have it processed rapidly with great urgency. It was because of these demands of his that the argument with Mr. Azcue and with the secretary followed, and in fact during the argument he accused us all of not being true revolutionaries, of not being sensitive to the fact that he was being persecuted.

I must say that from the very beginning I considered this a provocation, and I assured that in the manner in which we handled the case we followed the directives of the Foreign Ministry in the
sense that all individuals have to follow certain procedures in order to obtain a visa.

I would also like to say personally that as far as I am concerned, it is a source of great satisfaction to be present here before the committee because in the first place I consider this a very important investigation in itself and also because we are very interested in its successful outcome.

I am individually—and my government wants to insure—that things will be perfectly cleared up as a result. We feel that there have been efforts at making propaganda, at conducting campaigns, and Cuba has been, attempts have been made to link Cuba to this horrendous assassination.

From the reports that have been read here, apparently even I had been linked to this event, and I can assure that neither Cuba nor I in any manner whatsoever participated in something that we very strongly repudiate, as was clearly stated by Prime Minister Fidel Castro.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you very much, Mr. Mirabal.

We also want to thank you for having volunteered to be here today and to testify before this committee, and we are deeply appreciative for your appearance.

Does counsel have any statement to make?

Mr. Standard. Just this, Mr. Chairman. In anticipation of your incorporating in this record the 4 hour approximate transcript of the interview with President Castro, I ask that you incorporate into the record and make it a part of it a series of articles which are referred to but not with specificity by date or name.

First, a series of three articles by the French journalist, Jean Daniel, one which appeared in L'Express in French and two articles which appeared in the magazine, The New Republic.

Second, in the course of the interview several references are made to Ambassador William Atwood. Those statements describe his role in contacting the Cuban Government at the behest of President Kennedy. And I ask that those be included as well.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, counsel's request is hereby granted.

JFK exhibit F-685 may be entered into therecord at this point. [The information follows:]
CUBA

Avec Castro à l'heure du crime

Dans la pièce où est Fidel Castro, on capte la radio de Miami. La nouvelle arrive. Castro se lève et parle à Jean Daniel...
et la mort. Pas pensé à cette phrase d'un motiste cubain : « J'assure j'ai été que cette révolution sociale parler l'espagnol. Vous ne pouviez la contraindre vraiment si vous vous êtes un fonctionnaire. »... et, en effet, il se faisaient une sembler de l'alliance depuis que j'ai entendu chanter l'« International » par des gitanes filles devant la maison où H. avançait à un mètre de rugueux cubain.

Vers 13 heures, Fidel Castro déclare que, jusqu'à nous n'y pouvons voir, il fût bien de ne pas essayer de respecter l'empire du temps. Il s'est mis à faire corps l'émission de la gane de l'État. Toute la journée, il se trouvait dans l'atelier et il déclare qu'il ne se résignera pas à la nécessité de réunir une assemblée parlementaire. Ce n'est pas l'agitation, il parle avec lyrisme du sort de la réalisation et des possibilités que donnera à Cuba... Il a entendu en effet qu'il s'agit d'un jeune homme, membre du « Faire pour la Révolution de Cuba ». C'est un administrateur de Fidel Castro. Fidel déclare : « Elle avait la gauche, elle n'aurait pas dû nous revoir... »

Le ministre de la Propagande, le Dr. Mario del Río, a déclaré que Cuba avait eu le temps de se préparer à l'empire du temps. Il s'est mis à faire corps l'émission de la gane de l'État. Toute la journée, il se trouvait dans l'atelier et il déclare qu'il ne se résignera pas à la nécessité de réunir une assemblée parlementaire. Ce n'est pas l'agitation, il parle avec lyrisme du sort de la réalisation et des possibilités que donnera à Cuba... Il a entendu en effet qu'il s'agit d'un jeune homme, membre du « Faire pour la Révolution de Cuba ». C'est un administrateur de Fidel Castro. Fidel déclare : « Elle avait la gauche, elle n'aurait pas dû nous revoir... »

**Fidel Castro et Jean Daniel**

« C'est le président du Parti communiste cubain... Il est important. »

**JEAN DANIEL**

**Fidel Castro et Jean Daniel**

« C'est le président du Parti communiste cubain... Il est important. »

**JEAN DANIEL**

**Fidel Castro et Jean Daniel**

« C'est le président du Parti communiste cubain... Il est important. »

**JEAN DANIEL**

**Fidel Castro et Jean Daniel**

« C'est le président du Parti communiste cubain... Il est important. »

**JEAN DANIEL**

**Fidel Castro et Jean Daniel**

« C'est le président du Parti communiste cubain... Il est important. »

**JEAN DANIEL**

**Fidel Castro et Jean Daniel**

« C'est le président du Parti communiste cubain... Il est important. »

**JEAN DANIEL**

**Fidel Castro et Jean Daniel**

« C'est le président du Parti communiste cubain... Il est important. »

**JEAN DANIEL**

**Fidel Castro et Jean Daniel**

« C'est le président du Parti communiste cubain... Il est important. »

**JEAN DANIEL**

**Fidel Castro et Jean Daniel**

« C'est le président du Parti communiste cubain... Il est important. »

**JEAN DANIEL**

**Fidel Castro et Jean Daniel**

« C'est le président du Parti communiste cubain... Il est important. »

**JEAN DANIEL**
LE TESTAMENT DE KENNEDY

Le dernier dialogue


J'ai été tsu la Maison Blanche par le Président Kennedy, le 24 octobre, à 17 h 45. Le rendez-vous avait été fixé à 17 h 50. J'attendais placidement sur une chaise dans la salle des Conférences, lorsque le Président Kennedy est arrivé. Il était avec le Président du Conseil des États-Unis, John F. Kennedy, qui avait été convié à une conférence annuelle du Cercle des États-Unis. Le Président Kennedy a fait un discours de bienvenue et a salué les participants, dont le Président de la France.

La conclusion

Le Président Kennedy a ensuite demandé une conférence avec moi. Après un bref entretien, il a évoqué la question de la situation de l'Europe et de la position de la France dans les affaires mondiales. Il a souligné l'importance de la coopération franco-américaine et a exprimé son intention de continuer à œuvrer pour une meilleure entente entre les deux nations. Il a conclu en exprimant sa gratitude pour ma visite et en me souhaitant bonne continuation dans mes travaux de diplomatie.

Jean France-Marsan

[Signature]

La conclusion a été transmise à la France, et une note officielle a été émise par le Président Kennedy. Les conclusions de la réunion ont été discutées avec le Président de la France, qui a exprimé son accord.

La vérité sur l'affaire des fusées

Le Président Kennedy a également exprimé ses doutes sur l'affaire des fusées. Il a accusé le Président de la France d'avoir manipulé les informations pour semer le doute. Il a souligné que la vérité sur l'affaire des fusées n'avait pas été éclaircie et qu'il était nécessaire de continuer à travailler pour une meilleure entente entre les deux nations.

La France a répondu aux accusations de façon délicate et a assuré son attachement aux relations franco-américaines. Elle a promis de travailler pour une meilleure entente entre les deux nations et de contribuer à l'élimination des armes nucléaires.

[Signature]
LES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES

No 11 (novembre 1963)

N’avez-vous pas remarqué que cela ne se produit que dans les pays du Sud ?

J’entends parler de la goélette Blanche, le plus récent des symboles du haut gouvernement, qui a douze cents mètres de long !

Il est vrai que nous avons essayé de lancer la goélette Blanche en 1962, mais nous avons été confrontés à des difficultés incroyables.

Nous avons été confrontés à des problèmes techniques, à des problèmes politiques, et même à des problèmes financiers. Cela a été un échec, je ne peux pas le nier.

La goélette Blanche est un symbole de la puissance du gouvernement, mais elle a également des vertus symboliques. Elle est un rappel visible de notre détermination à ne jamais accepter de compromis.

Nous avons une grande responsabilité dans le monde, et nous ne pouvons pas nous permettre de faire des compromis. Nous devons continuer à défendre nos intérêts et nos valeurs, même si cela nous coûte cher.

Pourtant, nous devons être conscients de la réalité. La goélette Blanche est un symbole, mais elle est aussi une réalité. Elle est le reflet de notre détermination à défendre nos intérêts, et nous devons continuer à la défendre, même si cela nous coûte cher.

J’espère que nous pourrons réussir à la fin. Cela ne sera pas facile, mais nous ne pouvons pas abandonner.

Jean Daniel

COPYRIGHT © L’EXPRESS ET JEAN DANIEL. TOUTE REPRODUCTION, MÊME PARTIELLE, INTERDITE, SAUF ACCORD.
When Castro Heard the News

Havana

It was around 1.30 in the afternoon, Cuban time. We were having lunch in the living room of the modest summer residence which Fidel Castro owns on magnificent Varadero Beach, 120 kilometers from Havana. For at least the tenth time I was questioning the Cuban leader on details of the negotiations with Russia before the missile installations last year. The telephone rang, a secretary in guerrilla garb announced that Mr. Dorticós, President of the Cuban Republic, had an urgent communication for the Prime Minister. Fidel picked up the phone and I heard him say: "Como? Un atentado?" ("What's that? An attempted assassination?") He then turned to us to say that Kennedy had just been struck down in Dallas. Then he went back to the telephone and exclaimed in a loud voice "Herido? Muy gravemente?" ("Wounded? Very seriously?")

He came back, sat down, and repeated three times the words: "Es una mala noticia." ("This is bad news.") He remained silent for a moment, awaiting another call with further news. He remarked while we waited that there was an alarmingly sizable lunatic fringe in American society and that this deed could equally well have been the work of a madman or of a terrorist. Perhaps a Vietnamese? Or a member of the Ku Klux Klan? The second call came through: it was hoped they would be able to announce that the United States President was still alive, that there was hope of saving him. Fidel Castro's immediate reaction was: "If they can, he is already re-elected." He pronounced these words with satisfaction.

This sentence was a sequel to a conversation we had held on a previous evening and which had turned into an all-night session. To be precise, it lasted from 3.10 in the evening until 4 in the morning. A good part of the talk revolved about the impressions I recounted to him of an interview which President Kennedy granted me last October 24, and about Fidel Castro's reactions to these impressions. During this nocturnal discussion, Castro had delivered himself of a relentless indictment of US policy, adding that in the recent past Washington had had ample opportunity to normalize its relations with Cuba, but that instead it had tolerated a CIA program of training, equipping and organizing a counter-revolution. He had told me that he wasn't in the least fearful of his life, since danger was his natural milieu, and if he were to become a victim of the United States this would simply enhance his radius of influence in Latin America as well as throughout the socialist world. He was speaking, he said, from the viewpoint of the interests of peace in both the American continents. To achieve this goal, a leader would have to arise in the United States capable of understanding the explosive realities of Latin America and of meeting them halfway. Then, suddenly, he had taken a less hostile tack: "Kennedy could still be this man. He still has the possibility of becoming, in the eyes of history, the greatest President of the United States, the leader who may at last understand that there can be coherence between capitalists and socialists, even in the Americas. He would then be an even greater President than Lincoln. I know, for example, that for Khrushchev, Kennedy is a man you can talk with. I have gotten this impression from all my conversations with Khrushchev. Other leaders have assured me that to attain this goal, we must first await his re-election. Personally, I consider him responsible for everything, but I will say this: he has come to understand many things over the past few months; and then too, in the last analysis, I'm convinced that anyone else would be worse." Then Fidel had added with a broad and boyish grin: "If you see him again, you can tell him that I'm willing to declare Goldwater my friend if that will guarantee Kennedy's re-election!"

This conversation was held on November 29.

Now it was nearly 2 o'clock and we got up from the table and settled ourselves in front of a radio. Commandant Vallerio, his physician, aide-de-camp, and intimate friend, was easily able to get the broadcasts from the NBC network in Miami. As the news came in, Vallerio would translate it for Fidel: Kennedy wounded in the head; pursuit of the assassin; murder of a policeman; finally the fatal announcement: President Kennedy is dead. Then Fidel stood up and said to me: "Everything is changed. Everything is going to change. The United States occupies such a position in world affairs that the death of a President of that country affects millions of people in every corner of the globe. The cold war, relations with Russia, Latin America, Cuba, the Negro question... all will have to be rethought. I'll tell you one thing: at least Kennedy was an enemy to whom we had become accustomed. This is a serious matter, an extremely serious matter."

After the quarter-hour of silence observed by all the American radio stations, we once more tuned in on Miami; the silence had only been broken by a re-broadcasting of the American national anthem. Strange indeed was the impression made, on hearing this hymn ring out in the house of Fidel Castro, in the midst of a circle of worried faces. "Now," Fidel said, "they will have to find the assassin quickly, but very quickly,
otherwise, you watch and see, I know them, they will try to put the blame on us for this thing. But tell me, how many Presidents have been assassinated? Four? This is most disturbing! In Cuba, only one has been assassinated. You know, when we were hiding out in the Sierra there were some (not in my group, in another) who wanted to kill Batista. They thought they could do away with a regime by decapitating it. I have always been violently opposed to such methods. First of all from the viewpoint of political self-interest, because so far as Cuba is concerned, if Batista had been killed he would have been replaced by some military figure who would have tried to make the revolutionists pay for the martyrdom of the dictator. But I was also opposed to it on personal grounds; assassination is repellent to me."

The broadcasts were now resumed. One reporter felt he should mention the difficulty Mrs. Kennedy was having in getting rid of her bloodstained stockings. Fidel exploded: "What sort of a mind is this!" He repeated the remark several times: "What sort of a mind is this? There is a difference in our civilizations after all. Are you like this in Europe? For us Latin Americans, death is a sacred matter: not only does it mark the close of hostilities but it also imposes decency, dignity, respect. There are even street urchins who behave like kings in the face of death. Incidentally, this reminds me of something else: if you write all those things I told you yesterday against Kennedy's policy don't use his name now; speak instead of the policy of the United States government."

Toward 5 o'clock, Fidel Castro declared that since there was nothing we could do to alter the tragedy, we must try to put our time to good use in spite of it. He wanted to accompany me in person on a visit to a granja de pueblo (state farm), where he had been engaging in some experiments. His present obsession is agriculture. He reads nothing but agronomical studies and reports. He dwells lyrically on the soil, fertilizers, and the possibilities which will give Cuba enough sugar cane by 1970 to achieve economic independence.

"Didn't I Tell You"

We went by car, with the radio on. The Dallas police were now hot on the trail of the assassin. He is a Russian spy, says the news commentator. Five minutes later, correction: he is a spy married to a Russian. Fidel said: "There, didn't I tell you; it'll be my turn next." But not yet. The next word was: the assassin is a Marxist deserter. Then the word came through, in effect, that the assassin was a young man who was a member of the "Fair Play for Cuba Committee," that he was an admirer of Fidel Castro. Fidel declared: "If they had had proof, they would have said he was an agent, an accomplice, a hired killer. In saying simply that he is an admirer, this is just to try and make an association in people's minds between the name of Castro and the emotion awakened by the assassination. This is a publicity method, a propaganda device. It's terrible. But you know, I'm sure this will all soon blow over. There are too many competing policies in the United States for any single one to be able to impose itself universally for very long.

We arrived at the granja de pueblo, where the farmers welcomed Fidel. At that very moment, a speaker announced over the radio that it was now known that the assassin is a "pro-Castro Marxist." One commentator followed another; the remarks became increasingly emotional, increasingly aggressive. Fidel then excused himself: "We shall have to give up the visit to the farm." We went on toward Matanzas from where he could telephone President Dorticós. On the way he had questions: "Who is Lyndon Johnson? What is his reputation? What were his relations with Kennedy? With Krushchev? What was his position at the time of the attempted invasion of Cuba?" Finally and most important of all: "What authority does he exercise over the CIA?" Then abruptly he looked at his watch, saw that it would be half an hour before we reached Matanzas and, practically on the spot, he dropped off to sleep.

After Matanzas, where he must have decreed a state of alert, we returned to Varadero for dinner. Quoting the words spoken to him by a woman shortly before, he said to me that it was an irony of history for the Cubans, in the situation to which they had been reduced by the blockade, to have to mourn the death of a President of the United States. "After all," he added, "there are perhaps some people in the world to whom this news is cause for rejoicing. The South Vietnamese guerrillas, for example, and also, I would imagine, Madame Nhu!"

I thought of the people of Cuba, accustomed to the sight of posters like the one depicting the Red Army with maquis superimposed in front, and the screaming captions "HALT ... to endanger the peace of the world with the missiles in Cuba! How dependent was Cuba on the Soviet Union? Is it not possible to envisage relations between Cuba and the United States along the same lines as those between Finland and the Russians? How was the transition made from the humanism of Sierra Maestra to the Marxism-Leninism of 1961? Fidel Castro, once more in top form, had an explanation for everything. Then he questioned me
once more on Kennedy, and each time I eulogised the intellectual qualities of the assassinated President, I awakened the keenest interest in him.

The Cubans have lived with the United States in that cruel intimacy so familiar to me of the colonized with their colonizers. Nevertheless, it was an intimacy. In that very seductive city of Havana to which we returned in the evening, where the luminous signboards with Marxist slogans have replaced the Coca Cola and toothpaste billboards, in the midst of Soviet exhibits and Czechoslovakian trucks, a certain American emotion vibrated in the atmosphere, compounded of resentment, of concern, of anxiety, yet also, in spite of everything, of a mysterious almost imperceptible rapprochement. After all, this American President was able to reach accord with our Russian friends during his lifetime, said a young Cuban intellectual to me as I was taking my leave. It was almost as though he were apologizing for not rejoicing at the assassination.

JEAN DANIEL
Unofficial Envoy

An Historic Report from Two Capitals

by Jean Daniel

A recent trip to the United States, followed by a journey to Cuba, made it possible for me to establish a "dialogue" between the late President Kennedy and Prime Minister Fidel Castro. Since my arrival in Mexico, where this article is being written, I have been asked whether the impressions I derived from these interviews could shed any light on the assassination of the President and on future relations between Lyndon B. Johnson and Castro.

Last week in these pages I answered the first question by describing the reactions of Fidel Castro, with whom I was visiting at the time, to John Kennedy's death. Here I shall explore the second question by reconstituting the Kennedy-Castro dialogue from the viewpoint of one who was a witness to it.

THE AUTHOR

President Kennedy received me at the White House on Thursday, October 24. My appointment had been scheduled for 5:30. I waited in the Cabinet Conference Room, and at 5:45 the President, following his usual custom, came to look for me himself so that he could escort me into his office. He apologized for the delay, not so much as a courtesy or to flatter me, but to explain the scheduling of his time, which seemed to be very strictly organized. As we passed through the small room where his secretary was working, we caught a glimpse of Mrs. Kennedy leaving by a French window on her way to the private garden of the White House.

The President called her back to introduce me.

It was still Indian summer in Washington. The weather was very warm, and both the President and Mrs. Kennedy were very lightly dressed, thus enhancing the impression of youth, charm, and simplicity which was in rather surprising contrast to the solemnity of entering these august chambers. The President (athletic looking in his well-tailored suit, speaking with quick, abrupt gestures and a mobile expression but, at times, freezing up and becoming disconcertingly, almost, I would say, completely expressionless) invited me to be seated on the semi-circular sofa which was in the middle of his office. He sat in a rocking chair opposite the sofa. The interview was to last from 20 to 25 minutes, and it was interrupted only by a brief telephone call.

The President immediately asked me how the French situation was developing. After my reply, he spoke about General de Gaulle. He talked in a relaxed fashion, like someone who has at last found solace in indifference after having long been exasperated and fascinated. John Kennedy was a man who liked to get to the heart of a matter quickly, and make decisions even more rapidly. But this was not possible in dealing with de Gaulle, who is more difficult to handle than Khroushchev. One day, impatient at not understanding the General's reasoning and intent upon convincing him, Kennedy telephoned de Gaulle direct. All in vain. Oddly enough, however, since the recent visit of de Gaulle's foreign minister, Couve de Murville, to Washington Mr. Kennedy had ceased to be so deeply concerned about Franco-American relations. The truth is, he had made up his mind not to worry about them any more. According to him, it was a waste of time.

"Mr. Couve de Murville and I both verified that we didn't agree on anything," the President told me. "And we agreed that such total disagreement was hardly calculated to create a flourishing friendship between two great Western nations. I came to the conclusion that General de Gaulle's strategy, which is rather incomprehensible to me, requires a certain amount of tension with the United States. It would seem that only through this tension is it possible to restore to Europe the desire to think for itself and renounce its torpid dependence on American dollar aid and political guidance!"

President Kennedy went on to sum up, with conciseness and vigor, the points of disagreement between the United States and France. On the subject of Germany, nuclear policy, Europe, the idea of "independence," he told me what has since become public
knowledge. He added, however, that France had a strange way of manifesting its independence, particularly, for example, on the subject of Vietnam and Cuba. It seemed ironic and irritating to him that the French Chief Executive was apparently bent on telling him how the United States should proceed, without assuming any risks himself. He told me that no one was more appreciative than he of advice, information, and even criticism; but that these were all the more valued if the friends proffering them were themselves committed to a program of action.

I then asked Mr. Kennedy, what could be expected from General de Gaulle’s proposed visit to the United States next February. He replied: “Absolutely nothing.” But he followed this up immediately and with a broad grin, as though savoring in advance the pleasure of the impending meeting: “It will be exciting, just the same. General de Gaulle is an historic figure; he is decidedly the strangest great man of our time.”

**Relations with Cuba**

Taking the initiative at this point, I brought up the subject of Vietnam and Cuba, saying that the Gaullists were not the only ones in France who deplored certain mistaken US policies. I pointed out that the first time I had the opportunity of meeting John Kennedy, he was a Senator and had just made a resounding speech on the subject of Algeria. I asked if he had proceeded, without that speech been faithfully applied in Saigon and Havana? Here my notes are very specific, and I shall let the late President speak through them:

“We haven’t enough time to talk about Vietnam, but I’d like to talk to you about Cuba. Incidentally, our conversation will be much more interesting when you return, because Ben Bradlee [of Newsweek] tells me you are on your way to Cuba now.

“Every now and then I read articles in the European press pointing out that we Americans were blind to what was happening in the Cuban situation. I have just learned that General de Gaulle himself regarded Communism in Cuba as nothing but the accidental and temporary form of a will to independence from the United States. Of course it is very easy to understand this ‘will to independence’ around President de Gaulle.”

John Kennedy then mustered all his persuasive force. He punctuated each sentence with that brief, mechanical gesture which had become famous:

“I tell you this: we know perfectly what happened in Cuba, to the misfortune of all. From the beginning I personally followed the development of these events with mounting concern. There are few subjects to which I have devoted more painstaking attention. My conclusions go much further than the European analyses. Here is what I believe.

“I believe that there is no country in the world, including all the African regions, including any and all the countries under colonial domination, where economic colonization, humiliation and exploitation were worse than in Cuba, in part owing to my country’s policies during the United States of America. It seemed ironic and irritating to him that the French Chief Executive was apparently bent on telling him how the United States should proceed, without assuming any risks himself. He told me that no one was more appreciative than he of advice, information, and even criticism; but that these were all the more valued if the friends proffering them were themselves committed to a program of action.

I then asked Mr. Kennedy, what could be expected from General de Gaulle’s proposed visit to the United States next February. He replied: “Absolutely nothing.” But he followed this up immediately and with a broad grin, as though savoring in advance the pleasure of the impending meeting: “It will be exciting, just the same. General de Gaulle is an historic figure; he is decidedly the strangest great man of our time.”

Taking the initiative at this point, I brought up the subject of Vietnam and Cuba, saying that the Gaullists were not the only ones in France who deplored certain mistaken US policies. I pointed out that the first time I had the opportunity of meeting John Kennedy, he was a Senator and had just made a resounding speech on the subject of Algeria. I asked if he had proceeded, without that speech being faithfully applied in Saigon and Havana? Here my notes are very specific, and I shall let the late President speak through them:

“We haven’t enough time to talk about Vietnam, but I’d like to talk to you about Cuba. Incidentally, our conversation will be much more interesting when you return, because Ben Bradlee [of Newsweek] tells me you are on your way to Cuba now.

“Every now and then I read articles in the European press pointing out that we Americans were blind to what was happening in the Cuban situation. I have just learned that General de Gaulle himself regarded Communism in Cuba as nothing but the accidental and temporary form of a will to independence from the United States. Of course it is very easy to understand this ‘will to independence’ around President de Gaulle.”

John Kennedy then mustered all his persuasive force. He punctuated each sentence with that brief, mechanical gesture which had become famous:

“I tell you this: we know perfectly what happened in Cuba, to the misfortune of all. From the beginning I personally followed the development of these events with mounting concern. There are few subjects to which I have devoted more painstaking attention. My conclusions go much further than the European analyses. Here is what I believe.

“I believe that there is no country in the world, including all the African regions, including any and all the countries under colonial domination, where economic colonization, humiliation and exploitation were worse than in Cuba, in part owing to my country’s policies during the United States of America.
DECEMBER 14, 1963

**Five. Second question What does the American government expect to gain from the blockade? Is the economic isolation of Cuba a punishment or a political maneuver?**

Kennedy's reply: "Are you suggesting that the political effectivenness of the blockade is uncertain [smile]? You will see when you go to Cuba whether it is or not. In any case, we can't anticipate. It's a subversion win in the other Latin American countries. Two dikes are needed to contain Soviet expansion: the blockade on the one hand, a tremendous effort toward progress on the other. This is the problem in a nutshell. Both battles are equally difficult." (Silence.) Then, a last comment: "The continuation of the blockade depends on the continuation of subversive activities."

The interview was over. I did not really wish to suggest anything, since I had never been to Cuba and, on the other hand, I had heard from all sides tales of the privations the Cuban people were suffering owing to their isolated economic situation. But I could see plainly that John Kennedy had doubts, and was seeking a way out.

That same evening I recounted this conversation in detail to an American colleague – an intimate friend of President Kennedy, through whom I had obtained this interview – and to the editor of The New Republic. Both my confidants, who knew the President a thousand times better than I, agreed that John F. Kennedy had never before expressed himself so specifically and with such feeling on his understanding of the first phase of the Castro revolution. They hesitated to draw any political conclusions from his remarks. However, they were not surprised at Kennedy's invitation to come and see him again when I returned from Cuba.

In effect, John Kennedy displayed two basic characteristics in his exercise of power: first, an overwhelming degree of empiricism and realism. A man without a particular doctrine, he reacted decisively to events, and only to events. Nothing but the shock of collision with a problem was sufficient to make him come to a decision, and because of this, his decisions were unpredictable. At that point he had a consuming need for information, and this need had increased a great deal since experience had taught him not to rely solely on official channels.

After this, I went to Havana.

**Night Session**

In the "Pearl of the Antilles, rum-perfumed and steeped in triumphant sensuality," as Cuba is described in those American tourist folders still lying about in the hotels of Havana, I spent three closely packed and intensive weeks, but thinking all along that I would never get to meet with Fidel Castro. I talked with farmers, writers and painters, militants and counter-revolutionaries, ministers and ambassadors – but Fidel remained inaccessible. I had been warned: he was snowed under with work. As a result of the hurricane, the Cuban government had been obliged to revise its whole planning program; and then, above all, he no longer had any desire to receive any journalists, least of all Western newsmen. I had practically given up hope when, on the evening of what I thought was to be my departure date (the capricious plane which links Havana with Mexico happily did not leave the next day after all), Fidel came to my hotel. I had heard of my interview with the President. We wove up to my room at 10 in the evening and did not leave until 4 in the following morning. Here, I shall only recount that part of that interview which constitutes a reply to John F. Kennedy's remarks.

Fidel listened with devouring and passionate interest; he pulled at his beard, yanked his parachutist's beret down over his eyes, adjusted his maqui tunic, all the while making me the target of a thousand malicious sparks cast by his deep-sunk, lively eyes. At one point I felt as though I were playing the role of that partner with whom he had as strong a desire to confer as to do battle; as though I myself were in a small way that intimate enemy in the White House whom Khrushchev described to Fidel as someone with whom "it is possible to talk." Three times he had me repeat certain remarks, particularly those in which Kennedy expressed his criticism of the Batista regime, those in which Kennedy showed his impatience with the comments attributed to General de Gaulle, and lastly those in which Kennedy accused Fidel of having almost caused a war fatal to all humanity.

When I stopped talking, I expected an explosion. Instead, I was treated to a lengthy silence and, at the end of that silence, a calm, composed, often humorous, always thoughtful exposition. I don't know whether Fidel has changed, or whether those cartoons caricaturing him as a ranting madman which appear in the Western press perhaps correspond to a former reality. I only know that at no time during the two complete days I spent with him (and during which a great deal happened), did Castro abandon his composure and poise. Here too, I shall let Castro speak for himself, reserving only the possibility of correcting certain judgments on these two political leaders based on my own experiences in Cuba.

"I believe Kennedy is sincere," Fidel declared. "I also believe that today the expression of this sincerity could have political significance. I'll explain what I mean. I haven't forgotten that Kennedy centered his electoral campaign against Nixon on the theme of firmness toward Cuba. I have not forgotten the Machiavellian tactics and the equivocation, the attempts at
invasion, the pressures, the blackmail, the organization of a counter-revolution, the blockade and, above everything, all the retaliatory measures which were imposed before, long before there was the pretext and alibi of Communism. But I feel that he inherited a difficult situation. I don't think a President of the United States is ever really free, and I believe Kennedy is at present feeling the impact of this lack of freedom. I also believe he now understands the extent to which he has been misled, especially, for example, on Cuban reaction at the time of the attempted Bay of Pigs invasion. I also think he is a realist: he is now registering that it is impossible to simply wave a wand and cause us, and the explosive situation throughout Latin America, to disappear.

Why the Missiles Were Installed

"There is one point on which I want to give you new information right now. I have not told anyone this until now, and I think an attempt is being made to frighten us all unnecessarily by perpetuating the idea that Cuba, and in particular, might provide a nuclear war, so I feel the world should know the true story of the missile installation.

"Six months before those missiles were installed in Cuba, we had received an accumulation of information warning us that a new invasion of the island was being prepared under sponsorship of the Central Intelligence Agency, whose administrators were humiliates by the Bay of Pigs disaster and by the spectacle of being ridiculed in the eyes of the world and then buried in US government circles. We also knew that the Pentagon was vesting the CIA preparations with the mantle of its authority, but we had doubts as to the attitude of the President. There were those among our informants who even thought it would suffice to alert the President and give him cause for concern in order to arrest these preparations. Then one day Khrushchev's son-in-law, Adzhubei, came to pay us a visit before going on to Washington at the invitation of Kennedy's associates. Immediately upon arriving in Washington, Adzhubei had been received by the American Chief Executive, and their talk centered particularly on Cuba. A week after this interview, we received in Havana a copy of Adzhubei's report to Khrushchev. It was this report which triggered the whole situation.

"What did Kennedy say to Adzhubei? Now listen to this carefully, for it is very important: he had said that the new situation in Cuba was intolerable for the United States, that the American government had decided it would not tolerate it any longer; he had said that peaceful coexistence was seriously compromised by the fact that 'Soviet influences' in Cuba altered the balance of strength, was destroying the equilibrium agreed upon and [at this point Castro emphasized his statement by pronouncing each syllable separately] Kennedy reminded the Russians that the United States had not intervened in Hungary, which was obviously a way of demanding Russian non-intervention in the event of a possible invasion. To be sure, the actual word 'invasion' was not mentioned and Adzhubei, at the time, lacking any background information, could not draw the same conclusions as we did. But when we communicated to the Russians too began to interpret the Kennedy-Adzhubei conversation as we saw it and they went to the source of our information. By the end of a month, the Russian and Cuban governments had reached the definite conclusion that an invasion might take place from any moment to the next. This is the truth.

"What was to be done? How could we prevent the invasion? We found that Khrushchev was concerned about the same things that were worrying us. He asked us what we wanted. We replied, do whatever is needed to avoid the United States having any attack on Cuba in the same way as that on Hungary and the United States. And how to realize this collective and our thinking and discussion revolved around this point. We thought of a proclamation, an alliance of conventional military aid. The Russians explained to us that their concern was constant, that they wanted to save the Cuban revolution, and in other words, their socialist honor in the eyes of the world, and at the same time they wished to avoid a world conflict. They reasoned that if conventional military aid was the content of their assistance, the United States might not hesitate to initiate an invasion, in which case Khrushchev would retaliate and this would inevitably touch a world war."

At this point I interrupted to ask how Cuba could have been absolutely certain of Soviet intervention. After all, I said, Stalin certainly "let down" Markos, the Chief of the Greek Communist Resistance, because such help would have conflicted with prevailing zones of influence.

"I know," Castro replied, "but the two situations cannot be compared." Then he continued:

"Russia was much too deeply committed to us. Moreover, since then we have had every proof of the immense solidarity of the Soviet people and its leaders. You can see for yourself how clearly this solidarity is manifest here. Then there is something else, specifically apropos of Stalin. When I was in the USSR and others, outside Russia, were reproaching Khrushchev for taking a more conciliatory stand than Stalin toward the capitalists, Khrushchev confided to me several examples, which I will not repeat to you, illustrating the prudence, even the abdication of Stalin. He told me—and I believe him—that Stalin would never have placed missiles in Cuba."
"It is true that it was said then by other factions that the real reason for installing the missiles was because certain internal problems were driving the Russians to use us to provoke the United States. I am here to tell you that the Russians didn’t want and do not today want war. One only need visit them on their home territory, watch them at work, share their economic concerns, admire their intense efforts to raise the workers’ standard of living, to understand right away that they are far, very far, from any idea of provocation or domination. However, Soviet Russia was confronted by two alternatives: an absolutely inevitable war (because of their commitments and their position in the socialist world), if the Cuban revolution was attacked; or the risk of a war if the United States, refusing to retreat before the missiles, would not give up the attempt to destroy Cuba. They chose socialist solidarity and the risk of war.

"Under these circumstances, how could we Cubans have refused to share the risks taken to save us? It was, in the final analysis, a question of honor, don’t you agree? Don’t you believe that honor plays a role in politics? You think we are romantics, don’t you? Perhaps we are. And why not? In any event, we are militants. In a word, then, we agreed to the emplacement of the missiles. And I might add here that for us Cubans it didn’t really make so much difference whether we died by conventional bombing or by a hydrogen bomb. Nevertheless, we were not gambling with the peace of the world. The United States was the one to jeopardize the peace of mankind by using the threat of war to stifle revolutions.

"And so in June, 1962, my brother Raoul and Che Guevara went to Moscow to discuss ways and means of installing the missiles. The convoy arrived by sea in three weeks. The United States was able to find out that weapons were being shipped in, of course; but it took them two months to discover that these weapons were guided missiles. Two months... in other words, longer than we had calculated. Because, of course, we were seeking intimidation, not aggression."

Alliance for Progress

The conversation now turned to the Alliance for Progress. "In a way," Castro said, "it was a good idea, it marked progress of a sort. Even if it can be said that it was overdue, timid, conceived on the spur of the moment, under constraint... despite all that I am willing to agree that the idea in itself constituted an effort to adapt to the extraordinarily rapid course of events in Latin America. Such as, for example, what we read in the papers this morning – did you see the news? That Argentina is nationalizing the oil industry? The Argentine government! Do you realize what that means? This will cause more commotion on the New York stock exchange than Castroism! The Catholic and military conservatives of Argentina, the factions most closely linked with American interests! There is talk of nationalization of industries there, of agrarian reform there... well and good! If the Alliance for Progress provokes these developments, then it’s not doing so badly; all these things are consonant with the aspirations of the people. I can look back to the days of Eisenhower, or rather of Nixon, and recall the furor which broke out when the United States and Cuba together decreed an agrarian reform which was to apply, mark this well, only to landowners of over 200,000 hectares! Yes, 200,000! Yet the reaction of the trusts was terrible at that time. Nowadays, in the other Latin American countries, because the Communist banner is used as a bogeyman, the reaction of the American trusts is shrewder. They are going to choose straws, so as to rule indirectly. But there will be difficulties.

"This is why Kennedy’s good ideas aren’t going to yield any results. It is very easy to understand and at this point he surely is aware of this because, as I told you, he is a realist. For years and years American policy – not the government, but the trusts and the Pentagon – has supported the Latin American oligarchies. All the prestige, the dollars, and the power was held by a class which Kennedy himself has described in speaking of Batista. Suddenly a President arrives on the scene who tries to support the interests of another class (which has no access to any of the levers of power) to give the various Latin American countries the impression that the United States no longer stands behind the dictators, and so there is no more need to start Castro-type revolutions. What happens then? The trusts see that their interests are being a little compromised (just barely, but still compromised); the Pentagon thinks the strategic bases are in danger; the powerful oligarchies in all the Latin American countries alert their American friends; they sabotage the new policy; and in short, Kennedy has everyone against him. The few liberal or allegedly liberal presidents who were chosen as instruments of the new policy are swept out of office, like Bosch in Santo Domingo, or else they are transformed. Betancourt, for example, was not a Batista; now he has become one.

"In view of all these things, how can the American government seriously believe that Cuban subversion is at the root of explosions taking place all over the South American continent? In Venezuela, for example, are you familiar with the situation there? Do you think the Venezuelans need us to understand what’s going on in their country? Do you think we don’t have enough problems of our own? Right now I ask only one thing: Leave us in peace to better our country’s economic situation, to put our planning into effect, to
educate our young compañeros. This doesn't mean we do not feel solidarity toward nations that are struggling and suffering, like the Venezuelan people. But it is up to those nations to decide what they want, and if they choose other regimes than ours, this isn't our business.

"We Have Always Lived with Danger"

I asked Fidel where is this all going to end? How will the situation develop? Even if the United States uses against you what you call the alibi of Communism, it still remains true that you have chosen Communism, that your economy and your security depend on the Soviet Union, and that even if you have no ulterior motives in this association, still the United States considers that you are part of an international strategy, that you constitute a Soviet base in a world where peace depends on mutual respect for a tacit division of zones of influence.

"I don't want to discuss our ties with the Soviet Union," Fidel Castro cut me short. "I find this indecent. We have none but feelings of fraternity and profound, total gratitude toward the USSR. The Russians are making extraordinary efforts on our behalf, efforts which sometimes cost them dear. But we have our own policies which are perhaps not always the same (we have proved this!) as those of the USSR. I refuse to dwell on this point, because asking me to say that I am not a pawn on the Soviet chessboard is something like asking a woman to shout aloud in the public square that she is not a prostitute.

"If the United States sees the problem as you have posed it, then you are right, there is no way out. But who is the loser in the last analysis? They have tried everything against us, everything, absolutely everything, and we are still alive and getting better day by day: we are still standing upright, and we plan to celebrate with greater festivities than usual, on January 1, 1964, the fifth anniversary of the Cuban Revolution! The United States' policy of isolating us economically is less effective with each passing day; we are increasing our trade with the rest of the world. Even with Spain! We have just sold a shipment of 300,000 tons of sugar to the Spaniards. Far from discouraging us, the blockade is maintaining the revolutionary atmosphere we need to stiffen the country's backbone. Are we in danger? We have always lived with danger. To say nothing of the fact that you have no idea how many friends one discovers in the world when one is persecuted by the United States. No, truly, for all these reasons, we are not suppliants, we ask nothing. I'll tell you something else: since the rupture and the blockade, we have forgotten the United States. We feel neither hatred nor resentment any more, we simply don't think about the US. When I think of the problems which diplomatic relations with the United States would pose! The Swiss Ambassador is representing the US at present. I prefer to do business with him than with 200 members of an Embassy among whom surely some spies would be spotted.

"I have just talked to you as a Cuban revolutionary. But I should also speak to you as a peace lover, and from this viewpoint I believe the United States is too important a country not to have an influence on world peace. I cannot help hoping, therefore, that a leader will come to the fore in North America (why not Kennedy, there are things in his favor!), who will be willing to brave unpopularity, fight the trusts, tell the truth and, most important, let the various nations act as they see fit. I ask nothing: neither dollars, nor assistance, nor diplomats, nor bankers, nor military men—nothing but peace, and to be accepted as we are! We are socialists, the United States is a capitalist nation, the Latin American countries will choose what they want. All the same, at a time when the United States is selling wheat to the Russians, Canada is trading with China, de Gaulle respects Ben Bella, why should it be impossible to make the Americans understand that socialism leads, not to hostility toward them, but to co-existence? Why am I not Tito or Sekou Touré? Because the Russians have never done us any injury such as the Yugoslavians and the Guineans have complained of in the past, and because the Americans have never given us any of the benefits for which these two nations congratulate themselves today.

"As to this matter of fearing Soviet intentions in Latin America through Cuba's subversive activities, this is just attributing to others one's own desire to dominate. You said yourself just a little while ago that the Russians have had enough of their Cuban involvement. Economically this is obvious. This is why, speaking from a military viewpoint, it is better not to force nations to turn to the Russians for help. Really, It seems to me that a man like Kennedy is capable of seeing that it is not in the United States' interest to pursue a policy which can lead only to a stalemate. So far as we are concerned, everything can be restored to normalcy on the basis of mutual respect of sovereignty.

In conclusion, Fidel Castro said to me: "Since you are going to see Kennedy again, be an emissary of peace, despite everything. I want to make myself clear: I don't want anything, I don't expect anything, and as a revolutionary the present situation does not displease me. But as a man and as a statesman, it is my duty to indicate what the bases for understanding could be."

All this was said two days before President Kennedy's death.

CUBA: The New Republic and Jean Daniel
Mr. Standard. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. Because of the lateness of the hour, it will be the plan of the committee to make the presentation tomorrow morning of the interview with President Fidel Castro in Cuba. For that reason I would like to make some other remarks at this time.

This committee made two trips to Cuba, one on March 30, which extended from the 30th of March to the 4th of April. The second trip was from August 24 to August 29. Prior to going to Cuba on both occasions, it required a great deal of preparation and a great deal of contact between this committee and the Cuban Interest Section in the Cuban Government.

I want to acknowledge the presence here today at the witness table of one of the gentlemen who was extremely helpful and cooperative to this committee in terms of both of those trips, Senor Ricardo Escartin, who is the Consul and the First Secretary of the Cuban Interest Section. It was necessary for Mr. Escartin and other members of the Cuban Interest Section to meet with me on many occasions and also with Professor Blakey and members of this staff. We spent a great deal of time and received a great deal of cooperation from him on every occasion.

Also, in Cuba, Senor Senen Buergo, the American Department of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was extremely helpful and cooperative with this committee.

I also want to acknowledge the presence here at the witness table today of another gentleman who was extremely cooperative with us, and that was Senor Felipe Villa, Captain of the Ministry of the Interior, and during the course of both of our trips he extended a great deal of cooperation and help and assistance to this committee.

I would like also to mention two very talented and able Cuban translators who were extremely helpful to us, Ms. Juanita Vera Nellie and Ruiz de Sarade.

Others who gave cooperation and hospitality to this committee were Dr. Mondo Torres Santrail, the Minister of Justice; Oscar Fernandez Mel, the mayor of Havana; Jose Raimond Fernandez, Minister of Education, all of whom were extremely helpful and hospitable to us on our stay in Cuba.

In addition, we want to express our deep appreciation to President Fidel Castro. On the first trip we made to Cuba, President Castro spent in excess of 4 hours being interviewed by the chairman of this committee and other members of the committee and staff. The entire transcript will be put into the record at some point tomorrow.

During that period of time, the President made it very clear that it was the purpose of the Cuban Government to make it very clear that their government had nothing to do whatsoever with this very tragic occurrence in this country. It was the intent of their government to do everything possible to cooperate and see that the Cuban Government did everything in its power to clear up whatever it could around a tragedy of this type.

So we are indeed grateful for the kind of cooperation that this congressional committee has received, and we want to thank each of you gentlemen for the assistance you have given us in this very important matter.
If there is nothing further at this time, I might also say that we are once again indebted to the U.S. Marshall Service for the security arrangements here around the distinguished witnesses who have appeared here today.

We also would like to thank the interpreter from the State Department, Mr. Hervas, for a very efficient job he has done here today.

At this time the Chair will request that everyone remain seated until our witnesses have departed from the hearing room. Thereafter, we will adjourn these hearings until 9 a.m. tomorrow morning.

Thank you, gentlemen. You are excused.

[Whereupon, at 4:22 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 9 a.m., Tuesday, September 19, 1978.]
INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY

TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 1978

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The select committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 9:15 a.m., in room 345, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Louis Stokes (chairman of the select committee) presiding.


Staff present: G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel and staff director; Leodis Matthews, staff counsel; and Elizabeth L. Berning, chief clerk.

Chairman Stokes. A quorum being present, the committee will come to order.

The Chair recognizes Professor Blakey.

NARRATION BY G. ROBERT BLAKEY, CHIEF COUNSEL

Mr. Blakey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In late March and early April of this year, three members of the select committee—you yourself, Congressman Preyer, and Congressman Dodd—as well as three staff members, traveled to Cuba. It was the first of two trips in which the committee sought firsthand information about Lee Harvey Oswald's alleged visit to the Cuban consulate in Mexico City, as well as other evidence about the Kennedy assassination. During the trip to Havana the committee representatives were given an opportunity to interview President Castro himself.

In a 4-hour session, which was tape recorded, President Castro denied that he or any official of his government had anything to do with the death of President Kennedy or with Lee Harvey Oswald other than the visit to the Cuban consulate in September of 1963.

The committee asked President Castro a series of questions. First, the committee asked him to recount whatever details he had learned and could recall regarding Oswald's two visits to the Cuban consulate in Mexico City in September 1963.

Mr. Chairman, I ask that JFK F-429A, a photo taken during the interview of President Castro, be displayed and entered into the record at this point.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the record at this place and displayed.

[The information follows:]
Mr. Blakey. In addition, may a tape of that interview, JFK F-429B, and a transcript, JFK F-429C, also be included in the record at this point?

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the record at this point.

[Tape referred to above is retained in committee files.]

[The information follows:]

JFK Exhibit F-429A
INTERVIEW OF
FIDEL CASTRO RUIZ
PRESIDENT OF CUBA

STAFF REPORT
of the
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

September 18, 1978
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

Ninety-Fifth Congress
LOUIS STOKES, Ohio, Chairman

RICHARDSON PREYER, North Carolina
WALTER E. PAUNTRAY, District of Columbia
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, California
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut
HAROLD R. FORD, Tennessee
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, Indiana
ROBERT W. EDGAR, Pennsylvania

SAMUEL L. DEVINE, Ohio
STEWARD B. MCKINNEY, Connecticut
CHARLES THONE, Nebraska
HAROLD S. SAWYER, Michigan

STAFF

ROBERT BLAKE, Chief Counsel and Director
W. L. BIDWELL, Staff Counsel, Kennedy Task Force
JOHN J. COOPER, Researcher
Table of Contents

Page

I. Introduction ................................ 1

II. Excerpts:
   A. Lee Harvey Oswald's visits to the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City .... 2
   B. Comet Clark's Allegation ............. 8
   C. Use of Assassinations as a Political Weapon ............. 11
   D. Statements made by Fidel Castro at the Brazilian Embassy on September 7, 1963. .................. 17

This Staff Report contains an interview held with Fidel Castro on April 3, 1978. It is President Castro's story as told by President Castro, about major areas of the Committee's concern.

President Castro's words have been transcribed from the contemporaneous translations of Juanita Vera and Nellie Ruiz de Zarade. Their translations have been used so as to provide as accurate a transcription as possible. It is based solely on statements made by President Castro; it does not rely upon or cite other source material, or evidence the Committee has uncovered. It is based on an interview conducted by the Committee and staff with President Castro in Havana, Cuba. This interview, released today in its entirety, will also be published as an appendix to the Final Report of the Select Committee on Assassinations.

This Staff Report should not be read as "implying" that the Committee believes or disbelieves the statements made. The Committee is currently analyzing and investigating all aspects of the subjects raised in this interview that are related to this investigation. The Final Report will contain a complete analysis of the subjects discussed during the interview related to the investigation. The Final Report will also incorporate all the material that the Select Committee has acquired as a result of its investigation.
EXCERPT A

Lee Harvey Oswald's Visits

to the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City

Stokes: Mr. President, did it come to your attention shortly after the assassination that Lee Harvey Oswald, who was the accused assassin, had had contact with your Embassy in Mexico City?

Castro: Yes. In fact, it was after Kennedy's death that he caught my attention. Because here nobody receives news about anyone filing applications for a visa. These things are always solved through the Office of The Minister of Foreign Affairs. So it never is taken to the government. You know, it is not necessary. This is normal routine work. None of us has anything to do with visas. Some officials knew about it when somebody in particular filed an application there. But tens - or maybe hundreds of thousands of people file applications. But when Kennedy was assassinated and Oswald's actions were published in the newspapers, the officials who had handled visa applications realized that this Oswald could be the same Oswald who had gone to the Consulate in order to apply for a visa. That is why we had news about it, you know? After Kennedy's death we learned that a man by the name of Oswald had gone to the Consulate and filled out an application for a visa - that he had been told that we did not normally give an intransit visa until the country of destination granted one. And,
then we were told that a person had gotten very upset and had protested in an irate manner because he could not receive a visa. This was the news I had, more or less. The rest you know.

Stokes: We were wondering your . . .

Casaro: There is something I would like to add in that connection.

You see, it was always very much suspicious to me—that a person who later appeared to be involved in Kennedy's death would have requested a visa from Cuba. Because, I said to myself—what would have happened had by any chance that man come to Cuba—visited Cuba—gone back to the States and then appeared involved in Kennedy's death? That would have really been a provocation—a gigantic provocation. Well, that man did not come to Cuba simply because that was the norm—we rejected visa applications . . . like that. In those days the mechanism was very rigid because, of course, we had suspicions of anyone who tried to come to Cuba. People in charge of granting visas asked themselves: "Why does this applicant want to come to Cuba? What kind of counter-revolutionary activity could he carry out in Cuba?" Maybe the people thought that the person was a CIA or FBI agent, you know, so it was very difficult for a North American, just from his own wishes, to come to Cuba—because systematically we denied the visas. So, I think that there could always be an exception, but in those times it was very, very difficult to have anyone from the United States come into
Cuba because there was a tremendous suspicion and because in general permits to travel to Cuba were denied. Now, if it was a transit visa going toward another country — let's say -- had the Soviet Union granted the visa, you may be sure that our Consul would have granted the transit visa because the person would not be coming to Cuba only, but would be going to another country. The person would have to come (here) and if the Soviets would have granted the visa, then that would have accredited the person...like, you know, the person would have been given a transit visa because I feel that if the Soviets had granted the visa, then he would have come here. (In that era) it was not so crazy (that he tried) to come to Cuba because if he had obtained the visa from another country, it would have been for certain that our Consul would have granted him the visa to stop here. Now, can you imagine if that person had been to Cuba in October and then in November the President of the United States would have been killed? That is why it has always been something -- a very obscure thing -- something suspicious -- because I interpreted it as a deliberate attempt to link Cuba with Kennedy's death. That is one of the things that seemed to me very strange...
Stokes: Let me ask you this question, Mr. President. One of the persons that we have talked with since we have been here in Havana has been your former Consul, Mr. Azcue, who was produced at our request by your officials here. He told us that with reference to the man who appeared at your Embassy and who filled out an application for an intransit visa, that the photograph which appears on the visa application is the photograph of the man who died in the United States as Lee Harvey Oswald, but, that this man was not the individual who had appeared at your Embassy in Mexico City. And, my question would be in two parts: One, have you had an opportunity to talk with Mr. Azcue? And secondly, from all the information available to you, would this be your opinion also -- that the man who appeared at the Embassy was an imposter?

Castro: Actually, I don't have an opinion about that. I wouldn't be able to say whether I've met Azcue once. I don't remember now. I have no recollection at present of having met Azcue. Because I had been given the information about all that, I myself did not know whether he was in Mexico or here. It is very likely that I have seen him some time; however, I don't recall having met Azcue those days. Secondly, about the idea of an imposter, I have no special theory on that. As far as I have understood, Azcue has an
I've heard those comments before -- comments about the possibility of a difference, that he noticed the difference between the person who appeared requesting the visa and the person known as Oswald. But, I don't have a theory on that. It is likely that there could be two different people. But, now I am thinking -- if the person had obtained the visa, would he have visited Cuba? That is a hypothesis. What did he want the visa for?

From my point of view, the individual could have come to Cuba and compromised us. He would have us compromised. It seems to me that to apply for the visa had the purpose of having the individual come to Cuba. Now, we would have to enter into many contrefitures to reach a conclusion on that. Because where did he get the passports? Where did he find the passports that he was taking there?

Where was Oswald's passport? What became of Oswald's passports? Those papers should be somewhere.

I don't know what could have been the sense of sending another man, but I wouldn't dare deny that possibility. Actually, we would have to know what would have been the purpose. Why would another person have been sent?

I don't know whether you would have a theory about that. Personally, I don't have a theory.

Villa: About the possibility of an imposter, in public sources we have read that the possibility exists that there could be a double that carried out some actions that the real Oswald did not on some occasions in 1963.
Castro: There is something that I can guarantee. The Cuban government believes that Azcue is a serious and honest man; and that he has never said something differently from what he said the first time. He has more or less kept his story -- as far as I know. I mean, he is a person you can trust. He is a trustful man. That is all I can say about Azcue. But, I may say that if many people have elaborated theories, I am not among them.
EXCERPT B

Comer Clark's Allegation

Cornwell: One passage reads as follows:
An interview in July 1967 with a British
journalist, Comer Clark...do you have the trans-
lation of it there?

Villa: Yes.

Castro: Let me see it. I have it here.

Pause: (Approximately one minute while President Castro
reads it.)

Castro: This is absurd. I didn't say that.

Cornwell: Did the interview ever occur?

Castro: It has been invented from the beginning until the end.
I didn't say that. How could I say that?
It's a lie from head to toe. If this man would
have done something like that, it would have been
our moral duty to inform the United States. You
understand? Because if a man comes here, mentions
that he wants to kill Kennedy, we are (being pro-
voked), do you realize that? It would have been
similar to a mad person. If somebody comes to
us and said that, it would have been our moral
responsibility to inform the United States. How
could we accept a man from Mexico to Cuba who
tells us that he is going to kill President Ken-
nedy? If somebody is trying to create provoca-
tion or a trap, and uh--we would have denounced
him. Sure, a person coming here or even in one of our embassies saying that—and that never happened—in no part, as far as I know.

Escartin: That refers to the interview you spoke about in the beginning.

Castro: But how could they interview me in a pizzeria? I never go to public restaurants and that man invented that. That was invented from the upper to the bottom. I do not remember that. And, it is a surprise for me to see because I couldn't have said that. You have to see who wrote it. And, what is the job of that journalist? What is he engaged in? And, what prestige has this journalist? Not the one that wrote that book, but the origin of that version. You should have to find who he is and why he wrote it, and with whom he is related—and which sense they have to attribute those words which are absolutely invented. I think it is possible that you would be able to find out who that journalist was. Do you have some news about that journalist in that newspaper?

Villa: He was in Cuba and tried to carry out an interview with you.

Castro: Let me tell you. Of every one hundred interviews that are requested of me I only grant one because
if I were to give all the interviews that I am requested to, you can be sure that I would not be able to have anything but twenty-four hours of my life to have interviews. I would not have enough time to do anything else. Barbara Walters waited three years for an interview--just almost three years. And even that of Moyers. I didn't want to have that Moyers interview. He started talking and the truth is that he was very insistent from the time he came down from the airplane and in spite of the fact that there was no commitment from me regarding the interview. I granted one. There are a lot of interview requests and it is very difficult, but I would never have given a journalist an interview in a pizzeria.

Dodd: I don't even give interviews in a pizzeria.

Villa: Another element commander. That interview was published in a sensationalist or yellow press from the United States. It is a non-serious newspaper.

Castro: Especially at that time, a lot of barbaric things were published--a lot of lies.
Castro: . . . . . . It was really something inconceivable - could have the idea of killing the President? First, because that would have been a tremendous insanity. The Cuban Revolutionaries and the people who have made this Revolution have proven to be intrepid and to make decisions in the right moment. But, we have not proven to be insane people. The leaders of the Revolution do not do crazy things and have always been extremely concerned to prevent any factor that could become a kind of an argument or a pretext for carrying out aggression against our country. We are a very small country. We have the United States 90 miles from our shore which is a very large, powerful country economically, technically, militarily. So, for many years we lived concerned that an invasion could take place...I mean, indirect and at the end a direct aggression. We were very close to that. Yet look at the conclusions we draw. If the elections of 1960 had not been won by Kennedy, but Nixon instead, during the Bay of Pigs, the United States would have invaded Cuba. We mean that in the midst of the fight that Kennedy followed the line that had been already traced.
There is no doubt that we appreciate very highly the fact that Kennedy resisted every kind of pressure not to have the Marines land in our country. Because, there were many people who wanted the Marines to land here. Nixon himself was in favor of that. Had Nixon been President, facing the Bay of Pigs invasion, a landing by the military army of the United States would have taken place. "I am absolutely convinced," he said. However, Kennedy resisted all the pressures and he did not do that. What would that have meant for us? The destruction of the country? Hundreds of thousands, maybe millions of deaths? Paradise, undoubtedly, the people would fight. The people I am absolutely sure about. An invasion of Cuba by the United States would have been followed by thousands of deaths, millions of lives. "I was sure of that. We have an American military base in our territory, by force. And, it is not assumed that anyone is going to have a military base on someone else's territory, if it is not on the basis of an agreement. However, the United States has military bases in many places of the world, but here, it is by force. From that base, many provocations have been carried out against Cuba. There were people wounded...there were people killed. What did we do? We brought our guards away from the lines, from the fence.
We never shot at them. Why? Because we made every possible effort so that an incident of that kind would not become a pretext to be attacked. So, we have followed the policy. We had an American boat just three miles away from us for years, a warship full of electronic communications equipment and never a hostile action was carried against that warship. So, there are many events that have proven how careful Cuba has always been to prevent the perpetration of an invasion. We could have died heroically - no doubt about it. Now, that would have been a victory for our people. They're willing to be sacrificed and to die. Yet, it would have been just another page in history...nothing else. So, we have always been very much aware to not give The United States the pretext...the possibility...for (an invasion.) What was the cause of the missile crisis? The need we had to seek protection in case of an (invasion) from the United States. We agreed on the installation of the (strategic) missiles, because undoubtedly that diminished the danger of direct aggression. That became a danger of another kind, a kind of a global danger we became, but we were trying to protect our country at all times. Who here could have operated and planned something so delicate as the death of the United States President. That was insane. From the
ideological point of view it was insane. And from the political point of view, it was a tremendous insanity.

I am going to tell you here that nobody, nobody ever had the idea of such things. What would it do? We just tried to defend our folks here, within our territory. Anyone who subscribed to that idea would have been judged insane...absolutely sick. Never, in twenty years of revolution, I never heard anyone suggest nor even speculate about a measure of that sort, because who could think of the idea of organizing the death of the President of the United States. That would have been the most perfect pretext for the United States to invade our country which is what I have tried to prevent for all these years, in every possible sense. Since the United States is much more powerful than we are, what could we gain from a war with the United States? The United States would lose nothing. The destruction would have been here. The United States had U-2 air surveillancing for almost fifteen years. The planes flew over our territory every day. The women said that they could not go over their terrace naked for the U-2 would have taken a picture of them. That thing we could not allow to happen, you know, because it was demoralizing. So, there were, you know, those flights just very close to the soil. Those kind of flights was really demoralizing for our people. It was impossible to let
them continue to do that, so we had to shoot at them. On the following day after the missile crisis, we had the need to shoot at those planes, because to have allowed that would have created a demoralization among our people. And, I say that if we allowed that, you wouldn't have been able even to play baseball here. Because those planes came just twenty meters from here, so it was really demoralizing. See, the U-2 came very high, you know, and I tell you, Cuba has been characterized by following a firm policy, a policy of principles. Our position was known after the missile crisis. We were not in a position to make any concessions. That is a known position, but Cuba, the leaders of the Cuban Revolution, have never made that kind of insanity, and that I may assure you. And the biggest kind of insanity that could have gone through anyone's mind here would have been that of thinking of killing the President of the United States. Nobody would have thought of that. In spite of all the things, in spite of all the attempts, in spite of all the irritation that brought about an attitude of firmness, a willingness to fight, that was translated by our people into a spirit of heroism, but it never became a source of insanity. I'll give you practical reasons. Apart from our ideology, I want to tell you that the death of the
leader does not change the system. It has never done
that. And, the best example we have is Batista. Batista
murdered thousands of our comrades. If there was anyone
in which that kind of revenge was justified, it was
Batista. However, our movement did very difficult things,
but it never had the idea of physically eliminating Batista.
Other revolutionary groups did, but never our movement.
We had a war for twenty-five months against Batista's
army and spent seven years under Batista's dictatorship
with thousands dying. But, it never came to our minds...
we could have done it, very well, but we never thought
about that, because it was different from our feelings.
That is our position. That is why we are interested.
That is why I was asking you whether you are really
hopeful to give serious conclusions on this. On our
part, if there is something we could give you, we
would, without any kind of precondition. The informa-
tion we have offered you is not conditioned to anything.
In spite of the fact that the problem is thorny, that
doesn't stop this Committee here from giving the im-
pression that we are being judged here, that we are
being tried.
EXCERPT D

Statements Made By Fidel Castro

At the Brazilian Embassy on September 7, 1963

Castro: . . . . . Then a journalist asked me ... and the purpose I had ... I don't remember literally what I said, but I remember my intention in saying what I said and it was to warn the government that we know about the (at- tempted) plots against our lives. I mean, in one way or the other to let the United States government know that we knew about the existence of those plots. So, I said something like those plots start to set a very bad precedent, a very serious one -- that that could become a boomerang against the authors of those actions ... but I did not mean to threaten by that. I did not mean even that .. not in the least .. but rather, like a warning that we knew; that we had news about it; and that to set those precedents of plotting the assassination of leaders of other countries would be a very bad precedent .. something very negative. And, if at present, the same would happen under the same circumstances, I would have no doubt in saying the same as I said (then) because I didn't mean a threat by that. I didn't say it as a threat. I did not mean by that that we were going to take measures - similar measures - like a retaliation for that. We never
meant that because we knew that there were plots. For three years we had known that there were plots against us. So, the conversation came about very casually, you know; but I would say that all these plots or attempts were part of the everyday life.

I do remember about being in the Brazilian Embassy at that time ... that I did make a statement in that sense ... in the sense that I was informed of the plots and that that was a very bad precedent to form the various principles in relation to ...
Interview: Present were President Fidel Castro and his interpreter, Senorita Juanita Vera, Captain Felipe Villa, Senor Ricardo Escartin, Zenen Buergo, and Alfredo Ramirez (representing the Government of Cuba). Also present representing the Government of the United States were Congressmen Louis Stokes, Richardson Preyer, Christopher Dodd and staff personnel of HSCA: G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel, Gary Cornwell, Deputy Chief Counsel and Edwin Lopez, Researcher/Translator.

The meeting opened and President Castro stated:

Castro: Do you have the supposed statements that I have made? I have tried to remember. There is an individual who says that he interviewed me in a restaurant. That is very strange. I tried to recall him, you know. I tried to recall (the proposed) interview and on one occasion (he) said that it was in a (pizzeria). I just reached a conclusion not only because of the circumstances in which he says the interview was made, but also because of the content of the interview...or the alleged interview. I am absolutely certain that that

Interviewer Signature ____________________________________

Typed Signature ____________________________________

Date transcribed started July 10 1978
interview never took place. Now, I will have to check that about the alleged interview at the Brazilian Embassy) because that is true. I mean it's true that I went to the Brazilian Embassy. I've been trying to remember, and I recall the following: It is not that I found out that an attempt was being planned. Hills, when that attempt was made, it was very much a descent. The attempt was never mentioned to me at all. I recall that very...I don't remember literally what I said, but I remember my intention in saying what I said and it was to warn the government that we know about the attempted plots against our lives. I mean, in one way or the other to let the United States government know that we knew about the existence of those plots. So, I said something like those plots start to set a very bad precedent,
a very serious one -- that that could become a boomerang against the authors of those actions ... but I did not mean to threaten by that. I did not mean even that .. not in the least .. but rather, like a warning that we knew; that we had news about it; and that to set those precedents of plotting the assassination of leaders of other countries would be a very bad precedent .. something very negative. And, if at present, the same would happen under the same circumstances, I would have no doubt in saying the same as I said 'then' because I didn't mean a threat by that. I didn't say it as a threat. I did not mean by that that we were going to take measures - similar measures - like a retaliation for that. We never meant that because we knew that there were plots. For three years we had known that there were plots against us. So, the conversation came about very casually, you know; but I would say that all these plots or attempts were part of the everyday life.

I do remember about being in the Brazilian Embassy at that time ... that I did make a statement in that sense ... in the sense that I was informed of the plots and that that was a very bad precedent to form the various principles in relation to ... I remember (another nefarious precedent) was that of the hijacking of planes. The first planes hijacked in this area were Cuban planes, and the hijacking of the planes was encouraged by the United States government. Even an amount of money was offered as a
reward to the people that hijacked a Cuban plane. And later what happened? Well, it was all the way around — terrorist elements and insane elements and every kind of people. Once the precedent was established, these people started to hijack planes. And that is what I may tell you is part of that experience. And I repeat again that if a similar situation would come about, I could say just the same words — I could say just the same. Now, I cannot guarantee because I don't have the exact recollection. I don't have the exact copy of what I said literally. And, of course, one always has to be careful with the versions even on a given statement. But now, what were the intentions of that man when he wrote that he had interviewed me in the restaurant, and writing the things he wrote? There was a deliberate purpose — of creating confusion, of planting confusion and trying to have Cuba involved in these events.

Stokes: Mr. President, as a result of the statements or the conversation you had with this gentleman at that time, did you ever hear from President Kennedy?

Castro: I am trying to recall the date. I can tell you that in the period in which Kennedy's assassination took place Kennedy was changing his policy toward Cuba. I mean by that he was not adopting measures, not in fact. The whole style and aggressive measures against Cuba existed for many years. First of all, the Bay of Pigs; then the
missile crisis; then the piratic attacks -- those attacks which were organized in Central America and Miami, at a time at which they sent the mother boats to attack the refineries, the warehouses, boats, merchant ships, port installations and even the (innocent) population was also attacked in those days by these people. It has been known later - more or less - for how long these actions lasted. Now at that time, Kennedy was starting to question all these things. One of the facts, one of the events, was that an American official from the United Nations called my house. I don't speak English, so he spoke to one of my comrades who was with me there. After that, I've been able to go with more accuracy through those things. And, I think it was Atwood. I think it was Atwood because later he was appointed Ambassador to Guinea, and that was very significant because it was the first time such a thing happened -- the first time such a gesture came about. And, you could see undisputably that a new trend was coming (into) existence in the sense of established contacts. So, it was a sort of a change (in) policy. I don't recollect exactly what month it was. Have you been able to reconstruct the time at which Atwood (phoned me) at my house?

Escartin: We have been able to reconstruct that date around (inaudible).

Castro: Well, that was after the missile crisis, I think. That was after the Bay of Pigs and the missile crisis. I was of the opinion that the only man who could change that policy was Kennedy himself, because it seemed to me that at
that time it was not a time of the Bay of Pigs. At that time he had more experience. And, he had much more authority. Maybe after the missile crisis, he had much more influence. I was convinced that Kennedy was the man with enough talent and enough courage to question and change that policy. And, people started to (feel) about it. And I felt that a positive act was that famous speech he made at the American University. It was a speech about the need for peace, the need for prevention of war, the destructions that Hitler's invasion on the Soviet Union had caused. (He expressed this) in terms that he had not used for a long time -- that had not been used in the American theory for a long time. I have read all over that speech again. I cannot say that that's a perfect (speech), I feel that it had some gaps, but if you bear in mind what he said, at the moment he said it, in the midst of the cold war, there is no doubt that those statements were of a tremendous value. Now, in addition to that, the unfortunate circumstance happened that in the days previous to Kennedy's death a French journalist visited our country -- Jean Daniels. Then he told me -- he said that he was interested in having a discussion about a special topic with me. I remember that I took him with me to Veradero. Then, in the morning -- it was the morning on the way to Veradero and also at the beach he was explaining to me his purpose. We were talking about all this.
And, I would say that he was bringing a kind of message from Kennedy. In substance, as far as I remember now, he himself has spoken about this on several occasions. But, the most important thing was he told me that Kennedy had explained to him the great danger that existed during the missile crisis, and that Kennedy asked himself whether I (also) was aware of the whole danger that was announced at the time of the missile crisis. But, he was (somewhat) traumatized with all the remembrances of those days. When Kennedy found out that this journalist was coming to Cuba - he had a long talk with this journalist. (He asked the journalist to talk with me, and then return to Washington with a response). We were just talking in those terms. He had to finish explaining to me everything he had talked about with Kennedy and I had to give him an answer about all this. But then at lunchtime or after lunch -- I don't remember quite well -- the first news started to arrive by radio that an attempt against Kennedy had taken place and that he had been seriously wounded precisely at the moment that we were having that talk and that came to be another symptom, that Kennedy was questioning the policy that had been followed so far. Maybe he was elaborating some formula in order to have that policy changed. (From our) point of view, Mr. Kennedy was the only man that at that point had the authority and enough courage in order to bring about the change in that policy.
That was my opinion at that time.

Stokes: Do you remember the name of the journalist?

Castro: Jean Daniel -- a French journalist -- very well known --

Stokes: Do you remember the name of the journalist?

Castro: Jean Daniel -- a French journalist -- very well known --
enjoys prestige. He (had) met with Kennedy for some time,
and he was well impressed with Kennedy and he was pre-
cisely letting us know (about) the whole interview with
Kennedy, and the things that he had talked about with
Kennedy regarding Cuba. It was assumed that I had to
tell him something so that he would go back and convey it
to Kennedy. But, before we had just finished with our
conversation, the news arrived of the attempt against
Kennedy’s life. Actually, we were very much concerned
and immediately we suspected that an effort could be made
in order to try to link us... to link that death attempt
with the Cuban problems. Because immediately, you know,
it seemed to (us that) also within that atmosphere of a
cold war, some people could try to have us linked with
Kennedy’s death -- to the point that we were very concerned
and we thought about the measures that we could take in
the face of a danger of that sort.

Stokes: Mr. President, I think perhaps in that respect that it might
be good for you to tell us what your reaction and that of
the Cuban people was to the assassination of President
Kennedy.

Castro: I have no objection in telling you my reaction. It was
a natural and logical reaction. Actually, I felt sad
about it. I received that news with bitterness. Reasons?
First, I think an event of that nature always produces that reaction even when it is a political adversary. It's kind of a repulsion, a rejection. In the second place, I think I have said before that Kennedy was an adversary that we had sort of become used to. I mean that political, a strong political struggle existed. But, he was a known adversary. He was somebody we knew. We had (undergone) the Bay of Pigs, we had had the missile crisis — so many things had happened. And, at least he was an adversary we knew about. And all of a sudden, you have the impression that something is missing . . . that something is missing. (Thirdly,) on the basis of very deep political feelings, I think the first thing I learned from Marxism was the idea that situations, societies and social processes do not depend on men, but rather that there is a system; and the system cannot be changed by changing the men even on the basis of an old controversy. For the very past century among revolutionaries, between those who thought that the Czar should be eliminated or that the emperor had to be eliminated because they were the chiefs. That was the theory of dictatorships. Marxists always have been opposed to the idea of killing or having a person killed. That was a very much debated topic among the Marxist (elements). That is one of the first things the Marxists learned; and that it doesn't make sense to kill the political leaders . . . to such an extent
that in our own experience here in Cuba, it never came to our minds the idea that Batista's regime could be eliminated by eliminating the person. We attacked a regiment with 120 men ... over 120 men ... one of the strongest regiments of the country ... in order to take hold of the weapons and to start a struggle against Batista. And, it never came to our minds the idea of killing Batista. If we had wanted to eliminate Batista, we would have been able to. Later 82 men came back to the country from Mexico in a boat that was barely 60 feet long. We traveled 1500 kilometers. We started a war in Sierra Maestra and it never came to our minds the idea of eliminating Batista physically. (Some) people thought that killing Batista would change the system. And finally, maybe one of the things that I regretted the most was that I was convinced that Kennedy was starting to change himself. And, I was going by the impression that I was here talking to that man who was bringing a message from him. Actually, I was sad. I was very badly depressed. The impression I got was very bad. I was very sad about it. He was an adversary; a man with his personal characteristics ... being intelligent ... you may always have the adversaries, but you have an assessment of them as a person, as an intellectual, as political leaders. To a certain extent we were honored
in having such a rival. He was not mediocre. He was an outstanding man. And, that was my reaction.

Stokes: Mr. President, did it come to your attention shortly after the assassination that Lee Harvey Oswald, who was the accused assassin, had had contact with your Embassy in Mexico City?

Castro: Yes. In fact, it was after Kennedy’s death that he caught my attention. Because here nobody receives news about anyone filing applications for a visa. These things are always solved through the Office of The Minister of Foreign Affairs. So it never is taken to the government. You know, it is not necessary. This is normal routine work. None of us has anything to do with visas. Some officials knew about it when somebody in particular filed an application there. But tens – or maybe hundreds of thousands of people file applications. But when Kennedy was assassinated and Oswald’s actions were published in the newspapers, the officials who had handled visa applications realized that this Oswald could be the same Oswald who had gone to the Consulate in order to apply for a visa. That is why we had news about it, you know? After Kennedy’s death we learned that a man by the name of Oswald had gone to the Consulate and filled out an application for a visa – that he had been told that we did not normally give an intransit visa until the country of destination granted one. And,
then we were told that a person had gotten very upset and had protested in an irate manner because he could not receive a visa. This was the news I had, more or less. The rest you know.

Stokes: We were wondering your . . .

Castro: There is something I would like to add in that connection. You see, it was always very much suspicious to me -- that a person who later appeared to be involved in Kennedy's death would have requested a visa from Cuba. Because, I said to myself -- what would have happened had by any chance that man come to Cuba - visited Cuba - gone back to the States and then appeared involved in Kennedy's death? That would have really been a provocation - a gigantic provocation. Well, that man did not come to Cuba simply because that was the norm -- we rejected visa applications . . like that. In those days the mechanism was very rigid because, of course, we had suspicions of anyone who tried to come to Cuba. People in charge of granting visas asked themselves: Why does (this applicant) want to come to Cuba? What kind of counter-revolutionary activity could he carry out in Cuba? Maybe the people thought that the person was a CIA or FBI agent, you know, so it was very difficult for a North American, just from his own wishes, to come to Cuba -- because systematically we denied the visas. So, I think that there could always be an exception, but in those times it was very, very difficult to have anyone from the United States come into
Cuba because there was a tremendous suspicion and because in general permits to (travel to Cuba) were denied. Now, if it was a transit visa going toward another country - let's say -- had the Soviet Union granted the visa, you may be sure that our Consul would have granted the transit visa because the person would not be coming to Cuba only, but would be going to another country. The person would have to come (here) and if the Soviets would have granted the visa, then that would have accredited the person...like, you know, the person would have been given a transit visa because I feel that if the Soviets had granted the visa, then he would have come here. (In that era) it was not so crazy (that he tried) to come to Cuba because if he had obtained the visa from another country, it would have been for certain that our Consul would have granted him the visa to stop here. Now, can you imagine if that person had been to Cuba in October and then in November the President of the United States would have been killed? That is why it has always been something -- a very obscure thing -- something suspicious -- because I interpreted it as a deliberate attempt to link Cuba with Kennedy's death. That is one of the things that seemed to me very strange. (The facts of the events) seemed very strange also. As it was published, Oswald would have shot several times at a car that was moving with a telescopic (rifle). (I remember) when we trained in Mexico in order to come to Cuba to make revolution we had
several guns like that and it could be that we learned almost everything that could be learned about telescopic pistols, even the differences between different pistols: a normal pistol with a trigger, an automatic pistol and a telescopic (rifle). It is much more practical if you use a normal sight...when you try to focus a moving target and you (do it) more accurately...with that kind than with a telescopic sight. A telescopic sight view gun should be used against a fixed target -- not a moving one -- It is very difficult. And, I tell you it seemed very strange that he used that weapon and that those shots could have been made with that kind of weapon. Because, when you shoot the first charge you have to take the weapon away from your face to (focus) it again, to try to find the object again...the target...and you lose time -- it is quite difficult. I don't know whether later things were technical proof - technical tests were made to see whether...just a normal shooter at that distance and at that speed of the car could have (accurately made such shots). That was something else that was very suspicious to me.

But, as far as we are concerned, what was most strange was Oswald's attempt to visit Cuba.

Stokes: Realizing, Mr. President, the enormity of the appearance of Oswald at your Embassy and realizing the significance that it had relative to the assassination itself, was it
important enough that you summon individuals who would have knowledge about his appearance to talk with you or to submit written reports relative to this matter?

Castro: I think what happened was the following: Nobody knew that. The comrades who had news of that, after the events took place, they reported it, I think, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. So, the only thing we did was when the Warren Commission was created and it requested information about this, it was agreed to send all the information we had at that time ... I recall that we were consulted with something about the visa application and we were willing to offer all the information they wanted. Now it was assumed that they were conducting the investigation. If they had wanted some additional action on our part (material from us), they should have (requested) it. But, they did not request any other (information) since ... as far as I have understood ... here we spoke with the people (our people) who had been in Mexico and our people went into the details of what really happened. And, that was very well clarified. Beyond this, there was not much more that we could do. You can imagine there was not much that we could contribute. As far as I have understood, the Mexican lady who used to work at the Consulate was later the object of many pressures -- even some kind of persecution.

Villa: She was arrested by the Mexican police with the purpose of finding out what he had said at the Consulate.

Castro: All that they said -- it was assumed that they wanted her
to say that also while at the Embassy he had made reference
to killing Kennedy. So the Mexican police had the purpose
of having the Mexican declare that.

Villa: Exactly.

Castro: And, who were the people interested in that? Who could be
the people interested in that?

Villa: To us that is very clear.

Castro: But, that is something worth to be taken into account. Why
would that lady become the object of that oppression?
What do you know about this lady now?

Villa: She lives in Mexico at present. She used to work in the
Consulate and she was sympathetic of the Cuban revolution.

Castro: She, of course, has a very high merit and that after that,
knowing how these things are, a person that did not enjoy
the diplomatic immunity could have been coerced.
She could have been blackmailed and she could have been
submitted by fear, you know, in order to have her make
a statement that would be against Cuba -- harmful to Cuba.
So, it is a tremendous merit that this Mexican lady did
behave the way she did because you know how people are
in some countries of the world. They take a helpless woman
without any kind of protection and then she can be forced
to say anything. One question I would like to raise with
you because we are speaking about that topic about which
we are very pleased to give you all the opinions and all
the cooperation that you might request that is in our
hands. Now, do you think you are going to be able to
bring out something really clear on the whole work you're
doing? Do you think you are going to be able to reach a clear conclusion?

Stokes: Mr. President, that is the precise reason why we are here in your country. One of the things we said to your top officials Friday morning at our first session was that we came to your country without any preconceived ideas or notions or conclusions of any type. We have tried to pursue the entire investigation in a fair and objective manner, searching only for the truth. The assassination of President Kennedy was a traumatic experience for the American people. And in addition to the trauma which was incurred by them, we found that a Gallup Poll in January of 1977 revealed that 81% of the American people believe that someone other than Lee Harvey Oswald participated in the assassination of President Kennedy. Only 19% believe that he was a lone assassin. Consequently, the mandate given this Committee by the House of Representatives was for us to investigate all of the facts and circumstances surrounding the assassination of President Kennedy. Precisely, it is our job to ascertain who killed the President. Did such a person have help either before or after the assassination? And then to ascertain in that respect whether there was or was not a conspiracy to kill the President. Additionally, we are charged with the responsibility to ascertain the performance of our own agencies in the United States: that is, the FBI, CIA, Secret Service, all of the American agencies
that participated in some way in the investigation conducted by the Warren Commission. And then lastly, our mandate is to make recommendations to the United States Congress based upon our findings as a result of the total investigation. So we have approached the investigation in that way -- hoping that we will be able to ascertain the truth of these facts and then be able to put to bed the theories, the rumors, the speculation that presently exists around the assassination of President Kennedy.

Castro: Have you had a broad access to all the possible sources of information?

Stokes: Yes, we have. If you have reference to our own agencies and our own files, the answer is yes, we have.

Castro: Are you optimistic about the fact that you'll be able to reach a sound conclusion on this problem? Are you optimistic about it?

Stokes: We are optimistic that even though the job is an awesome responsibility for the eleven men and one woman who are members of this Committee, along with the staff of 115 people, all of whom we feel are dedicated to this task, our final report will be one that will be a highly professional and competent job.

Castro: Any other question that you would like to raise I would be pleased to answer.

Stokes: Could we for a moment, Mr. President, go back to the moment you learned about Lee Harvey Oswald having been at your Embassy in Mexico City? Do you recall a speech that you made on the 23rd of November?
Fidel Castro Interview

Castro: This is on the twenty ... the speech on the 23rd. Did we have the data at that time that Oswald had been at the Embassy?

Villa: No. No.

Castro: So very likely we did not have it. I think I learned about that some days later and not immediately.

Villa: You mentioned that in the speech on November the 27th.

Stokes: 27th - all right. Then my question would be firstly in two parts. One, if he remembered the speech he made on November 27th, and then secondly ...

Castro: But, you should not confuse the man with the system.

Stokes: Yes, right, right. That's what you told us earlier, right.

Castro: That would be a negative fact for the interest of humanity. These ideas I've always had about this.

Stokes: And with reference to the second part of my question regarding the matters which occurred at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City which you referred to in the November 27th speech. Do you recall from whom you learned what had transpired at your Embassy?

Castro: I cannot recall. It should have been through Foreign Relations or maybe the Minister of the Interior. Somebody reported to me. We were just reported to about the facts -- that a gentleman had appeared at the Embassy requesting a visa by the same name as the man accused of having assassinated Kennedy. I don't remember how it was told to the American authorities. I remember the
Warren Commission requested through the Swiss Interest Section all the information we had about it. And, immediately, we put at their disposal all the materials we had. Because of course, we were interested more than anyone else in those events being clarified. We were more interested than anyone. At the first moment we were somewhat, you know, uncertain about what was behind this -- whether there were some people that wanted to use that in order to promote an aggression against Cuba. We had many reasons to suspect that because tremendous things had happened in that sense. We thought that maybe some very reactionary element could have wanted to eliminate Kennedy and just on the way try to eliminate Cuba, you know. That's why we were observing the whole development of events. But, some days later it started to be clearly seen that it was not a campaign orchestrated against Cuba. But, I'm not - I have no doubt in the least that if they had had the least evidence to link Cuba, that would have been done. A tremendous campaign would have been made and a very dangerous situation would have been created for us. But, now you have to bear in mind, at least to the extent that we know, that the Warren Commission did not make any charge against Cuba, nor did it conduct any effort in that sense. We were under the impression though, that they were working objectively or that if they were able to discover something, they would handle it. They would expose it. But, we thought that the danger
that we were concerned about in the very first moments were then no longer so bad. The fact that somebody went to the Embassy was what brought about the suspicion that somebody had tried to link Cuba. The other theory is that this individual decided himself just because of his initiative -- to visit Cuba -- with what purpose? That nobody knows. You would have to have good doses of naivete to think that he was the one who planned the trip to Cuba -- that he planned the trip to the Soviet Union himself. Actually, all of that is very strange, you know, very rare -- that he tried to go to the Soviet Union; that he tried to go through Cuba -- no other place, but through Cuba, because to go to the Soviet Union you don't have to go to Cuba necessarily. And to this we could add the further event that this individual who could have been able to clarify all because who could have shed more light on this than he himself - Oswald - 24 or 48 hours later. How many hours after the event?

Villa: 28 hours.

Castro: He was killed 28 hours after the event. And the only explanation given by the assassin was a sentimental reason. As far as I recall from what I read at that time he said that he had seen Kennedy's widow crying and seen the whole drama. He decided to take revenge with his own hand. And later on it was known that he was not a kind of a sentimental man: I mean to say he's a psychotic character and in the very face of the policemen -
killed the supposed author of Kennedy’s death. Because, who could have verified that better? Why was this man killed? I do know that you have more information than I do -- much more information than I may have on Jack Ruby’s personality. And, if Jack Ruby for a kind of strictly sentimental reason would have gone there to the very police station and in the face of the policemen killed the supposed author of Kennedy’s death. All this seemed to us very strange. And that is why we gave such importance to the effort he made in the Cuban Embassy. It was a kind of an attempt by somebody to have Cuba involved in the whole affair, in the whole issue. Another reasonable fact which I think deserves attention, a fact that deserves attention - and that is something that was known afterwards when the Senate Committee conducted their investigations was that practically the same day that Kennedy was killed, a CIA agent was going to have an interview. I do not know whether he had planned that interview with an important agent (Cubela) in order to assassinate me. I felt that a poison was going to be given to that person who was supposed to kill me. So, that is another element which is very suspicious. The same day Kennedy is killed, well about those same days, I get an attempt, a very urgent attempt by an individual with a plan to assassinate me. The Senate (Intelligence Committee) did not give his name, but we know who he was. And, there is no doubt that if one
person had the possibility to carry out that attempt, it was that person. Because, he was a man who came from the revolutionary ranks and he had very much good relations with us. So, I would say that among the very many attempts, plans, plots, collaborations of the CIA, this was one that had many possibilities of success because that individual had access to us. And that visit practically coincided -- that's a very suspicious coincidence with the Kennedy assassination -- very . We did not learn this until the Senate Committee investigation was conducted. Now, in connection with this Embassy, what were you interested in -- in connection with the Embassy and the visit?

Stokes: Let me ask you this question, Mr. President. One of the persons that we have talked with since we have been here in Havana has been your former Consul, Mr. Azcue, who was produced at our request by your officials here. He told us that with reference to the man who appeared at your Embassy and who filled out an application for an intransit visa, that the photograph which appears on the visa application is the photograph of the man who died in the United States as Lee Harvey Oswald, but, that this man was not the individual who had appeared at your Embassy in Mexico City. And, my question would be in two parts: One, have you had an opportunity to talk with Mr. Azcue? And secondly, from all the information
available to you, would this be your opinion also — that the man who appeared at the Embassy was an imposter?

Castro: Actually, I don't have an opinion about that. I wouldn't be able to say whether I've met Azcue once. I don't remember now. I have no recollection at present of having met Azcue. Because I had been given the information about all that, I myself did not know whether he was in Mexico or here. It is very likely that I have seen him some time; however, I don't recall having met Azcue those days. Secondly, about the idea of an imposter, I have no special theory on that. As far as I have understood, Azcue has an idea on that. I've heard those comments before — comments about the possibility of a difference, that he noticed the difference between the person who appeared requesting the visa and the person known as Oswald. But, I don't have a theory on that. It is likely that there could be two different people. But, now I am thinking — if the person had obtained the visa, would he have visited Cuba? That is a hypothesis. What did he want the visa for? From my point of view, the individual could have come to Cuba and compromised us. He would have us compromised. It seems to me that to apply for the visa had the purpose of having the individual come to Cuba. Now, we would have to enter into many conjectures to reach a conclusion on that. Because where did he get the passports? Where did he find the passports that he was taking there?
Where was Oswald's passport? What became of Oswald's passports? Those papers should be somewhere.
I don't know what could have been the sense of sending another man, but I wouldn't dare deny that possibility. Actually, we would have to know what would have been the purpose. Why would another person have been sent? I don't know whether you would have a theory about that. Personally, I don't have a theory.

Villa: About the possibility of an imposter, in public sources we have read that the possibility exists that there could be a double that carried out some actions that the real Oswald did not on some occasions in 1963.

Castro: There is something that I can guarantee. The Cuban government believes that Azcue is a serious and honest man; and that he has never said something differently from what he said the first time. He has more or less kept his story -- as far as I know. I mean, he is a person you can trust. He is a trustful man. That is all I can say about Azcue. But, I may say that if many people have elaborated theories, I am not among them. I have not operated on a theory like that. I just see many strange things that are not logical. It started with the very attempt of the person to come to Cuba; the calibre of weapon used, the absolutely abnormal way in which those people behaved. I mean there have always
been many strange things that made me (suspicious) about other people. I tell you, I read the book. I read that book "The Death of The President" written by Manchester. Manchester had the theory that this man acted alone and he argues a lot. He makes a kind of psychoanalytical (study) of Oswald and he defends the (lone assassin theory). Many people have a different theory. So, I have not been able to elaborate -- I wouldn't dare elaborate a theory -- for with me, everything would be speculation. On our account and because of our interest, some time ago we started gathering elements in order to have a better founded idea, you know. And, that is why our people started to gather materials and information. A group of comrades has been working in this direction. But, I am very much aware that we don't have access to (sources) of information which are fundamental. We have no access to the CIA archives or the FBI archives. We don't have access to the Warren Commission's files. How could we do something really well founded? When the Cuban government saw the Senate Committee Report, it was something real and it was that that individual who was the man to be given the weapon to kill me in Paris. This man never spoke about that. He was tried and was sentenced on account of the attempts, the plots against our lives. Those plans (had been continuous) and he sent weapons to Cuba until he was discovered. He confessed and told us the truth, but he never spoke about
that interview in which he was going to be given the weapon to kill me and that was published by the Senate Committee. He never made reference to that. That person is alive because I had to request some leniency. I mean, because his crime was very serious. It was a tremendous betrayal. It was treason, and at that time to participate in such an action was very severely sanctioned. And, following a tradition with individuals that had participated in the revolution, whenever it has been possible to prevent drastic measures, we have done so. This gentleman had been a revolutionary leader. He had been a good revolutionary fighter, and the public opinion was very irritated about it. His crime was really very serious. I wrote a letter to the Cuban Tribunal morally condemning him (but asking for leniency). I did it for the public opinion....That is Cubela's case. We learned that later when the Senate Committee Report appeared. But, all these elements made us think about the advisability of organizing some investigation on our account. We had hoped that being in contact with your Committee could give us some elements of judgment for our own information. But, as far as I know, you don't contribute many elements of judgment because -- as I have been told -- you cannot make use of most of the information you possess.
I have been told that one of our hopes was to receive some information. We are giving as much information as we have and we are receiving nothing.

Stokes: One thing I would like to say and I think you ought to know is that many Americans are ashamed of the CIA and the degrading attempts that they've made on your life. And, that's something that disturbs many, many decent Americans and I think you ought to know that. Mr. President, with your permission I'd like to defer to my other colleagues, if they have any questions, if that is agreeable to you.

Castro: Yes, please.

Stokes: Mr. Preyer?

Preyer: Mr. President, you mentioned that you believe that you could transfer power of chains of government without killing the head of the government. That is the tradition of our country also. I speak personally and not for our government, but I join Chairman Stokes in saying that when I read about AMLASH, Cubela and the Church Committee reports I was shocked and outraged. I am confident that is the overwhelming reaction of the American people. I am convinced that the President did not know about that; the head of the CIA, John McCone, did not know of that; or our other high officials; and that this was an aberration of a small group and that it would have
shocked our high officials just as it shocks me if they had known of it. The fact that the Church Report on AMLASH came from the Agency -- from the government itself rather than being leaked through a newspaper story or something of that sort.

Interpreter: Excuse me, I didn't get that last part -- I am sorry.

Preyer: Well, the fact that the information on AMLASH and Cubela was revealed by our government agencies themselves and was not brought out against their will through a leak or newspaper story, I think, indicates the strong feeling in our government that this kind of thing must never happen again. And, we have set up now a House Intelligence Committee and a Senate Intelligence Committee, both new, to insure that it does not.

On the question of our not giving information, but receiving it, let me say we have a common interest in arriving at a final answer, a clear answer, to the question of the assassination of President Kennedy. We are seeking your help in that and your officials have indicated to us they are willing to continue working to help on that. Our Committee goes out of existence at the end of this year. When we file our final report, there will be a great deal of information in it.

Castro: Is it going to be public?

Preyer: It will be public -- which will be of interest to you. Until that time, because of our different jurisdictional problems, there is some evidence which does not belong
to us which we cannot release. But in the final analysis, the full report will make available much information of interest to you and may answer many of the rumors. In the meantime, one reason we press so hard for information is that this is the last opportunity that will probably be made in our country to reach a final answer. The last chance where an official body of Congress -- an official governmental body -- will make a judgment on this question.

That is why we hope that any information that bears on this subject that may come up in the next few months and any effort that could be made, even strenuous effort, would be justified because this opportunity may not come again. And I hope very much that we will be able to give clear answers to the questions. Your help will assist very much.

Castro: I think you are right in what you are saying. When I spoke about the hope of obtaining some information, it was not but a hope. It is absolutely our curiosity, you know. But, it is absolutely evident that we have the duty of handing over all the information we may gather. We are very much interested in having Kennedy's assassination clarified because in one way or the other attempts have been made to try to have Cuba involved in it. We have our conscience clear.
There is nothing so important as having your conscience clean -- absolutely clean. That's why it is not a matter of conscience, but rather a matter of political, historical interest to have all these problems clarified. It is also true that the fact that the United States has conducted an investigation on the (attempts on our people) and the fact that (it) has been made public is a very correct thing to do -- very right. Of course, I (hear) that in that publication many names were not disclosed -- on reasons of safety. When we conduct an investigation, in general, we publish everything because ..anyway..but I would have liked for the Senate report to have been more complete. It should have not protected so many people in the interest of the national security because that, you know, diminishes its moral value. It diminishes the moral value of the publication. However, I coincide with you that the fact that the investigation had been conducted and that all those materials were released is something highly positive. Now, you see, I was recalling Bill Moyers' report. Bill Moyers made a very important report of all these attempts -- all these logs on terrorist groups. Now, then, there is one point in which an intimation is made that Kennedy's death could have been a result of all these attempts against our lives. It is to say to a certain extent --
-- Moyers' report -- which has many positive things -- can leave the doubt that Cuba could have had some participation in that because there is a Representative of Congress speaking -- I think I spoke later, and at the end a Senator spoke that said that he had no doubts about that topic. So, we are very much...we are highly interested in that party being satisfied. Because, even when the Senate Intelligence Report was released, in some people the idea could have become stronger that Kennedy's death could have been our revenge for all that had been planned against us. If Cuba had something to do with Kennedy's death, it would have been indirectly because many people were trained in handling weapons and many things that were not normal were done, and under the shade of these irregularities, terrorism arises and develops, so (that) all these acts become the (norm).

It was precisely in that sense that I said that it was a nefarious precedent. Can you imagine that in the (entire) world I was one of the naive people who thought that these things could not happen. Not in the Middle Ages, but now in this era in which the whole apparatus of the government can remain very quiet and promote the killing of leaders of other countries? What is to happen to the world in the nuclear era if that becomes a practice?

Now we are lucky that all those plans were a failure.
We have not had to regret the death of any comrade leader of the revolution. Our attitude is not even that of hatred or resentment. On very rare occasions do we talk to visitors about these problems. That belongs in the past. It happened a long time ago and still the prints exist -- still the poor things exist.

You have to see the terrorist attack against a Cuban plane in flight -- a plane that exploded. Before that plane fell down, all the people got burned alive. Seventy-four people died. Who perpetrated that crime but people who were trained by the CIA? We suspect that some CIA agent had to do with that terrorist act. It's very strange, because that happened after Angola. The United States had adopted a very violent attitude towards us and Nixon made very forceful statements against us. One of the individuals who was recently arrested in Miami because he was involved in the preparation of terrorist activities was just declared non-guilty in a trial and he defended himself by saying simply that he had been in the White House. He said who he had spoken with and who gave him the weapons, and precisely those facts, those events, took place a week before the attempt -- before the sabotage on the Cuban plane in flight. And, he is just defending himself by saying that in the trial. He is one of the persons that was in the group who perpetrated the
sabotage. Now, I am going to tell you something. I think that now Carter is - I don't know what Party you belong to - and it is not interesting to the part of what I'm going to say. If I hurt someone's sensitivity I apologize for that, but I would have not trusted Johnson. I may say sincerely, I sincerely believe that Johnson would have followed that line, of the attempts against people's lives, terrorism, subversion. I have no doubt that Nixon was a man without scruples. I was always under a bad impression. I was convinced of that. But now, I see that this President of the United States would not be capable of resorting to that kind of action. There are two things in this connection: One, I think there is an attitude in the public opinion as to that Watergate affair, and the Senate investigations have contributed to create a sort of consciousness. I also think that the politicians have taken that into account, and I think also that personally Carter is a man of a different mentality. If I am asked whether I think Carter would be capable of planning these kinds of actions, I would say no. I would say I don't think him capable of doing such a thing. I am quite convinced. In that sense, we feel more relaxed. We had to defend ourselves from these actions for many years. You should not think that I like to be surrounded by people. I think you have to be alone. I would like to have a
normal life. We have taken many measures in all these years preventing attempts with different kinds of explosives and weapons, attempts with poison, and actually we are not saying all. I will tell you something. I would even say that I underestimated the CIA somewhat because I thought them capable of many things, but when I read the Senate Committee Report, I confess that I had not thought so much. Because, all that from bacteria, viruses, poisons, a shell with explosives, I don’t know how many tremendous things. But it was not only that. I want you to know that if we would have been careless, they would have brought a microphone and put it over there in one of the ashtrays and one mike over there in that seat and everything. There were not only subversive activities, but also espionage. There were many activities related to espionage. I remember that around the day in which the sabotage against our plane took place, the CIA asked in a question, to one of their agents here, whether I was going to travel to Africa, whether he could find out what place I was going to visit, what means of transportation I was going to use, I mean, a whole set of investigation which was not political, but rather that could be used for anything else. Now, going back to this topic, one of the things I’ve gone into recently with some people, is why Cuba – it was really something inconceivable – could have the idea of killing the President?
First, because that would have been a tremendous insanity. The Cuban Revolutionaries and the people who have made this Revolution have proven to be intrepid and to make decisions in the right moment. But, we have not proven to be insane people. The leaders of the Revolution do not do crazy things and have always been extremely concerned to prevent any factor that could become a kind of an argument or a pretext for carrying out aggression against our country. We are a very small country. We have the United States 90 miles from our shore which is a very large, powerful country economically, technically, militarily. So, for many years we lived concerned that an invasion could take place...I mean, indirect and at the end a direct aggression. We were very close to that. Yet look at the conclusions we draw. If the elections of 1960 had not been won by Kennedy, but Nixon instead, during the Bay of Pigs, the United States would have invaded Cuba. We mean that in the midst of the fight that Kennedy followed the line that had been already traced. There is no doubt that we appreciate very highly the fact that Kennedy resisted every kind of pressure not to have the Marines land in our country. Because, there were many people who wanted the Marines to land here. Nixon himself was in favor of that. Had Nixon been President during the Bay of Pigs invasion, a landing by the military army of the United States would have taken place. We are absolutely convinced of that.
However, Kennedy resisted all the pressures and he did not do that. What would that have meant for us? The destruction of the country? Hundreds of thousands, maybe millions of deaths? Because, undoubtedly the people would fight. The people I am absolutely sure about. An invasion of Cuba by the United States would have cost hundreds of thousands of lives, maybe millions of lives. We were aware of that. We have an American military base in our territory, by force. And, it is not assumed that anyone is going to have a military base on someone else's territory, if it is not on the basis of an agreement. However, the United States has military bases in many places of the world, but here, it is by force. From that base, many provocations have been carried out against Cuba. There were people wounded...there were people killed. What did we do? We brought our guards away from the lines, from the fence. We never shot at them. Why? Because we made every possible effort so that an incident of that kind would not become a pretext to be attacked. So, we have followed the policy. We had an American boat just three miles away from us for years, a warship full of electronic communications equipment and never a hostile action was carried against that warship. So, there are many events that have proven how careful Cuba has always been to prevent the perpetration of an invasion. We could
have died heroically - no doubt about it. Now, that would have been a victory for our people. They're willing to be sacrificed and to die. Yet, it would have been just another page in history...nothing else. So, we have always been very much aware to not give The United States the pretext...the possibility...for (an invasion.) What was the cause of the missile crisis? The need we had to seek protection in case of an 'invasion' from the United States. We agreed on the installation of the strategic missiles, because undoubtedly that diminished the danger of direct aggression. That became a danger of another kind, a kind of a global danger we became, but we were trying to protect our country at all times. Who here could have operated and planned something so delicate as the death of the United States President. That was insane. From the ideological point of view it was insane. And from the political point of view, it was a tremendous insanity. I am going to tell you here that nobody, nobody ever had the idea of such things. What would it do? We just tried to defend our folks here, within our territory. Anyone who subscribed to that idea would have been judged insane...absolutely sick. Never, in twenty years of revolution, I never heard anyone suggest nor even speculate about a measure of that sort, because who could think of the idea of organizing the death of
the President of the United States. That would have been
the most perfect pretext for the United States to invade
our country which is what I have tried to prevent for all
these years, in every possible sense. Since the United
States is much more powerful than we are, what could we gain
from a war with the United States? The United States would
lose nothing. The destruction would have been here. The
United States had U-2 air surveilling for almost fifteen
years. The planes flew over our territory every day. The
women said that they could not go over their terrace naked
for the U-2 would have taken a picture of them. That thing
we could not allow to happen, you know, because it was
demoralizing. So, there were, you know, those flights just
very close to the soil. Those kind of flights was really
demoralizing for our people. It was impossible to let
them continue to do that, so we had to shoot at them. On
the following day after the missile crisis, we had the
need to shoot at those planes, because to have allowed
that would have created a demoralization among our people.
And, I say that if we allowed that, you wouldn't have been
able even to play baseball here. Because those planes
came just twenty meters from here, so it was really de-
moralizing. See, the U-2 came very high, you know, and
I tell you, Cuba has been characterized by following a
firm policy, a policy of principles. Our position was
known after the missile crisis. We were not in a position
to make any concessions. That is a known position, but Cuba,
the leaders of the Cuban Revolution, have never made
that kind of insanity, and that I may assure you. And
the biggest kind of insanity that could have gone through
anyone's mind here would have been that of thinking of
killing the President of the United States. Nobody
would have thought of that. In spite of all the things,
in spite of all the attempts, in spite of all the irritation
that brought about an attitude of firmness, a willingness
to fight, that was translated by our people into a spirit
of heroism, but it never became a source of insanity.
I'll give you practical reasons. Apart from our
ideology, I want to tell you that the death of the
leader does not change the system. It has never done
that. And, the best example we have is Batista. Batista
murdered thousands of our comrades. If there was anyone
in which that kind of revenge was justified, it was
Batista. However, our movement did very difficult things,
but it never had the idea of physically eliminating Batista.
Other revolutionary groups did, but never our movement.
We had a war for twenty-five months against Batista's
army and spent seven years under Batista's dictatorship
with thousands dying. But, it never came to our minds...
we could have done it, very well, but we never thought
about that, because it was different from our feelings.
That is our position. That is why we are interested.
That is why I was asking you whether you are really
hopeful to give serious conclusions on this. On our part, if there is something we could give you, we would, without any kind of precondition. The information we have offered you is not conditioned to anything. In spite of the fact that the problem is thorny, that doesn't stop this Committee here from giving the impression that we are being judged here, that we are being tried.

Stokes: We certainly don't want in any way to convey that, in fact, uh, ...

Castro: No, no, no. I mean not you. I am not thinking of you. I mean that some people could see it that way; that Cuba has been investigated by the Committee.

Stokes: Well, Mr. President, one thing we have done in that respect, we even said to your Cuban Interest Section in Washington when we first began that we wanted to come down here and do this part of the investigation very quietly without any fanfare, without any publicity, and this is the overall way we have tried to conduct our whole investigation...everything is being done quietly in executive session until such time that we compile all the data so that we don't in any way declaim or degrade anyone. Then, hopefully, at the end we can come out with a report that everyone will respect.

Castro: There is something which is not secret.
If I may ask you, is there anything true, or how much could be true about those publications which state that many people who could have had a part in Kennedy's death have died in accidents and things like that?

Stokes: This is one of the difficulties of attempting to conduct an investigation thirteen years after the event has occurred. Obviously, there are people who in the normal course of the investigation we would have wanted to talk with, we cannot talk with because they are now deceased. This is one of the difficulties that we face.

I yield to Congressman Dodd.

Dodd: Mr. President, I won't take much time. I think most of the questions have been asked. I wish we had ...

Castro: I have time. Please don't mind about my time. I made no other commitment today, so I would have time. Nobody is waiting for me.

Dodd: I wish we had an evening just to talk about the Peace Corps, but we will save that for another time. A tape is played?

There are a couple of things here. The question you asked of Chairman Stokes -- -- the one regarding the optimism we have over reaching a final conclusion in regard to this effort is one that I think we all ask ourselves almost every day. It is the question that is very important in the minds of many, many people, not only in government, but also of course, the American
people are concerned about our efforts. I said today in one of our meetings that I strongly suspected that your grandchildren and my grandchildren will be reading books about the assassination, just as we read them today about the assassination of Lincoln, another historical figure that had been assassinated, and where the suspicion of conspiracy has existed. I think we would be fooling ourselves if we tried to suggest that at the conclusion of our hearings we were going to end once and for all, all of the speculation for all time. I don't think that is possible.

But, what we are going to try and do, and I think that what we have done successfully over the past year and a half, is to approach this case with an open mind and not prejudge the case. And, the temptations are great to do that. For every day we almost see a new theory. But, we are determined to proceed through this process listening to all sides and then using the evidence that we are able to collect, to reach as definitely as we can, regarding those points that have been nagging at the consciences and minds of the people all across the earth. Two other points: One is that we intend not only to publish our hearings and the conclusion that we reach. We also intend to use every available means of communication in the United States, hopefully television, radio, to conduct open public hearings, not only showing our conclusions, but how we arrived at
those conclusions. We suspect that many, many people do not want to read a boring report, but would rather be better informed by radio and television and newspapers. We intend to hide nothing, to release all information without any fear whatsoever as to where that information leads or what our conclusions would be. I think, I know I can speak for myself, and I'm sure I can speak for everyone else on this Committee. I wouldn't serve on this Committee if I didn't think in the end that I could say to my constituents that I had done an honest and thorough job and that I wasn't hiding anything from them. And, my last point is, Mr. President, that had some of your government officials not mentioned it today, we would have, but it was very encouraging to hear it come from them, that they would like to continue to keep the lines of communication open between themselves, your government and our Committee. And, as that old Chinese proverb goes - a journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step. And I think this is a good beginning and I want to just say here and now that I have been deeply impressed by your statements. I find your logic compelling and I guarantee you that we will do the very best job we can, including the final report.

Castro: How many legislators do you have on this Committee?

Stokes: There are twelve in all, one lady and eleven men.
Castro: Don’t you all have to be involved in elections at the end of this year now?

Stokes: Uh huh. Yes, we do.

Castro: And how would you be able, how would you manage to carry out all this work, and take care of the election campaigns at the same time? How would you?

Dodd: He doesn’t have any trouble at all. (About another Congressman.) (Laughter)

Castro: And you work personally in the campaigns, don’t you? I mean, with all this? The twelve, I mean the twelve people on the Committee work together, participate in all hearings and all the interviews and all that?

Stokes: The Committee ... I have been in Congress ten years, Mr. President, and I serve on several other committees in the House. And, I know in general they are hard working committees. But, I have never seen twelve people who have worked together the way this Committee has. We work extremely long hours, we have worked into the night when the occasion necessitated it. We have worked Saturdays and Sundays when it was necessary and remained in Washington to work on Committee matters. We just have twelve people who are dedicated to the fact that this is an opportunity to do something of historic nature and they are dedicated to devoting the time that it requires. In addition to the twelve Members of Congress, we have a staff of 115 people. The staff is
headed up by Professor Blakey. You might be interested in knowing that we spent three months searching for a director of the staff. And, we were extremely concerned that we get a person of the highest professional ability, along with integrity that cannot be compromised in any respect, and one who would direct the staff in a way that we would let the chips fall where they may in the final analysis. And to that degree, I am sure....

Castro: Now he has to continue working while you run the re-election campaign.

(Laughter)

Stokes: But, when we go home he has to keep on working right here.

Castro: You would have to go to meet your constituents and then .. that would be the most important moment of all these efforts, you know? The moments to draw the conclusions... Would it be possible for you to finish up the report when due? Don't you need more time?

Stokes: We promised the House of Representatives (laughter) that there would be no further requests for time. I am not worried about time; it is the money part. The House is appropriating about five million dollars over the two-year period for us to complete this investigation...and

Castro: And only 115 people?
Stokes: Well, Mr. Barber of Maryland who watches the purse strings of the House says it involves a lot of money. We have had to face that kind of opposition on the floor of the House of Representatives.

Blakey: Mr. President, I have no questions to ask of you, but less we as guests only asked questions and did not respond to any of yours, let me answer at least in part the last question you asked.

You expressed some interest in what we call the mysterious death projects. The literature about the Kennedy assassination is filled with instances of people who have in some way been connected to the assassination and have themselves died under mysterious circumstances. We are looking into those deaths and seeing whether there are sinister explanations for them. Let me comment on one of them: Now, this is not from our investigation, but from my own information, and he may be a man of some interest to you. Let me put it in context for you. I cannot comment on many of the facts in the investigation. As you put it, much of the information is limited by matters of national security. For example, in our country, it has never been officially acknowledged that AMLASH was Rolando Cubela and nothing that we say here today should be read as an indication on our part that that is true or not true. But to continue...Sam Giancana, who was a Mafia leader
in Chicago, who according to the Senate Intelligence Report, directly plotted on your life, was a person who was under investigation by myself in the Department of Justice and ironically on November 22nd, 1963, I was with the Attorney General, Robert Kennedy, in a meeting of the Organized Crime session and among the subjects taken up at that time was the Attorney General's personal interest in my work in seeking to prosecute Sam Giancana. I bring this to your attention for two reasons: First, to express to you the feeling of one who has spent a great deal of his life working to see to it that members of the Mafia in the United States consistent with due process receive justice. I know from personal knowledge that Robert Kennedy shared those concerns. He would never have been knowingly involved in using those people to plot an assassination of you. And, while I cannot speak of personal knowledge of the President of the United States, there was no difference between them. I say that to express my sense of shame and outrage that members, according to the Senate Intelligence Report, of the CIA were involved in that. Those people who were in charge of our government at that level in my judgment had no knowledge. But to respond more particularly to your question, it is unlikely that Sam Giancana died be-
cause he testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee. As I indicated to some of the members of your staff, Mr. Giancana was responsible for the death of hundreds of people in Chicago, and the remarkable thing is not that he died then, but that he had not been killed much earlier.

Stokes: The last gentleman here, Mr. President, is Gary Cornwell. Gary is the Deputy Chief Counsel for the Kennedy Subcommittee and he would have direct responsibility in terms of the final work product related to the Kennedy investigation. I separate out the Kennedy assassination because as you know we are investigating also the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King. Two murder investigations are going at the same time.

Castro: The five million dollars is for both?

Blakey: You ought to also know, Mr. President, that this is the budget attributable to the Committee itself. In fact, the United States Senate, particularly the people who were responsible for the Church Committee investigation, have been helping this Committee. The Federal Bureau of Investigation has a relatively large staff devoted to getting their files made available to us. We have actually received cooperation from the Central Intelligence Agency. Some members of the staff would say not as fast and as full as we might like, but the final report is not in. The police departments in Dallas
and in Memphis have been helping us and if you consider the work that was done in 1963 and 1964, the actual available resources in the United States devoted to these investigations are considerably more than five million dollars.

Castro: May I suggest something? Why don't you investigate also Oswald's personality in one sense, whether Oswald was also a member of any intelligence agency in the United States?

Blakey: That is among the issues that we are looking into.

Castro: I think that is a very important thing. Because, for me, Oswald's personality - it's a mystery...that first he was in the Army, the Navy, and later he appears in the Soviet Union. He married a Soviet citizen. He came back to the States. I still get the impression that this individual's personality is that of a spy. It is the typical way you recruit a spy and send him to another country. This seems to me very important. I think it is very important to go very deeply into his past, to see if at any time it was possible to really know about his personality. That would be very important.

Blakey: Of all the questions I think we will answer, that I feel with a degree of certainty, we will. I should also add, Mr. President, that if you consider the resources that your staff has also devoted to this
organization and the time and effort they have put into it, the five million dollars grows even more.

(Laughter)

Castro: Sure, they have been working. But as you know, our contribution is very modest because I think that the fundamental things for the investigation could be conducted only in the United States. And, what we can do is very little, very little. But, from the first moment we made the decision to make available anyone you wanted to talk with. I think that your task is a hard one. Hard, because your prestige is at stake with the investigation. You face a task of tremendous responsibility and in that sense I think a very hard job has been assigned to you.

Stokes: We share your feelings on that, Mr. President.

Blakey: Their job is harder. They are politicians. They must run for reelection. I can always go back and teach.

Castro: Will the report be many volumes?

(Laughter)

How big is the Warren Committee Report? When will the Warren Committee Report be published?

Blakey: The Warren Commission has already been published.

Castro: Warren Commission?

Blakey: Commission. Yes.

Castro: Warren Commission, what was it?
Villa: It was twenty-six volumes. We had two copies of the summary, but we have not seen the twenty-six volumes.

Castro: Have you read all that?

Villa: Yes, we have.

Castro: We have to say that the Warren Commission was objective. They did not try to commit Cuba.

You were a Federal Judge. Then, are you the man with the most experience in this kind of business.

Preyer: Well, in the federal courts we didn't have to deal with anything as complex as this with so many rumors and so many facets to it. Usually, we had a narrow question, so this is really a new experience for me.

Castro: They would give their lives to discover something decisive, you know?

(Laughter)

Is there anyone else you would like to meet?

Villa: Piniero. Piniero worked at the Ministry of Interior at that time. They are interested in speaking to Piniero because he met with Santo Trafficante in the early sixties and gave him 24 hours to leave the country, and also because he met with Ascue.

Castro: We did not even have a Ministry of Interior at that time. He worked as some kind of investigator, but at that time we did not have a Minister of Interior. I think it was for the Army. Some things we have now that we did not have then. They were created, you know, in the course
of the years. The first year everybody did whatever they wanted. There was chaos, you know. The state was not organized, so the people came in and out, absolutely free. There were not the controls that existed later, that were created later, especially in the first year of the revolution. I recall a social problem. All the casinos were closed and thousands of people were unemployed without a solution to the problem. So, we had to take back that measure to gain time to find an economic solution for the people who would remain unemployed when the casinos were closed. So, the state had to cover the salaries of all the people who worked there. And, I want to tell you something else: As you know, recently there was a television conference where efforts were being made in order to have the Cuban government involved in drug traffic, smuggling drugs. That is very curious, you know. I don't know why that theory is expounded now. It is a very recent invention. It happens that we are the one country in this hemisphere that has cooperated the most with the United States without any purpose, I mean, we have no intention of doing the United States a disfavor. But, anyway, on the basis of Cuba's belief with regard to drugs, very severe measures were implemented to prevent them. We have become the number one cooperators of the United States in this area. You don't know how
many boats we have captured here that come along Cuban
coasts carrying drugs. You don't know how many planes
we have taken here carrying drugs and, of course, over
the past twenty years the individuals who have been in-
volved in drug traffic have always been sentenced, always.
These were not people that could affect us. They were
just going and coming from South America and Central
America to the United States. And, they just happened
to come here by chance. Dozens of people have been
searched on account of drug traffic, on account of the
international drug traffic laws. We have eliminated
drug use in Cuba and I myself wonder why it is we have
to cooperate with the United States if when the embargo
was imposed on our country we could have planted
ten thousand acres of marijuana and become the largest
supplier of marijuana to the United States in combina-
tion with all those people. We did not do that since
we were blockaded and knowing that in the United States
there is a market for marijuana even though the govern-
ment in this country has fought the most against drugs.
Besides in Cuba we don't have drug problems, but we had
to even uproot the last plants of marijuana planted in
the mountains. And actually, look at how we're being
paid back now; they pay us back by trying to link us into
the drug traffic. It's incredible, you know. We can
say it like that; this is the government that has fought
the most against drug traffic in this hemisphere. No
discussion about it. And, we are lucky that we don't have that problem ourselves because unless the State imported cocaine and marijuana, that problem has almost disappeared.

Laughter.

Translator left; said she would be around.

Second translator arrives.

Castro: Well, we have almost finished.

Escartin: Who was the one who made that impeachment about the drug problem where Representative Wolff participated?

He was the head of the Committee.

Castro: Why did he do that? Do you know the address, because I am going to write them a note.

Laughter.

Castro: And, I am going to ask a budget for stamps and paper. I'm going to sabotage the next election.

Escartin: Even though he made some political statements with a certain prestige, he is deceitful. It seems that there are some statements made by him on the basis of an investigation and that this man used them as he wished trying to attain certain political objectives of propaganda because you have explained our stand regarding that. And, there is something strange there: A Cuban Counter-Revolutionary was mentioned who made an operation with Colombia which seems to have serious drug problems...and they tried to
Fidel Castro: Just two old friends down there defended me. The President of Columbia defended me also, so I have to thank some two persons who defended me.

Escartin: It is interesting that Hernandez-Cartaya was retained there by the FBI. It seems that somebody is trying to solidify this story...that's the situation.

Stokes: Mr. President, before we continue, Gary Cornwell, I think, has a couple of questions to ask you.

Cornwell: Mr. President, there was a book published by Daniel Schorr called "Clearing the Air". If you haven't read the book, I would like to read one passage.

Castro: I haven't read that. You know about that book?

Villa: I haven't.

Cornwell: One passage reads as follows:

An interview in July 1967 with a British journalist, Comer Clark...do you have the translation of it there?

Villa: Yes.

Castro: Let me see it. Yes, I have it here. This is absurd.

Pause: (Approximately one minute while President Castro reads it.)

Castro: This is absurd. I didn't say that.

Cornwell: Did the interview ever occur?

Castro: It has been invented from the beginning until the end. I didn't say that. How could I say that?
It's a lie from (head to toe). If this man would have done something like that, it would have been our moral duty to inform the United States. You understand? Because if a man comes here, mentions that he wants to kill Kennedy, we are (being provoked), do you realize that? It would have been similar to a mad person. If somebody comes to us and said that, it would have been our moral responsibility to inform the United States. How could we accept a man from Mexico to Cuba who tells us that he is going to kill President Kennedy? If somebody is trying to create provocation or a trap, and uh...we would have denounced him. Sure, a person coming here or even in one of our embassies saying that...and that never happened...in no part, as far as I know.

Villa: That refers to the interview you spoke about in the beginning.

Castro: But how could they interview me in a pizzeria? I never go to public restaurants and that man invented that. That was invented from the upper to the bottom because you asked me about the Brazilian Embassy and I have no obligation to that and never said it was true. That in the Brazilian Embassy I talked about this problem of the attempt. That was true. I could deny it, but I don't because it was strictly the truth. I didn't remember who the journalist was nor...but I
have the idea that something like that was discussed and that there was a declaration at the Brazilian Embassy. I can't assure it because I don't remember it, but it probably occurred... Later on they tried to present it as a threat and I didn't do it with that intention. Of course, I didn't do it with that intention. But, not that other interview. I do not remember that. And, uh, it is a surprise for me to see because I couldn't have said that. You have to see who wrote it. And, what is the job of that journalist? What is he engaged in? And, what prestige has this journalist? Not the one that wrote that book, but the origin of that version. You should have to find who he is and why he wrote it, and with whom he is related...... and which sense they have to attribute those words which are absolutely invented. I think it is possible that you would be able to find out who that journalist was. Do you have some news about that journalist in that newspaper?

Villa: He was in Cuba and tried to carry out an interview with you.

Castro: Let me tell you. Of every one hundred interviews that are requested of me I only grant one because if I were to give all the interviews that I am requested to, you can be sure that I would not be able to have anything but twenty-four hours of my life to have interviews.
I would not have enough time to do anything else. Barbara Walters waited three years for an interview. Just almost three years. And even that of Moyers. I didn't want to have that Moyer interview. He started talking and the truth is that he was very insistent from the time he came down from the airplane and in spite of the fact that there was no commitment from me regarding the interview. There are a lot of interview requests and it is very difficult, but I would never have given a journalist an interview in a pizzeria.

Dodd: I don't even give interviews in a pizzeria.

Villa: Another element commander...That interview was published in a sensationalist or yellow press from the United States. It is a sensationalist newspaper.

Castro: Especially at that time, a lot of barbaric things were published. They are still being written. Yesterday I was reading an English paper, I don't remember its name, speaking about Angola, and saying that we in military operations against the blacks killed thousands of women and children and so forth. And, I also mentioned before the declaration of that Representative about the drug traffic. Previous to that incident they tried to implicate us in that. If there is somebody in this world that has accustomed himself to listen to the worst things without losing sleep, it is us.
The campaigns that were carried out, directed campaigns that were carried out throughout the world - in western continents and also in the United States - against Cuba and all of us had no precedents. There are a lot of people that are badly informed about Cuba, and we have nothing to hide, nothing. They have spoken about tortures in Cuba, and that was a tradition from the war during the Revolutionary War. We never put a finger on another person because we created an awareness in our people. We condemned torture and I can assure you that this is a principal that knows not a single exception in our country, because it would have the repulsion of all the world. Why are our policemen so efficient...especially the security policemen who protected all of us? Do you know why? Because, it was precisely a police which did not carry out torture. There are a lot of countries where they apply torture and they never discover anything. They never become policemen in themselves. Now our people couldn't be able to receive any information by means of torture, and they develop intelligence, and the technique of investigation and of prevention. There is a time in which we had more than one hundred counter-revolutionary organizations and all of them were penetrated. We knew more than the counter-revolution armies when a person was arrested because there were some things that he didn't
remember: who he met, which places and so forth.

I'm going to tell you, there was a time in which penetration of our people increased so much that in turn they became the heads of some of those counter-revolutionary organizations. The police wouldn't be able to develop a technique of investigation and they wouldn't have investigated anything if they just took one person and tried to destroy him. That tradition will never serve. A true police is one which is developed and that will seek intelligent ways of obtaining information. Batista's policemen tortured and didn't discover anything. And, for us there is no problem. Security has a lot of advantages because all of the people are militants within the Revolution - country people, children, neighbors, students, peasants and the women. Everybody is organized and, that is why. Through the agents we know everything that is going on. Let me tell you something. One day a parrot was lost. In Havana, we told this to the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution - about trying to find out where this parrot was, and they found the parrot. Some other time, a woman was at the hospital. She had a daughter. Her daughter was robbed from the hospital, so we had to find the girl. Everybody assumed that it was a mental case of somebody. Of course, that was not published in the newspapers.
Why not? We did not want any panic. We called up all the CDRs and forty-eight hours later, the girl appeared. One person in one place had a child and they hadn’t seen that she was pregnant. That woman was obsessed about having a child and she went to the hospital dressed up like a nurse and she took the girl. And, after forty-eight hours, they found her. There was something else: Here we never have a political kidnapping. Here we never have a terrorist activity. We find out earlier. There were some counter-revolutionaries. But, there is something. The greatest part of them went to the United States, especially the wealthy people. The social base of the counter-revolution was transferred to the United States. The United States wanted to take from us the doctors and the professionals - they got half of the doctors. Out of six thousand doctors, they got three thousand. But then that forced us to concentrate on a school of medicine. Now we have twelve thousand doctors - almost one thousand are abroad in different countries working. We have thirty-five hundred students at the Cuban Medicine School. By 1985 with the new facilities now in progress we will enroll some seven thousand students every year. We are going to train thirty-three thousand students at the University. Our doctors are distributed throughout the country, and before they
were all located in the Capitol. So, if the United States wanted to take our professional personnel, they forced us to develop a new system. Fortunately, they didn't take only technical people, but also wealthy people, delinquents, pimps.

(Laughter)

and exploiters of vices such as drugs, gangsters and all that type of people. They went to the United States. They opened the doors because before the Revolution they had a limit. The United States couldn't receive more than ten thousand and there were a lot of people who wanted to go there trying to find some jobs or social programs. Then, when the Revolution triumphed, the United States opened its doors. Can they repeat that procedure with some other countries? No, they can't. What would happen if the United States opened the way for all those Mexicans who want to go to the United States trying to find jobs? What about all the Brazilians, Colombians, Peruvians...? They opened the doors and they took the social ground work of the Counter Revolution. So, they left the houses. Those houses were turned into schools and dwelling houses for humble people. You understand? And all those who left here, they left these houses for humble people. and, in the country, the most humble people stayed. You understand? What resources they need to carry on
the Revolution and what social ground work they need for making Counter Revolution, they don't have. That is why the country is defending itself. And that is why we were able to depend on intelligence, and not torture. Thousands of times, they have said that in Cuba we torture. It is like that, but people of all nations know how things were and are in Cuba. We never had any persons disappear. It wasn't a new invention. We would never have that. We never found a dead man in the street. We were forced to legislate tough laws, but nobody was ever sanctioned except through the courts and through previous law. Since we were in the Sierra Maestra, we started making the first law. We said to the people... Well, the assassins and the torturers are going to be punished. Nobody will take revenge in their own hands. That was a promise we made to the people. The torturers were punished and also the criminals, who generally are not punished. You can see now that things are going on in Chile and in some other countries. They are doing unbelievable things. Sometimes I have heard some stories about things going on there and they are unbelievable. That is why we are not in agreement with their thinking. We have been accused of denying a man his human rights; that is to say that things are worse here than in Chile, Brazil and so forth. Who are they going to tell that story in this case? But, in spite of it all, we have survived. And the campaigns did not manage to destroy us.

REST OF INTERVIEW CONSISTS OF PERSONAL REMARKS
Mr. Blakey. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I would like now to play the recording of President Castro’s answer to that first question.

Chairman Stokes. You may proceed.

[Tape recording played.]

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Chairman, the committee’s next question was more specific. It dealt with an account published in 1967 in the National Enquirer claiming that Oswald while at the consulate had voiced an intention to assassinate President Kennedy.

Mr. Chairman, I note that JFK F-428 has already been displayed and ask that it be entered into the record. It is a reproduction of that National Enquirer article.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, so ordered.

[JFK exhibit F-428 follows:]

Mr. Blakey. It is probably also appropriate to note that that article has had wide circulation. For example, Daniel Schorr repeats it in his book, “Clearing the Air.”

President Castro, according to the story in the National Enquirer, had admitted to being told of the threat, though he had taken no action in response to it. The tape of this portion of President Castro’s remarks is not suitable for playing in a public room. Consequently, I will read his response.

President Castro said:

This is absurd. I didn’t say that * * * It has been invented from the beginning until the end. I didn’t say that. How could I say that? It’s a lie from (head to toe). If this man would have done something like that, it would have been our moral duty
to inform the United States. You understand? Because if a man comes here, mentions that he wants to kill Kennedy, we are (being provoked), do you realize that? It would have been similar to a mad person. If somebody comes to us and said that, it would have been our moral responsibility to inform the United States. How could we accept a man from Mexico to Cuba who tells us that he is going to kill President Kennedy? If somebody is trying to create provocation or a trap, and uh * * * we would have denounced him * * * Sure, a person coming here or even in one of our Embassies saying that * * * And that never happened. No part, as far as I know * * * But how could they interview me in a pizzeria. I never go to public restaurants and that man invented that. That was invented.

I do not remember that. And, uh, it is a surprise for me to see because I couldn't have said that. You have to see who wrote it. And, what is the job of that journalist? What is he engaged in? And, what prestige has this journalist? * * * You should have to find who he is and why he wrote it, and with whom he is related * * * and which sense they have to attribute those words which are absolutely invented. I think it is possible that you would be able to find out who that journalist was. Do you have some news about that journalist in that newspaper?

Let me tell you. Of every 100 interviews that are requested of me I only grant one because if I were to give all the interviews that I am requested to, you can be sure that I would not be able to have anything but 24 hours of my life to have interviews. I would not have enough time to do anything else. Barbara Walters waited 3 years for an interview * * * just almost 3 years. And even that of Moyer * * * I didn't want to have that Moyer interview. He started talking and the truth is that he was very insistent from the time he came down from the airplane and in spite of the fact that there was no commitment from me regarding the interview. There are a lot of interview requests and it is very difficult, but I would never have given a journalist an interview in a pizzeria.

Mr. Chairman, the author—

Chairman STOKES. Would you suspend for just one moment?

MR. BLAKEY. Certainly.

Chairman STOKES. I think I misunderstood you. There was some reason you explained for reading that.

MR. BLAKEY. Yes; the tape unfortunately, as has been my experience, Mr. Chairman, and I am sure yourself in trials, that any effort, when you have a mechanical device inevitably they fail at least once out of three, and while we made an effort to enhance the quality of that portion of the tape, in which President Castro responded to this particular question, we played it and it just simply was not suitable for playing in a public auditorium. It was not audible. Consequently, it was thought best to read it rather than to play the tape.

Chairman STOKES. Thank you.

MR. BLAKEY. We really did the best we could.

Mr. Chairman, the author of the National Enquirer story was a British freelance journalist named Comer Clark. He died in 1972.

Nevertheless, the committee, while conducting other investigations in England, made an effort to explore Mr. Clark's background and reputation for veracity. Frankly, it was not good. Apparently, he wrote extensively for the sensationalist press in England. His articles include such items as "British Girls as Nazi Sex Slaves," "I Was Hitler's Secret Love," and "German Plans To Kidnap the Royal Family."

On the other hand, even though there may be considerable doubt as to the fact of Clark's interview with President Castro, the committee has been informed that the substance of the Clark article is supported by highly confidential but reliable sources available to the U.S. Government.

Apart from the reliability of the source, whether or not this source may have provided reliable information in this instance is of
course an issue that the committee will have to consider in December. In this connection the Cuban Government has suggested to the committee that the circulation of this story represents a disinformation effort by the Central Intelligence Agency designed to discredit Cuba and to implicate her in the assassination.

Mr. Chairman, President Castro also discussed the general subject of assassination as a means for achieving political change. His thoughts on it are pertinent to the investigation. It would be appropriate, then, to play his response to that question, which fortunately is clear enough to play in a public proceeding.

Chairman STOKES. OK.

[Tape recording played.]

Mr. BLAKEY. Finally, Mr. Chairman, President Castro commented on the specific so-called threat reported in the New Orleans Times Picayune of September 9. It would be appropriate, Mr. Chairman, to play the last excerpt.

Chairman STOKES. You may proceed.

[Tape recording played.]

Mr. BLAKEY. Mr. Chairman, I would note for the record that President Castro was of course speaking in Spanish, and the simultaneous English translation was provided by Juanita Vera.

Mr. Chairman, in August, during the committee's second trip to Cuba, the Cuban Government made available to the committee one Rolanda Cubela, who identified himself to the committee as AMLASH, on the basis of his reading of the 1976 Senate report. It would be appropriate at this point, Mr. Chairman, to enter into the record and to display JFK F-424, a photograph of Mr. Cubela.

[The information follows:]
Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the record and displayed accordingly.

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Cubela indicated that he had been prosecuted and convicted by the Cuban Government for plotting against Premier Castro. He said that during that prosecution he did not inform the Cuban Government and the Cuban Government did not learn that his plot had the support of CIA personnel. The Cuban Government affirmed Mr. Cubela's assertion. He also indicated that he had no evidence on which he could say that any official of the U.S. Government or of the CIA higher than his case officer was aware of the assassination aspects of his plot. The Cuban Government suggested that the AMLASH plot in operation on November 22, 1963, as outlined in the Senate report, could not, therefore, have served as a provocation by the U.S. motivating Cuban retaliation against President Kennedy.

Mr. Chairman, another aspect of the committee's investigation of Oswald's trip to Mexico had to do with any associations Oswald may have had while he was there other than those at the Cuban consulate and the Soviet Embassy. The Warren Commission concluded he had none, that he kept to himself throughout his stay. It turns out, however, that 11 days after the Commission concluded its investigation and issued its report in September 1964, a Mexican woman came forward with quite a different version of Oswald's activities in Mexico City.

Her name is Elena Garro de Paz. Though now divorced, she was at the time the wife of Octavio de Paz, the noted poet and Mexican diplomat. Elena Garro herself is an accomplished author.
Ultimately, Elena Garro's story came to the attention of American intelligence services. As far as it is known, no service initiated a full-scale followup investigation. One reason might be that Elena Garro's credibility is controversial. This committee has been told, on the one hand, that she is absolutely trustworthy, while others have claimed that the same vivid imagination that has made her a literary success has also tended to color her perception of actual events.

That being said, Elena Garro's story is interesting, as is the way it has unfolded in this investigation.

Elena Garro says that along with her daughter, Elenita, and her sister, Deba Galvan, she was invited to a party at the home of her cousin, Ruben Duran Navarro, then the brother-in-law of Sylvia Tirado Duran. She first said that the party was in early October 1963, though, after inspection of her personal calendar for that period, she adjusted the time to late September.

There were three young American men at the party, she says, the guests of Sylvia Duran, and one of the Americans was Lee Harvey Oswald. She describes one of his companions as tall and slender with long blond hair, a gaunt face, and a protruding chin. The other was tall also, with short, light brown hair.

In 1964, Elena Garro became a friend of an American foreign service officer named Charles Thomas, and, over time, she related her story to him in detail. She explained that when she had gone to the American Embassy in October 1964 and told her story, the man she talked to seemed to believe little of it.

She told Thomas that Oswald was wearing a black sweater at the party, and that he stared at the floor a lot. She said the three Americans stuck together rather than mix with the other guests. She said that Eusebio Azcue, the Cuban consul, was also at the party.

Elena Garro told Thomas that on the day of the assassination, she and her daughter went to the Cuban Embassy and shouted, "assassins."

This she claimed was before she saw a newspaper photo identifying Oswald as the suspected assassin.

After she and her daughter returned home on November 22, 1963, a man she thought was an agent of the Mexican Ministry of Government came to her house and told her and Elenita that they were in danger of being harmed by the Communists. He took them to a "sanctuary", a small hotel called the Vermont, where they remained for 8 days. It was after getting to the hotel that Elena Garro first saw a picture of Oswald and realized she had seen him at the Duran party.

This man, who must be referred to here as Mr. X, advised Elena Garro to beware of the American Embassy, that it was staffed by Communists.

Elena Garro also claimed that several months after the assassination she was visited by two Communists who warned her not to tell her story.

Shortly after the assassination, Elena Garro told Thomas, an American woman came and spent several days at her home. This woman, who must be referred to here as Ms. Y, was told the story one evening by Elena Garro’s sister, Deba Galvan, who had been
drinking. Ms. Y urged the two women to tell their story to American authorities in Texas, not in Mexico. Failing that, Ms. Y offered to arrange a meeting with a high-ranking American official in Mexico. It never transpired, because Elena Garro and Ms. Y had a falling out.

Ms. Y did, however, send the first report on Elena Garro and her story to American authorities in 1964.

Charles Thomas, the American service officer, was concerned about the Elena Garro story and reported her account in memoranda that were circulated in the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City. Nevertheless, when the reports reached Washington, neither the CIA nor the FBI showed any interest. No investigation was ordered, even though, on October 10, 1966, it was learned an Elena Garro had indeed been registered at the Hotel Vermont over the period she claimed she was there in 1963.

Charles Thomas returned to Washington in 1967 when his tour of duty in Mexico ended and he was "selected out" of the foreign service in 1969 for failure to be promoted. In 1971, having had some 2,000 job applications rejected, he committed suicide. In 1974 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, having determined that his dismissal was a mistake, had through an act of Congress Mr. Thomas posthumously reinstated.

Mr. Chairman, the committee on Friday of last week received permission from the State Department to make public a group of previously classified documents dealing with Mr. Thomas and Elena Garro de Paz’ story. While they have been declassified, there are certain privacy aspects of them that would make it inappropriate to include it in this record now.

Nevertheless, I would ask that they be marked as JFK F-403 and inserted in this record at this point after they have been duly edited.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection it may be done.

[The information follows:]
Dear Mr. Stokes:

This refers to my letter of September 15, 1978 concerning your September 13 request for the declassification and release of six documents about Charles William Thomas and Elena Garro de Paz.

The Department's Bureau of Inter-American Affairs concurred in the declassification and release of the major portions of the documents, enclosed at Tab A. These six documents contain certain information which still warrants classification pursuant to E.O. 11652. The deleted information, if released, could damage U.S.-Latin American relations or reveal confidential sources and methods which remain a part of U.S. Embassy operations.

The Bureau of Inter-American Affairs also agreed to the declassification and partial release of four other documents, which appear in the CIA files on Elena Garro de Paz. These documents appear at Tab B. However, the Department requests that the Select Committee not make these documents a matter of public record. These documents may assist the Select Committee in understanding the background story of Elena Garro de Paz. However, because the nature and substance of these documents relate more specifically to U.S.-Latin American relations and not directly to Ms. Garro de Paz, the Department would prefer that the Committee not cite these documents in the public record.

The Honorable
Louis Stokes, Chairman
Select Committee on Assassinations
House of Representatives
As always, I appreciate the Select Committee's cooperation in all matters of record releases. I hope the release of the enclosed documents will prove useful to the Select Committee in conducting the hearings into the circumstances surrounding the death of President John F. Kennedy.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Douglas J. Bennett, Jr.
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations

Enclosures:

As Stated
Honorable William P. Rogers
Secretary of State
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

In winding up my affairs at the Department of State, there is a pending matter which I believe merits your attention.

Lee Harvey Oswald, the presumed assassin of President Kennedy, was alleged to have been present at a party given by a Mexican communist sympathizer and attended by the Cuban Consul, a veteran intelligence officer, when he was in Mexico shortly before the assassination. There are allegations that the Mexican Government may have been aware of Oswald's presence at that party and that the Cuban Government may have tried to intimidate others who saw him there.

A careful investigation of these allegations could perhaps explain them away. Until then, however, their public disclosure could reopen the debate about the true nature of the Kennedy assassination and damage the credibility of the Warren Report.

Since I was the Embassy officer in Mexico who acquired this intelligence information, I feel a responsibility for seeing it through to its final evaluation. Accordingly, I have prepared a memorandum (enclosed) explaining this information and its initial assessment, keyed to three memoranda of conversations with my Mexican informant.

I believe you would want to consider carefully whether to let well enough alone in this case, or whether the risks attending possible public disclosure of these allegations make further investigation warranted.

Respectfully,

Charles William Thomas

Enclosure:
Memorandum and four attachments.
MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Investigation of Lee Harvey Oswald in Mexico

1. While serving as Political Officer in the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City from 1964 to 1967, I became quite friendly with the Mexican playwright, Elena Garro de Paz. An intelligent, witty, and outspoken woman, I found her a very useful if sometimes biased source of political gossip and personal history on significant Mexican personalities. She introduced my wife and me to many important people in Mexico. She was also particularly knowledgeable about agrarian affairs. A biographic report that I prepared on her on May 3, 1966 is attached (Tab A).

On one occasion, Miss Garro inadvertently mentioned to me that she had been at a party with Lee Harvey Oswald and two American companions when Oswald was in Mexico just before the Kennedy assassination. The party had been at the home of her cousin, Ruben Duran. The memorandum of that conversation, dated December 10, 1965, is attached (Tab B). I had not read the Warren Report, but I assumed that if Oswald had been to such a party in Mexico, it would have been well known to the Embassy. I also knew Miss Garro to be something of a professional anti-communist who tended to see a communist plot behind any untoward political event. However, the episode about her being escorted into hiding at an obscure hotel intrigued me. Accordingly, I decided to report the matter in writing. I gave the memorandum of conversation limited distribution within the Embassy, and did not send any copies to Washington.

A few days later I was called to the office of Mr. Winston Scott, who headed the Embassy's Political Research Section. Also present was Mr. Nathan Ferris, the Embassy's Legal Attaché. They had noted with interest my December 10 memorandum of conversation. They pointed out that there had been a great many rumors about Oswald at the time of the assassination and that some could not be verified and others had proved false. They asked me, however, to try and get a more detailed replay of Miss Garro's story. Mr. Scott made clear that the FBI had full responsibility for any further investigations of the Oswald case.

4. In a memorandum of conversation dated December 25, 1965 (Tab C), I provided a much more detailed and accurate restatement of Miss Garro's alleged encounter with Oswald and subsequent developments. Certain errors in my original presentation were corrected. Miss Garro guessed that the date of the party at her cousin's house was in early September, 1963. She admitted that she had gone to the Embassy to report briefly about this matter on an earlier occasion.

per Francis J. McNeil
ARA 9/15/78
5. I got no reaction to the second memorandum from Messrs. Scott and Ferris. However, the Deputy Chief of Mission, Clarence Boonstra, who had been Charge d’Affaires at the time of the Kennedy assassination and subsequent Oswald investigation, told me that Oswald had not been in Mexico on the date given for the party. He stated, furthermore, that the informant had changed her story. When I explained that she hadn’t changed her story but that rather I now had given a more accurate account of it, he reiterated that the date was wrong and seemed to dismiss the whole affair.

6. Some time later, Elena Garro told me she had found her old calendar and had reconstructed the date of the party at which she had seen Oswald. She stated it had been in late September rather than early September. (Oswald was in Mexico from September 26 to October 24, 1963.) I accordingly went to Mr. Ferris’ office and informed him of this. He replied that she had given the late September date accurately when she had come to the Embassy and made her original report to the FBI. He added, however, that someone who was at the party had stated that there were no Americans there. He did not reveal who had provided this information. I asked Mr. Ferris to tell me frankly if he thought I should continue pursuing this matter. He advised me that it was not necessary since he considered the Oswald case closed, stating again the ballad heard all these rumors before.

7. Although the date of the alleged party had been placed in the proper time frame, I was puzzled at the report that there had been no Americans at the party. I had assumed that Miss Garro could have clearly been mistaken about the identity of the Americans she saw there, but never doubted that she had seen some Americans. Although, I had met Elena Garro’s sister, Deva Guerrero, I had never discussed the Oswald case with her. Mrs. Guerrero’s grown son, however, told me that he was quite convinced that his mother had seen Oswald.

8. Although I pursued the matter no further, I felt obligated nevertheless to report in writing the developments described in the memorandum of conversation dated July 13, 1966 (Tab B). I thought it was particularly strange that the Cuban Government would carry Miss Garro’s address the small hotel where she was allegedly hidden away after the Kennedy assassination by a man identified with the Mexican Ministry of Interior. I should perhaps add that it was I, rather than Miss Garro, who first noticed the address. At the least, the letters lend some cross confirmation to her story about the small hotel. At the most, they provide a source of endless speculation about conspiracy and international intrigue.

9. In early 1967, in the context of the Garrison investigation of the Oswald case, which had opened in New Orleans, Allen White made an interesting comment to me about the investigation of Oswald’s activities in Mexico. He stated that the DSF (the security police attached to the Ministry of Interior) had interrogated the
It would appear that whereas the FBI has discounted the Elena Garro allegations, the CIA is still considerably disturbed by them. The CIA may not have pressed for further investigation, however, for a number of reasons: 1) considering the sensitive overlap and subtle competition between two intelligence collecting agencies, it had to yield to the FBI's clear jurisdiction; 2) there are obvious complications in conducting such an investigation in a foreign country.

Under the circumstances it is unlikely that any further investigation of this matter will ever take place unless it is ordered by a high official in Washington.

If all the allegations in the attached memoranda were true, they would not, in themselves, prove that there was a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy. However, if they were ever made public, those who have tried to discredit the Warren Report could have a field day in speculating about their implications. The credibility of the Warren Report would be damaged all the more if it were learned that these allegations were known and never adequately investigated by the competent American authorities.

Reference is made again to the biographic report (Tab A) on Elena Garro. She is hardly an ordinary or average person. Her strengths and weaknesses become exaggerated precisely because she is not. It would be easy and convenient to sweep this matter under the rug by claiming that Miss Garro is an unreliable informant since she is emotional, opinionated, and "artistic." I have been affected at times by that temptation myself. No American official, however, knows her better than I do. On the basis of the facts that I have presented, I believe that, on balance, the matter warrants further investigation.

Finally, the record should show that a representative of a major American publication has at least some knowledge of this story.

Charles William Thomas
July 25, 1969
1. Elena Garro, the mercurial wife of Octavio Paz, was born of Spanish parents in Puebla on December 27, 1925. She attended the National Autonomous University of Mexico and later did graduate work at the University of California (Berkeley) and at the University of Paris. She has long been married to Octavio Paz, a career diplomat who is also one of Mexico’s finest poets and leading intellectuals (author of El Laberinto de la Soledad). Since her husband went to his present post as Ambassador to India, she has been separated from him, apparently with their mutual consent. Her 20-year-old daughter, also named Elena, resides with her in Mexico City.

2. Having spent 17 years of her life in Europe, she has a rather un-Mexican objectivity about her native land and has a reputation for being one of its more articulate detractors. At the same time she is very emotionally committed to many aspects of Mexican life and has made an important contribution to its artistic development.

3. While enjoying the reflected glory of her prestigious husband, she has become a significant writer in her own right. Bozar Solido, El Ray Negro, La Sirena en el Salón, Ventura Alameda, and Andere por las Ruedas, are plays that have had appreciative audiences in Europe, where they have been translated into German, as well as in Mexico. Two more plays, Perdida Expresa and El Viaje, are in preparation. Her short stories are collected in a volume called La Semilla de Colores. The Literary Supplement of the London Times has called her novel, Los Recuerdos del Perverti, a “splendid success.” One critic has said of her: “For Elena Garro, there is no frontier between reality and fantasy; in any case, the latter is a second reality—perhaps more intimate—whit which one may perceive without passport or forewarning, thanks to the effectiveness of a literature fired with passion, flavor, and life.” It might be added that the frontier between reality and fantasy is also difficult for her to distinguish in real life.

4. A witty, urbane, and opinionated woman (she speaks Spanish, French, English, and German) with an unflagging sense of humor, she has reportedly had a stormy marriage with Octavio Paz, whose social conventionality she continually and deliberately mocked with her erratic and whimsical behavior. Although her forthright opinions and sharp wit tend on occasion to ruffle feathers in Mexico, her important social, literary, and political connections render her fairly immune from...

GROUP 3 — Downgraded at 12-year intervals, not automatically declassified.
serious counterattack. Her plays are being currently produced in Mexico City and Zurich, and she has just had a lengthy exclusive interview with one of the large morning dailies here. Politically, she appears to be Catholic and traditionalist, and in her admiration for German culture she occasionally exhibits flashes of National Socialism. Although on domestic political issues, her views seem progressive, she often describes herself as a reactionary, because this is the term her communist friends apply to her. Her political connections run the gamut of the political spectrum. During her moments of bitter denunciation of corruption in the ruling PRI, she often threatens to join the Communist Party.

5. Miss Garro has for many years been an active worker in the Confederacion Nacional Campesina (CNC), the agrarian arm of the PRI, and is particularly close to the recent CNC Secretary General, Javier Razo-Garro. She has been a tireless propagandist and agitator on behalf of the poorer Mexican peasants, and she is on close personal terms with and apparently enjoys the respect of peasant leaders from all over the country. Her house is a constant meeting place of peasant leaders, and she was recently paying the hotel bills of over 100 of them who were suffering delays in getting their grievances heard. She has on occasion published articles bitterly criticizing the government's agrarian policy, particularly the alleged political assassination of troublesome peasant leaders, in such leftist publications as Siempre and Sucesos. All this demonstrates that she is somewhat fanatic on the subject of campesinos. While she detests the new head of the CNC, Agustín Hernández, she has cultivated, partly for her own protection, President Díaz Ordaz' Director of Agrarian Affairs, Norberto Aquirre-Beltrán, who is now a frequent visitor to her home. She is also very friendly with and a strong supporter of Carlos A. Madrazo, former President of the PRI and ex-Governor of Tabasco, because of his sympathy for the plight of the peasants and his desire to reform the PRI.

6. Elwin Garro's brother (Eduardo?), who also resides in Mexico City, is a construction contractor for plumbing and electrical work. He seems less emotional than Elena and is not concerned with politics. A sister, Deva, is married to a second-rate painter named Guerrero-Galván. According to Elena, she is a communist sympathizer. Another sister is married to an American and resides in Cuernavaca. Three cousins, Lyda, Horacio, and Rómulo Durán, are all reportedly communist sympathizers. Horacio's wife, Sylvia Durán, is employed by the Cuban Embassy here. Elena Garro is very close to her daughter, Elenita (or Chata), who echoes her mother's controversial views and has considerable influence over her. Elenita is not well educated, but unfortunately she is rather well read and has been prematurely exposed to ideas which she has not yet properly understood and assimilated. Accordingly, she can be obnoxiously outspoken.

7. Miss Garro is well disposed toward the United States and has been friendly and forthcoming with Embassy officers. Her broad range of
significant personal friends, the views of many of whom are important to the Embassy, makes her a useful Embassy contact, and she is currently carried as a target in the Embassy's Youth Program. Despite her access to much that is going on beneath the surface in Mexico, including peasant unrest, the fact that she has a tendency to romanticize developments in reporting on them makes it difficult at times to determine what degree of credence to place on what might well be useful and concrete information.

8. She lives in a modest but comfortable house on Calle Alencastre 220 in Lomas Virreyes. Her telephone number is 40-20-57.
In the course of a discussion about other matters, Sra. de Paz mentioned that she had met Lee Harvey Oswald, the presumed assassin of President John F. Kennedy. She was very reluctant to discuss the matter, but finally imparted the following information. Needless to say, the source of this information should be carefully protected.

1. In September, 1953, shortly after her return from abroad, she went to a party at the home of Rubén Díaz, who is married to her cousin. Her daughter, Elena, accompanied her. There she met Oswald and two other young Americans who were with him. The three young Americans remained apart from the other guests. She expressed an interest in talking to them, but was discouraged from doing so by some of the other guests.

Most of the guests at the party were Communists or philocommunists. She remembers seeing the Cuban Consul, Jacques (phonetic); General Clark Flores of the Mexican Olympic Committee; Silvia Díaz, who she later learned was Oswald's mistress while he was here; Emilio Carballeda, the writer, who she thinks is now in the United States; and a Latin American Negro man with red hair.

2. In November, 1953, when the identity of Kennedy's assassin became known, she and her daughter went to the Cuban Embassy and, once admitted through the front gate, shouted 'assassin' and other insults at the staff there.

3. Shortly afterward, she and her daughter were visited by a friend, Manuel Carvillo, who was then an official in the Secretariat of Communication, and was told he had orders to escort them to a small and obscure hotel in the center of town. They were kept there for eight days under protest that they were in danger.

GROUP 3 - Declassified at 12-year intervals, not automatically declassified.

per Francis J. McNeil
ARA - 9/15/72
When she told Carvillo she wanted to go to the American Embassy and explain that she knew of Oswald's connections here with Mexican Communists and Cubans, she was told that the American Embassy was full of Communist spies. She said Carvillo tried to give the impression that he is an extreme rightist. He now has a job at Dallas Area.

5. Some of the other people who were at the party with Oswald were taken to the state of Veracruz, where they were "protected" by Governor Louis Ariza. Rubén Durría is reportedly "protected" by General Clark Flores and is now driving a big car and looking very prosperous.

6. Many Communists and philocommunists here believe Kennedy's assassination was the result of a Communist plot engineered by Fidel Castro. Rubén Durría has subsequently told her that he is not really a Communist and that it had been a great mistake to kill Kennedy.
Dec 25, 1965

Lee Harvey Oswald and Kennedy Assassination

REFERENCE: Memorandum of Conversation, December 10, 1965

Elena Garro de Paz, Mexican writer
Charles Vs. Thomas, Political Officer

AMB, DOL, P (2), P/2, L, CEB, CR/2 (2)

On December 25, Sra. de Paz again discussed at considerable length her alleged encounter with Oswald. Also present, as they were at the original conversation on this subject, were Mr. and Mrs. de Paz's daughter, Blanca. Some further information on this subject was given subsequently on January 9, 1966. During this later conversation, Sra. de Paz admitted that she had gone to the Embassy on an earlier occasion with her daughter and mother-in-law and had talked to the Embassy officers (presumably from the Legal Attaché's Office) about the matter. She said since the Embassy officers did not give much credence to anything they said, they did not bother to give a very complete story. The following information supplements and in some instances corrects that given in the memorandum of December 10.

1. Lydia, Horacio, and Rubén Durán are all cousins of Sra. de Paz. Silvia Durán is married to Horacio, who is a rather young man. Horacio was converted to communism by Ricardo García. Sra. de Paz has never had anything to do with Silvia, that is, she does not visit or considerate there. Rubén was born in the United States and served in the US Army during the war. He still goes to the US from time to time but has no relatives or particular connections there. Lydia also travels occasionally to the US. The party in question was held at the home of Rubén Durán.

2. She believes that the date of the party was about September 2 or 3, 1963, it was a few days before the visit of the Soviet ambassador, Gagarin. She believes it was a Monday or Tuesday because it was an odd night to have a party.

GROUP 3 - Declassified at 12-year intervals
not automatically declassified
(September 2 and 3, 2 in fact, fall on Sunday and Monday.) She cannot conveniently reconstruct the date from her calendar because it is in a desk which is now stored away with a lot of other furniture blocking it.

3. At the party the man she assumes was GولدRose wore a black sweater. He tended to be silent and stared a lot at the floor. Of his two young American companions, one was very tall and slender and had long blond hair which hung across his forehead. He had a count face and a rubber nose protruding chin. The other was also rather tall and had short, light brown hair, but he had no real distinguishing characteristics. All three were obviously American and did not dance or mix with the other people. She was very cardily延伸 because she saw then by chance the next day walking down the street together.

4. Although Sra. do Paz had returned from an extended stay in Europe only in June or July, she had already met Uncle known and knew positively that he was at the party. On another occasion (it was not clear whether before or after the party in question), she attended a party where she saw among others, Ruben Aceas; Baldo Cordalido, the pro-Castro writer; and a Latin American Negro man with red hair. (These last two were not at the Duran party as was mistakenly stated in the December 16 memorandum.) Cordalido and Aceas, along with others, were in a heated discussion on that occasion about President Kennedy, and they came to the conclusion that the only solution was to kill him. Sra. de Paz said that Cordalido is known as a Castro agent in Mexico. He has been in the U.S., in the Soviet Union, and now times to Cuba. Following the assassination of Kennedy, he spent about a year in Cuba. When he returned, he got a job teaching at Rutgers University through Dr. José Vasquez, who was formerly with the Rockefeller Foundation in New York and is now a professor at Rutgers. Cordalido is presumably still there. The day after the assassination, Blanca Paz encountered Sra. de Acero and took her in a car. Cordalido is supposed to come to Havana after the assassination, and his wife followed him shortly thereafter.

5. Others present at the Duran party in addition to her and her daughter were Horacio and Silver Duran; Lydia Duran; Sra. de Paz, her economist sister; Dona Guadalupe General Jose Edna Clark Flores and his mistress, a Guatemalan widow; a medical doctor from Balboa Hospital; a young American couple, both fat and blond, who were spending their honeymoon in Mexico; a 60-year-old Mexican woman in a red dress; and a rather strange woman claiming to be Mexican but did not look or talk like one. Her first name was Alejandro and she immediately wrote Blanca several love letters. She claims she turned them in to the American Embassy. Ricardo Guerra, a communist, and his wife, Carmen Castellanos, a writer, were both supposed to come to the party but declined to come, according to Sra. de Paz, when they learned that she would be there.

6. On Saturday, November 23, 1963, the day after the Kennedy assassination, Sra. de Paz' brother drove her and her daughter about 3:00 p.m. to the Cuban Embassy. Her brother was embarrassed by their behavior and drove a block up the street to wait for them after letting them out. The two women then went inside the gate and shouted "escapada" and other insults.
7. Later that day, they were visited by a friend, Manuel Calvillo, who said that they were in serious danger from the communists and that he would take them to a small hotel where they would be safe for a few days. (It was not clear whether he said he was acting under orders or not.) Calvillo was known around town to be an undercover agent for the Secretariat of Labor and to be a personal friend of Ros Pacheco and Gustavo Mass Oliver; accordingly, they believed and trusted him. Among other things he said was that Sylvia Dutha had been arrested. This was public information at that time.

8. Since she could not remember the name of the hotel, Sr. de Pueb said to the part of town where she remembered it to be, and we found it. It is the Verizon Hotel, located at Calle Verizon 29. It is on one and a half blocks west of Avenida de los Inmigrantes just south of the Virgin of. She stated that the hotel is owned by someone from San Luis Potosí and is used by businessmen from that area. She and her daughter did not personally register at the hotel. She thinks Calvillo registered them as relatives of friends of his from San Luis Potosí. Although modest, it is a quiet and comfortable-looking hotel. They stayed there until the following Friday and hardly left their room.

9. It was not until after they were in the hotel and saw the newspapers and the photographs of Oswald that she said her daughter both came to the independent conclusion that he was one of the young assassins at the Durán party. When Calvillo visited them at the hotel, she told him she wanted to report to the American Embassy what she knew about Oswald's connections with local communists and with Acuna. Calvillo said she shouldn't go because the American Embassy was full of communist spies. When she returned to her house the following week, guards were posted outside it.

10. When she saw her sister, Eva Carrera, after returning home, the latter was terrified because of Oswald's presence at the Durán party. She had come to the conclusion independently that it was Oswald whom she had seen there. Sr. de Carrera was also very angry with the Durán because she thought they had become involved in the assassination plot for years. Despite being a pacifist, she was an advisor of President Kennedy's because she is also a patriot and a non-communist. About two months after the assassination, Sr. de Carrera was killed in by two communists, who refused to identify, and was killed with threats to come back in a party with one of them. She remained so terrified that she would not accompany Sr. de Pueb to the American Embassy to tell what she knew of Oswald.

11. A short time after the assassination, Emilio Carrillo, the pro-Castro writer, took the Durán to Jalapa, Vercus and kept them out of the way for a while until the initial shock of the Kennedy assassination wore off. Carrillo has connections with the University of Veracruz Press.

12. Also, shortly after the assassination, an American named John Coble went to Sr. de Pueb's house. She was sent by their mutual friend, Ernesto Crist, a Costa Rican who is now John Coble's roommate and who was formerly the director of the Veracruz Journal whom he used with the underground movement.
at the initiative of the persons involved, with the help of the American embassy, the\nmission of the president of the Cuban government, and the pursuit of the\nrise of the situation. The result was a meeting between the two parties,\nwhich led to the resolution of the conflict.

At about the end of January, 1966, Silvia Duran visited Ms. de Pox. She\nsaid he was going to visit the United States and wanted her to protect him as\nmuch as possible while he was away. He feared it might be discovered that Oquendo\nhad been to his house. Since he had been born in the United States, he knew it\nwould be easy for the Cuban government to deport him. They both agreed to say nothing about it. He said it was Silvia Duran who\ngot him involved with Oswald. He added that he was not really a communist and was\nagainst the assassination.

15. About six months after the assassination, she was talking to Ms.\nPelaez, the Secretary of the Secretariat of Communication about another matter, she told the\nstory of her encounter with Oswald. She urged her not to go to the American Embassy\nand suggested that if she insisted on doing anything at all, she merely write the\nembassy an anonymous letter.

16. She also stated that she understood that Oswald had come to Mexico more\nthan once.

Some time of the above was written. Since 1962, frequent\nmeetings have taken place which all had witnessed. At the death\nof the party, a month or two after the assassination, he was\nasked if he knew where the Cuban government had kept his\nfiles and personal effects. He replied that he did not know where they were kept.\nHe said that some time after the assassination, the state of Texas had asked him if he\nwas a United States citizen. He said that he was, but that he was not sure of it.\n
Silvia Duran was a Cuban citizen who had lived in the United States since 1962. She\nwas a close friend of Oquendo and was the contact person for the\nCuban government in the United States. She was also a close friend of\nOswald and was the person who helped him escape to Mexico. She\nalso helped him get a job and a place to live. She was a key player in the\nOswald assassination conspiracy.
1. She described some developments which may have some bearing on her claim that she was Harvey Oswald at a party at the home of her cousin, Rubén Darío, when Oswald was in Mexico prior to the Kennedy assassination.

2. She stated that her writer friend, Carlos Solorzano, is quite well acquainted with Cuban Ambassador Joaquín Hernández. She said Solorzano was apparently not particularly leftist but that his brother, Alfonso, was a communist. Ambassador Hernández had told Solorzano that he would very much like to meet Saa. Paa Solorzano accordingly arranged a party at his own house on June 30, 1966, and invited both of them. Also present were Ciro Bentos and his wife; Elvira Vargas, the leftist journalist with savoir who is a close personal friend of President Díaz Orsas; Emael Capello, the pro-Castro writer; Joaquín Max Cuadra, head of the publishing firm called Editorial Berti; and Juan Soriano, the painter. She said she was probably invited to make her feel at ease, since he is a friend of hers and was the only anti-communist there besides herself.

3. During the evening, Ambassador Hernández, when she described as intelligent and cultural, concentrated his attention on her and did his best to flatter her by hearing her literary productions. In addition, he expressed great interest in her friend, Carlos Najarra. He issued a personal invitation to her to attend the annual literary festival of the Casa de las Américas in Havana. She explained to him that she was not a Fidelista and that she wouldn’t go to Havana unless Juan Soriano went with her. Hernández then invited Soriano to attend as well, but the latter roundly denounced the Castro regime over the objections of the others present, who urged them both to attend the festival.

4. Later, her friend, Víctor Raúl Galian, the pro-Castro journalist, who, she says, personally dislikes Ambassador Hernández, warned her not to go to Cuba alone.
5. On July 6, a wired from the Cuban Embassy delivered to her home on Calle Manzanares in Havana by a messenger enclosed two letters and some printed matter from the U.S. to her friends in Havana. The first letter, written in October, gave her address as Vermont 33, and the second letter, written in April, gave her address as Vermont 39. The message for the first letter, with the above address, was reacted for return to the sender, which was the Cuban Embassy here. The second envelope, which contained the whole package, had no address as it was hand-carryed to her home (see attachments).

6. Mr. Evans stated that the only possible reason the letters were addressed to her at Calle Vermont was because she spent several days at the Hotel Vermont immediately after the Havana assassination (see referenced case). The correct address of the hotel, however, is Vermont 33. She concluded the Cuban Government carried that street and number, with a minor error, as her regular address.

7. Since Manuel Calvillo had taken her to the Hotel ostensibly to protect her from the communists, this raised the question of how the Cubans obtained that address. She stated that as far as she was aware, the only people who knew she had been at the Hotel Vermont were Manuel Calvillo and two close friends of his, Enrico de la Pena and Margarita Nichelini. Two other friends of these three who might have learned of it are Emilio Otero and Juan Cobb. She said she had always seen very suspicious all three of these people because they had gone out of their way to cultivate her when she returned from Havana in 1934 and had made such a point of being outspoken professional anti-communist. She remembered that many years ago Margarita Nichelini was a communist. She now wondered whether Calvillo and perhaps the other two as well were Cuban agents. She stated again that Calvillo was a close personal friend of the Palauares and Gustavo de la Oria, and that greatly, presumably from Communist, had been placed outside her house when she had returned from the Hotel Vermont. In fact, since Calvillo's recent dismissal from his position at the Secretariat of Education (for lack of information to the press about the Fondo de Cultura Económica), he had shown her two personal telegrams from President de la Oria ensuring her that another job would be found for him in the future. She added that she had told Calvillo that she had gone to the U.S. Embassy at one point to tell that she knew about her alleged encounter with Oswald. To add to her suspicions, she remembered that what appeared to be a gunman who often accompanied Calvillo and Palauares was a Spanish refugee named (same) Valencias. She said Valencias's first wife was a Russian communist had married during the Spanish Civil War. She had subsequently taken their children and returned to the Soviet Union.

8. She thought it possible that the Cuban Embassy had now deliberately given her the letters from the Casa de las Americas with the Vermont Street address in order to frighten her. She was closely concerned about what appeared to be three gunshots that had been fired through her upstairs.
near their island until she was out of the house about three weeks ago. She said that with all the activity in town owing her of being an agent of the FBI and the government irritated with her because of her support for Carlos Heurano, she did not feel entirely safe living alone with her daughter. She said her brother was now sleeping at the house to ease their anxiety.

9. Finally, San. Paz stated that she had recently encountered her cousin, Lydia Durán, and that the latter had been very friendly and wanted to meet her again. She said Lydia was very poor and had a small job with Diffusion Cultural at the Anthropological Museum.
Hernandez, Amador — A Director of Education for the State of Chihuahua

B- A friend of Elena Garro de Paz who was cultivated for her protection because of his membership in the political party of power.
C- None

Eusebio — A Subject is the Cuban Commercial Attaché to Mexico.
B- Attended the party given by Ruben Duran which Oswald allegedly attended.
C- Reflects that Subject had contact with Oswald at the Cuban Embassy and that an argument between Oswald and Subject occurred because Subject could not issue Oswald a visa to go to Cuba, at the direction of the Cuban Government.

Hernandez Armas, Joaquin — A Subject is the Cuban Ambassador to Mexico.
B- Subject is a close associate of a communist friend of Elena Garro de Paz.
C- None

Formation Obtained from Sources
- Department of State Records
- Mr. C.W. Thomas' Correspondence
- The Warren Commission Report
The Consulate learned from a very reliable source that several weeks ago

three agitators, and a third not yet identified, sent three

sent three agitators and a third not yet identified — to Ciudad Juarez to incite student groups to demonstrate against and stone the American Consulate at Ciudad Juarez on May 23, 1960, Students' Day. The Chessman case, United States-Cuban Policy, and attacks on Mexican monopolists (Eloy Villina, in particular) are to be used as the slogans for their student demonstration. Their efforts have resulted in very little success to date, with only La Escuela Normal Nocturna giving them any backing. Apparently they are quite disappointed with the results, but intend to establish a cell among the students in Juarez to solidify their position. Arturo Guin, the leader of the three-man group, has returned to Chihuahua City, leaving the other two to carry on the work. At this moment the attack on the Consulate seems likely to fail; however, the Consulate will watch their future activities very closely and will request police protection if and when appropriate.

This may very well be a local problem, in which case other posts in Mexico may not be affected. However, if the purpose behind the demonstration is to create the impression that widespread anti-United States feeling exists in Mexico, all posts may be attacked.

William D. Wright
American Consul General

Copies Sent To:
Original, 1 copy Political Section, Ambassador, Mexico
1 copy SupConf, Embassy, Mexico
1 copy Legal Attaché, Embassy, Mexico
1 copy Security Advisor, Embassy, Mexico
DEPARTMENT PASS TO:
1 copy each Consulate in Mexico
From a source within the Cuban Government believed to be reliable case information indicating that the Bank for Foreign Commerce of Cuba (BANDEC) was planning to use the free port of Tijuana, Mexico, as point of entry for U.S. merchandise ultimately destined for Cuba.

Architect Basilio Acosta, Cuban Commercial Attaché to Mexico, reportedly talked recently with BANDEC officials in Havana regarding the advantages of using Tijuana for this purpose:

1. It is a free port.
2. It has a great deal of movement and hence there is less possibility of being conspicuous than in a city on the Gulf of Mexico.

According to the plan, BANDEC would make available some $3,000,000 in credits for purchasing raw materials and spare parts needed for public works equipment which is out of commission. Possibly the credit would be increased later to obtain vital parts for sugar mill machinery and other important factories. The Public Works department was to furnish a list of the raw materials needed but the rest was yet to be determined.

Representatives of U.S. firms in Mexico would be utilized, most of the representatives were described as not knowing the destination of the merchandise. An unnamed American firm in Tijuana was suggested as participating, a (presumably) Mexican firm called "Don Lazaro's sons" was mentioned as being trustworthy for the transaction.

Through another source the Embassy learned that Cuban Commercial Attaché Acosta had mentioned a Mexican algodonero (cotton dealer, broker or grower) as possibly being of assistance in a third country transaction, suggesting the possibility that "Don Lazaro Hijo" might be connected in some way with the cotton business.

ACTION COPY — DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The action office must return this permanent record copy to IML/R files with an endorsement of action taken.

per Francis J. McNeil ARA 9/12/78
COMMENT: It is likely that Sr. Azcue, upon his return to Mexico, will play a prominent role in this transaction, assuming that the financially hard-up Castro Administration can make available the necessary credits, or is not able to obtain the merchandise in other ways.

The Embassy realizes that the information presented above is sketchy and is not in a position to obtain details, nor to follow the progress because the contacts were "one-time contacts" and brought the information to the Embassy at some personal risk. However, it may fit in with other information already known to the Department and serve as background for such additional information on this subject as the Embassy may chance to pick up at a later date.

For the Chargé d'Affaires ad interim

E. A. Gilmore, Jr.
Counselor of Embassy for Economic Affairs

ACTION R: Department please pass copies to Mexico City, Monterrey, Ottawa and London.
Cuban Ambassador to Mexico Joaquin HERNANDEZ Arnaiz arrived at Tampico on the evening flight of CHA on September 5, 1964. Hernandez was met at the airport by Cuban Consul José L. POSADA Torres and his wife, Camilo Domenech, Commercial Counselor of the Embassy, and Attaché Alejandro Rodriguez, who had preceded Hernandez by car, and a group of less than twenty local people. No state or municipal officials were present.

On Sunday, September 6, a barbecue was offered in the visitors' honor by Eng. Alfonso MURIELA of Petroleos Mexicanos at his home in Colonia Murielera. Murielera is a known communist.

On Monday, the Cubans traveled to Cd. Victoria where they were received by Governor Praxedis BALDEO and other officials of the state government. The Governor had a private luncheon for the Ambassador and his party. The Governor also accompanied them on visits to schools, government buildings and the museum.

The Cubans were in Cd. Mante on Tuesday, accompanied by Lic. Cristobal GOEV, Executive Officer of the state government, and Amado TORRES, Director of the Office of Press, Information and Tourism of the state. According to sources in Mante, no enthusiasm could be generated for a mass greeting; therefore, some school children and municipal employees were ordered out to greet the Cubans.

The Cuban Ambassador visited the Ingenio (sugar mill) of Mante and had a long talk with its manager, Ing. Manuel ZORILLA Rivera. Zorilla is a well known leftist. Information available indicates that he has long been under Communist Party discipline.
The visitors were entertained at supper at a dingy cafe on the edge of Cd. Mante. It is not known by whom they were entertained or who attended. It is understood that only a few persons were present. The party also visited a school and the new Social Security Hospital.

Newspapers stated the next day that the Cubans had announced that they will buy 40,000,000 pesos worth of Tamaulipas cotton. If true, it is probable that about fifty per cent of the cotton will be purchased from the Ingenio del Mante. Members of the cooperative planted 4,000 hectares in cotton this year.

On Monday afternoon, the Mayor of Tampico was instructed by telephone from Cd. Victoria to give a luncheon for the Cuban Ambassador at the Casino Tampiqueño on Wednesday, September 9. The maximum number of persons authorized was twenty. The luncheon was duly held, but it appears that there was some difficulty in filling twenty places. Only fifteen persons, including the four Cubans, attended. A list of those present is attached. Mayor INGUAYZO told me in confidence that he was ordered by Mexico City and Cd. Victoria to give only this luncheon and to invite only city officials. Also, he was ordered to discourage private citizens from making any displays of friendship.

A buffet supper for one hundred twenty persons was given by the Cuban Consul at the Grata Azul of the Hotel Tampico on the evening of September 9. The affair was attended by the general and admirals commanding the military and naval zones and the finance officer of the military zone. The Mayor told me that he did not attend.

The Cubans have emphasized the commercial in their public and private talks. They continually reiterate their desire to buy cotton, henequen, beans and onions. They grow lyrical over the advantages to Tamaulipas that such trade would bring. Communism or politics are never mentioned.

In Cd. Victoria, the Ambassador talked at length with Oscar GUERRA ELIZONDO, representative in Tamaulipas of the Department of Agriculture and Cattle Raising. The arrangements for this and other commercial discussions were made by the Banco de Comercio Exterior at Mexico City. According to a reliable source, no contracts or agreements were signed.

The Ambassador is said to have offered grants for five youths from Tamaulipas to visit Cuba. One, a third year law student, José BERTA Suella, who probably will make the journey, said that he had been nominated by the Governor. The Consulate will attempt to learn and report details soon of the exact method of selection as well as the names and backgrounds of other nominees.
In the Consulate's view the visit should be considered a failure. The minimal courtesies accorded by the state and local authorities; the very poor press coverage; the reported failure to reach any firm commercial agreements; and the apathy of the public (including students) must have been disappointing indeed to the Cubans.

Enclosures: Attachments

Copies of newspaper articles:

- cc: Counselor for Consular Affairs
- Counselor for Political Affairs
- Political Research
- Director, Mexican Affairs, Washington, D.C.

GROUP 3
Downgraded at 12-year intervals; not automatically declassified.
The activities of the Cuban Embassy here in connection with the sixth anniversary of the Castro regime were almost ignored by Mexican press.

The leftist El Dia (January 5) did carry a brief item on the Ambassador Joaquin Hernandez Arma's reception, held on January 4, and reported the Ambassador's participation in the traditional wreath-laying ceremony at the Independence Monument earlier in the day. But El Dia omitted any editorial eulogies, contrasting sharply with the moderate Excelsior's attack on the "abominable extremes" incurred in Cuba, made in the course of a commentary (January 5) on Secretary Rusk's recent observation that the menace of Castroism had declined.

GROUP 3 - Downgraded at 12-year intervals, not automatically declassified.
Mexican Participants in Havana Celebrations

A number of Mexican leftists are known to have visited Havana in order to participate in the celebrations at the invitation of the Cuban regime (see the enclosure to this despatch for a list of certain of these persons). It is interesting that no top-level member of the Mexican Communist Party (PCE) went to Havana, although the director of the National Directorate of LÓBANO Toledo's Popular Socialist Party (PSP) did participate in the ceremonies at the Cuban capital. A variety of reasons were probably responsible for the absence of any top-level PCE officials. These officials were presumably very busy making final arrangements for the National Congress of the PCE-dominated section of the Central Campesina Independiente (CCI-Independent Peasants' Central), which opened on January 6 (see Notes 31 and 31). Among other reasons, it is possible that the PCE leadership also concluded that this was not a particularly opportune time to converge on Havana, particularly in view of the recent change of administration here (see in this connection the Embassy's A-579 of December 29, 1964).

For the Ambassador:

Wallace W. Stuart
Counselor of Embassy
for Political Affairs

1/ The text of the brief Diaz Ordaz message to President Dorticos was released to the press by the Cuban news agency Prensa Latina on January 8 and was picked up without comment in El Dia of January 9, 1965.

2/ According to the Ultimas Noticias of January 2, 1965, the "Panamanian Communist leader and agitator Moises CARRASQUILLA Vasques" passed through Mexico City on January 1 en route to Havana for the anniversary celebrations.

Date: _UNCLASSIFIED_ NO FOREIGN DISSEM_ (2)

List, as described above.

per Francis J. McNeil ARA

9/15/70
Certain Mexicans known to have participated in ceremonies in Havana marking Sixth Anniversary of Castro Regime:

Ernesto CACALLINO Espéron
Margarita CASTILLO Salazar
Máximo CORREA Camargo
Elvira Manzano de GONZALEZ
Jorge GONZALEZ Ramirez
Carlos LABINES
Nicolás PÉREZ Ramírez
Gloria TOPOCA Ortega
Rosa YUIG Fernández
Lázaro RUIZO Félix
Alfredo SÁENZ Delgado
Miguel A. VELASCO
Mr. Blakey. The committee has also tried to locate Mr. X and Ms. Y to no avail.

The committee also sought to interview another individual who was employed in the Cuban Embassy in 1963. Although the interview had been prearranged, he left Mexico City suddenly the day committee investigators arrived, and returned the day they were scheduled to depart.

The investigators, having decided to stay an extra day, contacted the former employee by phone, but he refused to speak with them. The committee has learned that Mexican authorities had been requested not to allow the committee investigators to interview the employee.

Members of the Duran family were questioned about Elena Garro’s allegations. They denied that they socialized with the people she said were at their party, although Sylvia Duran did recall that Elena herself may have been at one or two parties at her home in the fall of 1963. Sylvia Duran denied that Oswald had been there.

Another Mexican has claimed to have been in contact with Oswald in Mexico City. Oscar Contreras Lartique told an American foreign service officer (not Charles Thomas) in 1967 that as a student at the University of Mexico in 1963 he had met Oswald as he was leaving a roundtable discussion at the School of Philosophy.

Contreras, who described Oswald as “strange and introverted,” said he spent the rest of the day, that night and part of the following day with Oswald and some other students. He said Oswald told them he had come to the university looking for pro-Castro students who might help persuade the Cuban Embassy to grant him a visa. Oswald told them, Contreras said, that he was from California and was a member of a pro-Castro organization in New Orleans.

Contreras was later reinterviewed by American authorities. He refused to identify other students who had met Oswald, because he said they were still active revolutionaries. Contreras stated that originally Oswald was suspected of being an American intelligence agent, that he never mentioned President Kennedy or assassination, and that he repeatedly expressed a wish to get to Cuba promptly.

Mexican authorities have reported to the committee that there was indeed an Oscar Contreras Lartique registered at the University of Mexico in 1960, but not in 1963. They also reported that Oscar Contreras had once signed a manifesto written by a pro-Castro student group, but that the group ceased to function in 1962.

Nevertheless, the committee placed some significance in Contreras’ story because it has been learned that a professor from the University of Mexico held philosophy seminars at the Duran home. The philosophy professor, a close friend of the Durans, was a well known Marxist at the university.

The committee tried to arrange an interview with Contreras through Mexican officials, but when its investigators arrived, Contreras disappeared.

In summation, Mr. Chairman, I must frankly state that the committee has, with the exception of certain witnesses made available by the Cuban and Mexican Governments, largely been frus-
trated in its attempts to investigate the nature of Lee Harvey Oswald's activities and possible associates in Mexico City through personal interviews with those persons who purportedly have first-hand knowledge of such matters.

The only other theoretical possibility for resolving these issues was, of course, physical evidence, either documents or photographs. In this regard, the Cuban Government has suggested that photographic evidence should exist, at least as to Oswald's alleged visits to the Cuban consulate in Mexico City. Such photographs might well include, of course, the identities to the companions, if any, who were with him on those occasions.

In fact, the Cuban Government has provided several photos to the committee. They are reflected in JFK F-438 which, Mr. Chairman, I ask be displayed and entered into the record at this point.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection it may be entered into the record at this point.

[The information follows:]
Mr. Blakey. To support its claim that there was a photographic surveillance site across the street from the Cuban consulate in 1963, the Cuban Government, Mr. Chairman, has indicated that the top left of the photograph represents a diagram of the Cuban consulate on the left and on the right of the building that is displayed immediately to the right of that diagram. It is from that building that they suggest that photographic surveillance took place.
The three bottom photographs on the exhibit illustrate examples of their ability to photograph the photographer, during the course of his surveillance of the Cuban consulate.

Mr. Chairman, I would indicate that the committee has conducted an extensive investigation to determine who, if anyone, was responsible for the surveillance outlined in this exhibit in the periods of time during which that surveillance was in operation.

It has also sought to identify and personally interview those individuals who may have conducted the surveillance and to obtain, if possible, all relevant photographs.

Once again, however, I have to report to you, Mr. Chairman, that the committee's efforts have met with frustration. No photographs of Lee Harvey Oswald or of any other person who can be said to be an associate of his have been located.

Mr. Chairman, that ends today's presentation on Cuba, Mexico and the assassination.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you, Professor Blakey.

Before you proceed to the next section, once again I think it appropriate for me to indicate for the record the kind of cooperation that was necessary for this committee to obtain in order to do the extensive type of investigation that we have done in this particular area.

I acknowledged in the latter part of yesterday's hearings the kind of cooperation we had gotten from Cuban Government officials. But I might appropriately note at this time that to my knowledge and to the knowledge of the members of this committee, it is unprecedented for a head of a foreign nation to subject himself to interrogation by a congressional committee.

Not only did President Castro spend in excess of 4½ hours with this committee, but he made it clear and apparent to us that in every respect his officials were to give us complete cooperation.

I think the final record in this case will indicate the voluminous documents and witnesses that we interviewed in this area and virtually every request made by this committee was complied with, even to the extent of the fact that the committee when it went there conducted itself in the same way we have attempted to do our work here and that is to work quietly and without any type of fanfare.

And for that reason, we made the same type of request in Cuba that our work there not be announced, that we be accorded the opportunity to work privately and quietly and to that extent the President and his officials afforded us the kind of housing that we needed in order to remain out of public view.

So I think that the record ought to appropriately acknowledge the fact that this committee was given extensive cooperation by President Castro and his officials and we are grateful for that cooperation.

Professor Blakey?

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Chairman, it would be appropriate now to shift the focus of the hearing somewhat from Cuba, Mexico City and the assassination, and begin today and in the days that follow an examination of the performance of the agencies.

The first agency whose performance in 1963 and 1964 will be examined is the Secret Service.
Of all of the Federal agencies that were in any way involved in protecting President Kennedy or investigating his assassination, the Secret Service has come in for the most scathing criticism. Within hours of the tragedy in Dallas, press accounts were pointedly suggesting that the agency had been derelict in its duty to provide Presidential security.

The more obvious questions were first raised. Why had the motorcade been routed through Dealey Plaza, an open, park-like area surrounded by tall buildings? Why wasn't there more physical protection for the President—why, for example, were there no agents in the limousine itself, forming a human shield? Why was the limousine moving at such a slow speed? And why were agents in an open car directly behind the limousine so slow to respond at the sound of the first shot?

The Warren Commission was quite blunt in its admonishment of the Secret Service:

The Commission has concluded that at the time of the assassination the arrangements relied upon by the Secret Service to perform this function were seriously deficient.

And, the Commission adds in its final report:

The Commission believes that the facilities and procedures of the Protective Research Section of the Secret Service prior to November 22, 1963, were inadequate.

The approach of the Warren Commission seems to have been (a) to document the conduct of Secret Service agents physically present at the assassination scene; and (b) to record the perceptions of supervisory personnel as to Secret Service performance on the trip to Dallas and to reforms called for to improve the protective operations of the agency.

The select committee, while not disregarding the performance of the Secret Service on November 22, 1963, has attempted to go one step farther. It has assembled data on threats against President Kennedy from Secret Service files, in an effort to establish a basis for a fair, objective analysis. This has enabled the committee to scrutinize the extent to which Secret Service protective measures reflected the agency's grasp of potential danger to the President during the Kennedy years.

In other words, was the Secret Service in part to blame for the assassination because it failed to gather sufficient information on security problems in Dallas, or because it failed to analyze that information for its full significance?

The questions this committee posed for itself were these:

1. How skillfully did the Secret Service acquire information about threat activity around the country?
2. What was the quality of the insight used to analyze the information?
3. Did protective operations in the field reflect a thorough awareness of threat activity?

Before we get to testimony bearing on these questions, it would seem useful to consider for a moment the historic background of the Secret Service and its evolving role in Federal law enforcement.

It is worth noting that the Kennedy assassination was the first and only event of its kind since the Secret Service was assigned to full-time protection of the President in 1901, as a result of the
assassination of William McKinley. Originally, when it was formed in 1865, the Secret Service was not given responsibility for Presidential protection, even though that was the year Lincoln was murdered.

The primary purpose of the Secret Service at the outset was to deal with counterfeiting which had become a national outrage in the period before 1862 when a standardized national currency was adopted. By the end of the 1860's the new agency had all but eliminated the problem.

For the balance of the 19th century, the Secret Service engaged in various criminal detection activities. It investigated the Ku Klux Klan in the 1870's, Spanish espionage in the 1890's, organized crime in New York City in the eighties and nineties, and syndicated gambling in Louisiana at the turn of the century.

Even with the assignment of Presidential protection as its primary role, the Secret Service was not guaranteed, however, necessary annual appropriation to carry out the task. It wasn’t until 1908 that the agency’s mission was clarified, and, at that, for an ironic reason.

When the Secret Service exposed the participation in land fraud schemes by Members of Congress from several Western States, legislation was passed restricting the operations of the agency and creating a new Federal law enforcement body which ultimately became the Federal Bureau of Investigation. So, the original FBI men were eight agents transferred from the Secret Service.

The law limiting the Secret Service’s responsibilities left it with two concerns: Treasury matters, or counterfeiting, and protection of the President. On occasion, however, it was given exceptional assignments.

During World War I, for example, it went after German saboteurs, and in 1921 it was the body that investigated the roles of Secretary of the Interior Albert B. Fall and Attorney General Harry M. Daugherty in the Teapot Dome Scandal.

From about 1930 on, the Secret Service was an anticounterfeiting agency with the additional assignment of protecting the President. For the latter function, on only two occasions before November 22, 1963, was the agency tested by an actual assault on a President:

In February 1932, the car in which President Roosevelt was riding was fired on in Miami, killing the mayor of Chicago, Anton Cermak. In November 1950, members of the Puerto Rican Nationalist Party tried to force their way into Blair House, the temporary home of President Truman.

It ought to be clear, therefore, that the best way to evaluate the performance of the Secret Service at the time of the Kennedy assassination is to look at it not so much in the context of history, but rather in the context of the climate in 1963 and how well the Secret Service appreciated that climate, especially as it might have been evident in Texas.

President Kennedy posed a problem for the Secret Service from the start. As a policymaker, he was liberal and innovative, perhaps startlingly so in comparison with the cautious approach of President Eisenhower. His personal style was known to cause agents assigned to him to tear their hair. He traveled more frequently than any of his predecessors, and he relished contact with crowds.
of well wishers. He scoffed at many of the measures designed to protect him and treated the danger of an assault philosophically, if someone wanted to kill him, he reasoned, it would not be very difficult to stop him. On at least one occasion, President Kennedy was literally “lost” by the Secret Service detail guarding his hotel room.

Indeed, on the very day of the assassination, Presidential Assistant Kenneth O’Donnell is reported to have told a Secret Service agent, “you are not at fault. You can’t mix security and politics. We chose politics.”

The core of the Presidential security arm of the Secret Service is the White House detail, which in 1963 was composed of 36 special agents. In addition, there were six special agent drivers, eight special agents assigned to the Kennedy family, and five special officers detailed to the Kennedy home in Hyannisport, Mass. On the trip to Texas, there were 28 special agents in the Presidential entourage.

In all, out of 552 employees in November 1963, there were 70 special agents and 8 clerks—17 percent of the total Secret Service work force—assigned to protecting the President and Vice President directly or to the Protective Research Service, a preventive intelligence division charged with gathering and evaluating threat information and seeing that it is usefully disseminated.

In addition, there were 30 employees in the office of the Chief of the Secret Service, plus 313 agents and 131 clerks in 66 field offices, all of whom were on call to assist in Presidential protection.

The time of need for the most manpower was in 1963, as it is now, when the President traveled and was exposed to crowds of people in open spaces. Then, the Secret Service called on municipal, county, and State law enforcement agencies for personnel who assisted in the preparation of large-scale protective plans.

In planning a Presidential trip, a set of procedures was customarily followed. It is expected that they will be detailed in testimony today, along with answers to certain specific issues stemming from the Kennedy assassination, such as securing buildings along a parade route and liaison between the Secret Service and other agencies, Federal as well as State, county, and local.

From the beginning of its investigation of the Secret Service, the committee realized the great importance of the Protective Research Service. PRS is the memory of the agency, and it is responsible for analyzing threat data. By reviewing PRS files and interviewing its personnel, the committee has sought to clarify just how much the Secret Service, as an agency, knew about the sort and degree of the dangers the President faced in the fall of 1963, and to learn what protective tactics had been devised in response to them.

The committee was at pains to make a valid distinction between major and minor threats to the President in order that it could concentrate on the followup action to the significant ones. A threat was considered major if (a) it was verbal or communicated by a threatening act, and (b) if it created a danger great enough to require an in-depth and intense investigation by the Secret Service or other law enforcement agency.

The committee examined all threat profile investigations from March to December 1963, 313 of them in all, and it incorporated
into its analysis information on some major threat activity back to December 1962.

The committee also considered the following questions in its investigation of Secret Service threat activity files, questions raised by the Kennedy assassination itself:

One: Was there an indication of a conspiracy to harm Secret Service protectees?

Two: Was there information developed in investigations of earlier threats that might be useful in the investigation of the assassination?

Three: Was the pertinent information in the Secret Service files made available to the Warren Commission?

The first witness today will be Inspector Thomas J. Kelley. Inspector Kelley was assigned to represent the Secret Service in the investigation of President Kennedy's assassination. Inspector Kelley served as Secret Service liaison to the Warren Commission.

Inspector Kelley received a B.A. from Providence College and an LL.B. from Georgetown University Law School. He has been the special agent in charge of the Philadelphia Field Office, an Inspector in the Washington office, the Assistant Director of Protective Intelligence and Investigations in Washington, D.C., and he currently is the Assistant Director of Protective Operations in Washington, D.C.

Inspector Kelley is a member of the International Association of Chiefs of Police and he has served as consultant to several Far Eastern police agencies, as well as consultant to the Dominican Republic on protective matters.

It would be appropriate at this time, Mr. Chairman, to call Inspector Kelley.

Chairman Stokes. The committee calls Inspector Kelley.

Sir, would you raise your right hand and be sworn?

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you will give before the committee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

TESTIMONY OF INSPECTOR THOMAS J. KELLEY, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF PROTECTIVE OPERATIONS IN WASHINGTON, D.C.

Inspector Kelley. I do.

Chairman Stokes. The Chair recognizes counsel for the committee, Leodis Matthews.

Mr. Matthews. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Kelley, at this time are you retired from the Secret Service?


Mr. Matthews. In 1963 you were a member of the Secret Service inspection detail?

Inspector Kelley. Yes.

Mr. Matthews. What were your duties and responsibilities?

Inspector Kelley. The duties of the inspector from the Chief's office at that time were to conduct the field investigations of the activities of the Secret Service both in the field, at headquarters, and on the protective details, to make periodic inspections of the offices.

Mr. Matthews. Were you concerned about the performance of the agents in those investigations?
Inspector Kelley. Yes, sir.
Mr. Matthews. What type of inspection did you conduct of the agents' performance?
Inspector Kelley. In the field office?
Mr. Matthews. Yes.
Inspector Kelley. Their productivity, the manner in which they conducted their cases, the number of arrests, the kind of investigations they conducted, their relationship with outsiders, their relationship to their own people, and generally the conduct of the requirements of the job.
Mr. Matthews. I want to call your attention to an exhibit, JFK F-423. Are you able to see the exhibit from where you are, Mr. Kelley?
Inspector Kelley. Generally, yes I can.
Mr. Matthews. This exhibit purports to be an organizational chart of the Secret Service as of November 13, 1964.
Inspector Kelley. Yes, sir.
Mr. Matthews. To your knowledge would that have been basically the same organization of the Secret Service in 1963?
Inspector Kelley. Yes.
[The above referred to exhibit follows:]

JFK Exhibit F-423

Mr. Matthews. In your position as inspector would you report to the Director of the Secret Service?
Inspector Kelley. Yes, sir, report to the Chief Inspector who reported to the Director or the Chief.
Mr. Matthews. In the chart there is an indication about halfway down at the righthand side of the White House detail?
Inspector Kelley. Yes, sir.
Mr. Matthews. As an inspector, did you also have occasion to inspect the performance of the White House detail?

Inspector Kelley. Yes, during an inspection of the White House detail we would review the performance of the detail.

Mr. Matthews. What considerations would you give in evaluating their performance?

Inspector Kelley. The general conduct of the people on the detail, the carrying out of their assignment, the connection they had with their superiors and their fellow agents.

Mr. Matthews. Would you also have conducted performance reviews of the Protective Research Service?

Inspector Kelley. Yes.

Mr. Matthews. Did you focus on the quality of investigation by the field offices in the Protective Research Service, whether they complied with the guidelines and procedures of the Secret Service?

Inspector Kelley. Yes, that was part of the inspection procedure.

Mr. Matthews. I want to call your attention to November 22, 1963. At that time you were in Louisville, Ky.?

Inspector Kelley. Yes, sir.

Mr. Matthews. And you received a communique from Chief Rowley?

Inspector Kelley. Yes, sir.

Mr. Matthews. What were the contents of that message?

Inspector Kelley. The chief's office directed me to proceed to Dallas, Tex., to assist Mr. Sorrels, the agent in charge of the Dallas office, to assist him in finding out what had happened at Dallas, what were the events surrounding the assassination, and to coordinate any investigation that might be conducted by the Secret Service concerning the assassination.

Mr. Matthews. And you arrived in Dallas, Tex., that evening?

Inspector Kelley. That evening.

Mr. Matthews. Upon your arrival, did you understand that your responsibility was to conduct a criminal conspiracy investigation?

Inspector Kelley. No. Actually, at that time it was to find out exactly what happened and what the role of the Secret Service had been in that tragedy there.

Mr. Matthews. What were your first actions?

Inspector Kelley. I first met with Mr. Sorrels and we went to the police department where Oswald was being interrogated. I sat in on, I think it was the second interrogation of Oswald.

Mr. Matthews. Now in total you were present for at least four interviews with Lee Harvey Oswald?

Inspector Kelley. Yes.

Mr. Matthews. Why did you feel it was necessary to be there?

Inspector Kelley. We were, of course, attempting to find out what had happened, whether he was the assassin, whether he had accomplices, whether there were other problems that the Secret Service might be facing in connection with assassination of other people. It was just generally to find out what had happened.

Mr. Matthews. The Warren Commission has indicated that there were several people present at the time.

Inspector Kelley. Yes. In my opinion, there were too many present at the time of the interrogation of Oswald. The interrog-
tion of Oswald by Captain Fritz of the Dallas Police Department was conducted under something less than ideal circumstances.

Mr. MATTHEWS. What effect would those circumstances have had upon the interrogation itself?

Inspector KELLEY. In my opinion, it made the interrogation of Oswald by Captain Fritz, who at that time had the primary jurisdiction of handling Oswald, made it very difficult for him to conduct the kind of interrogation that should have been conducted.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Did you engage in any conversation with Lee Harvey Oswald?

Inspector KELLEY. Yes, I did.

Mr. MATTHEWS. What was the nature of that conversation?

Inspector KELLEY. I had asked Oswald if he had assassinated the President. I told him who I was. I said that the Secret Service had the responsibility for protecting the President, that he was in custody accused of assassinating the President, and we wanted to know whether he had done it, and if he hadn't done it, to let us know; if he had done it, to admit it.

He indicated that he would talk to me later on.

Mr. MATTHEWS. Were you also present at the time Lee Harvey Oswald was shot.

Inspector KELLEY. I wasn't in the immediate vicinity. I was upstairs in the police office. We had just left Oswald in the police headquarters. The police took him down to the basement to transport him. Mr. Sorrels and I remained upstairs. When we heard that he had been shot, we immediately went down to the basement. Oswald was still in the basement. The ambulance had been backed in to take him to the hospital.

I attempted to enter the ambulance with Oswald to go to the hospital. I was prevented from getting into the ambulance by the Dallas policemen who got into the ambulance with him.

Mr. MATTHEWS. During the time between your first conversation with Lee Harvey Oswald and the time the shooting occurred, did you make any attempt to ascertain what his background had been?

Inspector KELLEY. Let me have the question again.

Mr. MATTHEWS. What investigation did you conduct into the background of Lee Harvey Oswald?

Inspector KELLEY. The investigation that the Secret Service conducted personally was, the interviews with Mrs. Oswald, with Marina. We had put a detail with Marina after Lee Harvey's assassination and we attempted to get as much background as we could on Oswald from her.

There was a great deal of information coming to us in the Dallas office at that time from the other agencies who had information on Oswald. The FBI had information on him. The agency apparently had some information on him and had furnished it to our headquarters.

The Dallas police had some information on him and the State Department had some information on him in connection with his trips to Russia. The military was supplying information to our headquarters and it was being provided to me at Dallas.

All of this information was coming down to Dallas to me.
Mr. Matthews. Did you make any attempts personally to obtain information from the Secret Service files about Lee Harvey Oswald’s background in connection with the Cuban organizations?

Inspector Kelley. Well, the inquiry we made of the Secret Service files was whether the Secret Service had anything on Oswald prior to the assassination, and we had none.

Mr. Matthews. Based upon your investigation in Dallas in the few days right after the assassination, did you develop a background in regard to Lee Harvey Oswald which you communicated to the field offices of the Secret Service?

Inspector Kelley. Not an entire background. We were putting all the information together, but I don’t know that we put it in any one document. It was in the series of documents that accompanied records we were preparing.

Mr. Matthews. Mr. Kelley, when you were in Dallas conducting the investigation, were you the person in charge of the assassination investigation on behalf of the Secret Service?

Inspector Kelley. Yes; in Dallas.

Mr. Matthews. Did you request the field offices conduct investigations of suspects who they thought may have a connection with the assassination?

Inspector Kelley. In connection with the assassination? No; I don’t know that we sent any requests, that I sent any requests like that out. You must remember, that there was a coordinated investigation being conducted by the protective research section in Washington and our offices were furnishing us information that came to their attention from other agencies subsequent to the assassination and furnishing that to us at headquarters and to me in Dallas.

Mr. Matthews. Did you request that the Chicago field office conduct an investigation in connection with the rifle found in the Texas School Book Depository?

Inspector Kelley. Yes; I did.

Mr. Matthews. Who did you talk with in the Chicago office?

Inspector Kelley. I don’t recall now who I talked to, but I talked to someone in the Chicago office and asked them to run this lead out that we had.

Mr. Matthews. Now, Mr. Kelley, you were aware of an investigation concerning special agents who were alleged to have been drinking the night before and the morning before the assassination?

Inspector Kelley. I am aware of the inquiry; yes.

Mr. Matthews. To your knowledge, were any of those agents found in violation of the Secret Service rules?

Inspector Kelley. I don’t think they were found in violation of any Secret Service rules warranting any action. It was an area of poor judgment, I presume, but there was no specific violation of any rule.

Of course, the inquiry indicated that their action the night before had nothing, no bearing, on what happened in Dallas.

Mr. Matthews. Did you have occasion to review the performance of the agents at the time of the Kennedy assassination, the shooting episode in Dealey Plaza?

Inspector Kelley. Yes; the agents that were in Dallas.
Mr. Matthews. What conclusion did you reach with respect to their behavior?

Inspector Kelley. Well, I felt that none of the agents could be charged with any dereliction of duty in connection with the assassination.

Mr. Matthews. Did you have any conversation with the driver of the Presidential vehicle?

Inspector Kelley. No; I did not.

Mr. Matthews. Did you review his conduct?

Inspector Kelley. I reviewed his conduct.

Mr. Matthews. What did you understand his instructions were?

Inspector Kelley. Well, his instructions were, to see that the car was driven safely, that the safety of his passengers was paramount, that he was to assure himself that the car was in condition to move properly, just to keep in mind the safety of the passengers.

Mr. Matthews. Did he have any specific instructions that he was to take in anticipation of harm to the President?

Inspector Kelley. The general instruction, to the agents in a situation where the President is considered to be in danger is to get the President out of there, to evacuate the President.

The Secret Service does not consider it necessary for the Secret Service to stand and fight in any situation. That our primary duty is the security of the President and to remove him from any dangerous situation.

So that generally the instructions to the drivers of the cars are to be prepared to get the President away from any dangerous situation.

Mr. Matthews. Had the driver of the vehicle received any training in defensive driving or evasive driving?

Inspector Kelley. Not in a formal sense. However, Mr. Greer who was driving the President's car at that time and the other agents who were assigned as drivers had long practice and history of driving the Presidential vehicles and the security vehicles.

Mr. Matthews. Were there any tests available at the time to gauge or measure the reactions of those persons who were responsible for the close physical protection of President Kennedy?

Inspector Kelley. I presume there were tests available. I am not certain that any were given to the particular agents that were involved at the time of the assassination.

Mr. Matthews. You reviewed their performance?

Inspector Kelley. But I reviewed their performance?

Mr. Matthews. You did review their performance?

Inspector Kelley. I did review their performance.

Mr. Matthews. Do you have a recollection that any such tests were available to give them?

Inspector Kelley. I have no recollection that any tests were given.

Mr. Matthews. Mr. Kelley, the special agent in charge of the White House detail testified before this committee that he had been removed from his position, that he had considered his conduct a demotion. Did you have occasion to review his performance?

Inspector Kelley. Yes; that man, of course, was not at Dallas. I had occasion to review his performance at other times, but he was not present in Dallas.
Mr. Matthews. Did you review his performance in connection with selecting agents to go to Dallas and making the arrangements for the trip?

Inspector Kelley. Yes.

Mr. Matthews. What, if any, conclusions did you draw with respect to his performance?

Inspector Kelley. His performance was normal under those circumstances. The selection of agents was a rather routine performance at that time.

Mr. Matthews. How long did you remain in Dallas?

Inspector Kelley. I can’t tell you the exact date, but I returned to Washington some time before December 15, probably the first week or 10 days of December.

Mr. Matthews. Now in the week following the assassination, did you receive any reports from the field offices, reporting results of their investigation or whether there were any subjects, or other agents connected with the assassination?

Inspector Kelley. Yes; we received several reports. At that time there were several rumors going around that Oswald had been seen in various places and Oswald had connections in various cities. And these reports were coming to us and being evaluated.

Mr. Matthews. What was the nature of those reports generally? Did they identify any particular organization?

Inspector Kelley. They were generally running out rumors concerning Oswald being seen with certain people in other cities. There was a report coming to us from New Orleans that Oswald had been seen in New Orleans, had been arrested in New Orleans, and had been participating in some pamphleteering activities in New Orleans.

Mr. Matthews. You were aware during the time you were in Dallas that Lee Harvey Oswald had been a member of the FPCC, Fair Play for Cuba Committee?

Inspector Kelley. That came out of New Orleans.

Mr. Matthews. And you were also aware of the fact that one of the Secret Service agents had interviewed Marina Oswald shortly after the assassination?

Inspector Kelley. Yes.

Mr. Matthews. During the course of that interview she had indicated to him that she was a strong Castro supporter?

Inspector Kelley. Yes.

Mr. Matthews. Did you make any requests to any of the field offices to determine if there were any Cuban organizations or groups which had threatened, or presented a threat to, the President?

Inspector Kelley. No, I didn’t make any particular requests on that matter, but there were at that time, prior to the assassination, several investigations going on in the Secret Service office concerning groups that had in their rhetoric indicated that they were a danger to the President or had threatened the President or had been reported to threaten the President.

Mr. Matthews. Mr. Kelley, I call your attention to a report that was written by a special agent in Chicago, a synopsis of which indicates that an informant advises that he had been in touch with
a group of Chicago Cubans who may be involved in the assassination of the late President Kennedy.

Inspector Kelley. Yes.

Mr. Matthews. Can you state whether or not you were aware of that investigation while you were in Dallas?

Inspector Kelley. Yes; I was.

Mr. Matthews. Did you file a report in connection with that matter?

Inspector Kelley. No; I didn’t file any report that I recall. It was information coming to us.

Mr. Matthews. Did you receive any other information that tended to support or corroborate that investigation?

Inspector Kelley. Not that I recall.

Mr. Matthews. Do you recall receiving any reports from the Miami area focusing in on an investigation connected with the Chicago investigation?

Inspector Kelley. Yes, there were several reports coming out of the Miami area. The Secret Service had been very interested in the Cuban activity in the Florida area, the Miami area particularly, prior to the assassination because of the visits of President Kennedy to Miami and to his home in Florida.

We had frequent trips to Miami with our protectees. And we were concerned with the Cuban activities in Miami and we received several reports concerning them.

Mr. Matthews. Do you recall receiving a report from a special agent in Miami, a Miami investigation, mentioning a person by the name of Quentin Pina Machado?

Inspector Kelley. Yes, I did.

Mr. Matthews. What was your recollection about that report?

Inspector Kelley. That report was one of a series of reports that we received concerning the activities of the pro-Castro and anti-Castro groups in Miami. He was alleged to be an activist, a radical and a dangerous man.

Mr. Matthews. Mr. Kelley, I refer to JFKF-419, the report that I have discussed with you previously, a synopsis of which indicates that information had been received from an informant indicating that if the assassination of the President involved an international plot or conspiracy and that if there was evidence connecting Fidel Castro, the person who would have been responsible for carrying out any action on the part of Fidel would be Quentin Pina Machado, a Cuban terrorist used by Castro to carry out any Castro action.

Inspector Kelley. Yes.

Mr. Matthews. Did you make any determination to investigate the authenticity of that information?

Inspector Kelley. We did not make a separate investigation by the Secret Service. This matter was under investigation by the FBI and by the agency. We were receiving information and exchanging information with the two agencies in connection with Machado and several other Cuban radicals in the Miami area.

Mr. Matthews. Now with the exception of the memorandums you received from Miami, the memorandums you received from Chicago indicating the possibility of Cuban involvement in the
assassination, was there any other evidence of a conspiracy that you were concerned with?

Inspector Kelley. There were other memoranda coming and information coming into headquarters concerning the activities of other groups, some of whom had been alleged prior to the assassination as having an interest in the President, having threatened the President actually.

Mr. Matthews. What type of groups would those have been, what affiliations?

Inspector Kelley. These were some of the white rightist groups, the John Birch Society and the Ku Klux Klan, several of the right wing groups.

Mr. Matthews. Did you read all the reports that the Secret Service generated in connection with your investigation?

Inspector Kelley. Yes, I did.

Mr. Matthews. Would you have been the only person reviewing those reports?

Inspector Kelley. No, there were several people reviewing the reports; the Protective Research Division, Mr. Sorrels was reviewing some of them in Dallas, several people.

Mr. Matthews. Did the Secret Service actively become involved in determining whether or not there was a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy soon after the assassination?

Inspector Kelley. Yes. We were interested and we were certainly involved in attempting to answer that question.

Mr. Matthews. Were there any restrictions on the scope of what areas you were to investigate?

Inspector Kelley. The research that was done was done by the Protective Research Section in connection with what information we had and then asking for what information any other of the agencies had, the intelligence-gathering information.

The Secret Service was not in the business of gathering intelligence. We were in the business and are still in the business of evaluating the intelligence we receive.

So we were dependent and depending a great deal on the other intelligence agencies to furnish us information.

Mr. Matthews. Now, the FBI was in Dallas at the same time conducting an investigation?

Inspector Kelley. Yes.

Mr. Matthews. At some point you received an indication that the FBI would conduct the conspiracy investigation?

Inspector Kelley. Yes.

Mr. Matthews. When was that?

Inspector Kelley. That was shortly after I got down there, probably 2 or 3 days after I got down there. I received information from our headquarters that the Government had indicated that the FBI would be in charge of the investigation of the assassination.

Mr. Matthews. As near as you can remember, what date would that have been?

Inspector Kelley. I would say it would have been about the 24th or 25th. I really can't be certain after this length of time.

Mr. Matthews. Did you make any effort to discuss with the FBI what areas that the investigation should focus on?
Inspector Kelley. Not really. I had several discussions with Jim Malley who was my counterpart from the FBI in the Dallas office. There was an occasional question from Malley as to what we were doing in this area or that. We resolved those inquiries among ourselves.

I was there to see what had happened in connection with the Secret Service's responsibility, to see what this assassination meant to us in connection with our other protectees whether this was an ongoing conspiracy where President Johnson might be assassinated or some other Government official.

We were interested in that in those few days where there was a great deal of confusion as to what had happened.

Mr. Matthews. Did you formulate any plan or course of investigation to determine whether, in fact, there was a conspiracy?

Inspector Kelley. No, except the general plan to find out what happened, what went on.

Mr. Matthews. What did you do with the information that you received from Chicago and Miami?

Inspector Kelley. I merely read it and, of course, a copy of that information went to the protective research section who, of course, would evaluate it as to what it meant to us, along with myself.

Mr. Matthews. What type of evaluation would they conduct? What were they trying to find out?

Inspector Kelley. They would ascertain whether—their original request, of course, was to ascertain whether this had anything to do with the assassination in Dallas.

Mr. Matthews. Did they have the responsibility of drawing connections between the various information that was coming in from the field office?

Inspector Kelley. Yes.

Mr. Matthews. And they were to apprise you of what connections, if any, there were?

Inspector Kelley. Yes, and, of course, I was free to make my own judgment down there, too.

Mr. Matthews. What person in the intelligence division did you talk with in connection with that?


Mr. Matthews. And he was aware of all the reports that you had?

Inspector Kelley. Yes.

Mr. Matthews. Now how was your liaison process with the FBI working? Was there a free exchange of information?

Inspector Kelley. At that time in Dallas?

Mr. Matthews. Yes.

Inspector Kelley. Yes, I felt there was a free exchange of information. We were getting some information that was not available to them through our contacts with Marina. Of course, our agents were picking up information on the street as they do. People were coming to us at the local level in Dallas. I felt there was a free exchange of information. There certainly was between myself and Mr. Malley.

Mr. Matthews. Now, when you were in Dallas, you received information from an Agent Patterson that he had talked with an
FBI agent regarding some top secret information in regard to Lee Harvey Oswald?
Inspector Kelley. Yes.
Mr. Matthews. And he indicated to that agent that he could not tell him what the information was, but that it would be exchanged at the Washington level?
Inspector Kelley. Yes.
Mr. Matthews. Specifically, he mentioned the fact that the agent had had contact with Marina Oswald some 10 days before the assassination?
Inspector Kelley. Yes.
Mr. Matthews. And you later learned that that agent was James P. Hosty?
Inspector Kelley. Yes.
Mr. Matthews. Did you ever find out what top secret information he was referring to?
Inspector Kelley. No, I didn’t find out any top secret information he was referring to, but, of course, the information came to us shortly thereafter, perhaps at the same time, that the FBI had contacts with Oswald and had contact with Marina to find Oswald and to talk to him.
In discussing what this information was later, I think that it referred to the fact that Oswald had been in Russia.
Mr. Matthews. Well, you say you think; did you ever discuss that with Inspector Malley?
Inspector Kelley. No, I didn’t.
Mr. Matthews. Did you ever find that the agent who, in fact, had contact with Marina had been special agent James Hosty?
Inspector Kelley. Yes, I learned that as a general piece of information, that Hosty was the control agent for Lee Harvey Oswald and that in that connection he had contacted Marina.
Mr. Matthews. Did you ever learn about what has become known as the Hosty note?
Inspector Kelley. No; that never came to my attention.
Mr. Matthews. When did that first come to your attention?
Inspector Kelley. I think I read that in the press a year or so ago or whenever it became public.
Mr. Matthews. Now you were receiving information from the FBI in regard to Lee Harvey Oswald?
Inspector Kelley. Yes.
Mr. Matthews. And you learned that while Lee Harvey Oswald was in New Orleans he had contact with Carlos Bringuir, a member of the Cuban group known as the DRE?
Inspector Kelley. Yes.
Mr. Matthews. Did you send that information on to Mr. Bouck in the intelligence section?
Inspector Kelley. Yes. Mr. Bouck got that information about the same time I did in the reports that came from New Orleans.
Mr. Matthews. Was there ever anything developed from the Secret Service file in regard to whether there was an assassination attempt or plot involved?
Inspector Kelley. A plot? Whether there was a plot involved in the assassination of President Kennedy?
Mr. Matthews. Yes; based upon the Secret Service investigation after the assassination?
Inspector Kelley. No; there was not.
Mr. Matthews. Did you review all that information?
Inspector Kelley. Yes, I did.
Mr. Matthews. Now, Mr. Kelley, you have become aware of a September 7 speech given in 1963 by Fidel Castro at which time he indicated that he was aware of the CIA attempt to cause the Cuban leaders to be assassinated?
Inspector Kelley. I have heard of it; yes.
Mr. Matthews. And that he would respond in kind.
Inspector Kelley. Yes.
Mr. Matthews. Did you hear that? Did you know about that during the course of the Secret Service investigation in 1963?
Inspector Kelley. I am not too sure when I became aware of that. I really don't know. I don’t think so. I think this information was brought to my attention later after I had returned to Washington.
Mr. Matthews. Would that have been a type of information that the Secret Service would be interested in——
Inspector Kelley. Yes.
Mr. Matthews [continuing]. For intelligence purposes?
Inspector Kelley. Yes. It didn't come to my attention until later, since the thing happened before the assassination. It is not the sort of thing that would come directly to my attention anyway. It would come to the protective research section.
Mr. Matthews. Now later when you returned to Washington, you became the liaison person with the Warren Commission?
Inspector Kelley. Yes, sir.
Mr. Matthews. Were you the principal person in the Secret Service responsible to the Warren Commission?
Inspector Kelley. Yes.
Mr. Matthews. What were your responsibilities?
Inspector Kelley. I had a responsibility to assist the Warren Commission in any way we could, to furnish them any information we have in connection with the assassination, and to generally see that the Commission got everything it needed from the Secret Service.
Mr. Matthews. Who would make the determination of which and what type of information was supplied to the Warren Commission?
Inspector Kelley. That would come from—well, Mr. Rankin would request what information he wanted. I would make the determination as to what information I thought the Commission would want from it. But generally what happened was that if the Commission heard something from some other agency that perhaps they thought the Secret Service might have something on, they would ask us for it. If we had it, we would give it to them. If we didn’t, we would tell them. When the Commission was formed, we sent up a great deal of documents, which included everything we had done in Dallas, all the information that had come to the Dallas office while I was there, all the reports and the statements made by the people which were involved. So it was one massive turning over to the Commission of everything that they thought they
wanted at that time, and then subsequently, as their deliberations went on, they asked for other material.

Mr. Matthews. Did you make any independent suggestions to the Warren Commission of what areas they should or ought to investigate?

Inspector Kelley. Not really; no.

Mr. Matthews. Did you discuss with them concepts of conspiracy?

Inspector Kelley. Oh, yes, I have discussed with some of the staff the things that we had going at the time of the assassination, the kinds of threats we have.

Mr. Matthews. You discussed with them the information that you have received from the field offices?

Inspector Kelley. Yes.

Mr. Matthews. And did you supply them all the reports in connection with that?

Inspector Kelley. We supplied them with all the reports that we thought were pertinent to the assassination.

Mr. Matthews. Now you also became involved in examining certain parts of the Secret Service operation and performance before the assassination with the Warren Commission?

Inspector Kelley. Yes.

Mr. Matthews. You considered, for instance, whether it was feasible to establish certain buildings on the motorcade route, if there is any more danger than others?

Inspector Kelley. Yes, we furnished the Warren Commission with the kind of procedures we were going through at that time.

Mr. Matthews. Now subsequent to that, you were involved in investigating and determining whether or not there were certain things on the motorcade route that should be particularly noted by the advance agents?

Inspector Kelley. Yes.

Mr. Matthews. You considered warehouses as being a building of particular concern?

Inspector Kelley. Empty buildings, empty warehouses, or warehouses that were partially occupied, yes. Every building is a security risk, but there are certain types of buildings in which there is a lot less control than there are in others.

Mr. Matthews. Now you also became aware of the threat made by Joseph Milteer?

Inspector Kelley. Yes, I was aware of that investigation.

Mr. Matthews. What was that investigation?

Inspector Kelley. That was an investigation of members of the Ku Klux Klan and white rightists, wherein information had been received that one of the people had made a threat against the life of the President, against President Kennedy.

Mr. Matthews. Do you specifically remember the nature of that threat? Was it that the President would be in the Miami area on November 18, and that it would be possible to assassinate him from a high building with a rifle?

Inspector Kelley. Yes.

Mr. Matthews. What, if anything, did the Secret Service do to respond to that?
Inspector Kelley. These organizations that were involved, these people involved were continuing investigations that had been going on by the FBI, we exchanged information with the FBI as to where these people were, what they were doing, and there was just an attempt to evaluate this threat which was a similar threat, we had received others like it throughout the year, whether it really meant something that the Secret Service would have to take some action on, specific action on.

Mr. Matthews. Now the threat was for November 18, 1963, and it was that there would be an attempt to assassinate the President from a high building with a rifle.

Inspector Kelley. Yes.

Mr. Matthews. Was there any effort made in Dallas to check any of the buildings?

Inspector Kelley. Whatever effort was made was a request by the advance man with the Dallas police to see what they could do about a route survey.

Now in those days, the Secret Service's resources were extremely limited. We depended a great deal upon the local police departments for this type of backing and I don't know specifically what the Dallas police were asked to do or what they did on the survey route. I can recall what the advance report suggested they do.

Mr. Matthews. When you reviewed the performance of the advance agents, did you give any special consideration to the Milteer threat, whether or not they knew about it?

Inspector Kelley. The information coming at that time on a threat like that would go from the Protective Research Section to the White House detail. They were furnished with this kind of information. I can't say what they did with this particular piece of information.

Mr. Matthews. Do you know whether the advance agents who went into Dallas were aware of that particular threat?

Inspector Kelley. I don't know personally whether they were.

Mr. Matthews. Now, Mr. Kelley, we have reviewed a series of reports that have been identified as JFK F-414 through JFK F-418, the caption of which reads Cuban Plot to Assassinate the President. The details of the investigation began in November of 1962 until August of 1963.

Inspector Kelley. Yes.

Mr. Matthews. Have you had occasion to review those reports?

Inspector Kelley. Yes, sir.

Mr. Matthews. Would you give the committee a brief summary primarily of what those reports contain and what the investigation was?

Inspector Kelley. This was an investigation of Cuban activity in the Miami area. It resulted from the interception of two letters to an address in Miami. The letters contained information of a threatening tenor to the President, against President Kennedy. I don't recall the exact text of the letters, but they were of sufficient importance to us to conduct an investigation and to ask information from the FBI and the agency as to what they knew about the particular people involved.

Mr. Matthews. And the letters were mailed from where?
Inspector Kelley. I don't recall. They were from outside the country.

Mr. Matthews. Havana, Cuba?

Inspector Kelley. From Cuba, yes.

Mr. Matthews. According to the exhibit, the investigation established that the address and the person who mailed the letter was authentic.

Inspector Kelley. Was what?

Mr. Matthews. Was authentic.

Inspector Kelley. The person who mailed the letter, the name was authentic, yes. However, there was an opinion by the intelligence people that these letters were perhaps sent to be intercepted. There was an indication by the intelligence analysts in our own shop and in the other agencies that perhaps the way these letters were addressed they were meant to be intercepted.

Mr. Matthews. Now Quentin Pino Machado was mentioned as one of the persons involved in that investigation.

Inspector Kelley. Yes, sir.

Mr. Matthews. Was there ever any attempt made to connect this information to the later information you received about Quentin Machado?

Inspector Kelley. Not by us, and I am not familiar with what followed in the investigation, mostly because we never made any connection between this investigation and this threat with the Oswald matter, with the assassination in Dallas.

Mr. Matthews. Now during your time that you were with the Warren Commission, did you ever personally review this material in connection with the assassination investigation?

Inspector Kelley. Yes, we sent some of this information up to the Warren Commission. They were aware of this investigation. Some of their staff people, of course, were in Miami and followed up something of that.

Mr. Matthews. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions at this time.

Mr. Fithian. At this time the Chair will recognize the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ford, for such time as he may consume. Following that, we will proceed to the 5-minute rule.

Mr. Ford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First, I want to ask counsel, Mr. Matthews, if copies of the different exhibits have been given to the witness, specifically JFK F-420, also F-415 and F-418.

Would you give that to the witness at this time?

Mr. Matthews. Yes, Mr. Congressman.

Mr. Ford. We will get back to that in a few minutes, Mr. Kelley. Mr. Kelley, your position as an inspector included evaluating the performance of the agents; is that correct?

Inspector Kelley. Yes, sir.

Mr. Ford. Did you evaluate the reaction of agents in Dealey Plaza to the sound of gunfire?

Inspector Kelley. Yes, I considered it and thought about it.

Mr. Ford. You thought about it?

Inspector Kelley. Yes.

Mr. Ford. Governor Connally testified before this committee that as an experienced hunter, there was no question in his mind that
the first sound was rifle fire. The evidence before this committee so far has indicated that in all probability the first shot missed. The medical and autopsy testimony has indicated that the third shot was definitely the fatal blow. We have had experts to establish that time between the first and the third shot was over 7 seconds.

I want to ask you, Mr. Kelley, what consideration did you give to the reaction between the first, second and third shot of the two agents riding the Presidential limousine? And also the agents immediately behind the limousine?

Inspector Kelley. It is very difficult to second-guess what a person should have done in a crisis like that or just what he knew had happened. I think from talking to the agents, I don’t think that any of them knew they were under fire until they saw the President so badly wounded.

The agents, of course, in the follow-up car were some distance away from the action. Their training and what their responsibility was, of course, was to look at the crowd. They were not looking at the President. Their instructions are that they ought to be looking away from him, to see what was going on.

The two people in the car, of course, were facing the other way. I don’t think any of them realized at the time the first shot went off that they were under fire. We had a parade situation with motorcycles alongside of you, the crowd cheering, people making a great deal of noise, as is usual in a political motorcade of that type, and in summary, I just don’t think the agents knew they were under fire until much too late to do anything about it.

Mr. Ford. Yes, but what training did the agents receive?

Inspector Kelley. Well, the training, the agent had extensive training as to how to handle a crowd and how to attempt to keep themselves, between danger and the President’s body. They have a great deal more training now than they had then, but even in those days there was specific training procedures that the agents went through, the recognition of gunfire, a very difficult problem for anyone I think in those situations.

Mr. Ford. Mr. Kelley, Mr. Maurice Martineau, the special agent in charge of the Chicago field office, testified before this committee that before the assassination, the field offices did not call on other Federal agencies for assistance.

Would you tell us why, the Secret Service never contacted law enforcement agencies for assistance in those areas where threats had been received, for instance, Dallas, Miami of other areas?

Inspector Kelley. Well, we could call on any of the local police agencies for assistance and not only could but did. There was some restriction on us about calling on FBI agents for physical protection, to assist in the physical protection of the President. We had access to any government agency for information, for intelligence information. We were not prohibited from calling on other Federal agencies, if we considered it necessary. We could get assistance and bodies. It was not easy but it could be done if we had a situation where we thought we needed them.

Mr. Ford. Well, Mr. Martineau said in his testimony: “I think it was a matter that tragically and unfortunately took an assassination to bring it into sharp focus the need for further steps which the Secret Service previously did not authorize.”
My question: During your tenure with the Secret Service, did you find that to be true before the assassination?

Inspector Kelley. I think that the Secret Service did not have all the resources it needed to conduct this important protective responsibility. We were shorthanded. We did not have the number and kinds of people and training that this serious responsibility called for.

Mr. Ford. Mr. Kelley, soon after you arrived in Dallas, you requested that the Chicago office determine whether Alex Hidell had purchased a rifle from the Klein's Sporting Goods Store; is that correct?

Inspector Kelley. Yes, sir.

Mr. Ford. If you will recall, when the Secret Service agents arrived, FBI agents had already been there; is that correct?

Inspector Kelley. Yes, sir.

Mr. Ford. And in fact instructed the manager not to talk to anyone else; is that correct?

Inspector Kelley. Yes, sir.

Mr. Ford. Were the Secret Service and the FBI investigating the case independently, and, what, if any, attempts did you make to prevent this duplication of investigation?

Inspector Kelley. No, I don't think we were investigating the matter independently. I think at that time, in those very early days of the investigation, we were attempting to investigate it jointly. The rifle had been identified as having been used, the alcohol and tobacco people had identified it as having been purchased in Chicago by Oswald using his alias of Hidell. We got that information and I just sent it out to Chicago to ask that it be verified. The Bureau apparently had the same information a little earlier than we had and did the same thing.

I saw no problems with the duplication of effort in the first few days of Dallas. There was a great deal of confusion going on. We just did what we thought we had to do to get the information that we were trying to seek as to what was happening, what the assassination meant to us in our protective efforts.

Mr. Ford. Were you in contact with the FBI——

Inspector Kelley. Yes.

Mr. Ford [continuing]. During this period?

Inspector Kelley. Yes.

Mr. Ford. Were there any recommendations, Mr. Kelley, to the Warren Commission that they focus upon the conspiracies which the Secret Service at one time were concerned about?

Inspector Kelley. I don't think there had been a special focusing on any one particular activity that we were doing. I think they focused on the entire range of possibilities.

Mr. Ford. Were you aware that there were significant questions of Oswald's connection and association with Castro's government and the Cuban groups in the United States during this investigation?

Inspector Kelley. Yes, well, we were aware of Oswald's trip to Mexico. It became known to us after the assassination. We were aware of his activities in Dallas with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. We received no indication of any link with Oswald
with organized radical groups among the Cubans except the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.

Mr. Ford. But you did have information of his involvement with the pro-Castro—

Inspector Kelley. Yes, sir.

Mr. Ford. Is that correct?

Inspector Kelley. Yes, sir.

Mr. Ford. What reasons did you have for not thoroughly reviewing all the files in the Secret Service to supply the Warren Commission with any reference that would assist the Commission in the investigation, Mr. Kelley?

Inspector Kelley. Oh, I think we supplied the Warren Commission with anything that was pertinent to the assassination, anything they asked for, and anything that we, in our opinion, thought would be interesting to them. We held nothing back from the Warren Commission that I know of. It was my job to see that we didn't, and I don't think we did.

Mr. Ford. When the FBI began to focus its investigation on Lee Harvey Oswald, did you gain any impression that the conspiracy investigations conducted by the Secret Service was being ignored at that time?

Inspector Kelley. No, no, sir.

Mr. Ford. Were you aware of what other information was?

Inspector Kelley. I was aware of the information we had, I was also aware that much of the information contained in our files concerning these Cuban activities was coming from the Bureau, and there was a free exchange of information between the Bureau and ourselves in Miami and at headquarters concerning these alleged plots.

Mr. Ford. Mr. Kelley, there was a group of Secret Service personnel who reviewed the assassination investigation conducted by the various field offices of the Secret Service; is that correct?

Inspector Kelley. Yes, in the Protective Research Section.

Mr. Ford. Who were the people in that group, Mr. Kelley?

Inspector Kelley. There were people in the Protective Research Section and some others who were brought in from the field who had been in the protective research area, and of course I was involved in it.

Mr. Ford. During the meetings, did you ever discuss whether there were any credible investigations to be done in the conspiracy area?

Inspector Kelley. In connection with the Oswald matter?

Mr. Ford. The Oswald what?

Inspector Kelley. In connection with the assassination, you mean, or generally in the threat area?

Mr. Ford. Well, in connection with the assassination, prior to the assassination, or the assassination itself—

Inspector Kelley. Prior to the assassination it would have been done by the Protective Research Section, by Mr. Bouck, who has discussed these matters with the head of the White House detail, with the Deputy Director, the Deputy Chief at the time, and the Chief of the Secret Service concerning important, what we considered important plots that came to our attention, either came to our
attention directly or perhaps came to our attention through the FBI or the agency.

Mr. Ford. Did this group determine what files should or should not be given to the Warren Commission?

Inspector Kelley. No, I think the decision as to what files should be given to the Warren Commission was pretty well handled by myself.

Mr. Ford. Were any recommendations given to the Warren Commission?

Inspector Kelley. Recommendations by the Secret Service?

Mr. Ford. No, by this group, from this group we are discussing.

Inspector Kelley. No.

Mr. Ford. As far as conspiracy?

Inspector Kelley. No, we made no recommendation to the Warren Commission.

Mr. Ford. No recommendation?

Inspector Kelley. No. We merely supplied them with information we had.

Mr. Ford. Mr. Kelley, the agent in charge of the intelligence function for the Secret Service testified before this committee that he had no knowledge of the substance of Fidel Castro's September 7, 1963, speech in which Castro voiced what had been interpreted as a direct threat to the Kennedys.

What consideration was this threat given in deciding to investigate any persons who were strong pro-Castro supporters?

Inspector Kelley. I don't think any consideration was given to investigating pro-Castro supporters. With the resources we had at that time, we were pretty well confining ourselves to threats made against the President. Domestic security was the responsibility of the Bureau.

Mr. Ford. Did it occur to you at that time to investigate all pro-Castro persons that would have been in the Secret Service intelligence files?

Inspector Kelley. If they were in the Secret Service intelligence files, of course they did get a periodic review.

Mr. Ford. They did?

Inspector Kelley. They got a periodic review as the matters in the Protective Research Section were reviewed.

Mr. Ford. I mean during, right after the assassination of President Kennedy?

Inspector Kelley. Right after that, all the information we had in the Protective Research Section was pretty thoroughly reviewed. We were looking for some information that we had that might go back to Oswald.

Mr. Ford. When the FBI took control of the assassination after December 9 I think you said, you mentioned earlier that you were contacted through a White House order, did you release all of that information at that time to the FBI, including the intelligence files?

Inspector Kelley. No, we didn't release it to them. The information, we reviewed the information, and the information we had on the Cuban conspiracies and the Cuban groups we found was all information that the FBI had. As a result of the assassination and the review, we received a great deal more information that the
Bureau had on these groups than we had had heretofore which the
Bureau previously did not think that we were concerned with.

Mr. Ford. But do you recall whether you went through the files
to investigate all of the pro-Castro persons immediately after the
assassination?

Inspector Kelley. Not for the purpose of investigation, simply for
the purpose of whether we had them. How many we had and
that had any relationship to Oswald.

Mr. Ford. Would Castro's statement together with Marina's
statement to the Secret Service agent, shortly after the assassina-
tion, have strongly indicated that such persons should have been
investigated?

Inspector Kelley. Not by the Secret Service, we don't feel. The
Secret Service out of necessity, because of their resources, confined
themselves to direct threats that we had received.

Mr. Ford. Mr. Kelley, Quentin Machado was known to the Secret
Service even before John F. Kennedy's assassination——

Inspector Kelley. Yes, sir.

Mr. Ford [continuing]. As being an associate of a person who had
threatened the President and was investigated as part of a Cuban
plot to assassinate President Kennedy?

Inspector Kelley. Yes, sir.

Mr. Ford. Yet all of the information in the Secret Service files
were not supplied to the Warren Commission stating this?

Inspector Kelley. No, that isn't quite true, Mr. Congressman. In
the first group of reports that we sent to the Warren Commission,
a report on Quentin Machado was sent to the Warren Commission.
That report had a file number on it reflecting that there was a
great deal more information in the Secret Service files on this
particular situation. We have, since this matter came up with us in
the investigation, have been attempting to ascertain whether
this group of papers, which is F-415, ever went to the commission,
and we cannot say that it did or did not, but we can definitely say
that the report on Quentin Pino Machado containing the same file
number as this information did go to the commission, so the com-
mmission had access to this file and had access to the information.

I also know that the commission, did an intensive inquiry con-
cerning the activities of the Cubans in the Miami area, which
involved this investigation.

Mr. Ford. Mr. Kelley, let me get to my real question here. I am
concerned. Were you of the opinion that the Warren Commission
was open to the possibility of the conspiracy?

Inspector Kelley. Yes.

Mr. Ford. Did you consider this information pertinent and rele-
vant to their inquiry during this time?

Inspector Kelley. Yes.

Mr. Ford. Mr. Kelley, I have just a few other questions here. I
would like to call your attention to JFK F-415 through F-418.
Do you have it there?

Inspector Kelley. I have F-415 and F-416.

Mr. Ford. As I understand it, these reports contain information
regarding the Secret Service's investigation into a Cuban plot to
assassinate President Kennedy; is that correct?

Inspector Kelley. Yes, sir.
Mr. Ford. The Secret Service was aware of this information during the course of the Warren Commission; is that correct?

Inspector Kelley. Yes, sir.

Mr. Ford. But never actually gave the commission these reports during their investigation; is that correct?

Inspector Kelley. Not these particular reports, but we did give the Warren Commission information concerning these plots, and it was the Secret Service Report No. 206 that we sent to the commission, and it is in the commission file, mentioning Quentin Machado, containing the file number under which these reports are filed.

Mr. Ford. At the time, Mr. Kelley, were these reports considered by the Secret Service to be secret documents?

Inspector Kelley. They were so classified, yes.

Mr. Ford. Sir?

Inspector Kelley. They were classified as secret.

Mr. Ford. Is that a rationale for not giving them to the Warren Commission?

Inspector Kelley. No. We gave other secret documents to the Warren Commission. That wasn't the rationale why they were not given. As a matter of fact, I don't have it before me, but I think the memorandum we also gave to the Warren Commission was classified.

Mr. Ford. You know earlier, it might have been when Mr. Matthews was talking with you, you mentioned that you were to supply them with relevant and pertinent reports.

Did you consider the investigation of this plot a concern of the work of the Warren Commission?

Inspector Kelley. Not really. In hindsight and with what happened during the Warren Commission recommendation there, in my opinion this investigation that was conducted in Miami had no relationship to the Oswald assassination. It was, however, one of the things that the Warren Commission was reviewing, Oswald's connection with pro-Castro groups, and I just feel that this information was available to the Warren Commission; that so much of it came from other agencies that they probably had the same information from the Bureau and the CIA in connection with it. It may very well have been that some of the staff people in the Warren Commission came and reviewed these reports that we had since they had a referenced file number, knowing that we had information on these plots. But our records do not show that we transmitted these to the Warren Commission.

Mr. Ford. But you are saying that you reported to them a file number; is that correct?

Inspector Kelley. Yes.

Mr. Ford. Would there have been anything in the reports you provided to the Warren Commission which would have given them a clue as to what information the number might have referred to as a file number?

Inspector Kelley. Yes, I think the memorandum we sent to them, Memorandum 206 that we sent to them, would have supplied that information.

Mr. Ford. It would have?

Inspector Kelley. It would have.
Mr. FORD. The FPCC, Mr. Kelley, or the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, is mentioned in the reports, and a member of that organization is alleged to be a part of the plot to kill the President. Would there have been anything in the files and reports you provided the commission to indicate the presence of this group in that investigation?

Inspector Kelley. Not in the report, not in the particular two-page report we sent to them in connection with this case. That report dealt mostly with Machado.

Mr. FORD. The two-page report?

Inspector Kelley. I referred that we did send to the commission in this area.

Mr. FORD. And the Warren Commission had the two-page report?

Inspector Kelley. Yes.

Mr. FORD. Let me ask you this: Were you aware at the time that Lee Harvey Oswald had been a member of the same organization in the New Orleans area, the pro—anti-Castro—

Inspector Kelley. Subsequent to the assassination?

Mr. FORD. Yes.

Inspector Kelley. Yes, we learned of that subsequent to the assassination. We didn't have anything on Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination.

Mr. FORD. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.

Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Kelley, earlier today counsel for the committee Matthews asked you about the conduct of the Secret Service prior to the assassination. Relative to that, he asked you whether they had broken any rules or regulations of the Secret Service, and your answer was that they had not.

Knowing, however, of their conduct on the previous evening, was it ever evaluated in terms of performance?

Inspector Kelley. We would have preferred that they had stayed away from the places they were at. We would have preferred they had gone to bed earlier. But in the whole review of what had happened, there was no indication that that activity the night before had any effect on their performance the next day or that it had any effect on the assassination that happened.

Chairman Stokes. Well, have you ever had a chance to review the Zapruder film?

Inspector Kelley. The Zapruder film?

Yes, sir.

Chairman Stokes. And referring back to the question posed to you by Congressman Ford with reference to reaction time, did you study the film from the viewpoint of whether the reaction time of agents was in accordance with what you felt would be top performance?

Inspector Kelley. Yes, Mr. Chairman, and it was reviewed, we reviewed it very thoroughly with the agents who were involved. The motorcade was moving. You can recall in the Zapruder film the very great difficulty Clint Hill had in even reaching the car to assist Mrs. Kennedy, and the agents were just not able to get up to that car in time.
Chairman Stokes. When you review the film, you can clearly see the reaction that Governor Connally had, with reference to the first shot.

What reaction do you see in terms of the Secret Service agents?

Inspector Kelley. Well, in the film, of course, there is no apparent action that is being taken by Mr. Kellerman, who is in the front seat. The driver at that time apparently was unaware of anything that happened, apparently through the concentration of his responsibility of driving the car, and there is no apparent reaction on the part of the agents.

Chairman Stokes. But doesn't your investigation reveal that in the Vice Presidential car there is a reaction on the part of Agent Youngblood immediately?

Inspector Kelley. When the caravan in the motorcade begins to move out, there is, when it was apparent that the motorcade had been fired on, and it was apparent that the motorcade had been hit, and the motorcade begins to move out from the area is when there is the reaction.

Chairman Stokes. Well, the apparent real first reaction we see on the part of agents then is at the point where someone says "Let's get out of here."

Inspector Kelley. "Let's get out of here." That was Mr. Kellerman's instructions to the driver, "Let's get out."

Chairman Stokes. That is only after the third shot.

Inspector Kelley. Yes.

Chairman Stokes. What did your investigation reveal in terms of the activities of the agents the night before?

Inspector Kelley. The night before?

Chairman Stokes. Yes, sir.

Inspector Kelley. It is a long time ago. This was an after-hours club where they had apparently—where drinks could be served. It was also a place, the only place open at the time in the area where the agents could go and have something to eat, and they went to this place for that purpose.

Chairman Stokes. Do you recall what place you are talking about?

Inspector Kelley. I beg your pardon?

Chairman Stokes. Do you recall what place you are talking of?

Inspector Kelley. No, I don't recall it.

Chairman Stokes. How late were these agents about, that night?

Inspector Kelley. I am sorry, Mr. Congressman. I don't recall. It was late in the morning. It was after midnight.

Chairman Stokes. Can you tell us how late after midnight?

Inspector Kelley. No, I am sorry I can't. I don't recall the details of that investigation. It was done by another inspector. Although I reviewed it, my memory on it isn't that good now.

Chairman Stokes. Would the time 2 a.m. refresh your recollection?

Inspector Kelley. It was in that area, yes, sir.

Chairman Stokes. So that we understand, so far as you are concerned, with all that you know about their activities the previous evening, in terms of relating it to their performance the following day, you don't find that it in any way affected their performance?
Inspector Kelley. No, sir.

Chairman Stokes. Now one other question: I am not an expert in security, but it would seem to me that common sense would dictate that high buildings would afford an assassin a greater opportunity than a lower spot, if I were planning an assassination.

Can you tell me to what degree the Secret Service covered the high buildings in the area or made any kind of investigation as to whether or not this could afford someone the kind of opportunity that was afforded that day?

Inspector Kelley. At that time, in that time period?

Chairman Stokes. Yes, sir.

Inspector Kelley. The Secret Service had to depend upon the local authorities to assist them in this kind of a route survey. We have a parade route. There are hundreds of buildings and thousands of windows that a parade route goes down in a political situation as it was in Dallas. It is usual to go to the police and find out what buildings along the route are not occupied and then who occupied them.

If possible, the police put somebody at the particular buildings that perhaps are not occupied. Then they ask for the cooperation of the people who occupy the buildings to look out for strangers and to see that the people who are asked to get into the buildings are people that are known to them. That is about the extent of the route survey that could be conducted in those days.

A building like the Depository, the same thing would apply, that you would go to the manager and ask him to be concerned about strangers coming into the building. There would be no, for instance, review of every employee in the building to find out who he was.

Chairman Stokes. You don't place any agents in those buildings or anything of that sort?

Inspector Kelley. We do now, depending upon our resources, or police are asked to do it. But in those days there weren't that many people available.

Chairman Stokes. Do you do it now as a result of the fact that it occurred then?

Inspector Kelley. Well, we do it now because we have the resources to do it. The Congress has given us the resources to do it. We do it now whenever we can.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you. My time has expired.

The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Devine.

Mr. Devine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Inspector Kelley, you served how many years in the Secret Service before you retired?


Mr. Devine. You retired when?

Inspector Kelley. February 28 of this year.

Mr. Devine. You were a special agent in charge of the Philadelphia office and an inspector at the time of your resignation?

Inspector Kelley. No, sir, I was the Assistant Director for the Protective Forces at the time of my retirement.

Mr. Devine. But you were an inspector at the time of the assassination?

Inspector Kelley. Yes, sir.
Mr. DEVINE. One of the mandates of this select committee is, after having conducted the investigation hearing, to make recommendations to the Congress. You will recall that at the time of the assassination the offense apparently was against the peace and dignity of the State of Texas and not a matter necessarily of Federal jurisdiction.

Do you in your capacity as a long time Secret Service employee have any suggestions or recommendations as it relates to an offense of this nature?

Inspector KELLEY. Well, as you know, that deficiency has been taken care of by the Congress. It is now a Federal crime to assassinate the President, that is § 1751, title 18 U.S.C. Hopefully, it will never happen again, but if it does, the jurisdictional lines have been a lot better drawn now.

Mr. DEVINE. Yes. Well, again, at that time it was an offense against the laws of the State of Texas and the FBI intervened at the specific direction of the then President Lyndon Johnson?

Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. DEVINE. I guess the degree of cooperation then between your agency and the Bureau was satisfactory, was it not?

Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. DEVINE. And your primary responsibility was to protect the life of the President and the President's family?

Inspector KELLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. DEVINE. Who makes the decision prior to a motorcade on whether or not the motorcade route will be publicized? Is that by the Secret Service or——

Inspector KELLEY. Usually it is by the staff.

Mr. DEVINE. Whose staff?

Inspector KELLEY. The President's staff.

Mr. DEVINE. The Presidential staff?

Inspector KELLEY. Yes.

Mr. DEVINE. Does the Secret Service have the right of veto of that decision?

Inspector KELLEY. We have the right to suggest that perhaps it is not a good idea or that we have no problem with it. Usually in these areas where there is a political connotation to the motorcade the route will be published and usually has to be published.

As a matter of fact, there is activity to get a crowd out so it has to be published.

Mr. DEVINE. Apparently the Secret Service was not overly concerned in this instance, but had you received information that the President's life was in danger, did you have an absolute right of veto of publicizing a motorcade route or canceling a motorcade?

Inspector KELLEY. We have no legal right to veto them, but with the cooperation we have with the staff and the rapport that we had with the President's staff, if we had a serious consideration that the President's life was in danger, I feel sure we can persuade the President's staff to accept our recommendation.

Mr. DEVINE. You in response to a question from Congressman Ford said that on that date and at that time that the Secret Service was "shorthanded," that you did not have the resources available that were needed.
Now why was this, because of lack of funds, lack of personnel, or poor planning?

Inspector Kelley. Well, we like to think it was merely the lack of funds. The ability to do many of the things that we have now was not present at that time. We didn't have the numbers of people to do the proper route surveys. We didn't have the number of people to access and evaluate the kinds of information we should have been getting. There just was not enough people to do the job.

Mr. Devine. I think you said you felt it was probably due to lack of funds?

Inspector Kelley. Yes.

Mr. Devine. Of course, it is easy for this select committee and everyone else to second-guess a situation like this and I think we all recognize that it is just totally impossible and impractical to expect that any agency such as the Secret Service or any other can totally guarantee that they can protect the life of a President when he is exposed to large crowds in a downtown area; isn't that accurate?

Inspector Kelley. That is true, Mr. Devine. Yes, sir.

Mr. Devine. I have no further questions.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Preyer.

Mr. Preyer. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Fithian.

Mr. Fithian. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Inspector, I wanted to pursue additionally Mr. Devine's line of questioning.

Now, taking advantage of your 36 years of experience and the fact that the assassination of President Kennedy was not the last nor the most recent attempt on the life of a President, we have the example recently of President Ford and others. What can be done in your estimation, if you were writing the law, what can be done legislatively to improve the protection of the President of the United States?

Inspector Kelley. Legislatively, I am not too sure I have the answer to that, Mr. Fithian. We have been, of course, supported by the Congress ever since the 1963 incident. We have additional resources now. The requests for resources that we get are now being handled. Mr. Devine suggests, you know, another pile of money isn't going to do it.

In the kind of society we have and the kind of contact that our President and the other people that we protect have with the public, it is very difficult to isolate them from the public. And, of course, the contacts with the public is where the danger lies, as we saw with Mr. Ford. There are an awful lot of disturbed people on the streets that I don't think we can do very much about.

Mr. Fithian. Some have suggested that the requirement be put into the law that in motorcades such as this that you have to have a bubbletop vehicle or something of that nature. Others have said that the President speaking from a podium, the crowd of people that have not been prescreened or selected, that some kind of glass shield be a requirement.

Realizing that you cannot insulate and totally remove the danger, are there things that you would recommend if you didn't
have to satisfy anybody else and your job was to safeguard the
President of the United States and you wrote all the rules and
regulations for that? Do you have any recommendations to make to
this panel?

Inspector Kelley. Strictly on security grounds, of course, the
riding of the President or a dignitary in an open car down a parade
route is a very dangerous procedure. Walking along a fence at an
airport shaking hands with a campaign crowd is a dangerous proce-
dure. There may be someone in the crowd who thought he would
never get a chance to get that close to the President, but when he
finds he is that close, he does something to him.

The people who have assassinated Presidents of the United
States have a characteristic running through them. They are all
these loners, these people who have a grudge, with a mental histo-
ry. Oswald fit that category exactly. The closest thing we had to a
political assassination was, of course, the attack on Blair House,
but there, again, the people that attacked it had mental problems.

The isolation of the President in our society I just don't think is
feasible. If he is going to do a parade route for a political purpose,
he wants to be seen and, of course, this was the objection you get
by some of the protectees with the people standing around him, the
agents who surround him.

You get complaints about that that they come out to see the
President and all they can see is a group of agents standing
around, they never get to see the President, either in a standing
situation or in a motorcade.

The cars are equipped to give him that kind of protection, to
furnish him that shield between himself and the crowd, but fre-
cently we were not able to use them.

Mr. Fithian. It could be made a law, though, that that is the
only car. That is just the way you build the car, I suppose.

Inspector Kelley. Yes, that is the way we build the car.

Mr. Fithian. I mean, it could be made a law that the bubbletop,
the glass protection is required. Would you recommend that?

Inspector Kelley. On strictly security grounds I would recom-
mand it. I have very little faith that that could be or would be
provided to the President or that the President would accept it. Of
course, he would accept it if it was the law, but not that he would
want it.

Mr. Fithian. One other question: Do you have any recommenda-
tions to make as to ways to improve the coordination between the
law enforcement and security personnel, not only the Secret Serv-
cice and the FBI but the Secret Service and local police depart-
ments?

Do you have any recommendations in that area?

Inspector Kelley. The Warren Commission made some recom-
endations concerning the kinds of information that the Secret
Service should ask these organizations to furnish them. We, of
course, were and are in the business of protection. These people are
in the business of gathering intelligence. They made recommenda-
tions that we followed.

And I think the arrangements we have with the local and the
Federal agencies who are assisting us in this gathering of intelli-
gence are first rate. There is, of course, in the last number of years,
and I was—I had some experience with it in the last 2 years of my years with the Secret Service since I was in charge of the Protective Forces, and that is in the kind and the amount of intelligence that we are now getting from the intelligence-gathering agencies, the guidelines to the Bureau, for instance, concerning the kinds of activities they will engage in now in connection with radical groups has cut down tremendously the flow of information we have from the Bureau about groups.

There has been a very significant decline in the amount of information we receive since those guidelines. They are having problems with the Freedom of Information Act, they are having problems with the Privacy Act, as to just what kinds of information they can collect.

It has cut down considerably the amount of information available to the Secret Service for evaluation, it is our job, not their job, to evaluate this information and how it affects the safety of the President.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Kelley, I was riding in a Presidential limousine in Hartford, Conn. with President Ford when we were hit by a car. I am sure you read about it, everybody did.

A Hartford policeman just simply forgot to block off a street. If you look at this picture over here, you see the President's limousine wide open and the only protection on either side is a policeman on a motorcycle, the very same situation we encountered in Hartford.

Do you feel that the Secret Service should be given more men and more equipment and should they be doing the side running rather than the local police in a community?

Inspector Kelley. No, I don't think, Mr. McKinney, that would solve too many problems. I think the kinds of activities that the police engage in everyday are not the kinds of activities that the Secret Service engage in and that it is not necessary for us to have our own motorcycle people, our own crowd control people.

The uniformed presence, of course, in a crowd is a great deterrent. Trying to quantify what prevention does is, of course, very difficult. We don't know how many assassins we have discouraged by the fact that we have people around the President or whether if we didn't have any around him, whether it would make a difference.

So I think the resources we have been given when we requested them have been adequate for it.

Mr. McKinney. I would agree with you. I guess they are great at that. But when they are not standing in front of a green light, they are not too good. The bubbletop was not bulletproof, as I understand it, it was simply plexiglass.

Inspector Kelley. At that time, that is right.

Mr. McKinney. But there is a possibility that it could have deflected the bullet or a possibility that the smashing of the bubbletop by a bullet would have brought about a faster reaction.

Who made the decision whether or not that top was going to be on?
Inspector Kelley. I am not the best witness on that I think. I think Mr. Rowley will appear before you later and I think perhaps he is the best witness on that.

I have heard various interpretations of why. Of course, what you say is perfectly true, if we had a bubbletop there would have been some obfuscation of the assassin's view. It is a deterrent.

Mr. McKinney. The other question I would ask is: Even though the bubbletop was not on, I assume it had to be there in case it rained so it could be put on in speedy notice?

Inspector Kelley. Yes, it was in the back of the car.

Mr. McKinney. Since the bubbletop was not on, why was no one assigned to riding the back of that car? It seems that two men standing on the back of the car holding on to those hand grips would not have obstructed the view of the President from either side of the parade, but they certainly would have obstructed the assassin's clear line into the rear of the car.

Inspector Kelley. Well, the information I was given on that subject was the President didn't want them there.

Mr. McKinney. OK, that is all the questions I have.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Edgar.

Mr. Edgar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Kelley, I notice from some briefing materials that we have in our booklets that you were present during several interviews by Captain Will Fritz of Lee Harvey Oswald; is that correct?

Inspector Kelley. Yes, sir.

Mr. Edgar. Can you indicate for us why none of those interviews were taped?

Inspector Kelley. The Dallas police didn't have a tape recorder and I didn't have one with me, and apparently no one else had one. They didn't have a tape recorder for Captain Fritz anyway.

Mr. Edgar. Wouldn't it have been a logical thing in 1963 for—

Inspector Kelley. Yes.

Mr. Edgar [continuing]. For an investigative person like yourself from the Secret Service to demand or request or require a tape recorder be present when interrogating such a sensitive witness?

Inspector Kelley. Well, I didn't feel when I was allowed to come into the interrogation room that I had the right to insist on a recording of it. I was there as a guest of the Dallas Police Department and Captain Fritz was handling it.

On hindsight, I should have wired myself before I went in there. But it was just my own position that I did not think I should insist on a recording of it.

Mr. Edgar. You used the phrase "you didn't think you were allowed", or you were given permission to go in and listen in on the interview. Was there a breakdown in lines and chains of command that made you feel as though you didn't have full or equal opportunity with the captain of the Dallas Police Department to interrogate this witness?

Inspector Kelley. No, there was certainly no lack of cooperation between the Dallas Police Department and ourselves and Captain Fritz and me. As a matter of fact, when we first went in to do the interviews, I didn't know whether they had a recording or not. I
guess I just assumed they had, but I did find out later that the interview was not being recorded.

Mr. Edgar. In your conversation with Lee Harvey Oswald, what did he say to you?

Inspector Kelley. He indicated to me that he was a Communist but not a Marxist. The only other things he talked to me about, or I talked to him about, was the fact that he had been accused by the police department as being the assassin and we were concerned about whether he was or whether there was somebody else that assassinated President Kennedy and I would like to talk to him about it, and he indicated, I will talk to you later.

Mr. Edgar. Did he indicate to you at that time that you were the first Secret Service agent to talk with him?

Inspector Kelley. No; I don't recall that conversation with him.

Mr. Edgar. Had he encountered any other Secret Service agents prior to your conversation with him?

Inspector Kelley. No; he hadn't.

Mr. Edgar. In his alleged leaving of the Texas Book Depository, did he run into any agents at all?

Inspector Kelley. No; he did not. We didn't have any agents there.

Mr. Edgar. It also indicates in our briefing material that you were placed in charge of the protective detail around the Oswald family; is that correct?

Inspector Kelley. Well, I was not in charge of it. I formed it. I selected the people and supervised it.

Mr. Edgar. Did you ever have occasion to talk with Marina Oswald?

Inspector Kelley. Yes; I had several discussions with her.

Mr. Edgar. And that was through a Russian-speaking Secret Service interpreter?

Inspector Kelley. Yes; Agent Gopadze.

Mr. Edgar. What were your impressions of Marina Oswald in the few days and weeks after the assassination?

Inspector Kelley. My impression of her was that she was terribly frightened that something would happen to her, either that the U.S. Government was going to do something to her or that people would. She was frightened of being assaulted and attacked.

Mr. Edgar. Did she indicate to you who she was frightened of specifically?

Inspector Kelley. Well, the government, the U.S. Government would retaliate against her.

Mr. Edgar. Did she indicate whether that was the CIA, the FBI, the Secret Service, the Dallas Police Department?

Inspector Kelley. She didn't indicate specifically anybody. She did not get along with the FBI agents that had previously contacted her.

Mr. Edgar. I have a great many additional questions in that area, but because of the time, let me just ask one final question: When we were putting together the Select Committee on Assassinations after its rocky history, one of the first things that we did under our new chief counsel was put together an investigative plan for both the deaths of President Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King.
Was there at any time a sit-down discussion with the FBI, the Secret Service, and/or including the Dallas Police Department, of an investigative plan along the lines of, gentlemen and ladies, let's sit down and decide where we go from here in investigating each of the aspects of this tragic assassination?

Inspector Kelley. No; not to my knowledge, and I certainly did not participate in any such plan. I did have several discussions with Mr. Malley as to what we were doing and why we were doing it, the kinds of things we were interested in and the kinds of things that were coming to our attention, either from the streets in Dallas or from our field offices.

Mr. Edgar. As a non-policeman and a non-lawyer and someone who comes to this kind of experience in kind of a new way, it seems to me that that was an oversight on the part of the investigative agencies or that that was not a practice—

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired, but the Chair will let the witness answer.

You may proceed.

Inspector Kelley. The order had come down that the FBI would take full responsibility for the investigation of the assassination, so there was really no problem then concerning ourselves and the FBI.

The Dallas Police Department also understood that their role in the investigation of Kennedy's assassination had been taken over by the Bureau.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Edgar. Thank you.

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Sawyer.

Mr. Sawyer. Yes.

Did, at that time, the Secret Service have specific contingency plans, like the military does, on hypothetical things happening, a specific plan to be put into effect by the agents on the scene?

Inspector Kelley. Well, the specific plan, of course, in all the protective procedures was that if something untoward happened in a protective situation, the only plan was to get the protectee out of there, out of the dangerous situation.

Mr. Sawyer. Was there any specific plan of how to do that that was laid out in advance?

Inspector Kelley. Yes; the agents, of course, were to surround the President if he was in a vehicle. The vehicle was to be moved out directly regardless of convoys or motorcycle and to merely remove the President from the dangerous area.

Mr. Sawyer. Is it presently just as vague as that or do they lay out specifics? On a parade route, let's say, if things happen, where they go, what they do, and with how they get there?

Inspector Kelley. It is much more improved now and there are practice runs of what to do in a specific area of attack.

Mr. Sawyer. So that the agents know specifically if they are in a certain area of a parade route where they are going to go and how they get there?

Inspector Kelley. Exactly.

Mr. Sawyer. They didn't do that then?

Inspector Kelley. Well, it was not a practice to practice these situations in getting out of them. There was a lot less sophistica-
tion in those days as to how to handle an emergency than there is today. Mostly because of resources.

Mr. Sawyer. I presume, then, at that time that individual agents didn't know specifically what they, themselves, were supposed to do and where they were supposed to take a position or this kind of thing?

Inspector Kelley. Oh no. I think the positions in a parade and the positions of who will stand where when the car stops or what each agent will do when the car is moving is spelled out and was spelled out at that time.

Mr. Sawyer. I see. I don't mean that there was no arrangement made for this sort of thing, but it was a lot less sophisticated than it is today and the agents did not have the opportunity to practice in those situations that they have today.

Also, along the line of the questioning of Chairman Stokes, I, too, was impressed in watching the Zapruder film at how rapidly Governor Connally reacted to that first shot and all through the series of three shots there was no visible reaction by any of the agents that were in the pictures.

Do they receive any training in recognizing by sounds the sound of rifle shots or pistol shots?

Inspector Kelley. They do now. They receive formal training in it. In those days, the young agents that were on the detail, the trained agents that were on it, all had a great deal of physical attributes. There was no formal training in the recognition of shots before that.

Mr. Sawyer. There is now?

Inspector Kelley. Agents are always qualified with pistols. They were qualified with their firearms and the use of shoulder arms, but there was no specific training on the recognition of pistol shots or rifle shots.

Mr. Sawyer. What also surprised me about that reaction by Governor Connally and the nonreaction by the agents through that time frame of say 7 or 8 seconds is that the agents, I would think, would be alert for exactly that kind of thing, be concentrating on it much as a sprinter might concentrate on listening to the starting gun, whereas Governor Connally would have had other things on his mind.

And yet their reaction, for being there for that real purpose, is surprising, their total lack of reaction to it for such a long time frame.

Inspector Kelley. Mr. Congressman, you know, Governor Connally was hit with a bullet.

Mr. Sawyer. Not at that first shot. He turned to see where the shot came from and testified here and it is perfectly obvious in the picture that he recognized this rifle shot and spotted pretty much where it came from and he was hit by the next shot.

Well, anyway, aside from that, one other thing that impressed me when I was in Dallas and looking at this was the so-called grassy knoll location, that we were told no one had either checked out or even stationed as much as a Dallas policeman there.

If you are familiar with that situation, the fence runs along the top of the grassy knoll, a solid fence with trees overhanging, and
there is nothing behind it at all but a big, unoccupied gravel parking lot and railroad tracks and a perfect escape situation. Apparently, it was somewhat of a hangout for bums since there are wine bottles and everything else laying around back there.

I am just amazed that the Secret Service would not have been alert to that kind of a situation because you could have killed the President from there with a handgun.

Inspector Kelley. Well, along that parade route, from the airport there were a number of those same hazardous situations on a parade route of that length. There were, of course, some police in the area. There was nobody on the grassy knoll. There were some police in the area of Dealey Plaza as it went into the underpass.

Mr. Sawyer. Today would the Secret Service check out places like that and insist that there be some policeman behind that fence or somebody to cover that kind of a situation?

Inspector Kelley. Yes, we do a great deal more of that than we did before.

Mr. Sawyer. Thank you. I have no further questions.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Devine. Mr. Kelley, I just have one question: Do you feel that the Secret Service and/or the FBI failed in its pre-assassination investigation?

Inspector Kelley. No, Mr. Devine. When you look at the background of Lee Harvey Oswald, a number of government agencies had information on him. No one government agency had it all and the Secret Service had none.

However, if we had, if we knew the totality of his background and if we knew that he was working in the bookstore at that time, I feel that the Secret Service would have done something to insure that we knew what Lee Harvey Oswald was doing at the time of the parade. We would have seen that he was at work or we would have seen what he was doing in the bookstore if we knew the totality of it.

He turned out to be the kind, as I say, of the typical assassin, the typical assassin of Presidents, a loner, a man with a history of mental problems, a bitter man, a man who felt himself a failure.

In talking to Marina, he was a very disturbed man. To predict human behavior to that extent, I think was just an impossibility. We have a great many people in this country who have these same tendencies who never turn out to be assassins. I think the ability to predict that kind of human behavior is still beyond us.

Mr. Devine. So it gets right back, then, to the impossibility to totally protect any President isn’t that right?

Inspector Kelley. Yes.

Mr. Devine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Kelley, at the conclusion of a witness’ testimony before this committee the witness is entitled to 5 minutes in which he may comment upon or explain or in any way amplify or expand upon the testimony he has given before this committee.

On behalf of the committee, at this time I extend to you 5 minutes for that purpose if you so desire.
Inspector Kelley. Just a minute Mr. Chairman, to expand on some of the discussion we had with Mr. Edgar as to the kinds of information we are now getting or not getting from the intelligence agencies that are responsible for the gathering of intelligence.

We have found, or I have found just before I retired, a very serious declination in the number of reports we get from the Bureau and the kind of reports that we get from the Bureau that I think we should have. We got after the Warren Commission's recommendation up until 1974. We have had a great many of them and they are falling off predictably every month.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you very much, Mr. Kelley. We appreciate your appearance here. At this time you are excused.

Inspector Kelley. Thank you.

Chairman Stokes. The committee will recess for the noon hour and we will therefore have recess until 2 p.m. this afternoon.

[Whereupon, at 12:24 p.m. the committee recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m.]

**Afternoon Session**

Chairman Stokes. The committee will come to order.

The Chair recognizes Professor Blakey.

Mr. Blakey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The next witness to be called this afternoon will be former Secret Service Chief James J. Rowley. Chief Rowley was Director of the Secret Service from 1961 until his retirement in 1972.

As Director of the Secret Service in 1963 he exercised general supervision over President Kennedy's trip to Dallas.

Chief Rowley entered the Secret Service in 1938 as a special agent. He received a master's degree in law from St. John's University in Brooklyn, and in 1939 he was transferred to the Presidential Protective Division. He was named special agent in charge of the division in 1947, a post he held until he was appointed Director of the Secret Service in 1961.

Chief Rowley has served six Presidents during his career with the Secret Service—Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon. It would be appropriate at this time, Mr. Chairman, to call Chief Rowley.

Chairman Stokes. Would the witness please stand and raise your right hand and be sworn.

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you will give before this committee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Chief Rowley. I do.

**TESTIMONY OF JAMES J. ROWLEY**

Chairman Stokes. Thank you. You may be seated.

The Chair recognizes Counsel Leodis Matthews.

Mr. Matthews. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Rowley, in 1963 where were you at the time of the John F. Kennedy assassination?

Chief Rowley. I was at the Treasury law enforcement training school's graduation luncheon, a restaurant in Washington, D.C. I was summoned to the telephone and was informed by Mr. Behn, who was at that time agent in charge of the White House detail,
that the President was shot. I immediately notified Mr. Bob Wallace, who was Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, in attendance at the luncheon, of the nature of the telephone call, and both of us immediately proceeded to the East Wing of the White House, where Mr. Behn's office was located.

Mr. Matthews. What did you do in regards to assigning responsibility for the assassination to anyone in the Secret Service?

Chief Rowley. I spoke to Paul Paterni, the deputy chief, and asked him who was the nearest inspector to Dallas, Tex., having in mind that time was of the essence. He reported back that Inspector Kelley was just leaving Louisville, Ky. We were able to reach Inspector Kelley at the airport and told him to proceed immediately to Dallas.

Mr. Matthews. At the time you made that assignment to Inspector Kelley, did you give him any specific instructions of what he should do when he reached Dallas?

Chief Rowley. I did not speak to him, but I am quite sure that Deputy Chief Paterni did. Paterni told him to take charge of the investigation, which was also my thought at the time we decided to send him there.

Mr. Matthews. Soon after Inspector Kelly arrived in Dallas and began his investigation, you received a communiqué through the mail, an office report, indicating that there had been a Chicago investigation of some Cubans?

Chief Rowley. I did not get that.

Mr. Matthews. Mr. Rowley, let me just call your attention to JFK F-419, a document I believe that I have supplied you earlier.

Chief Rowley. Yes.

Mr. Matthews. Have you had occasion to read through that report?

Chief Rowley. Yes, sir.

Mr. Matthews. That report indicates that you received it shortly after the assassination. It was entitled, "Possible Involvement by Quentin Pino Machado in a Conspiracy to Assassinate JFK."

Did you review that report?

Chief Rowley. I do not think I reviewed that report. I did not see my initials on it, so therefore I have to assume I did not review it.

Mr. Matthews. I also call your attention to JFK F-422, a document which you also have in your possession, entitled, "Chicago Investigation of Cuban Groups Alleged To Be Involved in the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy."

Do you have any recollection of having received and reviewed that report?

Chief Rowley. I think my initials are on that report which would indicate that I did read it, but I have no immediate recollection.

Mr. Matthews. Did you receive any report about the agents' performance in Dallas?

Chief Rowley. We did receive reports from time to time on Dallas, but which specific report are you referring to?

Mr. Matthews. Well, did you receive a report indicating how the agents had performed at the time that the shooting episode occurred in Dealey Plaza?
Chief Rowley. The report indicated that they performed adequately under the circumstances. The action of Agent Clint Hill, that he was attempting to take some action, is indicative of the agent's response.

Mr. Matthews. Did you play any role in supervising the investigation itself?

Chief Rowley. No, sir.

Mr. Matthews. I want to call your attention to what has been marked as JFK F-423, "Secret Service Organizational Chart," off to your right. In your opinion, would the Service have been organized in substantially the same manner in November of 1963?

Chief Rowley. Yes.

Mr. Matthews. Would Mr. Kelley's position on the chart have indicated that he had authority in the field office to direct that the agents conduct whatever investigation he felt was necessary?

Chief Rowley. Yes, sir, he had that authority.

Mr. Matthews. Did you ever establish any other panel or reviewing board or authority for the Dallas investigation?

Chief Rowley. Offhand, I do not recall any review panel, unless you have in mind what I heard this morning, that Mr. Kelly conducted a meeting in which they discussed the intelligence aspect of the Service.

Mr. Matthews. Did that meeting occur in Washington?

Chief Rowley. I believe it did. It would have, been at the PRS office.

Mr. Matthews. What was the purpose of that meeting?

Chief Rowley. Mr. Kelley described it in this morning's hearing. I was not aware of it at the time. Today is the first time I became aware of the meeting.

Mr. Matthews. At the time of the assassination, had the Secret Service established any procedures for the handling of physical evidence?

Chief Rowley. I think basically they handled the physical evidence as they would any other evidence, particularly evidence in the criminal field.

Mr. Matthews. Mr. Kelley mentioned that there was some confusion as to what the scope of the Secret Service investigation was. What authority did the Secret Service have to participate in the investigation?

Chief Rowley. We were involved in the investigation in that we had the responsibility of protecting the President. The reason for my dispatching Mr. Kelley to Dallas was to supervise the investigation, to ascertain the facts as quickly as possible.

Mr. Matthews. The Chief of the intelligence branch of the Secret Service testified before this committee that he was removed from his position for what he interpreted as the failure of his mission. Were you responsible for his removal?

Chief Rowley. In the course of reorganizing the protective research division itself, and because of the infusions of additional agents into that division to handle and evaluate the many reports from the CIA and FBI that we were receiving at that time which required considerable supervision, we assigned an inspector to supervise the whole operation until the workload became less demanding.
Mr. Matthews. Did you make any effort to close off the Texas-Mexico border?

Chief Rowley. My first reaction was to ask the Immigration and Naturalization to close off the border between Texas and Mexico.

Mr. Matthews. And at the time you made that request, what thoughts did you have as to what should be done?

Chief Rowley. At that time, because of the proximity of the border to Dallas, I thought that there might be the possibility of someone escaping via that route.

Mr. Matthews. In your own mind, in discussions with the persons convened on your staff to discuss the Secret Service role in the assassination, were there any thoughts that perhaps a person of international character may have been involved in the assassination?

Chief Rowley. There were those thoughts, and that was one of the reasons why I asked Immigration and Naturalization to close the border.

Mr. Matthews. When the Warren Commission was established, you selected Mr. Kelley to be the liaison person?

Chief Rowley. Yes, sir.

Mr. Matthews. Why did you make that selection?

Chief Rowley. Why? Because it was a natural selection, inasmuch as he was in Dallas to conduct the investigation, and would be familiar with what might be required by the Warren Commission, and therefore would be of great assistance to them.

Mr. Matthews. As Chief of the Secret Service, did you ever make any attempts to meet with the person in charge of the FBI and formulate a strategy for investigation?

Chief Rowley. I did meet with Mr. Hoover and, we reaffirmed the longstanding cooperative relationship between our two agencies.

Mr. Matthews. Did you have any input on a strategy of investigation for the Warren Commission?

Chief Rowley. I think we did prepare something for the Warren Commission. Specifically I do not recall, but I have in the back of my mind such a report.

Mr. Matthews. Mr. Kelley has already testified to some exhibits I would like to identify for the record which you have a copy of: of JFK F-414, of JFK F-415, of JFK F-416, F-417, and F-418, a series of reports which his testimony has indicated involved the Secret Service investigation of the Cuban plot to assassinate the President.

Were you aware of those reports during the course of the Warren Commission investigation?

Chief Rowley. No, I have no recollection of them.

Mr. Matthews. Do you have any recollection of having reviewed those documents?

Chief Rowley. No, sir. You mean at that time, or recently?

Mr. Matthews. At the time that the documents were generated.

Chief Rowley. No.

Mr. Matthews. Did you work out any agreement as to which files would be supplied to the Warren Commission?

Chief Rowley. That was left up to Inspector Kelley, since he was the one most familiar with what documents. In fact, he was direct-
ed to comply with all the requests that were made by the Commission to the Secret Service for reports.

Mr. Matthews. Were there any restraints on his authority to produce reports?

Chief Rowley. There was no restraint on his authority.

Mr. Matthews. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would move for the admission of JFK exhibits F-419 through F-422, and request the chairman's approval to make a subsequent submission.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection they may be entered into the record at this point.

[The information follows:]
SECRET SERVICE REPORT REGARDING QUINTIN PINO MACHADO’S POSSIBLE INVOLVEMENT IN CONSPIRACY TO ASSASSINATE JFK

YIELD: Miami, Florida

PERIOD COVERED: 11-27/29-63

INVESTIGATION MADE BY: St. Ernest L. Aragon

INFORMATION has been received from 3-11-63 indicating that if the assassination of President Kennedy involved an international plot or conspiracy and if it was established that Fidel Castro had anything to do with the plot or conspiracy, that the party responsible for carrying out any action on the part of Fidel Castro undoubtedly was Quintin Pino Machado, a Cuban terrorist used by Castro to carry out any Castro action.

(1) INTRODUCTION:

On November 27, 1963, 3-11-63 was interviewed on another matter and during this interview he furnished information which he believed pertinent in connection with the assassination of President Kennedy.

(2) GENERAL BUSINESS:

During interview of 3-11-63 on November 27, 1963, he stated that if an international conspiracy or plot, or if Castro’s intervention or the assassination of President Kennedy is in fact established, that Quintin Pino Machado probably has been the intellectual instigator of the conspiracy or plot. Source related that Quintin Pino Machado belonged to the communist party but was better known as belonging to Castro.

3-11-63 added that Quintin Pino Machado was a former Cuban delegate to the U.N. and subsequently the Cuban ambassador to Nicaragua. He stated that Machado is well known as a terrorist who also trained other youth in the manufacturing or planting of bombs and explosives and was the chief coordinator of sabotage for Castro against Guantana.
Source further related that Quintin Pino Lachado worked in a clandestine manner for Castro throughout South America and is the person responsible for Castro action in North and Central America, as well as in the Caribbean area.

3-ll-63 also stated that while Quintin Pino Lachado was Cuban ambassador to Nicaragua, he allegedly sponsored a baseball team called "Cuba" and would take the members of the baseball team to an outlying area allegedly to practice the game, but instead taught them how to manufacture bombs and explosives.

3-ll-63 further advised that either in June or July 1963 Quintin Pino Lachado was known to have participated in a conference with Cherry Jarrett in Trinidad, South America and subsequently Quintin Pino Lachado also allegedly continued operating out of Mexico City and may have been there prior to or up until the assassination of President Kennedy. The source said that they were employing all of their resources in trying to discreetly determine whether or not Quintin Pino Lachado was in fact in Mexico City prior to the President's assassination. They advised that they have dispatched a delegation to Mexico City to work in unison with their delegation in that city in an effort to determine whether Quintin Pino Lachado was in any way involved or whether the conspiracy may have been originated through Fidel Castro.

The above information was discussed with J. J. Marshall on November 27, 1963 and on November 29, 1963 it was telephonically furnished to S. E. Miles at Dallas, Texas.

With respect to Quintin Pino Lachado, reference is made to the file involving a Cuban plot to assassinate the President under file 3G-2-52,682, specifically the 20th of report submitted to the reporting agent dated December 14, 1962 wherein Quintin Pino Lachado is prominently mentioned. Further reference is made to Paragraph 7, p. 30 of the referenced report wherein is indicated that "The source cautions that Quintin Pino Lachado should be considered a dangerous person."

On November 29, 1963, 3-ll-63 again contacted this office and revealed that while Quintin Pino Lachado was in a drunkard condition in Las Villas Province, Cuba (exact date not recalled) Jacobo Arbenz stated that he had almost succeeded in assassinating Dr. Enrico Huertas at Miami, Fla. (This office has no information regarding the latter assassination attempt on Dr. Enrico Huertas). It is noted, however, that Dr. Enrico Huertas was among the invited guests to participate at the dinner in honor of President John F. Kennedy held at the Americana Hotel on November 22, 1963 under the auspices of the Inter-American Press Association.
Transcript of conversation involving alleged threat against the President furnished by 3-11-17 copies of which are being furnished the appropriate offices for discreet background checks and photographs of the individuals involved to be obtained through the respective FBI offices. This matter has been classified as “Confidential” by SAIC Bouck.

## DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION

On 11-12-63 informant 3-11-17 furnished this service with a typewritten transcript of recorded conversation between a trusted confidential informant of 3-11-17 and one J.A. Milteer, 212 S. Troops St., Valdosta, Ga., telephone Cherry 4-1357, with a Post Office Box located at Quitman, Ga. where this individual had run for a political office. This conversation took place on the morning of 11-9-63.

The contents of this transcribed conversation was telephonically furnished to SAIC Bouck, Chief’s Office, Washington, D.C. by SA Jamison on 11-12-63. Copies of same attached to the original of this report as well as to the copies of this report being sent to the appropriate offices listed under "Distribution".

SA Jamison conferred personally with SA Leonard Paterson, FBI, Miami, Fla. and Sgt. C.H.Sapp, Commanding Officer, Intelligence, Miami Police Dept., Miami, Fla. re any knowledge of the individuals mentioned in the transcript of the conversation involved and the following information was obtained:

J.A. Milteer, white, male, 45 to 52; 5'7"; 155 lbs; brown graying hair; last seen driving a white Volkswagen sedan, state and tag number unknown;
reported to have departed the Miami, Fla. area 11-2-63 for Jacksonville for the purpose of having an attorney by the name of Lee (774) draw up a charter for the proposed Constitutional Party of America in the State of Florida and then return to his home in Valdosta, Ga.

Hilber is alleged to carry a loaded .45 calibre automatic in his V6. The FBI office, Atlanta, is alleged to have background information on this individual and possibly photographs. If same are not available through the Atlanta FBI office, photographs will probably be available through the local newspapers in either Valdosta or Tallahassee, Ga. as he was a candidate for a political office in that area.

"Brown". This is one Jack Brown, who is reported to be the Imperial Wizard of the Dixie Klan, Chattanooga, Tenn. He is described as white; male; about 50 to 55; 5'7"; very slim build; reddish complexion; sandy hair; does not wear glasses; is reported to operate an older model car which is kept in very good condition and is thought to be either a Ford or a Chevrolet. He is considered as one of the prime suspects in the bombings in that area and the FBI office, Knoxville, Tenn. is alleged to have background information and photographs.

Jackie Brown is reported to be the son of Jack Brown and resides with him in Chattanooga, Tenn.

The Jack Celulik (phonetic) is also thought to be this same Jackie son of Jack Brown. Kenneth Adams is a white male; from Anniston, Ala., very active in Klan activities and possibly involved in the bombings several years previously. The FBI office at Birmingham, Ala. should have information and photographs of this individual.

There is another "Kenneth" possibly associated with this group, one Kenneth Cof, who is a radical and lives in the Denver area. Information and photographs of this individual are alleged to be available through the FBI office in Denver.

Lee H.C. Cloud or H.C. Lee is from Atlanta, Ga. and believed to be active in the White Citizens Council there. The FBI office, Atlanta, should have information and photographs of this individual.

Conner McCloud is reported to be the publisher of a pamphlet in Union, N.J. called "Common Sense". No other information is known concerning this individual.

"Un" is one James Heathcote, white, male, in his 60's; quite wealthy; resides at 535 N.W. 12th Court, Miami, Fla. He owns quite a bit of real estate and has an office at 425 N.W. 34th Ave., Miami, Fla. At one time he was quite active in the Florida States Rights Party which is no longer in existence.
SA Peterson and Sgt. Sapp stated that it would not be advisable to contact this individual as he would damage the source of the information.

"Andrews" is Robert Andrews, operator of Andrews Optical Shop, 7501 N.E. Second Ave., Miami, Fla., who is sympathetic with right wing people but is not actively engaged with them or willing to be identified with them.

In connection with the proposed visit of the President to Miami Beach, Fla., on November 18, 1963, the information contained in this report and that of the transcribed conversation has been furnished the advance agents making the survey on this proposed visit. SAIC Bouck requested that the appropriate offices in whose districts previously mentioned individuals reside make discreet inquiries concerning these individuals on the FBI level and only of trusted enforcement agencies known to have no sympathetic feelings or alignments with organizations such as Ku Klux Klan or other radical right wing organizations.

SAIC Bouck also requested that photographs be obtained of these individuals and furnished his office immediately as well as the Miami office for use of the men on the advance protective survey being conducted in connection with the visit of the President to this area.

This report is being submitted for informational purposes and as the individuals involved are currently in other districts, the case is being statisfically closed at Miami. Any additional information obtained through local contacts will be the subject of a supplemental report.

In addition, copies of transcript to Chief's office and all interested offices. Attached are copies of type literature furnished informant for distribution by J.A. Hilberry.
Information obtained at the Dallas Office

During the interview of the subject's wife she advised that the FBI had contacted her about the location of her husband about 10 days prior to the assassination and she had told them that her husband worked in the building from which the President was killed. She also stated that she had been interviewed in October and gave the same basic information to the FBI.

While I was at the police station, I engaged an FBI agent in a conversation and found out that he was on the subversive desk. He stated that Oswald had contacted two known subversive agents about 15 days before the shooting but the entire information was top secret and he could not tell us any more but he felt sure that the file would be turned over to our Chief.

The wife also advised that she had seen the rifle that was used in the shooting at her home about three weeks before the shooting.

She advised that she was a Castro supporter and from the interview it was felt that she is still a hard core communist.

She stated that he had never mentioned killing the President but would not mention anything about shooting Connally.

She stated that she did not know the man that killed her husband.

It was felt by the interviewer that she was not telling the truth and still believed in communism.

William M. Patterson
Special Agent
Confidential

003659

Report of the U.S. Secret Service on the Assassination of President Kennedy

U.S. TREASURY DEPARTMENT
Washington, D.C.
Charge of the District in which the visit is scheduled. He coordinates all local activities and works out a minute by minute schedule for the President's visit. He coordinates, through the Special Agent in charge of the proposed trip, all arrangements with the White House staff, with field offices of the Secret Service, with political party officials and others directly concerned with the President's visit. He also goes to the destination of the proposed visit and personally takes charge of coordination with local law enforcement agencies and other local officials.

On November 4, 1963, the Secret Service White House Detail was informed that the President planned to make a trip to Dallas on November 22, 1963. Assistant Special Agent in Charge (ASAIC) Roy H. Kellerman was designated to be in charge of the Texas trip and Special Agent (SA) Winston C. Lawson was assigned as advance agent in charge of preparations for the proposed Dallas visit. Final confirmation of the visit plans was received on November 8, 1963. (See Exhibit 1 - Tentative Itinerary for President's Visit on November 21-22).

A. Identification of Individuals Believed Dangerous to the President

The Secret Service has established procedures which are designed to identify in advance individuals in the area who might
constitute a threat to the person of the President. These procedures are initiated as soon as possible after definite notification of a trip is received. They may be divided into two categories: (1) the activities of the Protective Research Section of the Service, and (2) activities on the scene of the visit under the direction of the advance agent in charge of preparations and the Special Agent in Charge of the District.

(1) Protective Research Investigation

On November 6, the Protective Research Section of the Secret Service, was informed by SA Lawson of the forthcoming visit of the President to Texas on November 21-23 and requested to make a suitable check to see if there were any identified individuals in the Dallas area known to the Service to have either threatened the person of the President or been brought to the attention of the Service as persons dangerous to the President. A search was then made of the files to see if any such individuals were known to be located in the areas where the President was to visit (Exhibit 2). The files of this Section contain information on persons who over the years have come to the attention of the Section as potentially dangerous to the President. The basic criterion for including an individual in
the PRS file is information which indicates the individual may constitute a threat to the person of the President. The files include among others, individuals afflicted with mental illness manifesting itself in behavior hostile to the President, those who have made overt threats, and those who belong to organized groups which have specifically advocated assassination of U.S. public officials.

The number of names in the PRS files presently approximates 1,000,000, an unknown number of which are dead or inactive. A principal source of names is those who have written letters, sent packages, or made telephone calls to the White House which are thought to be threatening, or who have appeared in the vicinity of the White House making threats or conducting themselves in a way to arouse suspicion of hostile intentions. Other names are submitted to the Secret Service through established liaison procedures by the F.B.I., the C.I.A., and state and local police departments.

From the basic PRS files, certain names of seriously dangerous individuals are selected and also maintained in a trip file. This file contains approximately 100 high risk individuals. It is constantly changing as new names or new information is received.

CONFIDENTIAL
THOMAS MOSLEY - HOMER ECHEVARRIA INVESTIGATION
Secret Service materials

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO: Chief - Attn. Deputy Chief Paterni

FROM: ASAEC Martinez, Chicago

DATE: December 9, 1963

subject: Homer S. Echevarria

This will confirm my long distance phone call to Deputy Chief
Paul J. Paterni in which the aspects of this case were discussed and
in which it was agreed that the nature of this investigation should
be discussed with other federal agencies to insure that they do not
have a prior case involving these subjects which would be jeopardized
by continued investigation by this Service.

Maurice G. Martinez
Acting Special Agent in Charge
Informant 2-1-226 has advised that one Thomas Mooney has been in touch with a group of Chicago Cubans who may be involved in the assassination of the late President John F. Kennedy. Also, that this Cuban group is endeavoring to purchase through Mooney a variety of automatic weapons and explosives.

Reference is made to the office memorandum to the Chief from Acting U.S. Attorney G. M. Johnson, Chicago, dated November 25, 1963, which memorandum, containing a long distance telephone call from Deputy Chief Paul J. Paterni, Washington, D. C., verified that this matter had been discussed with Deputy Chief Paterni, who had directed that information related to the assassination of the late President Kennedy, and that this information also could involve the protection of President Lyndon B. Johnson, that all information developed by the U. S. Secret Service should be made available to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and that a joint investigation should be conducted with an exchange of reports and a free flow of information.

For the information of all officers concerned, 2-1-226 advised on November 26, 1963, that he had heard that one Mr. Mooney, allegedly had been attempting to negotiate a sale of machine guns to the late Mrs. Schawerda, and that Schawerda allegedly made a comment the day before the assassination of President John F. Kennedy that "we now have plenty of money — our new bankers are Jews — as soon as 'we' (or 'they') take care of Kennedy...."
The file showed that upon entry to the United States, Echevarria had indicated that he was going to work for the H.H. Simpson Building Company at Dallas, Texas, and that he intended to live at 1033 Dallas Drive, in Dallas.

The file also reflected that Echevarria had been living with his friend, Mr. T. Sezari, No. 109 Casa Del Mar, La Villa, Cita, and that the Echevarria file's maiden name is Lartina Del Rio Jesus Cortinillos. According to the file, Echevarria and his wife,Myra Echevarria (Callas), were listed as father, mother, and mother, Carlos Valencia. The file also revealed that Echevarria had been born to the Minister of Police in Havana.

The file showed that Echevarria had moved from Miami to Dallas, Texas, from Dallas to 1235 Wildwood Drive, Apartment 3, Jackson, Michigan; and then to 130 East Chicago Road, Jonesville, Michigan. While in Jonesville, he allegedly worked for the Win. A. Wagner Company. He then lived at 1004 Quintard Avenue, Anniston, Alabama. On July 23, 1961, he allegedly was living at 2052 West Pershing Street, Chicago, Illinois. He then lived at 1138 North Williams Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. A confidential source advised that Echevarria now resides at 1602 North Albion Avenue, Chicago, Illinois.

Investigation has established that Echevarria's telephone, No. 278-2922, was installed on September 26, 1961. His teletype has been made from that phone.

On November 27, 1961, Special Agent Noonan and Fabian proceeded to the Chicago office of the FBI and conferred with FBI Agent V.E. Rogers. A copy of the photograph of Echevarria, appearing in the file of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, was given to Agent Rogers. During this interview, Agent Rogers advised that he knew Wally Echevarria prior to this date, and was the very person he had been introduced to when Echevarria's last meeting took place at a grocery store located at 1031 East North Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. Agent Rogers advised that this grocery store was owned by Fabian and was a favorite meeting place for those people. He stated that he meeting with Wally Echevarria was by chance, and that he was introduced as an agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Agent Rogers believed that since he had met Wally Echevarria that morning, he, Rogers, should probably stay in the background of the investigation.

Special Agent Rogers stated that from the information provided by an interview with A.E. on the previous night, it was his belief that the organization to which Echevarria belonged was similar to the Mauro organization. He also advised that this group was primarily interested, at least in the Chicago area, in obtaining money and disseminating propaganda of an anti-Italian nature. From his conversation it appeared that the Bureau had reliable information.
Near the intersection of Milwaukee Avenue and Logan Square, Chicago, Illinois, the dictator told Osvald that he would have to be careful in the near future. A few days later, the dictator entered the car. This party dominated the conversation from this point.

This unknown Cuban first asked Osvald if he could provide, to which Osvald replied, "Yes, a machine gun, World War II, 30 caliber, machine pistol, 9 mm., which would sell for 1,800 dollars, and seven 55 caliber ammunition. The cost of these items was 2,800 dollars, and 10 per round of ammunition.

The Cuban then asked Osvald for materials for sabotage, and Osvald told him to write down what he wanted and he would attempt to obtain it. This individual made the following list of items which he was interested:

- Peroxide
- Detonators of all types
- 100 30 caliber machine guns, World War II, 9 mm., machine pistol, 9 mm., which would sell for 1,800 dollars, and seven 55 caliber ammunition.
- N-3 (It is not known what this Cuban meant by this designation)
- 36 (Explosive Automatic Rifles)
- 37mm (This might possibly refer to the Carabine or the
- 37mm machine gun)

Osvald obtained this list from Osvald's person and it was turned over to the Police, to be processed for whatever fingerprint might be obtained thereof.

The unknown Cuban then told Osvald that he was going to ask him two questions, the answers to which would determine whether or not his organization would do business with him. The first question was, "How do you feel about the assassination of President Kennedy?" to which Osvald shrugged his shoulders and said, "This is no skin off my back either way." The second question was, "Who do you know from Cuba and how can we check up on you?" to which Osvald replied that he knew Michael Ponce (phonetic) and that he had been arrested by the Chicago Police Department for this very same activity in which he was now engaged, and that to verify this all that had to date was to check the records of the Chicago Police Department. The Cuban replied that he knew Michael Ponce and that the organization to which he belonged would check the records of the Chicago Police Department.

Osvald stated that Michael Ponce had formerly been a regular Naval officer in the Cuban Navy under the Dictator Fulgencio Batista, and that he knew that Osvald had been involved in gun-running activities with Ponce in the late 1950's.
2-1-265 stated that the meeting produced the following results. Mosley informed Schaverria and the unnamed Cuban that he was a member of a group of six persons, and that they had one "contact." Two of the members of the group owned a small screw machine factory. (It should be noted at this point that assembly weapons can readily be obtained as securities if the barrels have been plugged, and that it is the practice of gun-runners to obtain these plugged weapons, take them to an unscrupulous screw machine operator, and have the barrels reamed out, since the plugging is usually lead.)

Mosley informed the two Cubans that since the assassination of President Kennedy a great deal of "care" has been exercised, and that his people were willing to provide the guns to the Cubans for a nominal down payment if the group could provide them with a responsible party in the Chicago area who would vouch that the remainder of the money would be paid to them after the deal had been consummated. Mosley informed the Cuban that his group was saving six guns, and should they be double-crossed they intended to take retribution.

The unnamed Cuban stated that this deal sounded acceptable to him, and that if Mosley checked out at the police department their organization would get in touch with him through an attorney. This attorney would provide Mosley with a list of equipment which they desired, and all dealing from this point on, between Mosley and the organization, would be handled through the attorney. The unnamed Cuban also stated that the list of equipment would be written in a code which would be taught to Mosley by Schaverria.

Mosley was asked how he could be contacted. He stated that in the past it had been his practice to enter an ad in the personal column of a local newspaper, using the code name, "Black Foot." It was agreed that should this group at any time in the future wish to contact Mosley they would run an ad in the personal column of the Chicago Tribune, which would read, "Black Foot call (a telephone number would be entered) after (a time would be entered)."

The unnamed Cuban stated that the telephone number would be a key phone, the number to call at 7:00 P.M. the same day the ad was run, and that he would be on a list of his organization for one-half hour before and one-half hour after the time stated in the ad.

The unnamed Cuban stated that it was the understanding that at least some of the backers of this group are Russian elements, and that the backers are not resident in Chicago.

2-1-265 stated that the unnamed Cuban allegedly is a member of the Student Federation of Revolutionaries.

On November 29, 1963, Special Agent Harte was contacted by Swedish Agent Ylva Röger, FBI, and Agent Perera was briefed on the information received from 2-1-265 on the previous day. Agent Perera visited the
Student Federation of Revolutionary may very possibly be the Student Revolutionary Directorate, and that the unnamed Cuban fit the description of the "Revolutionary Black," a representative of this group who he met at the grocery store located at 2351 West North Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, shortly after his introduction to Romar Schaeffer on November 27, 1967.

It was learned from Agent Rogers that the Harper attempts to join the Student Revolutionary Directorate in New Orleans; that while Colwell was under consideration by this group, he was observed by members of the group distributing literature for the Fair Play for Cuba Committee; that, in addition to this, Colwell had taken part in a debate of the Cuban problem against members of the Student Revolutionary Directorate.

Agent Rogers stated, in regard to an attorney who might be working with the Student Revolutionary Directorate, that one-floorer across an attorney in the Chicago area, who became interested in the anti-Castro movement, could possibly be the contact for Tom Hesley. Agent Rogers stated that Sierra has claimed to have a great deal of financial backing and has attempted to organize the great number of anti-Castro movements in this country. There are allegations that the financial backing of Sierra is from the money he made by selling American businesses.

Through a confidential source the name of anyone asking inquiries at the Chicago Police Department regarding Thomas Hesley will immediately be made available to this service. It should be noted that this source is extremely reliable and fully aware of the importance of secrecy in this investigation.

SUSPECTS

HARVEY S. SCHAEFFER, 360 S. Dramatic Taboria Schaeffer - White; male; Cuban; 32 years; born at Sanitario, Camaguy, Cuba; 5'9"; 150 pounds; black hair; mustache; light complexion; a bus driver for the Chicago Transit Authority; resides at 2351 North Albany Avenue, Chicago, Illinois; drives a 1957 red Chevrolet, 1955 Illinois License 13560.

THOMAS NESSEY, 3 Ton - White; male; American; 50 years; 6 feet; 150 pounds; black hair; mustache; usually wears a bow tie; a bus driver for the Chicago Transit Authority; resides at 2350 North Albany Avenue, Chicago, Illinois; drives a 1950 black Thunderbird, 1953 Illinois License 13560.

ERNESTO CARRIL - White; male; about 30 to 32 years of age; approximately 5'7"; dark complexion; black hair.
It is anticipated that an undercover special agent will be introduced by informant 2-L-256 to Tom Kesley, and that this agent will be present at whatever meetings may take place in the future between Kesley and the Cuban group.

Copies of this report are being sent to the Miami office for a check of Immigration files, as that was Homer Beharrilla’s port of entry.

Additional copies are being sent to Dallas, Detroit, Grand Rapids, and Birmingham with the request that investigation be made at Beharrilla’s place of residence and employment, as stated above, in the districts of said offices, and that background information on the suspect be obtained.

Copies of this report are also being forwarded to the Springfield office with the request that they make an investigation at the Bureau of Motor Vehicles regarding Beharrilla’s car. If at all possible, the entire history of this car should be obtained.

Investigation is continued in Chicago for further contacts with 2-L-256 relative to additional meetings between the several suspects.

DISTRIBUTION:

Chief  
City & L co.

Miami  2 col’s
Dallas  2 col’s
Detroit  2 col’s
Grand Rapids  2 col’s
Springfield  2 col’s
N.Y., Chicago  1 col
Chicago  2 col’s
**SYNOPSIS**

The Investigation & Naturalization Service, Miami, Fla., discloses the file of Renee Emanuel Velutiva-Echevarria is not in their local office. They stated their Central Office, Washington, D.C. could advise the location of this file. The Francisco Blanco in subject case is someone other than the Francisco Blanco mentioned in CC-30,156. The Francisco Blanco of interest in this investigation has been tentatively identified as Juan Francisco Blanco-Torres, a sector of the Student Revolutionary Directorate at Miami, Fla.

1) **INTRODUCTION:**

Reference is made to miscellaneous reports dated December 3, 1963 by SA Edward L. O'Brien, Chicago, requesting further investigation of this case in the Miami area concerning Renee Emanuel Velutiva-Echevarria and Francisco Blanco.

2) **FURTHER INVESTIGATION:**

On 12-10-63 inquiry was made of 3-11-64 relative to Valutiva-Echevarria and he is still of record.

On the same date, records of the DHS, Miami, Fla. failed to disclose that the file of Valutiva-Echevarria was in this district. SA Charles Challese, DHS, advised that Valutiva-Echevarria may have been a transient through Miami and his file would have been forwarded to the office where he was to establish residence.

Challese stated that if this particular file was not in Chicago that their Central Office in Washington D.C. would be able to advise the exact location of the file.

---

**CONTENTS**

- Report Made By: [Signature]
- Date: 12-10-63
- Special Agent or Charge: [Signature]
- Date: 6-26-66

(Continue on plain paper)
On 12-11-63 the reporting agent discreetly interviewed Francisco Blanco mentioned in CO-2-31,030. He is currently residing at 2711 S.W. 35th St., Miami, Fla. Francisco Blanco is described as w/2 Puerto Rican; 5' 5 1/2''; brown eyes; silver gray hair; dark complexion; Institute and has resided in Miami since 1927. As will be observed, the Francisco Blanco described above is someone other than the Francisco Blanco of interest in this investigation.

On 12-12-63 through a confidential source inquiry was made of the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (D.R.E.) (Student Revolutionary Directorate) at Miami, Fla., and it was determined that this organization has a member known as Juan Francisco Blanco-Fernandez.

Later on this same date the confidential source made personal contact with Juan Francisco Blanco-Fernandez and, through a discreet conversation with him, learned that he had been in Chicago approximately two weeks ago. Fernandez alleged is the head of the military phase of the Student Revolutionary Directorate at Miami, Fla.

On 11-13-63 the D.R.E. file of Juan Francisco Blanco-Fernandez under his No. A12503420 was reviewed and it disclosed that Fernandez entered at Miami, Fla. on 10-13-61 through Cuban Passport No. 45764 valid until 10-13-61. He was described as w/2; Cuban; 330 5/14/49 at Finar del Rio, Cuba; 5'-7; blue eyes; black straight hair; on one side. At the time of his entry, he was detained for violation of the immigration law. He was subsequently given an indefinite parole. His FBI number is 126357. The file further discloses that Juan Francisco Blanco-Fernandez, along with seventeen other members of the D.R.E., participated in a raid at the Million Dollar section of Havana, Cuba, on 8-25-62.

On 11-13-62 Fernandez enlisted into the U.S. Army and he was assigned to CO-3090342, 602 230th En, lst Inf. Bgts, Ft. Jackson, S.Cal. The inclusive dates of his active service in the U.S. Army are not known, nor is the exact date of his discharge. Since his discharge from the U.S. Army, he has been residing in Miami, Fla. except for his recent trip to Chicago and he is currently the head of the military section of the D.R.E.

Photograph of Fernandez was extracted from the D.R.E. file and exhibited to the confidential source and he identified him as the subject in question. This photograph has been reproduced and copies are attached hereto for use in the Chicago office.

1) CONCLUSION:

Copies of this report are being forwarded to the Washington F.O. in order of inquiry may be made at the Central Office of D.R.E. in an effort to determine where the D.R.E. file of Horacio Samuel Valdivia-Echevarria, D.R.E. number A12503420 is located there. For the information of the Washington F.O., Echevarria is also known as Horacio S. Echevarria and is described as w/2; Cuban; born at Jativaico, Caracas, Cuba; 5-3; 160; black hair; mustache; olive complexion. His FBI number A12503420.
Photographs of Juan Francisco Blanco-Fernandez are attached for Chicago and unless otherwise directed this investigation is closed in Miami.

ATTACHMENTS

Chicago: Photograph of Blanco-Fernandez.

Note: Inasmuch as Blanco-Fernandez is the director of the military branch of the D.R.E. in Miami, his mission to Chicago may have been for the purpose of securing military equipment from Thomas Hosely. If the Chicago office desires a direct interview with Blanco-Fernandez, please advise.
Informant 2-1-266 advised of meetings between Thomas Mosley and Homer S. Chevarria; and also between Mosley and the X "Mano" [last name unknown], who allegedly is a leader of all Cuban groups in Chicago. "Mano" has expressed an interest in obtaining automatic weapons, detonators, and explosives. He further stated that purchase of these items would be on a cash basis and that no credit was desired. 2-1-266 further stated that Mosley had been told that there was going to be an action taken by the Cuban group in 90 days, for which action the Cubans need of explosives. An investigation has established that there is no apparent violation over which the United States Secret Service has jurisdiction, other Federal agencies which may be concerned are being provided with copies of this report and investigation by the U. S. Secret Service is being terminated.

**INTRODUCTION**

Reference is made to the report of Special Agents Edward E. Tucker and Joseph E. Hosman, Jr., dated December 3, 1963.

**GENERAL INQUIRIES**

On November 30, 1963, confidential informant 2-1-266 advised that Thomas Mosley and Homer S. Chevarria were planning a meeting to be held on December 1, 1963 at the Chicago Transit Authority station, 4221 West Augusta Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. This meeting was to take place between...
2:00 and 5:00 p.m., and allegedly was to be held because Escobarria had indicated that there was going to "...be a hit in 90 days..." and Escobarria's group was interested in obtaining explosives. The significance of the above statement is not known as of this writing.

On this same date, another check of the Chicago Police Department files of suspect Thomas Mosley revealed a record for Mosley under the alias, Art Mickleton, and reflected that in April 1959 Mosley, alias Mickleton, had been arrested for illegal possession of fictitious license plates and that when his car was searched some machine guns were found and Mosley had been summed over to the Alcoholic and Tobacco Tax Division of the Internal Revenue Service.

On this same date, Special Agent Walter Rogers of the Federal Bureau of Investigation was apprised of the possible meeting between Mosley and Escobarria on December 1, 1961. Special Agent Rogers was also advised of the possible negotiation for the sale of explosives, and he indicated that to the best of his memory one Martin Merza, a member of the Directory "Campanista Revolucionario," had come North from Miami about eight or nine months ago and had been in Chicago. Merza had expressed an interest in obtaining detonators and had been "...up in Michigan..." trying to buy detonators. Special Agent Rogers was told that this Service would keep his agency informed of any developments. Rogers stated that if we learned the names of any particular organizations mentioned by Mosley or Escobarria, the FBI would like to know about them.

On December 1, 1963, at 1:45 p.m., Thomas Mosley was observed sitting in his 1960 Thunderbird in the parking lot behind the Chicago Transit Authority station at 1122 West Diversey Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. At 5:03 p.m., Roman S. Escobarria arrived in his 1957 red and white Chevrolet. He stopped next to Mosley and got into the car with Mosley. At 5:10 p.m., Escobarria got out of Mosley's automobile, got into his own car, parked it, and then walked into the bus station, dressed in his uniform, apparently to go to work.

Basically, the following transpired at this meeting:

Escobarria was late and was worried about being tardy for his bus run. Mosley indicated to Escobarria that Mosley's associates were interested in taking over the financial backing of Escobarria's group, and Mosley indicated to Escobarria that he believed the Cuban group had criminal backing; that if these hoodlums were "...not too big..." Mosley's group could take care of them. Mosley also told Escobarria that if the Cuban group had signed any type of promissory note with any backers or bankers, Mosley's organization could pay off the note. Mosley also told Escobarria that he, Mosley, was only a contact man, runner, and enforcer for Mosley's organization, but if Escobarria could swing the financial backing of the Cubans to Mosley's people, Mosley would assure Escobarria of a share of the profits. Mosley then added Escobarria about not wanting to go back to Cuba to fight, to which Escobarria replied that the other people could do the fighting, and when the fighting was over Escobarria would then return to Cuba.
Mosley then told Echevarria that if he could swing the financial backing over to Mosley's group, Echevarria could go back to Cuba with plenty of money.

A check at the Chicago Credit Bureau on December 3, 1963, revealed that a Francisco Blanco, residing at 1333 South May Street, Chicago, Illinois; wife, Madalena, formerly lived on (house number not shown) Calhoun Avenue; employed by Grosme, Inc., Miles, Illinois; had been the subject of a credit inquiry by the Legal Furniture Company on December 21, 1962.

On this same date, a search of the files of the Immigration and Naturalization Service revealed that one Francisco Blanco, originally from Mexico, was of record. It was noted that the description of this Francisco Blanco was not the same as the subject of the same name referred to in the prior report. However, a photograph was obtained for future reference and possible identification.

On December 1, 1963, informant 2-1-266 advised that Echevarria and Mosley were discussing a meeting between Mosley and a man known only as "Mannie," who was to meet Mosley on the evening of December 3, 1963, at 9:30 p.m., at the Logan Square Terminal Bar Room. Allegedly, this "Mannie" is over the "entire council." "Mannie" was to be sitting in the bar and drinking a bottle of Budweiser beer; he was to have a package of Camel cigarettes on the left side of the bottle and a cigarette lighter to the right. Mosley was to approach this man and ask him, "Are you Mannie?" If the answer was affirmative, Mosley was to state, "I am Black Foot."

On December 5, 1963, 2-1-266 advised that Mosley was going to meet "Mannie" as previously arranged. 2-1-266 was instructed to find out all he could about the meeting between Mosley and "Mannie."

On December 5, 1963, Special Agent Thomas R. Manson, U. S. Bureau of Customs, and Special Investigator Thomas E. Hansen, Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division, were consulted regarding the alleged dealings in automatic weapons and were confidentially apprised of the investigation as of this date. Copies of the report of the writers, dated December 3, were made available to both of these men and they were requested to keep this information confidential. During discussion with Special Agent Manson, Bureau of Customs, he made available files from that Bureau reflecting some Cuban arms activity in the past. The following information has been extracted from these files:

In August 1961, one John Burman, residing at 535 Baseline Road, Northville, Michigan, and who is employed as a sales representative for the Richmond Arms Company, Blissfield, Michigan, was approached by the William Newton and a Lieutenant General (TN) Osborne. William Newton, allegedly residing in Miami, Oklahoma, was suspected of being a leader of a Cuban movement but was a person who stayed in the background. The Customs file did not reflect information on Lieutenant General Osborne. Newton and Osborne requested that Burman attempt to obtain 10,000 M-1 rifles for an "Anti-Castro revolution."
On August 29, 1961, Martina, a Spanish-born Cuban, allegedly residing at 1228 Northwest Sixth Street, Miami, Florida, and apparently the head of the Cuban Exile Revolutionary Organization, met in Kansas City, Missouri, to discuss a meeting that was to be held on September 9, 1961 at Chicago. Also present was a man named Martinez, allegedly from Kansas City. Reportedly, Cardoso was acting at the time as the arms procurement officer for this movement. According to Customs files, Cardoso is a naturalized American citizen and was residing at 2217 South Crainwell Avenue, Chicago, Illinois.

On September 9, 1961, Burman met at the LaSalle Hotel in Chicago with Cardoso, Martinez, and one Dr. Orlando Bouza, representative of the Cuban anti-Communist Army. This meeting was called for the purpose of discussing the sale of such items as M-1 rifles, M-16 rifles, hand grenades, flame throwers, bazookas, and ammunition for the same.

On September 12, 1961, another meeting was held by the same group to discuss the price and type of arms.

Some time later in 1961, exact date unknown, one Martin Morus (probably the same person mentioned by FBI agent Rogers), who according to the Customs files is the National Coordinator of the Directorio Exiliado Revolucionario, obtained 1,000 fuse-type blasting caps from Burman and two telegraphic, sending and receiving sets which allegedly were given to Praello Duran, the supposed agent, and took them to Miami. According to the Customs file, Morus had originally submitted his request for blasting caps to Jose Cardoso (mentioned above).

On October 24, 1961, George Marti (probably Jorge Marti Salazar), residing at 1116 Maplewood, Chicago, Illinois, Cuban refugee allegedly working for the CIA, telephoned Burman and inquired into the possibility of obtaining four or five tons of an explosive known as Col. It about this same time, Burman allegedly supplied Marti & Salazar and Morus with 1,000 blasting caps, and Morus and Marti & Salazar reportedly went to Miami. Allegedly, these men had driven to Burman's residence and then allegedly drove on to Miami after receiving these materials.

The files of the Bureau of Customs also reflected that in October 1963 three individuals, all allegedly Cubans, who were identified as Jose Cardoso, Elio Sierra, and Roberto Hernandez, had come to the Willow Run, Michigan, airport, where they were met by Burman and then taken to rooms which had been reserved for them at the Hayflower Hotel in Plymouth, Michigan. Allegedly, these Cubans advised Burman that they wanted to purchase 9mm caliber pistols, sub-machine guns, Browning automatic weapons, comouflage C-3 explosives, recoilless rifles, and ammunition for these weapons. They indicated that they had the necessary funds and were impatient to consummate the purchase. Burman was told that the group needed these items for a guerrilla action which was to precede a real attempt at revolution in Cuba. It is not known whether delivery of the items was ever made by Burman. However, the report indicates that Sierra and Hernandez departed Willow Run by plane for Chicago and that Cardoso departed Willow Run alone by automobile.
Regarding the name, Sierra, mentioned above, it is noted that the Customs file reflects that the Sierra at Willow Run, Michigan was constantly referred to as "Doctor" by the other Cubans. A confidential source at Chicago was advised that there is one Paulino Sierra, an attorney, who has been very active in the Cuban movement in Chicago, who claims to have financial backing, and who allegedly wants to unite all anti-Castro groups.

It now appears possible that this Paulino Sierra, the "Doctor" Sierra who appeared at Willow Run, and the "Hamin" who met Mosley at the Terminal Lounge on December 5, 1963, may be one and the same person.

Regarding the Stello Duma mentioned above, it is noted that the local television newspaper guide for the week of December 7 through December 13, 1963, reflected that the local NBC station at Chicago would carry a "White Paper" program on the evening of December 9, 1963, at 9:00 p.m. CST, which would concern itself with the Bay of Pigs invasion of October 1961. It was determined that this program was cancelled and another was substituted for it; however, the brief sketch in the TT guide listed Cuban personalities to be interviewed and one of the names listed was the Stello Duma, who was described as one of the participants in the Escamay (Cuba) Mountain revolt.

A search of the Chicago office indices failed to make a definite association with any of the names appearing in this report.

On December 5, 1963, informant 2-1-266 advised that Mosley had gone to the meeting with the man known as "Hamin" on that date at the Logan Square Terminal Tap. A description of "Hamin" will appear below. "Hamin" allegedly advised Mosley that he wanted to meet Mosley's superior, and he indicated to Mosley that the backers of his group were very responsible people in high positions who had ample money. "Hamin" also advised that his group is buying ships which are being purchased in the names of different American citizens; allegedly, nothing of a detrimental nature was said during this conversation regarding the United States.

Relative to the policies to be followed by President Lyndon B. Johnson, "Hamin" indicated that it made little difference one way or the other as to the policies President Johnson followed. "Hamin" allegedly stated that the late President Kennedy helped "sometimes"; however, he "...played both sides of the fences to save face." "Hamin" also indicated that all of the Cuban groups in Chicago were now united with the exception of one.

According to "Hamin," his movement is headquartered in Miami, and his group wants no credit of any kind extended to it and will make all purchases on a cash basis. "Hamin" indicated that he had been doing a lot of travelling lately—to San Francisco, New York, and other cities. When the subject of New Orleans came up, "Hamin" allegedly avoided any discussion of that city, for unknown reasons.
"Manuel" indicated to Mosley that by the 9th or 10th of December 1963 he would know what his Cuban group's requirements would be. "Manuel" said he was going to get in touch with Miami and that he definitely wanted to meet the person who Mosley has alleged makes his group's decisions, in order that "Manuel" can place an initial order for demolition explosives.

On December 9, 1963, informant 2-1-266 advised that there is a possibility that Echevarria has contacts in Cuba, as he allegedly is going to obtain commemorative Cuban stamps depicting the flights of the Russian engineers. Echevarria indicated he could get these stamps in about two weeks.

2-1-266 also advised that the Cuban groups are indicating that they desire to step up the sabotage program; however, it is not known if the groups mean the sabotage program in Cuba or elsewhere. 2-1-266 has also determined that there is a desire on the part of the Cuban groups to have any and/or all of the explosives they purchase in Chicago distributed to various parts of Illinois.

On December 9, 1963, it was determined that the former telephone number of Eomer Echevarria, NLW 9-2507, located at his former address of 2235 North Milwaukee Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, received a collect telephone call from Miami, Florida on December 9, 1963. The call was made from 378-9172, an Miami, and was from one Gonzalez-Gatelli (phonetic) to James "Ramala" or James "Gabella" (phonetic). Neither of these names could be identified in the Secret Service master index at Chicago.

It was also determined on December 10, 1963, that Eomer S. Echevarria formerly lived at 4236 North Washtenaw Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, in addition to other addresses mentioned in the memorandum report of December 3, 1963, of Special Agents Noonan and Tucker, U. S. Secret Service, Chicago.

On December 10, 1963, 2-1-266 advised that he is positive he can introduce an undercover agent into this group at any time.

SUBJECT

EMER S. ECHEVERRRA - previously described.
EMER S. MOSLEY - previously described.
PERISON CUBAN met by Mosley and Echevarria on November 23, 1963 - previously described.

"PAINTER" - white male (Cuban); could be Jewish or Greek; 68 to 72 years; 5'9"; dark, short, wavy hair (receding); very sharp dresser; suit and tie; speaks fluent English; very neat and clean.
DISPOSITION

Investigation conducted by the U. S. Secret Service indicates that a group of anti-Castro Cubans is endeavoring to accumulate automatic weapons, ammunition, and explosives for the alleged purpose of overthrowing the Castro regime.

Inasmuch as this activity does not come within the jurisdiction of the United States Secret Service, and as there is no apparent violation which falls within this agency's purview, the investigation of this case by the Secret Service is being discontinued.

Copies of this report are being directed to the Chicago offices of the U. S. Customs Service, the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax Division of the Internal Revenue Service, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation for whatever continued attention is deemed appropriate by those agencies.

DISTRIBUTION:

Chief
Miami
Dallas
Detroit
Grand Rapids
Birmingham
Springfield
FBI, Chicago
Bureau of Customs, Chicago
Alcohol & Tobacco Tax Division, Chicago

Orig. & 1 cc
1 cc
1 cc
1 cc
1 cc
1 cc
1 cc
1 cc
1 cc
1 cc
Mr. MATTHEWS. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman STOKES. At this point the Chair will recognize the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ford, for such time as he may consume, after which the committee will operate under the 5-minute rule.

Mr. Ford.

Mr. FORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Rowley, when you became aware of the assassination, you requested that the Immigration and Naturalization Service at the Texas border be alerted. Could you tell us why?

Chief ROWLEY. I just tried to explain that it was a natural instinct or reaction, if you will, to do that, thinking that there might be some avenue of escape in that direction.

Mr. FORD. Were there any thoughts on your mind at the time that there might be an assassin from a foreign government who would then attempt to escape to Mexico?

Chief ROWLEY. No, not at that time; no, sir.

Mr. FORD. You mentioned a minute ago to the counsel that you met with the Director, Mr. Hoover, and in talking with him, did you ever discuss the line of investigation and the exchange of intelligence?

Chief ROWLEY. That was worked out right after the assassination, Mr. Congressman, but we already had their cooperation to the extent that they were able to provide us with intelligence information prior to that time.

Mr. FORD. You mentioned earlier that you assigned Inspector Thomas Kelley—

Chief ROWLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. Ford [continuing]. To Dallas for the investigation. Again for the record, why did you assign Mr. Kelley, dispatch him to the Dallas-Fort Worth area?

Chief ROWLEY. I assigned Mr. Kelley because he was the nearest inspector to Dallas at that time. As I explained previously since time was of the essence, I wanted to send an inspector as quickly as possible, and Mr. Kelly was the closest one. One of the responsibilities of an inspector is to do precisely what Mr. Kelly did in Dallas, direct the investigation and the activities.

Mr. FORD. Was he there to investigate who may have been involved in the assassination or to review the performance of the Secret Service in connection with the assassination?

Chief ROWLEY. He was there to become involved in the investigation to determine the facts surrounding the assassination.

Mr. FORD. Mr. Rowley, you testified before the Warren Commission June 18 of 1964. At that time in your testimony you were asked by Senator Cooper the following questions, and I quote:

Do you have any information based upon any facts that you know based upon any information given to you by persons who claim to have personal knowledge that there were persons engaged in a conspiracy to kill President Kennedy.

And your response was, “I have no such facts, sir.”

He then asked you the following additional question, and I quote:

I address the same question as to whether you have any information that the killing of President Kennedy had any connection with any foreign power.

Your response was, and I quote:
I have no such information.

We have heard testimony from Mr. Kelley indicating that there were assassination plots investigated by the Secret Service in early 1963. Were you aware of those investigations at the time of your testimony before the Warren Commission?

Chief Rowley. I would have to look at the reports themselves, Mr. Congressman, to see whether my initials were on them. In the reports that you speak of, it was established that there was not any activity directed against—or of interest to us as it affected the President of the United States.

Mr. Ford. Going back to the first question, you said, "I have no such facts, sir."

The second question you also said, "I have no such information."

I am asking now, were you aware of those investigations at the time you appeared before the Warren Commission?

Chief Rowley. Well, if I made that statement, then I was not aware of those facts.

Mr. Ford. I would like counsel to give the witness JFK F-416, F-417, F-418, and ask the witness whether his initials appear upon the face of these reports.

Chief Rowley. Yes, sir.

Mr. Ford. Chief Rowley, why did you not call it to the Warren Commission's attention back in 1964 when you appeared before the Commission?

Chief Rowley. This information at the time was handled either by the PRS or through Mr. Kelley, and I can only assume, Mr. Congressman, that these reports were furnished to the Warren Commission.

Mr. Ford. The reports in your hand were reported?

Chief Rowley. That is right. It was an ongoing investigation, as I see it, in which case there would be a relationship with the FBI and the CIA, and in the ultimate I would think that the report itself would establish whether or not it affected the safety of the President of the United States.

Mr. Ford. But you had initialed these reports or documents prior to the June 18, 1964 appearance before the Warren Commission; is that correct?

Chief Rowley. That is correct, sir. This was a year before the assassination. We are talking about 1962.

Mr. Ford. Thank you very much, Chief Rowley. At this time I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman, and yield back the time.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Edgar.

Mr. Edgar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Rowley, were you here this morning when Mr. Kelley was speaking?

Chief Rowley. Yes, sir.

Mr. Edgar. I had asked him about the process of taking over an investigation such as the assassination of a President of the United States and asked about the investigative plan, whether or not Secret Service would have sat down to put together such a plan.

To your knowledge, was such an investigative plan put together to coordinate the FBI and the Secret Service and other investigative agencies' analysis of the assassination?
Chief Rowley. No, sir.

Mr. Edgar. In your meetings with J. Edgar Hoover, wouldn't it have been logical for you as Chief of the Secret Service and he as head of the FBI to determine what strategy or plan you would have to investigate this death?

Chief Rowley. Yes, sir. Your earlier question was that before there was an opportunity for anybody to sit down, the President of the United States directed that the FBI to conduct the investigation and that the Secret Service would cooperate with them in any manner and phase that we could.

Now I did indicate to the Director at such meetings that we would cooperate with them. They had their own strategy as to how they would investigate it.

Mr. Edgar. But wouldn't it have been appropriate for you as Chief of the Secret Service to say, Mr. Hoover, I understand that the President has designated you as the lead agency in this important investigation, but we have a role to play as well because it was our agents who were attached and assigned to the President for his protection and we have an agent in Dallas by the name of Mr. Kelley and there are others involved who have information. How can we sit down to make sure that the information that we have in our Secret Service files as well as the ongoing and continuing reports that are coming in from our field offices can be analyzed in an appropriate place in your investigative plan?

Wouldn't that have made some sense?

Chief Rowley. It would have made some sense, but I think it was all developed subsequently by submitting such reports by both agencies to the Warren Commission and eventually evaluated by their legal staff.

Mr. Edgar. But in hindsight—and I know it is difficult in hindsight—looking at a situation where there was information available to you, at least out of your Chicago office and your Miami office, relative to threats on the President's life in the files of the Secret Service and that information was available to you prior to the death of President Kennedy, shouldn't you have that information with the FBI as well as the Warren Commission?

Chief Rowley. I think Mr. Kelley indicated, and if he hadn't, I will say it now, that the FBI was in on that operation as well as the Agency. So we were exchanging information in the entire thing.

I think you will find in the ultimate that we have found that there was no particular jurisdiction on our part, and that there was nothing of interest to us.

Mr. Edgar. Let me talk about Mr. Kelley's arrival on the scene in Dallas. If you would have put yourself in Mr. Kelley's place, arrived in Dallas and went to the Dallas Police Department, sat in on several interviews with Lee Harvey Oswald yourself, would you have tape recorded that conversation?

Chief Rowley. I don't know whether we had tape recorders, but I think you must recognize under the situation at that time that Mr. Kelley was rushed down there and even if he had the funds to rent a tape recorder, I don't think he would have had the time to do so.
Furthermore, I don't think that he would have anticipated the type of confusion that he encountered as he described it to you, nobody would have.

Mr. EDGAR. Would you have insisted that word for word, verbatim be taken down by a court reporter?

Chief ROWLEY. If you could obtain one, I suppose you could. But in the confusion, no one had an opportunity to ask questions because in addition to the people that he described there, there were also the press right beyond the perimeter trying to ask questions.

Mr. EDGAR. One of the reasons, Mr. Rowley, that I am pursuing both the investigative plan and the activities of the immediate investigation, it just seems to me that the Secret Service and the FBI and the Dallas Police Department, someone should have had their wits about them enough to say, let's sit down and before we interview and before we go running in 1,000 different directions, let's analyze what we have on our hands, tragic as it is, and make sure that the press is secured, the corridors are secured, the alleged assailant is secured, that the information that we receive from that assailant is taken down for possible use in the investigation.

I don't get that sense from looking at the materials that are available to us. The sense that I get, and maybe you can correct me if I am wrong, is that there were three agencies who felt that they either had some jurisdiction or no jurisdiction, that they had some information or no information, and that they had their agents on the scene but not necessarily talking and coordinating with each other and that no one strongly was in charge from the Federal point of view.

Is that a misreading of what actually took place?

Chief ROWLEY. Captain Fritz was in charge, but whether or not he had the command of the situation, I can't say. But that is all very nice if you can lay it out in advance knowing that there would be an assassination, knowing that you would arrest a certain individual and then be able to take him into custody and then set up the guidelines as you just enumerated.

But here was a situation where they arrested Oswald, took him into the police station, photographers, television cameramen, reporters and all were descending on the police headquarters trying to get to the man, trying to obtain his picture, the reporters trying to listen into the conversation and so forth. This is what Mr. Kelley described to me at the time.

In addition, you had the situation with the Dallas Police Department. The State had the responsibility initially. So that as Tom Kelley indicated this morning, you know, they were the host, so therefore you had to respect their jurisdiction.

To carry this a bit further, the FBI kept after me to try to get our man in charge in Dallas, Vernon Sorrels who was the agent in charge, and had a rapport with the Chief of the Dallas Police Department, to get them to release the rifle so that it could be flown to Washington and for ballistic tests. This is the process that I had to go through at the time in order to get them to release it.

So I give you that for what it is worth that there was confusion and difficulty.

Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. EDGAR. I thank the gentleman.
Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. McKinney.

Mr. McKinney. No questions.

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. Devine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am sorry floor business prevented my being here during the key part of Mr. Rowley’s testimony. I do want to welcome you here. I know we have pulled you back from retirement at the beach to testify this morning. I am sure it is not a very pleasant experience to have to go through all these things.

You did testify before the Warren Commission, didn’t you?

Chief Rowley. Yes, sir.

Mr. Devine. Did you testify before any congressional committees in connection with this matter?

Chief Rowley. Yes. In 1976, in February, I testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee chaired by Senator Schweiker.

Mr. Devine. Do you as the former head of the Secret Service have any thoughts that you would like to impart to this committee inasmuch as the mandate of the House is that we make recommendations to the Congress in the area of possible legislation as it relates to assassinations?

Do you feel that you would have been in better shape to have your agency handle it better if you had had more laws at your disposal or more funds or did you have the authority you felt was necessary to do what was necessary to protect the President?

Chief Rowley. I think within the framework of that period, we didn’t have the manpower or the equipment that we would have liked to have had. But I must say that since then we have the manpower and the equipment.

Mr. Devine. Have you given it any thought, Mr. Rowley, about whether any further Federal legislation is necessary to make your organization more effective or to make the security of the President more effective?

Chief Rowley. Well, in all honesty, Mr. Congressman, since I am retired I haven’t given that much thought. I would have to say that my successor, Director Knight, undoubtedly would have some views on that.

I am quite sure that there have been considerable improvements in all phases of the Secret Service in the past 5 years under his leadership.

Mr. Devine. That is all. Thank you.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ford.

Mr. Ford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have one final question.

Mr. Rowley, would it be your opinion that the evidence of possible Cuban involvement was never fully investigated by the Secret Service?

Chief Rowley. I don’t think I could say that, Mr. Congressman. For one thing, we investigated to the extent we could with the cooperation of the information we got from the CIA and the FBI on the individuals that were earlier mentioned.

Then, further, I would not be privy to what the Warren Commission legal staff did in the course of their investigation to establish something like that.
Mr. Ford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Sawyer.
Mr. Sawyer. There is just one or two questions.
I am interested really in what current procedures are. Do I understand correctly that they now do actual practice runs on this kind of an emergency if it comes up so that everybody knows in advance just what kind of a game plan they have if something extraordinary happens?
Chief Rowley. That is now part of the training, Mr. Congressman. We have out at Beltsville an outdoor range and training facility in which we are able to train the agents under all types of conditions and possibilities.
Now whether they have improved that within the past 5 years, I don't know. But I know when I left we had that kind of training.
Mr. Sawyer. Do they start out with a kind of a premise that such a thing is going to happen on each motorcade so that they are mentally attuned to not being caught unexpected but actually expecting this on each time?
Chief Rowley. It has greatly improved by 100 percent. We have alternate routes which are patrolled by our agents and the police. There are communications on different channels so that they don't conflict with the main motorcade. We have men posted on roofs and places that were selected as vulnerable places by the advance agents. We have a certain number of advance agents who are supervised, who are assigned certain particular things such as buildings along the route and the type of traffic that runs through the city, et cetera.
The other factor is that there is constantly a helicopter flying above, checking ahead with communications with all the posts on the roofs to advise them of what they see here so that they can take immediate action.
Mr. Sawyer. As I said to a previous witness, I have been very impressed in watching the Zapruder film, the slowness of the reaction of the agents compared to the reaction of Governor Connally. I think for anyone watching that, it is perfectly obvious that they were not really alertly attuned to the possibility of some catastrophic event like that happening.
I just wonder if there has been some effort to in effect instill an approach that instead of it being the unexpected, it is the expected, and they are just waiting for it to happen which might have increased their reaction time and might have saved the President?
Chief Rowley. Well, I think there is an exhibit from the Warren Commission that shows that one of the cars had the door swung open apparently after the first shot in which two agents are attempting to get out at about that time which may not have been in the Zapruder film.
But to bring you up to date, the men are trained in precisely the manner that you have indicated, the response, the reaction, et cetera, and where their position is on the car when an incident of that kind happens.
Chairman Stokes. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Sawyer. Yes, certainly.
Chairman Stokes. On the point Mr. Rowley just made with reference to the fact that there is an exhibit, during the recess I had discussed with Professor Blakey my concerns and your concerns about this reaction time. At the appropriate time he says he is prepared to show us this particular exhibit which does denote some reaction time which I will ask him to do at the appropriate time afterward.

Mr. Sawyer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Well, they were pretty much out of range of being any help to the President in this kind of a circumstance anyway. But the two agents in the car, by just jamming the accelerator on that first shot, might arguably have done some good. Yet it wasn’t until the third shot, which I guess spans a time frame of 7 or 8 seconds, which while it might not sound like a long time, is time enough for somebody to run 75 yards if they are a sprinter, they could have wheeled that car, it seems to me, a lot quicker than they reacted.

I recognize that if you are not expecting a thing, it takes you a little while to gather your wits about what is happening. But if your mental attitude is, as I said before, a sprinter on the starting blocks waiting for the gun, if you are attuned to that, your reaction time is much quicker.

Chief Rowley. You have to consider the scene, Mr. Congressman. The driver is concerned, and incidentally it was an armored car which carries considerable weight.

Mr. Sawyer. But with no top.

Chief Rowley. No top, no, but it is still heavy in the body. When you are involved in one of those motorcades and there are people shouting and acclaiming the individuals and the motorcycles, you know, at times they slow down and then they have to kick the motor in and it explodes and so forth, these agents have been used to that.

So that when this first or second shot was fired, they assumed, because their concentration in the meantime is on the public and the people there, and they are oblivious to what the noise is that is going on, in other words, it was difficult to distinguish between a backfire and a rifle shot.

So that these things have to be considered when one attempts to evaluate whether there was a reaction in sufficient time or not. Having been through those exercises many times myself, I recognize the problem that they had at that time.

Mr. Sawyer. Well, I am only comparing it to Governor Connally who probably has heard a lot of backfires, too, and he immediately reacted to what he recognized, according to his testimony and quite obviously in the film, as a rifle shot where there was no comparable reaction by the agents for two additional shots.

Anyway, thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is all I have.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.

I wonder because of the concern that both Mr. Sawyer and I have had in this area, Professor Blakey, if while Mr. Rowley is still here, you would display that exhibit and comment upon it.

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that the clerk display F-126. This exhibit, Mr. Chairman, has already been entered in the record. It is a photograph taken, according to the best evidence in the record, at approximately the time, according to the acoustics, of
the second shot which would be approximately 1.6 seconds after the first shot.

I wonder if the clerk would use the pointer. You can see the Secret Service agents in the followup car have turned their heads. You can see four Secret Service agents. Two of them have turned their heads and are beginning to look back at the depository.

If you look back at the third car, the white car behind the President’s limousine, the doors are opening. The evidence in the record would indicate that it is from that car that Secret Service agents came in an effort to protect Lyndon Johnson, the Vice President, who was following the President’s car.

So that if the acoustic evidence is correct, the first shot was fired and apparently missed, and 1.6 seconds later, the approximate time of this photograph, you do have the beginning of reactions by Secret Service agents.

In the followup car they are turning around and in the white car the doors are beginning to open and they are making an effort to come out.

The acoustics evidence indicates there is approximately 5.8 or 5.9 seconds between the second and the third shot, and then if the acoustics evidence is to be believed, there would have been a fourth shot five-tenths of a second later, which would make it approximately 7 seconds from the beginning of the process.

My time on that may be a little off. The record would have to speak for itself. So it is approximately 7 seconds between the first shot and the shot that hit the President and surely killed him.

Chairman Stokes. What about in the Presidential car? Is there any reaction being shown to anyone there?

Mr. Blakey. The reaction in the Presidential car in this photograph, if you point at the windshield you can just begin to see the President’s hand moving up. At least my inspection of this exhibit does not indicate that there has been any reaction by the Secret Service agents in that car. This is 1.6 seconds after the first shot had been fired.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you.

Would there be any further comment on your part, Mr. Rowley, on the explanation given by Professor Blakey?

Chief Rowley. When you talk about the two men on the right side, they are covering their span. The front man is just finishing his span so he will come back and the other fellow behind him is covering his span back that way. The others on the other side are finishing theirs. This is when Mr. Hill started off that running board to catch up to jump on the back pedal of the Presidential vehicle. That was a difficult thing to do, to run around in front of the followup or Secret Service car and then jump on that pedal.

You may have read where Mr. Hill missed the step but was able to cling to the hand guard and to pull himself up. They were about to take off as Mr. Sawyer indicated to get out of the area. And he pulled himself up in time to do that, and having done so he was able to push the First Lady back into her seat.

Chairman Stokes. That would have been standard procedure with reference to those two men. While one scanned the crowd in one way, the other would be doing it in the opposite way?

Chief Rowley. That is right.
Chairman Stokes. Thank you. My time has expired.

Mr. Edgar. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Edgar?

Mr. Edgar. I just have one question.

Looking back at the information that you provided to the Warren Commission, was there any evidence or information that for any reason that was related to the situation that the Secret Service did not provide to the Warren Commission?

Chief Rowley. Did not provide to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Edgar. Yes.

Chief Rowley. We provided them with everything that we had. We had no reason to withhold anything.

Mr. Edgar. So to your knowledge every bit of information relating to the assassination that the Secret Service had was provided to the Warren Commission?

Chief Rowley. Yes, sir.

Mr. Edgar. Thank you.

Chairman Stokes. Is there anyone else seeking recognition? Does counsel have anything further?

Mr. Matthews. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

During the course of these proceedings we have made reference to what has been identified as JFK F-414 through JFK F-418.

Mr. Chairman, these exhibits are now classified secret and are in the process of being declassified. We would ask that they may be made part of the record in the condition that they are now in subject to being declassified. In addition, three additional exhibits, JFK F-450, F-451, and F-452, bear upon the testimony today, and we ask that they be admitted into evidence.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection they may be so ordered.

[The information follows:]
April 12, 1961

**SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT**

Mr. J. E. Baughman  
Chief, J. S. Secret Service  
Washington, D.C.

Sir:

This report is submitted in reference to the above-captioned subject and supplements Protective Survey Report dated April 12, 1961.

The President and Mrs. Kennedy, accompanied by Mr. Arthur Schlesinger, arrived at the White House at 10:51 a.m. the date and motored to the Pan American Union Building, arriving at 10:53 a.m.

The program proceeded as outlined in the Protective Survey Report.

President and Mrs. Kennedy, accompanied by Mr. Arthur Schlesinger, departed the Pan American Union Building at 11:27 a.m. and motored to the White House, arriving at 11:29 a.m.

Information received from Mr. Henry C. Reed, State Department, on the afternoon of April 13, 1961, disclosed that the Cuban Delegation to this Meeting would attend. Previous information from the Pan American Union officials said they declined the invitation and would not attend the Meeting.

Mr. Reed stated that the Cuban Ambassador to the Organization of American States was Carlos M. Lachas; the alternate representative was Quintin Figo Machado; and the adviser was Jose Nelson Carrera. Mr. Reed further stated that Machado and Melson were characters of ill repute, both reported to be carrying firearms, and were to be considered dangerous.

Photographs of Machado and Melson were obtained from the FBI and were reproduced by P/S and distributed to all personnel participating in the security arrangements. These photographs will be turned over to P/S for future reference.
At 8:30 a.m. this date, Mr. Reed called and stated that the Brazilian Ambassador to this Meeting informed him that after paying a visit to the Cuban Ambassador's residence last evening disclosed that it was the plan of Ambassador Lechuga to go to New York City this date, allowing his alternate representative, Machado, to occupy his place with the 21 Ambassadors seated on the stage with the President.

ASAIC Campion, SAS Griffith and Parker of this Service and 3 detectives of the Metropolitan Police Department were posted at the entrance to the Pan-American Union Building with representatives of the Pan-American Union who could identify these subjects in the event they would attend this Meeting.

Neither the Cuban Ambassador nor the two subjects, Machado or Molleo, appeared at this Meeting.

Resulting from the above information, SAS Hill, Chaney and Burke, as well as the 3 Metropolitan Detectives were also added to the security. SA Hill was posted on the balcony near the elevator on the second floor. SA Chaney replaced SA Parker on Post #9. SA Burke replaced SA Griffith on Post #ll.

Stewart G. Stout  
ASAIC, 1-16

Approved:

James J. Noway  
ASAIC, 1-16

cc: SAIC Washington (2)

SGS:wb
SYNOPSIS

A letter in Spanish, postmarked Havana, Cuba, November 14, 1962, and improperly addressed, involving a plot to assassinate the President, was intercepted by this Service. Subsequent investigation disclosed Antonio Rodriguez y Jones as the most logical intended recipient of the letter and the person designated to carry out this plot. Investigation continuing to establish the identity of the co-conspirators of this plot. Collateral investigation requested of various offices as indicated.

For purposes of clarity, this report will be divided into the following sections: (a) Introduction; (b) General Inquiries; (c) Surveillance; and (d) Conclusion.

(a) INTRODUCTION:

There follows a chronology of the development of this case:

Wednesday, November 21

4:50 P.M.

Informant 1-15-45 telephoned the Washington Field Office advising ASAIC Dahlquist of the existence of a paper which indicated a plot to assassinate the President by certain Cuban revolutionary factions. This information was immediately relayed to the reporting special agent for appropriate investigation.
6:30 P.M.
At the home of 1-15-45, it was learned that at approximately 10:15 A.M. that day a telephone call was received from Informant 1-15-47 who related that a chauffeur employed for the Venezuelan Delegation of the Inter-American Defense Board had seen a letter which involved a plot to assassinate President Kennedy. Fearing that the Chief of the Delegation, Colonel Hugo Trego, was involved in the plot, the incident was reported to 1-15-47 requesting advice in the matter and what action should be taken to advise the proper United States officials.

After 1-15-47 made appropriate inquiries with U. S. officials, he checked back with the chauffeur to insure that the letter would be given to the U. S. Secret Service for investigation. This chauffeur, Antonio Rodriguez y Gil, stated that the letter was received in the morning mail at approximately 8:00 A.M. that day, and that since contacting 1-15-47 he had made inquiries among members of the Venezuelan Delegation and had decided to turn the letter over to an official of the Delegation for possible referral to the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

7:30 P.M.
Through the Washington City Directory it was ascertained that Antonio Rodriguez y Gil resided at 2335 Ashmead Place, N.W., Washington, D.C., Telephone No. Hobart 2-9170. Rodriguez was called and arrangements were made for an interview later that evening.

[Deleted.]

9:00 P.M.
At the office of the Venezuelan Delegation to the Inter-American Defense Board, 2335 Ashmead Place, N.W., Washington, D.C., Colonel Hugo Trego, Chief of the Delegation, advised he had this letter in his possession. Col. Trego also advised he had notified the FBI and the Metropolitan Police Department to make certain the proper investigative organizations in the United States were apprised of the existence of this letter. He stated that the
letter was received at the Venezuelan Delegation at 12:00 Noon that day and was opened by Col. Trego at 7:00 P.M. (this differs from the information received from Antonio Rodriguez Gil in that he reported the letter was received at 8:00 A.M. and was opened shortly after being received in the morning mail).

During the course of the evening and interrogation of Col. Trego, Antonio Rodriguez, et al, the following were present: Lt. Jacob Breckman and Sgt. Robert Gray (Detective) of No. 13 Precinct; Special Agents L. B. McDonald and Joseph Sculley of the FBI; and Jose Valado, translator, Venezuelan Delegation.

During the evening, the letter was translated by Col. Trego, in cooperation with Jose Valado and Special Agent McDonald of the FBI. Subsequently, on November 26, 1962, the letter was shown to SA Victor J. Gonzalez of this Service and following is the translation which SA Gonzalez furnished:

"Conrad Rodriguez,

"In accord with the planning and obstinant attitude of Kennedy to invade Cuba carry out the attempt on his life in the terms conceived. I am not giving you more data because it is not necessary since all that you have to know you know, and for its own security and effectiveness of the planning I comply thus with superior orders.

"I have had no other way of communicating this to you by any other safer means, for that reason I had to do it by letter. In the U.S. they are not in habit of opening the letters for that reason I trust everything will go well. A good communist has to run these risks. We have to count on our own energies because USSR has not adopted a solid position with Cuba. These are high level questions that a good communist (card carrying) should not question.

"If he does it in that way it will be for the good of all communist that are in the world. Cuba is not all. Enough already has been done by Cuba.

"I will send you the next news if I am able by a safer method. Give me a prompt answer. I am embracing you. - Pepe"

The envelope, written in English, was postmarked Havana, Cuba, 9:00 A.M., November 14, 1962, and bore the address 9246 7 N.W. and 11432 St., Washington, USA. The letter, written in Spanish, is dated Havana, Cuba, November 13, 1962.
During the course of the interrogation of Antonio Rodriguez Gil and members of the Venezuelan Delegation by the reporting special agent and representatives of the FBI and Metropolitan Police Department, efforts were made to determine if any address existed in Washington, D.C., which would in any way tie in with the address on the envelope of this letter. It appeared strange, indeed, that a conspirator involved in a plot to take the life of the President would not know how to contact a co-conspirator. Although the writer of this letter indicates some knowledge of the United States customs, he apparently is confused as to the proper procedure employed by the Post Office in directing mail in view of the fact that two addresses which are non-existent appear on the envelope. No information could be developed during this investigation which would in any way clarify this grossly inaccurate address.

Information was developed from Antonio Rodriguez Gil and Col. Hugo Trego that Gil was born on July 7, 1931, in Galesia, Spain. He is described as white; male; Spanish; 5-6; 154; brown hair (shaved to the scalp with bald patches). Gil left Spain and traveled to Venezuela in 1952, was married there in 1957 to Delores Valado, and worked in Caracas with the Columbian Embassy. In 1958 he became a Venezuelan citizen, Passport #019965, and that same year came to the United States. His citizenship status was temporary and when he traveled to the United States he lost this status and is no longer a citizen of Venezuela. In 1958, in the United States, he obtained a position with the Venezuelan Delegation to the Inter-American Defense Board. Gil claimed he has never traveled to or resided in Cuba.

During the interrogation, it was learned that approximately three months ago Gil received a letter from the Central Office of Safeway Stores, Inc., and, as directed, went to the office and was shown a check payable to Safeway from an Antonio Rodriguez, drawn on Riggs Bank. A micro-film strip of this check was projected and on examining the signature Gil immediately observed that it was not his but probably that of some other Antonio Rodriguez. Gil was of the opinion that the check was drawn at the 18th and Columbia Branch of Riggs Bank.

It was also learned during interrogation, from Jose Valado, that approximately two months ago, while attending the Americanization School, 19th and California Streets, N.W., he recalled a student there by the name of Antonio Rodriguez; that this man was in his early 30's; 5-1 in height; slender build; very light skin; black hair; and married.
At the conclusion of the interrogation, Col. Trego offered his full cooperation to this Service and the FBI, and advised he would immediately report any information that might come to his attention concerning the intended recipient of this letter.

Thursday, November 22

Full details concerning the development of this case were reported to SAIC Geiglein at 2:00 A.M. As per instructions, SAIC Bouck, PRS, was advised of this letter at 10:00 A.M. He indicated that the White House Detail and White House Police would be alerted.

During the course of this investigation, close liaison has been maintained with the Chief's Office through SAIC Bouck by immediately transmitting any significant developments as they occur.

(b) GENERAL INQUIRIES:

[Deleted.]

1-15-5 further advised that one Antonio Rodriguez Jones had been contacted by pro-Castro Cubans known to have been involved in acts of violence in the United States, and that further details of these incidents would be furnished at a later date.

On November 23, 1962, Mr. Carl Malone, Superintendent, Inquiry and Claims, Dead Letter Section, Main Post Office, Washington, D.C., was contacted through Postal Inspector Joseph Verant. It was pointed out to Mr. Malone that the address, 9246 7 N.W. and 11432 St., USA, on the envelope in question was crossed out in red ink and on the bottom was written No. 953 and the address of Antonio Rodriguez Gil, 2335 Ashmead Place, N.W., Washington, D.C. Mr. Malone explained that the Post Office furnishes a registry service for any mail originating from a foreign country that is improperly addressed. The mail is forwarded to his section for searching and, in this
particular case, Mrs. Elizabeth Acree looked in the Washington Directory and found the only Antonio Rodriguez listed, and wrote the address, 2335 Ashmead Place, N.W., on the envelope with a note that the postman should try that address.

A search was initiated through the foreign and local Dead Letter Sections of the Post Office for any mail addressed to Antonio Rodriguez, with negative results. As per request, Mr. Malone placed a flag in his files and if any letter is received in his section addressed to Antonio Rodriguez, this Service will be immediately advised.

On November 23, 1962, Mrs. Cora Beasley, D. C. Board of Education, John Quincy Adams School (Americanization School), 19th and California Streets, N.W., Washington, D.C., was interviewed and a search was initiated in an effort to determine whether she had any students by the name of Antonio Rodriguez. Mrs. Beasley advised that no current students by that name are on the rolls of that school; however, in 1959 there was an Antonio Rodriguez listed, age 50, address unknown.

In view of the fact that Antonio Rodriguez is a very common Latin American name, efforts were immediately commenced to determine the number of individuals in the Washington, D.C., area with that name, and whether or not agencies engaged in conducting investigations on individuals involved in subversive activities would show a record for any of these persons.

On November 23 and during the week of November 26, 1962, 1-15-5 furnished information concerning Antonio Rodriguez Jones and his possible association with Jose Moleon Carrera and Quinton Pino Machado. Carrera ostensibly is a Military Adviser to the Cuban Delegation to the Organization of American States and works with the Cuban Delegation through the Inter-American Defense Board. Both he and Machado, who is known as the "hatchet man" for the Cuban Embassy in Washington, have been involved in acts of violence, including beatings and abductions of defectors from Communist Cuba.

According to 1-15-5, in August of 1961, one Felipe Martinez Rivera was abducted by a group of Cuban Communists in the United States after it was learned that Martinez was severing all ties with Communist Cuba. Martinez was taken to Baltimore, Maryland, and held by this group. Antonio Rodriguez Jones was observed as being a member of the group and standing watch outside of the door during interrogation of Martinez.

Secret
1-15-5 learned that the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Relations, on October 4, 1961, had requested that subject be contacted through the Organization of American States, requesting that he furnish the Cuban Government with information concerning schooling.

It was further learned by 1-15-5 that on June 20, 1961, the subject was observed making pro-Castro remarks to members of his class while attending the Institute of Modern Languages, 1322 M Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.; further, that the subject was quite frequently with Martinez prior to Martinez defection to the United States. When the subject learned that the Cuban Embassy in Washington, D.C., was interested in the whereabouts of Martinez, he reported whatever information he had to Quinto Pino Nachado who was then acting as an alternate representative to the Organization of American States with Jose Moleon Carrera. It was further learned that in December 1960 the subject had a Communist publication delivered to his residence in Washington, D.C. In addition, Jose Moleon Carrera had been in contact with the subject in November 1960 concerning the whereabouts of Martinez.

1-15-5 received information that Captain Jose Moleon Carrera was active in New York City in December 1961 in selecting and training 15 pro-Castro Cubans for undercover work in the United States. Following his activity in New York, Moleon, accompanied by an individual of unknown identity, left the United States for Cuba and they were expected to return to the United States in a very short period of time.

1-15-5 furnished the current address of subject as The Granite State Apartments, 1731 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C., Apt. No. 203. Information was also transmitted that photographs of subject and members of his family had been taken and efforts would be made to obtain copies for this Service.

On November 24, 1962, an effort was made to determine the maker of the check with an account at Riggs Bank which had been charged to Antonio Rodriguez Gil's account through the Safeway Store at 18th and Columbia Road, N.W. It was learned that it is the policy of the Riggs Bank not to furnish information concerning depositors without a subpoena. Mr. D. E. Wisecarver, Vice President and Manager of the Riggs Bank at 18th and Columbia Road, N.W., inquired of the Central Depositor Listing and established that the Dupont Circle Branch had two Antonio Rodriguez listed; however, it would be necessary to obtain information concerning these depositors from the Cashier of Riggs Bank, John C. McCormick, in the absence of a subpoena.
Mr. McCormick was telephoned and he advised that representatives of 1-15-5 had previously made inquiry concerning this matter and information was furnished them that the Dupont Circle Branch has two Antonio Rodriguez - one, Antonio Rodriguez Gil (the recipient of this letter) and another Antonio Rodriguez who does not have a Washington, D.C., address but lists an address in a foreign country. Mr. McCormick suggested that since the original contact with the Riggs Bank was made by a representative of 1-15-5, the Riggs Bank be again contacted by 1-15-5 as additional information was in existence concerning the present location of the other depositor named Antonio Rodriguez. 1-15-5 was advised of Mr. McCormick’s request.

On November 26, 1962, contact was made with 1-15-9 in an effort to determine the background on Antonio Rodriguez Jones and members of his family. It was learned that the subject’s father, Antonio Rodriguez y Echazabal, wished to defect to the United States at the time of the Punta del Este Conference. He previously had fought with Fidel Castro during the revolution for a period of approximately three years, and after Castro had obtained control of Cuba had been appointed to diplomatic posts in Haiti, Pakistan, and Guatemala. During these periods he had been known to associate with pro-Communist groups frequently. In April 1962, he and his son, Antonio Rodriguez Jones, were observed in Guadalupe, Mexico. Although the subject’s father had expressed anti-Castro sentiments recently, 1-15-9 is of the opinion that he cannot be trusted because of his past close association with Communist groups.

Antonio Rodriguez Echazabal resides at 1638 R Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., Telephone 332-6277, which phone was installed on October 2, 1962, in the name of Enrique Pedro Rodriguez y Jones, son.

Informant 1-15-46 disclosed long-distance calls made from that phone since date of installation, as follows:

10-5-62 - New York City, MO 2-2908
On November 27, 1962, SAIC Geiglein telephonically advised SAIC Whitaker, New York, and SAIC Marshall, Miami, of these calls.

On November 30, SAIC Whitaker telephonically advised this office as follows concerning the identity of the individuals called:

**MO 2-2908** - subscribed to Gaston Jumelle, 360 Riverside Drive, Apt. 2-C, New York City.

**TP 7-0700** - subscribed to the Chalfonte Hotel, 200 West 70th St., New York City.

**OL 9-8991** - subscribed to John Regalado, 129 Hudson St., Hoboken, N.J. Regalado is described as single; a refrigerator mechanic for Power Air Conditioning Corp., Long Island City, New York. He has a good credit rating.

The results of the check of the telephone calls to Miami, Florida, are covered in memorandum report submitted by SA Ernest I. Aragon November 30, 1962.

The subject, Antonio Rodriguez Jones, resides at 1731 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Granite State Apartments, Apt. 203. The telephone (unlisted) is subscribed to by Yvonne and Brenda Jones. Columbia 5-1965. Yvonne Jones is the subject’s aunt.

Informant 1-15-46 advised that on October 17 a call was placed to Lexington 9-0391, and on November 2, 1962, to Lexington 9-0290, both in Baltimore, Maryland.

SAIC Geiglein telephoned the Baltimore office on November 30, 1962, requesting that these numbers be checked. That same date, the Baltimore office advised that these numbers were listed to the office of the Consulate General of Venezuela, Keyser Building, 207 East Redwood Street, Baltimore, Maryland.
On November 26, 1962, the Immigration Service file of Antonio Guillermo Rodriguez-Jones, Alien Registration #A12-189-161 and A12-860-029, was personally reviewed by SA Robert R. Kyanko at the Washington Field Office, Travel Control Unit, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Washington, D.C.

The file reflected that the subject was born a Cuban citizen on August 24, 1943, at either LaSalud, Havana, Cuba, or Port-au-Prince, Haiti. He first arrived in the United States at Miami, Florida, on June 8, 1959, and was granted permission to stay until September 8, 1959. He stated that he came to the United States to visit his aunt, Yvonne Jones, 1731 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Apt. 203, Washington, D.C. He also claimed that he would be supported in the United States by his aunt as he was formerly a student in Cuba and had no prospective employment in this country.

The file further reflected that he attended Ecole Francaise Internationale, Washington, D.C., having been admitted to the school on September 24, 1960. On June 16, 1961, he transferred to the Institute of Modern Languages, Inc., Washington, D.C., and withdrew from this school on July 14, 1961, to attend Georgetown University. The file contained certifications from the Directors of Ecole Francaise Internationale and the Institute of Modern Languages verifying subject's attendance at the schools; however, there was no certification as to his attendance at Georgetown University. The file also reflected that his last admission to the United States was on June 8, 1962, at New York City (the file did not indicate when he left the United States). At that time, he boarded Pan American Flight No. 220 at Guadalupe, bearing Cuban Passport #47901.

Upon this entry, he stated that his permanent address was 126 Raizet (Rue St. Anne), Guadalupe. He also gave the following previous addresses: Paseo Linea, Potin (52), Vedado, Havana, Cuba; Cuban Embassy, Haiti; and 101 Blvd. Gt. Jacques, Brussels, Belgium. He stated that he was seeking admission to the United States for political asylum from the present Cuban regime.

The file reflected the following description of subject: white; male; Cuban; 5-6; 170; brown eyes; brown hair; unmarried; place of birth, LaSalud, Havana, Cuba, or Port-au-Prince, Haiti; date of birth, 9/24/43. His father is Antonio Andres Rodriguez-Echazarbal, Alien Registration No. A12-941-442, former Cuban Minister to Pakistan. His address in the United States as of August 21, 1962, is 1731 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Apt 203, Washington, D.C.
The file contained the following summary regarding subject's admissions to the United States: He is a native and citizen of Cuba, born in Havana on 8/24/43, and was formerly a student in Cuba. Cuban Passport No. 47901 was issued 9/1/60 and bears an "F" (Student) visa issued 9/23/60, valid to 9/22/64, and a "B-2" (Visit or Pleasure) visa issued 3/15/62, valid to 3/15/66, both for unlimited admissions. Subject now desires political asylum in U.S. as has his father. Prior to entry into the United States on June 8, 1962, he was residing at F4 #87 Bat. D, Unite 12, Hibiscus, Uieuxbourg, Abimes, Guadalupe.

Subject's file also contained a memorandum from the District Director, Immigration & Naturalization Service, Miami, Florida, to the District Director, Immigration & Naturalization Service, Washington, D.C., transmitting information regarding one Antonio Rodriguez from their Caribbean Index File. The information furnished may or may not relate to the subject. The information was shown as follows:

1. Antonio Rodriguez
   Reportedly member of Executive Committee of Retail Stores Employees, Union of Havana, Cuba (Communist union) - no date shown.

2. Antonio Rodriguez
   Reportedly fought on side of Republican forces in Spanish Revolution (Communist?).

3. Antonio Rodriguez
   Communist PSP member, collaborator of Luis Moreno-Vives.

4. Antonio Rodriguez
   President PSP - Barrio Arroyo y Calvario, Calzada de Sojucal. No. 848, Havana, Cuba.

5. Antonio Rodriguez
   Active Communist.

6. Antonio Rodriguez
   Pedros, Matanzas, Cuba - Reportedly subscribed to Cuban Communist Newspaper "Hoy."

[Deleted.]
The file also contained a photostat of a sample Cuban Election Ballot bearing the name of Antonio Rodriguez as a candidate for Labor Union Foreman in the General Elections of 59-61.

No further information was contained in the file.

On November 27, 1962, the Immigration Service files of members of subject's family, as far as could be determined, were also reviewed by SA Robert R. Kyanko at the Travel Control Unit, Washington Field Office, Immigration & Naturalization Service, Washington, D.C.

Father - Antonio Andres Rodriguez-Echazabal, Alien Registration #A12-941-442, born 8/17/13 Bejucal, Havana, Cuba. The file reflected that he entered the United States at New York City on June 7, 1962, as a political refugee from the Cuban Communist Regime. When he entered the U. S. he held Cuban Passport #6(25169) and a B-2 (Visit or Pleasure) visa. He indicated to Immigration officials in New York City and Washington, D.C., that he was formerly employed by the Cuban Government as Ambassador to Haiti, Guatemala, and Pakistan. His statements reflected that he became dissatisfied with the political condition in Cuba while he was Ambassador to Pakistan. He also said that he considers Fidel Castro a traitor to the Cuban people and that he is also opposed to Francois Duvalier, Dictator in Haiti. In Guatemala he claimed that he prohibited Cuba from doing anything to the Government of Guatemala.

He also stated that he has numerous contacts in the United States, Haiti, Jamaica, and South America to fight Duvalier and Castro. He further indicated that he has never been, nor is he now a Communist, and that his feelings are in accord with a democratic form of government. He stated that he is presently a member of Tereera Fuerze Anti-Communista por la Liberacion de Cuba.
The file contained several newspaper clippings regarding Echazabal's defection from the Cuban Government in 1962. Photographs of these clippings are attached and are self-explanatory. The file also contained a statement from him regarding his defection from the Castro regime and his political feelings about Castro, the Cuban Government, and the United States. A copy of the statement is attached and is self-explanatory.

The file reflected that his address in the United States is 1731 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Apt. 203, Washington, D.C.

The file also contained medical records regarding an eye operation which he had undergone at Washington Hospital Center from August 30 to September 4, 1962. The attending physician was Seymour Duwaroff, M.D., 1302 - 18th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. - NORTH 7-1700. It was also noted that Echazabal employed C. L. Caltaldo, Professional Nurse, 2502 Hayden Drive, Silver Spring, Maryland, during his convalescence. He had also consulted a Dr. James Scully, 1835 Eye Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., regarding his eye condition. It was further noted that Echazabal's hospital expense was partially paid by the Government-Wide Indemnity Benefit Plan (Federal Employees Health Benefits Plan), indicating that he is an employee of the United States Government. The file did not reflect the name of his employer.

No other pertinent information was contained in the file.

Mother - Edith Rodriguez-Jones, Alien Registration #A12-943-430, born 3/10/17 in either Haiti or Cuba. She entered the United States at New York City on August 2, 1962, bearing Laisses-Passer #719903 and a B-2 visa. Her last Cuban address was Paseo Linea, Potin (52), Vadado, Havana, Cuba. Her address in the United States was listed as 1614 - 17th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.

Her file contained no further pertinent information other than the fact that she stated upon entry that she is anti-Castro.

Brother (apparent) - Enrique Pedro Rodriguez-Jones, Alien Registration #A12-943-429, born 11/2/37 in Haiti, Cuban citizen. He entered the United States at New York City on 8/2/62 bearing Cuban Passport #13736 and a B-2 visa. The file reflected that he was formerly employed in Cuba as a Military Attache to Haiti. Previous addresses were listed as: Edificio Emb., Haiti, and Potin (52), Vadado, Havana, Cuba. He listed his address in the United States as 1614 - 17th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.
His file contained information from the Caribbean Index of the Immigration & Naturalization Service regarding one Enrique Rodriguez (no further identifying information was given), as follows:

1. Co.leader of Cienfuegos LV.
2. Member PURC, 1939.
3. Reportedly a Communist, member of Furniture Workers Union, Havana, Cuba.

His file contained no other pertinent information other than the fact that he stated he was anti-Castro upon entry to the United States.

Sister - Edith Elviria Rodriguez-Magel, Alien Registration #A12-941-584, born 12/4/38 at Port-au-Prince, Haiti. She entered the United States at New York City on 5/31/62 bearing Cuban Passport #47617. She is spouse of Hans Magel, Alien Registration #A12-941-978, their last German address being Wakenheim Peld Strasse 23. She indicated her address in the United States as 1731 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Apt. 203, Washington, D.C. The file reflected no previous or present employment and no further information was contained in her file.

Brother-in-law - Hans Magel, Alien Registration #A12-941-978, born 8/6/30 in Goettingen, West Germany. He entered the United States at New York City on 4/31/52 bearing German Passport #3410529 issued at Havana, Cuba, 11/14/60. He is described as white; male; German citizen; 5-6 1/2; 130; brown hair; brown eyes; fair complexion. His father is Franz Magel and his mother Else Bilsing. Previous addresses were listed as follows: 5/55 to 8/59, Rue Geffero 67, Port-au-Prince, Haiti; 8/59 to 11/61, Paseoy 201, Havana, Cuba; 5/62 to present, 1731 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Apt. 203, Washington, D.C.

His employment history was listed as follows: 5/55 to 8/59, employed by Antonio Rodriguez as a meat cutter; 3/60 to 11/61, Consolidado Carne, Havana, Cuba; 7/12/62 to present, Auth Brothers, Auth Sausage Company, Inc., Washington, D.C., as a Utility Meat Cutter.

No further information of interest was contained in his file.
The following individuals are the children of Edith Rodriguez (subject’s sister) and Hans Magel:

Niece – Haidi Magel, Alien Registration #A12-941-582, born 5/9/59 in Haiti. She entered the United States with her parents at New York City on 5/31/62. Her address was listed as 1731 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Apt. 203, Washington, D.C. No further information was contained in her file.

Niece – Ingrid Magel, Alien Registration #A12-941-583, born 3/10/58 in Haiti. She also entered the United States with her parents at New York City on 5/31/62. Her address was listed as 1731 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Apt. 203, Washington, D.C. Her file contained no further information.

On November 26, 1962, Immigration Service Files of all persons in the name of Antonio Rodriguez, living in the Washington Metropolitan area, were also reviewed by SARobert R. Kyanko:

Antonio Rodriguez Gil, Alien Registration #A11-005-711, born 7/7/31 in Orense, Spain. Entered the United States at New York City on 3/25/58 to seek employment. His passport, No. 019965, was issued at Washington, D.C., and expires on 6/14/63. His spouse is Lola de Rodriguez and he has one child, Maria Gosefina Rodriguez. He was previously employed in this country as a chauffeur at the Embassy of Ecuador. He is presently employed as a chauffeur for the Venezuelan Delegation, Inter-American Defense Board, Washington, D.C., at $150.00 per week. His file contained no further information.

Antonio Bolanos Rodriguez, Alien Registration #A12-577-204, born 8/17/41 at LaPalma, Canarias, Spain. His present address is 2013 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C., and he is enrolled in a full-time English training course at the Institute of Modern Languages, Inc., Washington, D.C. His file reflected the name of a friend, Maria Macdalena, living at the YWCA in Washington, D.C.

No other information was contained in his file.

Antonio Rodriguez Mansfield, Alien Registration #A12-188-602, born 9/19/40 at Port-au-Prince, Haiti. He entered the United States on 1/10/60, bearing Passport #60685 issued at Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, and Visa #002657. He stated that he came to the United States to pursue his college studies.
His file reflected that he is attending American University, Washington, D.C., majoring in Political Science. His address was listed as 4904 Belt Road, N.W., Washington, D.C. His file also reflected that he was employed as a delivery boy by the Piano and Organ Foundation, 7215 Wisconsin Avenue, Bethesda, Maryland. He may or may not have been employed by the Inter-American Development Bank in Washington, as his file contained a letter addressed to him in care of that establishment from the Immigration Service. The file also reflected the name of his brother, Mario Rodriguez, living at the same address.

His file contained no further information.

1-15-5 has been requested to determine whether any of the individuals named Antonio Rodriguez, other than the subject, as listed above, is of record.

On November 26, 1962, a name check was made by SA Kyank through the Central Student File, the Institute of Languages and Linguistics, and the American Language Institute, all of Georgetown University, Washington, D.C., and no record of attendance could be found in the name of Antonio Guillermo Rodriguez-Jones. The subject's attendance at Ecole Francaise Internationale and the Institute of Modern Languages was not personally verified inasmuch as his Immigration Service File contained certificates of attendance from the Directors of both schools.

On November 28, 1962, a mail cover was placed at the subject's apartment, No. 203, 1731 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C.; and the subject's father's address, 1630 R Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. These covers were placed through Postal Inspector Joseph A. Verant and were confirmed with a letter to the Postal Inspector in Charge, Washington, D.C., Mr. C. C. Garner.

On November 29, Postal Inspector Verant called and advised that on November 29 a piece of registered mail, Registry No. 4741, which consisted of a short correspondence envelope, was delivered to the Granite State Apartment desk for ENRIQUE RODRIGUEZ JONES, 1731 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. The letter had been postmarked on November 21, 1962, at Havana, Cuba, and bore the following return address:

Enrique Perez Cobian
Libertad 374 Esq aD Stampes
Santos Suarez
Havana, Cuba
This return address information was relayed to ASAIC Miller, PRS, and he later advised that subject's name is not of record.

The name of subject, Antonio Guillermo Rodriguez-Jones, was also checked through the file of the Protective Research Section, with negative results.

The files of PRS disclosed an incident involving the visit of the President and Mrs. Kennedy to the Pan American Union Building, Washington, D.C., on April 14, 1961, on the occasion of an address to the Special Meeting of the Council of the Organization of American States, which is of interest to this investigation. ATSAIC Stewart G. Stout, White House Detail, furnished a supplemental Protective Survey Report dated April 14, 1961, relative to information which was received in connection with the survey of the above-referred event.

It was learned that Quinton Pino Machado, alternate representative to the Organization of American States for Cuba, and the Cuban Adviser, Jose Moleon Carrera, would be present during the President's address. Information was received from 1-15-5 that both of these individuals are known to carry firearms and have a history of violence and should be considered dangerous. Photographs of the two subjects were obtained and the usual detail was augmented by agents of the Washington Field Office. During the course of the survey, further information was developed that the Cuban Ambassador, Lechuga, was planning to leave Washington for New York City and that during the speech of the President his place on the stage would be occupied by Machado.

All individuals entering the Pan American Union Building on April 14, 1961, were checked and it was ascertained that neither the Cuban Ambassador nor Machado or Moleon appeared at the meeting.

1-15-5 advised that the plan of Ambassador Lechuga was designed to embarrass the United States by having an empty chair on the stage when President Kennedy addressed the gathering.

On receipt of information from 1-15-5 that subject was possibly employed at the Georgetown Inn, the records of that establishment were checked November 22, 1962, under a pretext that the reporting agent was a representative of the Wage Board. It was learned that the subject was employed at the Georgetown Inn, Wisconsin and N Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., during the period, 9/18/62 to 10/28/62, as a bus boy, Social Security #578-60-0661.
He listed his previous employment as Paul Young's Restaurant on Connecticut Avenue, Washington, D.C., from 1959 to 1960, as a bus boy.

The firm auditor, Mr. Herbert C. Frith, confided that he recalled the subject as a very intelligent young man who was versed in French and Spanish and had taken languages in school in the United States. On October 28, 1962, the subject, whose services were entirely satisfactory, indicated he was resigning and requested his final pay check. While waiting for his check to be prepared, the subject stated that he felt it was necessary for him to devote his full time and energies to Fidel Castro and the Cuban cause in the United States. He stated further that he planned to move to New York City to join the Cuban "Army." Mr. Frith recalled that subject was definitely pro-Castro and, from his conversations, appeared to be a believer in the Communist "line."

(c) SURVEILLANCE:

On November 24, 1962, 1-15-5 furnished this Service with photographic slides of subject and members of his family. SAIC Bouck, PRS, prepared photographs from these slides which have been disseminated to the New York and Miami offices and personnel involved in surveillance on this case.

Surveillance on the subject was commenced on November 24, 1962, and is continuing.

On November 29, 1962, Special Agents Alfred Wong and Paul A. Scanlon of New York reported to the Washington Field Office for special assignment involving surveillance of subject.

With the cooperation of No. 3 Police Precinct, Washington, D.C., Detective Thomas Riley was assigned to reporting special agent for the purpose of obtaining a suitable location from which to maintain surveillance. A preliminary survey of the area surrounding the subject's apartment disclosed that the conditions were very poor for maintaining surveillance with an automobile. Consequently, the owner of the building at 1740 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., furnished the keys to this empty building for whatever use the Metropolitan Police might deem appropriate in their investigations of burglaries in the neighborhood.

Also, on November 28, 1962, Apartment No. 217, Granite State Apartments, was engaged for one month in the name of James Williams. The manager of this apartment was contacted by the police on a
pretext that this apartment would be occupied by the police in conducting surveillance in connection with investigations of burglaries in the neighborhood.

The results of the surveillance to date have disclosed that subject is employed at Gusti's Italian Villa, 5th and Morse Streets, N.E., Washington, D.C.; that while he frequently visits his father's apartment at 1638 R Street, N.W., he does not appear to have any male companions.

There follows a chronology of the surveillance maintained to date:

11/24/62, 2:00 P.M.
A survey was made of the entire neighborhood and building. Subject was observed in Apartment 203 and did not leave the apartment during the day. Surveillance was discontinued at 11:00 P.M.

Descriptions:

The subject is described as white; male; 19; light tan complexion; reddish-black kinky hair; 170 pounds; 5' 6"; very muscular build; speaks Spanish and French; wears dark knee-length car coat and a gray herringbone top coat, red plaid peak sport cap, and sport clothes. He has not been observed to wear glasses and does not smoke.

His aunt, Yvonne Jones, described as white; female; 55 to 60 years; 5 ft. tall; 120 pounds; heavy build; pasty gray complexion; black-grey stringy hair; bow-legged; pronounced hooked nose; high broad forehead; wears conical-shaped beige hat, black cloth coat-double breasted, hip length, with black squares and an orange border.

Subject's mother, Edith Rodriguez Jones, described as white female; 45; 5' 6"; 140 pounds; large boned; black hair in a bob; thick full mouth; wears dark lipstick, a dark full-length coat, green conical-shaped hat; well dressed.

11/25/62
Commenced 7:00 A.M. Nothing of an unusual nature was observed in the subject's apartment until 9:30 P.M. when a number
guests were observed arriving to attend what appeared to be a birthday party. One couple left at approximately 10:00 P.M. and was observed by SA Ned Hall entering 1638 R Street, N.W.,

Discontinued at 11:00 P.M.

11/25/62

SAIC Geiglein arranged with Deputy Chief Scott, Metropolitan Police Department, for assistance in maintaining surveillance. As per agreement, one plainclothes man would work with one Special Agent of this Service during the hours from approximately 7:00 A.M. to 11:00 P.M. This arrangement continued until December 3, 1962.

At 11:00 A.M., the subject, his aunt, Yvonne Jones, and his mother, Edith Rodriguez Jones, were observed leaving the apartment. They proceeded northeast on New Hampshire Avenue to 16th Street, N.W., where they boarded a downtown bus. SA Hall observed the subject returning to the apartment at 4:30 P.M. that date.

The purpose of subject's trip downtown was to prepare necessary papers for Immigration & Naturalization. While subject and his aunt were visiting the headquarters of Immigration & Naturalization, they were observed by SA Kyanko who was in that office to review records of subject and his family.

At 9:15 P.M., the subject was observed leaving his apartment and was followed on foot to 1638 R Street, N.W., where he entered his father's apartment on the 3rd floor. Subject left this building at 11:05 P.M., carrying a magazine, and proceeded directly on foot to his own apartment.

Discontinued 11:20 P.M.

11/27/62

At 10:08 A.M., the subject was observed departing his apartment and proceeding southeast on New Hampshire Avenue, east on R Street, to an address believed to be 1714 R Street, N.W., where he disappeared. SA Hall regained contact with subject at 1:30 P.M. when he was observed returning to his apartment. No further activity relating to the subject was observed.

Discontinued 11:20 P.M.

"11:05 A.M., SA Taylor and Detective Riley observing his apartment at 1638 R Street"
Description:

Antonio Rodriguez Echazabal is described as white; male; Cuban; 5'-9; 185; heavy build; black bushy mustache; wears horn-rimmed glasses; wearing a off-brown olive top coat; graying, receding hair.

He was observed leaving his apartment, proceeding east on P Street to the Chastleton Hotel where he purchased a paper and returned to the front of his apartment. There he met a group in a 1962 steel-gray, Buick LeSabre sedan, bearing New York License Plate 6 Q 5419. After parking the car, the group accompanied the elder Rodriguez to his apartment. This group consisted of four negro males, well dressed.

The license number of this car was checked with the New York State Police and is registered in the name of Dorothy Powell, 271 - 23 Pladome Avenue, Queens Village, New York.

1-15-5 was apprised of this meeting and furnished the following information:

Present at the meeting were: Ramiro Loyf, resident of the District of Columbia, Cuban exile; Marcel Fonbrun, exile from Haiti, residing in Long Island, N.Y.; Gaston Jumelle, exile from Haiti, residing in New York (this person was called by the subject's father on October 5 and October 25, 1962); Louis deJoie, Haitian exile who resides in New York.

The purpose of this meeting was an attempt on the part of the Haitian exiles to obtain support of the Cuban anti-Castro group for a Haitian movement designed to overthrow the rule of President Duvalier of Haiti. The leader of this movement is Paul E. Magloire, a former President of Haiti.

11/28/62

At 10:55 A.M., the subject was observed departing his apartment, proceeding northeast on New Hampshire Avenue, and hailing a Yellow Cab (not otherwise identified).

At 11:48 A.M., the mother and aunt were observed leaving the apartment and entering 1638 R Street, N.W.

At 3:50 P.M., Yvonne Jones appeared on foot at 1731 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., carrying groceries. At 4:35 P.M.,
subject's mother was observed entering 1731 New Hampshire Avenue.

At 9:45 P.M., subject returned to his apartment.

Discontinued at 11:30 P.M.

11/29/62

Subject was not observed leaving the apartment; however, he was observed returning at 3:10 P.M. Subject and mother departed the apartment at 3:40 P.M. Subject was dressed in what appeared to be a waiter's uniform - black bow tie; white shirt; black pants; highly shined shoes. Subject and mother entered 2039 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., and about 10 minutes later departed, the mother returning to the apartment, and the subject hailed a Diamond Cab, No. 298, at the 2000 block of 16th Street, N.W. As the cab pulled out from the curb, it was struck by a panel truck, and subject departed from the cab and hailed a Yellow Cab, No. 383, which proceeded west on U Street.

Inquiry of the Yellow Cab Company disclosed that subject was let out of the cab in front of 1150 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.

At 7:45 P.M., the subject's mother departed the apartment and proceeded to 1614 - 17th Street, N.W., entering that building and visiting a woman in Apartment 406. This apartment is listed for a Florentino Rodriguez. At 9:10 P.M., the mother returned to apartment.

At 11:00 P.M., surveillance was discontinued.

11/30/62

The Washington Detail agents were relived by Special Agents, Wong and Scanlon from New York.

At 10:25 P.M., the subject departed the apartment, boarded a bus at 16th and U Streets, N.W., and was observed entering Gusti's Italian Villa, 5th and Morse Streets, N.E. Discreet inquiry disclosed that the subject was working at this establishment as a waiter.

At 2:50 P.M., the subject was followed back to his apartment. At 3:15 P.M., the subject, his mother, and his aunt departed the apartment and walked one block to 1731 Riggs Place, N.W. An informant later advised that the person subjects visited at this address was probably a Mrs. Baum.
At about 3:35 P.M., the subject left alone and walked toward New Hampshire Avenue, and shortly thereafter returned to 1731 Riggs Place. Ten minutes later he again left this apartment with a woman believed to be his mother. They went to 1638 R Street, N.W.

At 4:00 P.M., what is believed to be the mother and the aunt departed this address and were not followed. About 25 minutes later the subject departed and surveillance was discontinued at about 17th and Q Streets. It was later determined that he was employed as a waiter at Gusti's Italian Villa that evening.

12/1/62

At approximately 5:30 P.M., the subject departed his residence with a woman who was either the aunt or the mother. They walked to R and 17th Streets, N.W., at which point the subject took a taxicab alone and was followed to Gusti's Italian Villa and was observed entering the premises. It was later learned that he worked as a waiter at that restaurant until 2:00 A.M. the following day.

12/2/62

No activity was observed involving the subject.

(d) CONCLUSION:

This investigation is being continued in Washington, D.C., in an effort to clearly establish whether Antonio Rodriguez Jones was the intended recipient of this letter and whether or not a plot is in effect to assassinate the President of the United States. Every effort will be made to determine the full circumstances surrounding the preparation of this letter. Liaison is continuing with 1-15-5 and 1-15-9, also with 1-15-46, in an effort to obtain additional information pertinent to this investigation.

Two copies of this report are being forwarded to Miami and New York. S.N.I.C. Geiglein confirmed telephone calls with those offices in memoranda dated November 28, 1962. It was requested that they initiate inquiry through reliable informants, by indirect or discreet means, to learn something of the reputation of the subject or his father, and photographs were furnished. Additional photographs are being forwarded to these offices of (1) Jose Moleon Carrera, and (2) Quinton Pino Machado. If it is learned that an informant knows the subject, the photographs of Machado and Carrera
should be shown in an effort to determine whether or not these two individuals have been seen with the subject, or whether or not they can be tied in in any way with the activities of the subject.

Two copies of this report are being forwarded to Baltimore, with photographs of the subject, his father, Jose Moleon Carrera, and Quinton Pino Machado, requesting that inquiry be initiated through reliable informants in an effort to learn whether or not the subject has any connection with the Office of the Consulate General of Venezuela. It is noted that on October 17 and November 2, 1962, calls were made from subject's phone, Columbia 5-1965, to that office. If it can be learned that the subject is known by informants, effort should be made to determine whether or not there is any tie between the subject and Machado and Carrera.

A Lookout for subject remains in effect with the White House Police.
Cuban Plot to Assassinate the President

Antonio Rodriguez y Jones, et al

SYNOPSIS

Subject interviewed under pretext. Information developed concerning the existence of a third letter postmarked Havana, Cuba, dated 11-5-62, addressed to one Carlos Meneses and signed "Pepe." There is evidence that a pattern has been established which indicates these letters have been purposely misdirected as part of disruptive tactics by the sender. Investigation continues.

DETAILS OF INVESTIGATION

Reference is made to report by the undersigned dated November 30, 1962, relating to the first letter in this case. After being processed at the Protective Research Section this letter was personally delivered to SA Douglas H. Brown of the Federal Bureau of Investigation by SA Robert R. Ryanko (1-15) on November 26, 1962.

Reference is made to report by the undersigned dated December 10, 1962, relating to the second letter. The original of this letter was received from [deleted], Central Intelligence Agency liaison man, by the reporting special agent on December 12, 1962, and personally delivered to the custody of SAIC Robert I. Bouck, Protective Research Section; on December 13, this original letter was transmitted to the Federal Bureau of Investigation with a covering memorandum.

Both of these letters are currently being processed by the FBI for possible association and identity of the sender and also for the possibility of code and writings in invisible ink. This Service will
be advised of the results of these examinations and, per agreement, the FBI will return these original letters at the conclusion of their processing.

On December 10, 1962, Informant 1-15-45 advised of a letter recently intercepted, dated November 5, 1962, from Havana, Cuba. This letter was addressed to one Carlos Meneses, P. O. Box 347, Guatemala City, Guatemala. 1-15-45 disclosed that a substantial portion of the letter states:

"Prepare for air force uprising to take place 3rd week, this month. Imperative Ydigoras be overthrown. This will be first uprising of series already prepared. Latin America must be totally Communist within one year. Long live World Revolution. On dictating these orders I am carrying out direct orders of Fidel."

There is every indication, from information and reports extant, that Carlos Meneses is not known at P. O. Box 347 in Guatemala City and that, consequently, the letter was intercepted and turned over to a person of authority in the Guatemalan Government. Intelligence sources in Guatemala City indicate that Meneses was a Mayor of the departmental capital of Chimaltenango and was elected and served as a member of the government's Executive Committee. A copy of this letter was turned over to a representative of 1-15-9 and the original letter is being used by the government of Guatemala in their current investigation.

During this current phase of the investigation of Antonio Rodriguez y Jones, information was developed by 1-15-17 concerning the background and reputation of his associates, as follows:

Claude Thomas Desulma (referred to in report dated 12/10/62, page 4), born Dec. 15, 1938, in Port-au-Prince, Haiti; described as 5' 6"; 150 pounds; black hair; black eyes; Social Security No. 095-34-4199. Desulma's last listed address was 1505 Varnum Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. His employment history indicated that he had been employed from Feb. 1960 to Jan. 1961 with the Endmore Plastic Co., and from Sept. 1961 to Feb. 1962 with the Leslyn Products Co., a plastics processor; further information indicated that he had previously been employed with the Television Nationale de Haiti in the capacity of a public relations man and is presently being considered for employment with the United States Information Agency. To date, the security investigation disclosed nothing of a derogatory nature concerning the background of Desulma.
It is noted in report dated 12/10/62 that the subject had been in contact with one Andrew Jolley in the Moroccan Embassy. 1-15-17 advises that in all probability, this was the anglicized spelling for the Press Attache of the Moroccan Embassy, a Mr. Abdelkhalik Jallal. This individual was known by 1-15-17 to have been seeking employees in an effort to cover both sides (pro and con) of the Cuban situation.

In an effort to determine the author of the second letter received for investigation, the files of various government agencies were checked for the name, Jose Menendez, with negative results.

On December 10, 1962, 1-15-17 disclosed that one Jose Menendez y Ramos was associated with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC), a pro-Communist group, and that in July 1961 his wife, Carrie Hernandez, who was also associated with that group, was known to have been agitating for her husband's return to Cuba.

Ramos is described as white; male; born 11/11/21 in Havana, Cuba; 5-8; 150; brown eyes; black hair; last known residence in the United States, 1211 1/2 - 17th Avenue, Tampa, Fla.; last employment, as a baker in the Union Bakery, 1508 - 9th Avenue, Tampa, Fla.

According to 1-15-17, Ramos was known to be a member of the Executive Board for the FPCC in Tampa. On October 23, 1961, Ramos and his wife were observed in Cuba and Ramos was described as occupying a "top job" with the Castro Government. Ramos has abandoned his residence in the United States.

A telephone call was placed on December 11, 1962, by the reporting special agent to SA Arnold K. Peppers, Tampa, relating the above information concerning Jose Menendez y Ramos. It was requested that SA Peppers obtain as many specimens of the subject's handwriting and/or handprinting as available and that these specimens be forwarded to the Washington Field Office as soon as possible.

Accordingly, specimens of Ramos handwriting were forwarded to this office December 12, 1962, with report of SA Peppers. Also, specimens of Ramos handwriting and handprinting were uncovered by the reporting special agent at the American Bakery and Confectionery Workers International Union (AFL-CIO), 1120 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C.
On December 14, 1962, Mr. Irby Todd of the Office of the Examiner of Questioned Documents, Treasury Department, made a preliminary examination of the first and second letters and disclosed that they were of common authorship. In examining the specimens of the handprinting available, reported to have been executed by Jose Menendez y Ramos, Examiner Todd furnished the opinion that in all probability these were not specimens of Ramos' handwriting but rather that someone had prepared these forms on which the handprinting appears for Ramos. In studying the handwriting of Ramos, Mr. Todd disclosed that Ramos is capable of writing and printing in an above-average style.

A further examination will be made by the EQD in Washington, D.C., when all specimens of Ramos handwriting have been received.

Informant 1-15-48 was contacted and disclosed nothing of interest which would contribute to this investigation. All contacts observed by 1-13-48 between the subject, Antonio Rodriguez Jones, and others have been in connection with the pursuance of better employment and with personal friends on which there is no derogatory information.

On December 12, 1962, Informant 1-15-49 was interviewed concerning the subject and whatever background information could be obtained relative to members of the subject's family.

1-15-49 indicated that subject's father, Antonio Rodriguez Echazabal, was well known by officials in the Cuban government, both before and after the Castro revolution. He recalled that the subject's father was engaged as a butcher (owned a meat store) in Haiti and that when Castro came into power the elder Rodriguez walked into the Cuban Embassy in Haiti and advised that he was the new Ambassador. In 1959 there were reports that the elder Rodriguez had shot and killed an individual associated with an anti-Castro group. Since that time he has been held in very low esteem by groups involved in anti-Castro activities.

[Deleted.]
1-15-49 knew of the infamous reputation of Jose Moleon Carrera and Quinton Pino Machado; that both of these individuals were members of the Inter American Defense Board and the Organization of American States; and that Moleon lived and operated out of the Cuban Embassy from January 1961 to January 1962 in a clandestine manner. 1-15-49 knows of no association between the subject and these two individuals.

When 1-15-49 was questioned concerning his knowledge of acts of violence by pro-Castro groups in the United States, he recalled that approximately four weeks ago Dr. Jose Hiro Cardona, head of the Cuban Revolutionary Council, was almost killed by a pro-Castro revolutionary group. He had driven his car to his home and approximately one hour after he entered his home his car was blown up by a bomb which was set on the fender. 1-15-49 advised that another government agency involved in investigations of a security nature compared fragments of this bomb with the bomb used by the saboteurs in New York and could not associate the bombs as being of common manufacture. 1-15-49 said that the pro-Castro groups, both inside and outside of the United States, are capable of any acts of violence and have been known to purposely have directed communications to anti-Castro groups for reasons of harassment and to cause difficulty for these individuals.

1-15-49 knew of a Jose Menendez who was employed with the Institute of National Agrarian Reform and is presently occupying a very important position with the Castro government. He could furnish no further information concerning this individual.

1-15-49 offered full cooperation with this Service and stated that when he is able to obtain a visa for the elder Rodriguez mother he will deliver it in person to 1731 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., and attempt to obtain as much information as possible concerning the subject. In addition, he indicated that he would contact others having knowledge of current pro-Castro activities in an effort to obtain more background information on the subject.
Through Mr. James F. Greene, Deputy Associate Commissioner, Domestic Control, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Washington, D.C., arrangements were made for the subject to be called into the Immigration and Naturalization Field Office for reinterview.

On December 12, 1962, the reporting special agent posed as an Immigration and Naturalization investigator and was assisted by William B. Dinwiddie, Jr., Investigator, INS, at which time a signed, sworn deposition was obtained from the subject covering his interrogation. It appeared very unusual that the subject and his father took no steps to obtain clarification of their Immigration and Naturalization status. They are presently both classified as parolees and neither has taken steps to become naturalized citizens. In this status they can be placed in a detention center by the INS if any information is developed that would have a bearing on anti-American activities or that would indicate they were untruthful to INS authorities in matters of an official nature.

During the interrogation, the subject indicated that he knew Felipe Martinez Rivero and Jose Moleon; that Pino Machado, whom he also knew, had discussed with him plans for education behind the Iron Curtain. He admitted being contacted by Moleon concerning Martinez and also that he had taken a picture of a home of a Cuban Naval Attaché (Miguel Pena) at the request of an officer in the Cuban Embassy; that he had visited the Cuban Embassy on a number of occasions while his father was in the diplomatic corps for Fidel Castro; and that he had purposely lied to officials in the Cuban Embassy in order to protect his father. The subject admitted no present involvement with any group or organization and indicated allegiance to the American principles and his desire to remain in the United States.

On December 13, 1962, the subject was accompanied by his father to whom he read the deposition. The elder Rodriguez indicated he was in agreement with the statements his son made concerning his allegiance to the United States and offered his assistance to the Immigration & Naturalization Service. He admitted that he was presently working with a group to effect the overthrow of the government in Haiti by peaceful means.

On December 17, 1962, copies of this deposition were furnished SA Joseph Sculley of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

On December 13, a representative of the State Department Security Section, Mr. Jack Lynch, advised that a dispatch was being SECRET
sent this date to all security offices in the Latin American area, advising of the possibility of additional letters emanating from Havana, Cuba, signed by "Pepe," indicating acts of violence or revolutionary activities. No mention was made in this dispatch of the interest of the Secret Service or that any previous letters were received which indicated the safety of the President was involved.

It now appears that a pattern has been established relating to the addressing and delivery of these letters under investigation. The first letter was so improperly addressed it could not have been directed to any individual in Washington, D.C. The Post Office surmised that the proper recipient was Antonio Rodriguez Gil; however, investigation disclosed that this was in error. The second letter was addressed to a known anti-Communist mail drop in Miami, Florida, and the third letter was addressed to a Post Office box at which the addressee was not known.

Investigation is being continued in Washington, D.C., in an effort to obtain further information and knowledge concerning the sender of these letters.

A request has been made through the State Department and Central Intelligence Agency to obtain a copy or the original of this third letter which was sent to Guatemala City.

Copies of the deposition obtained from Antonio Rodriguez Jones are being forwarded to the Miami, New York, and Newark offices, with this report, for whatever value it may afford in current investigations.

The Chief's Office, through the CIA Liaison, will explore the possibility of further investigation in Havana, Cuba, to determine the identity of the sender of these letters.

The Immigration and Naturalization Service in Washington, D.C., disclosed that the file on Jose Menendez y Ramos, No. A 6190710, is in Miami, Florida. It is requested that the Miami office obtain specimens of Ramos' handwriting and/or handprinting and forward them to Washington, D.C., for examination by the EOD.

Close liaison is being continued with 1-15-5, 1-15-9, 1-15-46, and other informants in an effort to obtain additional information pertinent to this investigation.
Copies of official reports received from other agencies, and other pertinent data are included as attachments for the Chief's Office only, as follows:

D. Employment Contract Card - Antonio Rodriguez (Jones), Georgetown Inn.
E. Deposition of Antonio Rodriguez Jones, 11/26/62.
F. Deposition of Antonio Rodriguez Jones, 12/12/62.
I. Deposition Antonio Rodriguez Echazabal, 11/19/62.
K. Report of ATSAIC Stout, 4/14/61, relative to incident involving Moleon and Macnado.
SYNOPSIS

Discreet inquiries of reliable sources of information in Miami has failed to reveal any information relating to the subject.

(a) INTRODUCTION:

Reference is made to long distance telephone call of November 27, 1962 from Special Agent in Charge Harry A. Geiglein, Washington Field Office, to Special Agent in Charge John A. Marshall, Miami, Fla., requesting discreet investigation in this case.

(b) GENERAL HISTORY:

Through the period November 27 - 30, 1962, discreet inquiries were made of all reliable sources of information in the Miami area relative to the subject matter. During contacts with these known reliable sources of information, the subject matter was not discussed nor the subject of this investigation. No information of interest was developed during these inquiries, although the nature of the inquiries was extremely removed from the subject matter.

[Deleted.]

[Deleted.]
Further reference is made to long distance telephone call on November 31, 1962 from Special Agent in Charge Geigl, Washington Field Office, to Special Agent Dragon, Miami, Fla., requesting the results of inquiries in this area and also advising of long distance telephone calls made from Washington, D. C. telephone number 332-6277 to Enrique Rodriguez, brother of Antonio Rodriguez y Jones, 163 P. Street, M. A., as follows:

On October 15, 1962 to Franklin 1-9394, Miami, Fla.
On October 17, 1962 to Franklin 1-9221, Miami, Fla.
On October 23, 1962 to Franklin 1-9221, Miami, Fla.
On October 25, 1962 to Franklin 1-9221, Miami, Fla.

On this same date inquiry was made of a confidential source in Miami and it was learned that telephone number Franklin 1-9394 is a pay station located at the Rice Hotel, 310 North Miami Ave., Miami, Fla., and that telephone number Franklin 1-9221 is also a pay station listed under the name of Julio Garceran, 222 17th Terrace, Miami, Fla.

It is noted that the address of Julio Garceran, 222 17th Ter., Miami, Fla., is in the vicinity of the address of Informant 3-11-23.

Informant 3-11-23 was contacted relative to Julio Garceran and informed reports that Julio Garceran is well-known. His full name is Julio Garceran de Pall and he is 50 years of age. Informant 3-11-23
states that Garceran is a former magistrate and professor in Cuba; that
Garceran now claims to be the head of the Constitutional Government of
Cuba in Exile and has laid his own plans to take over the presidency of
Cuba after the overthrow of Castro. Informant states that Garceran is
not recognized by legitimate and responsible Cuban organizations in Miami
and that he does not have a large following. Informant states that
Garceran's ideals are considered "fantasy."

The information relating to the lists of the telephone numbers was
relayed to Special Agent Frank G. Stoner, Washington Field Office, Wash-
ington, D.C., November 30, 1962 via long distance telephone call, together
with the information pertaining to Julio Garceran.

(C) DISPOSITION:

Continued investigation in this case is held in abeyance pending further
instructions from the controlling office.
A letter written in Spanish, postmarked at Havana, Cuba, November 29, 1962, sent by Jose Menendez, 5th Avenue No. 2611, Reparto Miramar, Marianao, Havana, Cuba, addressed to Bernardo Morales, Apartado 1621, Miami, Florida, was intercepted at Miami by 3-11-62 on December 7, 1962. The letter reveals a plot to assassinate the President of the United States. Traces are being run on Bernardo Morales and persons of similar names as well as other names contained in subject letter. Bernardo Adalberto Morales-Rivero, a remote possibility, is being checked out further.

(A) INTRODUCTION:

On December 7, 1962, 3-11-62 telephoned Special Agent in Charge John A. Marshall at his residence and informed him of the receipt of a letter, written in Spanish, which they had intercepted and which revealed a plot to assassinate the President of the United States.

3-11-62 stated the letter was postmarked at Havana, Cuba, November 29, 1962 and indicated it was sent by Jose Menendez, 5th Avenue 2611, Reparto Miramar, Marianao, Havana, Cuba, addressed to Bernardo Morales, Apartado (Box) 1624, Miami 1, Florida. 3-11-62 advised the letter was delivered to them by a source on December 7, 1962. They further advised that Box 1624 at Miami, Florida, is listed to Radio Libertad La Voce Anti-Communista de America and the local representatives for Radio Libertad are Olga Duque de Heredia and Aida Mayna-Cantara, both currently residing at 152 S.E. Third St., Apt. 37, Miami, Florida. 3-11-62 further advises Radio Libertad is a clandestine organization which broadcasts from Caracas, Venezuela.
They stated that Post Office Box 1624 at Miami, Florida, serves as a letter drop for correspondents wishing to communicate with the radio station.

They advised that the original letter was being forwarded to the Chief's Office and a copy of the original letter and a translation of the letter were made available to the Miami office.

The contents of the letter were thoroughly analyzed and discussed at the Miami level with 3-11-14 and the opinion has been expressed that the letter may be either provocative type letter or it may possibly contain a message for United States authorities. It appears that the text of the subject letter is prominently explicit and specific with respect to the intent.

Source said they have run traces on Bernardo Morales and have developed one Bernardo Adalberto Morales-Rivero as the possible intended recipient of this letter, although this is only a remote trace. Bernardo Adalberto Morales-Rivero furnished as contacts in Miami one Octavio Ledo of 6083 W. 16th Ave., Hialeah, Florida, as well as Manolo Quijano and Jorge Morales.

3-11-14 further advised that their traces on Bernardo Morales and the other names appearing on the subject letter are being continued. They have requested that inquiry of Radio Libertad to determine if a Bernardo Morales is working for the radio be initiated through their headquarters in Washington.

They report no traces on Olga Duque de Heredia.

3-11-14 furnished a trace on one Aida Mayo which indicates that as of 1960 her name appeared on a list of names carried in the personal effects of the Cuban Ambassador to the U.N. She was reported to be a member of the 26th of July Movement in New York. She is also reported to be a Cuban agent in the U.S. who resided at 330 Haven Ave., New York City. Aida Mayo is said to be a close friend of Fidel Castro and, although not an official of the Cuban government, she sometimes acted on behalf of the Cuban government.

A trace on Radio Libertad La Voz Anti-Communista de America, furnished by 3-11-14, indicates that in 1961 Jose Vasquez Blanco and Mario Altona visited the U.S. Embassy in Caracas, and informed the embassy that they represented a clandestine radio in Venezuela and furnished information relative to their broadcasting schedules. It is reported that they had the means to re-broadcast material to Latin countries, including Colombia, Panama, Venezuela and Jamaica, as well as Cuba. The purpose of their call at the U.S. Embassy was to request broadcast material but they did not otherwise ask for financial support.
3-11-14 stated that they do not know at the Miami level whether they are supporting Radio Libertad.

Special Agent in Charge John A. Marshall, Miami, telephonically advised Special Agent in Charge Geiglein of the Washington Field Office of the interception of this letter in Miami and its contents and that the original letter would be forwarded to the Chief's Office for a technical check. Special Agent in Charge Marshall further requested that the Washington Field Office endeavor to determine through sources of 3-11-14 whether Bernardo Morales is an employee of Radio Libertad in Caracas and further that they attempt to determine the identity of Jose Menendez, the sender of this letter in Havana, Cuba through their sources in Cuba.

On December 10, 1962, a photostatic copy of the letter addressed to Antonio Rodriguez at Washington, D.C. was received by the Miami office and comparison of the handprinting on that letter with the handprinting on the letter addressed to Bernardo Morales in Miami, Florida, makes it appear evident that both letters were penned by the same person.

A translation of the letter addressed to Bernardo Morales at Miami, Florida, as furnished by 3-11-14 is as follows:

"Havana, 27 Nov. 62. Dear Bernardo. Today Carlos gave me your new P.O. Box. This info was given to him by your friend Miriam. For days I have wanted to write to you as I have to various of our mutual friends, giving them the instructions which follow and which I am sending you. I hope that they will arrive in time. Now to the Matter: I have already communicated to 'your friends' of Miami and Pasaia and to those in Washington the precise instructions for the attempt which we are planning against Kennedy in Washington or if that should fail when he visits Brazil. It is necessary to mortally strike imperialism at its very heart. If we are able to kill President Kennedy, it would be a great success, super extraordinary, for Fidel and for the Communist Liberation Movement. We Cubans are the ones who are marching with world-wide Communism. We are consolidating a Marxist-Leninist Regime within 90 miles from the U.S. Get an interview with them (Sic). We have to rely on our own forces. Russia can not do it all. There is enough already. Believe me, if we are able to do this we will paralyze imperialism completely. They will respect Fidel and his Government more. The tactics to follow in the future is
one of constant agitation throughout America in order to frighten or terrorize capitalism. The idea is erroneous that there has to be quiet for the time being. No matter how difficult the situation may be, one must never be afraid of imperialism. Did you not see, thanks to the sabotage in Venezuela, during the past month, that we paralyzed the invasion of Cuba during the blockade? We will also completely paralyze the future plans of the United States if we are successful in killing Kennedy. Certainly in the face of such an act Vice President Lyndon Johnson will not get involved with us for a long time. To this end, get in contact with 'your friends' so that they will give you the instructions which they have received through the appropriate channels. Your tactics should be to continue demonstrating yourself as anti-Communist, more specifically anti-Castro, as you have. Up to now you have played your role very well and you have been successful in completely deceiving the F.B.I. You are an artist. By the way, are you already speaking over the radio against Fidel? How it will make me laugh to hear you. The F.B.I. cannot cope with us. They are imbeciles, cretins. I have decided to send you this by mail since your 'anti-Communist' address certainly will not be 'controlled' by the F.B.I. Furthermore I do not wish to take advantage of other means. The specific and detailed instructions of the plan will be sent by means known to you. Answer by the same means. Fidel is very anxious to know how the plans are progressing. I salute you. Signed: 'Pepe.' P.S. How is your wife? Greet her and your brother warmly."

\[(B)\] **GENERAL INQUIRIES:**

On December 10, 1962, on the premise that the subject letter may have been intended for a recipient in Post Office Box 1624 in Post Office branches in the general Miami area, Post Office boxes 1624 in Coral Gables, Miami Beach and North Miami Beach, Florida, were checked through the postal inspector's office. Post Office Box 1624 at Miami Beach 39, Florida, is assigned to Arthur Baron, 1777 Collins Avenue, having been rented in September 1962. The Post Office Box by the same number at Coral Gables 34, Florida, is assigned to Florence Higgs, 277 Minorca, having been rented on February 23, 1962. The Post Office Box by the same number at North Miami Beach 61, Florida, has not been in use since 1958.

The Main Post Office at Miami, Florida, does not maintain a dead letter file for mis-addressed mail.
On December 10, 1962, Special Agent Robert J. Jamison, Miami, checked the files of federal and state investigative agencies in the Miami area for information relative to Bernardo Morales but he was not found of record.

On the same date Special Agent Jamison checked the records of the Immigration & Naturalization Service, Miami, and learned that they had a file on one Bernardo Adalberto Morales-Rivero whose Immigration & Naturalization Service number is AL2903942. Morales-Rivero was born on February 24, 1928 at Sagua, LaGrande, Las Villas, Cuba. He is five feet seven (5'7") in height, 140 pounds in weight, has brown eyes and brown hair, and wears a mustache.

Morales-Rivero entered the United States on June 5, 1962, through Miami International Airport under Cuban passport No. 6845 and was admitted for an indefinite period. At the time Morales-Rivero entered the United States he was carrying a fraudulent B-2 visa which he declared was fraudulent. At the time of his arrival in Miami he gave political reasons for defecting from Cuba.

On September 5, 1962, Bernardo Adalberto-Rivero submitted a statement to the Immigration & Naturalization Service, wherein he states in part that he is a citizen of Cuba and that he has never been arrested or deported from the United States and that he has never belonged to any Communist organization. The statement is signed "Bernardo Morales".

Morales-Rivero lists members of his immediate family as Bernardo Morales, father, age 71; Micaela Rivero, mother, age 61; and Manuela de la Caridad Elias Planellos, wife, age 33. He also lists contacts in the United States as Octavio Ledon of 6083 W. 16th Ave., Hialeah, Florida, and Manuel Quiapo and Jorge Morales, both of Miami, Florida.

In September 1962 Morales-Rivero submitted a change of address to the Immigration service indicating that he is currently residing at 133 Bacon Point Road, Pahokee, Florida, and is currently working for the Oceola Sugar Mill in Pahokee, Florida. His Social Security number is 265-74-5140, secured under the name of Bernardo A. Morales.

On December 11, 1962, a source of 3-11-21 was interviewed in Miami. [Deleted.]

This source stated to his knowledge there was no one by the name of Bernardo Morales working for the radio station.
On December 11, 1962, after repeated efforts, Olga Duque de Heredia and Aida Mayo were located and interviewed. Olga Duque de Heredia is also known as Olga Louisa de la Caridad as well as Olga Duque de Lopez. Olga Duque exhibited Cuban Refugee registration card No. 21343 which indicated she entered the United States at Miami, Florida, on October 7, 1961. She is currently residing at 152 S.E. Third St., Apt. 37, Miami, Florida, and receives mail in care of Post Office Box 1624, Miami 1, Florida. Olga Duque works for the Catholic Relief Center at Miami.

Olga Duque stated that her husband, Humberto Lopez Perez, is one of the original founders of Radio Libertad and is currently the director. She said that the radio station in Caracas is a clandestine operation and that they request all mail for the radio be sent to a letter drop in Miami where she receives the mail and later forwards it to her husband in Caracas. She said that she rents Post Office Box 1624 at Miami, Florida, solely for the purpose of receiving correspondence for the radio station. Olga Duque stated that she is not certain whether the radio reaches Cuba and emphasized that she does not receive any mail from Cuba. She said that the majority of the correspondence for the radio emanates from Venezuela and sources in the United States. She said that as representative of the radio in Miami she is authorized to open all mail before it is forwarded to Caracas.

Olga Duque stated that the letter addressed to Bernardo Morales was picked up at the mail drop on Sunday, December 2, 1962. She said that she did not immediately open the letter because it had a Cuban return address and that she initially intended to return it to the post office since she did not know the addressee. Olga Duque said that on December 4, 1962, at her office located at 600 Biscayne Boulevard, she opened the letter and after reading the contents she took the letter to a priest at Gesu Catholic Church, who advised her to immediately surrender the letter to the proper authorities. Olga Duque said that as she did not know how to get in touch with the proper agencies, on December 6, 1962, she eventually contacted Cesar Gajate, an impeccable friend of long standing, who has been in Miami for the past three months, and who she considers to be of good moral character, an avowed counter-revolutionary, and anti-Communist, in whom she confides whole-heartedly, and surrendered the letter to him, with the request that he deliver the letter to the proper authorities. (The letter was delivered by Gajate to 3-11-14 on December 7, 1962 and a copy was received by this Service on December 8, 1962.)

Olga Duque said that she is certain that Bernardo Morales is not working for the radio station in Caracas. She said that she does not know a Bernardo Morales as such nor the sender of the letter, Jose Mendenez. She also said that Bernardo Adalberto-Morales-Rivero is unknown to her, as well as any of the other names mentioned in the letter.
Olga Duque said that she is of the opinion that the letter was intended to intimidate the operators of Radio Libertad and that the names and addresses of the sender and the intended recipient are fictitious. She said that their office in Caracas had been broken into and a list containing the names of all persons associated with the radio had been stolen.

Interview of Aida Mayo discloses that her full name is Aida Mercedes Mayo Castera, widow of Vidal Fernández, deceased. She is of record with the Cuban Refugee Center in Miami under file No. 18412. She entered the United States at Miami, Florida on March 3, 1961 as a Cuban refugee. She exhibited a document which indicates she is one of the founders of the Partido Revolucionario Cubano Auténtico (Authentic Cuban Revolutionary Party), an anti-Castro organization. Aida Mayo said that although she is residing with Olga Duque, she is in no way associated with Radio Libertad.

Aida Mayo said that she is oftentimes mistaken for another Aida Mayo, who is a close associate and aide to Fidel Castro. (She evidently is referring to the Aida Mayo known to 3-31-61).

A photograph of Bernardo Adalberto Morales-Rivero was exhibited to Olga Duque and Aida Mayo, and neither was able to identify him as a person known to them or an employee of Radio Libertad.

On December 11, 1962, Octavio Loden was interviewed at 6083 W. 16th Ave., Hialeah, Florida. His full name is Octavio Loden Baradanía. He was born in Cuba on January 19, 1922 and entered the United States at Miami, Florida, on August 1, 1961. His Immigration & Naturalization number is AI2444404. He is presently on indefinite parole status in this country and is currently working at the Talisman Sugar Company, at Talisman, Florida.

[Deleted.]

Octavio Loden stated that he has known Bernardo Adalberto Morales-Rivero who works in the Okeola Sugar Mill at Pahokee, Florida, for over ten years. He says that Morales-Rivero is an honest, respectable man, and to his knowledge has never been involved in politics. He says that Morales-Rivero was forced to leave his employment as a metal-smith in Sagua La Grande, Cuba, as the result of pressures brought upon him to go work in the cane fields. He said that Morales-Rivero subsequently renounced the Castro regime and fled to Havana, where he remained in hiding until he was able to secure a visa, at which time he left for Miami, Florida.
Ledon stated that Morales-Rivero, to his knowledge, has never been associated with any organizations and is an avowed anti-Communist. Ledon stated that as long as he has known Morales-Rivero he has never suspected that Morales-Rivero was a Castroite or was sympathetic to the Communist regime. Ledon stated that Morales-Rivero is presently residing with his family at Pahokee, Florida, and to his knowledge, he receives all mail addressed to him direct at his Pahokee, Florida, address.

Arrangements have been made for interview of Morales-Rivero under pretext.

Reference is made to Memorandum Report dated November 30, 1962, submitted by Special Agent C. E. Taylor, Jr., Washington Field Office.

On December 10, 1962, 3-11-23 was interviewed relative to Antonio Rodriguez y Jones and his father, Antonio Andres Rodriguez-Echazabal. Photographs were exhibited to them and the sources stated the subjects were unknown to them.

With reference to Jose Nelson Carrera, 3-11-21 stated that Carrera is a former engineering student from the University of Havana and was a member of an organization known as "March 13". This source states that one of the leaders of the above mentioned organization was Faure Chauvont, now a minister in the Castro government and formerly a Cuban ambassador to Russia. Source related that Commander Nelson Carerra was appointed as a military attaché to the Inter-American Defense Council in Washington, D.C. The source states that Commander Nelson Carerra was not originally a member of the Communist party and his sympathy was pro-Nationalist; nevertheless, he created great problems in the Inter-American Defense Council, defending the Castro Communist regime. At present he is believed to be in Cuba.

With reference to Quentin Pino Machado, the source states that Machado was a member of the 26th of July Movement. One of his brothers died in a terrorist action in the city of Matanzas. Pino Machado served a prison sentence in Cuba until December 31, 1958. While he was in prison he associated with Armando Hart of the 26th of July Committee and he was indoctrinated into the Communist Party. Machado was alternate ambassador to the United Nations and although he never participated in debates, it is believed that instead he was the organizer of subversive movements in the United States. Machado is said to have worked during the fight against Batista in matters of sabotage.

In addition, with reference to a Colonel Hugo Trego, the source advised that Trego was a principal in the overthrow of the government of Perez Jiminez in Venezuela. Source states that Colonel Trego had great military backing in Venezuela and although he was in accord with the Betancourt government, it was feared that he might instigate the overthrow of Betancourt. As a result, Colonel Trego was given a diplomatic assignment in Washington, D.C. in order to get him out of Venezuela.

On December 10, 1962, 3-11-23 was interviewed relative to the subjects in this case. The source reports that Antonio Rodriguez y Jones and Bernardo Morales are unknown to him.
The source states that Antonio Andres Rodriguez-Echazabel formerly was a resident in Haiti who, after the overthrow of Batista's government, was designated as ambassador to Haiti. It was reported that he had some difficulty with the Haitian government and was subsequently sent to another country in the Americas where he was subsequently declared persona non grata. He subsequently became ambassador to Pakistan. His current whereabouts is unknown but it is believed that he is in Washington, D.C.

The source reports that Commander Jose Noleon Carreras was in Washington representing Cuba in the Inter-American Defense Council. The source states that when Cuba was expelled from the organization Commander Noleon returned to Cuba and his current whereabouts is unknown.

With reference to Quentin Pino Machado the source states that Machado had different diplomatic assignments in Latin America and at the present time he is believed to be representing Cuba in a country behind the Iron Curtain, either in Romania or Bulgaria.

The source added that in a session of the Organization of American States held on October 25, 1961, the alternate representative of Nicaragua charged Quentin Pino Machado, then Ambassador of Cuba, with interference in the internal politics of Nicaragua. The source related that the Nicaragua representative stated in his commentary that "on January 22, 1950, Ambassador Quentin Pino Machado presented his credentials. Nobody could have suspected that behind the youthful appearance of the Cuban Ambassador was hidden the personality of a terrible conspirator and terrorist. He carried in his briefcase all the instructions, plans and orders to be carried out in Nicaragua. Immediately after being accepted as Ambassador he began to put into effect his sinister activities under the protection of his diplomatic immunity."

"His first step was the foundation of the 'Juventud Patriotica Nacional' (National Patriotic Youth), with youths of high school age. This organization served as a platform for the ulterior subversive activities planned by Pino Machado. He taught the terrorist technique and its dreadful phases of destruction and death.

"The Cuban Embassy became the general headquarters of subversion. The young terrorist under the direction of Pino Machado, received daily training in the manufacture of bombs, cutting of telegraphic lines and how to blow up railroads. The terrorists of the National Patriotic Youth perfected their training with the pamphlets written by General Alberto Bayo (known in file CO-2-31,789), a pernicious Spaniard who teaches the technique of destruction ..........Official and individual automobiles were burned on the streets........"

The source cautions that Quentin Pino Machado should be considered a dangerous person.

Further reference is made to Memorandum Report dated December 11, 1962 from Special Agent Peppers, Tampa, Florida.
On December 12, 1962, the records of the Immigration Service in Miami were checked for Jose Menendez y Ramos. He is of record under INS No. A61902310. He was born on November 11, 1921, at Guanabacoa, Cuba. He is five feet five inches (5'5") in height, 144 pounds in weight, has brown eyes and black hair, ruddy complexion. He lists his occupation as baker and mechanic. He is married to Caridad Hernandez de Menendez. He lists his father as Rufino Menendez, deceased, and his mother, Josefa Ramos.

The INS file reveals that Jose Menendez y Ramos first entered the United States on October 31, 1945, and remained until December 16, 1945.

He again entered the United States on February 3, 1946, with Cuban passport No. 2603, issued on June 29, 1943, which carried visa No. 1317 issued at Havana, Cuba, on January 24, 1946. His residence in the United States is listed as 1211 17th Avenue, Tampa, Florida.

He departed Tampa, Florida, on November 6, 1952 for a two-week pleasure trip to Cuba, and was permitted to re-enter the United States on December 23, 1952, with permission to remain until November 6, 1953.

The next notation in this file indicates that Menendez y Ramos submitted a request to return to Cuba and establish residence in that country, and he renounced all his rights and privileges of a resident alien in the United States. He departed the United States on October 8, 1961, and returned to Cuba.

[Deleted.]

[Deleted.]

The report reflects that Menendez was elected an executive member of the FPCC. His wife, Caridad Menendez, is reported to be a U.S. citizen, having been born at Tampa, Florida. Menendez is reported to be "extremely" pro-Castro and defends the Castro regime.

The report of 3-11-15 further reveals that Caridad Menendez was employed by Doctor Torretta at Tampa, Florida, but was dismissed because of a letter she wrote to a Tampa newspaper regarding the FPCC.

Caridad Menendez was reported to be sympathetic to the Castro regime and as of September 6, 1961, she and her children returned to Cuba by way of Mexico.

In report of 3-11-15 dated December 29, 1961, it reveals that as of October 23, 1961, Jose Menendez was known to have a "top job" in Cuba. He is also reported to have been a leader of Communist youth in Cuba before coming to the United States.
Photostatic copies of the handprinting of Jose Menendez y Ramos contained in his INS file are being forwarded to the Chief's Office for analysis. The original handprinting of Menendez y Ramos could not be secured through the local INS office and they have suggested that if required, a request be made that his file be forwarded to Washington for analysis there.

The film negative of the photograph of Bernardo Adalberto Morales-Rivero is being forwarded to the Chief's office for reproduction and distribution.

All reliable sources in Miami have been tapped for information relating to this case and investigation is being continued. This case is being coordinated in Miami with 3-11-15 and 3-11-14.

(I) DISPOSITION:

Case continued.
Conversation between William Somersett and Joseph Milteer

November 9, 1963:

Informant: Somersett  Subject: Milteer

Informant: I don't know. I think Kennedy is coming here on the 18th, or something like that, to make some kind of speech. I don't know what it is, but I imagine it will be on the T.V. and you can be on the look for that. I think it is the 18th that he is supposed to be here for a speech. I don't know that it is supposed to be about.

Subject: You can bet your bottom dollar he is going to have a lot to say about the Cubans. There are so many of them here.

Informant: Yes. Well, he will have a thousand bodyguards. Don't worry about that.

Subject: The more bodyguards he has, the more easier it is to get him.

Informant: What?

Subject: The more bodyguards he has the easier it is to get him.

Informant: Well, how in the hell do you figure would be the best way to get him?
Subject: From an office building with a high powered rifle, how many people does he have going around who look just like him? Do you know about that?

Informant: No, I never heard that he had anybody.

Subject: He sure has got them.

Informant: He has?...

Subject: He has about 15. Whenever he goes any place they (illegible) he knows he is a marked man.

Informant: You think he knows he's a marked man?

Subject: Sure he does. Sure does -- yeah.

Informant: They are really going to try to kill him?

Subject: Oh yeah, it is in the working. Brown, himself. Brown is just as likely to get him as anybody. He didn't say so, but he tried to get Martin Luther King.

Informant: He did?

Subject: Oh yes. He followed him for miles and miles, and couldn't get close enough to him. ...

Informant: I never asked Brown about his business or anything, you know just what he told me, told us, you know. But after the conversation, and the way he talked to us, there is no question in my mind who knocked the church off in Birmingham,
You can believe that, that is the way I figured it.

Subject: That is right, it is the only way you can figure it.

Informant: That is right.

Subject: Not being there, not knowing anything.

Informant: But from his conversation, as you and me know him, but if they did, it is their business, like you say.

Subject: It is up to the individual.

Informant: That is right. They are individual operators, we don't want that within the party. Hitting this Kennedy is going to be a hard proposition, I tell you, I believe, you may have figured out a way to get him. You may have figured out the office building, and all that. I don't know how them Secret Service Agents cover all them office buildings, or anywhere he is going. Do you know whether they do that or not?

Subject: Well, if they have any suspicions, they do that, of course. But without suspicion, chances are that they wouldn't. You take there in Washington, of course. It is the wrong time of year, but you take pleasant weather, he comes out on the veranda, there, and somebody could be in a hotel room across the way there, and pick him off just like -- (fades out).

Informant: Is that right?
Subject: Sure disassemble a gun, get on out. You don't have to take a gun up there. You can take it up in pieces, all those guns come knock down. You can take them apart -- ....

Informant: Boy, if that Kennedy gets shot, we have got to know where we are at. Because, you know, that will be a real shake, if they do that.

Subject: They wouldn't leave any stone unturned there, no way. They will pick up somebody within hours afterwards, if anything like that would happen just to throw the public off.

Informant: Oh, somebody is going to have to go to jail, if he gets killed.

Subject: Just like that Bruno Hauptman in the Lindberg case, you know. ..
OUTLINE

PRINCIPLES

of

PROTECTION OF THE PRESIDENT

and

OTHER DIGNITARIES

THE

SECRET SERVICE SCHOOL

JANUARY 4, 1954

Copy No. 00570
Chauffeurs

1) Drivers for both the President and the protective detail must be competent operators who have been carefully trained in the specific techniques of protective driving.

2) The drivers should also be well versed in the general principles of protection to assure that the automobiles will be maneuvered to facilitate the protective effort.

(a) The driver of the President's car should be alert for dangers and be able to take instant action when instructed or otherwise made aware of an emergency.

Examples -

In 1916 an attempt was made to assassinate the Premier of Japan when two bombs were thrown at his car. The Chauffeur saw one bomb about to be thrown and suddenly speeded up so the bomb fell and exploded behind the car. The other bomb failed to explode.

In 1914 Archduke Ferdinand of Austria was assassinated when his chauffeur, through negligence, turned down a wrong street, became confused and stopped the car prior to turning around in the middle of the street. While the car was stopped, the assassin ran up and shot the Archduke.

(b) The driver of the protective escort cars must be alert to assure that the protective detail is always in close contact with the President's car.

Examples -
In 1933 the ex-premier of Greece was assassinated when the attackers forced their car in between the ex-premier's car and the protective escort vehicle and killed him by firing a hail of shots through the back of his car.

In 1921 the premier of Spain was assassinated when a motor-cycle with a sidecar carrying three men was allowed to draw alongside the premier's car and fire a volley of shots through the side of the car.

(3) The efficiency of the protection is hindered if the protective detail does not have complete confidence in the ability of the drivers to control their vehicles in exact coordination with the protective movements.

(4) Drivers should have training in auto maintenance and trouble shooting.

(a) To permit quick diagnosis and possible correction of minor trouble encountered on the road.

(b) To permit their personal determination that equipment is in satisfactory operating condition at all times.

(c) To permit recognition of noises or signs of impending breakdown.

(d) To permit frequent inspections and recognition of alterations or added accessories that might indicate covert tampering.

c. Mounting and Dismounting Moving Automobiles

(1) No attempt should be made to mount a rapidly moving vehicle unless it is equipped with running boards or other suitable external standing areas.
The following affidavit was executed by Thomas J. Kelley on June 1, 1964.

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
ON THE ASSASSINATION OF
PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY

CITY OF WASHINGTON,
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, DC.

I, Thomas J. Kelley, being first duly sworn do upon oath depose and state:

I am an Inspector in the United States Secret Service assigned to Secret Service Headquarters in Washington, D.C. On November 22, 1963, I was not in the City of Dallas at the time of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. I was instructed through Deputy Chief Paterni to go to Dallas directly from Lexington, Kentucky, where I had been engaged in a special assignment and arrived on Friday evening in Dallas at approximately 10:30 p.m.

I attended a total of four interviews with Lee Harvey Oswald, all of which were held in the office of Captain J. W. Fritz of the Homicide Bureau of the Dallas Police Department. Three of these interviews occurred on November 23 and the fourth on November 24. (Prior to my arrival in Dallas, Oswald had been interrogated on November 22.)

Subsequent to these interviews I dictated summaries from my notes of the subject matter discussed and these dictated summaries were transmitted to Chief James J. Bowley on November 29 and December 1, 1963.

Copies of these written summaries are attached to this affidavit as exhibit A and incorporated by reference herein and made a part hereof. The summary of my last interview with Oswald which occurred on Sunday, November 24, 1963, was the first portion of a four-page memorandum which included in addition to the report of the interview, my report on the circumstances immediately following the murder of Lee Harvey Oswald.

I hereby certify that the attached memoranda constitute my total written memoranda of the interviews with Lee Harvey Oswald at which I was present. I have no additional recollection at this time which I can add to the attached memoranda. I further certify that these memoranda accurately summarize my notes and recollections from these interviews.

Dated this 1st day of June 1964.

(S) Thomas J. Kelley,

THOMAS J. KEELER.

AFFIDAVIT OF J. W. FRITZ

The following affidavit was executed by J. W. Fritz on June 9, 1964.

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
ON THE ASSASSINATION OF
PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY

STATE OF TEXAS,
COUNTY OF DALLAS, TX.

Before me, Mary Rattan, a Notary Public in and for said County, State of Texas, on this day personally appeared J. W. Fritz, Dallas Police Department, who, after being by me duly sworn, on oath deposes and says: I wish to supplement the evidence given by me on Wednesday, April 20, 1964, before the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy, as follows:

The Spent Rifle Hulls

Three spent rifle hulls were found under the window in the southeast corner of the 6th floor of the Texas School Book Depository Building, Dallas, Texas, on the afternoon of November 22, 1963. When the officers called me to this window, I asked them not to move the shells nor touch them until Lt. Day of the Dallas Police Department could make pictures of the hulls showing where they
AFFIDAVIT OF RONALD G. WITTMUS

The following affidavit was executed by Ronald G. Wittmus on July 30, 1964.

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
ON THE ASSASSINATION OF
PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 58:

I, Ronald G. Wittmus, have reviewed the testimony of Sebastian Francis Latona before The President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy and I agree with the conclusions stated therein. I have conducted independent examinations of the items which were the subject of Mr. Latona's testimony and on the basis of these independent examinations I reached the same conclusions reached by Sebastian Francis Latona.

Signed this 30th day of July 1964, at Washington, D.C.

(S) Ronald G. Wittmus,

RONALD G. WITTMUS.

AFFIDAVIT OF THOMAS J. KELLEY

The following affidavit was executed by Thomas J. Kelley on July 30, 1964.

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
ON THE ASSASSINATION OF
PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 58:

I, Thomas J. Kelley, being duly sworn say:

1. I am an Inspector in the United States Secret Service assigned to Secret Service Headquarters in Washington, D.C.

2. On November 24, 1963, I attended the interrogation of Lee Harvey Oswald in the Dallas Police Station. Those present included: Captain Fritz; Forrest Sorrels of the United States Secret Service; Postal Inspector Harry Holmes; and several Dallas Police Officers.

3. It is my recollection that during this interrogation, Oswald was not asked about nor did he speak of a trip that he took to Mexico or plans that he had to go to Cuba.

Signed this 30th day of July 1964, at Washington, D.C.

(S) Thomas J. Kelley,

THOMAS J. KELLEY.

AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT A. FRAZIER

The following affidavit was executed by Robert A. Frazier on July 31, 1964.

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
ON THE ASSASSINATION OF
PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, 58:

I, Robert A. Frazier, Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, do hereby state that I have reviewed the testimonies of Cortlandt Cunningham on March 11 and April 1, 1964, before the President's Commission on the assassination of President John F. Kennedy and I agree with the conclusions stated therein.

I do hereby state that I conducted independent examinations of the items which were the subject of Mr. Cunningham's testimonies and that on the basis of these independent examinations, I reached the same conclusions reached by Mr. Cunningham.

Signed this 31st day of July 1964, at Washington, D.C.

(S) Robert A. Frazier,

ROBERT A. FRAZIER.
Chairman Stokes. Is there anything further?
Mr. Matthews. I have nothing further.
Chairman Stokes. Mr. Rowley, at the conclusion of a witness's testimony before this committee the witness is entitled to 5 minutes in which he may explain or comment upon his testimony in any way.
I would like to at this time extend to you 5 minutes for that purpose.
Chief Rowley. I am very grateful for the interest shown by the committee and for the opportunity to meet with you in reviewing the assassination and the subsequent investigation.
I have tried to recall facts and activities which took place to the best of my ability. Obviously, time has not helped to make personal recollections clearer and I hope you will understand that certainly my knowledge and recollections are not as precise as they once were.
I would like to add, however, that the investigation of the Warren Commission has been most helpful to the Secret Service and throughout my tenure as Director of the Secret Service, the interest and support and recommendations of the Congress were extremely helpful, and I am certain my successor, Mr. Knight, shares this high regard.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Stokes. Thank you very much, Mr. Rowley. We appreciate your appearing here today and the testimony that you have given to this select committee of the House.
With that, you are excused, sir.
Chief Rowley. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Stokes. There will be a meeting of the full committee in executive session at 5 p.m. this evening in H-328. The next public meeting of the committee will be at 9 a.m. tomorrow morning.
The Chair now adjourns the meeting to 5 p.m. this evening in executive session.
[Whereupon, at 3:30 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene in executive session at 5 p.m.]
INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF
PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 20, 1978

House of Representatives,
Select Committee on Assassinations,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met at 9:18 a.m., pursuant to recess, in room 345, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Louis Stokes (chairman of the committee) presiding.


Staff present: G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel and staff director; I. Charles Mathews, special counsel; James E. McDonald, staff counsel; Robert W. Genzman, staff counsel; and Elizabeth L. Berning, chief clerk.

Chairman Stokes. A quorum being present, the committee will come to order.

The Chair recognizes Professor Blakey.

Narration by G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel

Mr. Blakey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The murder of President Kennedy was probably the most significant crime committed in the 70-year history of the Federal Bureau of Investigation that the Bureau was called upon to investigate. It is, thankfully, the only Presidential assassination of modern times, and for that reason alone, the FBI was presented in its investigation with a monumental task, one complicated further by a rapid succession of events, including: The fatal shooting of the accused assassin at Dallas Police Headquarters on November 24, 1963; and the establishment of a Presidential commission to learn the facts about the assassination, for which the FBI had primary responsibility to do the investigative work.

At the moment word came of the President's death in Dallas, there was confusion in Washington over the FBI's role in the investigation. It was not at that time a Federal felony to assassinate a President, though to threaten harm to him or to conspire to injure any Federal officer, while he was discharging his official duties, did fall within the Bureau's jurisdiction.

Originally, the FBI's entry into the case was predicated on a statute covering an assault on a Federal officer, though there was considerable debate at FBI headquarters over the basis for the investigation. The problem became moot, however, when President Johnson ordered the FBI to enter the case in the interest of national security.
It would be instructive, given this early legal dilemma as well as the controversy that developed over the FBI’s investigation, to trace the history of the Bureau from its inception in 1908.

Up until that time, Federal agencies and departments were responsible for their own investigations, and the Department of Justice was primarily a prosecutorial body, although it was given statutory authority to perform investigations in 1871.

In 1907, Attorney General Charles J. Bonaparte proposed an investigative force in the Department of Justice and went ahead with it despite the objections in Congress. His successor, George Wickersham, named the force the Bureau of Investigation.

By the end of World War I, the Bureau was firmly established as the main law enforcement arm of the Federal Government, its size increasing fivefold from 1916 to 1920. The two major influences on this growth were (1) the war itself, which confronted the Bureau with the task of enforcing President Wilson’s alien enemy proclamations and with the problems of draft evasion and enemy espionage, and (2) the Mann Act, giving the Federal Government jurisdiction over certain interstate criminal activities, making a marked increase in the demands on the Bureau, as well as calling for additional appropriations.

After the war—in the period 1919 to 1924—two successive Attorneys General abused the power of the Bureau of Investigation. A. Mitchell Palmer, in his campaign against Bolshevist radicals, acted with questionable legality. After the bombing of his home in June 1919, Palmer created the General Intelligence Division of the Bureau to deal with radicalism, and he named a young Justice Department attorney, J. Edgar Hoover, to head the division. The division used covert as well as overt means to gather information on suspected radicals.

In 1920, Attorney General Palmer also directed the wholesale deportation of members of the American Communist Party and the Communist Labor Party. This led to the controversial “Palmer raids,” which, though they diminished the standing of American Communists, came to symbolize for many the abuse of police power for a political purpose.

Then came the Harding administration, which saw Harry Daugherty, the President’s campaign manager, named Attorney General. Daugherty, in turn, appointed his friend, William S. Burns, of the detective agency, to run the Bureau. Burns was antiradical and antilabor, as well, and he continued the questionable practices of unlawful wiretapping and illegal surreptitious entry in investigative work.

Although the primary target continued to be Communists, the Bureau is credited during this period with having dealt a heavy blow to the Ku Klux Klan.

Harlan Fiske Stone, a New York attorney and civil libertarian, was appointed Attorney General by Calvin Coolidge in 1924. Stone was a reformer, and he named Hoover Director of the Bureau of Investigation with a clear mandate to clean it up. Hoover created a structure and a set of policies that would endure for nearly 50 years. He also established the independence of the Bureau within the Department of Justice.
The Bureau stayed out of the limelight until the 1930's when the emergence of a resourceful criminal underworld, feeding on public response to prohibition, became a national concern. The Bureau was recognized then as the single law enforcement agency in the country that could cope with crime of such interstate dimensions. Public outrage over the kidnaping of Charles Lindbergh's infant son led to enactment of the so-called Lindbergh Law in 1933, adding kidnaping to the list of interstate crimes that came under the jurisdiction of the Bureau.

Then, in 1934, there was a major expansion of Federal criminal laws when Congress passed a package of nine new statutes. They dealt with such crimes as killing or assaulting a Federal law enforcement officer, fleeing across a State line to avoid apprehension or prosecution and extortion involving interstate commerce.

That same year, Bureau agents were granted authority to go beyond general investigative power and to serve warrants and subpoenas, to make seizures and arrests, and to carry arms.

The Bureau was renamed in 1935, becoming the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and by the end of the decade, it was able to point to an array of important accomplishments, for example: a Division of Indentification with central fingerprint records; an FBI laboratory with up-to-date scientific law enforcement techniques; and a National Police Academy for training State and local law enforcement officers.

The Bureau then had no internal security or counterintelligence functions until they were established, beginning in 1936, by a series of Presidential orders coupled with a secret oral agreement between Hoover and President Roosevelt. The FBI was authorized to store intelligence information collected by Federal agencies.

In 1939, a written directive was issued providing that the FBI take charge of investigative work relating to "espionage, sabotage, and violations of neutrality regulations." Subversive activities were not specifically mentioned until 1950, in an Executive order by President Truman.

The FBI's primary responsibility during World War II was enforcement of laws dealing with espionage, sabotage, and conscription. It also conducted the apprehension of enemy aliens, but Hoover opposed the relocation of Japanese citizens as a violation of their civil rights.

The FBI also conducted foreign intelligence in South America, attempting to gather information on activities detrimental to U.S. interests.

After World War II the fear of communism was such that internal security activities against it was acceptable to most Americans. The FBI's actions were based on a series of statutes that covered membership in the Communist Party, including the Smith Act, the Internal Security Act of 1950, and the Communist Control Act of 1954.

J. Edgar Hoover himself defined as disloyal any acts that could pose a threat to the Government, and even after the anti-Communist fervor of the McCarthy era had subsided, the internal security operations of the FBI continued.

By 1960, Hoover had developed a force of agents who employed sophisticated investigative techniques and enjoyed unusual inde-
pendence. Hoover himself had become a formidable figure who
deftly handled Presidents, Attorneys General, and Members of Con-
gress, as he groomed his image as an extraordinary crime fighter.
FBI appropriations would pass without serious opposition in Con-
gress after only pro forma hearings.

J. Edgar Hoover’s three distinct priorities in those years were
the fight against communism, statistics that reflected FBI progress
and the positive image of the Bureau. He also had, according to
some, two glaring crime spots in the area of civil rights and orga-
nized crime that put him at odds with the Kennedy administration.

It has been documented that little priority was given by the FBI
to requests by the Civil Rights Division of the Department of
Justice. Not all would agree with his choice of words, but his point
was widely shared. Historian Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., in his
recent book, “Robert Kennedy and His Times,” writes that Hoover
had “the racist instincts of a white man who had grown up in
Washington when it was still a southern city.”

By 1964, under pressure from the Kennedy Justice Department,
the FBI was beginning to alter its stance, but before then, Schle-
singer noted that:

“For reasons of policy as well as prejudice, Hoover succeeded in withdrawing the
FBI almost completely from civil rights investigations. Internally, he preserved it as
a lily-white agency.”

Hoover was also reluctant, according to some, to allow the
Bureau to join Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy’s all-out fight
on organized crime. Indeed, as late as the early 1960’s, Hoover
himself had been quoted as saying that no national coalition of
underworld figures dominated organized crime. On that, Schlesing-
er wrote:

Kennedy had determined to stop the drain of power in America to obscure forces
beyond moral and legal accountability. In insisting on the spreading threat of
organized crime, he offended J. Edgar Hoover doubly—by dismissing the cherished
Red menace and by raising a question the Director had done his best for 40 years to
ignore.

The FBI priority here too came under sharp challenge during the
new administration. Turning to the investigation of the assassina-
tion itself, the Bureau’s investigation was of a magnitude unsur-
passed in the annals of American law enforcement. In all, 80 FBI
personnel were on the scene in Dallas within a few hours of the
fatal shots and by the time it was over, 2,300 reports consisting of
over 25,000 pages based on 25,000 interviews had been filed, most
within weeks of the assassination itself.

The quality of the investigation, however, has been the subject of
mounting criticism over the years. At first, taking potshots at the
Bureau was an exclusive avocation of critics of the Warren Com-
mission. Eventually, however, doubts and misgivings were being
expressed by committees of both Houses of Congress, by former
high-ranking officials of the FBI itself, and by members and staff of
the Warren Commission, which had relied on the Bureau for its
fieldwork.

There are four principal issues that the select committee has
considered in its assessment of the quality of the FBI investigation.
Not necessarily in the order that they will be discussed in the
hearing today, or their relative importance, they are as follows:
One, did the FBI's early conclusion that Oswald alone was the assassin, that he had assistance from no one, hamper the thoroughness of the investigation that followed?

In 1976, the Select Committee on Intelligence issued a report in which it noted that within 3 weeks of the assassination, just as the Warren Commission was beginning its investigation, the FBI prepared a position paper, "concluding that Oswald was the assassin and that he had acted alone." The Senate committee went on to note, "The Bureau issued its report on the basis of a narrow investigation of the assassination focused on Oswald, without conducting a broad investigation of the assassination which would have revealed any conspiracy, foreign or domestic."

Two, did senior FBI officials, wanting to close the case quickly, compromise the proficiency of Bureau field personnel?

Make no bones about it, this charge has been leveled at the late Director of the FBI, J. Edgar Hoover, and against a few of his close personal associates. Evidence of Mr. Hoover's position has been cited from a statement he is said to have made by telephone to President Johnson just hours after Oswald had been shot down by Jack Ruby:

"The thing I am most concerned about * * * is having something issued so we can convince the public that Oswald is the real assassin." In a memorandum dated November 29, 1963, relating a conversation that day with President Johnson: "I advised the President that we hope to have the investigation wrapped up today, but probably won't have it before the first of the week."

Three, was the FBI investigation internally mismanaged?

Just such an allegation has been made by a former Assistant Director who supervised major aspects of the investigation. The criticism has also been directed at the organizational structure of the probe. It was divided between two FBI divisions.

The Central Investigative Division was assigned the task of assembling the facts of the assassination itself, because this is the division that is customarily put in charge of murder investigations. The actual work was supervised by an official who headed the bank robbery desk, because the manual of operations designates that desk to handle assaults on Federal officials.

The Domestic Intelligence Division was assigned the question of possible conspiracy, as well as other aspects of subversion. Domestic Intelligence was also given the job of piecing together the background puzzle of Lee Harvey Oswald, his activities, associates, motivations, and so on. A source of a lack of confidence in the FBI investigation that has developed since 1964 is the realization that 20 members of the Domestic Intelligence Division, including an assistant director, were secretly censured by Director Hoover for their mishandling of a preassassination investigation of the activities of Lee Harvey Oswald.

Four, was the FBI investigation conducted in such a way that the Bureau's specialists on Cuba and organized crime did not actively participate?

The FBI had, prior to the assassination, considered Jack Ruby sufficiently knowledgeable about "criminal elements in Dallas" to contact him as a potential informant on nine separate occasions, and questions have been raised about the failure to probe his
known connections with gangster elements in Chicago, Dallas, New Orleans, Havana and elsewhere.

In addition, the Bureau had specialists on Cuban and Cuban exile activities. They were not called on in the assassination investigation, even though both Oswald and Ruby had suspected ties to Cubans or Cuban exiles.

Mr. Chairman, a former official of the FBI is here today to testify about the investigation of the Kennedy assassination. He is James R. Malley, who joined the Bureau as a special agent in 1937. Mr. Malley was an inspector in the General Investigative Division and principal assistant to Director Alex Rosen. He played an important role in putting together the Bureau's four-volume report on the assassination given to the President in December 1963.

Subsequently, as the FBI liaison officer to the Warren Commission, Mr. Malley was in a position to closely observe the key role in the assassination investigation played by the FBI.

Mr. Malley retired from the FBI in 1971. It would be appropriate at this time to call him.

Chairman Stokes. The committee calls Mr. Malley.

Mr. Malley. Where do you want me to sit?

Chairman Stokes. At the witness table right in front of me.

TESTIMONY OF JAMES R. MALLEY

Chairman Stokes. Please stand and be sworn. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you will give before this committee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Malley. I do.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you. You may be seated.

The Chair recognizes counsel for the Committee, Mr. James McDonald.

Mr. McDonald. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Would you please state your full name for the record?

Mr. Malley. My full name is James R. Malley.

Mr. McDonald. And were you employed by the FBI, Mr. Malley?

Mr. Malley. From 1937 until 1971.

Mr. McDonald. And in what capacity did you begin your service with the FBI?

Mr. Malley. As a special agent.

Mr. McDonald. What was your position in November 1963?

Mr. Malley. I had been designated as inspector at the time and was working as an assistant or No. 1 man, you might say, to Assistant Director Alex Rosen, in charge of the General Investigative Division.

Mr. McDonald. What did your duties entail?

Mr. Malley. My actual duties were very broad. I was supposed to try to keep track of everything going on in the General Investigative Division, handle routine matters I did not feel was necessary to send into the Assistant Director, also see all mail that was going to him and, in general, to double check on things that were going on in four different sections in the Bureau's General Investigative Division.
Mr. MCDONALD. Mr. Malley, let me direct your attention to November 22, 1963. You were employed then as the inspector for Mr. Rosen?

Mr. MALLEY. That is right.

Mr. MCDONALD. That was a Friday. Were you working that day?

Mr. MALLEY. I was working that day.

Mr. MCDONALD. And when did you learn of the assassination of President Kennedy?

Mr. MALLEY. Returning from lunch I turned on a radio that was available while I was sitting in Mr. Rosen's office in his absence. I turned on the radio to catch, I believe it was the 12:30 news. That was the first time I learned anything about it.

Mr. MCDONALD. And what did you do in an official capacity?

Mr. MALLEY. Before I had any opportunities to do anything, and I can't recall the exact time, I was contacted by Associate Director Al Belmont.

Chairman Stokes. Excuse me just a moment. We are having a little difficulty hearing you. Mr. Malley, if you can put that mike a little closer.

Mr. MALLEY. I don't think you want me to talk louder; you merely want it a little closer?

Chairman Stokes. Right. Thank you very much.

Mr. MALLEY. Mr. Belmont was in the same position that everyone else was in. He knew, I knew, that we had no actual jurisdiction. He did indicate to me that he had been in touch with Mr. Shanklin, who was the Special Agent in charge of Dallas, and that he would be back in touch with me as soon as there was more definite information available. That was about it for the time being.

Later in the day, and I presume it must have been close to 3 o'clock, I was either told by telephone or asked to come down to Belmont's office, I cannot recall which, at which time he informed me that the General Investigative Division would be handling the assassination case of President Kennedy.

Following that, and still not having many details to go on, I started lining up personnel that would be available on a round-the-clock basis to handle whatever might develop.

Mr. MCDONALD. Were you given any specific instructions as to what your role would be?

Mr. MALLEY. Not at that time.

Mr. MCDONALD. And your immediate supervisor was Mr. Rosen?

Mr. MALLEY. That is correct.

Mr. MCDONALD. Was he present that day?

Mr. MALLEY. He was not. He was scheduled to go on annual leave that morning and instead of taking off as he had planned to leave the city, he was ill and did not leave the city at all. He eventually came back to the office sometime the following week.

Mr. MCDONALD. Did you have any meetings with Mr. Hoover on that day?

Mr. MALLEY. I did not.

Mr. MCDONALD. What were the next set of instructions you received on Friday afternoon?

Mr. MALLEY. I don't recall that I received any instructions on that particular afternoon. In reading this statement, Mr. Blakey
has mentioned that there was a lot of confusion. There was. Because up until around 7 o’clock, if my memory is correct, there was a definite uncertainty as to what jurisdiction the Bureau had.

As I understand it, Belmont had instructed the Dallas office to be certain that they stayed in a position where they would know exactly what was going on and what the Dallas police were doing so that possibly nothing would be interfered with in the way of evidence and nothing lost.

Mr. McDonald. Did there come a time when you proceeded to go to Dallas?

Mr. Malley. There was. On Sunday, after the shooting of Ruby, I am sorry, of Oswald by Ruby, I heard it on television. I had been at the office all morning and had just gone home around 12 o’clock. My wife heard it on television while I was changing clothes, mentioned there was going to be a rerun. I listened to that and immediately dressed and started back to the office and arrived around 2 o’clock.

When I arrived there, Courtney Evans was sitting in Mr. Belmont’s office, who had not had time to get to the office yet. He was talking to Mr. Hoover. Following that call I was told that I was on my way to Dallas.

Mr. McDonald. And who is Courtney Evans?

Mr. Malley. Mr. Evans at that time was an Assistant Director in charge of the Special Investigative Division.

Mr. McDonald. Were you given any instructions on going to Dallas?

Mr. Malley. There was no time for instructions. I was told to get the first plane that I could and Evans commented that undoubtedly by the time you arrive in Dallas, Belmont will have a number of instructions for you and he probably will be on the phone waiting for you to arrive.

Mr. McDonald. Did you receive any instructions when you got to Dallas?

Mr. Malley. I did. As I recall, I arrived in the Dallas office somewhere near 8 o’clock, possibly a little later, and was immediately told to get in touch with Mr. Belmont, which I did. Mr. Belmont informed me that the Director had been in touch with President Johnson, that the President was very upset about the number of comments being made by certain individuals in Dallas, mainly the district attorney, the chief of police, and the sheriff’s office. He requested that I contact each one of them and see if I couldn’t put a stop to miscellaneous statements they were making relating to the assassination and what investigation was going on.

Mr. McDonald. Did Mr. Belmont relate to you anything specific as far as what President Johnson wished to have told to these individuals?

Mr. Malley. To the best of my recollection, it was simply a statement that the President was extremely unhappy and desired that the individuals be requested to stop talking about the assassination.

Mr. McDonald. And did you in fact relay those instructions?

Mr. Malley. As soon as I was able to contact each one of them by telephone I did so. I was unable to reach the District Attorney for some time because about 2 minutes before an agent tried to
reach him in his office, he had left to appear on television, and again for some time related different things that he felt were important to the assassination.

Mr. MCDONALD. Mr. Malley, tell us what happened upon your arrival in Dallas and what the status of the investigation was at that time?

Mr. MALLEY. In answering you truthfully I couldn’t tell you what the status was. I had so many telephone calls when I arrived there that I had to take care of that it was some time before I had a chance to even ask questions.

Shortly after contacting the three individuals that I have mentioned to you, I had a telephone call from Mr. Belmont telling me that a detailed memorandum setting forth all information that was known concerning the assassination was to be prepared and be back in Washington on Tuesday morning. I was also requested to have prepared the same type of memorandum relating to the shooting of Oswald by Jack Ruby.

It was mentioned that two men from Washington who were familiar with the type of a memorandum that would be necessary would be in Dallas some time that night, probably around 4:30. My instructions were to get hold of the necessary people in Dallas, to accumulate all the data that had been prepared from Friday up to that time on Sunday night, to get it lined up in some kind of sensible order, in order they could start reviewing it and start preparing the two memorandums requested.

Mr. MCDONALD. Who was directing the investigation in Dallas?

Mr. MALLEY. It was under the overall direction of the SAC, Gordon Shanklin.

Mr. MCDONALD. What role did you play?

Mr. MALLEY. I was supposed to oversee the entire thing, to make sure that the Bureau’s interests were properly looked after, to make sure that there were no unnecessary delays on anything, and that everything possible was done to find out exactly what the correct facts were.

Mr. MCDONALD. You had been working on the case over the weekend prior to going to Dallas?

Mr. MALLEY. I had been in the office a great deal. When you say working on it, I saw a great many teletypes, a lot of other information, files were being checked in Washington for any possible helpful information there, and I couldn’t tell you right now exactly what I did over that weekend before I left for Dallas.

Mr. MCDONALD. Did you in fact convey President Johnson’s instructions to each of the three men you mentioned?

Mr. MALLEY. I did.

Mr. MCDONALD. What was their reaction?

Mr. MALLEY. The Chief of Police was very cordial, said he would be glad to do it but he didn’t know how to go about it, and if my memory serves me correctly, I suggested that he had no problem, all he had to do was either say he had no comment to make or the matter is under investigation and I do not care to discuss it.

The Sheriff was extremely cordial and said he didn’t recall that he had been making many comments but we would see that he didn’t if he had.
In speaking with Henry Wade it was a little bit different story. He informed me that he had been a former FBI agent, which I was well aware of, that he had been district attorney for a number of years, that he felt that he was qualified to decide what statements he could make and what ones he should not make.

If I remember correctly, I said, you are certainly entitled to your opinion but in this instance the President of the United States is asking you to refrain from such comment, but you do what you want to, but this is what the President wants. That is about it.

Mr. MCDONALD. Now, you have testified you arrived in Dallas after Oswald was shot by Jack Ruby?

Mr. MALLEY. That is correct.

Mr. MCDONALD. When you arrived at the Dallas FBI office, what was the status of the investigation as far as its moving toward completion?

Mr. MALLEY. I just answered you, Mr. McDonald; from the time I got there I had so many things to do I would have no idea. It was a number of hours after I was there that I was even able to start asking questions.

Mr. MCDONALD. Prior to your going to Dallas, what was your perspective as to the case itself?

Mr. MALLEY. I hadn’t formed any ideas of any kind. The President had been shot on Friday; Oswald was shot on Sunday; it was much too early to form any ideas.

Mr. MCDONALD. Mr. Malley, I am going to read to you from a memorandum that was prepared by Walter Jenkins to President Johnson—Mr. Blakey also referred to it in his narration—the memorandum reflecting a phone call with J. Edgar Hoover, and the memorandum is dated November 24, 1963, two days after the assassination. The pertinent paragraph quoting Mr. Hoover states: “The thing that I am concerned about, and so is Mr. Katzenbach, is having something issued so we can convince the public that Oswald is the real assassin.”

What would your comments be on that? We are talking about two days after the assassination. This is probably being written contemporaneously with your arriving in Dallas.

Mr. MALLEY. Not having talked to Mr. Hoover, I certainly am not in a position to say what was going on in his mind. I can give you my interpretation of what he would have meant by it. That would simply mean that because of such a crime of that magnitude, he was talking to either the President or Jenkins, whichever it was, saying that the public needs to be settled down.

As far as saying that Oswald is the man and nobody else, I don’t think you can take that interpretation from such a one sentence remark such as that.

Mr. MCDONALD. I am looking at a memo dated November 26, 1963, from Mr. Evans to Mr. Belmont and it is titled “The Assassination of President Kennedy,” and it says—this is dated 4 days later, “From the facts disclosed in our investigation, there is no question that we can submit in our report convincing evidence, beyond any doubt, showing Oswald was the man who killed President Kennedy.”

Then at the bottom of this page there is handwriting, which has been identified as Mr. Hoover’s. And in the last line Mr. Evans is
making reference that a case of this magnitude cannot be fully investigated in a week's time. And Mr. Hoover has written underneath, "just how long do you estimate it will take."

Then under that he went on to write, "it seems to me we have the basic facts now."

Again, we are 4 days after the assassination. You were in Dallas at the time.

Mr. Malley. I don't recall that I was asked by anyone how long it was going to take. If I had been I would have told them I had no idea because of the magnitude of what needed to be done in Dallas alone, not counting anything that might go on elsewhere. The volume of work was such that no one could estimate the time.

If I recall correctly, it was either Tuesday or Wednesday following the assassination that I was asked if we had sufficient personnel, and I requested that 40 more agents along with clerical help, stenographic help, be sent into Dallas to assist those who were already there. So certainly I did not feel it was going to be completed within any week.

Mr. McDonald. You were asking for additional agent personnel, and as reflected in these memos, at the top level, at least there was an opinion being formed that the case essentially was wrapped up.

Mr. Malley. I won't agree with you because I don't know what they were doing in Washington. I know where I was and I know what had been done, and I think you may be interpreting remarks about wanting to get something out to the public to let them know what had been developed up to that time as a misinterpretation of what the Bureau intended to do later.

Mr. McDonald. I will quote one more memorandum to you, and that is dated 29 November 1963, which is found in the Senate Intelligence Committee's, the Church Committee's, Book 5 Report on page 34. In it, the memorandum is by Mr. Hoover, recounting a telephone conversation he had that day with President Johnson. And he says, "I advised the President that we hoped to have the investigation wrapped up today but probably won't have it before the first of the week, as another angle had developed. Again we are getting an example of at the top level the case being in a sense completed.

Now, again, from your Dallas perspective does this jibe with what you were doing in Dallas?

Mr. Malley. Well, again, I say that when people say that they hoped to have it completed and so on, I don't think for a minute they were talking about having every facet fully and exhaustively investigated. I think what they are saying is that, based on the information that was available at that time, the essential facts of the investigation had been developed. It doesn't mean it was over by any means.

Mr. McDonald. Mr. Chairman, the memorandums that I have just quoted from have been marked JFK exhibits F-457, F-458, and F-459. I move that they be received into the record at this time.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, they may be entered into the record at this point.

[The above marked JFK exhibits F-457, F-458, and F-459 follow:]
Mr. J. Edgar Hoover said as follows:

There is nothing further on the Oswald case except that he is dead. Last night we received a call in our Dallas office from a man talking in a calm voice and saying he was a member of a committee organized to kill Oswald.

We at once notified the Chief of Police and we assured the Oswald would be given sufficient protection. This morning we called the Chief of Police again warning of the possibility of some effort against Oswald and he again assured us adequate protection would be given. However, this was not done.

They brought him out of the City Jail and were taking him to the County Jail when a man stepped out and shot him in the stomach. This man was arrested at once. He goes under the name of Jack Leon Ruby but his real name is Rubinstein. He runs two night clubs in Dallas and has the reputation of being a homosexual. Immediately after the shooting, he (Oswald) was moved to Parkland Hospital and died about 25 minutes ago. We had an agent at the hospital in the hope that he might make some kind of a confession before he died but he did not do so.

Ruby says no one was associated with him and denies having made the telephone call to our Dallas office last night. He says he bought the gun about three years ago and that he guessed his grief over the killing of the President made him insane. That was a pretty smart move on his part because it might lay the foundation for a plea of insanity later.

I dispatched to Dallas one of my top assistants in the hope that he
U.

President Kennedy was shot at 12:30 PM on November 22, 1963, in Dallas, Texas. The assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald, was arrested later that day.

Oswald had been living in the area for some time, but his background was largely unknown. The investigation was initially led by the Dallas Police Department, under Chief of Police John F. Duane.

A series of events followed, including the arrest and murder of Lee Harvey Oswald, and the trial of his accused assassin, Jack Ruby. The investigation was conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), under the leadership of Director J. Edgar Hoover.

The report on the assassination was classified and declassified in 1976, after the passage of the Marine Midway Act. The report was compiled by a team of investigators, including a panel of experts from the National Academy of Sciences.

The report concluded that the assassination was the result of a single gunman operating alone. However, the report also raised questions about the involvement of others, and the possibility of a conspiracy.

The declassification of the report was accompanied by the release of a large amount of government records related to the investigation, including the assassination of President Kennedy and the subsequent investigation into the incident. The release of these records has been controversial, with some groups arguing that they should remain classified for national security reasons.

The assassination of President Kennedy remains one of the most famous and controversial events in American history, and continues to be a subject of much speculation and research.
And since this has nothing to do with the fact that Oswald
committed the murder, I want to emphasize this: The
research that instead of a Presidential Commission, a
District Attorney's Department report based on the
"Dallas File,"

Oswald having been killed prior to the findings to the Dallas
Police Department, was inadequate. I will show, I am afraid,
a lot of civil rights people to raise a hue and cry because
he was

illegally killed and had no weapon. There are bound to be
some elements of our society who will bolster their hopes of
that his civil rights

were violated— which they were.

We have no information on July 16th in Chicago. Although there are
some rumors of underworld activity in Chicago. Of the two night
clubs, one in a strip tease joint and the other in a linear place.

W. J. b.
Mr. J. Edgar Hoover said as follows:

There is nothing further on the Oswald case except that he is dead. Last night we received a call in our Dallas office from a man talking in a calm voice and saying he was a member of a committee organized to kill Oswald.

We at once notified the Chief of Police and he assured us Oswald would be given sufficient protection. This morning we called the Chief of Police again warning of the possibility of some effort against Oswald and he again assured us adequate protection would be given. However, this was not done.

They brought him out of the City Jail and were taking him to the County Jail when a man stepped out and shot him in the stomach. This man was arrested at once. He goes under the name of Jack Leon Ruby but his real name is Rubenstein. He runs two night clubs in Dallas and has the reputation of being a homosexual. Immediately after the shooting, he (Oswald) was moved to Parkland Hospital and died about 45 minutes ago. We had an agent at the hospital in the hope that he might make some kind of a confession before he died but he did not do so.

Ruby says no one was associated with him and denies having made the telephone call to our Dallas office last night. He says he bought the gun about three years ago and that he guessed his grief over the killing of the President made him insane. That was a pretty smart move on his part because it might lay the foundation for a plea of insanity later.

I dispatched to Dallas one of my top assistants in the hope that he
might stop the Chief of Police and his staff from doing so damned much talking on television. They did not really have a case against Oswald until we gave them our information. We traced the weapon, we identified the handwriting, we identified the fingerprints on the brown bag.

We were able to identify the bullets as coming from that gun. All the Dallas Police had was three witnesses who tentatively identified him as the man who shot the policeman and boarded a bus to go home shortly after the President was killed. He got on a bus to go home to get a shirt and the bus conductor tentatively identified him as the man who boarded the bus.

Oswald had been saying he wanted John Abt as his lawyer and Abt, with only that kind of evidence, could have turned the case around, I'm afraid. All the talking down there might have required a change of venue on the basis that Oswald could not have gotten a fair trial in Dallas. If they keep on talking, perhaps the same will be true of Ruby.

Chief of Police Curry I understand cannot control Capt. Fritz of the Homicide Squad, who is giving much information to the press. Since we now think it involves the Criminal Code on a conspiracy charge under Section 2-11, we want them to shut up. Furthermore, I have ordered the evidence be secured by the Police Department. We sent most of the evidence back to them. We still have the bullets that were fired and will keep them.

The thing I am concerned about, and so is Mr. Katzenbach, is having something issued so we can convince the public that Oswald is the real assassin. Mr. Katzenbach thinks that the President might appoint a Presidential Commission of three outstanding citizens to make a determination. I countered with a suggestion that we make an investigative report to the Attorney General with pictures, laboratory work, etc. Then the Attorney General can make the report to the President and the President can decide whether to make it public. I felt this was better because there are several aspects which would complicate our foreign relations.

(deletion)

DECLASSIFIED
FBI letter, September 1, 1978
By Trudy Peterson NARS, Date 9-18-78
And since this has nothing to do with proof that Oswald committed the murder, I made the suggestion to Mr. Katzenbach that instead of a Presidential Commission, we do it with a Justice Department report based on an FBI report.

Oswald having been killed today after our warnings to the Dallas Police Department, was inexcusable. It will allow, I am afraid, a lot of civil rights people to raise a lot of hell because he was handcuffed and had no weapon. There are bound to be some elements of our society who will holler their heads off that his civil rights were violated -- which they were.

We have no information on Ruby that is firm, although there are some rumors of underworld activity in Chicago. Of his two night clubs, one is a strip tease joint and the other is a liquor place.
Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach called with reference to the report which is to be submitted by the FBI in relation to the circumstances surrounding the assassination of President Kennedy.

He noted that a tremendous responsibility had been placed on the FBI in this instance by President Johnson because this report, which is to be publicized, is for the purpose of assuring the American public and the world as to what the facts are in Kennedy’s assassination and setting to rest the many many rumors that have been circulating and speculation both in the United States and abroad.

Katzenbach noted in this regard that we are being called upon to, in many instances, prove the negative. For example, he observed that there has been considerable speculation in the press in the United States and in Europe that the assassination was part of a communist or Castro conspiracy. There have also been allegations that Oswald and Ruby were known to each other and were part of a conspiracy. It has been further alleged that Oswald was killed to silence him.

Katzenbach noted that it is, of course, more difficult to prove that something did not occur than to prove what actually happened. As a consequence, it is his belief there might have to be some so-called editorial interpretation. He noted that the report will be subjected to the closest scrutiny by the world-wide press and foreign governmental representatives, as well as by the American people. He knew that we were keeping this in mind in preparation of the report.

As Katzenbach understands it, the report is to be reviewed by the Justice Department and transmitted to the White House. In this regard, he feels it is his responsibility to do this personally for the Department. To this end, he said if it would be helpful he would be glad to review and discuss any preliminary drafts, since time is of the essence.

1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. LeLoach
1 - Mr. Lisen
1 - Mr. Sullivan
Memorandum to Mr. Belmont

ACTION BEING TAKEN:

From the facts disclosed in our investigation, there is no question but that we can submit in our report convincing evidence beyond any doubt showing Oswald was the man who killed President Kennedy. The problem is to show motive and this, of course, is a condition of Oswald's mind and can be, at best, a speculative conclusion predicated upon circumstantial evidence. Oswald has admitted he was an avowed Marxist. The facts are not clear cut as to his relationship with organized communism, either the Communist Party or the pro-Castro organizations. The Domestic Intelligence Division has been reviewing this very matter so that our report may reflect the factual information we have in this regard. While neither the White House nor the Department should be able to contend that our report does not meet the required purpose, we must be factual and recognize that a matter of this magnitude cannot be fully investigated in a week's time.
The following notation appears at the bottom of this memorandum in Director Hoover's handwriting:

The Presidential Report on both matters should not be prepared until all allegations and angles have been completed."

The FBI delivered these reports to the White House and the Attorney General on December 3, 1963.

In a November 29, 1963 memorandum, Hoover recounted a telephone conversation he had that day with President Johnson:

The President called and asked if I am familiar with the proposed group they are trying to get to study my report—two from the House, two from the Senate, two from the courts, and a couple of outsiders. I replied that I had not heard of that but had seen reports from the Senate Investigating Committee.

The President stated he wanted to get by just with my file and my report. I told him I thought it would be very bad to have a rash of investigations. He then indicated the only way to stop it is to appoint a high-level committee to evaluate my report and tell the House and Senate not to go ahead with the investigation. I stated that would be a three-ring circus.

I advised the President that we hope to have the investigation wrapped up today, but probably won't have it before the first of the week as an angle in Mexico is giving trouble—the matter of Oswald's getting $8,500 from the Cuban Embassy and coming back to this country with it; that we are not able to prove that fact; that we have information he was there on September 18 and we are able to prove he was in New Orleans on that date; that a story came in changing the date to September 28 and he was in Mexico on the 28th."

On December 3, 1963, the UPI wire carried a story reported in various newspapers under the following lead:

An exhaustive FBI report now nearly ready for the White House will indicate that Lee Harvey Oswald was the lone and unaided assassin of President Kennedy, Government sources said today."
Mr. McDonald. When you were in Dallas, Mr. Malley, was active consideration being given to investigating the possibility of a conspiracy?

Mr. Malley. That existed from the minute it happened. I can’t say that I saw a memorandum to this effect or a memorandum to that effect or a telephone call, but I do know that it was on everybody’s mind, was there somebody else involved. It was an essential part of the investigation to find out.

Mr. McDonald. These discussions of conspiracy, were they active in the Dallas field office?

Mr. Malley. You are asking me a question that dates back 15 years ago and I am not in a position to truthfully answer you and say this happened or that happened in the way of some conversation I had.

Mr. McDonald. In light of Evans memo to Belmont with Mr. Hoover’s writing, his handwriting, saying essentially we have got it all wrapped up, in your opinion, would that affect the investigation ongoing in the field, if Mr. Hoover was saying that he felt the investigation was essentially closed? Would that have an effect, in your opinion, on the way the Bureau handled the conspiracy aspects to the case?

Mr. Malley. To start off, I was handling 90 percent of the telephone calls between Washington and Dallas after I arrived, there may be a higher percentage. I know that I never received any comments from Belmont, the Director, or anyone else in Washington indicating that Mr. Hoover was saying that we would have the investigation finished in a few days. So I have to answer you by saying that it would have had no effect on anybody that I knew in Dallas unless somebody else got a telephone call and I was not made aware of it. It certainly had no effect on me.

Mr. McDonald. You stated that you arrived in Dallas after Jack Ruby shot—

Mr. Malley. Around 7:30 to 8 o’clock on Sunday night.

Mr. McDonald. Did this event have any effect on the Bureau’s relationship with the Dallas Police Department?

Mr. Malley. I do not recall hearing of any friction that developed while I was in Dallas and I don’t think there was any friction developed later. I think they remained on the same solid basis they were. I could be wrong.

Mr. McDonald. Can you recall after the shooting of Oswald, did you yourself participate in any discussions as to the possibility of whether it was a related event, directly related to the murder of the President. In other words, if it involved a larger conspiracy, the possibility of a larger conspiracy?

Mr. Malley. Are you referring to other personnel in the Dallas office or what?

Mr. McDonald. Either in the Dallas office or back at headquarters in Washington?

Mr. Malley. You gentlemen have had access to the file. I think you will find that teletype, if my memory is accurate, sent by the people at the seat of Government telling the Dallas office to not overlook the possibility and check thoroughly to see whether it could have been any police involvement in the shooting of Oswald by Ruby.
Mr. McDonald. Mr. Malley, I am going to direct your attention to an organizational chart that we have prepared that I showed you before the hearing. If the clerk could display the organizational chart for us. It has been designated JFK exhibit F-456. If you would walk over to the easel we have a clip-on microphone. If you would give us a rundown of the organizational structure in the Bureau at the time of the assassination.

[JFK exhibit F-456 was received into the record.]
Mr. Malley. In 1963, at the time of the assassination, J. Edgar Hoover, as you heard previously, was the Director. The Associate Director was Clyde Tolson and one of the Assistants to the Director was Alan H. Belmont. Am I talking loud enough so you can hear me?

Mr. McDonald. Yes. If you would stand on the other side of the easel.

Mr. Malley. Be glad to either way.

Mr. McDonald. Thank you.

Mr. Malley. Under Mr. Belmont was the Domestic Intelligence Division, whose Director was William C. Sullivan; the General Investigative Division, whose Assistant Director was Al Rosen, and a Laboratory and Special Investigative Division, and I am not going to identify those people unless you want me to.

Mr. McDonald. No, that is fine.

Mr. Malley. I failed to mention that under Mr. Tolson and Mr. Hoover was an Inspection Division whose Director at that time was Mr. James Gale. Under the Domestic Intelligence you had an inspector, No. 1 man in charge, Joseph A. Sizoo, another inspector, No. 2 man, Donald E. Moore, the Espionage Section under a section chief by the name of William A. Branigan, and there were a number of individual agent-supervisors who were assigned to this case. Do you want their names mentioned?

Mr. McDonald. Not at this time, thank you.

Mr. Malley. In the General Investigative Division, I happened to be the No. 1 man, and as you heard, I was assigned to handle liaison with the, oh, you haven’t heard yet, I was assigned to handle liaison with the Warren Commission.

There was also a criminal section, whose section chief was James Hanley. An individual by the name of Henry Schutz was a unit chief, under which was bank robberies and a number of other rather important criminal investigations, and there were two individuals that did work quite a bit on this particular case, by the name of Richard Rogge and Fletcher Thompson.

Mr. McDonald. Mr. Malley, regarding Rogge and Thompson, you just said that they worked closely with you on the case.

Mr. Malley. They did in the early stages. They were the two individuals who were sent to Dallas to write the first two memorandums that I told you about, and we also had a civil rights section, which was under a section chief by the name of Clement McGowan. Does that cover what you have?

Mr. McDonald. That is fine, thank you.

Mr. Malley, in the investigation of the assassination how did the various divisions participate in the case?

First of all, which was the primary division to run the case, the assassination case, and who was in charge of that investigation?

Mr. Malley. As far as the actual assassination is concerned, it was definitely in the General Investigative Division. When you say who is responsible, are you referring to what section it was being handled and what supervisor was primarily responsible?

Mr. McDonald. Which person was primarily responsible at the top to begin with?

Mr. Malley. Well, because of what happened when I got back from Dallas I would say that I had to be.
Mr. MCDONALD. What happened when you got back from Dallas?

Mr. MALLEY. Well, I had been told before I left Dallas, sometime in the afternoon, that the Warren Commission had been established, they would be functioning almost immediately, and that I was to return to Washington on the first plane that I could get out of Dallas. I came back that night, and the next morning I had a little note from the Director that I was to get in touch with Mr. J. Lee Rankin as soon as possible, with the telephone number on it. I didn't succeed for a day or two but I did make an effort continuously for the next days until I got it.

I then went up to see him and introduced myself. We had a rather long chat about things in general but nothing concerning any real developments because neither one of us were in a position to talk about it.

Mr. MCDONALD. On what date was this again?

Mr. MALLEY. Strictly from memory, I think I returned from Dallas on December 12. I may be inaccurate.

Mr. EDGAR. Would the counsel yield?

Mr. MCDONALD. Yes.

Mr. EDGAR. Would the witness talk into the microphone?

Mr. MALLEY. I am sorry, beg your pardon.

Mr. MCDONALD. So you stated that you returned from Dallas on the 12th. On that day you were notified that you were going to be the liaison with the Warren Commission?

Mr. MALLEY. That is correct.

Mr. MCDONALD. What duties were you to do? What were your duties going to be?

Mr. MALLEY. Well, very generally, I was to handle all contacts by telephone or in person with the Warren Commission. I was also to see that every piece of mail that went to the Warren Commission was personally delivered and in that respect I was not only liaison but I was the mailman, and I had specific instructions that nothing was to go to the Warren Commission that I hadn't seen and reviewed thoroughly.

Mr. MCDONALD. Now, prior to December 12, the Bureau released its report on the assassination?

Mr. MALLEY. Yes, sir.

Mr. MCDONALD. Did you play a role in the preparation of that report?

Mr. MALLEY. In that report I have to say no. I told you that two memorandums were prepared in Dallas which were returned to Washington the Tuesday morning after the assassination. I definitely reviewed those. I went over material that was being utilized in the preparation of them, and I don't know whether the two memorandums are in existence now. But, if you had read either one of them you would say that you saw the comment, this is the information that is available as of the writing of this memorandum.

Mr. MCDONALD. When you refer to memorandum, you are referring to the report?

Mr. MALLEY. I am not. I am referring to a piece of paper similar to this, consisting of around 15 pages, I believe, on Mr. Ruby, I mean on the assassination of President Kennedy and around 8 or 9 on the shooting of Oswald by Ruby.
Mr. McDonald. Well, the report came out in early 1963, prior to the 12th, and the report said in essence that Lee Harvey Oswald killed the President alone.

Do you know why this report was put out so rapidly?

Mr. Malley. I can only tell you that based on what I was told in Dallas, they wanted to put it out much faster than it was put out.

Mr. McDonald. They wanted to.

Mr. Malley. It was strictly on the basis of letting the President, the Attorney General and a few others that they felt needed to know immediately what the facts were as of that time.

It was my understanding that information was going to be disseminated long before it was.

Mr. McDonald. Were you aware——

Mr. Malley. I do not know what occurred in Washington that delayed it except one telephone call I had. After they had an opportunity to read the two memos, they said how do we know this is completely accurate. I said, if you can’t take my word for it, I said, you have to wait until you get reports. There was nothing else I could say.

Mr. McDonald. Prior to your return to Washington, when you learned you were going to be liaison with the Warren Commission, you must have been aware that they were discussing the formation of such a commission.

Mr. Malley. I don’t remember whether I ever heard that there was a possibility of the Warren Commission being formed or not. I have no way of thinking back and recalling whether I did or didn’t.

Mr. McDonald. Can you recall, as you knew, what the Bureau’s reaction to the formation of such a commission was?

Mr. Malley. I never heard of anything one way or the other until you showed me a memorandum on it. The last time I talked to you I might have indicated to you the Director was unhappy. I don’t interpret that memo that way.

Mr. McDonald. So, it is your testimony you have no personal knowledge of what the Bureau’s reaction, specifically Mr. Hoover’s, was to the creation of the Warren Commission?

Mr. Malley. I could only give you my reaction when I was called into his office after I returned from Dallas and what he told me at that time. There was certainly no criticism. I was told that the Warren Commission had been established. I was the liaison representative, and he wanted full and complete cooperation with them and no information whatsoever withheld from them. Give them everything.

Mr. McDonald. Mr. Malley, in the overall investigation of the assassination, what was the interaction between the various divisions in the Bureau, specifically general investigative and domestic intelligence?

Mr. Malley. To the best of my knowledge, there was complete cooperation between all the various people working on the assassination or the domestic intelligence aspect, and in the civil rights angle.

Mr. McDonald. What was your relationship with William Sullivan, the Director of Domestic Intelligence?

Mr. Malley. Are you referring to this individual case?
Mr. McDonald. Yes.
Mr. Malley. I don't think I had very many conversations with Sullivan on this particular case. I usually dealt with the section chief, Mr. Brannigan, or the individual supervisor.
Mr. McDonald. What was the domestic intelligence section, what were they doing regarding the assassination case?
Mr. Malley. As you saw, they had five or six supervisors. To go back and tell you exactly what they were doing at this time, I cannot. I do know that they all had specific assignments in it and one of the fundamentals, again, was to prove or disprove whether there was any possibility that they could come up with of a conspiracy. It was also to develop all aspects of Oswald's personal life, where he had been from the time he returned from Russia, what he did before he went to Russia and anything else that might give us any assistance.
Mr. McDonald. And this division handled the conspiracy aspect within that division?
Mr. Malley. There, again, it is difficult to say that they were the only ones doing it. They were primarily, because of their knowledge with various nationality groups, et cetera, and the fact they were looking into his entire personal life, they would have been in a better position to come across something than somebody handling criminal aspects.
Mr. McDonald. You were in the General Investigative Division?
Mr. Malley. That's correct.
Mr. McDonald. Would you have any direct knowledge or supervision over what was being done in the Domestic Intelligence Division as far as the assassination was concerned, considering your role as liaison with the Warren Commission?
Mr. Malley. Yes, I would, in that every report that was sent to the Warren Commission came to me before it went to Assistant Director Belmont and we both were charged by the Director with reading every word of it. In addition to that, there were literally hundreds of teletypes that came in from the field on various aspects of the investigation. Teletypes, which came into our division, regardless of whether they indicated there was anything to do with work going on over at Division 5, copies were made and sent to them.
Mr. McDonald. When you say Division 5, what are you referring to?
Mr. Malley. That's the Domestic Intelligence Division, I beg your pardon. Likewise, any teletypes that came to them, whether it seemed to refer to our work or not, teletypes were sent to the General Investigative Division for information so if there was anything that could be tied in, they could do it.
Mr. McDonald. Well, I am going to refer to the book 5 of the Senate Intelligence Committee, the Church committee report, where they are speaking of a supervisor in Domestic Intelligence Division who was reported to be the leading Cuban expert within the Bureau at that time, and he testified before the Church committee that he was never informed—first of all, he never even knew of any CIA assassination attempts against Fidel Castro. And this supervisor testified before that committee that he had no recollection of any Bureau investigation of Cuban involvement in
the Kennedy assassination. He was asked a question: "Were there ever any meetings that you recall where there were discussions as to whether or not the Cubans were involved in the assassination of President Kennedy?"

And he answered, "No; I don't recall. I would say no."

And they questioned, "Do you know if that possibility was investigated?"

Answer: "Well I can't even say that for sure, no, I can't.

Question: "Do you recall at any time ever seeing any memoranda or instructions that Cuban sources be contacted to see if there was any Cuban involvement in the assassination of President Kennedy?"

And he answered, "There were no such communications, to my knowledge, ever sent out from headquarters."

And they asked him: "If they were sent out, in all likelihood, would you have known about it?"

And he said, "Yes."

Now, this was the investigations being conducted, as you say, in Division 5, the Domestic Intelligence, and this is the leading Cuban expert in the Bureau at the time saying that during the assassination investigation, he wasn't even contacted to consider this aspect.

As liaison to the Warren Commission, and you did know the paperwork that was going on, what would your response be to his comments that he wasn't even involved?

Mr. Malley. I don't know how good his memory was. I do know that their division had the responsibility for keeping their own people aware of what was going on and if he didn't know what was going on in that section, I would say somebody was remiss.

Mr. MCDONALD. I am sorry.

Mr. Malley. Somebody was remiss in not keeping him aware. I can't possibly answer what went on over in their division on a day-to-day basis. You know, and I know that there was an investigation concerning the possibility of Cuban involvement, if you reviewed the material. It would be impossible for me to think that he wasn't aware of it.

Mr. MCDONALD. Is it your testimony the investigation would have been conducted by Division 5?

Mr. Malley. That part of it.

Mr. MCDONALD. And we have this statement given in 1976 that the leading Cuban specialist wasn't involved.

Mr. Malley. That's his statement. I can't answer for him.

Mr. MCDONALD. OK.

Turning now to the Special Investigative Division that you referred to on the chart, what was that division's responsibility?

Mr. Malley. I don't think they had any specific assignment. Courtney Evans, at that time, as I mentioned, was an Assistant Director and he was handling liaison with the Department, primarily with Robert Kennedy and other top officials of the Department.

Mr. MCDONALD. Was part of their jurisdiction organized crime?

Mr. Malley. To the best of my memory, yes.

Mr. MCDONALD. Can you recall, after the shooting of Oswald by Ruby, what consideration was given at that point to the possibility of organized crime involvement, either in the Ruby shooting of Oswald or the overall assassination of the President?
Let me ask one question further before you answer that. After Ruby shot Oswald, how long did it take the Bureau to learn about Jack Ruby himself, his background, his associates, the kind of person he was?

Mr. Malley. Well, from the standpoint of the type of person he was, I am sure that within an hour or so before we ever got near the investigation, the Bureau was probably well aware of the fact that he was running a night club which amounted to sort of a striptease place. And beyond that, I am not able to tell you when we really developed his full background data except that we did start so-called civil rights investigation on the basis that he had been shot while in custody of the police department, and that did give us the basis for jurisdiction.

Mr. McDonald. So, this investigation was handled by the General Investigative Civil Rights Division?

Mr. Malley. General Investigative Division in the Civil Rights Section.

Mr. McDonald. What consideration was being given at the time to the possibility of Jack Ruby being involved with organized crime in the commission of either of the shootings?

Mr. Malley. I can’t tell you what they were doing back in Washington because I wasn’t there until after December, the 12th. I do know that they were under instructions in Dallas to consider all possibilities of involvement to the nth degree of anyone, primarily on the basis that Ruby might have had some assistance. So, I can’t answer you any more specifically than that.

Mr. McDonald. As you pointed out, Courtney Evans was the Assistant Director of that division and he has appeared before this committee in deposition and interview. When he was asked whether his division had ever been asked to render assistance in the investigation of Jack Ruby or any organized crime aspects of the case, he said to us, I am quoting from an interview, “They sure didn’t come to me. I know they sure didn’t come to me. We had no part in that that I can recall.”

This committee, in our look at this case, spoke to Mr. Charles Stanley. Do you know who he is?

Mr. Malley. Yes, I do.

Mr. McDonald. He was Evans’ principal assistant in 1963. And he was asked whether that division was ever asked to participate in the investigation of the assassination. And he told us:

I don’t think we had one thing to do with it. To my knowledge, we were never brought in on that. I don’t recall a thing coming through our division on Ruby or Oswald.

And then we spoke to Jack Danahey; do you know who he is?

Mr. Malley. I believe he was working in New York for many years. I don’t know of him ever being in Washington.

Mr. McDonald. In 1963, he was the assistant special agent in charge in your New York office. Apparently, he is widely regarded as an expert in organized crime. And he was asked if he or any other Mafia specialists in the Bureau were ever consulted on the investigation of Jack Ruby or any other aspects of the Kennedy assassination. And Danahey answered, and this was in our interview with our committee, “I know damn well I wasn’t. No one said anything to me.”
And lastly, we spoke to Mr. Al Staffeld, who is another official in the organized crime section and he was asked essentially the same question and he gave essentially the same answer, that he had no recollection of any involvement or any information or request for assistance coming to that division by those handling the assassination case.

With that in mind, could you explain to us how the General Investigative Division would have been handling any organized crime aspects, the possibilities, if there were some, to the assassination?

Mr. Malley. As briefly as I can, if any name showed up either in the investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy or in the investigation being conducted by the civil rights section of the shooting of Oswald, there is no question in my mind, and you would have to doublecheck with the supervisors, but if a criminal figure of any known standing had been mentioned or any criminal figure that had a lot of information in the files on him, I don't have any doubt they would have discussed it with the individual supervisors down in the organized crime unit.

That would not necessarily have been called to the attention of either Mr. Stanley or Mr. Evans, and it might not even have been called to the attention of Staffeld. If there was any reason to send any memorandum or letters or anything else through them to be initialed by that division, it certainly would have been done.

I do know that in the civil section—civil rights section—I was told they were in touch with him many times on individual names that came up in connection with possible criminal figures.

Mr. McDonald. Mr. Malley, after the creation of the Warren Commission, first of all, what was the Bureau's relationship to the Commission, and you being the one essentially in the middle, how would you categorize the relationship?

Mr. Malley. Strictly a business relationship. No friendliness, no unfriendliness. Just strictly, you have your work to do, we have ours. If we want something from you, we will call you and ask for it. If we want further explanations, we will get them from you. There was never any animosity shown, that I am aware of.

At least, it didn't rub off on me if there was.

Mr. McDonald. Prior to the creation of the Commission, the Bureau was handling the case on its own. The directives were coming out from Washington or Dallas, or wherever, to cover leads. Did this change after the Warren Commission was established?

Mr. Malley. Not for quite a long, long time. After the Warren Commission had had an opportunity to review the large number of reports that had been sent to them, they eventually started asking a few questions and in many instances, their questions were answered by saying, if you will look at the report of so and so on a certain page, the information is there and you haven't located it yet. In a few instances, they sent us letters or made telephone calls and said we have checked into this aspect; we feel that maybe it would be well to conduct a little further investigation and they would outline what they wanted.

As far as directing the investigation, they did not attempt to take over what we were doing. We continued to do our own investiga-
tion on everything we thought was necessary the entire time that they were in existence and up until the time I retired in 1971.

Mr. McDonald. And you are saying that the Bureau continued its own investigation, you did not respond only to leads from the Warren Commission; is that what you are saying?

Mr. Malley. That's what I'm saying. We did our own work. Whenever they had any questions, we tried to answer them for them. They did not give us directives, you do this, you do that, you do this. When they had specific items they wanted to check on, they did tell us.

Mr. McDonald. You stated you were in Dallas when you were told to meet with Mr. Rankin, the general counsel of the Warren Commission. Excuse me, you came back to Washington and were told you were going to be liaison.

Mr. Malley. I can't say I was told before I got back from Dallas, when I was told, I was going to meet with Rankin. I do know I was told in Dallas I would be handling liaison. I think I told you that I had a memorandum or something on my desk saying I was to get in touch with Rankin as soon as possible after I got back.

Mr. McDonald. Were you aware of the fact that Mr. Hoover was involved in the, I guess we could say, the blocking of the first choice for the Warren Commission general counsel, a man by the name of Warren Olney. Were you aware of that situation?

Mr. Malley. I don't recall that I was ever told that.

Mr. McDonald. Did you learn of it subsequently?

Mr. Malley. I don't remember it. If I did know it, I don't remember it now.

Mr. McDonald. One of the other items that has come up over the years regarding the Warren Commission and Mr. Hoover was that it has been reported that Mr. Hoover had dossiers or files, on members of the Warren Commission and staffs. Were you aware of this, and I am not referring to security-check files, but just things that we would call a dossier. Are you familiar with that?

Mr. Malley. I don't recall that I was ever told. It seems to me it would be a normal procedure if you were dealing with a large number of staff members and committee members, that it would be well to know exactly what was transpiring on each one, from your standpoint of your dealings with him.

If one of them said this on a certain date, contradicted himself on another date, certainly, it would be well to have had a record of what was going on. So, when you refer to a file, a dossier on each one, I can well understand why they might have had such a thing.

Mr. McDonald. Mr. Malley, I just have one further question. And that is with the benefit of hindsight of 15 years and looking back on what went on, in your opinion, was the overall investigation of both the assassination of the President and the murder of Lee Harvey Oswald handled properly?

Mr. Malley. Well, I might turn that around just a little bit and say you have had the benefit of the Church Committee investigations, you have had the benefit of the Warren Commission and you had the benefit of all our files. Maybe you could tell me what you feel we did wrong and I will be glad to answer what you think we did wrong.
Mr. McDonald. Well, we appreciate you trying to turn the table on us—but, we are here to ask you questions.

Mr. Malley. No, I am not trying to turn the tables. I am just asking you what you feel we did wrong and if I am not entitled to that, well, that's that.

Mr. McDonald. I am not here to answer questions. So with that, Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you, Counsel. The procedure at this point will be that the Chair will yield himself such time as he may consume, after which we will then operate under the 5-minute rule.

Mr. Malley, one thing I would appreciate you clearing up for me that you just stated to Counsel for the committee, do I understand you to say that the Commission did their work and we did ours; is that your statement?

Mr. Malley. That is correct.

Chairman Stokes. And by that, what do you mean?

Mr. Malley. I meant, Mr. Stokes, exactly what I said, in that we were not asked to be leg-runners or do every little thing that they might think of. If they did have something to come up, we did it. We were operating independently on our own investigation, but definitely under instructions from Mr. Hoover that if they needed any clarification or had any requests to make of us, that we carry them out fully.

Chairman Stokes. Then, for further clarification, anyone having the understanding that in terms of the Commission's investigation that was being directed by them and the FBI was pursuing leads under their direction, that would not be true; is that right?

Mr. Malley. It would be true if they asked us. But the numbers of requests they made was minimum. They were reviewing reports, anything else that we sent to them and proceeding on their own to evaluate it and whenever they made a request, we did do it. You can say that we are an investigative arm when they needed us. But beyond that, we were not under their direction.

Chairman Stokes. So, the basic investigation was being completed under the total direction, then, of the FBI itself?

Mr. Malley. That's right.

Chairman Stokes. In terms of your responsibilities, what was your relationship with Assistant Director William Sullivan?

Mr. Malley. As I mentioned awhile ago, and I don't know whether you understood me, I said I do not recall very many conversations that I had with Sullivan in connection with the assassination and the Oswald case. I did have direct communication with other people in his division.

Chairman Stokes. You know, of course, that Assistant Director Sullivan is now deceased?

Mr. Malley. Yes.

Chairman Stokes. Let me read to you some excerpts from an interview with former Assistant Director Sullivan that was conducted by another House committee in 1975 after which I will ask for your comment.

In the interview, Mr. Sullivan was asked to recall Director Hoover's relationship to the Warren Commission. In the interview, Mr. Sullivan stated that Mr. Hoover, and I now quote Mr. Sullivan,
“did not like to see the Warren Commission come into existence, that he did show marked interest in limiting the scope of it or circumventing the scope of it by taking any action that might result in neutralizing it.”

In this same interview, Mr. Sullivan went on further and said this, and I again quote “From what I saw and what I heard, what I understood, he, Mr. Hoover, was not pleased about the creation of the Warren Commission, No. 1. No. 2, he was not interested in seeing the Warren Commission conduct an exhaustive investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy because he thought that the FBI investigation was adequate.”

Having heard this statement by Mr. Sullivan, would you concur in his observations on this point?

Mr. Malley. I would not, because I have no knowledge of what Mr. Sullivan was talking about when he says the Director was opposed to the creation and so on. The only comment I have heard along that line is the one that Mr. McDonald read awhile ago based on the telephone conversation with the White House. And I never personally heard him object to the Warren Commission in any way, shape, or form.

Chairman Stokes. In this same interview, Mr. Malley, Mr. Sullivan was asked whether he had seen anything in the files to indicate that Oswald had any relationship to the CIA. In response to this question, Mr. Sullivan answered in a rather ambiguous manner, and I quote his testimony at that point:

“No, I think that has been discussed. I think there may be something on that, but you asked me if I had seen anything. I don’t recall having seen anything like that, but I think there is something on that point. Whether it is valid or not, I don’t know. It rings a bell in my mind.

Now, it would seem that Director Sullivan was not giving a clearly negative response to that type of a question. And I wonder, from your investigation of this matter, whether you would make some comment with reference to that point.

Mr. Malley. I am not trying to avoid your question. I have difficulty answering it bacause when I was before the Church Committee, I was asked about some CIA material that had allegedly been delivered to the Bureau and that it had not been fur-nished by the Bureau to the Warren Commission.

The material they referred to me, I had no recollection of it at the time. Subsequently, I was shown a letter which was sent on November 23d to the President—it may have gone to the Attorney General—where it referred to a source in Mexico giving some information which related to the fact that Oswald had been in Mexico and had been in communication with the Soviet Embassy.

I do not know for sure. I can only assume where it came from. But I had no knowledge of it at the time I was before the Church Committee, that I can recall. Whether Mr. Sullivan had knowledge, he is the only one who could answer the question, or maybe somebody in his division who worked with him. I don’t know what Mr. Sullivan did as far as any materials such as this.

Chairman Stokes. On that specific point, that is as much light you can shed on that point?

Mr. Malley. That is all I know about it.
Chairman Stokes. Let me now make reference to another segment of the same interview with Assistant Director Sullivan in 1975. This segment relates to what Mr. Sullivan perceived as gaps in the Bureau's investigation into the possibility of whether Lee Oswald was involved with others in the assassination.

Keeping in mind that Mr. Sullivan was the man in charge of directing the Bureau's investigation of any conspiracy aspects of the case, let me refer to these further comments by him.

"To my recollection, we never developed any conclusive evidence that would tie or bind Mr. Oswald to any foreign nation or to the instructions of any foreign nation directly or indirectly in connection with the assassination of President Kennedy. Now, there are gaps here that I would like to make very clear. These gaps certainly bothered the men in my division and they bothered me. And I am sure they bothered some of the men in the Dallas field office.

"For example, there is a gap as to what transpired when Mr. Oswald was in Russia. We really do not have any firm information on this at all."

From your own investigation, did you find the same or similar gaps?

Mr. Malley. If my memory is correct, another Government agency, who had access to information about Oswald's activities in Russia, furnished to the Warren Commission—my memory is not good enough to tell you that I had access to every word of it—but I would presume if they furnished it to the Warren Commission, it was given to us. That would have been given to the Domestic Intelligence Division inasmuch as it related to their activities, rather than the actual assassination.

Chairman Stokes. What about Mr. Sullivan's comment that there were other men in the division who found such gaps disturbing?

Mr. Malley. The only thing I can tell you, and I repeat what I have said before, there was very, very close coordination between the men, and I say that regardless of what Mr. Sullivan may have said because I know it of my knowledge.

And if there were any such gaps in anyone's mind, they certainly had an obligation to discuss it with the men in both divisions to see to it that they were cleared up, if possible.

Chairman Stokes. You are saying, then that no one discussed those gaps with you?

Mr. Malley. No.

Chairman Stokes. Mr. Malley, let me again quote Mr. Sullivan during the course of interview. He says, "It is my understanding from conversations on this subject, that he, Hoover, did not want the Warren Commission to conduct an exhaustive investigation for fear that it would discover important and relevant facts that we in the FBI had not discovered in our investigation. Therefore, it would be greatly embarrassing to him and damaging to his career and to the FBI as a whole."

And then when asked if he believed that the Dallas FBI's secret destruction of a letter from Lee Harvey Oswald could have been one of the things that Mr. Hoover was afraid the Warren Commission might uncover, Mr. Sullivan further stated as follows, and I quote him again: "Well, that could be, but it didn't happen to come
to my mind when you raised the question. I do think, though, and this is only an opinion, I do think that what he had in mind went beyond that. If he did have that in mind, it went to something more basic, that we might have failed to discover a relationship between Oswald and the Cubans, and if we had failed to discover a relationship between the two and the Warren Commission did, then we would, indeed, as a Bureau be in serious trouble."

Can we ask for your reaction to this point brought up by Mr. Sullivan?

Mr. Malley. With regard to the first part, where he is saying the Director was opposed to this, that and the other thing, I don’t know if it was the first day I was back in Washington or the second, Mr. Hoover called for Belmont, his associate director, and myself, to come to his office. We were told in very firm conversation by the Director that we were to exhaustively pursue every aspect of any lead that developed, no matter how small it appeared to be, and to leave nothing to doubt.

If that sounds like the Director, who was trying to short-circuit the investigation, I can’t understand plain English. I think that is a very, very important thing for you gentlemen to understand, that where I was concerned, Mr. Hoover never said anything except go forward to the nth degree on anything that comes to your attention.

Where Mr. Sullivan gets his information, I cannot tell you. He is dead and I am not going to make any statements that I can’t back up personally.

Chairman Stokes. Mr. Malley, we have learned in the years since the assassination that Director Hoover secretly disciplined 17 Bureau officials for what he regarded as mistakes and deficiencies in their pre-assassination investigation of Lee Harvey Oswald.

The fact that these Bureau officials were punished for these deficiencies in the Oswald investigation was never revealed to the Warren Commission. It was never, in fact, publicly known until 1976. Let me now read to you a statement by former Assistant Director William Sullivan regarding this area and then I would like to ask for your further comments on this.

And I quote him: "I suggested that the disciplinary action was arbitrary but calculated rather than capricious. It was calculated, it was thought out as a means of Mr. Hoover protecting himself against any indictment that he was at fault in the assassination of President Kennedy. That the FBI, under his direction, had made mistakes and, therefore, he was culpable and apparently his reasoning, as we interpreted it at the time, was that if he ordered disciplinary transfers and letters of censure to a large number of men and then if he was charged with culpability in the assassination of President Kennedy, he could say these men are the ones responsible, and I have already taken disciplinary action against them."

Do you believe that this was true?

Mr. Malley. Again, I don’t know where Mr. Sullivan got his information. I know that I was not made aware nor did I ever see the memorandum which you are referring to concerning the disciplinary action. I did hear that some had been recommended, but I
was never made aware of what went on. I think you would have to talk to somebody else who had more knowledge about it that I do.

Chairman Stokes. Were you personally familiar with any disciplinary action relative to Mr. Hosty, James Hosty?

Mr. Malley. Yes, in that there were certain things that occurred in Dallas that Hosty was involved in where I was told he would probably be recommended for some action based on some loose, unnecessary statements that he made the day of the assassination.

Other than that, I have no recollection of anything else.

One other thing. You mentioned this note. The first time I ever heard about the note was after it appeared in the newspapers. I believe it was a year ago this summer. I was questioned at that time by the Bureau when they were conducting their own investigation to find out who might have known about it at the time, and didn't reveal it.

Chairman Stokes. The first time you heard about the note was a year ago?

Mr. Malley. That's correct, when it came out in the newspapers.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you. I have no further questions.

The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Dodd.

Mr. Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Malley, for being here this morning.

I would like to go back to the very first question that Chairman Stokes raised to you. I didn't write down your exact quote when you responded, but it struck me. You talked about the relationship between the Bureau and the Warren Commission. You described it as a business relationship. They asked for things and you would respond and it was a very, well, I guess, business relationship is maybe the best way to describe it. And I was a little struck by that.

It occurred to me that we had a commission that was set up by the President of the United States, that was chaired by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of this country, investigating the death of an American President.

I sensed, in your response, and this is my opinion, but I sensed in your response that the creation of the Warren Commission was a source of embarrassment to the Bureau because it, in effect, was saying that we can't rely on the Bureau to do a thorough and complete investigation of this matter, and we have to set up a separate commission.

Would I be incorrect in assuming that that was not an uncommon feeling among upper echelon people within the Bureau that, in fact, the creation of the Warren Commission was, in effect; a black eye; that the very fact it was created was a black eye for the Bureau?

Mr. Malley. The only answer I can give you on that is no official—

Mr. Dodd. Is no what?

Mr. Malley. No official higher than I has discussed their feelings with me about the creation of the Warren Commission. I personally did not consider it any black eye to the Bureau. I felt that on such a matter as important as that, that if they wanted to create a commission to double-check what the Bureau was doing, they had a perfect right to do it, and I went along with the
Director's feeling that we should cooperate fully and do anything we could to help, which we did.

Mr. Dodd. Your answer now has a bit of a different twist to it than it did when you originally answered it.

Mr. Malley. No, you are indicating that I felt there was something wrong, that I was not in agreement that the Commission should be created. If I gave that impression, I am sorry because it was none of my business whether they did or did not have a commission.

Mr. Dodd. Let me ask you this: You talked about it as a business relationship, and I presume by that you mean that since you, the agency, the Bureau, was the body responsible for the collection of data, evidence and so forth, in effect, the Bureau was the investigating arm of the Commission. The Commission did not have a separate group of investigators. It relied upon the Bureau for the collection of information; isn't that correct?

Mr. Malley. That's correct.

Mr. Dodd. Am I to assume further from your response to Mr. Stokes' question that unless the Commission asked for something specifically, unless they asked for certain data and evidence, that the Bureau was not forthcoming on its own with information—

Mr. Malley. No, that's a completely erroneous impression. We were constantly turning over reports, every time that one was received from the field, to the Warren Commission and gave it to them just as fast as we possibly could.

So, when you say that we were not doing anything unless they asked us, that is completely wrong.

Mr. Dodd. The Bureau volunteered information?

Mr. Malley. We kept doing it up until the day they disbanded the Commission.

Mr. Dodd. Why didn't you give them the Hosty letter?

Mr. Malley. Because I didn't know about it. If I had I certainly would have.

Mr. Dodd. I am not suggesting you yourself, I am talking about the Bureau. If the Bureau was cooperating in giving information to the Warren Commission, you were aware of the Hosty letter, that is the Bureau was, why didn't the Bureau in the sense of cooperation you are describing, turn over the Hosty letter to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Malley. I can't answer the question because not knowing about it, I don't know what the thinking was of the people who had it or knew about it.

Mr. Dodd. So, using that example, there was not a full sense of cooperation in terms of making the information available?

Mr. Malley. Well, I would have to say, is there a man in this room who never made a mistake in judgment?

Mr. Dodd. I am not suggesting that there is a mistake in judgment. You are talking about a letter written in the hand of the man who has been accused of assassinating the President to an FBI agent in Dallas. That is not a mistake in judgment, that is a decision on the part of someone not to turn over a very valid and important piece of evidence.

Mr. Malley. I can't answer your question any more than saying what I have already.
Mr. Dodd. Did you have any, or to your knowledge, did anyone in
the Bureau have any kind of a special relationship with anyone
who was a member of the Warren Commission? By that, I am
asking you this: Did anyone who served on the Warren Com-
mission, was any member of that Commission requested to provide
information to the Bureau, from executive sessions, that would not
otherwise have been available to the Bureau?
Mr. Malley. Not that I am aware of. There is a possibility that
somebody may have been very friendly and talked to them, but I
don't know of any special request that was ever made to anyone to
keep them advised.
Mr. Dodd. You never made any requests?
Mr. Malley. I did not.
Mr. Dodd. To your knowledge, no one else made any requests of
any member of that Commission to report on what the activities of
the executive sessions of that Commission were?
Mr. Malley. Not that I can recall.
Mr. Dodd. Mr. Chairman, I think my 5 minutes may be up. I will
come back.
Chairman Stokes. Time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. McKinney.
Mr. McKinney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Malley, during the original investigation in Dallas, and
when you were first brought in, was there a tremendous amount of
pressure from the Bureau to get it done?
Mr. Malley. It would depend on how you interpret the comment
that you have just made. There was all kinds of pressure to get
everything under control as fast as you could. Everybody was reading
things from the news media, radio, television and so one, ques-
tions were being asked, what about this, what about that, and no
matter how much pressure you were getting, a group of men can
only do so much in a given time in handling investigative work; whereas as far as I am concerned, I repeat again, I was never given
any time limit that we had to have anything finished.
Mr. McKinney. In other words, at that stage in your investiga-
tion you did not feel that there was pressure being brought to bear
that resulted in the investigation being anything but complete?
Mr. Malley. Not where I am concerned.
Mr. McKinney. Did you hear through general gossip columns of
the FBI or your fellow colleagues, of any inordinate pressure being
brought upon the FBI by the Attorney General or by anyone else
in the administration, including the Director, to speed it up at any
cost?
Mr. Malley. No.
Mr. McKinney. After the Warren Commission was established
and you became liaison, the Committee is aware of several state-
ments on the part of different people within the administration
suggesting that they wanted the Warren Commission wrapped up
as quickly as possible. Did you at that point as liaison to the
Warren Commission, feel that this type of pressure was in any way
hurting your efforts to fully supply the Warren Commission or
fully answer any of the questions they had?
Mr. Malley. Truthfully, I cannot remember that such comments
were made. It wouldn't have had any effect whatsoever on what
the Bureau did at that time regardless of whether they wanted to wind it up or whether they didn't. We were working on something and we would have continued it until we thought we had fully exhausted it.

Mr. McKinney. You made a statement earlier that you were sending reports to the Warren Commission right up to their dissolution, so to speak.

Did you feel, as an individual and as a long-term agent, and I gather a specialist in your field which was Communism in the United States, that the Warren Commission was brought to a close too soon, before it had all of the information the FBI had? Or, did you feel that it should have been continued longer?

Mr. Malley. The best answer I can give you on that is that the majority of reports that were being sent to the Warren Commission, after probably the middle of the summer, 1964, were rather innocuous reports of miscellaneous allegations and so on that were continuing to come in. I am not in a position to give you examples, but just things that would have to be checked out to see if there was anything to them.

I do think that the Warren Commission in their hearings, exhausted all of the fundamental aspects of the inquiry as I knew it at that time.

Mr. McKinney. The Warren Commission had rather a cavalier attitude toward the role of Jack Ruby, in fact almost to the point of suggesting that they could find no real ties between Jack Ruby and organized crime. How did you feel about their handling of the Ruby matter.

Mr. Malley. Well, when you say his ties with organized crime, the only comment I could make is from what I remember reading in reports. I do remember reading that there were several individuals, possibly high school associates of Ruby, that did eventually become pretty well known in organized crime. To the best of my—-

Mr. McKinney. Wasn't it pretty well known to the FBI that Jack Ruby, No. 1, was a member of organized crime, No. 2, he ran a strip joint and has been somewhat commonly referred to as a supplier of both women and booze to political and police figures in the city of Dallas.

 Didn't you find it a little difficult to accept the Warren Commission's final output on Ruby with the knowledge that the FBI had put into the Commission?

Mr. Malley. You are saying the final findings. All I know is that every effort was made to check out his activities completely and anything that we checked was given to them.

Now, I am not in a position to criticize what the Warren Commission findings were and I can't say that I agree or disagree with what they found, it is too many years ago.

Mr. McKinney. Do you think that the push for speed and a resolution to the Warren Commission's deliberations might have been one of the reasons why they were deficient in such areas as following through on Ruby?

Mr. Malley. Well, based on my conversations with Mr. Rankin I think if he felt we were shortchanging him on time that he would have made a statement for the record at that time to say so.
Mr. McKinney. I have no more questions, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Stokes. Time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ford.
Mr. Ford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Malley, yesterday, Mr. Kelly, with the Secret Service, testified that on December 9, 1963, they were instructed to turn over the assassination to the FBI. To what extent was this investigation continued by the FBI?
Mr. Malley. Are you referring to what Secret Service was doing or what?
Mr. Ford. No; when they turned the investigation over to the FBI on December 9, after receiving orders from the White House, to what extent was this investigation continued from that point on?
Mr. Malley. Well, I don't know whether I interpret your question correctly because we were already doing everything we possibly could. We continued to do so.
Mr. Ford. Mr. Kelly said yesterday that the Secret Service considered the case practically closed when Lee Harvey Oswald was arrested. I think you said earlier that the FBI did not feel that way, and so I am asking at this point what steps or how did you continue the investigation?
Mr. Malley. We never changed our position one way or the other. Just because Secret Service was dropping out of it we went right ahead with everything that we could possibly do to definitely establish not only the information we thought was correct, namely, Oswald was probably involved, but to firmly show it and see if there was anyone else involved, which we had in mind constantly.
Mr. Ford. Memos were coming from Director Hoover instructing that the case be wrapped up as soon as possible, is that correct?
Mr. Malley. That is what you are telling me. I wasn't in Washington at that time so I don't recall reading them when I got back.
Mr. Ford. One final question.
Could Director Hoover's attitude toward the Kennedys have had any effect or influence on the investigation of the assassination?
Mr. Malley. Well, I think I am going to say this for about the third or fourth time. He told me not to stop at anything, to go all out and do everything to thoroughly exhaust every possibility. That certainly wouldn't indicate that any relationship he had would have had any effect on our investigation.
Mr. Ford. Thank you.
Chairman Stokes. Time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Fithian.
Mr. Fithian. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to review again exactly the structure of authority in Dallas after you arrived there.
Is it your testimony that you were put in charge and that Shanklin and Hosty reported to you during their days out there?
Mr. Malley. Hosty did not report to me directly at any time. As far as Mr. Shanklin's position, he was the agent in charge of the office, I was sent down there to help coordinate the activities, to help him out in any way I could.
There were a number of days where I think that both of us were on the phone close to 16 to 18 hours a day, and beyond that, I don't know whether I know exactly what your question is.
Mr. Fithian. Well, who made decisions?
Mr. Malley. If there were any decisions to be made, if Shanklin was the one who received the information, he discussed it with me. If we agreed, fine. If we didn't agree, it was up to me to say yes or no.

Mr. Fithian. So, in other words, you were the authority in Dallas?
Mr. Malley. As far as from the standpoint of making any decisions on that level.
Mr. Fithian. OK. At the time you were conducting your investigation, did you know, were you aware that when Oswald killed Officer Tippit, presumably, that he was in about the most direct walking route that one could lay out between his apartment and Jack Ruby's
Mr. Malley. I don't recall that I knew it immediately. It did come out because of checks that were made to try and tie in whether or not Ruby and Oswald had ever had any relationship of any kind, friendship, working relationship, or anything else, the Bureau's investigation did not ever reveal the slightest indication of a tieup between Ruby or they were ever——
Mr. Fithian. I understand that. I am just asking whether or not you were aware at the time the investigation was——
Mr. Malley. Sometime during the investigation I definitely was.
Mr. Fithian. And were you aware of a memorandum from Evans to Belmont, or the substance of that memorandum, dated November 26, 1963, which I believe is JFK F-457, in which it is clearly acknowledged, that at least there are rumors, this is not evidence, there are rumors, people want to know and it says "There have also been allegations that Oswald and Ruby were known to each other and were part of a conspiracy. It has been further alleged Oswald was killed to silence him."
Just to clarify for you in the record, I am not now espousing the theory that necessarily Ruby killed Oswald to silence him. What I am doing is this. This data was in the possession of the Bureau, that is, it was no news to you or anybody else that there were rumors that these two men were associated and, therefore, it seems to me rather pertinent that the chief investigative officer there on behalf of the Bureau would have known that, to the layman at least, it appears that Oswald might be walking from his apartment to Jack Ruby's at the time that he inadvertently came upon police officer Tippit.

My question is whether or not you at the time you were conducting the investigation were aware of that?
Mr. Malley. There is no way that I can go back 15 years and tell you when I became aware of it. While I was in Dallas I certainly went out and retraced the steps from here to here to here, to the rooming house he stayed in, and so on and so forth.

Mr. Fithian. So you were aware of it sometime before December 10th?
Mr. Malley. I think I left on the 12th.
Mr. Fithian. On the 12th, when you returned, you were aware of it some time?
Mr. Malley. I am reasonably sure I would have had to be.
Mr. Fithian. Let me move to another question.
I think you testified that you were not aware of a threatening note from Oswald to the Bureau in Dallas, to Hosty, in particular. At the time that the decision was made by someone of that important piece of evidence pertaining to Oswald's relationship with the Bureau and his feelings toward a Bureau agent, isn't that the kind of information that would be discussed between Mr. Shanklin and yourself prior to its destruction?

Mr. Malley. Had I known about it I would certainly have done something about it. I am sorry, he didn't tell me.

Mr. Fithian. Did you recommend to the Bureau any kind of censure or punishment or reprimand for either Hosty or Shanklin as a result of subsequently finding out that this had been destroyed and that, you while in charge, were not informed?

Mr. Malley. First of all, I didn't find out about it until a year ago, when I had been out of the Bureau for some 6 years. So I would not be making any recommendations as to what should be done about it.

Mr. Fithian. I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 2 additional minutes, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ford [now presiding]. The gentleman is recognized for 2 additional minutes.

Mr. Fithian. Were you made aware at any time during your stay in Dallas, or during the existence of the Warren Commission—were you made aware of the extent of Oswald's contacts with the FBI, that there was an actual security file on him? Did you know that when you arrived in Dallas?

Mr. Malley. I knew that on Friday, November 22. I had not had a chance to see the file before I left to go to Dallas because of the fact that there were a lot of people who were interested in seeing the file. They were working in the Domestic Intelligence Division. Subsequently numerous copies were made up and were available to anyone that needed one.

Mr. Fithian. Thank you.

I would like now to ask a question of a much more general nature and perhaps would call upon sort of your general philosophy and review of your thoughts while you were in the Bureau.

Yesterday we had some interesting testimony here from the Secret Service. One of the important aspects of that testimony was a rather clear indication on the part of the witness that he believed Oswald to be some kind of a nut, and it seemed to have emanated from this witness' view that anybody who attempted the assassination of the President of the United States would have to be psychopathic or he would have to be mentally out of order.

Would you concur with that general line of interpretation?

Mr. Malley. I am not in a position to give you a very direct answer. All I can tell you is that there are many people around the country that you would never know what their thoughts were or what they were capable of doing, and that because one does something on a spur of a moment or with a few days of deliberation, I don't know how you can describe the individual.

We do know that Oswald, 6 months before he killed Kennedy, took a shot at Oswald, I mean at General Walker. So the man's mentality must have been one of wanting to either do something where he would feel proud of himself, or something of that nature,
but that is not a very direct answer to what you have asked me. I just don’t know how to answer you.

Mr. FITHIAN. I was just wondering if ever in any of the times when you were talking over coffee and——

Mr. MALLEY. The only thought that I have ever had on the matter is that from the very early stages of Oswald’s life he seemed to be a complete loner, completely independent, and resentful of taking instructions from anyone.

Mr. FITHIAN. What I was trying to get at is whether or not you and the other high officials in the Bureau, when discussing this, either after the Kennedy case, after the Kennedy assassination, or before, generally tend to believe that the only person capable of actually trying to undertake the assassination of a President or a high official in the United States would have to be mentally unbalanced or off or different?

Mr. MALLEY. I wouldn’t say that that is a complete necessarily correct situation.

You do know that where Oswald is concerned he did some planning on his own. You can say that he was mentally unbalanced. He was certainly smart enough to do a little figuring on that particular situation. He did manage to get away from the building, not for long, but he did manage to get away. Who is to say whether the man is unbalanced or whether he has just got a temporary point that he wants to make for himself and make some history, whether he is going to be prosecuted, killed or what himself, I don’t know.

Mr. FITHIAN. Mr. Chairman, the reason I raise this question, is that I guess that I was increasingly disturbed by yesterday’s testimony and I really kind of wanted to go back to that witness or to those witnesses, both of these agencies, and ask whether or not either agency would in retrospect have been able to detect or identify a politically motivated apart from a pathologically motivated, psychopathically motivated, type of an assassination.

I guess I am not sure that we are fully aware that there are terrorists who for political reasons these days do things which cannot be normally attributed to somebody who is just mentally off. Maybe we would have thought that 15 years ago, that anybody who hijacked a French airliner or who did many of the kinds of sensational terrorist things that have happened in the last 5 years, or so, maybe we would have thought that only someone who was mentally warped could have done that, but my question, which is very ill phrased, and ineptly phrased, is whether or not, either then or now, the Bureau and the Secret Service and other agencies are really thinking in the dimension of today’s world in terms of real terrorists, who act for political, not personally unbalanced reasons, and it disturbs me that that kind of thinking might have prevailed then and therefore, the whole investigation by the FBI was put in that direction rather than to immediately question and thoroughly investigate the potential of either a politically inspired collaborative thing or one in which organized crime was involved?

There are two or three other kinds of lines of investigation that seem to me to be rather inadequate by the Bureau and the Secret Service and the Warren Commission, as for as that is concerned, and that is why I was wondering what your philosophy was, where you were coming from?
Mr. Malley. Well, the only thing that I can say to you is that at that time and today you have literally hundreds of people walking around the streets that may be capable of violence or terrorist activities at any time. I don't know how the Government could afford to spend the money that would be necessary to keep a surveillance on everyone that they thought had the potential to do something out of the question.

Mr. Fithian. Mr. Chairman, I would like to return to this question but I am going to have to run and vote or miss that vote. Thank you very much.

Mr. Edgar [now presiding]. I yield back to the Chairman and then I will ask some questions.

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Edgar.

Mr. Edgar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Malley, who is in charge of the Monday after Oswald's assassination by Jack Ruby, of the FBI's investigation into the death of President Kennedy?

Mr. Malley. Who was actually in charge of it? In Washington or in Dallas or where?

Mr. Edgar. OK, let's start with the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Mr. Malley. Well, I think you would say Mr. Alan Belmont, Associate Director under Mr. Hoover, was actually overseeing the entire investigation.

Mr. Edgar. Again, would you sit closer to the mike? Mr. Alan Belmont?

Mr. Malley. That is correct.

Mr. Edgar. In your opinion, Mr. Alan Belmont was in charge of the investigation?

Mr. Malley. Overall.

Mr. Edgar. For the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

What was your relationship with him?

Mr. Malley. I described my prior position. I was, therefore, working under Belmont and then under Rosen, so there were two people, one person in between myself and Belmont.

Mr. Edgar. At any time in the days following the assassination of President Kennedy, did you suggest or did you participate in a meeting to develop an investigative plan of where the Federal Bureau of Investigation was going to go in analyzing this particular case?

Mr. Malley. To say that that particular question, the purpose of a meeting, I cannot do it. I do know that I had many, many conferences with Mr. Belmont by myself, many with the supervisory staff that was working in the Division that I was from, as well as supervisors from the Domestic Intelligence Division.

Mr. Edgar. Did the FBI have a plan?

Mr. Malley. Well, there was a definite plan, namely, the purpose of the investigation, as we have said five times already, was to find out whether there was any conspiracy involved and to make sure whether or not Oswald did actually kill the President.

Mr. Edgar. Was that plan written down anywhere?

Mr. Malley. If it was, I am not aware of it.

Mr. Edgar. Now, you have just indicated that the FBI had a plan and that that plan was not written down anywhere but——
Mr. Malley. I didn’t say it wasn’t. I said I am not aware of it.
Mr. Edgar. You did suggest, though, that the verbal plan was to
cHECK OUT CONSPIRACY?
Mr. Malley. Certainly.
Mr. Edgar. What part did the FBI play in trying to coordinate
the information of the CIA and Secret Service?
Mr. Malley. If we received any information from the Secret
Service or the CIA we would have taken it into consideration in
our own investigation.
Following the creation of the Warren Commission, I presume
they gave their information to the Warren Commission. Whether
they gave it to us, you would have to come up with a specific
document and check.
Mr. Edgar. Why wouldn’t you have suggested that the FBI sit
down with the CIA and the Secret Service to find out what infor-
mation they had and to share with them what information you had
about Lee Harvey Oswald, Jack Ruby, or anything relating to the
assassination?
Mr. Malley. With respect to the Secret Service, while I was in
Dallas no one was in more constant communication with Inspector
Tom Kelly than I was. We talked very frequently on the phone.
Following the assassination and back in Washington, I frequently
had lunch with Tom Kelly and talked to him on the phone fre-
quently. So I don’t think you can say that we weren’t aware of one
another’s problems and that we didn’t try to help one another out
a bit.
As to CIA relationships, that would have been handled by Mr.
Sullivan’s division and I can’t offhand say what they did with CIA.
Mr. Edgar. Did you talk to Mr. Kelly about the scope of the
FBI’s investigative plan?
Mr. Malley. I do not remember that I did.
Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. Edgar. Mr. chairman, I ask unanimous consent to continue
for 3 additional minutes.
Chairman Stokes. Without objection, the gentleman is recog-
nized.
Mr. Edgar. Mr. Kelly testified yesterday that his agency checked
out Lee Harvey Oswald’s rifle in Chicago, and the purchase of that
rifle, and discovered that the FBI had already been there and that
some information was shared with the proprietor of the shop indi-
cating that the FBI had said don’t talk to anyone else about this.
Do you know if that is accurate?
Mr. Malley. I don’t have the slightest idea. I am not ignoring
your question, I just don’t know.
Mr. Edgar. Just a few moments ago you said that the purpose of
the Warren Commission—and I hope I am correctly quoting your
words—was in essence to quote “double check the FBI’s investiga-
tion.”
Was that your testimony?
Mr. Malley. I don’t recall that I said the purpose. I may have
been asked a question where I said I would presume that they were
asked to make certain what the FBI did and whether it was com-
plete and thorough and so on.
Mr. Edgar. Was that the attitude of the FBI at the time of the Warren Commission's formation?

Mr. Malley. We just went through this a little while ago, and I can't tell you of anybody that had any attitudes as such. They may have talked among themselves, I don't know what they did. All I know is that nobody tried to convince me that we were to do anything other than a very thorough job and cooperate fully with the Warren Commission.

Mr. Edgar. But if the prevailing attitude were that of the same phraseology that you have just shared, it would indicate to me that the FBI was a bit paranoid about the Warren Commission in that it was in a sense looking over its shoulder and doublechecking it and looking at its investigation, and that is backed up by some comments that I just read in a report that we have in our folder here, the final report, book V of the investigation of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy reference of the intelligence agencies. It goes through a whole litany of concerns that the FBI had about the overseeing of its investigation and the things that the Warren Commission might find out.

Did it ever occur to you that the Warren Commission may have been formed to provide a coordinated function of putting together a puzzle and that rather than being a doublecheck of the FBI it was in essence using the FBI as its investigative arm, and it was looking at the Secret Service and the CIA and Oswald and Ruby and just trying to figure out what in fact took place in Dallas, and what it could tell the American people about that particular event, with no malice or intention of doing anything to the FBI.

Is that a possibility?

Mr. Malley. Well, unless I saw the instructions that were given to Mr. Rankin and the entire Warren Commission, I would certainly have no idea of the exact purpose for which they were established. I do know what I thought they were trying to do, and they were certainly trying to find out all the facts relating to the assassination, and I don't think they cared whether it was good or bad from the standpoint of whether we made mistakes or did something perfect, they wanted to know the correct situation and would bring out what happened. I don't think they were showing any partiality nor do I think they were showing malice.

Chairman Stokes. Time of the gentleman has again expired.

The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Devine.

Mr. Devine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, in order that the record may be complete—and I welcome Mr. Malley here today—Mr. Malley, you and I have been acquainted for something in excess of 35 years, isn't that right?

Mr. Malley. That is correct.

Mr. Devine. And you and I were both assigned to the New York office at the same time?

Mr. Malley. That is right.

Mr. Devine. I believe you were in a supervisory capacity and I was just an ordinary special agent; is that right?

Mr. Malley. I wouldn't say an ordinary, Mr. Devine, I would say you were assigned there and were doing your job.

Mr. Devine. I believe that Assistant Director Belmont was also assigned to the New York office at that time?
Mr. Malley. That is correct.
Mr. Devine. And he has since deceased?
Mr. Malley. That is correct.
Mr. Devine. How long ago did he pass away?
Mr. Malley. I believe it was a year ago this spring, but I may be wrong. Time goes by fast.
Mr. Devine. Yes.
Mr. Malley, I am sorry that these rollcalls require us to be absent from time to time, and I understand that our chairman and perhaps our counsel questioned you about the statements attributed to Mr. Sullivan.
Are you in a position—you may have answered this—are you in a position to state whether or not Mr. Sullivan was looked upon with disfavor by the majority of your personnel?
I don’t mean to put you on the spot.
Mr. Malley. I said before—Mr. Sullivan is dead, he can’t speak for himself—I will repeat what I have told the two men from your committee, that I said to them, Mr. Sullivan was not an easy man to get along with and on a personal situation. I think I am correct in saying that three out of five telephone calls I ever had with him I ended up hanging up after a discussion where there was no possibility of discussing anything sensibly.
It all comes down to the fact that Mr. Sullivan had a very strong attitude, that if I say something, I am correct, and if you don’t agree with me, you are wrong.
Mr. Devine. Are you in a position to say the circumstances under which he left the Bureau?
Mr. Malley. I had left the Bureau prior to that time so I am really not capable of saying. It would be strictly hearsay on my part. I do know from rumors that there were some difficulties encountered.
Mr. Devine. Mr. Malley, I think I know what your answer will be to this but I think it should be made clear for the record. Did the Bureau have any preconceived notion on who was responsible for the Kennedy assassination and then conducted an investigation to confirm that preconceived idea?
Mr. Malley. Other members of your committee have indicated they might feel that we did that. That is not correct. As far as people who were working on the assassination, they had an open mind and still had an open mind up to the time that I left the Bureau in 1971 that there could be somebody else involved.
Mr. Devine. So that in this investigation the Bureau followed its time-tested policy of being purely a factfinding organization, seeking facts and not making recommendations, letting the chips fall where they may; is that correct?
Mr. Malley. That is correct.
Mr. Devine. Finally, Mr. Malley, I would like to refer to the narration our chief counsel, Mr. Blakey, when he was giving pretty much the history of the Bureau. In one place he indicated that J. Edgar Hoover’s three distinct priorities were the fight against communism, statistics that reflected FBI progress, and the positive image of the Bureau.
He also had, according to some, two glaring blindspots in the areas of civil rights and organized crimes, which put him at odds with the Kennedy administration.

Are you in a position to make any comment upon the activities of the Bureau in the area of civil rights up to and including this time?

Mr. Malley. Yes, I think I am.

Mr. Devine. Would you state that, please?

Mr. Malley. Personally, while I was in the field, before I was called into the seat of government, I had several occasions where I was asked, not asked, told, to conduct civil rights investigations, which I did.

Back in the late middle-forties, while I was assigned as an assistant agent in charge in Houston, Tex., I attended a number of schools for police and sheriffs, where one of the topics to be discussed was the civil rights statutes, and explained to the police officers who were present the full details of why the investigations were being made on civil rights matters and the necessity of changing their ways, if they were engaging in any activities whereby they would be in violation of the civil rights statutes.

On returning to or coming back to Washington in 1952, there was a civil rights desk set up at the seat of government where they were supervising civil rights cases, and I do know that it was a pretty active desk. So when the comment is made that Mr. Hoover had no interest in civil rights, what his personal feelings were I cannot say officially he was carrying out all obligations under the civil rights statute.

I also know that some claims were made concerning our attitude and when you say that we didn’t take over and do things until the Kennedys came in, I remember one instance, which I would like for your record to show, namely, that certain people in the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice felt that they had a perfect right to have agents assigned to them to go out in the field and they would direct all of the agent’s activities and not be in a position to do what they felt needed to be done except on the departmental attorney’s instructions.

The Director flatly refused to assign personnel under those circumstances but did say, “you tell us the cases you want investigated, we will do them, turn the results over to you, and if your have any problems with our investigation we will do as much more or anything else that you want to ask us to do, but we will conduct our original investigation.” Beyond that, I think I have covered it.

Mr. Devine. The second part of the question, Mr. Malley, had to do with organized crime and some conflict with the Kennedy administration. Are you in a position to comment on that? I know you were not assigned to the criminal division at that time.

Mr. Malley. I am not really in a position to comment about any conflict. I do know that following the Kennedy assassination, I am sorry, the Kennedy administration taking power, more emphasis was placed on organized crime. Beyond that I am not in a position to comment.

Mr. Devine. Thank you.

Chairman Stokes. Time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. Malley, with reference to some of the answers you have just given Mr. Devine with reference to the attitude of the department with reference to civil rights, were you still with the department when the COINTEL program was initiated?

Mr. MALLEY. That was in another division. I did hear references to it. I was not thoroughly familiar with it.

Chairman Stokes. Well, since you have left the department are you now familiar with the COINTEL program?

Mr. MALLEY. Only what I have read in the newspapers. No other way could I be familiar with it since I left the Bureau.

Chairman Stokes. Are you aware of the fact that as a result of a Senate committee uncovering the COINTEL program, it has been described as being one of the most disgraceful activities to ever be conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation against people like Dr. Martin Luther King, and other civil rights persons?

Mr. MALLEY. I saw it in the paper that there was a lot of criticism.

Chairman Stokes. And having seen that in the paper, does that in any way impact upon your statements here this morning with reference to the great civil rights attitude of the department?

Mr. MALLEY. I didn’t hear your last part.

Chairman Stokes. From what you have read, then, about the COINTEL program initiated by the Bureau, does that in any way impact upon the statements that you have made here about the fine attitude of the department toward civil rights?

Mr. MALLEY. When you say department, are you referring to the Justice Department or do you mean a department in the FBI?

Chairman Stokes. I am talking about the FBI.

Mr. MALLEY. The only thing that I can tell you is what I did say, that we were interested in conducting civil rights investigations. What was handled under the COINTEL program I cannot comment on because I don’t know exactly what was going on.

Chairman Stokes. Another point with reference to Mr. Sullivan. It seems to me that the underlying question here is not whether he was a difficult man to get along with. The question, it seems to me, is as you knew him, was he a truthful man?

Mr. MALLEY. I can’t cite instances. I would say there are a number of recollections where I felt to myself that that is not the way I understood the situation to be when I read certain things that he had prepared.

Chairman Stokes. That is not my question, sir. My question is, as you knew him, was he a truthful man?

Mr. MALLEY. I wasn’t acquainted with him on a social basis. As far as official dealings with him, I did not always believe everything that he tried to convince me of. That still is not a direct answer. That is the only way I can answer it.

Chairman Stokes. Well, let’s put it another way. From all that you knew about him, would you disbelieve him under oath?

Mr. MALLEY. I think that if it looked to Mr. Sullivan like it was to his advantage to say what he was thinking, he might say it, and I don’t know whether he would even be aware whether he was fabricating or not.
Chairman Stokes. Mr. Malley, I think the question I am putting to you is a fairly simple question and really requires a fairly simple answer. From all you know about him—

Mr. Malley. I would not trust him.

Chairman Stokes. Beg pardon?

Mr. Malley. I would not trust him, if that is a better answer for you.

Chairman Stokes. There is a difference between trust and credibility.

Mr. Malley. Let me say then that I don’t think his credibility was as high as most people that I was acquainted with in the Bureau.

Chairman Stokes. You don’t care to answer my question, is that correct?

Mr. Malley. I can’t say that he lied deliberately at any time. All I know is that I had many dealings—

Chairman Stokes. I just asked you sir, from all you knew about him, would you believe him under oath?

Mr. Malley. Not necessarily.

Chairman Stokes. Now, Mr. Hoover was a powerful man, wasn’t he. Isn’t that a fair statement?

Mr. Malley. I would regard it as true.

Chairman Stokes. And throughout the Bureau, by the men in the Bureau, he was regarded as being a powerful man, was he not?

Mr. Malley. Yes.

Chairman Stokes. And it will be a fair statement to say that in his imposing position he intimidated men who worked in that Bureau, isn’t that true?

Mr. Malley. I won’t agree with that statement. Some fellows may have felt that way. I felt that if I didn’t like what Mr. Hoover was doing I had a right to walk out any time I wanted to. He didn’t ask me to come to work, I asked him to work there.

Chairman Stokes. Well, with reference to other men in the Bureau, wasn’t it commonly known that he intimidated men?

Mr. Malley. All I can answer there is to say that if something went wrong your agents knew they would probably be receiving disciplinary action. If you call that intimidation, maybe it is.

Chairman Stokes. And with reference to that disciplinary action, because of the fear of incurring his wrath, wasn’t it commonly known in the Bureau that field supervisors would often cover up the mistakes of their men so as not to incur his wrath?

Mr. Malley. I don’t have knowledge of that. I was a field supervisor for 4½ years and I don’t remember that I ever covered up for anybody.

Chairman Stokes. Well, I am not asking you what you did, I am asking, wasn’t it common knowledge?

Mr. Malley. I can’t answer what other people did. When you say common knowledge, I don’t know that to be common knowledge.

Chairman Stokes. I have no further questions.

The gentlemen from Indiana, Mr. Fithian.

Mr. Fithian. I yield to Mr. Sawyer.

Chairman Stokes. I am sorry. I didn’t realize the gentleman had gotten back. The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Sawyer.

Mr. Sawyer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As I understand your job of liaison entailed reading carefully anything that went from the Bureau to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Malley. That is correct.

Mr. Sawyer. At least that was part of the job?

Mr. Malley. Yes.

Mr. Sawyer. What was the purpose of your reading carefully everything that went to the Warren Commission before it went there?

Mr. Malley. To make certain that everything was properly, thoroughly, and exhaustively run out. Mr. Belmont and I had the same assignment, and in reading reports, et cetera, I know that I did it, and I am sure that Belmont made notes reading reports to double check back and see what the preliminary investigation was on certain matters, whether it had been completely followed through.

If there wasn't a definite answer, to see to it that further investigation was made, check with the supervisors to find out whether more investigation was being conducted.

Mr. Sawyer. Did you have authority to decide, after reading something, that it wasn't going to go to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Malley. I did not. There was nothing that came through, as far as the Bureau was concerned, that did not eventually go to the Warren Commission.

Mr. Sawyer. When you say eventually, what do you mean eventually?

Mr. Malley. What I am saying is that if a report came through and it was obviously incomplete and had not been thoroughly looked into, we sent it back to the field to get a more complete investigation and then sent over a completed product.

Mr. Sawyer. Did you do that, did you exercise any discretion with respect to things that, in your judgment, might be embarrassing to the Bureau?

Mr. Malley. I did not.

Mr. Sawyer. Was that part of your job?

Mr. Malley. As I said before, we were told to hold nothing back from the Warren Commission.

Mr. Sawyer. But you were told to read carefully anything before it went?

Mr. Malley. And to make sure it was accurate and fully investigated.

Mr. Sawyer. You operated somewhat as a censor, then, between the Bureau and the Warren Commission?

Mr. Malley. No, sir. When you say a censor, you are inferring I would have the right to take this out and take that out, and I am saying that my only purpose in reading material was to make certain that the investigation was complete.

Mr. Sawyer. So you only had authority to add in and not take out, is that correct?

Mr. Malley. And the additions would only be to get further data to explain what the thing was all about.

Mr. Sawyer. And you never in the course of this saw this Hosty letter either?

Mr. Malley. I have said four times I never saw the letter until—I am sorry, you were out, maybe you didn't hear me—I never knew
anything about the Hosty letter until 1 year ago when it came out in the newspapers.

Mr. Sawyer. Thank you.
I have nothing further, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Stokes. Time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Fithian.
Mr. Fithian. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Now, let me just make sure I am correct. You were the first person assigned, you were initially assigned as the liaison to the Warren Commission, is that correct?
Mr. Malley. That is correct.
Mr. Fithian. And did anyone else serve as the liaison throughout its existence?
Mr. Malley. Not to my knowledge, unless there was some situation where I was ill or might have taken a day off, and I don't recall that occurring.

Mr. Fithian. And you told us that you reviewed documents and all matters that went to the Warren Commission, you read them personally?
Mr. Malley. That is right.
Mr. Fithian. I would now like to direct your attention to the Oswald address book and ask you whether or not you saw that document prior to its going to the Warren Commission?
Mr. Malley. To be specific, I can't recall that I saw the address book as such. I saw the results of everything that was in his address book in a report form and I believe that I was shown the actual address book.

Mr. Fithian. And did you satisfy yourself that it was authentic and complete; that is, did you look at the report that was going from the Bureau to the Warren Commission, compare that with the address book itself?
Mr. Malley. I had to use a little reliance on people who were working with me. To take the time to go through everything that was in Oswald's notebook and compare item by item, I could not take the time to do it.

Mr. Fithian. So that we can be completely accurate, then, it would be inaccurate to say that you read everything that was forwarded from the Bureau to the Warren Commission?
Mr. Malley. I did make the comment that I read any letters and all reports that went from the Bureau.

Mr. Fithian. Are you aware that a particular page from the Oswald notebook was not forwarded and that that page included agent Hosty's name and address and license number?
Mr. Malley. I had no recollection of it. I was told by one of your staff members that that occurred.

Mr. Fithian. Do you have any comment for the committee as to how that could have occurred?
Mr. Malley. No, I am not in a position to answer you because I knew nothing about it.

Mr. Fithian. Is it your professional judgment that the book once acquired by the FBI always remained in the possession of the Bureau?
Mr. Malley. It would be most unusual if it did not.
Mr. FITHIAN. And, therefore, would it be fair for the committee to conclude—

Mr. MALLEY. May I interrupt you there?

Mr. FITHIAN. Yes.

Mr. MALLEY. I do not know if this is one of the items of evidence that was picked up by the Dallas Police Department prior to the time that it was turned over to the FBI.

Mr. FITHIAN. Who would have given you the book?

Mr. MALLEY. One of the supervisors in Washington or one of the agents in the field office before it was sent into Washington; I cannot recall.

Mr. FITHIAN. Does the Bureau retain some kind of chain of custody within the Bureau?

Mr. MALLEY. Generally speaking, when a piece of evidence is picked up in the field, it is handled by the agent who picked it up until he dictates his material. It is then put in an evidence envelope. If it is coming to Washington, it is marked "evidence" so anyone knows that it is evidence.

Mr. FITHIAN. So it would be reasonable, would it not, to believe that the only possible alteration of the contents of the book would have to have been done by somebody in the Bureau?

Mr. MALLEY. All I can tell you is that we did receive a lot of material from the Dallas Police Department. When that book may have been turned over, if it was turned over by them, I don't know.

Mr. FITHIAN. I should correct this by saying it is the transcription that has the page removed.

Mr. MALLEY. Not from the actual report, and not from the actual notebook.

Mr. FITHIAN. No, I believe it is; I have to check with counsel on this, but I believe it is the transcription of the address book, that which was prepared by the Bureau, the transcription prepared to go through you to the Warren Commission, is that not correct, and so it would be a page of that transcription that is missing.

Mr. MALLEY. I would have no way of knowing.

Mr. FITHIAN. Who would have prepared the transcription and signed off on it?

Mr. MALLEY. It would depend on the agent's name that was on the report or whether it was an insert prepared by an agent.

Mr. FITHIAN. But when it got to you, you would verify that someone had, even if you didn't check it yourself, line by line, you would verify that somebody, some responsible authority in the Bureau, had signed off on the document, wouldn't you, isn't that the way you keep your custody straight?

Mr. MALLEY. Are you referring now to keeping the evidence straight or are you referring to this transcription?

Mr. FITHIAN. You see, I am not a lawyer, but it just seems to me that when the President of the United States is killed and documents are transmitted from one person to another or one agency to another, certainly documents as important as those belonging to the alleged assassin—

Mr. MALLEY. Certainly.

Mr. FITHIAN [continuing]. That there would have to be some kind of clear chain of travel for the document. I don't think it just appears in your hand, and so my question is: Was there not some
system in the Bureau whereby each person who had that and
prepared the transcript and brought it to you as the supervisor, as
the liaison to the Warren Commission, would have signed off on it?
And your responsibility to the supervisor would have been to ascer-
tain that, in fact, someone had attested to you in one form or
another that that was a bona fide document, a complete document
before it went to the Warren Commission. Now, is that too much to
expect that is the process?

Mr. Malley. You are dealing with an entirely different situation
in this instance. It was usually handled in the field; namely, most
pieces of evidence went direct from a field office to the U.S. attor-
ney's office. In this instance, anything coming in from the Dallas
office in the way of evidence would have had to come in, it would
be seen by the supervisor and he, in turn, if it was being handled
by an individual letter, would have kept it in a folder marked
"evidence" and sent it to myself and then on up to Mr. Belmont.

As far as signing a document of some kind, to say this one
handled it or that one handled it, I don't know of any time the
Bureau followed that much of a clerical procedure.

Mr. Fithian. I ask for unanimous consent to proceed for 2 addi-
tional minutes, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, the gentleman is recog-
nized.

Mr. Fithian. Let me review this, then. Since it has now been
demonstrated that a page, in fact, of the transcription was missing
and since reasonable evidence is that it came to the Bureau com-
plete, the alteration, the omission would have to come either at the
Dallas office level, at the Washington supervisor level, or by you or
by the Warren Commission prior to publication. That's the only
four stops that it made; isn't that correct?

Mr. Malley. Correct.

Mr. Fithian. And your testimony is that you did not know of the
omission. Is that correct?

Mr. Malley. That's what I said.

Mr. Fithian. Now, there is additional evidence that the page, in
fact, was not only missing, but that it was retyped so as to appear
to be a complete record. What kind of penalty, what kind of repri-
mand might be reasonably expected to come down from the top,
from you or someone, for the person who had made such an alter-
ation? Wouldn't there be some kind of discipline?

Mr. Malley. If it had been known, there would have been a
thorough check made and recommendations made.

Mr. Fithian. The way it appears to the casual and perhaps to
even the careful observer is that the Hosty note was destroyed
because it reflected badly on the Bureau, that the Oswald tran-
scription was altered because it reflected badly on the Bureau and
a number of other things were done so as to put the Bureau in the
best possible light.

Can you give us any hard evidence as to why we should not
believe that that is the case; that is, that various things were
altered, omitted, or drafted in such a way as to put the Bureau in
the very best possible light rather than to give the complete infor-

mation to the Warren Commission?
Mr. Malley. Concerning your second comment, that Hosty’s name was left out of this transcription, I know of no good reason that it would have been left out. Hosty, at one time, was handling the investigation of Oswald. The fact he had gone out and talked to his wife would be no reason to try to eliminate Hosty’s name that I know of.

So, I am not in a position to say why anyone would eliminate it. I have to let you draw any conclusions you want to as to why these things were done because I do not know about them.

Mr. Fithian. And you are not prepared to offer any hard information as to why that kind of conclusion might be drawn by someone reviewing the documents?

Mr. Malley. No, I am not; I am not.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has again expired. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Edgar.

Mr. Edgar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Going back to the questioning of our chairman, Mr. Stokes, and the questioning of Mr. Devine about both Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Hoover, could you describe Mr. Hoover’s personality to the committee as you understood it?

Mr. Malley. With regard to what?

Mr. Edgar. What was he like to work for as an individual?

Mr. Malley. He was a very domineering individual who wanted the job done by everybody that was involved. As far as I am concerned, demanded as much excellence that was possible to obtain.

Mr. Edgar. In the course of your many years in the FBI, did you see any changes in Mr. Hoover’s personality?

Mr. Malley. I don’t think so.

Mr. Edgar. So, he was the same in 1955 as he was in 1963 and the same as he was in 1968?

Mr. Malley. As far as I am concerned.

Mr. Edgar. It has been pointed out through a number of documents that we have had access to that Mr. Hoover became concerned at some point that the FBI would not be looked upon favorably by the Warren Commission. Is that your impression of Mr. Hoover’s concern during the end of 1963 and early 1964?

Mr. Malley. I have previously stated that I saw nothing to indicate that Mr. Hoover was worried about what the Warren Commission came up with. He wanted us to thoroughly cooperate with them, thoroughly go ahead with our investigation.

You say you have these indications; I know nothing about them.

Mr. Edgar. Well, on an April 3, 1964, memorandum to William Sullivan, he handwrote the note, “Their so-called compliments of the Bureau’s work are empty and have no sincerity.” It goes on to point out several other memorandums and notes where Mr. Hoover was concerned about how the Bureau would be seen. I do note that there was by one agent—well, here’s another quote of Mr. Hoover, “In any event, such gross incompetency cannot be overlooked for administrative action postponed,” and this was a handwritten note on the 17 agents that were going to be disciplined secretly.

Did you know of that disciplinary action?

Mr. Malley. I knew that Mr. Gale had been requested to conduct an investigation. I didn’t know when he completed it, nor did I
know all details about it. I don't recall that I ever saw the memo-
randum that recommended it.

Mr. Edgar. Did you ever bring to the attention of the Warren
Commission that there were agents who were reprimanded?

Mr. Malley. I just got through telling you that I never saw the
note, memorandum. I wasn't aware of all the details and I, there-
fore, would not have had anything to do with bringing it to their
attention.

Mr. Edgar. It seems to me that what you are saying by that
answer is, even though you were the liaison person for the FBI,
there was information available to the FBI not available to you
that was not transmitted to the Warren Commission.

Mr. Malley. As I said, I was not shown the memorandum. I
couldn't have made any recommendations about it going any place,
not knowing whether it had ever been completed.

Mr. Edgar. I can respect that. From the indications that I am
receiving from reading these documents, Mr. Hoover was angry
that those agents did not put Mr. Oswald on the security index and
yet Mr. Hoover, at least, did not direct you to transmit that infor-
mation, and the reasons for that feeling on his part to the Warren
Commission; is that correct?

Mr. Malley. I can't answer what Mr. Hoover thought.

Mr. Edgar. Did you ever transmit to the Warren Commission
the feeling of the Director that Lee Harvey Oswald should have
been on the security index?

Mr. Malley. No; not to my recollection.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired. The
gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Sawyer.

Mr. Sawyer. You knew Agent Hosty was suspended or otherwise
disciplined for his conduct in connection with the Oswald affair;
did you not?

Mr. Malley. I don't recall the exact date. I do know that eventu-
ally for some time he was suspended, but I don't remember when it
was.

Mr. Sawyer. Do you know why?

Mr. Malley. Are you referring to the original investigation? Are
you referring to the Hosty note or what are you referring to?

Mr. Sawyer. Do you know why he was suspended—Agent Hosty?

Mr. Malley. If I knew, I would be glad to tell you. I do not know.

Mr. Sawyer. And it was then, in your view, just happenstance
that Hosty was eliminated from this transcription of the notebook?

Mr. Malley. I didn't say that. I said I do not know why it would
have been because I see no reason for it to have been.

Mr. Sawyer. You don't think that reason could have been con-
nected with the same reason that Hosty was suspended for his
activities?

Mr. Malley. I really can't say that I would take that attitude
because it was very obvious from the reports that were available
that Mr. Hosty had been involved in the investigation of Oswald. I
don't know why they would want to try to eliminate his name just
from a notebook.

Mr. Sawyer. I have nothing further, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. Malley, as a witness before our committee, at the conclusion of your testimony, you are entitled to 5 minutes at which time you may, in any way, explain any portion of your testimony, you may comment upon it, you may expand upon it in any way.

On behalf of the committee, I, at this time, extend to you 5 minutes for that purpose.

Mr. Malley. I have no further comments I desire to make.

Chairman Stokes. There being nothing further, on behalf of the committee, we thank you for having appeared here and giving us your testimony today.

Thank you very much. You are excused.

[Witness excused.]

Chairman Stokes. The Chair now recognizes Professor Blakey.

NARRATION BY G. ROBERT BLAKEY, CHIEF COUNSEL

Mr. Blakey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The FBI security case on Lee Harvey Oswald was opened on October 31, 1959, after it was learned that he had defected to the Soviet Union and had informed officials at the American Embassy in Moscow that he intended to provide radar secrets to the Russians.

The case was intermittently closed and reopened during the following 4 years as Oswald returned from the Soviet Union and moved from Fort Worth to Dallas to New Orleans and back again to Dallas.

It is the handling of the Oswald case that resulted in a decision by Director J. Edgar Hoover, not made public at the time, to discipline a number of Bureau employees, including an assistant director.

The next witness, Mr. Chairman, is a retired official of the FBI, James H. Gale. Immediately after the assassination of President Kennedy, Director Hoover assigned Mr. Gale to conduct an inspection of the Bureau's performance in the Oswald security case prior to the assassination. Mr. Gale's reports resulted in the censuring of a number of FBI employees.

Mr. Gale was hired as an FBI clerk on November 29, 1939, and became an agent on June 21, 1943. He has served as the assistant special agent in charge and special agent in charge in Anchorage, Alaska, and a special agent in charge in Richmond, Cincinnati, and the Washington field offices, as well as Chicago.

In 1962, Mr. Gale became Assistant Director for the Inspection Division. In 1964, Mr. Gale became Assistant Director of the Special Investigative Division. He retired from the Bureau on October 1, 1971.

Mr. Chairman, before calling Mr. Gale, it may be appropriate to note for the record that the select committee has deposed Special Agent James B. Hosty. His testimony was also taken earlier by other House and Senate committees and the select committee has, through the courtesy of those committees, full access to Mr. Hosty's testimony.

The select committee has also been in recent contact with Special Agent Hosty. Mr. Hosty has now new information to offer this committee. Newspaper stories that have recently indicated otherwise are not founded in fact. Mr. Hosty's role in the Oswald secu-
rity case and subsequently will, of course, be treated in the final committee report in December. He will not be called to testify here today.

It would be appropriate, Mr. Chairman, at this time to call Mr. Gale.

Chairman Stokes. The committee calls Mr. Gale.

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you give before this committee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Gale. Yes, I do.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you, you may be seated.

TESTIMONY OF JAMES H. GALE

Mr. Gale. May I approach him, please, the Counsel?

Chairman Stokes. Mr. Genzman you want to see.

The Chair recognizes Counsel for the committee, Robert Genzman.

Mr. Genzman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Gale, would you state your full name for the record?

Mr. Gale. James H. Gale.

Mr. Genzman. What was your occupation in 1963?

Mr. Gale. In 1963, I was the Assistant Director in charge of the Inspection Division.

Mr. Genzman. Briefly, what were your duties?

Mr. Gale. As Assistant Director in charge of the Inspection Division, I had charge over approximately 7 inspectors and about 25 permanent inspector's aides, and it was my responsibility to make inspections of every seat of government division as well as each of the 56 field offices on at least a one-time-per-year basis.

During that time, we would go into the files, investigative files, administrative procedures, make investigative suggestions, insure that personnel was being utilized at a maximum advantage, make sure that we were not indulging in too much redtape, and check into any investigative deficiencies and make pertinent recommendations for administrative action for any administrative or investigative deficiencies.

Mr. Genzman. How long did you perform inspection duties for the Bureau?

Mr. Gale. I was an inspector from 1956 to 1959. And then I was in charge of the Washington field office, thereafter going to Chicago, and then coming back as Assistant Director in charge of the Inspection Division from 1962 until 1964.

Mr. Genzman. And when did you retire from the Bureau?

Mr. Gale. I retired from the Bureau on October 1, 1971.

Mr. Genzman. In connection with your FBI duties, did you ever investigate the FBI's internal security case on Lee Harvey Oswald?

Mr. Gale. Yes, I did.

Mr. Genzman. Have you previously testified about your investigation of the Oswald security case?

Mr. Gale. No, I have not.

Mr. Genzman. Mr. Chairman, at this time, I would ask that the exhibit marked as JFK F-460 be entered into the record.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the record.

[The above-referred-to exhibit, JFK F-460, follows:]
It is definitely felt subject Oswald should have been on the Security Index (SI) based on following facts: (This is based solely on information in our files at time of and prior to assassination and does not take into consideration information subsequently developed.) (1) Subject's defection to Russia and statement that he never would return to United States for any reason. (2) Stated he was Marxist and advised Department of State he would furnish Soviets any information he had acquired as Marine Aviation Electronics Expert. Also affirmed in writing allegiance to Soviet Union and said service in Marine Corps gave him chance to observe American imperialism. According to State Department Oswald displayed air of new "Soehomore" Party liner at that time. (3) Upon returning to the United States Oswald displayed cold, arrogant, general uncooperative attitude and refused to take Bureau Polygraph test to determine if he had cooperated with the Soviets or had current intelligence assignment. (4) On 9/28/33 it was learned Oswald was subscribing to "The Worker," east coast Communist newspaper. (5) In April, 1933, learned he had been in contact with Fair Play for Cuba Committee, New York, and passed out pamphlets and had placard around neck reading "Hands off Cuba - Viva Fidel!" (3) Wrote letter June 10, 1933, to "The Worker" asking for literature saying he was forming Fair Play for Cuba Committee in New Orleans and he sent honorary membership to "those fighters for peace" Mr. Gus Hall and Mr. B. Davis (Ben Davis). (7) Arrested August 9, 1933, New Orleans, passing out Fair Play for Cuba pamphlets on street. Shortly thereafter interviewed on radio and said Russia had gone soft on Communism and Cuba only real revolutionary country in world today. (8) Contact with Soviet Embassy, Mexico, September and October, 1933.
Memorandum for Mr. Tol. Jr.

Re: Lee Harvey Oswald

upon the opportunity presented by the national emergency to authorize the public safety as shown by overt acts or statements within the last three years, established through reliable sources, informants or individuals.

Upon subject's return from Russia to Texas on 6/14/62, he was interviewed and displayed a recalcitrant attitude. The only investigation conducted was to interview a number of Government officials, three relatives and check with two Communist Party informants. The case was then closed after a second interview with subject by Dallas report dated 3/30/62. No neighborhood or employment sources developed, wife not interviewed, mail covers or other techniques not used to determine whom Oswald in contact with or whether he had intelligence assignment.

Inspector feels this limited investigation inadequate. Dallas Agent responsible for delinquencies until 3/28/63 was who is now retired, and no explanations obtained from him.

Dallas reopened case 3/26/63 assigned to Special Agent Jr., and supervised by Field Supervisor. After sending Bureau a letter on 3/25/63 setting out leads to determine Oswald's employment and consider interviewing Oswald's wife, the Bureau was not furnished any information until 8/23/63 and then only after the Bureau had made inquiry of Dallas. It was not until 9/10/63 the Dallas reported subject Oswald subscribed to "The Worker" on 9/23/62 and on April 2 1933, had been in contact with New York Fair Play for Cuba Committee, advising then that he passed out Fair Play for Cuba pamphlets and had placard around neck reading "Hands Off Cuba - Viva Fidel." Relief Supervisor advised he received information from New York concerning subject's subscription to "The Worker" and took no action except to route it to former Agent. He advised he did not feel this information warranted reopening case. Inspector does not agree, but feels in light of subject's defection, case should have been reopened at first indication of communist sympathy or activity.

Special Agent advised that New York did not report Oswald's 4/21/63 Fair Play for Cuba contact to Dallas until letter sent 5/27/63 and Dallas did not feel it necessary to report it to Bureau until 8/10/63. He admits it "possibly" would have been better to have reported on this matter earlier.

Special Agent, New York, handled this matter and states information was received from anonymous source and that because of heavy volume of such material he handled urgent matters first and finished getting processing at approximately the end of June, 1963.

Supervisor, New York, makes similar explanation. Inspector feels 33-day delay from 4/21/63 to 6/27/63 entirely too long to process such material, particularly inasmuch as New York in no position to determine value of some of this material to other offices who have active cases opened on individuals concerned.
Memo for Mr. Tolson

Re: Lee Harvey Oswald

advised Dallas considered the most important aspect of this case the interview of Oswald's wife and did not deem it advisable to interview her in March, 1963, because they developed information that Oswald drinking to excess and beat up wife on several occasions. stated that they allowed a 90-day "cooling-off period" and then couldn't locate Oswald or his wife until New Orleans located them in New Orleans and advised Dallas on 7/17/63. No instructions given New Orleans to interview Mrs. Oswald.

advised that after Oswald's return to Dallas was verified on 11/1/63 no interview was conducted of Mrs. Oswald because Dallas awaiting information from New Orleans. 

advised investigation was designed to avoid having Oswald's wife "gain the impression she was being harassed or hounded because of her immigrant status in order that the interview when conducted might be as productive as possible."

Inspector feels this entire facet of investigation mishandled. Mrs. Oswald definitely should have been interviewed and inspector feels best time to get information from her would be after she was beaten up by her husband as it is felt she would be far more likely to cooperate when angry at Oswald than otherwise.

On 11/1/63 Dallas determined from Mrs. Ruth Paine that Oswald working at the Texas School Book Depository (place from which assassination Shot fired by Oswald). Mrs. Paine unaware of Oswald's residence but stated Oswald's wife living with her. states he made pretext telephone call to Oswald's place of employment and was told Oswald residing with Mrs. Paine. Not recorded in file. On 11/3/63 Mrs. Paine reconatacted and unable to furnish information as to Oswald's residence address, but stated Oswald had visited his wife at Paine's house on 11/2 and 3/33. At this point Dallas held investigation in abeyance and no further investigation made until assassination.

explained that he held investigation in abeyance to be certain he was in possession of all information from New Orleans so he could possibly interview Mrs. Oswald and conduct further investigation. He was aware as of 10/3/63 that Oswald had been in contact with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City but felt because Oswald was employed in nonstrategic position where he would not have access to information important to national defense that he was justified in holding investigation in abeyance. Inspector definitely does not agree. New Orleans submitted 10-case report 10/31/63 and only leads outstanding in New Orleans were to ascertain Oswald's whereabouts. No indication New Orleans had any further data and New Orleans RUC'd case by form 11/10/63. Even if New Orleans had not reported all information in their possession, Dallas should have intensified investigation in light of Oswald's contact with Soviet Embassy and not held investigation in abeyance. Supervisor advised.
Memo to Mr. Tolson
Re: Lee Harvey Oswald

Lead set out by Dallas in March 25, 1963, letter for Dallas to determine present employment of Oswald and, thereafter, determine whether wife should be interviewed. This was not followed by Bureau for approximately five months until 8/21/63 when Dallas was asked about this lead after subject arrested in New Orleans for distributing Fair Play for Cuba pamphlets. Seat of Government Supervisor states additional investigation not conducted until subject arrested for Fair Play for Cuba activity inasmuch as he reviewed investigation and evaluated that subject was not engaged in activities inimical to the United States. States did not feel interview of subject's wife warranted and did not feel case should be reopened at Bureau on 3/25/63 merely to follow Dallas' recommendation of interviewing wife. Advised he did not feel subject's activities came within purview of SI criteria.

It will also be noted that stop placed against subject in Identification Division which was removed on 10/9/63 after subject arrested in New Orleans for Fair Play for Cuba Committee on 8/9/63. Advised stop was placed in event subject returned from Russia under an assumed name and was inadvertently not removed by him on 9/7/62 when case closed. Inspector feels error in removing stop on subject's Identification on 10/9/63, particularly after arrest on 8/9/63 for Fair Play for Cuba Committee activity in New Orleans. We might have missed further arrests without stop in Ident. Inspector also feels Ché Guevara not having additional investigation conducted when subject returned to United States and uncertainty wrong in not having subject placed on SI.

Instant case supervised at Seat of Government by Nationalities Intelligence Section regarding Fair Play for Cuba aspects and the Espionage Section regarding defection aspects and contact with Soviet Embassy in Mexico. Seat of Government Supervisor supervised the Fair Play for Cuba aspects of this case from 8/16 until 10/31/63. He failed to have Oswald put on the SI in spite of considerable Fair Play for Cuba activity coupled with Soviet defection background. In explanation he claims he did not feel Oswald met criteria for inclusion on SI.
On 10/10/63 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) sent teletype to
Bureau... This was routed to... of the Espionage Section to whom
case then assigned, who in turn was to file and take no action. By cablegram
10/16/63 Legat, Mexico City, advised they received instant information that day
from CIA, Mexico City. Legat asked Bureau to send pertinent background to
Mexico City and advise interested offices. 10/18/63 cablegram received Bureau
Saturday 10/19/63 by... and reply not made to Mexico
City until Tuesday P.M., 10/22/63. Linton advised he routed this material
with main file to... and conferred with... on 10/21/63. States because of
pressure of the other work on... desk prepared outgoing communica-
tion for Mexico City, New Orleans, and Washington Field Office on 10/22/63.
States he did not consider Oswald for SI at that time because he did not feel
Oswald met criteria. Inspector feels... shares in responsibility for delay in
answering Legat's cablegram of 10/18/63 and is in error for not having Oswald on
SI.

SOG Supervisor... failed to take any action on CIA teletype of
10/10/63. Legat by cablegram 10/18/63 failed to receive these data from CIA, Mexico, and had to ask Bureau for background
information and tell Bureau to advise interested offices. Inspector feels Legat
should have done this on 10/18/63 and also instructed field to intensify investigation
in orbit of Oswald's contact with Soviet Embassy, Mexico. Also failed to
put subject on SI, stating he did not feel Oswald met criteria. Advised that although case assigned to him since 10/10/63 he did not review file until
after assassination stating he had general idea of background of case. He explained
that his prescruption with Dan1 Espionage Case precluded his reviewing complete
file. Section Chief... advised... not over-assigned. During
October, supervising 104 cases with voluntary overtime 2:34". Instant
case would have required approximately one to two hours to completely review.

No report submitted until 10/31/63. Bureau not advised until report of 10/31/63
that Oswald wrote to "The Worker" on June 10, 1963, requesting literature to
assist him in establishing Fair Play for Cuba Committee in New Orleans, and sent
honorary membership cards for Ben Davis and Gus Hall. Knack advised that
although investigative period extended from 7/23 through 10/23/63, continuous
attention was afforded this case.

Supervised case and shares responsibility for delay in advising Bureau; also failed to put on Security Index, saying they did not feel sub-
et met criteria.
Memo for Mr. Tolson
Re: Lee Harvey Oswald

OBSERVATIONS:

As indicated above, there were a number of investigative and reporting delinquencies in the handling of the Oswald case. Oswald should have been on the Security Index; his wife should have been interviewed before the assassination; and investigation intensified - not held in abeyance - after Oswald contacted Soviet Embassy in Mexico. It was handled by two different Sections in the Domestic Intelligence Division, i.e., Nationalities Intelligence and Espionage.

While Section Chiefs did not see instant file or participate in the supervision of this case, it is felt that they have certain over-all responsibility for properly indoctrinating and training subordinate supervisory personnel and should be censured. This also applied to Inspector [redacted], who heads the Espionage Research Branch, and Assistant Director [redacted].

Likewise, [redacted] assigned Dallas until 4/24/63 and [redacted] assigned Dallas since 4/23/63, did not have an opportunity to review instant file. However, it is felt that they have over-all responsibility for properly training and indoctrinating subordinate personnel and should be censured.

Concerning the administrative action recommended hereinafter, there is the possibility that the Presidential Commission investigating instant matter will subpoena the investigating Agents. If this occurs, the possibility then exists that the Agents may be questioned concerning whether administrative action had been taken against them. However, it is felt these possibilities are sufficiently remote that the recommended action should go forward at this time. It appears unlikely at this time that the Commission's subpoenas would go down to the Agent level.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

For inadequate investigation including earlier interview of Oswald's wife, delayed reporting, failure to put subject on Security Index, and for holding investigation in abeyance after being in receipt of information that subject had been in contact with Soviet Embassy, Mexico City. If approved, to be handled by the Administrative Division.

[Signature]

[Redacted] Personal
Memo for Mr. Tolson
Re: Lee Harvey Oswald

2. Field Supervisor (Nonveteran), Dallas - Censure and probation for failing to insure that case more fully investigated and reported, for not placing subject on the Security Index and for concurring in decision to hold investigation in abeyance. If approved, to be handled by the Administrative Division.

3. (Veteran), Dallas - Censure for failing to have Oswald case reopened after Dallas informed that he subscribed to "The Worker," east coast Communist newspaper, 9/23/62. If approved, to be handled by the Administrative Division.

4. (Veteran), New York - Censure for failing to promptly disseminate Fair Play for Cuba information to Dallas concerning subject Oswald. If approved, to be handled by the Administrative Division.

5. (Veteran), New York - Censure for failure to insure that Fair Play for Cuba information concerning Oswald more promptly disseminated to Dallas. If approved, to be handled by the Administrative Division.
Memorandum for Mr. T (on Re: Lee Harvey Oswald

6. [Nonveteran], New Orleans - Censure for delayed reporting and failure to put on Security Index. If approved, to be handled by the Administrative Division.

7. [both Nonveteran] in San Francisco - [Veteran] in Dallas - Censure for overall responsibility in this matter. If approved, Administrative Division to handle.

8. [Nonveteran], New Orleans - Censure for failing to insure that there was no delay in reporting this matter and for failing to put subject on the Security Index.

9. Seat of Government (Veteran) - Censure and probation for failing to instruct the field to conduct background investigation concerning Oswald, upon Oswald's return from Russia; failing to have Oswald's wife interviewed; also for removing stop on Oswald in Ident on 10/9/63; failing to put Oswald on Security Index and for not reopening Bureau file to follow on Dallas after Dallas sent out letter on 3/25/63 to consider interview of Oswald's wife. If approved, to be handled by the Administrative Division.

[Signature]  
[Signature]  
[Signature]  

All Entries  
[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]
Mane for Mr. Tolson
Re: Lee Harvey Oswald

10. Seat of Government Supervisor (nonveteran) -
Censure and probation for failing to take action on CIA teletype 10/10/63; failing to completely review file until after assassination; failing to instruct field to press more vigorously after subject made contact with Soviet Embassy, Mexico, and failure to have subject placed on Security Index. If approved, to be handled by the Administrative Division.

11. Seat of Government Supervisor (Vetran) -
Censure for failing to place Oswald on Security Index, in spite of considerable Fair Play for Cuba Committee activity coupled with previous Soviet defection background.

12. Seat of Government Supervisor (Veteran) -
Censure for delay in handling incoming 10/18/63 cablegram from Mexico City and for not putting subject on Security Index.

Censure for over-all responsibility in this matter.

SEE ADDENDUM ON PAGE 11
Memo for Mr. Tolson
Re: Lee Harvey Oswald

SECRET

With respect to the individuals listed above who are veterans, they have had more than a year of Bureau service. Accordingly, they should be entitled to 30 days' written notice in the event they should be involuntarily separated, reduced in grade or salary or suspended for more than 30 days. They would also have a right of appeal to the Civil Service Commission for any of these actions.

Statements of the following individuals are attached: as well as statements of the personnel involved who are assigned to the Dallas Office. In addition, copies of explanations of Lundquist and Hoeg are attached.
Memorandum Mr. Gale to Mr. Tolson  
Re: LEE HARVEY OSWALD 
INTERNAL SECURITY - R

ADDENDUM: C. D. DeLoach:hif 12/10/63

I recommend that the suggested disciplinary action be held in abeyance until the findings of the Presidential Commission have been made public. This action is recommended inasmuch as any "leak" to the general public, or particularly to the communications media, concerning the FBI taking disciplinary action against its personnel with respect to captioned matter would be assumed as a direct admission that we are responsible for negligence which might have resulted in the assassination of the President. At the present time there are so many wild rumors, gossip, and speculation that even the slightest hint to outsiders concerning disciplinary action of this nature would result in considerable adverse reaction against the FBI. I do not believe that any of our personnel will be subpoenaed. Chief Justice Warren has indicated he plans to issue no subpoenas. There is, however, the possibility that the public will learn of disciplinary action being taken against our personnel and, therefore, start a bad, unjustifiable reaction.

ADDENDUM (AMB:csh) 12/10/63:

It is significant to note that all of the supervisors and officials who came into contact with this case at the seat of government, as well as agents in the field, are unanimous in the opinion that Oswald did not meet the criteria for the Security Index. If this is so, it would appear that the criteria are not sufficiently specific to include a case such as Oswald's and, rather than take the position that all of these employees were mistaken in their judgment, the criteria should be changed. This has now been recommended by Assistant Director Gale.

Aside from the above, I agree with Mr. DeLoach's observations.

A.B. Belmont
Chairman Stokes. Do you also want it displayed?

Mr. Genzman. No.

Mr. Gale, can you identify JFK exhibit F-460?

Mr. Gale. Yes, JFK exhibit F-460 is a memorandum which I prepared on December 10, 1963, to Mr. Tolson, who is the associate director.

Mr. Genzman. What was the subject of this memorandum?

Mr. Gale. The subject matter was Lee Harvey Oswald, Internal Security-R.

Mr. Genzman. What does the "R" denote?

Mr. Gale. Russian.

Mr. Genzman. Can you identify the distinctive handwriting which appears throughout JFK exhibit F-460; on page 3, for instance?

Mr. Gale. On page 3, there are several handwriting statements which were made in the handwriting of J. Edgar Hoover.

Mr. Genzman. Thank you.

Mr. Gale, why did you write this report?

Mr. Gale. The day after the President was assassinated, Mr. Hoover called me into his office and told me that undoubtedly a commission would be appointed to check into all facets of the assassination of the President and he indicated that he wanted us, wanted me, to make a thorough scrutiny of all the material which we had on Lee Harvey Oswald to determine whether we had properly fulfilled all of our investigative responsibilities and to make any necessary changes in our procedures regarding the handling of cases of this type.

Mr. Genzman. Would you read aloud the first paragraph of this report?

Mr. Gale.

Director instructed that complete analysis be made of any investigative deficiencies in the Oswald case, an analysis made concerning any necessary changes in our procedures; re, handling cases of this type. An analysis, re, procedure changes and dissemination policies handled separately.

Mr. Genzman. Does this paragraph adequately reflect the purpose of this report?

Mr. Gale. I think it does.

Mr. Genzman. How did you investigate the handling of the Oswald security case?

Mr. Gale. The first thing I did was pull all the files that we had down at the seat of Government. I made a thorough review of all the material which we had on Lee Harvey Oswald, all the cases, investigative cases that we had opened on him.

I thereafter interviewed certain personnel in the Internal Security Division, and I also sent out teletypes and made telephone calls to various field offices which were involved to obtain explanation from pertinent personnel as to what were considered as possible deficiencies in the investigation of Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination.

Mr. Genzman. Did you travel to any FBI field offices?

Mr. Gale. No, I did not.

Mr. Genzman. Were the steps which you undertook adequate for this type of investigation?
Mr. GALE. The steps which I took, in my judgment, were definitely adequate, and fulfilled the purpose of this investigation.

Mr. GENZMAN. What conclusions did you reach as a result of your investigation?

Mr. GALE. I reached conclusions that there were certain investigative and reporting delinquencies in the investigation for which administrative action should be taken against the responsible personnel.

Mr. GENZMAN. Directing your attention to page 6, would you read the second sentence?

Mr. GALE. "As indicated above, there were a number"——

Mr. GENZMAN. The second sentence, Mr. Gale.

Mr. GALE [continuing]. "Oswald should have been on the security index. His wife should have been interviewed before the assassination and investigation intensified, not held in abeyance, after Oswald contacted Soviet Embassy in Mexico."

Mr. GENZMAN. Does this sentence adequately summarize your conclusions?

Mr. GALE. Yes, it does.

Mr. GENZMAN. Did J. Edgar Hoover agree with your conclusions?

Mr. GALE. Yes, he did.

Mr. GENZMAN. Directing your attention to page 3, can you find any indications there that Mr. Hoover agreed with you?

Mr. GALE. He made several observations concerning excuses made by Dallas personnel that they had not interviewed Mrs. Lee Harvey Oswald. "Oswald had been drinking to excess and beat up his wife on several occasions. The agent indicated there should be a 60-day cooling-off period and Mr. Hoover said that was certainly an asinine excuse."

Mr. GENZMAN. Are you reading his handwriting?

Mr. GALE. Yes, I am.

Mr. GENZMAN. Continue, please.

Mr. GALE. "And also after Oswald returned from Dallas, no interview was conducted of Mr. Oswald because they said that they were trying to avoid giving the impression that she was being harassed or hounded because of her immigrant status."

In order that the interview when conducted might be as productive as possible, Mr. Hoover said I just don't understand such solicitude. Then I indicated I felt this entire facet of the investigation was mishandled. I felt that Mrs. Oswald definitely should have been interviewed, and I felt the best time to get information from her was after she had been beaten up by her husband. It was felt she was far more likely to cooperate when she was angry at Oswald than otherwise, and Mr. Hoover indicated this certainly made sense.

Mr. GENZMAN. Mr. Gale, earlier you testified that Lee Harvey Oswald should have been on the security index. What is the security index?

Mr. GALE. The security index was a list of names of individuals who are participants in activities of subversive organizations, had anarchist or revolutionary beliefs, and were likely to seize upon the opportunity presented by a national emergency to endanger the public safety, as shown by overt acts or statements within the last
3 years established through reliable sources, informants or individuals.

Mr. Genzman. Directing your attention to the last paragraph on page 1, would you read that paragraph?

Mr. Gale. Field and seat of government employees who handle instant case maintain subject did not come within the security index criteria. Inspector does not agree claiming that Oswald came within the following category. Investigation has developed information that individual, though not a member of or participant in the activities of subversive organizations, has anarchist or revolutionary beliefs and is likely to seize upon the opportunity presented by a national emergency to endanger the public safety as shown by overt acts or statements within the last 3 years established through reliable sources, informants or individuals.

Mr. Genzman. Why did you think Oswald came within this category?

Mr. Gale. I felt that Oswald came within this category because of his contact with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. He passed out pamphlets; had a placard around his neck reading “Hands off, viva Fidel.” He had also engaged in certain other activities which I felt came within the purview of the security index. He defected to Russia. He stated he would never return to the United States for any reason. He stated that he was a Marxist and had advised the Department of State that he would furnish the Soviets any information he had acquired as a Marine aviation electronics expert.

He also affirmed in writing allegiance to the Soviet Union and said the service in the Marine Corps gave him a chance to observe American imperialism. According to the State Department, he displayed the air of a new “sophomore” party liner at the time.

Upon returning to the United States, he displayed a cold, arrogant, and generally uncooperative attitude and refused to take the Bureau polygraph test to determine if he had cooperated with the Soviets or had a current intelligence assignment.

And he also subscribed to the Worker, east coast Communist newspaper, and he had also written a letter to the Worker asking for literature saying that he was forming a Fair Play for Cuba Committee in New Orleans and he sent honorary membership to those fighters for peace, Mr. Gus Hall and Mr. Ben Davis and he was arrested August 9, 1963, for passing out Fair Play for Cuba pamphlets on the street, and shortly thereafter, he was interviewed on radio and said Russia had gone soft on Communism and that Cuba was the only revolutionary country in the world today.

So for those reasons, I felt he should be on the security index.

Mr. Genzman. Thank you.

Did J. Edgar Hoover agree with you that Oswald met the criteria of the security index?

Mr. Gale. Yes, he did.

Mr. Genzman. Directing your attention to the routing slip following page 11, can you find any indication there of Mr. Hoover’s position? It is the last page.

Mr. Gale. Frankly, the copy I have here, I could read Mr. Hoover’s handwriting very well on an original copy, but the handwriting here is such that I am having a difficult time reading it.

Mr. Genzman. Let me read it, correct me if I am wrong.
“If the English language means anything, it certainly included a character like Oswald,” at the bottom of the page.

Mr. GALE. Yes, I think that’s correct.

Mr. GENZMAN. Did the FBI supervisors and field agents who were actually involved in the Oswald security case think that Oswald met the security index criteria?

Mr. GALE. No, they did not.

Mr. GENZMAN. None of them did?

Mr. GALE. None admitted to me that he did. Of course, if he did, then it would not be a very wise thing for them to do probably because it would be self-serving; it was self-serving for them to maintain that he should not be on the security index because if he should be on the security index and was not, then, of course, they were culpable of not having put him on the security index.

Mr. GENZMAN. What would have been the result if Oswald had been on the security index?

Mr. GALE. I don’t think it would have had any result insofar as the assassination was concerned. I don’t think it would have prevented the assassination. I don’t think it would have had any material effect insofar as the assassination was concerned at all. It was an internal error. They did not have him on there, and I felt he definitely met that criteria and that he should have been on there.

Mr. GENZMAN. Based on your findings, what recommendations did you make?

Mr. GALE. I made recommendations for certain administrative action against the agents involved for the different investigative and reporting delays.

Mr. GENZMAN. How many employees at the FBI were disciplined?

Mr. GALE. There were 17 employees disciplined as a result of my inquiry.

Mr. GENZMAN. Did these 17 employees include supervisors as well as field agents?

Mr. GALE. Yes, they did.

Mr. GENZMAN. Can you explain how they were disciplined in general terms?

Mr. GALE. Some were censured and some were censured and put on probation.

Mr. GENZMAN. Were any employees suspended or transferred at this time.

Mr. GALE. Not to my recollection.

Mr. GENZMAN. Directing your attention to page 6, would you read the middle paragraph, beginning with the word “concerning”?

Mr. GALE. Concerning the administrative action recommended hereinafter, there is a possibility the Presidential Commission investigating instant matter will subpoena the investigating agents. If this occurs, the possibility then exists the agents may be questioned concerning whether administrative action had been taken against them.

However, it is felt these potentialities are sufficiently remote, that the recommended action should go forward at this time. It appears unlikely at this time that the commission subpoena would go down to an agent level.
Mr. Genzman. Would you explain what you meant in this paragraph?

Mr. Gale. What I meant was that it was unlikely that any of the agents would be subpoenaed by the Commission—

Mr. Genzman. By the Warren Commission?

Mr. Gale [continuing]. By the Warren Commission and there was considerable feeling among some people in the Bureau that the administrative action should not be taken at this time for fear of the fact that it might come out publicly, and I was opposed to that. I felt the administrative action should be taken and Mr. Hoover agreed that this matter should not be overlooked nor administrative action postponed.

Mr. Genzman. Are you reading from his handwriting below the paragraph?

Mr. Gale. I am interpolating that.

Mr. Genzman. Thank you.

Mr. Gale. I can't read the copy I have.

Mr. Genzman. Would you explain again why you were concerned about this information getting to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Gale. I said here that there is a possibility the Presidential Commission investigating instant matter will subpoena the investigating agent. If this happens, the possibility then exists that the agents may be questioned concerning whether administrative action had been taken against them.

However, whether the Commission would subpoena him and they would testify to that or not, I still felt they should be disciplined.

Mr. Genzman. Mr. Chairman, at this time, I would ask that the exhibit marked as JFK F-461 be entered into the record.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the record.

[The above-referred-to exhibit, JFK F-461, follows:]
Memorandum

To: MR. TOLSON
From: J. H. GALE
Date: September 30, 1964
Subject: SHORTCOMINGS IN HANDLING LEE HARVEY OSWALD MATTER BY FBI PERSONNEL

With regard to Warren Commission report Director noted, "I want this carefully reviewed as pertains to FBI shortcomings by Gale. Chapter 8 tears us to pieces. Also I want memo of what we have done to plug our gaps. I also want to make certain we check and make certain proper disciplinary action has been taken against those responsible for derelictions charged to us."

Memorandum dated December 10, 1963, Mr. Gale to Mr. Tolson, recommended the following administrative action, which was approved, as a result of a review of Oswald's file by Inspector which reflected serious shortcomings:

**DALLAS**

1. (Veteran) - Censure and probation for inadequate investigation including failure to interview Oswald's wife until after assassination, delay reporting failure to put subject on Security Index, and for holding investigation in abeyance after being in receipt of information that subject had been in contact with Soviet Embassy, Mexico City.

2. Field Supervisor (Nonveteran) - Censure and probation for failing to insure that case more fully investigated and reported, for not placing subject on the Security Index and for concurring in decision to hold investigation in abeyance.

3. (Veteran) - Censure for failing to have Oswald case reopened after Dallas informed that he subscribed to "The Worker," east coast Communist newspaper, 9/28/62.

4. (Nonveteran) - Censure for over-all responsibility in this matter.

5. (now in San Francisco) (Nonveteran) - Censure for over-all responsibility in this matter.

**NEW YORK**

1. (Veteran) - Censure for failing to promptly disseminate Fair Play for Cuba information to Dallas concerning subject Oswald.

2. (Veteran) - Censure for failure to insure that Fair Play for Cuba information concerning Oswald more promptly disseminated to Dallas.

Enclosures
NEW ORLEANS

1. (Nonveteran) - Censure for delayed reporting and failure to put on Security Index. is now retired.

2. (Nonveteran) - Censure for failing to insure that there was no delay in reporting this matter and for failing to put subject on the Security Index.

SEAT OF GOVERNMENT

1. (Veteran) - Censure and probation for failing to instruct the field to conduct background investigation concerning Oswald, upon Oswald's return from Russia; failing to have Oswald's wife interviewed; also for removing stop on Oswald in Iden on 10/9/63; failing to put Oswald on Security Index and for not reopening Bureau file to follow on Dallas after Dallas sent out letter on 3/25/63 to consider interview of Oswald's wife.

2. (Nonveteran) - Censure and probation for failing to take action on CIA tele type-10/10/63; failing to completely review file until aft assassination; failing to instruct field to press more vigorously after subject made contact with Soviet Embassy, Mexico, and failure to have subject placed on Security Index.

3. (Veteran) - Censure for failing to place Oswald on Security Index, in spite of considerable Fair Play for Cuba Committee activity coupled with previous Soviet defection background.

4. (Veteran) - Censure for delay in handling incoming 10/18/63 cablegram from Mexico City and for not putting subject on Security Index.

5. (all Nonveterans) - Censure for over-all responsibility in this matter.

The Commission has now set forth in a very damning manner some of the same glaring weaknesses for which we previously disciplined our personnel such as lack of vigorous investigation after we had established that Oswald visited the Soviet Embassy in Mexico. The Commission specifically criticizes for not making more vigorous efforts to locate and interview Oswald regarding unsolved matters and Inspector feels this criticism is valid. testified that certain information furnished by New York on Oswald's contact with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee was "stale" when he received it and this statement is set forth in the Commission's report.

As indicated above, a New York Agent and Supervisor were censured for this delay. certainly should not have testified that information from New York was "stale." testified concerning his failure to conduct investigation from November 5, 1963.
until after the assassination. stated that on November 1, 1963, he received a copy of the New Orleans report which reflected that Oswald had given false biographic information and stated he knew he would eventually have to investigate this and was "quite interested in determining the nature of his contact with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City." When asked what his next step would have been replied:

"Well, as I had previously stated, I have between 25 and 40 cases assigned to me at any one time. I had other matters to take care of. I had now established that Lee Oswald was not employed in a sensitive industry. I can now afford to wait until New Orleans forwarded the necessary papers to me to show me now had all the information. It was then my plan to interview Marina Oswald in detail concerning both herself and her husband's background.

"Q. Had you planned any steps beyond that point?

"A. No. I would have to wait until I had talked to Marina to see what I could determine, and from there I could make my plans.

"Q. Did you take any action on this case between November 5 and November 22?

"A. No, sir."

When questioned by Commission concerning why he did not disseminate the information on Oswald to Secret Service, testified he interpreted his instructions as requiring some indication that the person planned to take some action against the safety of the President or Vice President before making such dissemination. He testified he participated in transmitting two pieces of information to Secret Service pertaining to President's visit. He further stated he did not realize the motorcade would pass the Texas School Book Depository Building. He testified he did not read the newspaper article describing the motorcade route in detail since he was interested only in the fact that the motorcade was coming up main street "where maybe I could watch it if I had a chance." Inspector feels that testimony as quoted in the Commission report makes the FBI look ridiculous and definitely taints our public image for efficiency. If we had made a proper investigation of Oswald we would not have been so vulnerable.
In connection with interview of Mrs. Ruth Paine on November 1 and 5, 1963, the Commission indicates that Mrs. Paine advised a Bureau Agent that she did not know Oswald's address. She was not asked nor did she volunteer Oswald's telephone number, which she did know. The Commission intimates that Agent should have asked her specifically re phone number so Oswald's current residence could be locat. This interview was conducted by, advised he did not ask Mrs. Paine re Oswald's telephone number inasmuch as Mrs. Paine informed she did not know Oswald's address or how he could be located. Inspector feels should have been more specific in his interrogation and asked Mrs. Paine if she had Oswald's telephone number.

 Also testified that conditions in the Dallas police station at time of detention and interrogation of Oswald were "not too much unlike Grand Central Station at rush hour, maybe like the Yankee Stadium during the World Series games. It is questionable whether should have described conditions in such an editorializing and flamboyant manner but rather should have indicated conditions were crowded and if called upon to give an estimate of how many people were located therein, to give said estimate.

The Commission's report reflects that after the assassination a number of boxes which appeared to be used as a gun rest by Oswald in the Texas School Book Depository Building were processed for fingerprints by both the Dallas Police Department and the FBI. Some of Oswald's prints were found thereon, but the Commission noted that "most of the prints were found to have been placed on the carton by an FBI Clerk and a Dallas Police Officer after the carton had been processed with powder by the Dallas police." Special Agent instructed that the cardboard boxes were evidence, had to be processed for fingerprints, and under no circumstances was he to touch them with his bare hands in wrapping same so could personally carry them to the Bureau. denies told him to wear gloves or any covering on his fingers. He is an experienced Clerk and states he is well aware that his hands are not to come in contact with evidence to be examined for fingerprints. advised he has never previously wrapped original evidence but only evidence package.
which had been prepared with evidence sticker by Agents. He states instant package did not have any label indicating it was going to the Latent Fingerprint Section and only information he had was that it was to be handcarried to Bureau headquarters. Inspector feels Special Agent is culpable for not more closely handling and supervising this matter to insure that the Clerk's fingerprints were not placed on the evidence, particularly in view of the importance of this case.

The Commission report indicates that we did not have a stop on Oswald's passport with the Department of State and did not know Oswald applied for a passport in June, 1963, to travel to Western European countries, Soviet Union, Finland and Poland. This is another specific example of how this case was improperly investigated. The same personnel are responsible for this example as were previously criticized for not using appropriate techniques and making a more vigorous and thorough investigation, to determine with whom Oswald in contact or whether he had intelligence assignment.

The Bureau by letter to the Commission indicated that the facts did not warrant placing a stop on the passport as our investigation disclosed no evidence that Oswald was acting under the instructions or on behalf of any foreign Government or instrumentality thereof. Inspector feels it was proper at that time to take this "public position. However, it is felt that with Oswald's background we should have had a stop on his passport, particularly since we did not know definitely whether or not he had any intelligence assignments at that time.

The Commission has criticized the FBI for taking too restrictive a view of its responsibilities in preventive intelligence work and that even though there were Secret Service criteria which specifically requested the referral of Oswald's case, nor was there any requirement to report the names of defectors, there was much material in the hands of the FBI about Oswald, the knowledge of his defection, his arrogance and hostility to the United States, his pro-Castro tendencies, his lies when interrogated by the FBI, his trip to Mexico, and his presence in the school book depository job and its location on the route of the motorcade which should have been enough to induce an alert agency, such as the FBI, to list Oswald as a potential threat to the safety of the President.

OBSERVATIONS:

We previously took administrative action against those responsible for the investigative shortcomings in this case some of which were brought out by the Commission. It is felt that it is appropriate at this time to consider further administrative action against those primarily culpable for the derelictions in this case which have now had the effect of publicly embarrassing the Bureau. It is felt that SA Hosty had the primary investigative responsibility in this case, the primary field supervisory responsibility, and Special Agent is the primary Bureau supervisory responsibility.
Memo for Mr. Tolson
Re: Lee Harvey Oswald

It is also felt that the information on Oswald should have been disseminated to the Secret Service. Oswald should have been on the Security Index but was not. In this regard it appears that prior to the assassination we were unduly restrictive in making available the names of Security Index subjects to Secret Service. It is felt that Inspector [redacted] who has over-all charge of the Security Index in the Domestic Intelligence Division, should be censured for not having sufficient imagination and foresight to initiate action to have such material disseminated to Secret Service. It is likewise felt Assistant to the Director [redacted] should be censured for the same reason as [redacted] as well as for his over-all responsibility in the entire matter.

In regard to the Director said, "I want the case shown the Civil Service Board since he is a veteran and ascertain whether they will sustain a dismissal since his derelictions have now publicly disgraced the Bureau." The Administrative Division has thoroughly explored this case with its Civil Service Commission (CSC) contact, E. H. Bechtold, head of the Veterans Service Staff. Bechtold feels in all probability we would not be sustained. In his view, main offense is his mishandling of the Oswald investigation, and that this is the only possible basis for a successful adverse action against [redacted]. However, [redacted] was censured and placed on probation 12/13/63 for his grossly inadequate investigation of the case. Bechtold said to take action against again for such offense would place in double jeopardy. He said CSC has always ruled that after administrative action has once been taken, the same offense cannot serve over again as the basis for further action. He considers it unlikely that the after-acquired bad publicity would persuade CSC to depart from this precedent.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. SA [redacted] (Veteran), Dallas, be censured, placed on probation and suspended for 30 days for his derelictions in this matter. (As noted above, he was censured and put on probation in December, 1963, and removed 3/25/64. He was transferred from Dallas 9/28/64.) If approved, to be handled by the Administrative Division.

2. SA [redacted] (Non-veteran), Dallas - Censure, Probation and transfer from his office of preference for failing to insure that case more fully investigated and reported, for not placing subject on the Security Index and for concurrence in decision to hold investigation in abeyance. (It will be noted that [redacted] was removed from supervisory duties on 4/9/64 as a result of his derelictions in the Oswald case.) If approved, to be handled by the Administrative Division.
3. (Veteran), Domestic Intelligence Division - Censure and probation for failing to have Oswald case reopened after Dallas informed that he subscribed to "The Worker" east coast Communist newspaper, 9/23/62. If approved, to be handled by the Administrative Division.

4. (Veteran), Domestic Intelligence Division - Censure probation, and transfer to the field for failing to instruct the field to conduct background investigation concerning Oswald, upon Oswald's return from Russia; failing to have Oswald's wife interviewed; also for removing stop on Oswald in Ident on 10/3/63; failing to put Oswald on Security Index and for not reopening Bureau file to follow on Dallas after Dallas sent out letter on 3/25/63 to consider interview of Oswald's wife. It will be noted that on 4/3/64 (Veteran) was ordered transferred, because of his derelictions in the Oswald case, to Indianapolis, which transfer and prospective demotion from GS-14 to GS-13 were subsequently cancelled in view of the opinion of CSC that the demotion would not be sustained if he appealed. The CSC opinion was based on its "double jeopardy" policy above-mentioned in the Hosty case. It is, therefore, recommended transfer not be accompanied by demotion. This kind of action was recently taken with respect to former (Veteran) of San Francisco. If approved, to be handled by the Administrative Division. (Field should be advised not to use as Supervisor.)

5. (Veteran), Domestic Intelligence Division - Censure and probation for failing to place Oswald on Security Index, in spite of consider Fair Play for Cuba Committee activity coupled with previous Soviet defection backgro.
Me: Lee Harvey Oswald

6. (Veteran), Domestic Intelligence Division - Censure for probation for delay in handling incoming 10-18-63 cablegram from Mexico City and for not placing subject on Security Index. If approved to be handled by the Administrative Division.

7. (Non-veteran), New Orleans - Censure and continuation on probation for failing to insure that there was no delay in reporting this matter and for failing to put subject on the Security Index, it being noted he was put on probation result of the inspection letter dated 6-22-64 for shortcomings detected during the inspection of the office. If approved, to be handled by the Administrative Division.

8. (Non-veteran), Dallas - Censure and placed on probation for failing to properly handle and supervise this matter to insure that the Clerk's fingerprints were not placed on the evidence. If approved, to be handled by the Administrative Division.

9. (Non-veteran), Domestic Intelligence Division - Censure for not exercising sufficient imagination and foresight to initiate action to have Security Index material disseminated to Secret Service. If approved, to be handled by the Administrative Division.

10. (Non-veteran) - Censure for his over-all responsibility in this entire matter. If approved, to be handled by the Administrative Division.
Memo for Mr. Tolson
Re: Lee Harvey Oswald

11. (Non-veteran), Domestic Intelligence Division - Censure, probation, removal from supervisory duty, demoted from GS-14 to GS-13, and transfer to the field for failing to take action on CIA teleprinter 10/10/63, failing to completely review file until after assassination; failing to instruct field to press more vigorously after subject made contact with Soviet Embassy, Mexico, and failure to have subject placed on Security Index. If approved, to be handled by the Administrative Division.

12. No action is being recommended against because he retired as of 5/1/63 which retirement was brought about by his transfer to Springfield as a result of this case. (Transferred 4/10/64).

13. No further action being recommended concerning those who were in charge of the Dallas Office during the pertinent period as they have previously been censured for their over-all responsibility and did not personally see or handle the investigation as it developed prior to assassination. The primary responsibility for the investigative delinquencies rests with the investigating Agents as well as field and Seat of Government supervisors. Also, no action be taken against Dallas, for having his fingerprints on the cartons as it is felt this was primary fault of the Agent for not properly overseeing this important assignment.

14. Action with respect to determining if changes Director ordered in disseminating material concerning Security Index subjects and defectors to Secret Service were put into effect and are being handled separately as is inquiry re status of new criteria of Secret Service concerning information to be furnished them. Also being handled separately is determining whether Security Index sufficiently liberal so as to insure Secret Service receiving names of all individuals who may present a danger to Pres.
Memorandum

Re: Lee Harvey Oswald

15. No further action is being recommended concerning Special Agents in New York inasmuch as they were previously censured concerning this matter and they were merely disseminating information from a "source" where they obtained and photographed approximately 200 pieces of information. Oswald's name had no significance to processing Agent and he processed patently urgent material first. This information obtained by New York on 4/21/63 sent to Dallas 6/27/63 and Hosty did not report same to Bureau until 9/10/63. Hosty previously admitted "possibly" would have been better to have reported earlier. The New York delay did not affect the merits of the investigation.

It is noted that SAs Hosty, are veterans with more than a year of Bureau service. Accordingly, they should be entitled to 30 days' written notice in the event they should be involuntarily separated, reduced in grade or salary or suspended for more than 30 days. They would also have a right of appeal to the Civil Service Commission for any of these actions.

Enclosures: Attached hereto is memorandum J. H. Gale to Mr. Tolson dated December 10, 1963 re Lee Harvey Oswald reflecting previous inquiry and action taken.

Memoranda to SAC, Dallas, dated September 29, 1964.

PERSONNEL BRIEFS OF HOSTY.
Mr. Genzman. Mr. Gale, can you identify, JFK exhibit F-461, Mr. Gale. Yes; JFK F-461 is a memorandum from me to Mr. Tolson dated September 30, 1964.

Mr. Genzman. What is the subject of that memorandum?

Mr. Gale. It is captioned “Shortcomings in Handling Lee Harvey Oswald Matter by FBI Personnel.”

Mr. Genzman. Why did you write this report?

Mr. Gale. I wrote this report because Mr. Hoover had noted that he wanted this matter carefully reviewed insofar as it pertains to FBI shortcomings by Gale. He said that the Warren Commission report tears us to pieces.

He also wanted a memorandum as to what had been done to plug our gaps, and he also wanted to make certain that we check and make certain that proper disciplinary action had been taken against those responsible for derelictions charged to us.

Mr. Genzman. Were you just now reading from the first paragraph of this report?

Mr. Gale. Yes, sir.

Mr. Genzman. I direct your attention to the bottom paragraph at page 5. Would you read the first two sentences?

Mr. Gale [reading]:

We previously took administrative action against those responsible for the investigatory shortcomings in this case, some of which were brought out by the Commission. It is felt that it is appropriate at this time to consider further administrative actions against those primarily culpable for the derelictions in this case, which have now had the effect of publicly embarrassing the Bureau.

Mr. Genzman. What conclusion did you reach concerning the testimony of FBI witnesses before the Warren Commission?

Mr. Gale. The conclusion reached by me was that some of this testimony was not adequately handled. We felt that they were testifying in too flamboyant a fashion and were not confining themselves to the facts and testifying the way they were supposed to as FBI personnel.

Mr. Genzman. Directing your attention to page 5, would you read in the middle of the page the three sentences beginning with “The Bureau”?

Mr. Gale [reading]:

The Bureau by letter to the Commission, indicated that the facts did not warrant placing a stop on the passport as our investigation disclosed no evidence that Oswald was acting under the instructions of or on behalf of any foreign government or instrumentality thereof. Inspector feels that it was proper at that time to take this public position. However, it is felt that with Oswald’s background we should have had a stop on his passport, particularly since we did not definitely know whether or not he had any intelligence assignments at that time.

Mr. Genzman. Why was this public position taken?

Mr. Gale. I don’t know. I didn’t write that particular letter to the Commission. However, I might say that in analyzing this, this was not something that was black and white. Whether or not we should have had the passport or the stop on his passport was subject to interpretation. In other words, there were shades of gray involved here and apparently those that wrote the letter to the Commission took a different view than I took, and I felt that there should have been a stop placed on that, but apparently the people who wrote the letter to the Commission did not feel that there was a—did not warrant placing a stop on his passport when they sent
that to the Commission, the same as they felt that, I guess, that it was not proper to have him on the security index, and I differed and I felt that he should be on the security index.

Mr. GENZMAN. Would you reread the last sentence of that paragraph?

Mr. GALE [reading]:

However, it is felt that with Oswald's background we should have had a stop on his passport, particularly since we did not know definitely whether or not he had any intelligence assignments at that time.

Mr. GENZMAN. Mr. Gale, according to some individuals, this sentence implies that the FBI did at some point determine that Oswald had connections with some U.S. intelligence agency.

Mr. GALE. That is not what I meant. What I meant in writing that sentence was that we did not know definitely whether he had any intelligence assignments at that time, but I felt in my mind that he possibly could have had intelligence assignments based on his Russian background, his defection to Russia, and the fact that he would not take the polygraph examination, and also because of his activities with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. However, I had no concrete information to establish any of those possibilities.

Mr. GENZMAN. Thank you.

As a result of your memorandum were additional disciplinary actions taken against various agents?

Mr. GALE. Yes, they were. I want to say at this time that disciplinary action was not unusual in the Bureau. As I said before, I had the responsibility, and inspectors before me had the responsibility, of making inspections of the field as well as the seat of government, and where investigative shortcomings were found, in almost every inspection that was made, there would be administrative action taken against agents in the field or at the seat of government, and very seldom did any inspection go by whereby some administrative action was not taken.

Mr. GENZMAN. Mr. Gale, was there every any internal inspection of the Bureau's investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy?

Mr. GALE. No; I was never called upon to make any investigation of the Bureau's investigation of President Kennedy. All of my investigation here was confined to the presecurity investigation of Mr. Oswald and I conducted no investigation of anything that was done insofar as the investigation of the assassination.

Mr. GENZMAN. Thank you, Mr. Gale.

Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.

Chairman STOKES. Thank you, counsel.

At this point, the Chair will yield himself such time as he may consume, after which we will operate under the 5-minute rule.

Mr. Gale, I understand you to say that disciplinary action within the Bureau was not unusual?

Mr. GALE. No; it was not.

Chairman STOKES. And would disciplinary action always be taken for, what you have described here today, as deficiencies?

Mr. GALE. Sometimes. We had a rule in the FBI, Mr. Chairman, and some of the orders of censure that were sent out in this case, we had a rule that all leads had to be covered in 30 days and a report had to be submitted in 45 days.
Now, this particular investigation, a number of instances, as I recall, were not handled properly. It was not obeyed. Chairman Stokes. How much time did you devote to the investigation that you made that resulted in your report finding these deficiencies?

Mr. Gale. I can't recall exactly, but it must have been approximately 1 ½ or 2 weeks.

Chairman Stokes. I see. You have made some mention of agents being flamboyant and not—not's see what language you used—not acting as FBI agents should, or testifying as they should. Tell us what you mean by that?

Mr. Gale. The memorandum reflects that one of the agents testified that conditions in the Dallas police station at the time of detention and interrogation of Oswald were not too much unlike Grand Central Station at rush hour, maybe like Yankee Stadium during the World Series games, and I said it was questionable whether the agent should have described in such an editorialized and flamboyant manner, but rather should have indicated conditions were crowded and if called upon to give an estimate of how many people were located therein to give such an estimate.

Chairman Stokes. Now, can you tell us, Mr. Gale, having conducted this investigation, and having made the kind of findings that you made here, and the conclusions which appear in your report, tell us why these type of deficiencies occurred, how did this type of thing come about?

Mr. Gale. Well, of course, they gave explanations. The agents in their expansions said it was due to the pressure of other work, and so forth.

I might say that, in the light of Presidential assassination, if you were to take any investigation, and a lot of investigations and scrutinize them, you would find errors in them that you wouldn't ordinarily find unless you scrutinized them so carefully.

Chairman Stokes. Did any of the deficiencies come about as a result of a man just disregarding rules and regulations of the Department?

Mr. Gale. Of course, these rules, the 45th day reporting deadline, for example, the 30-day investigative coverage deadline, were disregarded. Also we felt that good judgment was not used in a number of instances in the failure to take prompt investigative action after they had received information. Of course, I cited that in this memorandum that I wrote.

Chairman Stokes. When disciplinary action of this type is taken, does news of that spread throughout the Department pretty rapidly?

Mr. Gale. Sometimes it did and sometimes it didn't. It all depends on what it was. The Bureau, as I indicated before, Mr. Chairman, took disciplinary action with considerable regularity over violations of rules and regulations, over investigative delinquencies, and scarcely any inspection went by without our taking some sort of administrative action against somebody for not doing what we felt should have been done.

We felt, Mr. Hoover felt, and no one likes to be inspected, I might add. I was a clerk, I was an agent, I was assistant agent in charge and a special agent in charge. At no time did I ever relish
being inspected. However, the inspection system, I feel, and even though I disliked being inspected, and when I no longer was an inspector I was in charge of a division, I didn’t like being inspected then either.

Nevertheless, it was a catalyst that made the FBI at that time a highly efficient organization because it made you go to that extra step. Rather than go home maybe at 6 o’clock at night, you would stay until 8 o’clock at night to do what you should have done in order to achieve a high degree of efficiency.

Chairman Stokes. Well, would it also be fair to say that no one likes being disciplined?

Mr. Gale. That is exactly right.

Chairman Stokes. And had it not been for your inspection, many of the things which you brought out, perhaps would have never been brought out, relative to deficiencies, isn’t that true?

Mr. Gale. They might have been brought out on another inspection. In other words, a routine inspection. If someone picked up this file, if I pick up the file on a routine inspection I am sure I would have picked up some of the same deficiencies. But, of course, you couldn’t review every single file in the FBI. It was a random thing.

Chairman Stokes. Couldn’t some of these deficiencies have been detected or picked up by those in a supervisory position over those men?

Mr. Gale. Absolutely. That is why they were disciplined, for not picking them up.

Chairman Stokes. And wouldn’t you say that Mr. Hoover was feared by the men in the Department?

Mr. Gale. No; I would say he was respected by the men.

Chairman Stokes. Well, in the field?

Mr. Gale. In the field, I would say that they had a degree of reverence for him when I was there.

Chairman Stokes. But didn’t he also have a reputation for being able to bring down his wrath upon anyone whom he felt did not perform in a certain way?

Mr. Gale. Mr. Hoover was a perfectionist. He demanded a very high degree of performance and it was always my contention that if you demand an average performance you will probably get a degree of mediocrity. Mr. Hoover demanded perfection. He never got perfection but he got excellence, and if he had only expected something to be average, he would have gotten mediocrity.

Chairman Stokes. And where he did not get the standard of perfection that he demanded, he dealt with that in a very wrathful manner?

Mr. Gale. He dealt with it in a firm but fair manner. You knew what you were going to get if you didn’t do your work right. You knew precisely. The word was around. The agents knew very well from training school on that if they did not handle their investigations in an efficient manner that their promotions would be denied and that they would not receive salary increases, and so forth, which I think is entirely proper. I don’t think that those individuals who were not doing their work properly should be given promotions and get salary increases and so forth.
Chairman Stokes. Now, your finding that Oswald had not been placed on the security index was an important finding, was it not?

Mr. Gale. It was. I felt all the findings were important, but that was one of the important findings.

Chairman Stokes. One of the more important ones, I would say. How would that have changed Dallas, had he been placed on the security index?

Mr. Gale. In my opinion, it would not have changed Dallas at all.

Chairman Stokes. What is the relative importance of it?

Mr. Gale. Because we had a criteria that individuals of this type should have been placed on the security index and, therefore, the agents and employees handling that should have complied with that.

Chairman Stokes. Then had he been on the security index, in your opinion, the Secret Service or no other agency would have looked at him differently in Dallas at that time?

Mr. Gale. I don’t think so. We had an awful lot of people on the security index. I don’t believe that would have looked at him any differently.

Chairman Stokes. Do we still utilize the security index today?

Mr. Gale. I understand that we do. I don’t know. I have been retired for a period of 7 years.

Chairman Stokes. During the course of your investigation of the assassination, did you find any evidence that Oswald had been an FBI informant?

Mr. Gale. Absolutely not. I had all the files pulled on Mr. Oswald when I made my inquiry and I received no files indicating that he had been an informant. If, of course, I had, I would have taken an entirely different attack on this thing.

Chairman Stokes. I see. So the bottom line is that you have no information?

Mr. Gale. Absolutely none of it.

Chairman Stokes. All right. Now, did you come to find out about the threatening note that Oswald had left at the Dallas FBI office?

Mr. Gale. Only after I had left the FBI and I was interrogated about that by an assistant director in my law office.

Chairman Stokes. Now, was James Hosty one of the men that you recommended disciplinary action on?

Mr. Gale. Yes; he was.

Chairman Stokes. Tell us why.

Mr. Gale. I don’t recall offhand. I would have to look at this report. For certain investigative and reporting delinquencies, I believe, the late reporting, failure to put subject on the security index. The report states:

For holding, for failure, including the earlier interview of Oswald’s wife, for holding investigation in abeyance after being in receipt of information that subject had been in contact with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.

Chairman Stokes. Now, I suppose these findings came about as a direct result of direct contact you had with Hosty himself?

Mr. Gale. No, that wasn’t how it was done in the Bureau. Almost on a daily basis, every couple of days anyhow, almost all field offices would receive communications from the headquarters asking for explanations. They would come by teletype or else by
airtel, and they would ask for explanations from the agent as to his investigative shortcomings.

They would send back an explanation to the headquarters. It would go to the individual investigative division. Many times the divisions themselves would raise the question. Other times Mr. Hoover would raise the question on an investigation. Why wasn’t this done, why wasn’t that done, why didn’t we do it this way, why did we do it that way.

A teletype would go out to the field or a telephone call would go out to the field, explanations would be required. And in this instance, if I recall correctly, to the best of my recollection, I either telephoned the agent in charge in Dallas or else I sent a teletype out, I am not sure which, or airtel, probably a telephone call or teletype, asking for certain explanations as to how this case was handled. Thereafter memoranda came in to me and the memoranda reflected what the agent said in his defense.

I asked him for explanation as to why he wouldn’t do this and why he did that and why he did the other thing. That was the usual inspection procedure, and all matters of that type we would write up the matter itself, set forth what we felt were delinquencies, and ask for a written explanation. Very seldom was the agent ever interviewed in a situation like this personally.

Chairman Stokes. Well, now, you seem to have found Hosty deficient in several areas, then, as a result of the reports that came in to you?

Mr. Gale. Yes sir.

Chairman Stokes. And when did you learn of the note that had been left for Hosty in the Dallas field office.

Mr. Gale. I only learned of that after I had been retired about 4 years.

Chairman Stokes. Had you learned about such a note, what would have been your reaction to that during the course of your investigation?

Mr. Gale. If I had learned that a note had been left and that nothing had been done with it, or what is the question?

Chairman Stokes. That it had been destroyed.

Mr. Gale. If I had learned that a note had been left and it had been destroyed I would have certainly made an inquiry as to the whys and wherefores and who had been responsible for destruction of it.

Chairman Stokes. Would you have probably at that point also talked directly with that agent?

Mr. Gale. No; I probably would not. Very seldom did an official from the headquarters talk to an agent in the field. We dealt with them through their supervisors or through the agent in charge. We very seldom dealt directly with the agent.

Chairman Stokes. I see. Thank you. I have no further questions.

The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Fithian.

Mr. Fithian. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Gale, I want to clarify one thing before I go to the questions I have, and that pertains to JFK exhibit F-460 and not the report that you sent, but a memorandum from you to Mr. Tolson, I believe.
I understand the heading is correct. In any case, it is dated December 10, 1963, and the memorandum also carries in the blank following it between the dates, D. C. DeLoach. Do you have that with you?

Mr. Gale. Yes sir.

Mr. Fithian. It is page 11 of your document.

Now, I draw your attention to the last paragraph. Can you tell me something about that, the one that starts: "It is significant to note"?

Mr. Gale. I am not sure I read the same thing that you are, Congressman.

Mr. Fithian. Would counsel assist us a little bit?

Mr. Genzman. Mr. Gale—

Mr. Gale. My copy here is very bad. That is why I am having a problem with reading it.

Mr. Genzman. On page 11 of your December 10, 1963 report there is an addendum with the initials A. H. B., signifying Alan Belmont?

Mr. Gale. Yes.

Mr. Genzman. Do you see that paragraph?

Mr. Gale. Yes, I see it here, right.

Mr. Fithian. Just read over that last paragraph.

Mr. Gale [reading]:

It is significant to note that all of the supervisors and officials who came into contact with this case at the seat of government, as well as agents in the field, are unanimous in the opinion that Oswald did not meet the criteria for the security index. If this is so, it would appear that the criteria are not sufficiently specific to include a case such as Oswald, and rather than take the position that all these employees were mistaken in their judgment the criteria should be changed. This has now been recommended by Assistant Director Gale.

Mr. Fithian. What does that mean?

Mr. Gale. Well, that meant that the other people did not agree with the fact that the security index did not—that Oswald met the security index, and Mr. Belmont took the position that rather than saying all of these employees were mistaken in their judgment, the criteria should be changed. Mr. Hoover took the position that they were more than mistaken.

Mr. Fithian. So, if I interpret this correctly, it is the people who are being disciplined, it is their collective judgment that Oswald did not qualify?

Mr. Gale. That was not unusual. Most people being disciplined took the collective judgment that the inspector was wrong.

Mr. Fithian. I suspected as much.

Do they usually go so far as putting that in writing?

Mr. Gale. Mr. Belmont was a high official and, therefore, he had that prerogative.

Mr. Fithian. So his putting this in writing in a memo is not unusual?

Mr. Gale. No. I reported directly to Mr. Tolson and Mr. Hoover, and so did he.

Mr. Fithian. I direct your attention to the last sentence, "This has now been recommended by Assistant Director Gale."

Mr. Gale. Right.
Mr. Fithian. Does that mean that you recommended that the security index criteria be expanded, or that you recommended and concurred with that whole paragraph?

Mr. Gale. That does not mean that I recommended and concurred with the whole paragraph. I recommended that if they want to change, let them go ahead and change it, if they felt it should be changed.

Mr. Fithian. You held to your feeling that the discipline should go forth?

Mr. Gale. Yes, sir.

Mr. Fithian. Is that correct?

Mr. Gale. Yes.

Mr. Fithian. Now, you are something of an expert on discipline, obviously, in inspections and infractions of the rules in the FBI. What did you hope to achieve by this sort of collective disciplining of everybody who might have made another judgment in the preassassination handling of Oswald?

Mr. Gale. Let me point this out. That I wasn't necessarily an expert on discipline or an ogre in the Bureau. I was merely fulfilling the responsibilities—

Mr. Fithian. I understand that.

Mr. Gale [continuing]. That I had and that many others who held the same job before and since did in the same fashion what the Inspection Division hoped to achieve and, of course, as I said before, no one liked to mete out discipline. I do not get any pleasure out of meting out discipline, and I am sure Mr. Hoover did not either. I would much rather give an agent commendations. On the other side of the coin, inspectors on occasion would pick up an investigation and find that it was particularly well done and commend the agents or recommend the agents or recommend them for an incentive award. So this was a double-edged sword. We weren't just meting out discipline, we were also recognizing superior performance.

Mr. Fithian. I understand that and I apologize for the lack of clarity of my question.

Chairman Stokes. Time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Devine.

Mr. Devine. And the Inspection Division is not necessarily a new division, it wasn't organized following the Kennedy assassination, was it?

Mr. Gale. No, it was not; it has been in existence since Mr. Hoover took over the FBI and, of course, the reason, one of the reasons that he put the Inspection Division in the FBI was because when he took it over it was in such a terrible state of disarray with crooks and so forth permeating its ranks.

Mr. Devine. That dates back to 1924?

Mr. Gale. That is right.

Mr. Devine. Mr. Gale, I think you earlier stated that the Director sough perfection and demanded excellence among the agents, and those that failed to measure up to those standards or for one reason or another didn't reach that pinnacle faced disciplinary action; is that correct?

Mr. Gale. If their performance was bad enough, yes.
Mr. DEVINE. Back in my day and I think it continued through your day and probably still yet, you were either censured or reduced in salary and transferred to a much less desirable office.

Mr. GALE. That is correct.

Mr. DEVINE. I know in my time if a fellow was in Miami, he would probably be transferred to Butte, or if he was in Los Angeles, he would go to Sioux Falls.

Mr. GALE. That is right.

Mr. DEVINE. This was part of the overall disciplinary action that was followed back in those days and continued through the Kennedy assassination disciplinary action into today.

Mr. GALE. That is correct.

Mr. DEVINE. So the thing I am trying to bring out is the fact that disciplinary action was taken in this major case, it was not unusual as it relates to any major case, if there were what you as an inspector considered a dereliction of duty?

Mr. GALE. That is exactly right. That is what I was trying to point out insofar as the field inspections we made in the field offices. There was scarcely a field office inspection that went by without somebody not being disciplined as a result of some error in judgment or some violation of the investigative rules or reporting rules. It was not at all unusual.

Mr. DEVINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. SAWYER. What happens when somebody is put on the security index; what does that do?

Mr. GALE. It doesn’t do much of anything until Congress and the President, in a national emergency would declare a national emergency, and in World War II I can tell what it did. The President and Congress decreed that the individuals on the security index should be detained, and they were detained, picked up for custodial detention at that time, and there were hearings held.

Mr. SAWYER. If a President, let’s say, is going to visit an area, such as Dallas in this case, would anybody check the security list for people who were on it in that area?

Mr. GALE. I don’t know what was done in that regard. That was not in my particular sphere of expertise, so I don’t know.

Mr. SAWYER. You actually don’t even know that, whether they do or not?

Mr. GALE. I don’t know whether they do it now, I don’t know whether they did it then.

Mr. SAWYER. So then whether somebody goes on the security index is just kind of put in the bank against a national emergency or something, and nothing happens, the person isn’t—

Mr. GALE. Right. In case we have a national emergency tomorrow, if they weren’t on the security index, certain investigative actions would not be taken against them, and it is possible that they could do great damage because they would not be receiving investigative scrutiny in a national emergency and, of course, nobody knows when a national emergency is going to occur.

Mr. SAWYER. But no reference was ever made to the security index absent a national emergency, it was just filed away, nothing was done with——
Mr. Gale. There were certain investigative, as I recall, there were certain investigative requirements if you were on the security index, where they took investigative steps periodically to see where you were and what you were doing. You weren’t left in a dormant status. They would keep better track of your activities if you were on the security index than if you were not.

Mr. Sawyer. If I understand you to say before nothing happened, when you went on the security index, I misunderstood, there is a surveillance followup?

Mr. Gale. I told you before, I was not assigned to the Domestic Intelligence Division, my primary background in the FBI was in the criminal field, and I frankly am not the person to be talking insofar as the security index is concerned. I don’t have any great expertise in that.

Mr. Sawyer. I am not asking you for great expertise. You spent 32 years in the Bureau. Certainly you can’t sit there and tell me you don’t know what happens when somebody is on the security index. Are you telling me that?

Mr. Gale. I just told you what happened when they were on the security index. I told you that in the event of a national emergency some action would be taken against them.

I also told you that periodically their cases would be reviewed if they were on the security index. So I did not tell you I did not know anything about it. I told you that when it came down to the fine technicalities of the security index there were others who were more qualified than I to testify about that.

Mr. Sawyer. How often would they be checked if they were—

Mr. Gale. I don’t know.

Mr. Sawyer. You don’t know?

Mr. Gale. No.

Mr. Sawyer. Would it be as often as once a year?

Mr. Gale. Possibly. I don’t know. I think maybe it might have been. I have forgotten since I have been out 15 years, and frankly, I don’t remember how often we checked them at that time.

Mr. Sawyer. You said something about checking where they are located. Were they kept track of as to location?

Mr. Gale. I don’t recall the details at this time as to how we did that.

Mr. Sawyer. But do you know whether you did that or not?

Mr. Gale. I think we did. To the best of my recollection, I think that was done.

Mr. Sawyer. And you wouldn’t have any knowledge as to whether people like the Secret Service would check on people in the localities who were on the security index?

Mr. Gale. I don’t know what procedure they were following after the assassination. I can’t recall at this time the recommendations that I made. I don’t have any memoranda in front of me concerning that. I know I made another inquiry concerning the security index and those procedures, but I have forgotten that now in the 15 years that have elapsed.

Mr. Sawyer. Would they have or would the Secret Service have access to the security index?

Mr. Gale. I don’t know whether they would or not.
Mr. Sawyer. Was it disseminated outside of the FBI, or was that something strictly internal in the FBI, the security index?

Mr. Gale. I think it would be disseminated to the Department of Justice, too, I don’t recall.

Mr. Sawyer. You don’t know whether the Secret Service would have access?

Mr. Gale. I don’t recall.

Mr. Sawyer. Thank you.

I have nothing further, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. Time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Fithian.

Mr. Fithian. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

What did you hope to achieve by recommending the disciplining of these 17 people?

Mr. Gale. As I indicated before, disciplinary action was recommended against Bureau personnel from time to time in order to achieve a higher standard of performance in the organization.

Mr. Fithian. It had nothing to do—

Mr. Gale. I know from my own experience the fact that disciplinary action was taken for mistakes and for shortcomings made you work harder and made you do the job better because you did not want to be the subject of discipline.

Mr. Fithian. Well, I have conducted a few Navy inspections myself, so I understand that part of the philosophy. My basic question drives to the question as to whether or not you thought that by recommending these disciplinary actions the Bureau would in some way look in a better light with regard to its conduct of the post-assassination handling of Oswald?

Mr. Gale. I don’t feel that this had anything to do with the post-investigative handling of Oswald.

Mr. Fithian. Thank you.

Do you have any idea how many people would have been on the security index in Dallas?

Mr. Gale. No, I have no idea.

Mr. Fithian. I asked Mr. Malley earlier this morning about some other kinds of infractions which seemed more serious than the ones you recommended discipline for.

What would you have recommended, had you conducted an investigation and found that a subordinate had concealed from his superior certain pertinent evidence?

Mr. Gale. I have no idea what I would have recommended at this stage of the game. That is a highly speculative question, I think.

Mr. Fithian. In all of your inspections—

Mr. Gale. I am sitting here in 1978 and you are asking me what I would have recommended in 1963.

Mr. Fithian. I understand that. You had some standards for inspection, didn’t you?

Mr. Gale. Of course we had standards, yes sir.

Mr. Fithian. In your inspections, in any inspection you ever covered, did you ever uncover a situation in which a subordinate had intentionally concealed from his superior any pertinent evidence?

Mr. Gale. I don’t recall anything like that.
Mr. Fithian. And did you ever uncover in any inspection you conducted a situation where anyone had destroyed evidence?

Mr. Gale. No, I don’t recall ever discovering in any inspection that I conducted anything where anybody destroyed any evidence.

Mr. Fithian. And did you ever discover a case where an FBI employee’s personnel had altered evidence?

Mr. Gale. I have no recollection of ever discovering anything like that in any of my inspections.

Mr. Fithian. So that if you never discovered that in all of your inspections, may we now, 15 years later, say that any one of those actions would be considered very serious?

Mr. Gale. I would say yes.

Mr. Fithian. And would we conclude properly that some kind of significant discipline might be in order?

Mr. Gale. Yes, I would say so.

Mr. Fithian. Mr. Gale, you are generally familiar with the policies followed by the FBI, aren’t you, with regard to the dissemination of information contained in the FBI security index?

Mr. Gale. No, I am not too familiar with that at this time. I do not recall that at this time, I said before.

Mr. Fithian. Do you know whether it was the policy of the FBI to share the information contained on the security index with any other Federal agency?

Mr. Gale. I don’t recall that offhand, no.

Mr. Fithian. You don’t know whether it would have been policy to share that with the Secret Service?

Mr. Gale. I don’t have any present recollection of that.

Mr. Fithian. Is it your judgment that the FBI should have shared that information with the Secret Service when the President was going to Dallas, or at any other time?

Mr. Gale. I think that there should be a free exchange of information between the FBI and the Secret Service concerning any individuals who have a subversive background. I believe that is being done now.

Mr. Fithian. So it would not surprise you then that the Secret Service felt that it should have indeed had that information from the FBI?

Mr. Gale. I wouldn’t know what the Secret Service would be surprised at or what they wouldn’t be surprised at.

Mr. Fithian. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. Mr. Gale, is it not conceivable that when we take the deficiencies that you found relating to Oswald, and in particular the deficiencies surrounding the deficient manner in which James Hosty treated the Oswald case, is it not conceivable that had he been handled in accordance with the rules and regulations that Oswald would have been then known he was under close surveillance by the FBI and, therefore, that might have been a deterrent to his actions in Dallas on November 22, 1963?

Is that not conceivable?

Mr. Gale. Well, of course, anything is conceivable, Mr. Chairman, and I think that is strictly speculative as to whether or not that would have taken place. I don’t know whether the investigative deficiencies here would have caused him to reach that conclusion or not, because undoubtedly one of the things that you are
doing in making an investigation is trying to handle it in such a way that the person does not know that he is under such intensive scrutiny, and most of the investigations of subversives are done in a manner whereby you do not place them under close surveillance or don't let them know that they are under investigation. You are not advertising to people you have under investigation that they are under investigation.

Chairman Stokes. Yes, but according to Hosty, he said he was waiting until a certain time had elapsed after the beating or whipping, or something.

Mr. Gale. Of his wife.

Chairman Stokes. His wife, before he would contact him further. It is just conceivable to me and since you felt that was improper action, did you not?

Mr. Gale. Yes.

Chairman Stokes. You felt the proper time to have talked with Marina was when she was angry.

Mr. Gale. Yes.

Chairman Stokes. With Oswald, and she might have told them something of value; isn't that true?

Mr. Gale. If they knew anything about it. Whatever she knew, she might have told them, yes.

Chairman Stokes. Whatever she knew, she would have told them, and that is what you felt should have been done?

Mr. Gale. Right.

Chairman Stokes. Is it not also conceivable that had Hosty done his job properly, he would have been able to advise the Secret Service that Oswald was working at the Texas Book Depository which was on the direct parade route.

Mr. Gale. I don't know whether he would have done that. Just the fact that he would have discovered that, I don't know whether he would have advised them of that or not. I don't know what he would have done. In other words, I am not the proper person, I don't think, to ask what Hosty would have done.

Chairman Stokes. You see, I don't think we are dealing entirely in speculative matters because, as a result of J. Edgar Hoover feeling that the FBI had not performed their responsibilities properly, he sent you in and gave you the direct responsibility of ascertaining whether or not they had done their job properly.

Mr. Gale. Correct.

Chairman Stokes. Pursuant to his direction, you investigated, found deficiencies, reported them back to the Director and then your recommendations relative to censure were carried out; isn't that correct?

Mr. Gale. That's right.

Chairman Stokes. So, then the purpose, it would seem to me, of his having taken that action and your having taken your action, was for the purpose of saying what had been done improperly and if it had not been done in this way, things might have been different.

Mr. Gale. No, I don't think that is what we were saying because I reached a conclusion that even if the investigative shortcomings and reporting shortcomings, which I had found, had been carried
out that it would not have made any difference in Dallas. That was my conclusion. That is still my conclusion.

What we were trying to do here was to insure that agents throughout the Bureau and these agents did not make similar mistakes in the future.

Chairman Stokes. Well, then, how do you come to the conclusion that if the Bureau had performed on par with the excellence demanded by the Director that this still would have occurred? I don't understand how you arrive at that conclusion.

Mr. Gale. Of course, if Hosty knew that Oswald was going to go to the book building with a gun, naturally, he would have advised Secret Service. But he didn't know that. We are sitting back here after the fact and it is much easier to see what you would have done after the fact than it is before the fact.

I frankly do not feel that these investigative shortcomings play any part in the Dallas assassination. They were investigative errors—if we felt they had played a part in that, believe me, the disciplinary action would have been much stronger.

Chairman Stokes. Isn't it conceivable that if they had talked with Marina, when they should have talked with Marina, they might have found out that he had shot at General Walker.

Mr. Gale. I don't know what she would have told him.

Chairman Stokes. But it is conceivable, isn't it?

Mr. Gale. Anything is conceivable.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Fithian.

Mr. Fithian. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to go back to one part of your testimony earlier today where you stated there was no stop put on Oswald's passport; isn't that what you said?

Mr. Gale. Yes.

Mr. Fithian. If there had been any suspicion of Oswald somehow being associated with foreign intelligence ties, would that have altered the recommendation on putting a stop on the passport?

Mr. Gale. Yes. Of course, I thought there should have been a stop placed on the passport anyhow.

Mr. Fithian. I am sorry.

Mr. Gale. I felt there should have been a stop placed on the passport anyhow.

Mr. Fithian. It certainly would have increased the probability they would have put a stop on his passport if they had any thoughts he was somehow associated with either Russia or Cuba, right?

Mr. Gale. Yes, I would think so.

Mr. Fithian. What effect would any information that he had ties, let's say, to our own domestic intelligence system, what effect would that have had on your recommendation?

Mr. Gale. Well, that never crossed my mind in any way, shape, manner or form.

Mr. Fithian. But it would be kind of inverse of the other?

Mr. Gale. The fact that he would have any ties to any of our domestic intelligence or—of course, I would have known if he had been a Bureau informant because I had that information from the files. But if I had any idea that he had been with any other
agency—I had no idea it never crossed my mind he possibly would be involved in that and I still don’t think he was.

Mr. Fithian. One last question, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Gale, are you satisfied with the post-assassination handling of the investigation by the FBI? Basically, we have concentrated on sort of pre-handling of Oswald.

Mr. Gale. I had nothing to do with the post-investigative assassination, whatsoever. I was still assigned to that when Mr. Malley completed that investigation. I was still assigned to the Inspection Division and at no time did Mr. Hoover ever ask me to make any inquiry concerning the post-assassination of Oswald and so, therefore, I was occupied doing other things with regard to my responsibilities as assistant director in charge of the Inspection Division and did not again come in contact with the investigation of the Oswald matter after I had completed this.

Mr. Fithian. And have not given any more thought to it?

Mr. Gale. Not particularly.

Mr. Fithian. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Gale. I have not read the reports. I have not read the reports that Mr. Malley wrote. I did not read any memorandum. I read certain newspaper accounts, of course. I followed the Oswald and Ruby matter, but from the standpoint of official memorandum, I was not reading that at the time. I had no official interest in that.

Mr. Fithian. And before we close, would you repeat for me why you were dissatisfied with Hosty’s performance in Dallas? I know what it says in the report. We have gone over that

Mr. Gale. That’s why.

Mr. Fithian. Is that it, the whole 9 yards?

Mr. Gale. That is as much as I can recall now. I only can recall why I was dissatisfied with anybody’s performance at this point from reviewing the record. I certainly have no personal recollection of anything like this as to an individual agent as to why a certain course of action was taken against him 15 years later.

Mr. Fithian. What I am saying is, does your written recommendation reflect your total thinking on Hosty’s performance at that time?

Mr. Gale. There possibly—at the time? To the best of my recollection, yes.

Mr. Fithian. And you started to say something else.

Mr. Gale. It is possible there is some memoranda, other memoranda in the file concerning this, I don’t know. There must be some explanations from him, and I don’t know if there is something else written by me or not. All I know right now is what I have here in front of me. That is all I recall about the matter. If there is anything else in the file, it could possibly refresh my recollection, but I don’t have any recollection of this other than what I have here.

Mr. Fithian. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Sawyer.

Mr. Sawyer. I am a little puzzled as I understand your testimony, that these deficiencies in the pre-assassination investigation had really nothing to do with the ensuing result in Dallas.

Mr. Gale. I didn’t think so; no, sir.
Mr. Sawyer. And yet, your report devotes itself to some speculation whether the administrative punishment ought to be withheld because it might get to the Warren Commission or whether you should go ahead because the subpenas probably wouldn't reach down to the agent level and, therefore, they wouldn't find out about it.

If it had nothing to do with the result in Dallas, why were you so concerned about the Warren Commission finding out about it since that was all they were concerned with?

Mr. Gale. I wasn't particularly concerned about it. There were other officials who were concerned about the administrative action being made public, I think, and embarrassing the Bureau.

Mr. Sawyer. You make mention in your recommending or suggesting you go ahead with it, you say the subpenaes of the Warren Commission probably would not reach down to the agent level.

So, apparently, you were concerned, or—-

Mr. Gale. I didn't feel it would and I didn't particularly care if it did. I felt the administrative action should go forward and so did Mr. Hoover. No matter who found out about it, I thought the chips should fall where they may, no matter who found out about it.

Mr. Sawyer. Yes, but you were saying they probably wouldn't find out about it which was an argument in favor of going ahead.

Mr. Gale. That is exactly right, because there were others who were opposed to it.

Mr. Sawyer. So, why would it be an argument of going ahead or not going ahead if it had nothing to do with the result in Dallas.

Mr. Gale. Because there were others in the Bureau who were opposed to that.

Mr. Sawyer. Well, then, they apparently felt differently than you did about whether it would have affected the results in Dallas; is that correct?

Mr. Gale. I don't think so. They may have felt the Warren Commission should not have had it because they didn't want it to become public at that time. They were concerned about adverse publicity insofar as our mishandling the case. It was not the practice and policy of the FBI to be airing its dirty linen in public.

Mr. Sawyer. The Warren Commission weren't interested in the procedural operations of the FBI in particular if they were connected with their charge; namely, to investigate the assassination in Dallas; isn't that correct?

Mr. Gale. You might be interested in knowing, Mr. Sawyer, that the Warren Commission found the same deficiencies that I found on the same things and right down the line. As a matter of fact, Mr. Tolson called me on two of the agents in New York that they found had, they felt, were derelict in the way they had reported the matter, and he asked me if we had found those and I told him, the Director wants to know if you found those and I told this, the Director wants to know if you found those and I told him, that, yes, we had found those. And so, the Warren Commission apparently didn't feel that these errors made any difference in Dallas, and I don't feel they did, either.

They had the same errors in front of them. They found the same exact errors that I found.

Mr. Sawyer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Stokes. I have just one final question, Mr. Gale. A part of the mandate given this committee by the House of Representatives is that we assess and evaluate the performance of the agencies as they related to the assassination of the President. And based upon your testimony here today with reference to the pre-assassination performance of the agency, your findings, your recommendation, if you were asked to rate the performance of the FBI on a scale of zero to ten, with ten representing the highest performance of the agency, what rating would you give the FBI?

Mr. Gale. Of course, insofar as the post-assassination investigation is concerned, as I indicated, I have not read that investigation.

Chairman Stokes. My question to you, I am sorry to interrupt you, my question is with reference to your inspection, your findings relative to the pre-assassination performance of the FBI.

Mr. Gale. Insofar as the investigation of Oswald, insofar as the pre-assassination investigation of Oswald, obviously would not give the agents who conducted the investigation a rating of ten.

I possibly would give them a rating of maybe six or seven, insofar as the investigation of Oswald was concerned, the pre-assassination of Oswald.

Further than that, I cannot comment because I was not involved in any other aspect of the situation.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you.

Does anyone have anything further?

Mr. Gale, as a witness before our committee, you are entitled at the conclusion of your testimony to have 5 minutes in which you may explain or comment in any way upon your testimony before our committee.

I extend to you at this time 5 minutes for that purpose.

Mr. Gale. I have no further observations or comments to make, and I thank the committee for their courtesy.

Chairman Stokes. We thank you very much for having appeared here and been a witness before our committee. Thank you very much. You are excused.

[Witness excused.]

Chairman Stokes. There being no further business to come before the committee at this time, the committee will adjourn until 9 a.m. tomorrow morning.

[Whereupon, at 1:25 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 9 a.m., Thursday, September 21, 1978.]
INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF
PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 1978

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met at 8:04 a.m. pursuant to recess, in room 345, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Louis Stokes (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Stokes, Preyer, Dodd, McKinney, Sawyer, Thone, Fithian, and Edgar.

Staff present: G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel and staff director; Gary T. Cornwell, deputy chief counsel; Elizabeth L. Berning, chief clerk; I. Charles Mathews, special counsel.

Chairman Stokes. A quorum being present the committee will come to order.

The Chair recognizes Professor Blakey.

Mr. Blakey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I understand that one of our distinguished witnesses this morning is on somewhat of a tight time schedule. In the interest of time, therefore, I would summarize my normal narration, but I would ask that it be included in the record as if read in full.

Chairman Stokes. So ordered.

NARRATION BY G. ROBERT BLAKEY, CHIEF COUNSEL

Mr. Blakey. President John F. Kennedy was the fourth American President to be assassinated, but his death was the first that led to the formation of a special commission for the purpose of making a full investigation into its circumstances.

In the earlier assassinations, the investigations were left to existing judicial bodies:

In the case of Abraham Lincoln in 1865, a military commission determined that John Wilkes Booth was part of a conspiracy, and the Office of the Judge Advocate General of the U.S. Army saw to the prosecution of six defendants, four of whom were hanged.

The assassins of James A. Garfield in 1881 and William McKinley in 1901 were promptly tried in courts of law and executed.

In the aftermath of the Kennedy assassination, it was decided by President Lyndon B. Johnson that a panel of distinguished citizens should be given the responsibility for finding the full facts of the case and reporting them, along with appropriate recommendations, to the American people.
The Commission was authorized by Executive Order 11130 to set its own procedures and to employ whatever assistance it deemed necessary from Federal agencies, all of which were ordered to cooperate to the maximum with the Commission, which had, under an act of Congress, subpoena power and the authority to grant immunity to witnesses who invoked the fifth amendment.

The Chief Justice of the United States Earl Warren was selected by President Johnson to head the Commission. Two senior members of the Senate, Richard B. Russell, Democrat of Georgia, and John Sherman Cooper, Republican of Kentucky, were chosen to serve on the Commission, as were two distinguished members from the House of Representatives, Hale Boggs, Democrat of Louisiana, and Gerald Ford, Republican of Michigan. Two attorneys who had long been in active Government service, Allen W. Dulles, former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and John J. McCloy, former president of the World Bank, were also named to the Commission. J. Lee Rankin, former Solicitor General of the United States, was sworn in as general counsel on December 16, 1963, and 14 attorneys were appointed within a few weeks to serve as assistant counselors.

The Commission did not employ its own investigative staff. Instead, it relied on agencies in place—the FBI and Secret Service for domestic aspects, the CIA when activities involving foreign countries required probing.

In September 1964, following a 9-month effort, the Warren Commission published a report that not only included its findings and conclusions, but also a detailed analysis of the case as the Commission perceived it. In addition, in its report the Commission wrote its own description of the challenge it undertook to meet: "... to uncover all the facts concerning the assassination of President Kennedy and to determine if it was in any way directed or encouraged by unknown persons at home or abroad."

In the years since the Warren Commission completed its work, there has been both praise and criticism of the product. The praise came first, and it was based on the obvious enormity of the effort. After all, the Commission had combed through so much evidence that only a part of it could be contained in 26 supplemental volumes, with the rest of it stored at the National Archives. And it had taken testimony, either in person or through deposition, from a total of 552 witnesses.

A Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist, in an introduction to one edition of the Warren Report, wrote:

The Warren Commission spent the better part of a year in an exhaustive investigation of every particle of evidence it could discover. . . . No material question now remains unresolved so far as the death of President Kennedy is concerned. Evidence of Oswald's singlehanded guilt is overwhelming.

It was the determination of Oswald acting alone that opened the Commission to attack from critics. For the most part, they were authors and independent investigators who rounded up numerous clues, some sounder than others, of a conspiracy. Some suggested that the Federal Government, the Warren Commission itself included, was covering up the conspiracy by suppressing evidence.

A result of the criticism was a growing doubt among the American people that the Warren Commission was right, that Oswald
had indeed been the lone assassin. Then, in 1976, it was revealed in hearings before the Senate Intelligence Committee that certain Federal agencies had not been as candid with the Commission as had been thought. The Warren Commission was not accused of being a party to the failure to find the truth, but its victim. The culpable agencies? The FBI and the CIA, both of which, the Senate committee concluded, had withheld significant information from the Commission.

The mandate of the Select Committee on Assassinations calls for an investigation of the performance of Federal agencies assigned to any aspect of the Kennedy case. With the Warren Commission itself, the issue to be considered is whether its procedures, techniques and organization were sufficient to carry out its mandate. In other words, the committee must consider the quality of the conduct of the Commission to judge the reliability of its conclusions.

Mr. Chairman, the three members of the Warren Commission still living have agreed to appear today and testify. They are: Gerald R. Ford, John Sherman Cooper and John J. McCloy.

President Ford received an A.B. from the University of Michigan in 1935 and an LL.B. from Yale Law School in 1941. President Ford practiced law in Grand Rapids from the time of his admission to the Michigan State bar in 1941 until he was elected to Congress as a Republican of Michigan in 1949. President Ford was a Member of the 81st to the 93rd Congresses; he was elected minority leader in 1965 and he became Vice President of the United States in 1973. He served as President of the United States from 1974 to 1977.

It would be appropriate now, Mr. Chairman, to call President Ford.

Chairman STOKES. The committee calls President Ford.

All persons in the room are requested to remain seated when the former President comes into the room. This is for security reasons.

Good morning, Mr. President.

TESTIMONY OF FORMER PRESIDENT GERALD R. FORD

President FORD. Good morning.

Chairman STOKES. May I ask you to please stand and take the oath. Just raise your right hand. You solemnly swear the testimony you will give before this committee is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God.

President FORD. I do.

Chairman STOKES. Thank you. You may be seated.

Welcome back to Capitol Hill, Mr. President.

President FORD. Thank you.

Chairman STOKES. Nice to see you here. For security purposes we asked that all persons remain in their seats when you came into the room.

At this time the Chair recognizes counsel for the committee, Mr. Gary Cornwell.

Mr. CORNWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good morning, Mr. President.

President FORD. Good morning.
Mr. Chairman, if I might, I have a very short opening statement which I would appreciate the opportunity to read, then I will be glad to respond to whatever the questions may be of Mr. Cornwell. Chairman Stokes. Mr. President, we would be glad to receive your statement at this time.

President Ford. Chairman Stokes, members of the committee, it is nice to be home and it is a great honor and great privilege to testify before this committee, and I thank you for the opportunity to appear along with my distinguished former colleagues on the Warren Commission, Senator John Sherman Cooper and the Honorable John McCloy. Each of us who were appointed by President Lyndon B. Johnson to the Warren Commission and who signed the final report of that Commission are prepared to respond to questions as submitted by you or the members of the committee or the staff.

I trust the committee understands my particular situation. I am most willing to respond to any and all questions relating to my service on the Warren Commission and related matters, but I must respectfully refuse to answer questions under the principle of Executive privilege that relate to the period from August 9, 1974, to January 20, 1977, the time that I served as President of the United States.

The Warren Commission was given by President Lyndon B. Johnson the tragic responsibility to investigate the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. No member of the Commission sought the assignment, but each member believed it was a public duty to respond to the request of the President. It was not an easy or pleasant duty because each of us had known President John F. Kennedy. The Commission, under the chairmanship of the Chief Justice, Earl Warren, conducted, in my opinion, a thorough, objective analysis and investigation, with the assistance of an outstanding staff and the help of many, many others within and without the Federal establishment.

The conclusions and recommendations of the Commission were unanimous. We believe the Commission report, despite questions that have been raised over the past 14 years, was an authoritative document covering one of the most tragic episodes in the history of the United States. In my own case, the staff of the committee has submitted a set of questions and requested responses in specific areas of inquiry. I will be glad to respond to the questions as propounded by Mr. Cornwell or members of the committee and I thank you for the opportunity to make my opening statement.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you, Mr. President, and we appreciate your appearance here this morning, and at this time the Chair will recognize Mr. Gary Cornwell for preliminary questions.

Mr. Cornwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. President, I would like to initially direct your attention to the fact that in response to the assassination there were a number of basic decisions made, first, of course, to create the Warren Commission, as opposed to relying, hypothetically, for instance, upon such other bodies as the Department of Justice, for the purpose of supervising the investigation.

Second, I would like to focus your attention upon the decision to rely upon the investigative agencies as opposed to perhaps attempt-
ing to create an investigative staff of the Warren Commission; the question of time constraints that may have been imposed upon the members and their staff because, of course, they were influential and busy men and they did have outside interests which coincided with the operation of the Commission; and such things as the relationship between the Commission and the investigative agencies. I would like to ask you to comment upon that, namely, the effectiveness of the organization and the procedures which were adopted in response to the assassination.

President Ford. In my judgment, Mr. Cornwell, the Warren Commission made a basic decision, which was a proper one. We decided that it was inadvisable for the Commission to recruit a totally new investigating staff, and we felt that it was far better to pursue the procedure which we did, which was to employ a limited group of very outstanding and prestigious lawyers, as I recall 14 in number, who came onto the staff and headed the staff organization. Then that staff under the close supervision and control of the Commission worked with the various investigative agencies of the Federal Government such as the FBI, the CIA, Secret Service, and others.

I must emphasize one point. Although the staff and the Commission utilized the investigative personnel and capabilities of organizations within the Federal establishment, we as a Commission and the staff were never satisfied with what information we got from these Federal organizations. What we did was to use them as a base, and then the staff and the Commission took off from there and handled individually the inquiries, the questions, and any leads that came to the Commission or to the staff.

Mr. CORNWELL. The Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations looked into some of these same areas and in book V of their final report they commented upon them.

It is my understanding that your opinion was not consulted, in fact I don’t believe the opinions of the other Warren Commission members were consulted, prior to the publication of that report, so I would like to direct your attention to a limited portion of it and ask you to comment upon its accuracy from your point of view.

At page 6 of the report, the Senate committee concluded that facts which might have substantially affected the course of the investigation were not provided the Warren Commission or those individuals within the FBI or CIA, as well as other agencies of the Government who were charged with investigating the assassination. The FBI was ordered by Director Hoover and pressured by higher Government officials to conclude its investigation quickly. The FBI conducted its investigation in an atmosphere of concern among senior Bureau officials that it would be criticized and its reputation tarnished.

On page 46 the report goes on to note that with only minor isolated exceptions, the entire body of factual material from which the Commission derived its findings was supplied by the intelligence community, primarily the FBI, and on page 47 the report concludes that although the Commission had to rely on the FBI to conduct the primary investigation of the President’s death, their relationship was at times almost adversarial, such relationship was not conducive to the cooperation necessary for a thorough and exhaustive investigation.
Would you agree with that, and to what extent, if any, would you think that such factors might have substantially affected the effectiveness of the investigation?

President Ford. Mr. Chairman and Mr. Cornwell, the committee did send to me this question, among others, and the material from the Church committee report. Because I want to be very accurate, since it involves a committee of the U.S. Senate, I would like, if I might, Mr. Chairman, to read a response to the question that Mr. Cornwell has asked, and with your approval I will do so.

Chairman Stokes. You certainly may do so.

President Ford. I concur with the conclusions of the Church committee's final report, book V, page 6, which states, and I quote: "The Committee emphasizes that it has not uncovered any evidence sufficient to justify a conclusion that there was a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy."

I categorically deny that the investigation of the assassination was deficient. The Church committee concedes directly or by implication that the Commission's conclusions based on available evidence were correct. To date, I have seen no new evidence that would change my views as a former member of the Commission. The Church committee states that the FBI was pressured by Director Hoover and higher Government officials to conclude its investigation quickly. The committee does not differentiate between the Commission's investigation and the investigations by the FBI and other Federal agencies. The FBI may have hurried its internal investigation, but the Warren Commission sets its own schedule for completion of its work, based on its best estimate of the time required to carry out the mandate of President Johnson.

When the Commission found that July 1964 was insufficient, the time was extended so we could properly conclude. The Church committee erroneously assumed that the main investigation was done by the FBI, when in fact it was undertaken by the Commission and the 14 independent lawyers assembled by the Commission and the rest of the Commission staff. I do find in reading pages 6 and 7 of the Church committee's report, that questions of policy procedures, decisions and so forth are raised but then in many instances the committee report did not come to firm conclusions or make categorical recommendations based on their sources of information.

My response to pages 46 and 47 of the Church committee report are as follows:

1. The Warren Commission did use the intelligence agencies of the Federal Government for the initial factual information and their preliminary analysis. However, the Commission and the staff never accepted this material at face value. From the information supplied from all sources, an independent followup investigation was conducted by the Commission staff, including interviews, interrogations and cross checking. Conclusions by the Commission were based on this independent process and not on Federal agency determinations.

The Commission had an obligation to follow a dual policy, on the one hand, to get maximum voluntary cooperation from all Federal agencies including the FBI, and on the other hand, to be insistent that the agencies respond in cooperation in however the Commis-
sion demanded. The latter requirement may have led some agencies to believe that there was an adversarial relationship. For the Commission to have adopted any other posture would have led the Commission critics to charge that the Commission was not carrying out its Presidential mandate.

Mr. CORNWELL. I would next, Mr. President, ask you if you would direct your attention to the possibility of some outside pressure or concern upon the Commission, and for that purpose I would like to show you two exhibits marked for identification, JFK F-457 and JFK F-443.

The first exhibit, Mr. Chairman, is a memorandum prepared by Presidential Assistant Walter Jenkins, dated November 24, 1963, and containing a resume of comments by FBI Director Hoover made on that date, and the second one is a memorandum reflecting—well, a memorandum from Mr. Evans and the FBI to Mr. Belmont and attaching a memorandum of Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach dated November 25. May we have those admitted into evidence, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman STOKES. Without objection, they may be entered into the record at this point.

[The above-referred-to exhibits, JFK F-457 and JFK F-443, follow:]

[JFK exhibit F-457 was entered previously.]
Deputy AG Katzenbach handed to me this morning the attached memorandum which he has sent to Bill Moyers, who will be the principal assistant to President Johnson in the White House. Katzenbach said that this memorandum was prepared by him after his discussions with the Director yesterday.

It is Katzenbach's feeling that this matter can best be handled by making public the results of the FBI's investigation. He thought time was of the essence, but that the report, of course, had to be accurate. He said he was thinking in terms of its release by the end of the week if at all possible.

Katzenbach further pointed out that he is having no success in selling the White House on the idea that this report should be released there. He understands that President Johnson has expressed himself as feeling this should be handled on a Department of Justice level. It is Katzenbach's belief that it would be most inappropriate for Robert Kennedy to issue this report. Katzenbach asked that the Director be informed of his feeling that, if the report is not released by the White House, then it should be made available publicly by the Director, pursuant to Presidential instructions.
MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MOYERS

It is important that all of the facts surrounding President Kennedy's assassination be made public in a way which will satisfy people in the United States and abroad that all the facts have been told and that a statement to this effect be made now.

1. The public must be satisfied that Oswald was the assassin; that he did not have confederates who are still at large; and that the evidence was such that he would have been convicted at trial.

2. Speculation about Oswald's motivation ought to be cut off, and we should have some basis for rebutting thought that this was a Communist conspiracy or (as the Iron Curtain press is saying) a right-wing conspiracy to blame it on the Communists. Unfortunately the facts on Oswald seem about too pat--too obvious (Marxist, Cuban, Russian wife, etc.). The Dallas police have put out statements on the Communist conspiracy theory, and it was they who were in charge when he was shot and thus silenced.

3. The matter has been handled thus far with neither dignity nor conviction. Facts have been mixed with rumour and speculation. We can scarcely let the world see us totally in the image of the Dallas police when our President is murdered.

I think this objective may be satisfied by making public as soon as possible a complete and thorough FBI report on Oswald and the assassination. This may run into the difficulty of pointing to inconsistencies between this report and statements by Dallas police officials. But the reputation of the bureau is such that it may do the whole job.
The only other step would be the appointment of a Presidential Commission of unimpeachable personnel to review and examine the evidence and announce its conclusions. This has both advantages and disadvantages. I think it can await publication of the full report and public reaction to it here and abroad.

I think, however, that a statement that all the facts will be made public property in an orderly and responsible way should be made now. We need something to head off public speculation or Congressional hearings of the wrong sort.

Nicholas de B. Katzenbach
Deputy Attorney General

Mr. CORNWELL. In particular, Mr. President, I would like for you to respond to these portions of those memorandum. With respect to Exhibit 457, the Walter Jenkins memorandum, according to the memorandum, Mr. Hoover stated on page 2, bottom paragraph, "The thing I am concerned about, and so is Mr. Katzenbach, is having something issued so we can convince the public that Oswald is the real assassin," and thanks to the cooperation of the Justice Department, although it is not in your copy right there, Mr. President, today we have received authority to declassify one additional sentence in that paragraph.

That additional sentence reads:

I felt this [not creating a presidential commission] was better because there are several aspects which would complicate our foreign relations.

In the second exhibit, F-443, Mr. Evans writes:

Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach handed to me this morning the attached memorandum which he has sent to Bill Moyers, who will be the principal assistant to President Johnson in the White House. Katzenbach said this memorandum was prepared by him after his discussions with the Director yesterday.

And the attached memorandum at paragraph one and then paragraph numbered two states:

It is important that all of the facts surrounding President Kennedy's Assassination be made public in a way which will satisfy people in the United States and abroad that all the facts have been told and that a statement to this effect be made now.

In paragraph two, it reads:

Speculation about Oswald's motivation ought to be cut off, and we should have some basis for rebutting thought that this was a Communist conspiracy or 'as the Iron Curtain press is saying' a right-wing conspiracy to blame it on the Communists.

And finally, in the materials which we previously provided to you, Mr. President, again the Senate report, at page 41, there is a quotation from a memorandum by Richard Helms, a cable to the CIA's Mexico station chief. Helms states:

For your private information, their distinct feeling here in all three agencies, CIA, FBI, State, that Ambassador is pushing this case too hard and that we could well create flap with Cubans which could have seriously repercussions.
What I would like to ask you is, were you aware of any such pressures at the time, and if so, to what extent, if any, do you think they might have distorted the investigative process?

President Ford. To the best of my recollection, and I remind the committee that the commission did its job 14 years ago, there was no pressure as a consequence of a memo or a statement by Walter Jenkins.

There was no pressure from any actions taken by Mr. Katzenbach. I fully would understand, however, the concern of the White House staff at that time for some early resolution of whatever the Warren Commission would decide. I can understand why the Department of Justice, and other Federal agencies, may have wanted some statement from the Commission at the earliest possible date. But to my best recollection, there was nothing that came from President Johnson or any of his associates in the White House, there was nothing that came to the Commission from the Department of Justice or other Federal agencies to hurry, in an incomplete way, a decision by the Warren Commission.

Now, again, to be very precise, I would like to read from a prepared response I have in reference to the Mexican question that has been raised.

I was not informed at the time of the Helms cable to the CIA Mexican station chief, but to my best recollection, the members of the Commission were familiar with the strong personal feelings of the then-U.S. Ambassador to Mexico. The Ambassador did believe that Castro was somehow involved in a plot to assassinate President Kennedy, and he was forceful in setting forth those views.

This view of the Ambassador obligated the Commission to make a thorough investigation of the Ambassador’s charges and the attitude of the CIA, FBI, and State. Although the Helms cable, to my best recollection, was not seen by me, I was familiar with the general views of the three departments as reflected in the Helms cable.

I believe the Commission was carried out to investigate any divergent views between the Ambassador, on the one hand, and the three departments on the other.

Mr. Cornwell. Mr. President, the committee has received evidence about such things as the destruction of a note within the FBI that caused internal dissension at the time, a note which may have been from Oswald and was delivered to Special Agent Hosty. We have received evidence of such things as the existence of CIA assassination plots, an association between CIA officers and some members of the underworld.

Was the Warren Commission familiar with those type of things and, if not, using the benefit of hindsight, could their existence have distorted the investigation?

President Ford. It is my best recollection that we were not familiar with the alleged destruction of the Oswald note to Hosty. From what I have read of the content, or the alleged content of that note, I don’t think the course of the investigation would have been changed by either the note itself or the destruction of that note.

The other question that was raised, the allegation that the CIA considered the possibility of using Oswald as a source of informa-
tion, I am not able to recollect whether we were familiar with that possibility, but, in my opinion, if we had known about it, I do not believe it would have significantly changed the course of or the conclusions of the Warren Commission.

There was a question raised about Mr. Hoover's theory of 1959 that Oswald may have been an imposter.

I personally was not familiar with that attitude of Mr. Hoover, in all honesty, I don't think that attitude on his part would have significantly changed the course of our investigation or the conclusions of the Commission.

You also raised the question as to the connection or possible involvement of the underworld in any assassination plot. I would like to state this for the record: I do not believe that if there was any association between some CIA officers and members of the underworld that that would have changed the conclusion of the Warren Commission.

However, had the Warren Commission known of any assassination plots directed against Castro, this might have affected the extent of the Commission inquiry. In other words, if we had known of these assassination plots or attempts by an agency of the Federal Government, it certainly would have required that the Commission extend its inquiry into those kinds of operations by an agency of the Federal Government.

But from what I have known of those plots, what I have read or heard, I don't think they, in and of themselves, would have changed the conclusions of the Commission.

Mr. CORNWELL. Finally, I would like to show you two exhibits marked for identification as JFK F-464 and JFK F-467, each of which respectively relate to the fact the CIA may have considered, at one point, the possibility of using Oswald as a source of information, and the second one relating to a theory or speculation that Mr. Hoover had at one point, that there may have been an Oswald imposter. May we have those admitted into the record, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman STOKES. Without objection, they may be entered into the record.

[The above referred to exhibits, JFK F-464 and JFK F-467, follow:]
For the record we forward herewith a memorandum by
in which he gives his recollections of / Interest in Subject following OSMAN
Subject's return to the United States from the USSR.

U.S.

Encl.

Distribution

5

Document Number 485-173

for FOIA Review on May 1778

17 Dec 1963 Dec 18 1969
SUBJECT: Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald

TO: 

1. It makes little difference now, but at one time an interest in Oswald. As soon as I had heard Oswald's name, I recalled that as I had discussed -- sometime in Summer 1960 -- with the Layton on of interview(s) through or other suitable channels. At the moment I don't recall if this was discussed while Oswald and his family were en route to our country or if it was after their arrival.

2. I remember that Oswald's unusual behavior in the USSR had struck me from the moment I had read the first dispatch on him, and I told my subordinates something amounting to "Don't push too hard to get the information we need, because this individual looks odd." We were particularly interested in the information that Oswald might provide on the Minsk factory in which he had been employed, on certain sections of the city itself, and of course we sought the usual that might help develop personality dossiers.

3. I was phasing into my cover assignment at the time. Thus, I would have left our country shortly after Oswald's arrival. I do not know what action developed thereafter.

Addendum

4. As an afterthought, I recall also that at the time I was becoming increasingly interested in watching develop a pattern that we had discovered in the course of our bio and research work: the number of Soviet women marrying foreigners, being permitted to leave the USSR, then eventually divorcing their spouses and settling down abroad without returning "home." The case was among the first of these, and we eventually turned up something like two dozen similar cases. I became interested in the developing trend we had come across. It was partly out of curiosity to learn if Oswald's wife would actually accompany him to our country, partly out of interest in Oswald's own experiences in the USSR, that we showed intelligence interest in the story.
Date: June 3, 1960

To: Office of Security
Department of State

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: LEE HARVEY OSWALD
INTERNAL SECURITY - R

Reference is made to Foreign Service Despatch Number 234 dated November 2, 1959, concerning subject's renunciation of his American citizenship at the United States Embassy, Moscow, Russia, on October 31, 1959.

It is noted that among other items, subject surrendered his United States Passport Number 1733202 to an American Embassy official. His last known residence as indicated in your despatch was the Metropole Hotel, Moscow, where he was residing in a non-tourist status.

Your attention is directed to the report of Special Agent John V. Fin, Dallas, Texas, dated May 12, 1960, entitled, "Report Transmitted to Residents of Russia; Internal Security R," a copy of which was furnished to the Department of State on May 24, 1960.

In that report you will note that subject's mother, Mrs. Marguerite C. Oswald, Fort Worth, Texas, advised that she recently received a letter addressed to her son from the Albert Schweitzer College in Switzerland indicating that Lee Oswald was expected at the college on April 20, 1960. She stated subject had taken his birth certificate with him when he left home. She was apprehensive about his safety because three letters she had written him since January 22, 1960, have been returned to her undelivered.

Since there is a possibility that an imposter is using Oswald's birth certificate, any current information the Department of State may have concerning subject will be appreciated.
Office Memorandum - UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : SY

FROM : Emery J. Adams, For the Director, Office of Security

DATE: June 10, 1960

SUBJECT: G. H. Adams, Lee Harvey

Ref : SY memorandum June 6

There are transmitted for your consideration the attached documents and/or reports relating to the subject. Should additional data be required, the basic document, when not attached, or the SY file, can be made available upon request.

The information transmitted herewith is for your confidential use only and not for dissemination outside the Department.

Please handle the attached material as indicated:

_____ A. RETURN TO SY.

X B. RETAIN OR DESTROY.

Since the final paragraph of the attached SY memorandum indicates the possibility of an impostor using the subject's birth certificate, please furnish this office with any current information available on him for transmittal to the FBI.

cc: FBI
    SOS
    SCA - I.R. Dorsz

Attachment:

FBI memo dated 6/3/60 at Washington.

SY file
Memorandum

TO: PT/F - Mr. John T. White
FROM: PT/U - Edward J. Hickey
SUBJECT: Lee Harvey Oswald, Your Memorandum dated March 31.

DATE: March 31, 1961

In view of the fact that this file contains information first, which indicates that mail from the mother of this boy is not being delivered to him and second, that it has been stated that there is an imposter using Oswald's identification data and that no doubt the Soviets would love to get hold of his valid passport, it is my opinion that the passport should be delivered to him only on a personal basis and after the Embassy is assured, to its complete satisfaction, that he is returning to the United States.

Mr. CORNWELL. Was the Warren Commission told about either such matter, to your knowledge, Mr. President?
President FORD. Not to my best recollection.
Mr. CORNWELL. Finally, the committee has received some evidence there may have been an employee in the Cuban consulate in Mexico City which may have had foreknowledge of the assassination, and the employee may have been a member of Cuban intelligence.
Did you ever receive any such information, to your memory, during the course of the Warren Commission's deliberations?
President FORD. It is my best recollection we were not so informed.
Mr. CORNWELL. Thank you. I have no further questions.
Chairman Stokes. Thank you, Counsel. At this point, the Chair will recognize the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Devine, for such time as he may consume, after which the committee will operate under the 5-minute rule. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Devine.
Mr. DEVINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. President, we welcome you here this morning and we appreciate it must be a bit difficult after 14-plus years to recall everything that occurred on this Commission, particularly due to the vast responsibilities that were put upon you, as both Vice President and President of the United States, during the intervening time.
With all due deference to the other members of the Warren Commission that are present, you did attain, probably, the reputation of being the most conscientious member of the Commission,
having attended more meetings and interviewed more witnesses than anyone else on the Commission at that time.

In that conclusion, Mr. Chairman, would Ms. Berning make available to the President JFK exhibits F-441 and F-442.

Mr. President, I think you have had an opportunity to, on a previous occasion, review these two memorandums, one of which is dated December 12, 1963; the other December 17, 1963, both memorandums being authored by the Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Mr. Cartha DeLoach.

And I would like to ask you if these memorandums, you had a chance to review them, are accurate with respect to the conversations with you and what, if any, relationship you had with the FBI during the operation of the Warren Commission.

President Ford. Congressman Devine, I appreciate the opportunity to respond to the two memorandums from Mr. DeLoach, one of December 12, 1963, and one of December 17, 1963. And if the committee will permit, I will read a prepared statement because I wish to be very accurate in this regard.

During my service in the Congress from January 3, 1949, until appointed to the Warren Commission, I had had an excellent relationship with the FBI. It was not on a frequent basis; I barely knew J. Edgar Hoover, but like most Americans, had great respect for him and the Bureau.

Over that period, I became reasonably well acquainted with Lou Nichols, who was Mr. DeLoach's predecessor. Mr. Nichols had a longstanding relationship with eight or nine editors of Booth newspapers in Michigan, including the Grand Rapids Press, which was the Booth paper in my hometown.

I met with Mr. DeLoach through Mr. Nichols, and when Mr. Nichols retired and whenever I had a congressional matter involving the FBI, I would contact Mr. DeLoach. These were contacts well before my appointment to the Warren Commission.

After my appointment to the Commission, and following several of the Commission's organizational meetings, I was disturbed that the Chairman, in selecting a general counsel for the staff, appeared to be moving in the direction of a one-man Commission. My views were shared by several other members of the Commission.

The problem was resolved by an agreement that all top staff appointments would be approved by the Commission as a whole.

In my December 12, 1963 discussion with Mr. DeLoach in my office, I told him of this temporary internal conflict with the Commission—within the Commission, I should say. In that same meeting with Mr. DeLoach, we discussed several other matters, including involving possible decisions of the Commission, and I related the visit to my office by Mr. John McCone, who was then director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. DeLoach gave me additional information on the matter discussed by Mr. McCone. On December 17, 1963, I again met with Mr. DeLoach in my office and the subjects discussed are set forth in the copy of the memo from Mr. DeLoach to Mr. Moore.

In reference to these meetings with Mr. DeLoach, and my questions relating to my relationship as a Commission member with the FBI, I will state the following:
One, I do not have any memoranda which shows that after December 19, 1963, I had any contact with Mr. DeLoach, and I know of no other memoranda from any source.

Two, the two contacts with Mr. DeLoach, which were prior to December 20, were made during the organizational period of the Commission and before any investigations or hearings were undertaken by the Commission.

Three, to my best recollection, the DeLoach memos appear to be accurate, but the relationship mentioned by Mr. DeLoach did not continue during the investigation period of the Commission.

Mr. Devine. On Sunday, June 7, 1964, Mr. President, you and I, I think, Chief Justice Warren went to Dallas and had an interview with Jack Ruby. Do you recall that situation?

President Ford. I recall it vividly, Mr. Devine.

Mr. Devine. You may further recall that during this conversation, Mr. Ruby said as follows, and this appears on page 194 of the transcript:

Gentlemen, if you want to hear any further testimony, you will have to get me to Washington soon, because it has something to do with you, Chief Warren. Do I sound sober enough to tell you this?

Chief Justice Warren. Yes; go right ahead.

Mr. Ruby. I want to tell the truth, and I can't tell it here. I can't tell it here. Does that make sense to you?

I would ask you, Mr. President, why was Ruby not taken to Washington for further questioning as he requested?

President Ford. First, the Chief Justice, the Chairman of our Commission, and myself, along with several staff members, thoroughly interrogated Jack Ruby in Dallas on that Sunday afternoon; the interrogation went 3 or 4 hours.

We believe that we had fully probed from him all of the information that he had available, and the Chief Justice, the Chairman and I reported back to the other members of the Commission the interrogation that we had of Jack Ruby. The other members of the Commission had full access, of course, to the transcript.

It is my best recollection that the other members of the Commission agreed with the Chief Justice and myself that it was not necessary to bring Jack Ruby from Dallas to Washington and to go through another interrogation of him in the Nation's capital.

Second, as the transcript indicates, Jack Ruby did request a polygraph examination. At his request, that was given, and the Commission and the staff of the Commission had the benefit of that polygraph and that interrogation. So, when you brought it all together, the interrogation by the chairman and myself and the staff, plus the polygraph, it did not seem necessary to bring Jack Ruby down to Washington for further investigation or interrogation.

Mr. Devine. In other words, it was the feeling of the Commission, or at least a majority of them, that no meaningful purpose would be served by transporting him from Dallas to Washington, is that right?

President Ford. That is correct, sir.

Mr. Devine. In another vein, Mr. President, if you know, why did Earl Warren agree to accept the position as head of the Warren Commission?
President Ford. I assume that the responsibilities of the Chief Justice—

Mr. Devine. Would you hold a minute, I think we have lost our sound.

Thank you Mr. President. Let me repeat the question, if you know, why did Chief Justice Warren accept the assignment as head of the Warren Commission?

President Ford. I believe that Chief Justice Warren accepted the assignment from President Johnson for precisely the same reason that the other six of us did. We were asked by the President to undertake this responsibility, as a public duty and service, and despite the reluctance of all of us to add to our then burden or operations, we accepted. I am sure that was the personal reaction and feeling of the Chief Justice.

Mr. Devine. I know that you were personally reluctant to accept it because you did not seek the assignment and I doubt if any of the other members did. What was Allen Dulles' role on the Commission?

President Ford. Allen Dulles had an identical relationship and role on the Commission with the rest of us. He was unique, however, in that he had served for a considerable period of time as the Director of the CIA, so that as a member of the Commission he could draw on that experience and expertise in any matters that involved the foreign intelligence problems.

It is my best judgment, Mr. Congressman, that we were fortunate to have had a person like Allen Dulles on the Commission because of his background.

Mr. Devine. Would you know, Mr. President, what his informal relations were with the CIA, since he was the retired Director? Did he have an opportunity to obtain more information for the Commission because of that unique position?

President Ford. To my best knowledge, he had no unusual relationship with the Central Intelligence Agency other than the fact that he had been a former Director. As I said a moment ago, I believe that background and experience was beneficial to the Commission and not harmful or detrimental to our investigation and our recommendations and conclusions.

Mr. Devine. To put it another way, Mr. President, you then don't feel that his former relationship with the CIA in any way hindered the operations of the Warren Commission?

President Ford. Not at all, sir.

Mr. Devine. If you know, why has the public acceptance of the findings of the Warren Commission diminished to reasonably low proportions over the years? This is speculation, but we would like to have the benefit of your thinking.

President Ford. Because I would like to be very precise I have a written statement which I would like to read in this regard.

Public acceptance of the Warren Commission findings has diminished for several reasons. No. one, the critics who have obtained the widest publicity have either deliberately or negligently mislead the American people by misstating facts and by omitting crucial facts in their discussions.

Second, there is general public cynicism about any report of an assassination of a President. The record shows questions after
many years are still being raised as to the assassination of other Presidents.

Third, the overwhelming majority of the American people have not read the entire Warren Commission report.

Now, under point one, let me make this specific matter a matter of the record.

The coverup of the underlying facts, in my opinion, of the Tippit murder has been a hallmark of critics of the Warren Commission. For instance, in the introduction to one of the best selling books professing Oswald’s innocence, one reads, and I quote:

The plain fact is there is no evidence at all to explain how or why the Dallas police instantly pounced on Oswald and until some adequate explanation is given no one can be blamed for entertaining the most likely hypothesis, viz, that the Dallas police had undisclosed reasons for arresting Oswald even before they had valuable evidence pointing towards him.

Once that hypothesis is admitted almost all of the evidence accepted by the Commission can be reinterpreted in a different way.

In my opinion, no investigation of the tragic assassination of the President can be complete without including an investigation of the murder of Dallas police officer J. D. Tippit. Almost all who have claimed that Lee Harvey Oswald was innocent of the murder of President Kennedy have also claimed that Oswald was innocent of the murder of Tippit. This is despite the fact that at least six eye witnesses, who either saw the murder or saw the Tippit gunman leaving the murder scene with a gun in hand, identified that gunman as Lee Harvey Oswald.

Moreover, Oswald was arrested with the Tippit murder weapon in his possession. The arrest of Oswald was an outgrowth of the acts of an alert citizen in Dallas, J. Calvin Brewer, who managed a shoe store in the neighborhood of the Tippit shooting. Shortly after Brewer learned from radio newscasts about the shooting of Tippit in his neighborhood, he became suspicious of the way a man first ducked into the entryway of his shoe store where police sirens were heard coming down the street, and then left the front of the store soon after the police sirens subsided.

Brewer followed the man down the street into the Texas Theater and then had the cashier call the police. When the police arrived at the theater, Brewer pointed out the man who was Lee Harvey Oswald. As the policeman approached Oswald pulled out a revolver. Carrying a concealed gun is a crime. The fact that Oswald had such a weapon in his possession, and drew it, is highly suspicious. Subsequent evidence provided that this very revolver had been purchased through the mail by Oswald under the same alias he used to acquire the rifle used in the assassination of President Kennedy.

Both Oswald’s revolver and Oswald’s rifle were mailed to the same post office box in Dallas. Witnesses at the Tippit murder scene saw the gunman throw cartridge cases into the bushes as he reloaded his revolver; an irrefutable ballistic evidence proved that those cartridge cases came from Oswald’s revolver, to the exclusion of all other weapons in the world. This exactly corresponds with the ballistic evidence that proved that the bullet found off Governor Connally’s stretcher in Parkland Hospital in Dallas, and the two large bullet fragments in the President’s limousine which came
from the bullet which struck President Kennedy's head, came from
Oswald's rifle, to the exclusion of all other weapons in the world.

Now, the point I wish to make is that in too many cases some of
the critics of the Warren Commission have either misstated or
omitted facts that were developed by the Commission and in the
process of either an omission or misstatement have led the public
to have less than full support for the commission's recommenda-
tions and conclusions.

Mr. Devine. Thank you. I have one question in a completely
different vein.

As you know, one of the mandates that the Congress has placed
on this select committee is to ultimately make recommendations.
You as President were the subject of a number of attacks, and
fortunately escaped with your hide.

President Ford. I am pretty healthy now.

Mr. Devine. You certainly look so.

President Ford. I am glad she missed.

Mr. Devine. Not wanting to be distasteful, and God forbid that
another situation would occur like occurred during the Kennedy
years, I hope we never have another assassination or assassination
attempt, but it is my understanding that if such a thing would
occur they would go through the same autopsy procedures as they
did back in 1963; whoever is President would be taken to Bethesda
Hospital, and he would be looked at probably by clinical patholo-
gists rather than forensic pathologists. It is my understanding also,
Mr. President, that the Metropolitan Police Department here has
anticipated that type of need for any so-called VIP and that they
have put together what they call an executive autopsy procedure
where they have everything available, they have videotapes availa-
ble, they have forensic pathologists available. That leads up to this
question, Mr. President, do you in your capacity as former Presi-
dent, as a former Member of the Congress that has been deeply
involved in the Warren Commission and the assassination prob-
lems, do you have any recommendations that you would like to
make to this committee either legislatively or procedurally as it
may relate to an assassination like this occurring in the future?

President Ford. Well, No. 1, I am glad that some plans have
been laid to maybe make the procedure in the case of another
tragedy in better, more professional hands. I am talking about the
autopsy. From what I read, this committee has determined that the
autopsy procedure in Bethesda was not conducted by the experts or
professionals in that area. That was of course unfortunate, and I
trust that what is now laid out would eliminate whatever the
difficulties were at the time of President Kennedy's assassination.

If such an assassination were to take place again, I am certain
that there would be a public demand for some organization to
undertake and investigate the full facts. I don't think the public
would be satisfied with anyone or all of the Federal agencies them-

 selves investigating and coming to conclusions. So you come down
at the bottom line, I would recommend that in such a tragedy that
what President Johnson did would be repeated. I see no better
alternative. I just hope it doesn't happen again, but if it did I think
that is the best option.
Mr. Devine. Do you feel there is any need for further legislation in this area? As you know at the time of the occurrence of the Kennedy assassination, it was not within the jurisdiction of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to investigate nor have jurisdiction in matters of this nature. That has been changed during the interim period.

President Ford. As I recall, that was a recommendation of the Commission and Congress responded to it, so at least legislatively we probably have a better circumstance today than we did in 1963. And other things have improved after as you have indicated. I would like to make a comment so the record is clear.

Even though there may have been some inadequacies, at the time the autopsy was undertaken in Bethesda, as I understand it, the individuals who investigated and actually reviewed the material on the autopsy, a very prestigious group from what I read, they have come to the conclusion which is the same as those who did it before, Kennedy was shot from behind.

Mr. Devine. Fine. Thank you, Mr. President.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentlemen has expired. Committee will now operate under the 5-minute rule.

Mr. President, in the commission arriving at the conclusion that Lee Harvey Oswald was the lone assassin, to what degree did the Commission struggle with the question of motive and what was the final conclusion relative to his motive?

President Ford. My best recollection, and I repeat it is 14 years later, is that we were not able to precisely pin down a motive for the assassination by Lee Harvey Oswald of President Kennedy.

There was no way of really being definitive as to that motive and so we could only speculate.

Chairman Stokes. Did it come to the attention of the Commission that the CIA had in their possession a Soviet defector by the name of Yuri Nosenko, who claimed to have information about Lee Harvey Oswald while he was living in Soviet Russia.

President Ford. It is my best recollection the commission was cognizant of the existence of Mr. Nosenko. It is also my best recollection that there was no certainty within the intelligence community of the Federal Government as to whether he was a plant, on the one hand, or a bona fide, on the other. There was that difference of opinion. And so the commission had to make its own decision as to the validity of whatever information he had.

Chairman Stokes. I would take it from that then that in terms of the Agency, that is the CIA, they were unable to give you some definitive information relative to his bona fide, so you might then come to a conclusion relative to any information regarding Oswald in the Soviet Union.

President Ford. I think that is generally correct, Mr. Chairman. Yes, sir.

Chairman Stokes. Now, yesterday we had a former agent from the FBI who testified before our committee, and the way he explained the investigative procedure was that the Commission conducted its own investigation, that the FBI conducted their own investigation, and I think the term he used “they did their own thing, we did our own thing; if they requested anything from us we gave them whatever they asked for.”
Would it be your recollection that that was the way that the Commission operated investigatively and FBI operated?

President Ford. Let me put it my way.

Chairman Stokes. Sure.

President Ford. The FBI, and I use that as an example, undertook a very extensive investigation. I don’t recall how many agents, but they had a massive operation to investigate everything. The Commission with this group of 14 lawyers and some additional staff people then drew upon all of this information which was available, and we, if my memory serves me accurately, insisted that the FBI give us everything they had. Now that is a comprehensive order from the Commission to the Director of the FBI. I assume, and I think the Commission assumed, that that order was so broad that if they had anything it was their obligation to submit it. Now if they didn’t, that is a failure on the part of the agencies, not on the part of the Commission.

Chairman Stokes. Mr. President, was the Commission made aware of the fact that as a result of an investigation or inspection which was directed by J. Edgar Hoover, that 17 agents were found to be deficient in the preassassination investigation relative to Oswald?

President Ford. To my best recollection, at least I was not familiar with any reprimand or corrective action taken by the Director.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you, Mr. President. My time has expired.

The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Preyer.

Mr. Preyer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is good to have you here, Mr. President, and Senator Cooper and Mr. McCloy, as the three members of the Warren Commission that can testify today. I think one of the problems the Warren Commission has had is that you went out of existence immediately upon the filing of the report, and you haven’t had the opportunity to answer your critics. There has been no official Warren Commission. And so I think it is very appropriate that you have this chance to answer for the historical record today.

Following up on the question Mr. Devine asked, one of the mandates of this committee is how should we deal with the eventuality of a high-level assassination in the future. The Warren Commission was the first citizens’ commission, as I understand it, which investigated an assassination. In the past we have left it up to the normal course of the judicial system.

You have had experience with citizens’ commissions. You appointed the Rockefeller Commission I believe. And you served on this commission. In view of your experience, do you feel that a high-level political assassination should be dealt with by a citizens’ committee, or should we leave it up to the normal workings of the judicial system?

President Ford. I would strongly advocate a high-level citizens’ commission as was done by President Johnson. To leave it up to the agencies of the Federal Government, in my opinion, would multiply cynicism and skepticism as to the conclusions. We certainly have had our problems with all the critiques that have been floating around in recent years but I think if the in-house agencies of the Federal Government had done the job and come to the same
conclusion we did, the critiques would have been far, far greater. So I recommend what President Johnson did as a possibility for the future.

Mr. Preyer. One further question on that score. The Warren Commission did not employ its own investigative staff and used agencies in place to develop the basic information—FBI, CIA, Secret Service. You have indicated that Warren Commission decision making was independent of any conclusions of those agencies and that you crosschecked their information.

But in the future, if a citizens' commission is set up, would it be your judgment that they should employ its own investigative staff as well as forming its independent conclusions with a limited staff, or do you feel that using agencies in place and forming your judgment on that as the Warren Commission did is the best way to go?

President Ford. It is my best judgment that the procedure and the policy the Warren Commission followed was the correct one, and I would advocate any subsequent commission to follow the same.

For the Warren Commission to have gathered together an experienced staff, to get them qualified to handle classified information, to establish the organization that would be necessary for a sizable number of investigators, would have been time consuming and in my opinion would not have answered what we were mandated to do in a timely and responsive manner.

It is my strong feelings that what we did was the right way. We were not captives of but we utilized the information from the in-house agencies of the Federal Government.

After getting the benefit of their experience and reports, we undertook by a wide variety of procedures to verify or to undercut what they had given us.

Mr. Preyer. Thank you, Mr. President.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. McKinney.

Mr. McKinney. Mr. President, it is a pleasure to have you here. Basically, to follow up on Judge Preyer's line of questioning, the then Assistant Attorney General, Mr. Katzenbach, in a deposition to this committee, and I quote from page 19, stated:

Perhaps naively but I thought that the appointment of Allen Dulles to the Commission would ensure that the Commission had access to anything that the CIA had. I am astounded to this day that Mr. Dulles did not at least make that information available to the other Commissioners. He might have been skeptical about how far it was to go to the staff or how it might be further investigated because there was somewhat more of an aura of secrecy surrounding the CIA in 1964 than there is in 1978.

We have found out that there were CIA files and information, of course, that were not given to the Warren Commission.

So following through on the judge's questions, did you at the time feel information was being withheld, and how would you handle this if another commission were to be formed to make sure the Commission knew it was getting all information?

President Ford. I had the feeling then, as a member of the Commission, that we were getting all of the information from any one or all of the Federal agencies, including the Central Intelli-
gence Agency. Obviously, there was some information as to assassi-
nation plots that, to my best recollection, was not given to us. I
can’t give you a 100-percent guarantee how you can get that infor-
mation. It depends on individuals, it depends on the system.

Why we weren’t given it, quite frankly, I don’t understand.

Mr. McKinney. Continuing on in that same deposition, on page
20, Mr. Katzenbach says:

It never would have occurred to me that the FBI would cover up anything. If you
ask me the question if the FBI failed to do something it should have done, would
they have covered that up? My answer to you is, even then, would have been yes,
they probably would not cover up information that somebody else was guilty of
something of the kind, but if the Bureau had made any mistake or anything for
which the public might criticize the Bureau, the Bureau would do its best to conceal
that information from anybody, including the Commission.

Of course, we find out now that this was true in the case of the
action brought against the agents for a supposed failure before the
assassination in handling the case of Lee Harvey Oswald.

Again, it seems to be a fact that the Bureau was withholding
information from the commission, despite a Presidential mandate.
Is there any way that you could suggest that we, as a committee,
could—again, I keep hoping this will never have to happen—give a
legislative or governmental standing to this type of commission,
should it ever have to be formed again, which would override this
type of bureaucratic decision within agencies such as the CIA or
the FBI?

President Ford. I don’t believe it is necessary to have a legisla-
tive charter for a commission of this kind. If my recollection is
correct, we did get, as a commission, legislative authority to put
witnesses under oath and to interrogate them under those circum-
stances.

As I recall, we had to get special legislation for that purpose,
which we did. I think that’s enough, or I think that’s sufficient to
insure that we have the power to pursue any and all angles.

Mr. McKinney. I want to thank you very much for taking time
out of your schedule, and it is a pleasure to have you here. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired. The
gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Dodd.

Mr. Dodd. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. President, to reiterate the remarks of my colleagues, it is a
pleasure to have you here with us on Capitol Hill, particularly in
the Cannon Building. You were telling us earlier it was your place
of residence as a Member of Congress for some years.

President Ford. I had an office down on the third floor down the
hall for 16 years.

Mr. Dodd. Welcome back. I would like to, if I could, Mr. Presi-
dent, direct your attention to the two memos I think you have in
front of you, exhibits 441 and 442. Those are the DeLoach memos.
And I would like to, if I could, ask you to respond to some ques-
tions with regard to the December 12, 1963, memo first, particular-
ly two paragraphs, the very first paragraph of the memorandum
and the next to the last paragraph of the memorandum.

The first paragraph, for purposes of the record, reads, and I am
quoting from it:
I had a long talk this morning with Congressman Gerald R. "Jerry Ford" R. Michigan in his office. He asked that I come up to see him. Upon arriving, he told me he wanted to talk in the strictest of confidence. This was agreed to.

Referring to the next to the last paragraph of the same memo, again I am quoting Mr. DeLoach here:

Ford indicated he would keep me thoroughly advised as to the activities of the Commission. He stated this would have to be on a confidential basis, however, he thought it should be done. He also asked if he could call me from time to time and straighten out questions in his mind concerning our investigation. I told him by all means he should do this. He reiterated that our relationship would, of course, remain confidential.

Mr. President, I would like to ask you some questions about this, if I could. First of all, the December 5 and December 16 meetings of the commission, is it my understanding those meetings were closed to the public and press; these were executive sessions?

President Ford. I don't recall those precise meetings, Mr. Congressman, but it is my best recollection that all meetings of the Commission were in executive session; not only those, but all that followed.

Mr. Dodd. And as I understand it, Mr. DeLoach would not necessarily have had access directly to the meetings. There was liaison with the FBI, but he was not the liaison.

President Ford. He was not the liaison person, but there was an FBI liaison officer there, as I recall, at all hearings.

Mr. Dodd. If I understood your testimony accurately this morning, you stated that you felt that the information that was contained in these two memorandums, two documents, was basically accurate, and yet you said that you had terminated your relationship with Mr. DeLoach in terms of these kinds of meetings after this December 17 meeting you had with him.

Can I, therefore, conclude that Mr. DeLoach's statements with regard to the next to the last paragraph on the second page of the December 12 memorandum is wrong?

President Ford. As I said in a prepared statement which I read in reference to both memorandums, it is my best recollection that we no longer had contacts, as indicated in these two memos, and to my best information, there are no other memorandums that would indicate a continuing relationship.

There are these two, all of which meetings took place in the organizational phase of the commission's operations. To my best knowledge, and I asked the staff of the committee to check most carefully, there are no other memorandums indicating contacts with Mr. DeLoach.

Mr. Dodd. Mr. President, in that second sentence of that next to the last paragraph, quoting it again, he stated, referring to you, I believe, "This would have to be on a confidential basis. However, he thought it should be done." Do you recall what your motivation was, if that is a correct statement, that the time you thought it should have been done and then having changed the relationship, at that particular time, why you felt that it might be important to have this kind of a confidential relationship with Mr. DeLoach?

President Ford. First, as I said in the prepared response earlier, I, like most Americans, at that time had great respect for the Director, Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, and for the achievements and the
accomplishments of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. I had developed a personal relationship, on a very off-and-on basis, with Mr. DeLoach. If I had a question as a Member of Congress that involved the FBI, such as you would have today, there is somebody over at the FBI you can call, and he will come and see you.

That's the kind of relationship I had with Mr. DeLoach. If I had a problem that involved the FBI, my contact at that time was Mr. DeLoach. I don't know who your contact would be at the present time, but there is a person at the FBI who will respond to your inquiries, and that was my relationship with Mr. DeLoach.

At the outset, during the organizational phase of the commission, we had some problems. We were concerned about what appeared to be the attitude of the chairman. Second, several others on the commission thought he wanted a one-man commission. Most of the members of the commission didn't agree with that. There were other organizational matters that I thought I could get a better feel for if I talked to Mr. DeLoach and had the benefit of his or the FBI investigations. That's why I had those two meetings, and, to my best recollection, that relationship terminated at the conclusion of the December 17 meeting.

Mr. Dodd. Mr. President, you anticipated my next question. I wanted to know, if I could, from you, why you felt it was important that you share this information specifically with the FBI, particularly when it seems to have been, at least, on a couple of internal matters—who should be chief counsel, for instance, whether or not there should be a press release issued on the FBI report.

Granted, it was on the FBI report, but that again, sounds more like an internal matter to the commission—what they should be doing, when the Chief Justice wanted to finalize the report. I am curious about why the FBI, why not someone else?

President Ford. Well, in the course of a conversation, maybe 15 minutes, you cover a lot of subjects. Some of it may be related to or pertinent to the organizational—organization of the commission, some of it may have been just general information. I can't help but indicate here that in one of these memos, it does state that John McCone, then head of the CIA, came to see me, and it is also indicated in here that Mr. McCone went to see other members of the commission. Was that improper? Mr. McCone was the head of an organization which was in the process of being investigated by the Commission. I don't think you turn a person away, a person of that responsibility, and I didn't, and I think it was perfectly proper. I don't know what other members of the commission did, but you have to remember, we were a unique group that was trying to get all the information we could. It was our obligation. It was mandated by President Johnson. In the organizational phase, we had a lot of questions, and, frankly, I think it was very proper to do what I did.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Dodd. Could I ask unanimous consent to proceed for a couple of additional minutes, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, the gentleman is recognized.

Mr. Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You mentioned in the memo, as well, that you thought these meetings ought to be confi-
dential. Was it your understanding, given the personal relationship of Mr. DeLoach, that there would only be information you should share with him as an individual, or did you fully expect him to report to supervisors or superiors of his within the Bureau as to any common suggestions and statements that you might have made to him in those meetings?

President Ford. I didn't pursue what the process would be after he left my office. Frankly, it didn't occur to me I should check it out. I only know what our two relationships were on those two occasions, December 12 and December 17, 1963.

Mr. Dodd. Did you, Mr. President, by any chance, you mentioned that Mr. McCone sought out various other commission members. In fact, he sought out you to talk to you about something. Did you seek out anyone else in any other agency to talk to at that time, other than Mr. DeLoach?

President Ford. Not to my best recollection.

Mr. Dodd. I gather from what you had mentioned just a minute ago that there were other personnel from various investigatory agencies that did contact other members of the commission from time to time. Is that an accurate statement of your testimony?

President Ford. I can't verify it one way or another. I have no way of knowing who might have contacted other members of the commission, and certainly my memory at this point would not be sufficiently accurate to make such a charge.

Mr. Dodd. Am I to understand that because of the confidentiality or the nature of these two meetings with Mr. DeLoach, that the other members of the Warren Commission, at the time, were not aware of the fact you had met with Mr. DeLoach?

President Ford. To my best recollection, I didn't indicate to him that I had those meetings; no.

Mr. Dodd. Did Mr. DeLoach—granted this is going back a long time—but do you recall whether or not he shared any information with you as to their feelings that you brought back to the commission? Was it comments, statements, suggestions, or anything that he might have said to you that you then brought to the commission as a member of that commission?

President Ford. I don't recall that any advice or suggestions he made were conveyed by me back to the commission; no. At least that's my best recollection.

Mr. Dodd. Mr. Chairman, I thank you. I have no further questions. Again, Mr. President, I appreciate your being here today.

President Ford. Thank you.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ford.

Mr. Ford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. President, I would like to first join with my colleague in thanking you for appearing here this morning. I only have one question for you, Mr. President. Do you feel that the Warren Commission received full and honest information from the FBI and the CIA in regards to Oswald's alleged connection with foreign governments?

President Ford. To the best of my recollection, I think we got from any and all of the Federal agencies all of the information they had as to Oswald's connection with any foreign government.
Mr. Ford. One additional question. What about the Secret Service, did the Warren Commission ever have dialog or communication with the Secret Service?

President Ford. Oh, yes, we had testimony, as I recollect, from the Director, who was Mr. Rowley at the time. We interrogated, as a commission staff, made a thorough investigation of the advanced procedures of the Secret Service, the actual operations of the Secret Service while President Kennedy was in Dallas. The commission and the staff, in my opinion, made a very thorough investigation of all the responsibilities and activities of the Secret Service; yes, sir.

Mr. Ford. Thank you very much, Mr. President, and, again, I thank you for coming. Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Sawyer.

Mr. Sawyer. Mr. President, I join with the others in saying what a pleasure it is to have you here. You have been really my only claim to distinction as a freshman Congressman here. You would be amazed how many times when I am introduced to somebody, they say, this is the fellow who occupies Gerald Ford's seat and the seat you held with such distinction for 25 years.

President Ford. Thank you.

Mr. Sawyer. Going back to this Tippit situation, one thing that has bothered me consistently, and I have to confess up until now I haven't had any substantial enlightenment on it, I just wonder if you have formed an opinion, not with respect to whether Oswald shot Tippit, I am totally satisfied on that and I think the evidence is overwhelming on that, but why Tippit stopped Oswald is a perplexing question in that at that point in time, as you may recall. Oswald had gone to an entirely different area of the city, far removed, he was only walking up the street. The description that had been issued was a general description that would be just kind of an average guy in size and general appearance. Did you form any opinion on that?

President Ford. Unfortunately, because of his murder, we never got any testimony from Officer Tippit, but I assume that he was a good officer and he had been alerted that there had been an assassination. I suspect that any well-qualified, alert officer was anxious to pursue anything that was suspicious.

I think we ought to compliment and congratulate Tippit for undertaking this effort that he did. Unfortunately, it resulted in his death. But why he did, other than carrying out his responsibilities, I wouldn't know.

Mr. Sawyer. Do you think that there would be any advantage in a criminal law applying to such a commission, let's say, as the Warren Commission, making it a Federal crime for any Agency personnel to withhold or not provide all pertinent information that they are requested to provide?

President Ford. I haven't studied this but are there not present laws on the statute books that would permit such a charge?

Mr. Sawyer. I can't answer you.

President Ford. If not, I think that ought to be investigated. Mr. Sawyer. Fine. Thank you very much, Mr. President.

That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Stokes. Time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Fithian.

Mr. Fithian. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to join with the others in expressing my appreciation for your coming this morning.

I have just two areas I would like to explore briefly with you. I would like to return for just a minute to your earlier statement concerning bullet fragments found in the Presidential limousine. In reviewing the Warren Commission, I find that the FBI tests of the fragments, both through spectography and neutron activation analysis, could not in fact determine the origin of the fragments.

I just want to read briefly from the Commission report:

Each of the two bullet fragments had sufficient unmutilated area to provide the basis for an identification. However, it was not possible to determine whether the two bullet fragments were from the same bullet or from two different bullets. With regard to the other bullet fragments discovered in the limousine and in the course of treating President Kennedy and Governor Connally, however, expert examination could demonstrate only that the fragments were "similar in metallic composition" to each other, to the two larger fragments and to the nearly whole bullet.

Is it your recollection that other evidence or other tests were run on the bullet fragment other than what I have had access to?

President Ford. I am not able to recollect that detail as to what other tests, if any, were conducted at that time.

Mr. Fithian. Thank you.

I would like to ask you about something that has been troubling me throughout our investigation and some reports that there was unusual pressure to either arrive at an early conclusion that it was Oswald alone, or to arrive at unanimity that Oswald was the lone assassin, et cetera.

There was a report in 1975 pertaining to a June 4 meeting of the commission, and the report in the Washington Star indicated that Ford provoked "a near uproar in the panel when on June 4, 1964 he charged that outside forces were trying to pressure the commission to decide in advance that Oswald was a solitary assassin.

I wonder if you would help the committee out by commenting on that report?

President Ford. I have no recollection of that particular June 4 meeting or any pressure that the commission received for any definitive conclusion. As other members of the commission, I think, will testify, we had a unanimous vote as to the fact that Lee Harvey Oswald committed the assassination and all other decisions of the commission were also unanimous.

There was no pressure. We operated as a unit of seven members who fortunately all agreed.

Mr. Fithian. I want to return briefly to the unanimous question in just a moment. But is it then your testimony that in your judgment the FBI had not decided prematurely, that there was no evidence that you had that the FBI withheld information from the commission or gave information to the commission that would make the Bureau look better instead of "everything that you asked for"?

President Ford. I suspect that the FBI, after its investigation, came to the conclusion that Oswald was the assassin. I suspect there is evidence, reports, around the Bureau, or maybe over in our
files, that that was their conclusion, but I emphasize their conclusion did not determine the conclusion of the commission. What they came to as a conclusion was helpful to the commission, but it didn't decide for the commission what our conclusion was.

Chairman Stokes. Time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Fithian. I ask unanimous consent to ask one additional question.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, the gentleman is recognized.

Mr. Fithian. Mr. President, it has been reported many places that there was some difficulty in arriving at unanimity of the conclusiveness of the evidence for the final report and that in order to get the unanimity, which is the historical record now, certain very carefully drafted language, such as no evidence to the contrary, or according to the evidence presented to us, and then the conclusion. Would you care to comment on the effort at drafting the report in such a way, did you have any problem arriving at the unanimity short of drafting some very careful, artful language?

President Ford. There was a recommendation, as I recall, from the staff that could be summarized this way. No. 1, Lee Harvey Oswald was the assassin. Two, there was no conspiracy, foreign or domestic.

The commission, after looking at this suggested language from the staff, decided unanimously that the wording should be much like this, and I am not quoting precisely from the Commission staff, but I am quoting the substance.

No. 1, that Lee Harvey Oswald was the assassin.

No. 2, the Commission has found no evidence of a conspiracy, foreign or domestic.

The second point is quite different from the language which was recommended by the staff. I think the Commission was right to make that revision and I stand by it today.

Mr. Fithian. Well, thank you, Mr. President.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. Time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Thone. Welcome back, Mr. President. The hour is late. Just one question. There was no question but that the Federal Bureau of Investigation has a lot of background material on Lee Harvey Oswald that should have alerted them, I am sure did alert them, to the fact that he could very well have been a security problem. They also knew, as I understand it, as least one agent knew, that he was working in the Texas Book Depository.

It is my understanding that that information was not then transmitted to the Secret Service.

Do you have any thoughts or suggestions regarding this obvious breakdown in communication?

President Ford. At one time I knew that whole story, but I must say I can't recall all of the details.

I think the conclusion of the Commission was that there had to be a better liaison between the FBI and the Secret Service and/or any other agencies involved in intelligence, et cetera, and I trust and hope that that interrelationship has been improved. It wasn't the best at that time, as my memory serves me.
Mr. Thome. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman Stokes. Time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Edgar.

Mr. Edgar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I, too, want to welcome you to the committee today and thank you for your answers to our questions.

Mr. President, was there a sitdown meeting of the Warren Commission with the FBI, the CIA, and the Secret Service at the very beginning of the Warren Commission’s investigation to outline an investigative plan for the commission?

President Ford. I do not recall any meeting of the full commission with the Director of the FBI, the Director of CIA, and the Director of the Secret Service. I am not sure such a meeting was necessary or essential.

Our first responsibility was to appoint a staff, which we did, and to layout a procedure by which we would investigate, et cetera. Mr. Rankin and the Chief Justice, if my memory is accurate, had the basic man to man relationship with the head of the FBI, the Secret Service and the CIA, and it is my feeling that that interrelationship was sufficient from the point of view of myself as a member of the commission.

Mr. Edgar. Did the commission itself have an investigative plan?

President Ford. Well, we have a plan that was under the direction of the commission and implemented by the staff, and that was a very specific investigation method, procedure, and I think it worked.

Mr. Edgar. The reason for my question is that we have uncovered some information that the Secret Service and the FBI and the CIA didn’t talk together very well and did not share information with each other prior to the assassination, and that there is some evidence that even after the assassination each of them worked separately and apart from each other. Wouldn’t it have been a proper role of the Warren Commission to act as a coordinating function between these agencies to get them to share information about Lee Harvey Oswald or about the investigation?

President Ford. If you will return or look at, Congressman Edgar, the report of the commission, page 24, under subparagraph small (c), the report says, and I will read it for you:

The Commission has concluded that there was insufficient liaison and coordination of information between the Secret Service and other Federal agencies necessarily concerned with Presidential protection.

It goes on, but that is a summary of the rest of the paragraph. Yes, I think we found there was insufficient liaison, coordination, before the assassination. I don’t think it was necessarily required that they have liaison afterwards in the course of the investigation. To do their respective responsibilities effectively, cooperation was essential before the assassination.

Mr. Edgar. Thank you.

Moving to another area. In reference to the disciplinary action of the 17 agents of the FBI, to the best of your recollection, when did you first come to know about the disciplinary action?
President Ford. To be honest with you, I did not know of that
disciplinary action at any time while I was a member of the com-
mission.

Mr. Edgar. Do you think that knowledge of that information
would have been helpful to the commission in light of the fact that
J. Edgar Hoover indicated that part of the reason for the disciplin-
ary action was that the agents should have been aware of Lee
Harvey Oswald's background and placed him on the security
index?

President Ford. It might have been helpful to the commission
but I don't think it would have altered in any way the final
recommendations or conclusions. I think we might have been
helped by that information, but I don't think it would have varied
other commission conclusions.

Chairman Stokes. Time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Edgar. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask unanimous con-
sent for 2 additional minutes.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, the gentleman is recog-
nized.

Mr. Edgar. Mr. President, you mentioned the importance of
Officer Tippit. I wonder if you could speculate for us where Lee
Harvey Oswald was going at the time of the shooting of Officer
Tippit?

President Ford. I have no immediate recollection of where he
was going at that time. I would have to refresh my memory before
I could give you any firm answer.

Mr. Edgar. Did you have an opportunity as part of the com-
mission to retrace Lee Harvey Oswald's steps from his rooming
house to the shooting of Mr. Tippit and then to the—

President Ford. Yes; I went to Dallas with the Chief Justice and
we spent a full day not only interrogating Jack Ruby but going
over precisely Oswald's movements as we understood them, during
that whole period. We went, again I can't recall the number, by the
house where the woman was on the porch, et cetera.

Mr. Edgar. In that journey, did you also travel to Jack Ruby's
apartment?

President Ford. I don't recall that.

Mr. Edgar. Let me just ask one final question, then.

Mr. President, what would you do to improve the protection of
the President of the United States?

President Ford. Well, having experienced 30 months of their
protection and their continuing protection at the present time, I
think they do a very professional job. They are an outstanding
group of people. They are well organized and have fine leadership.

I only know firsthand that in two instances they did a very, very
superb job in responding to an assassination attempt. In the case of
Fromm in Sacramento, an agent, Larry Boondorf, really moved in
effectively and quickly.

In San Francisco, again, what was done I thought was very
professional. I am very grateful as to how they handled themselves,
what they have done, and the way they are organized. I know of no
way you can improve it from my personal experience.

Mr. Edgar. Thank you, Mr. President.

No further questions.
Chairman Stokes. Time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Dodd, is seeking additional recognition.

Mr. Dodd. Just one question, if I may, and this will be the last one. I know you are running behind.

Today you stated there were a number of alleged incidents or facts that were relevant to one degree or another to the assassination which you and the other members of the commission, or many of them, were not aware of at the time you served on the commission.

You refer specifically to the existence of the Hosty letter and its contents, or its alleged contents; the allegations that Lee Harvey Oswald might have been an FBI informer; J. Edgar Hoover’s so-called second Oswald theory in 1959 when he was overseas; assassination plots against Fidel Castro; and just recently here, in questioning from Congressman Edgar, the disciplinary action that was taken against the agents in the FBI; things that you were not privy to at the time you were serving on the commission. I raise those points to ask you this question.

Without—and I understand your answer with regard to the conclusions in light of these additional revelations—but putting that aspect of it aside, the conclusions, in terms of an investigation, would you agree that the investigation of the Warren Commission, I mean that, for example, the witnesses interrogated, in light of these four or five facts or allegations that I have just mentioned, in light of that, do you feel that the investigation of the Warren Commission would have called upon additional witnesses, that the investigatory process would have changed as a result of those additional facts and information?

President Ford. To a degree, but I do not believe that there would have been any significant change in the process or the methods. Obviously we wanted to have all information, including the information that you have related. Unfortunately, for various reasons, it was not made available to the commission.

But I refer again to what I said earlier. I do not think our lack of information in those instances had any adverse impact on our conclusions or would have changed the conclusions.

Mr. Dodd. Thank you, Mr. President.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. Time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Devine, is seeking additional recognition.

Mr. Devine. Thank you, Mr. President, again for your total cooperation and appearance here.

I ask unanimous consent that JFK exhibits F-441 and F-442 be admitted in evidence at this point in the record.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, they may be admitted to the record at this point.

[The above referred to JFK exhibits F-441 and F-442 were admitted into evidence and follow:]
Memorandum

Mr. Mohr

FROM: C. D. DeLoach

DATE: December 12, 1963

SUBJECT: ASSASSINATION OF THE PRESIDENT

I had a long talk this morning with Congressman Gerald R. Ford (R - Michigan) in his office. He asked that I come up to see him. Upon arriving he told me he wanted to talk in the strictest of confidence. This was agreed to.

Ford told me he was somewhat disturbed about the manner in which Chief Justice Warren was carrying on his Chairmanship of the Presidential Commission. He explained that the first mistake that Warren made was his attempt to establish a "one man commission" by appointing a Chief Counsel, Warren Olney, that was his own protege. Ford stated that after the mention of Olney's name by the Chief Justice, at their first meeting, Allen Dulles, former Director of CIA, protested quite violently. Because of Dulles' protest, the other members told Warren that they would like to know more about Olney prior to giving their consent.

On the occasion of their second meeting, Ford and Hale Boggs joined with Dulles. Hale Boggs told Warren flatly that Olney would not be acceptable and that Dulles would not work on the Commission with Olney. Warren put up a stiff argument but a compromise was made when the name of Lee Rankin was mentioned. Ford stated that he was currently having problems inasmuch as the majority of the members of the Commission desired to go along with the recommendation made in Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach's letter to the Commission dated 12-9-63.

In this letter, Katzenbach recommended that the Commission make an immediate press release pointing out that the FBI report clearly showed there was no international conspiracy or collusion and that Oswald was a loner. Ford stated he was a minority on the that did not want to give out any press release until the Commission had had a thorough opportunity to review and discuss the FBI report. (I noted that the report was on his desk at the time of our meeting.)
I told Ford in strict confidence that the Director concurred with his viewpoint. I mentioned that our investigation thus far had conclusively shown that Oswald operated by himself and that Ruby additionally was a loner. However, FBI investigation was still pending on a large number of rumors, speculation and gossip and it, therefore, would be quite unfair for the Commission to take a stand prior to all the evidence being turned in. Ford stated this was his point entirely and that although he was a minority of one he intended to stick to his point.

Ford told me that John McCone, Director of CIA, had, approximately one week ago, gone up to his office and told him that CIA had uncovered some "startling information" in the Oswald case. McCone proceeded to tell Ford that a source of CIA's in Mexico had seen money exchange hands between Oswald and an unknown Cuban Negro. Ford stated this excited him greatly inasmuch as it definitely tended to show there was an international connection involved in the assassination of the President.

I told Ford that apparently McCone had failed to follow up on this matter. I mentioned that CIA's source had recanted his story and had indicated that it was a "fugitive of his imagination." However, to prove the unstable tendencies of this source, the source had later claimed that he was actually telling the truth. I pointed out that we were still checking some angles of this, however, the CIA source was obviously either unstable or somewhat of a psychopathic liar. Ford stated he could certainly see this.

Ford indicated he would keep me thoroughly advised as to the activities of the Commission. He stated this would have to be on a confidential basis, however, he thought it should be done. He also asked if he could call me from time to time and straighten out questions in his mind concerning our investigation. I told him by all means he should do this. He reiterated that our relationship would, of course, remain confidential.

We have had excellent relations with Congressman Ford for many years. He has been given an autographed copy of the Director's book "A Study of Communism" and has been in touch with my office on numerous occasions in the past.

ACTION:

Contact will be maintained with Congressman Ford.
Memorandum

Mr. Mohr

DATE: December 17, 1963

C. D. DeLoach

SUBJECT: LEE HARVEY OSWALD
INTERNAL SECURITY - R
THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION

I talked with Congressman Gerald Ford (R-Michigan) at his office at 1:45 P.M. this afternoon. The facts concerning the allegations that Lee Harvey Oswald received $6,500 in the Cuban Consulate, Mexico City, on September 18, 1963, and the recanting of such false facts were made very clear to Congressman Ford. Mr. Ford told me he was glad to get the further facts concerning the matter, particularly his review of the story that John McCone of CIA had told him originally.

With respect to the meeting of the Presidential Commission on December 10, Congressman Ford told me that the members of the Commission, including Chief Justice, agreed unanimously that no preliminary release should be made to the press regarding the facts as outlined in the FBI report.

Chief Justice Warren told the Commission that they should strive to have hearings completed and the findings made public prior to July, 1964, when the presidential campaigns will begin to get hot. He stated it would be unfair to present findings after July, 1964.

Several members of the Commission indicated that Oswald's handwritten elements in the exhibits section of the report should be typed out for clearer reading. Mrs. Kennedy was instructed to contact our liaison man, Inspector Malley, in this regard.

There was no criticism of the FBI at yesterday’s meeting. There were allegations made by one, including the Chief Justice, that the FBI had leaked portions of this report. I again went over very carefully with Congressman Ford the FBI had not had any "leaks" whatsoever. I told him we were well aware that the department had done considerable talking; furthermore, it now appeared somewhat obvious that members of the Commission were beginning to leak the report. I referred this week’s issue of "Newsweek" magazine which contains a rather clear analysis of the report. I told Congressman Ford that "Newsweek" was owned by the "Washington Post" and that apparently some one was trying to curry favor. I told him we, of course, did not get along very well with either the "Washington Post" or "Newsweek." He stated that he was in the same boat, that he liked neither one of these publications.
Congressman Ford told me that several members had been somewhat surprised, however pleased that the FBI's report had been in narrative form rather than written in a straightforward factual manner. I told him this, of course, was for the convenience of the Commission. He then mentioned Chief Justice Warren expressed the desirability of seeing the actual reports which back up those in narrative form. I told him the Director had issued very specific instructions that these reports be made ready for the Commission. I told him they were quite lengthy and would be considerable material to wade through.

Two members of the Commission brought up the fact that they still were not convinced that the President had been shot from the sixth floor window of the Texas Book Depository. These members failed to understand the trajectory of the slugs that killed the President. He stated he felt this point would be discussed in another meeting, of course, would represent no problem.

Three members of the Commission expressed disappointment that J. Edgar Hoover, former Chief of Secret Service, had seen fit to make a number of ill-informed remarks concerning the operations of the Secret Service in the press. The Commission does not agree with Hoover and criticized him quite thoroughly. They nevertheless plan to call him before the Commission and take testimony.

At the Commission meeting yesterday, Lee Rankin, the Chief Counsel, was authorized to hire two so-called "technicians" who will assist him in research and development of the Commission's findings. The Commission was told by Rankin that these men were skilled attorneys. One of these individuals is named Adamsermer, Police Commissioner in New York. Another individual is a person by the name of Jenner, an attorney from Chicago. The Commission was advised that both of these men are available for immediate employment. Congressman Ford stated he raised the question as to checking the backgrounds of these individuals. He was told by Rankin that both of them had very satisfactory backgrounds and belonged to no organizations inimical to the best interest of the U. S. Government.

Upon leaving Congressman Ford advised me that he will be in Michigan on a skiing vacation with his wife and children between December 22, 1963 and January 1, 1964. He stated I should call him at any time his assistance was needed.
DeLoach to Mohr

Lee Harvey Oswald

The Presidential Commission

He stated he had one problem. He wanted to take the FBI report with him yet had no way of transporting it in complete safety. I told him I felt the Director could wait him to borrow from us one of our Agent briefcases that contains a lock. He stated this would be ideal and he would appreciate loan of a briefcase very much.

ACTION:

This matter will be followed very closely. If there are no objections, will deliver an Agent briefcase containing a lock to Congressman Ford tomorrow, December 18, 1963.

Chairman Stokes. Mr. President, at the conclusion of a witness' testimony before this committee, he is entitled under our rules to 5 minutes. He may take that 5 minutes for the purpose of commenting upon his testimony or explaining it or expanding upon it in any way, and I would extend to you at this time 5 minutes for that purpose.

President Ford. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I will not take that time. I do wish to express my appreciation to you, the committee members, and the staff for their consideration. It has been a pleasure to be here. I will give my time to my former associates on the commission, John Sherman Cooper and John McCloy, who I am sure will be very helpful in expanding or improving on my observations here this morning.

I thank you very, very much.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you, Mr. President, for not only the time you have expended with our staff and Mr. Cornwell prior to your appearance here today, but taking time out of what we know is a very busy schedule to appear here and to offer the testimony we have received this morning.

As one of your former colleagues here in the House, it has been an honor to have had you here.

President Ford. Give my best to everybody.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you, we certainly will.

All persons are requested to remain in their seats for security reasons until President Ford has left the room.

Professor Blakey.

Mr. Blakey. Our next two witnesses this morning, Senator Cooper and Mr. McCloy, will be called as a panel.

Mr. McCloy received an A.B. degree from Amherst College in 1916 and an LL.B. degree from Harvard Law School in 1921. He is admitted to practice in New York and the District of Columbia. Currently he is in private practice in New York with the firm of Bilbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy.

Mr. Chairman, at this time it would be appropriate to call both Senator Cooper and Mr. McCloy.

Chairman Stokes. The committee calls both witnesses.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN SHERMAN COOPER AND JOHN J. McCLOY

Chairman Stokes. Gentlemen, would you raise your right hands. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you will give before this committee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. McCloy. I do.
Mr. Cooper. I do.
Chairman Stokes. Thank you, you may be seated.

The Chair recognizes counsel for the committee, Mr. Gary Cornwell.

Mr. Cornwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. Would you have identified for the record, counsel, the gentleman who has so ably assisted President Ford and who will be assisting these gentlemen?

Mr. Cornwell. It is Mr. Dave Belin. He was a member of the Warren Commission staff and he has been here as counsel for the President.

Mr. McCloy. He is not acting as counsel for me. I know him and have great respect for him but he is not here as my counsel.

Mr. Cornwell. Senator Cooper, I am sure that the committee will wish to explore with you whatever areas you may wish to elaborate on or that you may have any disagreement with in respect to the President’s testimony. I just have one question I would like to ask you.

You are quoted as stating in a televised broadcast recently that there were disagreements among the commission members, that, and I quote:

I think the most serious one of the ones that come to me most vividly of course, it the question of whether or not the first shot went through President Kennedy and then through Governor Connally.

Would you mind explaining to us the nature of that disagreement and how it was resolved?

Senator Cooper. If you don’t mind, may I make just a short preliminary statement?

First, I do want to thank the chairman and members of the committee for inviting the remaining members of the Warren Commission to be here. I think it has importance that we can give you our view of our work, our responsibilities, at a time 14 years before this date.

Also, I appreciate the fact that recent studies and events in the intelligence community have raised new questions which have caused you to conduct this investigation.

I would like to say that I agree wholeheartedly with the statement made by President Ford. We conducted our investigation, in the way he explained. I don’t know whether you will go into that
question with me, but we were not pressured in any way by any person or by any organization. We made our own decisions, as the President had asked us to do, and as we determined to do on the basis of what we thought was right and objective.

We knew each other. I had known every member of the commission before in some way. I cannot say we were intimate friends but we did know each other.

We did have disagreements at times in the commission and, as I have noted, I think the chief debate grew out of the question as to whether there were two shots or three shots and whether the same shot that entered President Kennedy's neck penetrated the body of Governor Connally.

The original judgment of the FBI, the Secret Service, and the CIA was that there were three shots. I don't think that convinced us except as a statement by people, many of them who were familiar with ballistics.

This question troubled me greatly. If not the first witness, one of the first witnesses, was Governor Connally of Texas. I remember very clearly this testimony. He said, "I heard a shot, I turned immediately to the right, and looked over my shoulder in the direction of the Texas School Book Depository." Later, he said, "I am familiar with firearms and I knew the shot came from that direction. I then turned back, I wanted to look at the President, over my left shoulder. In turning back, I knew I was struck by a bullet." He then fell or was pulled into the lap of his wife who was sitting to his left in the jumpseat, and he said, while lying there, he heard a shot and there fell over on him, into, I believe his hands, brain tissue, which, of course, he believed came from the President.

We heard later the testimony of ballistics experts. Some contended that because of the time element and relying to some degree upon the Zapruder films and other films, that it was not possible to turn off three shots in such a limited specified time. Others testified that certainly there was the time, that the rifle was a perfect rifle for that kind of firing, that the alignment was correct, there was a slight deviation at the end, but it was perfectly possible within the area and time space, which was I think between 5 seconds and 8 seconds.

I must say, to be very honest about it, that I held in my mind during the life of the Commission, as I have since, that there had been three shots and that a separate shot struck Governor Connally. It was determined, as shown in the report of the Commission, which I can read to you, but I know you are familiar with the report. It states there was disagreement on this issue, particularly as the subject was debated, that there were different opinions about it.

The majority believed that the same shot struck both President Kennedy and Governor Connally, but the report ended by saying, in effect, whatever was the fact, whether there was one, whether two or three shots, that it did not alter the conclusion of the Commission that Oswald was the sole assassin and there was no conspiracy.

Mr. CORNWELL. Mr. McCloy, again I am sure the committee may wish to explore with you whatever comments you may have in light of the President's testimony and which you may agree or
disagree with, but I would like to ask you about one subject matter. In an interview with our staff previously, and I hope I am quoting you substantially accurately, you expressed the view that the Commission did have enough time to reach its conclusions, but that you were greatly disturbed by the rushed composition and writing of the report.

I wonder if you would explain that to us and comment upon it, if you would.

Mr. McCloy. I will be very glad to. I would like to read a very brief statement from some notes about my general attitude toward this examination and the conclusions which we arrived at 14 years ago.

With respect to this particular question that you put to me, there was a book called I think, “Rush to Judgment,” or some such title, and I had that in mind when I received this inquiry. There was no “rush to judgment.” We came to a judgment in due course. There were some questions of style in regard to the preparation of the report where I would like to have had sort of a lawyer-like chance to make it a little more clear, from my point of view, as to what our conclusions were, but I had no question whatever about the substance of the report.

As I say, it had only been a matter of style and I had a feeling at the end we were rushing a little bit the last few days to get to print rather than to arrive at any conclusions. We had already arrived at our conclusions. It was just a matter of putting them into good form.

I may anticipate some of your questions in this very brief statement I will read from my notes here, but I would like to put one or two points before you, if I may.

You, of course, know I was appointed by President Johnson to this Commission. He called me up personally and asked me to serve, and he referred to some of my prior experience in government. I had known President Johnson before and he was aware of some earlier work I had done in the investigative field. I gathered that this was one of the reasons why he desired to have me serve. He personally enlisted, I think, all our services, and we all had a deep sense of responsibility to present to the President and to the people the facts, all the facts, relating to the assassination.

I believe that the Commission did acquit itself of that responsibility. I had a strong impression after our first meeting with the Commission, which we had early on, that each of the men—let’s put it this way, not one of the members of the Commission had any prior conceptions as to facts surrounding the assassination. As Chief Justice Warren very bluntly put it, “truth is our only goal.”

There are one or two things that I would like to say in addition to the reaffirmation of my belief that the report of the Commission does contain all the essential facts surrounding the assassination. I think it has stood well the test of time, and in short, I think it is a straightforward, objective, and reliable report of the essential circumstances of that great crime.

I don’t want to reexamine all of the evidence or defend the conclusions here. Probably, if I tried to defend them, it would take up too much time in the first place, and in the second place, it
probably wouldn't be looked upon as an objective analysis when I got through with it.

But I do wish to point out one or two things that I think have not been sufficiently stressed, as far as I can tell, in the course of this investigation. We are, in New York, handicapped by the fact we don't have any newspapers and we can't follow from day to day what has transpired down here. But I would like to attempt to put in perhaps better perspective before this committee the contributions which were made to the essential integrity and accuracy of the report by the trained and conscientious investigators who took part in making it.

And I would refer, first, to the much-maligned Dallas police force. I also refer, of course, to the FBI investigators and those of the CIA who were called on to assist, and the Secret Service and a number of other agencies. And, lastly, I would like to do justice to the Commission itself and its staff in arriving at these conclusions. These factors have not been sufficiently stressed either here, so far as I know, and indeed, in any of the commentaries I have seen over the years.

By and large, I would say that we had the benefit of very skilled and valuable investigative services in the course of reaching our conclusions.

In the course of our work, I had ample opportunity to come in contact with the people that were doing this work and I have, generally, a very favorable impression of the quality of that work. And coming back for a moment to the Dallas police force, I think it was rather remarkable the way that police force, bedeviled as they were by newspaper reporters and the press at that point and by the other pressures they were under, performed and that they should be given credit for the prompt and, in many cases, excellent police work which resulted in the very early apprehension of the assassin.

The Dallas police were responsible for the early collection of evidence which came to be of vital significance and they were also beset by all of these other agencies that were pounding around them at the time, including those of the Commission. I was rather impressed with the way they handled themselves in spite of the fact that there was a great dereliction of duty in connection with the provisions they made for the security of Oswald, resulting in his death. But my point is, in spite of that, you can't and shouldn't deny the Dallas police credit for an assiduous and, I think, prompt and efficient bit of police work.

The FBI made some mistakes and some misinterpretations, and we criticized them for the lack of full surveillance of Oswald that they probably should have undertaken before the assassination. But their work generally, I think, was of rather high order, and I don't see that, as President Ford said, the mistakes, such as I can recall them now, had any relevancy or any reflection upon the conclusions which the Commission reached.

I would refer to the staff of the Commission itself, which has already been referred to by President Ford. It is not true we didn't have our own investigative facilities. There was a very distinguished group of litigating lawyers that constituted the staff. I remember I was called upon to make suggestions as to who we
might get from my knowledge of the bar. We had a very impressive list and they did excellent work.

It is not true, as has been alleged, that we relied entirely on the agencies of the Government. Mr. Ford has brought that all out. I subscribe to what he said.

But I would also like to refer to the Commission itself. The Commission itself had considerable ability, in terms of experience in investigative procedures. Here is Judge Cooper; he was also a judge as well as a Senator. He was a county judge in Kentucky, and I am sure in connection with that position he had a great deal of experience in investigative work and in balancing judgments on evidence.

Hale Boggs, who is deceased, had a lot of investigative work in the House, certainly. I don't know that he ever held an office as a prosecuting attorney, but Senator Russell, who is also now dead, had been, as I recall, a county attorney or prosecuting attorney.

Justice Warren, himself, had been not only the former Governor of the State of California, but he had been attorney general and I think he had been a State prosecuting officer before that.

You know the experience of Allen Dulles. As for myself, I don't want to overemphasize it, but I spent 10 years of my life on a case which people have now forgotten about, but it was a rather famous case at one time. It was called the Black Tom case. It involved litigation—you probably heard of it—it had international and national prominence, at one time. It is hard to conceive of any experience that required any more exacting or more sustained investigative work than that litigation did. The outcome of it finally didn't take place until just before the beginning of World War II. It related to crimes that had been committed by the German Government in this country while we were neutral in World War I—murder, arson, explosions, and sabotage were involved. I won't go into all the details of it, but it took years of my time and experience, and I had rather extensive investigative training as a result of it.

I am simply saying that this Commission was far from a naive group. When the President asked me to take this position, he referred to my Black Tom experience. He said, you have a reputation for having some investigative experience. But he said, what I have in mind is something in the nature of the royal Commission which the British made such good use of and still do.

It was something after that pattern that he was thinking in terms of the Presidential Commission that he set up. I don't know if that throws a great deal of light on what his motivations were, but certainly he put a great deal of pressure on us in terms of the responsibility that he was putting on our shoulders. He was clearly very sensitive of how important an investigation this was.

So, I think the combination of the investigative experience, of not only the staff but of the Commission itself, was rather impressive. They weren't, as I say, naive. They had the know-how and the experience of weighing facts and evidence. It may be some of them didn't attend all the formal meetings, but the record doesn't show what work they did do outside of meetings. For example, I personally traced every step that I think that Oswald took after he committed the crime.
I sat there in the little cubbyhole he had from which he shot at the school depository; I worked and reworked the bolt of the rifle. I have had a good bit of experience with firearms and I knew a good bit about ballistics. I spent a lot of time in match shooting, using bolt-action rifles. And I tested for myself what I thought a man could do in terms of firing that particular rifle. And the contacts that we had with the various witnesses and the staff, none of which are a part of the record, are perhaps not understood. I think if you had a realization of all this work, you would find that the Commission as a whole was really most assiduous in terms of its application to its task. It didn't simply sit back and accept something that was handed to it.

Perhaps I would suggest that the sum total of the experience, of the investigative experience of the Commission far exceeded that of all the commentators that came along after the event and broke into print purporting to be experts in the matter.

We, of course, had some questions and differences of view; we talked to each other—Senator Cooper, I recall, had considerable doubt about this question of the path of the bullet which hit Connally. If I may just draw for a minute on my personal experience—perhaps I shouldn't do this—but it influenced my judgment. It was an important element in arriving at my own judgment in regard to that bullet, the so-called single bullet theory.

Twice in my life, and I am sure a number of people in this room may have had a somewhat similar experience, I stood right alongside of a man as he was shot. The first man—it was in World War I in France—was killed. The second man recovered from his wound. The circumstances of the second experience were really quite amazing. I am convinced, after my experience, that on occasion, when you are shot, you don't know the minute you are hit. There is a sort of a perceptible period following the impact before you get the full realization that you have been hit.

In the first case, it was a fellow officer in World War I. We were not far apart and he quietly said, “Jack, I think I am hit.” He shortly collapsed subsequently and died of his wound.

The other experience, which is almost unbelievable, was in Berlin when we were rehearsing for the reception of President Truman, who was going to visit us at the American headquarters in Berlin after the war. I had been, as you know, an official of the Government, Military Governor, and later High Commissioner for Germany, and Gen. Lucius Clay, my predecessor as Military Governor was with me, and we began to rehearse the ceremony because President Truman was coming along that afternoon to visit the headquarters.

We were rehearsing, for example, who would step up and first shake hands with the President, when the bugles should sound off, et cetera—“You are going to do this and you that.” There was a friend of mine who was on Clay’s staff and who later became a very distinguished jurist in Massachusetts. He became Chief Judge of the Supreme Judicial Court. His name was Cutter, and we designated him to pose as the President.

We said, “you are going to be President Truman, you are going to be the President and are to stand here.” We started through the rehearsal. This was in front of the headquarters in Berlin and, by
George, Cutter turned to me at a certain point, sort of hesitated and said, "Jack, I think I'm shot," and in a little while, he collapsed. You can imagine what a tizzy that created.

There were Secret Service people all around. Here was the man we were setting out to impersonate the President of the United States who was shot. And here again there was a very definite perceptible period following the shooting before he fully realized he was hit.

I know Governor Connally very well; I have shot quail with him and I know he's a good shot and I know he is familiar with firearms. Frankly, I don't think he knew exactly when he was hit. I saw his recent testimony—at least somebody reported to me, perhaps indirectly, that he wasn't as certain now as when he first appeared before us—before our Commission when he said he was sure it wasn't the same shot which hit President Kennedy which hit him. I don't know where that bullet could have gone if it didn't go through Governor Connally. Moreover, Governor Connally didn't know until the next day, I think it was, that he had been shot in the hand, as well as in the body.

I am suggesting that the certainty which he felt earlier isn't entirely reliable. The Germans have a word for it. They call it the "nachschlag." I believe those who had been close to places where people have been shot are frequently aware of a perceptible delay on the part of the victim in registering an awareness of the shot.

Insofar as the conspiracy issue is concerned, there has been so much talk about it that I don't think I need to dwell on it any further. I no longer feel we simply had no credible evidence or reliable evidence in proof of a conspiracy, but I rather think the weight of evidence is affirmatively against the existence of a conspiracy, though it falls short of proof.

I know how difficult, and you all know how difficult it is, to prove a negative. Somebody may pop up at some point and come forth with some affirmative testimony that would be credible when you have not been able to find it. But we weren't able to find it in spite of all our rather extensive efforts. And I think we inquired of every agency that purported to have any information about it and all of the reports which came back to us were negative.

I wouldn't know what kind of an agency could have told Oswald to stand ready in Dallas to shoot the President of the United States or at some other point when the opportunity arose. It was hard for me to concoct a conspiracy, whether with the assistance of Oswald or not, when there were so many fortuitous circumstances. Oswald clearly, in my judgment and everybody else's judgment, I think, who purports to be objective about it, was the undisputed assassin of the President of the United States, and that in a very brutal manner he indisputably killed Tippit closely following the assassination. He also had tried to kill General Walker. If Walker hadn't pulled his head back the minute of the shot, he would have been a goner, too.

Oswald, the evidence shows, was a killer and he was a loner. Having said that, my chief objective is now to try to give this committee the conviction that the Warren Commission was a rather well-equipped organization, because of its experience and because of the standing of the members, to perform its duties. This
is relative to the question as to what should be done if this situation arose again.

This is something that has been puzzling me as to what one should do, because I know the disrepute in which the findings of the Commission, our Commission, have been held. The Gallup Polls, I have been told, have shown that some 80 percent didn’t believe our report to have been thorough and reliable.

I didn’t talk this over with President Ford, but I was interested when he was asked the question. He said he thought he would do pretty much the same thing as President Johnson did. I had rather come to that conclusion myself because I have the feeling—this may be too subjective—that the Commission was a very thorough bipartisan unit, got together and hammered out an objective, reliable report. It did act in somewhat the same manner as the royal Commissions of Great Britain have done in the past. They have proven to be a rather effective form of investigating body.

I would hesitate to put legislation on the books now that would tend to set a rigid form for future investigations. I think you have to deal with the situations as they develop. I do believe that things have improved and some defects disclosed. I believe better communication between investigating agencies is apt to take place in the future, partially due to the criticism we made in our report of the prior work of the FBI in terms of surveillance, as well as in the findings of this committee. I don’t know, however, that you can today sit down and work out a piece of legislation that ought to cover all future assassination. Let’s hope that we never have a recurrence.

Suppose I just stop here and let you carry on with any other questions you may have, and I will try to answer them to the best of my ability.

Mr. Cornwell. Thank you. That answered my question and I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you, counsel. Do any other members of the committee have questions?

Mr. Sawyer, the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. Sawyer. Just more of an observation than a question. I think that the most puzzling and unsatisfactory part of the conclusions of the Warren Commission, to me, had always been the single-bullet theory. I had trouble with that. I think that the evidence that has been produced before this committee, and what I think was a superior scientific analysis by some NASA people who worked with that question, I think, at least in this committee member’s opinion, has made me a total convert to the single-bullet theory, and I think we have, to any reasonable mind, now proved that beyond a reasonable doubt.

I don’t think there was any deficiency in the Warren Commission members. I just think that there was a superior scientific analysis of it, particularly one that made use of a still picture from the opposite side of the street of Magruder which, by placement of things in a car, was able to position Mr. Connally in the car at a position laterally, considerably to the left of the President, which I had never really appreciated before. So that it was their conclusion that the bullet that went through the President’s neck could not have missed Governor Connally.
Mr. McCloy. I don't think it could have missed Connally. I think we were a little lax in the Commission in connection with the use of those X-rays. I was rather critical of Justice Warren at that time. I thought he was a little too sensitive of the sensibilities of the family. He didn't want to have put into the record some of the photographs and some of the X-rays taken at the time.

We took the testimony of course, of the doctors and probably with the X-rays—we wouldn't have been able to read the X-rays if we hadn't had the doctors' testimony. I believe later on a more thorough examination of those pictures and the X-rays and photographs with the respective positions of the President and Connally did produce a more convincing proof of where that bullet went.

As I say, I don't know where else it could have gone. I have talked with Governor Connally about it on a number of occasions, and I was very much interested to see he was a little shaken the last time he testified here. He had a conviction earlier that it was a second bullet that hit him.

Mr. Sawyer. I think we have had some evidence that would tend to bear out Governor Connally's recollection. I think there has been considerable evidence now that the first bullet missed everything, and it was the second bullet that hit the President and Governor Connally which then coincides with his testimony because he probably would not have heard the shot that hit him. But in any event, I also wanted to commend you on your conclusionary statement in the Warren Commission that there was no evidence of a conspiracy because you, as a lawyer, I am sure, appreciate about as far as you can go in proving a negative is to say that there was no evidence of the affirmative.

Mr. McCloy. That's right.

Mr. Sawyer. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Dodd.

Mr. Dodd. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Mr. McCloy and Senator Cooper, it is wonderful to see you again, particularly you, Senator Cooper. I remember meeting you on a number of occasions when you served in the Senate. It is a pleasure to see you here this morning.

Senator Cooper. Thank you. Pardon me, could you speak just a little bit louder?

Mr. Dodd. I will try and speak a little more clearly. It is nice to see you here this morning. I would like to just ask you, if I could, one question. You heard this morning the testimony of President Ford.

Senator Cooper. Yes.

Mr. Dodd. And I specifically asked him some questions with regard to a memo that was drafted by Mr. DeLoach from the FBI pursuant to a conversation.

Senator Cooper. Yes.

Mr. Dodd. That then Congressman Ford had with Mr. DeLoach.

Senator Cooper. Yes.

Mr. Dodd. At the outset of the Warren Commission hearings. President Ford, in his response to my question this morning, indicated that it was not an uncommon thing for a Member of Congress to have a relationship with the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion, have someone there you might know, talk over things with and so forth. That was the gist, as I understood it, in part anyway, of his answer to my question.

My question to you, Senator Cooper, is this: As a member of the Warren Commission and also as a Member of Congress, at the time that the Warren Commission began its work, did you have any such meetings or interviews with anyone from the Federal Bureau of Investigation or the Central Intelligence Agency which you initiated on your own to report in a confidential way the happenings of executive sessions of the Warren Commission?

Senator Cooper. First, I never initiated nor did the FBI ever initiate any conversation or correspondence with me. I met Mr. Hoover socially. I never talked to him about anything connected with his work. We just met him. I knew Mr. McCone chiefly because my wife was from California and had known him. It happened his wife was from my State, Kentucky. We saw each other socially, but never during this time or after did we ever discuss the work of the Warren Commission or the work of the CIA as it applied to the Warren Commission.

Mr. Dodd. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Cooper. I never discussed with the Secret Service during this time any of their duties or their responsibilities outside the hearings. After it was over, 2 or 3 years later, I was accompanying President Johnson to Kentucky on a trip. Mr. Youngblood of the Secret Service was in the car with us. President Johnson got out and spoke to everybody on a country road for 50 miles. Mr. Youngblood turned around and said—I was in the same car—he said, "you remember what I told you?" As he had told the Commission, it is almost impossible to protect the President who wants to see the people.

Mr. Dodd. Thank you, Senator.

Senator Cooper. I was asked this one question, and I am not going to take up your time, but in order that my first answer may not be misconstrued, would it be permissible for me to make two or three comments?

Mr. Dodd. Certainly.

Senator Cooper. First, I would like you to consider the difference in the time from 1963 to date. The FBI, at that time, was headed by Mr. Hoover who had been appointed Director continuously. He had, I would say, a good reputation. I don't think anybody ever thought about the CIA meddling in internal affairs.

The shock of the President's death called for an immediate investigation. It actually lay in the jurisdiction of Texas. There was no law that would permit the Congress to investigate. We were given that right by statute, also the right to subpoena witnesses and also to give immunity.

We never gave immunity to anyone. We provided complete protection to witnesses—right of attorney, right of record, right to cross-examine, and open hearing if they desired. Only Mr. Lane asked for an open hearing: We also had advisers sitting in with us from Texas: Mr. Jaworski, well-known today, the president of the American Bar Association; also Mr. Louis Powell, now Justice Powell of the Supreme Court, sat in at times. They took turns. And Mr. Eberstadt of New Orleans, former president of the American
Bar Association. Now, I just want to say this. As far as the killing of the late President Kennedy, we will always remember it with sadness. There is no evidence of any kind except that is directed toward Oswald: his rifle was purchased under an assumed name, but directed to his post office box; the cartridge shells which were down on the floor; the tests which showed that this was the only rifle which had the markings which were shown on the bullets; the fact that a man was seen by several witnesses, not identified, but seen in the window with the general description of what he looked like; his flight immediately; the fact that within a few minutes it was radioed that the killer perhaps came from the Texas Book Depository and radio cars were circling the city.

That is the reason Tippit was circling the city; the fact Tippit was killed and his killing witnessed by several witnesses brought Oswald to the Texas police offices. The police had already found the cartridges and the rifles and the bag in the Texas School Depository and within a half an hour, those facts were known.

Now, people have said that somebody told them that they saw somebody on the railroad bank or saw somebody going over the bank, but no one has ever been able to show any cartridges, any rifle, any pistol, no one has ever found anything other than the evidence about Oswald.

I would like that to be known; these facts are in the summary which I think is a very good one. The intelligence investigation under the leadership of Senator Church, which I know has helped cause this investigation by you, points out that the agencies did not disclose certain facts to us and that certain plots were going on. At the time we were in session, they should have been disclosed to us. They were not disclosed to us. We knew nothing about them.

There was no testimony of conspiracy—Oswald’s efforts to get in touch with the Soviets and with the Cuban Fair Play groups in New York were rebuffed, rebuffed at every step—I think he felt he was a failure and for the United States and for President Kennedy and all of us. He knew he was a failure at everything he tried, frustrated, with a very sad life, but he was a Marxist. Very curious, at the age of about 13 years, he began to study Marxism and he kept on in his writing, affirming that he was a Marxist.

Probably he did want to show himself as a great, supreme Marxist. Rather, like the anarchists of the last century, he didn’t care if he was killed or not. They just wanted to be known.

We found no trace of any conspiracy. Our staff not only received the reports from these agencies, they examined them. They questioned them. They went to the files of the FBI and CIA to see if there were any informants, if Oswald was an informant. They did a thorough job and I join with President Ford and Mr. McCloy in praising them. But they did not disclose to us all the facts.

I wanted to make this statement to make it clear that I concur wholly in what President Ford and Mr. McCloy have said, that we did our best. We found what we could at that time—the truth. If somebody else can find something else which we didn’t find, that, of course, is a duty on their part, as is the truth. It will be the truth.

I do make this final statement. I don’t think many people have ever read the report. Who has read 26 volumes of this case? How
many read the summary? If you read the summary, it takes a long time. Everything is in there and one of the reasons I know few people have read the summary is, there are some very interesting little side stories in it, that newspapermen and others would have published.

For example—and I will quit—the press dodger that was put out on the streets in Dallas. In this summary, it shows that that author just before he was discharged from the Army in Munich, he and a comrade demanded to go back to Dallas; they were trying to figure out ways they could make the quickest, and they said, we will go back to Dallas and we will infiltrate the John Birch and YAF and that's what they did.

I just have talked too long, but I congratulate you on the efforts you are making. I am very proud to come back, to speak on the disinterested effort we have made and I believe that, with all due respect, that the decisions we made, when we turned our final report over to President Johnson, will stand in history.

Mr. Dodd. Thank you very much, Senator, for your statement.

Mr. McCloy, if I can I would like to just address the very same question I did to Senator Cooper, the first initial question I had for him, the same one I had in the light of the questioning, that I followed this morning with President Ford, and that is whether or not you, as a member of the Commission, at any time, whether during the organizational meetings of the Warren Commission or any time after that, initiated any contact on your own in a confidential manner to report or confide in those agencies with regard to the happenings of the Warren Commission?

Mr. McCloy. No, I had no such contact. I saw their agents and talked to them but I initiated no contact with them whatever.

Mr. Dodd. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. Time has expired.

Any more members seeking recognition?

Mr. McCloy. May I make one addition to the record. I don't like to let that Berlin situation stand without pointing out the reason that Mr. Cutter was shot was because a major was cleaning his pistol three or four blocks from where this took place and the bullet came in and hit this man that was posing as President of the United States, and everything quieted down after that. But it was an extraordinary circumstance.

Chairman Stokes. Gentlemen, Mr. McCloy and Senator Cooper, on behalf of the committee, I want to thank both of you for having appeared here today and taken the time to give us the benefit of your observations with reference to the service you rendered while members of this very distinguished panel of Americans, and you certainly have been very helpful to this committee, and we also appreciate the time you have expended with our staff, and at this time, does counsel have something further?

Mr. Cornwell. Before we adjourn, it might be a good idea to make a matter of record JFK exhibits F-476 and F-477, a chart of the Warren Commission and a photographic blowup of the Warren Commission members that have been displayed during the testimony of the last three witnesses, and perhaps we could enter them into the record at this time?
Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the record at this time.

[The above referred to JFK exhibits F-476 and F-477 follow:]

THE WARREN COMMISSION

Richard B. RUSSELL
John Sherman COOPER
Hale BOGGS
Earl WARREN
Gerald FORD
Allen W. DULLES
John J. McCLOY

J. Lee RANKIN
Norman REDLICH
Melvin A. EISENBERG
Howard P. WILLENS
Alfred GOLDBERG
Charles N. SHAFFER, Jr.

WARREN
FORD DULLES McCLOY	I
J Lee RANKIN
Norman REDLICH
Melvin A. EISENBERG
Howard P. WILLENS
Alfred GOLDBERG
Charles N. SHAFFER, Jr.

I. Basic Facts of Assassination
II. Identity of Assassin
III. LHO's Background
IV. Possible Conspiratorial Relationships
V. Oswald's Death
VI. Presidential Protection

Francis W.H. ADAMS
Joseph BALL
Albert JENNER
William COLEMAN
Leon HUBERT

Arlen SPECTER
David BELIN
Wesley LIEBELLER
W. David SLAWSON
Burt GRIFIN
Samuel A. STERN

LIAISONS
Jim Davis - assigned from State Dept. to consult with WC about approaching USSR
Ted Sorensen - White House
Adam Yarmolinsky - Defense Department
James J. Malley - FBI

Thomas Kelley - Secret Service
Abram Chayes - State Department
H. Miller - Justice Department
R. Helms - CIA

JFK EXHIBIT F-476

JFK EXHIBIT F-477

So again we thank you very much for having appeared, and you are now excused.

Mr. McCloy. Thank you very much.
Senator COOPER. Thank you.
Chairman Stokes. At this time the committee will stand in recess until 1 p.m., in the afternoon.
[Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the committee was recessed, to reconvene at 1 p.m. of the same day.]

**Afternoon Session**

Chairman Stokes. The committee will come to order.
The Chair recognizes Professor Blakey.
Mr. Blakey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The next witness to be called this afternoon is J. Lee Rankin.
Mr. Rankin served as General Counsel to the Warren Commission.
He received an A.B. degree in 1928, and LL.B. degree in 1930, from the University of Nebraska. He is admitted to practice in New York, Nebraska, and the District of Columbia.
Mr. Rankin served from 1953 to 1956 as an Assistant Attorney General of the United States Department of Justice, in charge of the Office of Legal Counsel, and from 1956 to 1961 as the Solicitor General of the United States.
After serving as General Counsel to the Warren Commission, he became the corporation counsel for the city of New York from 1966 to 1972. Currently he is in private practice in New York with the firm of Rankin and Rankin.
It would be appropriate at this time, Mr. Chairman, to call Mr. Rankin.
Chairman Stokes. The committee calls Mr. Rankin.
Please raise your right hand to be sworn. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you will give before this committee is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Thank you, you may be seated.
The Chair recognizes counsel for the committee, Mr. Klein.
Mr. Klein. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Sir, could you please state your full name for the record?

**TESTIMONY OF J. LEE RANKIN, FORMER GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE WARREN COMMISSION**

Mr. Rankin. My full name is James Lee Rankin.
Mr. Klein. Mr. Rankin, what was your position with the Warren Commission?
Mr. Rankin. I was General Counsel.
Mr. Klein. And could you give us an idea of what your duties were as General Counsel?
Mr. Rankin. I had the executive responsibilities for the staff working under the Commission.
Mr. Klein. Were you in charge of the day-to-day operations of the Warren Commission staff?
Mr. Rankin. Yes, I was.
Mr. Klein. How did it come about that you became General Counsel for the Commission?
Mr. Rankin. I was called by Chief Justice Warren and asked whether I would be willing to serve as General Counsel for the Commission and I told him I would have to call him back, and I finally said I would but probably the rest of the Commissioners
would not want me and he had better find out whether they wish me to be General Counsel.

He said he had already found out before he asked me and they were unanimous about my being the General Counsel.

I then came down and was sworn in as Counsel.

Mr. Klein. Was there any discussion at that time about the goals of the Commission?

Mr. Rankin. The only discussion was that we were to try to find out who the assassin was and whether there was anyone else involved in it beyond the person whom we found to be the one who committed the act.

Mr. Klein. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would ask that the chart already up, marked JFK F-476 be received as a committee exhibit.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be received.

[The above referred to JFK exhibit F-476 was entered previously.]

Mr. Klein. Looking at that chart, which is on the extreme left, Mr. Rankin, it is entitled “The Warren Commission”, is that an accurate representation of the personnel who worked for the Warren Commission?

Mr. Rankin. Yes, it is. It does not include all of the personnel, of course, but does set forth the upper layers of it, and the Commissioners.

Mr. Klein. Could you tell us how the investigation itself was organized?

Mr. Rankin. I proposed an investigation that would consist of five parts and went to the Chairman, the Chief Justice, and the Commissioners with that proposal, and it was accepted and that is the way we proceeded. They are all described on the chart there.

Mr. Klein. How did you determine what the five parts it would be organized into would be?

Mr. Rankin. Well, it seemed to be a logical division of the responsibilities of trying to discharge our requirements under the executive order of the President.

Mr. Klein. Do you recall at this time what the five areas were?

Mr. Rankin. Well, I wouldn’t wish to miss any of them. If you have them, if you will just recite them, I can tell you whether they are correct or not.

Mr. Klein. The facts of the assassination, the identity of the assassin, the background of Lee Harvey Oswald, conspiracy, investigation and death of Lee Harvey Oswald. Are those the five areas?

Mr. Rankin. That is correct.

Mr. Klein. How many lawyers were assigned to each of these areas?

Mr. Rankin. There were two on each of the areas.

Mr. Klein. Would it be fair to say the the Federal Bureau of Investigation did most of the investigation for the Warren Commission?

Mr. Rankin. Well, that would be accurate as to the proportions, if you mean by most, percentage-wise, but we used all of the intelligence agencies of the Government before we got through and sometimes we used one intelligence agency on matters that we were not satisfied concerning and which were worked upon by
another intelligence agency. Oftentimes we wanted a doublecheck or felt that there were some inaccuracies or we were not completely satisfied, and asked some other agency that had no apparent relationship to check on the matter for us.

Mr. Klein. Whose decision was it to use Federal agencies as opposed to hiring investigators?

Mr. Rankin. That was a decision of the Commission, although I recommended that kind of a procedure because I described various possibilities of getting outside investigators and that it might take a long period of time to accumulate them, find out what their expertise was, and whether they could qualify to handle sensitive information in the Government, and it might be a very long time before we could even get a staff going that could work on the matter, let alone have any progress on it.

Mr. Klein. In 1964, at the conclusion of the investigation, what was your opinion of the performance of the Federal Bureau of Investigation?

Mr. Rankin. Well, as to their cooperation with us, I thought it was good. We were critical about some of the things that happened about alerting the Secret Service, about information that they knew about and we learned they had not informed the Secret Service about. That was all in the report.

But as far as not being frank and open with us and revealing what information they had, we assumed that they did that. I did, at least, and I think the Commission did.

Mr. Klein. You have partially anticipated my next question, which is, today, 1978, with what you learned over the course of the years, what is your opinion with respect to the performance of the Federal Bureau of Investigation?

Mr. Rankin. Well, I have been very much disappointed with some of the things that have been revealed and I have, of course, no personal knowledge about those matters. I have just read them in the press from the reports of investigations by the Senate committee and others, but I had a close relationship with J. Edgar Hoover while I was in the Department of Justice and it was always friendly, but also professional, and I thought good. I never believed that he would withhold information or have it withheld from anybody like the Commission or that the FBI would do that.

It seemed to me from my experiences that they were more professional than to do anything of that character. When I learned that they were supposed to have known about plans for an assassination that were underway in the CIA, according to the investigation of the Senate committee, and did not report it to us, and that we didn’t receive any such information from the CIA, it was quite disheartening to me to know that that kind of conduct was a part of the action of our intelligence agencies at that high level.

Mr. Klein. I only asked the question as applying to the FBI, but your answer applies to the CIA and the FBI; is that correct?

Mr. Rankin. I think it was our experience as it is revealed by investigation on the Senate committee. With the CIA it is worse than with the FBI because the FBI apparently did not originate the assassination plans and apparently the CIA did. So the FBI only happened on to them or were informed about such plans and then did not convey them to us.
But the CIA, they were apparently involved in them and did not alert us to the situation at all, give us any opportunity to take the action that we should have had the chance to, of investigating that type of information.

Mr. Klein. As General Counsel of the Warren Commission, you had no knowledge whatsoever of the assassination plots against Fidel Castro?

Mr. Rankin. That is true, I did not.

Mr. Klein. What were some of the pressures, the political pressures, time pressures, that were exerted upon the Warren Commission staff?

Mr. Rankin. We had pressures from the beginning on the time element because the country was anxious to know what had happened and whether there was any conspiracy involved. I was assured by the Chief Justice that it would only take me 2 or 3 months at the outside in this job and that is all the time I would be away from my law practice, and, of course, I wished to get the job done correctly and properly, but also to get back to my other work. On the other hand, the first meeting we had with the staff, I told them that our only client was the truth and that was what we must search for and try to reveal. I think we adhered to that, that we never departed from that standard, any of the Commission or myself or the staff. We tried as conscientiously as possible to convey the information explicitly that we discovered.

Mr. Klein. The report, the final report was completed in September of 1964. Was there any pressure to get that report out before the election in November?

Mr. Rankin. I didn't think there was any pressure. There was an expression by some members of the Commission that it would be better if the problem of the assassination and whether any conspiracy was involved and what had happened, who the assassin was, as the Commission found, if all of those questions were not injected into the various political conventions, but there was no indication at any time that we should try to get the report out for any such purpose and not adequately make a report or investigate whatever sources we were able to find.

Mr. Klein. Were there any pressures exerted not to find a foreign conspiracy because of the dire consequences that such a conspiracy might have for war or peace?

Mr. Rankin. None at all. There was a conscientious effort throughout to try to discover anything that would reveal that there was a conspiratorial action about the assassination of the President.

Mr. Klein. On that question of a possible conspiracy, the Commission has been criticized over the years for not devoting enough time, effort, and resources to investigating the question of whether there was a conspiracy to assassinate the President. Would you tell us first, do you believe that the Commission did devote adequate time and resources to that question, and second, would you give us an idea of how the Commission went about investigating whether there was a conspiracy?

Mr. Rankin. Well, I think that they did an adequate job in that regard. The problem of what could be discovered concerning whatever happened in the Soviet Union and whether there was any
involvement there was necessarily a very difficult matter because of the closed nature of their society. Our opportunity, even with the best penetration that we were able to learn of by our own intelligence people, to reach within that society and discover material that could be relied on, was quite sparse to say the least.

We, within the domestic community, made great efforts, and we followed out as far as we thought there was any reason to believe that there was a possibility of any Cuban involvement. If we had had the information from the CIA, we certainly would have run out those leads and tried to find out whatever we could in that area, but we were not given the advantage of that.

Mr. Klein. The Commission has received a good deal of criticism to the effect that in some areas in the final report the evidence was not strong enough to support the conclusions reached in that report; and that some staff members immediately prior to the issuance of the report stated that in certain areas they felt the evidence was not strong enough to support the conclusions.

What would be your position in reply to this criticism?

Mr. Rankin. I do not think it is a valid criticism. I examined, I think, every word of the report before it was printed and I constantly tried to understate rather than overstate the findings, the position of the Commission on all of the various matters that it acted upon and reported upon.

These positions were carefully reviewed by the Commissioners, in fact by each one of them, and they argued them, and the staff presented such materials they had and the Commissioners examined it. They participated in hearings and it was their disposition, so expressed, that the report not overstate what the Commission found and the evidence that would support it.

Mr. Klein. In connection with this issue of whether the report overstated the evidence, I would like to read you a portion from a deposition of Mr. David Slawson, one of your staff counsel he made the statement in 1978, when he was deposed by this committee.

I stand corrected, it was at an executive hearing before this committee, that he made this statement. He said, "I think because Earl Warren was adamant almost that the Commission would make up its mind on what it thought was the truth, and then they would state it as much without qualification as they could, he wanted to lay at rest doubts.

"He made no secret of this on the staff. It was consistent with his philosophy as a judge."

Do you agree with this statement by Mr. Slawson?

Mr. Rankin. No, I don't. That was not in character with the Chief Justice in my experience with him. He was explicit that he thought we should not spare any effort in trying to find out the answer to the question whether or not there was any other involvement than Oswald in the assassination. But with regard to what we should say about it, or report about it, he was always very vehement and expressive that we should tell it exactly as it was.

Mr. Klein. As you sit here today, do still believe the conclusions of the Warren Commission to be correct?

Mr. Rankin. I do.

Mr. Klein. In retrospect, what, if anything, would have been done differently in the Warren Commission's investigation?
Mr. Rankin. As I have said, if we had the information from the CIA and FBI, that they failed to give us, certainly those leads should have been followed out to discover whether or not there was anything of a conspiratorial nature involved. I assume that this committee has been doing that and that if you had anything of that kind we would know it by now, one way or the other.

But otherwise it has been suggested we could have taken a longer time. Of course, you could go on and on for years on anything of that kind. But I think there are reasonable limits and the Congress, I am sure, recognize that. I think the American people do. They realize that you can’t spend forever on matters of that kind and there is a limit to the amount of money that the people would want to spend, all within reasonable limits, I think.

We never had any difficulty on problems about money. We were assured that by the President. Our expenses were paid out of the Presidential funds. We received any money we needed, and we were never at any time told that we were to limit ourselves in that regard. Nevertheless, we would certainly not have wanted a staff just staying on and on nitpicking at a lot of little things that didn’t have apparently any prospect of success.

Mr. Klein. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you. You say you have no further questions?

Mr. Klein. No.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you, counsel.

The procedure at this point will be the Chair will recognize the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Sawyer, for such time as he may consume, after which we will go to the 5-minute rule.

Mr. Sawyer. Counsel, Mr. Rankin, has the fact that the Warren Commission report, according to all polls, received so much poor acceptance by the American people, given you any pause to reflect on whether you went about it correctly or not?

Mr. Rankin. Not really. You know, as a part of my job as General Counsel, I researched all of the assassinations and a number in regard to other countries, and went into the materials that were available about the assassination of President Lincoln. I discovered that there was a large body of opinion that didn’t believe any of the findings about Lincoln’s assassination, and about other people that had been assassinated. Apparently that is the lot of anybody that works in this kind of a field.

Mr. Sawyer. Did you make any effort either as a staff or, to your knowledge, as a Commission, to determine just where Oswald was going at the time he was intercepted by Officer Tippit?

Mr. Rankin. We speculated on it but speculations aren’t worth much.

Mr. Sawyer. Did you come to any reasonable hypothesis as to where he was going?

Mr. Rankin. We all agreed that he was on his way to try to escape but where we didn’t know, and everything from that point on was just one person’s guess against another’s.

Mr. Sawyer. Of course, I presume you were aware that the direction in which he was heading at the time that he was con-
fronted by Tippit kind of led to nowhere with respect to either escape routes or anything, just out in the neighborhood?

Mr. RANKIN. We didn't think that was really the complete answer because at that point he was very hardpressed and we thought he was more in the posture of just running.

Mr. SAWYER. Well, did you find out that Jack Ruby's apartment was about two or three blocks up the street, also on the direct route he was going?

Mr. RANKIN. Yes.

Mr. SAWYER. Did you also find out that in the Dallas newspaper announcement of the President's visit, that on the same page was the identity of an informant who had substantially destroyed the Communist Party in Texas by informing to the FBI and he was identified as living just about two blocks up the street, also on the direct route he was going?

Mr. RANKIN. I don't recall that I was aware of that.

Mr. SAWYER. But other than just the fact that on this some 14½ or 15 minute walk he had taken through a neighborhood after leaving his roominghouse, other than just running or escaping, you had formed no hypothesis on where he may have been going or what his intent may have been?

Mr. RANKIN. That is true, we did not.

Mr. SAWYER. With respect to—As you are undoubtedly aware, much of the criticism of the Warren Commission report and much of the basis of the various critics who have written extensively on the subject has been centered about one thing, principally the single bullet theory and the fact that available time did not permit one assassin. You made a decision or you and the Commission not to allow access to the autopsy information. Are you still satisfied with that decision as being a sound one?

Mr. RANKIN. Yes, I am. I think it has been revealed, that the basis of the decision was that the Kennedy family did not wish to have the pictures of the President, as shown by the X-rays and the other pictures after the assassination attempt, be the way that the American people and the world would remember the dead President. We thought we had good evidence from the doctors who were involved at the hospital in Dallas and also at the autopsy, and we did not want the President's memory to be presented in that manner, and we had already promised the American people that the investigation that everything that we obtained, except for such matters as involved national security, would be made available to them, so we would have had to publish it, if we used it ourselves.

In light of that, I think the choice that was made was correct and I don't think it has done any harm. I still would hate to have published throughout the world those pictures as a remembrance of our President.

Mr. SAWYER. On the other hand, Mr. Rankin, this committee staff and the committee made all of that original material available to a panel of pathologists, but we did not feel any necessity to make the pictures themselves public. To the extent they were relevant we had drawings made from the original and produced them and were able, I feel, to have totally laid at rest the one bullet theory, because of the ability to determine the points of entry of wounds and exits to be able to project back from those
wounds to locations from which firings occurred, and I don't think we were in any way compelled to or did do anything either distasteful or shocking at all as far as our public exhibitions of the situation were concerned.

Mr. Rankin. As far as I know, you haven't promised the American people that you would give them everything that you have received. Maybe you have, I am not aware of it, but we had, the Commission had. The Commission would not have been willing to cover up anything or withhold anything after such a promise.

Mr. Sawyer. Well, do you feel then that you may have made an error in promising to make all original material available, or do you feel you may have made an error in not making the material available to pathologists?

Mr. Rankin. No, I don't think either one was an error. I think if we hadn't promised the people and done what we did about giving them everything that we, the Commission examined, that was not involved in national security, the Commission's work would have had little credence with the people. I also think that once having done that the Commission couldn't say, well, we did everything but this and this and this and that we aren't going to give you—

Mr. Sawyer. In other words, then, if I understand you, because you made this commitment and didn't feel like this was material you wanted to make public for taste reasons or feeling reasons, you just didn't even look at it then, you let this promise govern your investigation?

Mr. Rankin. There was another factor that it was merely additional evidence, that is cumulative. The evidence of the doctors was equally good as far as the law goes and was of first quality, so that it wasn't as though we were without evidence.

Mr. Sawyer. Based on the testimony of those doctors and the evidence developed, they were, for example, like 4 inches off on the point of entry of the head wound, which, of course, projected, would be a horrendous error.

Mr. Rankin. I don't know that. I have heard that your staff discovered that and that Dr. Humes has admitted that he was that much off. At the time it was, and since, until I heard that, it was difficult to imagine that a man conducting an autopsy could make that kind of a mistake when he was observing the body that he was examining, and so forth.

Mr. Sawyer. Well, now that you have heard that, are you still satisfied with the decision not to even allow access to the X-rays and autopsy original data?

Mr. Rankin. I think I would not allow access if you combined with that the obligation to publish the X-rays as they are, because I think that, with the importance of President Kennedy to the people of this country, and to the world, and as an American public leader, I think that is very valuable even today.

Mr. Sawyer. Would you have taken that position vis-a-vis any relevant information that if you decided that either because of embarrassment or damage it might do to the FBI or the CIA or international relations, or whatever, that because of this self-imposed obligation to publish in general, you just then followed the proposition of not even looking at it?

Mr. Rankin. No, and I think our work shows that we did not.
Mr. Sawyer. Are you still happy with your decision to use the FBI as your sole investigative source?

Mr. Rankin. Well, that does not meet my, does not conform to my testimony, in my opinion. I thought I—I tried to make it plain that we used all of the intelligence agencies of the Government and we used Secret Service and others, including Military Intelligence, to check back on the FBI from time to time.

We also had a couple of investigators who were not important in the whole scheme of things. They could not do enough. But we had many files of investigations that the FBI made and if we had had a force to equal the number of man hours that we used the FBI, Secret Service, Military Intelligence, the cryptology people and all the others that we used in the Government, there would have been many thousands, and I think it would have been impossible and we would not have gotten out a report for years.

Mr. Sawyer. But as you probably know now, information was withheld by the FBI with respect to the so-called Hosty note from Oswald threatening to burn down a police station, or allegedly so.

Mr. Rankin. Yes, but Congressman, if you look back at that period we, all of us, did not believe the FBI was capable of that kind of conduct, at least I did not, and none of the commissioners did. And I think all of our ideas about what people in government are capable of and do has changed, but back then we did not think they would do such things.

Mr. Sawyer. Did you ever receive any advice from the FBI about the 17 agents that were subjected to administrative discipline because of their mishandling of the pre-assassination information about Ruby—not Ruby, Oswald?

Mr. Rankin. I think that is very shocking too. I think we were entitled to that information and a frank disclosure by Mr. Hoover that he felt they should be disciplined and why, and that we should have been able to go into that and try to discover whether it had any effect on our work.

Mr. Sawyer. I assume you feel the same way about the CIA's nondisclosure of alleged assassination plots that they may have participated in, vis-a-vis Castro.

Mr. Rankin. I do.

Mr. Sawyer. I am interested in the fact that you had received advice that Yuri Nosenko, a KGB officer who had defected, was available and willing to testify, had you not, before the Warren Commission.

Mr. Rankin. Yes, I had.

Mr. Sawyer. And that he professed to have first-hand knowledge of Oswald's activity in Russia during the period that Oswald was in Russia.

Mr. Rankin. Congressman, you did not include in your statement, as I understood it, that the CIA had told us that he was a fake and not a real KGB officer and that he was probably just planted on us. That was the information we got from the CIA about him, and it was in light of that that we did not call him because we thought, the Commission thought, they would just be the dupes of such a plan, if that was true.

Now, we certainly did not have the expertise, even with Allen Dulles on the Commission, to be able to judge whether a man was
truly a KGB agent or a plant. They, as the people in government skilled in that work ought to know such things. They spent a lifetime at that work, told us so that we felt, the Commission felt that there was no purpose to examine him after such advice and they did not want to be used to assist in the distribution of any information that the KGB; or anybody else; would be interested in having distributed to the American people through the Commission by somebody that was making a dupe of them.

Mr. SAWYER. Well, did you opt to have the man at least interviewed by one of the staff to form a judgment yourselves?

Mr. RANKIN. No. I had nobody on the staff and I had no Commissioner with such expertise. I do not think Allen Dulles could have done it; or could have had the skill, the expertise to make that kind of a judgment? Our information was that the CIA put a group to work on Nosenko to try to examine all of his background and find out whether he had enough knowledge of various events and matters within the Soviet picture to be a true KGB agent. We were led to believe, at least I was—it was my belief that these people had sufficient knowledge and the skill that was required so as to determine anything of that kind.

Mr. SAWYER. So that, then, because of the doubt cast on his veracity by the CIA, you opted not to even have the staff talk to him or even check what he had to say, is that right?

Mr. RANKIN. No; they were not telling us his veracity—whether he was truthful or not, except insofar as he was representing that he was a KGB agent. They were telling us that he was not a real agent and that seemed to me very important with regard to what he might have to say about the matter.

Mr. SAWYER. You are aware that the CIA has now reversed themselves totally on that position, I assume.

Mr. RANKIN. Yes; but I am shocked by the way they arrive at that conclusion and the procedures they apparently went through as I observed from some of your TV programs.

Mr. SAWYER. Are you satisfied with the decision of the Commission to hold all executive session hearings rather than public hearings? Do you think that may have contributed to the lack of acceptance of the report?

Mr. RANKIN. We had one open hearing.

Mr. SAWYER. That was because Mark Lane demanded—

Mr. RANKIN. That was Mark Lane, and I think you had similar experiences—

Mr. SAWYER. Who would naturally demand a public hearing, right?

Mr. RANKIN. I do not think it helped with your hearing, although I think you handled it well in regards to some of the problems developed.

Mr. SAWYER. As some people who watched it said that Mr. Lane had done for the legal profession what the Boston Strangler did for the door-to-door salesman.

Mr. RANKIN. We had no indication by the public that they were unhappy with our failure to have more open hearings. I cannot answer the question about whether it would have helped. But I have been impressed with this committee’s open hearings. They seem to have gone well and the reaction I have heard from various
people to some of the evidence has been impressive; they have been convinced by some of it.

Of course, they were not convinced by all of it; but you cannot expect that.

Mr. Sawyer. Another thing that I was interested in was that in the conference or interview or interrogation, whichever, that President Ford and the Chief Justice and some staff members had with Mr. Ruby while he was incarcerated in Dallas, he said, according to the transcript, substantially that he would like to tell the whole truth but he cannot tell them the whole truth while he is in Dallas, and if they would transport him to Washington, he would tell the whole truth.

Was any follow-up ever done on that at all by the staff or otherwise?

Mr. Rankin. No, there was not. We were all convinced that Ruby was interested in a trip to Washington rather than how much he could enlighten the Commission. It seemed quite apparent when you observed him and his approach to the whole suggestion.

Mr. Sawyer. Were you there at the time?

Mr. Rankin. Yes.

Mr. Sawyer. Is that the impression you got individually?

Mr. Rankin. Yes, I thought that he was quite enamored with the idea of coming to Washington and he even wanted to see the President. It was easy to imagine what that would all develop into if you got started on it.

Mr. Sawyer. There were no followup attempts, though, to try to elucidate that situation?

Mr. Rankin. No, there were not.

Mr. Sawyer. Was any check ever made or any check requested by the Commission to have the possible organized crime participation of this situation investigated?

Mr. Rankin. Well, we did the checking that is revealed by our report and appendices in that regard. We did not find enough possible connections to go beyond what we did. When I heard about some of the information that the Senate committee had developed about plans for the use of personalities from organized crime in connection with the proposed Castro assassination, or efforts or plans, or whatever you want to call that activity, it did disturb me some as to that aspect. I said to some of your staff, "I assume they were following up on that, and are running that out," to be sure they investigated out to the end of it.

Mr. Sawyer. The FBI liaison officer who appeared before this committee and who was acting as the sort of sole or principal liaison between the FBI and the Commission said that they had never involved or were never asked to or ever did involve their organized crime section of the FBI in the matter. Is that consistent with your recollection of it?

Mr. Rankin. That is, yes.

Mr. Sawyer. So, you did not have access what electronic surveillance may have been available in that section that may have related to their interest in doing away with President Kennedy; am I correct on that?

Mr. Rankin. That is correct.
Mr. Sawyer. Thank you very much. I have nothing further, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Rankin, it appears to me that there are two things that the Commission was looking for and could find neither. One was a motive for Lee Harvey Oswald to commit the crime and the second was the question of whether there was or was not a conspiracy. Would that be true, the Commission was trying to ascertain the facts of those two things?

Mr. Rankin. It is true, they were. I felt they did find an answer to the first one you described. They felt there was no motive beyond Oswald's own ambition for notoriety and position and so forth that was gone into at some length in the report.

Chairman Stokes. Let me ask you this: Whatever his activities were in Soviet Russia, do you think that it is possible that that could have provided some insight into motivation by way of background?

Mr. Rankin. I do not think so beyond what we presented. Now, I am quite aware, as I think the report shows, that we only said that we were unable to discover any such information about conspiracy or conspiratorial activity. What else he might have done that we never could get any information about in our efforts through the State Department or CIA or anyone else, is just a matter of speculation.

Chairman Stokes. It would seem that in that area, that is where Yuri Nosenko would have been very important to the Commission in terms of what he was able to tell the CIA about Oswald while he was in Soviet Russia, would it not?

Mr. Rankin. Well, if they got anything from him. When they reported to us, they did not report that they got any word about his associations with Oswald or knowledge about Oswald or anything like that.

Chairman Stokes. Do I understand from what you are saying that—I think we are talking about the CIA, are we not?

Mr. Rankin. Yes.

Chairman Stokes. Tell us what they did tell you that Nosenko told them about Oswald in Russia.

Mr. Rankin. They were satisfied he was not a KGB officer. They felt that he was a plant, that he was sent in for some purpose, but they did not know what it was, to try to participate. They said they felt he was not believable about anything that he would claim about Oswald or knowledge about him.

Chairman Stokes. And that he was not himself a bona fide defector then, I suppose.

Mr. Rankin. That is what they said.

Chairman Stokes. Did they tell you though what he had told them that he knew about Oswald?

Mr. Rankin. They did not go into any detail about what he said. They said that he just wasn't believable.

Chairman Stokes. When you say they, can you tell us specifically whom you are talking about at CIA?

Mr. Rankin. Well, I cannot remember the names now. It seemed to me, though, looking back on it, that it was their specialist in
Soviet matters and I think they had, my recollection is, they had a number of them and it wasn't just one man; it was teamwork of some kind.

Chairman Stokes. Did you ever have any conversation with Richard Helms about Nosenko?

Mr. Rankin. My recollection is he supported that position, that there was no purpose in trying to have Nosenko before the Commission or to inquire what he knew because he was not believable.

Chairman Stokes. Did anyone ever tell you Nosenko had said that while he was in Soviet Russia that two suitcases full of documents on Oswald were flown up from Minsk to the Russian capital immediately after the assassination? Did they ever tell you that?

Mr. Rankin. I do not remember anything like that.

Chairman Stokes. Probabilities are that if you were told something about that you would recall.

Mr. Rankin. Yes; because it is quite impressive. You would want to see what was in those suitcases if you had heard, I am sure.

Chairman Stokes. That is correct. That is part of the information Nosenko has given this committee. I have no further questions. The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Preyer.

Mr. Preyer. I have just a couple of questions, Mr. Chairman, relating to the problems that might have been created by using the FBI as your major investigative arm.

Early on in the work of the Commission, I believe it did come to your attention, allegations came to our attention that Lee Harvey Oswald might have been an FBI agent; is that right?

Mr. Rankin. That is correct.

Mr. Preyer. How were you able to investigate the truth or falsity of that charge? What did you do to investigate it?

Mr. Rankin. When that information came to my attention and then to the Commission's, we were very much shocked about it and the Commission had deliberations in which they tried to determine what was the best approach to try to find out the fact. They decided that we should make direct inquiries to J. Edgar Hoover.

The problem was not, as I recall it, whether Oswald was ever listed as an agent in their records because, as I recall, we checked that out and he was not. My recollection is that the question involved whether he might have been a numbered personality that the FBI had where the name of the individual is not revealed and thus has a cover, and it could be concealed. We examined the possibility that we could try to go into their records and examine every person, identify every person who had a number and we were assured that involved a large number of personalities.

The FBI was greatly disturbed about the idea of taking the cover off of all those agents that they had established over a long term of years and revealing their names to all of the staff as well as the Commissioners. I couldn't assure that their identity would not become known in that kind of a process.

So, the Commission finally determined that they would accept J. Edgar Hoover's personal assurance by affidavit that Oswald had never been an informer or agent of the FBI, and that was given.

Mr. Preyer. But you were somewhat in the position of asking the FBI to investigate itself or going to the innkeeper to ask whether the wine was good or not.
Mr. Rankin. Well, back at that time, Congressman, that did not seem so impossible as it might today.

Mr. Preyer. Yes; I think your answer to an earlier question has demonstrated a certain fall from innocence that we have all had since that time. Things are now believable which we would not have thought believable at that time.

Mr. Rankin. That is correct.

Mr. Preyer. The threshold of this belief has gone up quite a bit.

Let me ask you one other thing. The FBI reached a conclusion in their report that was made 17 days after the assassination that Lee Harvey Oswald was the lone assassin. Don't you think that would have had some chilling effect, would have dampened the incentive of FBI agents in following out the question of a conspiracy where his organization had already declared itself to the effect that there was no conspiracy?

Mr. Rankin. I think that is true but we always assumed that. We started out knowing the FBI had already decided who the assassin was and that no one else was involved, and we knew that was the agency position. It was very evident. But we did not rely on anything like that. We sought detailed evidence and if we didn't get the evidence we asked for, we sent back time after time to get it.

We treated their report in which they promptly found Oswald as the assassin and that was no conspiracy as though that was just an interesting document, but we are not there to ratify that; we were to find out if it was true and I think we were probably quite offensive, especially some of the younger members of our staff who looked forward to the opportunity of finding that the FBI was wrong, at least on as much as they could find.

So that often times they were challenging the agents, I had difficulty with some of our relationships because of that. I do not think it affected our people at all, but, of course, I recognize that it would have been lese majesty for anybody to tell Mr. Hoover, that the report was wrong.

Mr. Preyer. Just one final question along the problems that could arise where you use the FBI as your major investigative arm. You told Mr. Sawyer, I believe, that you did not know about the destruction of the Hosty note. Do you think if you had had independent investigators rather than relying on the FBI that you would have learned about the destruction of that note?

Mr. Rankin. There is always the possibility that we might. It seems to me there is a possibility it might have leaked out some way from the FBI, but it did not. I think that it would have been helpful to know that, although I do not suppose we would have changed about using the FBI and the other government intelligence forces, if we had discovered the note.

Mr. Preyer. Thank you, Mr. Rankin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Devine.

Mr. Devine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Rankin, you were in Dallas with Chief Justice Warren and President Ford on the occasion of the interview with Jack Ruby.

Mr. Rankin. Yes.
Mr. Devine. Did you participate in the questioning of him, or were you merely present, if you recall?

Mr. Rankin. It is hard to recall because I know I questioned him some, but whether I did the general examination, I cannot now recall.

Mr. Devine. He indicated at that time, if you were in the room this morning when President Ford testified, that Ruby requested that he be brought to Washington in order that he might tell the full and the true story. The President said that after discussing it with the Commission and the Commission staff they felt no meaningful purpose would be served by doing that. Did you agree with that decision?

Mr. Rankin. Yes.

Mr. Devine. Do you agree at this time that that was a proper decision?

Mr. Rankin. Yes. As I said earlier, when Congressman Sawyer asked me, I felt that he really wanted a trip to Washington rather than to help us in our problems.

Mr. Devine. In your interrogation or in the files of the Commission in having interrogated Jack Ruby, did the Commission ever come to a conclusion as to his motive in shooting Lee Harvey Oswald?

Mr. Rankin. I do not think they were ever satisfied as to what his motive was.

Mr. Devine. Did not the Commission receive testimony that Ruby was known in Dallas as a "police buff," that he had a habit of hanging around police headquarters and that his presence there was not unusual?

Mr. Rankin. That is correct.

Mr. Devine. And was there not also testimony before the Commission or at least reported to the Commission, that Ruby's motive probably was that as an obscure nightclub operator of some questionable reputation that he thought he would become a national hero if he killed the person that assassinated the President?

Mr. Rankin. I think that is true. I am not sure the Commission was satisfied that that was the answer.

Mr. Devine. Does that seem to make some degree of logic to you as chief counsel of the Commission?

Mr. Rankin. Well, it always seemed to me that it was quite a step for a man to take, with all the risks that were involved, just for that kind of a purpose.

Mr. Devine. I do not believe the Commission in its very thorough investigation ever tied Oswald and Ruby together in any association, did they?

Mr. Rankin. They did not.

Mr. Devine. In another area, Mr. Rankin, there was some testimony this morning about 17 or so FBI agents being subjected to disciplinary administrative procedures within the Bureau for lack of discretion or failure to meet the necessary standards on the preassassination investigation of Oswald and the fact he was never placed on the security index.

Were you aware of this administrative action within the Bureau?

Mr. Rankin. No, I was not. My relations with Mr. Hoover deteriorated a great deal after the report came out, and I was quite
surprised to learn that he took this position with the agents in light of his severe criticism of me and the report, but it appeared to me that this action was quite confirmatory of some of the criticism that the Commission had made in the report about some of the failures of the FBI in its liaison with the Secret Service.

Mr. Devine. Had you known of this action prior to the conclusion of the final report of the Commission, do you think it would have affected the investigation in any way or led it in any way to different results or conclusions?

Mr. Rankin. I do not think it would have changed the results or conclusions. I think that if we had been aware of it, we would have wanted to inquire about each one of the situations and see if there was anything there that could help us in our investigation.

Mr. Devine. It was not surprising to you, was it, Mr. Rankin, with your vast experience in and out of Government, to recognize that administrative steps were taken within many Government agencies, disciplinary steps were taken without airing the laundry publicly?

Mr. Rankin. No; but I was naive enough with regard to this particular task, as general counsel, to think that when the President of the United States told everybody to cooperate with us that they would understand that was an order and mandate and part of the law that governed public servants and that they would do it.

It seemed to me that the question of what they failed to do in each of these instances was a matter that would be of interest to the Commission and each of the Commissioners and that Mr. Hoover had an obligation on his own to inform us and let us take whatever proper action the Commission thought should be taken to find out what acts were being criticized and whether there was something that would affect the Commission's work.

Mr. Devine. Finally, Mr. Rankin, recognizing that nearly 15 years have intervened since the event and 14 years since the filing of the Warren Commission report, learning the things that you have learned during the intervening period, the new technical exotic crime detection techniques that have developed, additional witnesses that were not available to you, the meeting of the Rockefeller committee, the Church committee, the Assassinations Committee and all, as you sit here today, do you feel that the Warren Commission, had they the benefit of all this additional information, would have reached a conclusion different than that which you actually did?

Mr. Rankin. No; I think the Commission would not have arrived at any different conclusions.

Mr. Devine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Dodd.

Mr. Dodd. Mr. Chairman, in light of the fact I arrived a little bit after Mr. Rankin completed his statement, I will pass for the moment, if I can.

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Fithian.

Mr. Fithian. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Rankin, we want to thank you for coming and for cooperating with our committee. I have several questions that I would like to pursue, if time permits, and I might have to beg of the chairman some additional time.
First, I would like to ask whether or not the Commission and yourself, in particular, reviewed and approved the firearms tests that were administered by the FBI on the Mannlicher-Carcano that was alleged to be the Oswald weapon.

Mr. Rankin. Yes.

Mr. Fithian. And was a part of that test to determine how fast it could be fired?

Mr. Rankin. That is right.

Mr. Fithian. And the FBI performed those tests.

Mr. Rankin. Yes.

Mr. Fithian. Do you remember what the results were?

Mr. Rankin. I remember that the results were positive that the three bullets could have been fired within the time limits that I think were computed on the film.

Mr. Fithian. The 2.3, or as one witness I believe had it, 2.25 seconds between firings as the minimum time, it is your impression the three shots would fit in?

Mr. Rankin. That is right.

Mr. Fithian. And is it also your understanding that the firearms experts who performed these tests made use of the telescopic sight?

Mr. Rankin. That is right.

Mr. Fithian. Did the Commission order firing the tests of the weapons without the scope?

Mr. Rankin. I do not recall that they did.

Mr. Fithian. Did it ever occur to anybody on the Commission that it might have been fired without the scope?

Mr. Rankin. I do not think any of the Commissioners in discussing it thought that anybody could have shot with that accuracy without a scope.

Mr. Fithian. After you heard Governor Connally, did this give you any problems then?

Mr. Rankin. No.

Mr. Fithian. In trying to square his testimony with the FBI tests?

Mr. Rankin. I heard him before when he testified before the Commission.

Mr. Fithian. I meant, at that time, at the Commission's testimony?

Mr. Rankin. I think he is just mistaken and I think that the more evidence that is adduced will establish that where he was he had to be shot by that same bullet.

Mr. Fithian. But did the Commission's understanding of the firing time of the Oswald weapon cause any problems in interpreting other evidence, including the Zapruder film, or eye witness accounts?

Mr. Rankin. I don't recall any. If you could refresh my memory.

Mr. Fithian. You will recall that Governor Connally said he heard a shot and he turned.

Mr. Rankin. Yes sir.

Mr. Fithian. And the Zapruder film shows that turning, which tends to corroborate what the Governor said, I mean just to the layman.

I am wondering if you had any problem with that?
Mr. Rankin. Well, the fact that he turned I think is well established by the film. Whether he heard the shot after he had been shot isn't established by the Zapruder film.

Mr. Fithian. Well, now, if it can, and as it has in a tentative way by this committee, been established that the weapon can be fired with pretty good accuracy, and a lot faster than the FBI said, if you had had that information, what would this have done to your sort of adjustment of your interpretation of the evidence?

Mr. Rankin. Well, I don't think it would have changed unless you are thinking of something that I am not. We took into account, the Commission did, that there were three casings there and that there was testimony about three shots and other factors along with the time element.

Mr. Fithian. But there was also conflicting testimony, though I believe not given as much credibility by you and your staff and the Commission, that indicated that eye witness accounts heard other shots from other areas, particularly the grassy knoll area. Wouldn't your firing time limitation of necessity almost have to come to bear on that kind of testimony beyond the three cartridges that you found?

Mr. Rankin. We never thought that the testimony of shots from other points was impressive in the light of the wounds.

Chairman Stokes. Time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Fithian. I would ask either unanimous consent, to let me finish up this line of questioning, but I do have another area I would like to question after everybody else has completed, if I may.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection.

Mr. Fithian. But it just seems to me that someone, somewhere, who had a modicum of experience with firearms, would have discovered right off, even if you go down to the Archives today and look at the rifle, it is not a particularly difficult problem to pick it up and look at it and see it can be fired without the telescopic sight, and anybody who has fired with a scope would know you can fire a lot faster if you are looking for a moving target, you don't have to find it in the scope, if it can in fact be fired faster.

For 15 years we have been told it couldn't be fired faster. We now know that it is not true. It seems to me someone on the Commission having some evidence which appears to me not to be able to fit into the 2.25, which is the minimum time of the FBI, might have requested another kind of test firing, and I am curious that it did not occur to a single person on the Commission or on your staff or in the FBI, or anywhere else, along the line.

I guess my final question is, Was there no consideration given by the Commission, as far as you know by the FBI, to another kind of test firing of that weapon?

Mr. Rankin. Not that I know of. Of course, there were also problems of the leaves on the trees and how you fit them in, and the point where the Zapruder film showed the impact had to be, that is, that it had to be within certain spaces. All of that had to be fitted in too. So you are not just free to say, well, I can shoot this weapon so many times within so many minutes. There are other problems that you have to deal with and fit within.

Mr. Fithian. Mr. Chairman, I thank you.
I would just like to make sure that we have in the record at this point that our own final test firings will become a part of this record as they are completed.

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Edgar.

Mr. Edgar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I apologize for not being here during the earlier questioning of you, Mr. Rankin, but I do have some questions that grow out of earlier discussions about the way in which the Warren Commission began its investigation. You have indicated, I think, that within a relatively short period of time, after the assassination, the Warren Commission was formed and the Warren Commission did put a document out, did they not, indicating that Lee Harvey Oswald was essentially the lone assassin, shortly after the beginning of the Commission?

Mr. Rankin. Not that I recall.

Mr. Edgar. Well, not necessarily a lone assassin but that he was the assassin, is that correct?

Mr. Rankin. I don’t remember that either.

Mr. Edgar. When was the first time that the Warren Commission went public with any of their preliminary findings?

Mr. Rankin. I just don’t recall.

Mr. Edgar. Let me ask it in a different way. Did the Warren Commission have an investigative plan?

Mr. Rankin. Yes.

Mr. Edgar. How was that plan developed?

Mr. Rankin. It was developed by my making a draft of a plan and submitting it to the Commission for its acceptance or modification or rejection.

Mr. Edgar. The members of the Commission had an opportunity to review the plan and decided where the investigation and study would go?

Mr. Rankin. That is right.

Mr. Edgar. In making that plan, did you bring in the FBI or CIA to help assist you in areas of investigation, such as conspiracy?

Mr. Rankin. No.

Mr. Edgar. At any time, in the beginning phases of the Warren Commission study, did you bring in the FBI and the CIA and the Secret Service to try to coordinate what information they had available to them and have a discussion among them about what information would be available to them?

Mr. Rankin. No; I didn’t. At that period of time, the relations between the Secret Service and FBI were terribly strained in connection with what happened and the fact that the President had been assassinated and there was some feeling that neither one had done themselves proud in connection with the whole event.

Mr. Edgar. Would it have been a relevant possibility to bring them together to put aside those bickerings and differences and to say now that the assassination has taken place, and the Warren Commission has been formed, we now have to provide to the American public the most accurate information of what was available to us at the time of the death and what transpired following the assassination?

Mr. Rankin. I don’t think so, because I think it would have appeared that the Commissioners were putting themselves under
the domination of the FBI. The FBI had already come forward with their report in which they said that Oswald was the assassin and there was no conspiracy involved. That had leaked out. To have brought the different groups together would seem to me, in the first place the Secret Service is much smaller, less powerful and——

Mr. Edgar. Wouldn't that have given the Secret Service and CIA an opportunity to pose an alternative possibility to the already established rumor of the FBI?

Mr. Rankin. No; because I gave each of them in separate discussions with the Directors ample opportunity to suggest anything they wanted to and asked for their help in every way possible.

Chairman Stokes. Time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Edgar. Just one additional question, if I may. May I ask unanimous consent to proceed?

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman is recognized.

Mr. Edgar. In December and January of 1963 and 1964, when the FBI was disciplining 17 individuals for their role in the preassassination information of Lee Harvey Oswald, was that information made known to you in December and January of 1963 and 1964?

Mr. Rankin. No, it was not.

Mr. Edgar. Was it made known to you at any time during the Warren Commission?

Mr. Rankin. No; it was not.

Mr. Edgar. Thank you.

Chairman Stokes. Time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. McKinney.

Mr. McKinney. You were basically in charge, Mr. Rankin, were you not, of assignments of the staff?

Mr. Rankin. Yes.

Mr. McKinney. Was it true that the counsels Hubert and Griffin were essentially assigned to the investigation of Jack Ruby?

Mr. Rankin. Yes.

Mr. McKinney. Why under those conditions and whose decision was it, that they then did not go to Dallas to interview Jack Ruby when the Chief Justice and Congressman Ford went?

Mr. Rankin. I think it was in a discussion by myself with the Chief Justice and former President Ford and they said this matter is of sufficient importance we want you to supervise the examination.

Mr. McKinney. But in essence you were required to have a generalized knowledge of everything that was happening, rather, than the specifics of Jack Ruby?

Mr. Rankin. Well, I was watching it in detail in every area, too. I had to.

Mr. McKinney. One of the criticisms of the Commission report has been the depth of the Ruby investigation, and there have been many critics who questioned why the two counsels who were charged with investigating Jack Ruby were not present at the time he was questioned extensively in Dallas.

Mr. Rankin. Well, I don't think the criticism relates itself to the examination of Ruby. The criticism is whether or not the various
leads were followed to the extent that they should have been. That was a function that they both had.

Mr. McKinney. In other words, you depended on their following through on Jack Ruby as to, for instance, the question of his ties to organized crime rather than on the FBI doing that, or did you depend on both?

Mr. Rankin. Both.

Mr. McKinney. When did you become aware of the animosity of the FBI, or at least of J. Edgar Hoover toward the Warren Commission. It is expressed quite frankly in what we have listed as Kennedy exhibit F-471, which is the Belmont to Tolson letter. In that letter it is pretty well stated that the FBI itself is not going to send a liaison to the Warren Commission's meeting called by the Chief Justice, that the request of Attorney General Katzenbach that he be briefed so at least he could answer questions.

I believe Mr. Belmont states:

That would be very undesirable because there was really only one answer, that is, the question raised as to what the FBI is doing. There is a very simple answer, namely, we are pressing the investigation in the writing of the report. This is our major goal. Until that is completed there is nothing we can contribute.

In other words, the Chief Justice of the United States of America, the head of a Presidential Commission investigating the assassination of a President of the United States, was in essence told to forget it when he asked the FBI to have a liaison person there.

How did you react to that?

Mr. Rankin. I tried to avoid an open fight. It was obvious to me that I certainly had a reluctant relationship with the FBI in many respects and I was also making unreasonable demands everyday upon them and——

Mr. McKinney. Excuse me. Is that your wording, unreasonable demands, or would that be the Bureau's wording?

Mr. Rankin. That is my wording, too. It was unreasonable but I couldn't do anything else. I needed that help. The staff needed it and the Commission needed it and we didn't have enough other intelligence agencies to just forget about the FBI, and they had people stationed in various parts of the country, who it was logical to use.

The Secret Service had people occasionally in various places but they didn't have them stationed there all the time, and the FBI had a great group of personnel that could be used if they would be cooperative and help. So I was constantly asking for hundreds of investigations in places all over the country, and as soon as I got the reports on that and the responses, I would ask for some more, and I would ask for more complete reports on the ones that I thought were unsatisfactory. That in itself made a very difficult relationship and I don't blame them for feeling that they were being ridden pretty hard, which was true, but we never got to the place where they either apparently dared or would say they wouldn't do it. And as long as they didn't, I kept on. Then I had to be careful to watch everything they did to see that I was getting something worthwhile and that it was well done, and I knew pretty well what an FBI agent was capable of doing, from my experience in the Department, and I knew when it wasn't up to standard.
So when it wasn't up to standard we came back to them and said this has got to be done, get another agent on it if you can't get it done right.

Mr. McKinney. This was an actual memorandum dated December 3, 1963, right at the very beginning, and there is a clear implication that the FBI just was not going to cooperate with any preliminary facts nor were they going to send anyone to answer any questions.

Wasn't any attempt made at that point, with this sort of dramatic refusal, to have anyone in a higher position in the Government such as the Attorney General or the President of the United States, turn around to Mr. Hoover and say cooperate? In the terms of at least sending a liaison person? That is the one question here.

Mr. Rankin. I don't know in my experience with Government that anybody ever did that with Mr. Hoover during his lifetime.

Mr. McKinney. I would think almost nobody would have done it because I am sure Mr. Hoover had something on all of us, but, I also recognize the Chief Justice of United States, Earl Warren, as a rather controversial and opinionated gentleman who didn't like to take orders from anybody. I just find it amazing, since you were chief counsel between these two, that in essence the Chief Justice would sit back and take this sort of cavalier treatment from a subagency of the United States?

Mr. Rankin. I think the Chief Justice was shrewd enough to realize that the way to handle that was to put them to the test and see whether they would refuse, and when it came down to actually doing the work, they never did refuse.

Mr. McKinney. So even though the attitude was wrong, the answers were all right, so it was shunted aside?

Mr. Rankin. Yes. Now, except for these things they didn't tell us. It is apparent now that there were certain things they withheld, and that is something different.

Mr. McKinney. The whole catalog of horrors which some of my colleagues have addressed for the record. I thank you.

Chairman Stokes. Your comment, Mr. Hoover had something on all of us, someone said speak for yourself. [Laughter.]

Chairman Stokes. I ask that the clerk mark the exhibit I have handed her JFK F-447. I request she show it to the witness, please.
[Document handed to the witness for his inspection.]

Mr. Rankin. Yes.

Chairman Stokes. All right, the Chair requests unanimous consent that this document be made a part of the record at this point. Without objection, it is so ordered.

[The exhibit follows:]
MEMORANDUM

TO: The Commission

FROM: William T. Coleman, Jr.,
W. David Sloewson

SUBJECT: Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko

June 24, 1964

The Commission has asked us to prepare a short memorandum outlining in what respects the information obtained from Nosenko confirms or contradicts information we have from other sources.

Nosenko's testimony to the FBI is the only information we have on what he knows about Lee Harvey Oswald. (Commission Documents No. 434 and 451.) Perhaps more useful information could be gained if we were to question Nosenko directly, but it is unlikely. Nosenko told the representative of the FBI who questioned him that he had given all the information on Oswald he possessed.

Most of what Nosenko told the FBI confirms what we already know from other sources and most of it does not involve important facts, with one extremely significant exception. This exception is Nosenko's statement that Lee Harvey Oswald was never trained or used as an agent of the Soviet Union for any purpose and that no contact with him was made, attempted or contemplated after he left the Soviet Union and returned to the United States. Nosenko's opinion on these points is especially valuable because, according to his own testimony at least, his position with the KGB was such that had there been any subversive relationship between the Soviet Union and Oswald, he would have known about it.

Nosenko's statement to the FBI confirms our information from other sources in the following respects:

1. Prior to Oswald's arrival in Russia in the fall of 1959 he had no contacts with agents of the Russian government or of the International Communist Party who were in turn in contact with the Russian government. (Our cc: Mr. Rankin's File
Mr. Coleman
Mr. Slawson
Mail Room Files

DECLASSIFIED
EO 11850, Sec 3.2 (b)
Press Date: 1975
independent sources on this are extremely weak, however. We simply do not have much information on this particular subject.)

2. When Oswald arrived in the Soviet Union he was traveling on a temporary tourist visa but very quickly made known to the Russian authorities that he desired to remain permanently in the USSR and wanted to become a Soviet citizen. He made known his intention to his Intourist guide at the Hotel Berlin in Moscow. This Intourist guide was a KGB informer.

3. Oswald was advised through the Intourist interpreter that he would not be permitted to remain in Russia permanently and that he would therefore have to leave that country when his temporary visa expired.

4. Upon learning that his request to remain in Russia permanently had been denied, Oswald slashed his wrist in his room at the Hotel Berlin in an apparent attempt to commit suicide, was found by the Intourist interpreter when he failed to appear for an appointment that evening, and was immediately taken to a hospital in Moscow for treatment. This hospital was the Botkinskaya Hospital.

5. Oswald was questioned by doctors at the hospital and told them that he attempted suicide because he was not granted permission to remain in Russia.

6. Oswald was assigned to Minsk probably because it is above average for cleanliness and modern facilities, and would therefore create a good impression for him.

7. Oswald appeared at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City and asked for a Soviet re-entry visa.

8. Nosenko was shown certain portions of our file on Oswald, including a section which stated that Oswald received a monthly subsidy from the Soviet Red Cross. On seeing this statement, Nosenko commented that it is normal practice in the Soviet Union to cause the Red Cross to make payments to emigres and defectors in order to assist them to enjoy a better standard of living than ordinary Soviet citizens engaged in similar occupations. (Nosenko also said that the subsidy Oswald received was probably the minimum
given under such circumstances. This is news to us, although it is not inconsistent with other information we have.)

9. Oswald was in possession of a gun which was used to shoot rabbits while he was living in Minsk (Nosenko said he learned this upon reviewing Oswald's file after the assassination of President Kennedy when, under the circumstances, he took particular note of this fact.)

10. There is no KGB or GRU training school in the vicinity of Minsk.

11. All mail addressed to the American Embassy in Moscow, therefore, also including Lee Harvey Oswald's mail so addressed, is "reviewed" by the KGB in Moscow. Nosenko said that this is routinely done but he added that he personally had no part in the review of, or knowledge of such review, of Oswald's correspondence.

12. No publicity appeared in the Soviet press or Soviet radio regarding Oswald's arrival or departure from the Soviet Union or on his attempted suicide. (Our evidence on this is simply negative, that is, we have no evidence that there was any such publicity.)

13. Oswald was regarded as a "poor worker" by his superiors in the factory at Minsk.

The following information obtained from Nosenko is not available to us from any other source. As will be seen, it generally does not add much to our knowledge about Oswald but rather supplies background information on Soviet activities relating to his residence in Russia.

1. The KGB in Moscow, after analyzing Oswald through various interviews and confidential informants, determined that Oswald was of no use to them and that he appeared "somewhat abnormal."

2. The KGB did not know about Oswald's prior military service and even if they did, it would have been of no particular significance to them.

3. When the KGB was advised by some other Ministry of the Soviet State that the decision had been made to permit
Oswald to stay in Russia and that he was to reside in Minsk, it brought Oswald's file up to date and transferred it to its branch office in Minsk. The cover letter forwarding the file to Minsk, prepared by one of Nosenko's subordinates, briefly summarized Oswald's case and instructed the branch office to take no action concerning him except to "passively" observe his activities to make sure he was not an American intelligence agent temporarily dormant. (Oswald did tell an American friend once that on one or two occasions in Minsk he had heard that the MVD had inquired of neighbors or fellow workers about him.)

4. According to the routine of the KGB, the only coverage of Oswald during his stay in Minsk would have consisted of periodic checks at his place of employment, inquiry of neighbors, other associates, and review of his mail.

5. When the KGB was asked about Oswald's application for a re-entry visa made in Mexico City, it recommended that the application be denied.

6. Shortly after the assassination, Nosenko was called to his office for the purpose of determining whether his Department had any information concerning Oswald. When a search of the office records disclosed that information was available, telephone contact was immediately made with the KGB branch office in Minsk. The branch office dictated a summary of the Oswald file to Moscow over the telephone. This summary included a statement that the Minsk KGB had endeavored to "influence Oswald in the right direction." This statement greatly alarmed the Moscow office, especially in view of their instructions to Minsk that no action was to be taken on Oswald except to "passively observe" his activities. Accordingly, the complete Oswald file at Minsk was ordered to be flown at once via military aircraft to Moscow for examination. It turned out that all this statement referred to was that an uncle of Marina Oswald, a lieutenant colonel in the local militia at Minsk, had approached Oswald and suggested that he not be too critical of the Soviet Union when he returned to the United States.

7. Marina Oswald was once a member of Komsomol but was dropped for nonpayment of dues. (Marina told the Commission she was a member of Komsomol, but she has been inconsistent on why she was dropped.)
8. The Minsk KGB file on Oswald contained statements from fellow hunters that he was an extremely poor shot and that it was sometimes necessary for them to provide him with game.

9. After the assassination, the Soviet government provided about 20 English-speaking men who were assigned to the immediate vicinity of the American Embassy in Moscow to insure that no disrespect was shown by the Soviet citizens during this period.

10. Some other agency, just which agency Nosenko says he does not know, subsequently decided that Oswald would be permitted to stay in Russia, on its responsibility. Nosenko speculates that this other agency was either the Soviet Red Cross or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (This bit of information fits in especially neatly with Oswald's own statements that the Soviet officials he met after his suicide attempt were new to him, and did not seem to have been told by his earlier interrogators anything about him.)

The following information given by Nosenko tends to contradict information which we have from other sources:

1. Nosenko says that after Oswald was released from the hospital where he was treated for an attempt to commit suicide, he was told again that he would have to leave the Soviet Union and thereupon threatened to make a second attempt to take his own life. Oswald's own diary of this time contains no mention of a threat to make a second attempt at suicide or of any post-hospitalization statement by the Soviets that he would still have to return to the United States. Of course, Oswald's own account of these activities is not entitled to a high degree of credibility.

2. Nosenko says that there are no Soviet regulations which would have prevented Oswald from traveling from Minsk to Moscow without obtaining first permission to do so. We have information from the CIA and the State Department that such regulations exist, although they are apparently rather easily -- and frequently -- violated.
Mr. Rankin, have you had a chance to review this document?
Mr. Rankin. I have.
Chairman Stokes. And can you tell us what it is?
Mr. Rankin. It is a communication from William T. Coleman, Jr., and David Slawson to the Commission regarding Mr. Nosenko.
Chairman Stokes. And was a copy of this document provided to you and does it indicate thereon?
Mr. Rankin. It does, yes.
Chairman Stokes. All right. Now, this document or this memorandum was prepared from information furnished on whom?
Mr. Rankin. It was furnished regarding Oswald. Is that what you mean?
Chairman Stokes. Well, the subject matter.
Mr. Rankin. It was concerning what the FBI had learned from Nosenko about what he claimed he knew about Oswald.
Chairman Stokes. And this is a five page document prepared by members of your Commission staff?
Mr. Rankin. That is right.
Chairman Stokes. And my understanding is that Nosenko was in the possession of the CIA?
Mr. Rankin. That is right.
Chairman Stokes. And that this memorandum was prepared as a result of an interview of Nosenko by the FBI?
Mr. Rankin. Yes sir.
Chairman Stokes. Is that correct?
Mr. Rankin. Yes. Apparently, I don't know how they ever got to him, because they were not supposed to have jurisdiction in that area but—
Chairman Stokes. Our understanding is that the FBI would have to submit to the CIA the questions they wanted to ask Nosenko, the CIA would then ask Nosenko those questions and submit his answers back to the FBI. Is that your recollection of the procedure?
Mr. Rankin. No; I don't know what the procedures were.
Chairman Stokes. But, at any rate, with reference to this memorandum, can you give us some idea of how heavily the Commission relied upon this memorandum in its determinations?
Mr. Rankin. It is my impression now that the Commission did not rely on it at all, that the fact that the CIA was telling them that Nosenko was not a KGB officer and could not be relied upon, dissipated anything that the memo says about him and what he claimed to know about Oswald and caused the Commission to think that he was unbelievable about any of that.
Chairman Stokes. Thank you.
The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Edgar.
Mr. Edgar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Fithian will be back with some additional specific questions. Let me just ask you some general questions to help me focus on your role with the Warren Commission and its relationship with the FBI.
Did you personally meet with J. Edgar Hoover?
Mr. Rankin. Yes.
Mr. Edgar. What was his attitude toward you personally?
Mr. Rankin. It had changed.
Mr. Edgar. Changed from when to when?
Mr. Rankin. From the way our relationship was when I was with the Department of Justice, he was quite cold and uncommunicative.

Mr. Edgar. During your period of time with the Warren Commission?

Mr. Rankin. No. You asked me about when I saw him and I thought that was what you were dealing with. I went over to see him—

Mr. Edgar. Just clarify for me what you are talking about. His mood about you changed and you said he was cold. Was that on your personal visits to him, while you were with the Warren Commission?

Mr. Rankin. Yes. I don’t think I had more than two, if I had that many. I was dealing constantly with people below him.

Mr. Edgar. And could you further describe what you mean by the coldness, what were some of the conversations that he would share that would indicate this coldness?

Mr. Rankin. Well, by the nature of our work, when I was an Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Office of Legal Counsel, I had conferences with the President involving legal problems and some of them necessarily involved the FBI, and so we had consultations about such matters. The same is true when I was Solicitor General. At all times our relations were warm and cordial and we seemed to have an understanding between each other and cooperation; in trying to get the work accomplished that we had before us. When I saw him during my work with the Warren Commission, in his office, he acted as though he felt that the Commission was hostile to him and to the FBI, and he commented upon all the man-hours we were demanding of him and how it was a burden to the FBI in its carrying on its other work.

Without actually abusing me he made it plain that he was not pleased with our relationships.

Mr. Edgar. Did he resent the fact that you were doublechecking the FBI’s investigation?

Mr. Rankin. Every agent that I had anything to do with when I did that resented it. But I just had to do it anyway and I kept on doing it. Of course, that didn’t help with any of them. They soon could find that out.

Mr. Edgar. What is your feeling now in retrospect looking back in terms of your relationship and coldness and the resentment that the FBI felt about their alleged withholding from you of information?

Mr. Rankin. Well, you know, I assumed at that time, apparently mistakenly, that they were professionals and even though they didn’t like whatever I would demand as a lawyer, or if I was too insistent about the investigation or wanted a better investigation or something more complete, or more information or more disclosure, that they would recognize that I was acting as a lawyer in trying to carry out my work, and if they didn’t like it they still would appreciate that it was necessary to my work. Therefore, the thought never crossed my mind that they would deliberately withhold something as important as information about what had happened in connection with this assassination, which I thought was of major importance to the country. I didn’t think the FBI’s interests
in its own Bureau, as important as I appreciated it could be to an agent or Mr. Hoover, still was more important than that of the interests of the country as a whole, so I never thought that they would deliberately conceal or withhold anything.

I thought there might be some times when I would have to pull it out of them, and I might have to keep after something a good many times that I should have been able to get the first time, but the other never crossed my mind, as I say, and I never believed that Mr. Hoover would deliberately lie to the Commission.

Mr. Edgar. One final question, just in terms of your own intuitive speculation relating to a question I asked former President Ford earlier this morning.

Where do you think Oswald was going when he left the rooming house and walked behind the back alley there and up the street and shot Officer Tippit and went to the theater? Where was he heading? Was he just walking aimlessly or did he have a direction he was going?

Mr. Rankin. I have nothing except speculation and I have always thought he was just trying to get away and that is a curious thing about life, that Officer Tippit would show up in that situation.

Mr. Edgar. Did you have occasion to visit Jack Ruby’s apartment?

Mr. Rankin. No.

Mr. Edgar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I have no further question.

Chairman Stokes. Time of the gentleman has expired.

We have a time problem, I am informed, with reference to the next witness to follow Mr. Rankin.

Mr. Rankin, I wondered this. Several of the members have indicated they have some additional questions they would like to ask you. I wonder if you would agree that if we submitted those to you that you would be able to answer them for the record for us.

Would that pose any problem for you?

Mr. Rankin. No; I would be glad to do that.

Chairman Stokes. Fine.

All right. Then at this time let me extend to you on behalf of the committee 5 minutes, which you are entitled to as a witness before this committee, at which time you may make any comments you would like to make with reference to your testimony, and you may add to it or subtract from it, or whatever you like. I extend to you at this time that 5 minutes for that purpose.

Mr. Rankin. Mr. Chairman, I don’t want to take up 5 minutes of this committee’s time but I do wish to express myself that I am maybe not happy to be here but I am quite willing to be here to assist in your deliberations in any way and I hope that any enlightenment that you can contribute with your work and your staff’s efforts toward these problems will soon be available to the American people and will be helpful to their understanding of what happened.

Thank you.

Chairman. Stokes. Thank you very much, Mr. Rankin. We appreciate your cooperation and your presence and your testimony here, and again we thank you. You are excused.
Prior to the recognizing of counsel, I would like the record to reflect the fact I am informed by counsel for the committee that prior to April 4, 1964, that is, February 1964, to April 4, 1964, that the FBI did have access to Nosenko, although Nosenko was under the control at that time of the CIA. After April 4, 1964, they did not again have access to him until 1969.

The Chair recognizes Professor Blakey.

Mr. Blakey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is time now to consider the role of the Department of Justice in the investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy.

Senior officials at Justice were, of course, active in supervising the investigation, though the responsibility for carrying it out was in the hands of the FBI. In the de facto absence of Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy in the days following his brother's murder, the job of coordinating the Department's activities was up to Deputy Attorney General Nicholas deB Katzenbach.

Soon after the assassination, Katzenbach became a proponent of an independent Presidential commission to investigate the assassination.

The proposal he and others suggested to President Johnson called for the creation of a blue ribbon body that was to become the Warren Commission. It would, he recommended, be composed of present and former Government officials of eminent stature, such as the former Commission members who have testified here today.

When the Commission was created on November 29, 1963, the Department of Justice no longer was involved in the investigation in any way, although it continued to perform liaison functions for the Commission.

Here today, Mr. Chairman, is the Honorable Nicholas Katzenbach, former Attorney General of the United States. Mr. Katzenbach became Attorney General in 1964, when Robert Kennedy ran successfully for the Senate from New York. Mr. Katzenbach was later named by President Johnson to serve as Undersecretary of State.

Presently, he is general counsel and vice president of the IBM Corp.

It would be appropriate at this time, Mr. Chairman, to call Mr. Katzenbach.

Mr. Preyer [presiding]. The committee calls Mr. Katzenbach.

TESTIMONY OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH, FORMER ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. Preyer. Mr. Katzenbach, it is good to have you with us today. I ask that you stand and be sworn in at this time. Do you solemnly swear the evidence you are about to give before this committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Katzenbach. I do.

Mr. Preyer. We have a rather slim attendance at this moment because of a vote that is on on the House floor. I think Members will be returning momentarily.

Mr. Katzenbach. Not a new experience for me.
Mr. Preyer. I suggest that we take a several minute recess in place, if you do not mind. We would like to have—here is Mr. McKinney here right now. I think we are ready to proceed.

The committee will recognize Gary Cornwell, counsel for the committee, to begin the questioning of the witness.

Mr. Cornwell. Mr. Chairman, I am prepared at this time to question the witness. However, I had the opportunity to take a lengthy deposition from Mr. Katzenbach previously. That deposition has been provided to the committee and I have been informed that the committee has had an opportunity to study it carefully.

In light of that, I might suggest, in view of the late hour, perhaps the committee might simply like to begin first and ask the questions of Mr. Katzenbach in those areas that we are most concerned with.

Mr. Preyer. Is the deposition a part of the record or do you wish it introduced into evidence at this point in the record?

Mr. Cornwell. It is in the files. Mr. Katzenbach has not yet had an opportunity to read it carefully himself and to sign it. As soon as he does so, it will be made a permanent part of the record, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Preyer. Fine. The Chair recognizes Mr. McKinney to begin the questioning of the witness.

Mr. McKinney. Mr. Attorney General, it is a pleasure to see you again. We really appreciate your coming to help us in these deliberations.

I would like to start out by asking the question as to your exerting tremendous pressure right after the assassination to get the FBI report out and to get a report in front of the American people. This is somewhat evidenced by your memorandum to Mr. Moyers of November 25. What was your basic motivation in looking for such speed?

Mr. Katzenbach. I think my basic motivation was the amount of speculation both here and abroad as to what was going on, whether there was a conspiracy of the right or a conspiracy of the left or a lone assassin or even in its wildest stages, a conspiracy by the then Vice President to achieve the Presidency, the sort of thing you have speculation about in some countries abroad where that kind of condition is normal.

It seemed to me that the quicker some information could be made available that went beyond what the press was able to uncover and what the press was able to speculate about was desirable in that state of affairs.

Mr. McKinney. In your deposition to the committee on page 8, you suggested that one of your interests was that the facts, all of them, had to be made public and it had to be done in a way that would give the public, both in this country and abroad, the confidence that no facts were being withheld at all.

Do you think that pushing for this type of speed might have hurt the accuracy of the report or brought about the fact that some people would question the speed of its issuance its thoroughness, its completeness?

Mr. Katzenbach. I do not think the two notions are connected, Congressman. I think the motivations for getting some kind of report out, some facts out early were the ones that I have stated.
The memorandum of Mr. Moyers and a number of other conversations and things that I have said really related to the desirability of a totally thorough, complete investigation by a commission, such as the Warren Commission, which should point out all of the facts available and all of the reasons for their conclusions.

I never intended at any point that the investigation done by the FBI would be a substitute for the kind of investigation of President Kennedy's assassination.

Mr. McKinney. Perhaps for the general public and for the committee, you could discuss for us your recollection of when and how the idea of a Presidential Commission came forth. I know you mention it in your memorandum to Mr. Moyers again.

How did you feel about it, at first? Were you opposed to it or not, and when it was finally firmed up, how was it finally decided?

Mr. Katzenbach. I think an idea like that perhaps has several apparents. It was something that very soon after the assassination I thought was a good idea, that such a Commission should be formed of people of impeccable integrity, people who would search for the truth and who would make that truth public because I did not believe that if it remained entirely within the executive branch that that effect could ever be achieved as far as the general public here or abroad was concerned.

So, I thought very early that such a Commission was essential to, really to the political process, to getting all of the facts out on such an occasion as the assassination of a popular and respected President.

So, I pressed for that very early. I was never opposed to it. I was, however, in a somewhat awkward position because of my responsibilities in the Department of Justice as Deputy Attorney General at that time and, in effect, very nearly acting Attorney General at that time because of Robert Kennedy's tragic loss and reaction that he had to the assassination of his brother.

My awkwardness was because it was perfectly obvious to anybody who knew anything about the Federal Bureau of Investigation that they were certain to resent the appointment of any such commission. So, on the one hand, and if I were thought to be the source of that or to recommend that, then it would very seriously affect my relations with Mr. Hoover and the Bureau.

Mr. McKinney. In other words, it is safe to say that with the mere mention of another investigation or another investigation or an investigative commission, Mr. Hoover would have considered it a somewhat of an insult to the FBI in its activities in this area.

Mr. Katzenbach. Absolutely.

Mr. McKinney. You brought up the subject of the Attorney General, so I will move to that for just a moment. I think it also might be of benefit to the committee and the public if you were to describe to us as best you could the Attorney General's role and his feelings at that time. It has been difficult, I think, even though everyone is aware of the tremendous loss, for many people to understand why the Attorney General, who had had task forces all over the United States looking into organized crime, who had been an active prosecutor of organized crime, who had been an extremely activist Attorney General, why he never took more of a role in ordering the FBI to do things and in ordering his in-the-field people
who had connections with the Mafia to move into any areas such as the Cuban area.

Mr. Katzenbach. Well, when the assassination occurred, Robert Kennedy’s world just came apart, in that not only his affection for his brother, but everything that they had been trying to do, everything they had worked for a long time just went with that shot.

He was very devastated both I think by the personal loss and by the sudden crashing halt of all of the things that he had worked for with his brother for a long period of time.

His attitude was not difficult, I think, for those who knew him well to understand. He said nothing that was done was going to bring his brother back to life and it was, I think, almost as simple as that, as far as he was concerned.

Mr. McKinney. In other words, not only was his devastation personal but it was political in that it was just over, the whole dream.

Mr. Katzenbach. I think it was both. Both the two were so intertwined that it is difficult to distinguish them, I think. I think I would put them both under the feeling of personal. Everything that you were doing in life, a brother who was beloved just suddenly turned to dust.

Mr. McKinney. Throughout your deposition, you bring up a point that I do not think as a committee member I was aware of. Even in discussing the formation of a commission on page 13 of your deposition, you said, “I thought Chief Justice Warren probably had more credibility abroad than any other American.”

And you go on throughout your deposition in describing a tremendous amount of pressure from the State Department. I wonder if you would like to go into that in any more depth for the committee as to exactly why that pressure and in what forms it took. We have several exhibits suggesting the international repercussions, which I will put in the record later, which are essentially memos from Belmont, Jenkins, and Donahou and others.

I thought perhaps you might like to go into the background of that.

Mr. Katzenbach. I was certainly communicated with several times by the State Department and I suppose in a sense that is pressure, although I do not know that I really felt it as pressure. I felt they had their problems and they wanted some help in trying to resolve them.

We have 120, or whatever it is, Embassies around the world and every Ambassador there was being asked about this, being asked by that government what was happening, what was the story on it, as well as what effect it would have on our foreign policy, and I think they were very—being no information really available to them, they were simply feeling the lack of it and feeling that affected their credibility in foreign governments.

Mr. McKinney. Were they suggesting or did you have any conversations with the White House that suggested that perhaps President Johnson’s viability as a world leader was in question or weakened until the whole issue of who shot President Kennedy was resolved to the world’s satisfaction?

Mr. Katzenbach. I do not now recall any conversations as specific as that. It seems to me that had to be an underlying factor and,
in addition, perhaps it is important to remember that President Kennedy had worked a long time and had achieved a considerable amount of stature after some fairly difficult beginnings.

That here was not a totally unknown President, not totally unknown, relatively certainly unknown person in the Presidency.

Mr. McKinney. As essentially, although certainly not officially, acting Attorney General during this period would you describe to the committee what your relationship was with Mr. Hoover at that time?

Mr. Katzenbach. I had never had a great deal of relationship with Mr. Hoover in terms of personal relationship with him. I suppose I had seen him a half dozen times maybe while I was in the Department of Justice. He had a considerable animosity, I think, toward Robert Kennedy.

I think he had never been in a position of having an Attorney General who was closer to the President than he was and that was a new situation for him, and one I do not think he liked. His relationship with Mr. Kennedy was very, I think, cold formal and I suppose as Robert Kennedy's deputy, some of that shed off on me.

Mr. McKinney. Wasn't it true or isn't it inferable that Bobby Kennedy's very drive against organized crime was in effect, a slap in the face to Mr. Hoover in that it implied that the FBI had not been the gangbusters that we were all brought up to think they were?

Mr. Katzenbach. Yes, I think that is true and, of course, the drive in civil rights was one that kept exposing the Bureau to criticism, right or wrong, and that was resented by Mr. Hoover. Mr. Hoover resented criticism to a degree greater than any other person that I have ever known.

Mr. McKinney. I do not know whether you were in the room earlier, but I mentioned and brought up to Mr. Rankin a letter to Mr. Tolson in which the FBI, in essence, refused to go to the Warren Commission meeting as liaison and in essence refused to brief you as to what they were doing, stating that they would have nothing further to say to either the Commission or anyone else until their investigation was finished.

This was somewhat a slap to you as well as to the Warren Commission. How did you react to this?

Mr. Katzenbach. I think, Congressman, the first thing to remember is that was a letter from Allen Belmont to Tolson, not a piece of paper that I saw at the time or the Chief Justice saw at the time or that anybody other than those within the Bureau.

I think it is also important to remember that no memorandum, no letter written in the Bureau was really written for anyone other than Mr. Hoover. That is, it would reflect whatever the author thought Mr. Hoover's views were. I do not believe that Al Belmont put to me or had me put to the Chief Justice any flat refusal of that kind to go as a liaison.

My recollection is that the Bureau's attitude at that time was that it would be better if we did not go to this organizational meeting of the Commission because we will be asked a lot of questions about a report that is not complete, which we do not wish to answer until the report is complete; not an unreasonable posi-
tion to take and not one which reflects the attitudes reflected in the memorandum which you are reading.

And I believe that I probably, although I have no specific recollection of it, conveyed to the Chief Justice that view and those reasons and that he accepted them.

Mr. McKinney. How did you feel, as the Warren Commission moved on in its work? How did you feel about the FBI's thoroughness and the FBI's cooperation with the Commission?

Mr. Katzenbach. It was always my view, the whole time that I was in the Department of Justice, that the Bureau would do what you asked the Bureau to do and that they would do it well and professionally. They did not like what they were doing. They might want something more specific in the way of instructions than if they liked what they were doing.

For example, if you were to look at the files now on civil rights matters and compared them with ordinary crimes that the Bureau was investigating, you would find very detailed memorandum to the FBI from John Door in the Civil Rights Division, Burke Marshall saying please do this and then answers to that or this, do something else, three and four page instructions.

Whereas if it was a kidnapping, you did not really have to give them any instructions. They were there and doing things as they ought to be done.

I regarded then and I regard now, despite all that has come out, the Federal Bureau of Investigation is probably the most highly trained, the most effective investigative agency in the world.

Mr. McKinney. How do you tie that though to the fact that we now know they actually withheld from the Warren Commission any information they had regarding the CIA's overtures to the Mafia and the assassination attempts against Castro?

Mr. Katzenbach. I am very surprised that they did that and I really have no explanation as to why they did that. It may have been because Mr. Dulles was a member of the Commission and they thought that was his job to do it, but I am quite surprised, given relationships between the FBI and the CIA, I am surprised that the FBI did not seize the opportunity to embarrass the CIA.

Mr. McKinney. I am glad you used that word "embarrass" the CIA because I was going to ask you if you would describe your understanding at this period. My understanding is that the Director of the FBI had removed liaison from the CIA and the CIA retaliated. We had a situation where neither agency was talking to the other, basically on the basis of personal animosity rather than anything factual.

Is this your understanding of their relationship at this time?

Mr. Katzenbach. There may be some overstatement in that. Essentially that was strained for that reason. On the other hand, whenever that occurred and it occurred on other occasions, liaison was maintained simply because it had to be maintained at a lower level.

Mr. McKinney. You state in your deposition—we will move on to the CIA, on page 19. You say and I quote:

Perhaps naively, but I thought that the appointment of Allen Dulles to the Commission would insure that the Commission had access to anything that the CIA had. I am astounded to this day that Mr. Dulles did not at least make that
information available to the other Commissioners. He might have been skeptical about how far it was to go to the staff or how it might be further investigated because there was somewhat more of an aura of secrecy surrounding the CIA in 1964 than there is in 1978.

And then you went on to say that you are referring to generally anything that the CIA had in its files. Are you somewhat appalled at this point when you find out that not only were the files not thoroughly given to the Warren Commission but that such important things as Nosenko were not really given very happily?

Mr. Katzenbach. Yes, I am.

Mr. McKinney. Do you think that there is anything that this committee could possibly propose, should this terrible type of horror happen again, that would give a Commission such as the Warren Commission any type of authority which would override the bureaucratic malaise that we seemed to have had back during the Warren Commission days?

Mr. Katzenbach. I really cannot think of anything offhand. In the final analysis in government, you have to rely on the integrity and the competence of people in high position. They may not always have the integrity they should have and they may not always have that competence, but if you do not have that, it is pretty hard to scotch tape a solution around.

Mr. McKinney. There are two letters, as you probably know, which are Kennedy exhibits F-466 and F-473 from Mr. DeLoach, one of them on 11-25 and one on 12-20 concerning the leaks of the FBI information and a report, in essence, in one accusing you of leaking information. In your deposition you indicated it would be difficult for you to do so because you did not know the information.

And I just wondered what you could give this committee that would enlighten us at to why the FBI instead of simply putting out their report with the facts as they saw them started this process of slowly leaking to their favorite reporters?

Mr. Katzenbach. I think it was largely because of the appointment of the Warren Commission.

Mr. McKinney. I am sorry.

Mr. Katzenbach. It was largely because of the appointment of the Warren Commission and their resentment about that. They very much wanted the report to be made public. They very much wanted to get all the credit for it. They very much wanted the center stage.

When that was frustrated, I think they took steps of leaking the information. They have done that in much lesser contexts many, many times when I was in the Department.

Mr. McKinney. Isn’t it also possible that there is a definitive feeling on their part that a leak would not show a deficiency in an investigation as much as a report would be criticized for deficiencies?

Mr. Katzenbach. I doubt that. It is a speculation one can make. I doubt it for only one reason. I doubt very much that the Federal Bureau of Investigation thought there were any deficiencies whatsoever in their report.

Mr. McKinney. Or as least they thought there would be no deficiencies.

Mr. Katzenbach. They thought there were none; yes.
Mr. McKinney. Well, I am fascinated that the Senate came to the conclusion that, quoting from book V on page 6:

The committee had developed evidence which impeaches the process by which intelligence agencies arrive at their own conclusions about the assassination and by which they provided information to the Warren Commission.

They go on to state that “Facts that might have substantially affected the course of the investigation were not provided the Warren Commission.” Then you state on page 30 of your deposition that “Mr. Hoover resented greatly when Mr. Kennedy or I talked directly to any agent in the field.”

On page 47 of your deposition you said:

You see, nobody really could do it other than the Bureau, with the Bureau’s acquiescence. Nobody else knew. I did not know what was going on. Nobody in the government knew what was going on other than very short conclusionary statements which you got from liaison people, from the Director himself.

In other words, isn’t this really sort of a stone wall attitude toward the Commission, toward the Attorney General, the Assistant Attorney General and almost everybody else involved?

Mr. Katzenbach. Yes, it can be viewed that way. The Bureau, during the time that I was in the Department of Justice, had a very strong view that they were to do investigations.

That was their responsibility and their responsibility ran essentially to Mr. Hoover on that, and they wanted suggestions. They would follow suggestions, orders with respect to an investigation from prosecutors, from the attorneys in the Department who had responsibility for the development of a case.

But essentially how they went about it and how they did it, who was assigned to it, what they said was received up through their bureaucracy. What they resented was our talking with an agent in the field about an investigation he was doing, or about something he was familiar with rather than get that report coming back through the FBI bureaucracy and coming out with Mr. Hoover’s signature and a memorandum to the Attorney General from one of the Assistant Directors, as a memorandum for an Assistant Attorney General or whatever.

That is not all bad. They simply did not want to be pinned with the views expressed by some agent in the field. If they did not acquiesce in those views or if they had other information available to them which cast some doubt upon those views, and I can understand that as frustrating as it often was.

I can understand that. I mean, when I was in government or even today—I have lot of lawyers working for me. Not every one of those people is expressing my views.

Mr. McKinney. I guess one of the bottom lines, then, of all of this, is to ask the question: If the FBI and if the CIA had been wholly cooperative and wholly open to the Warren Commission, do you, No. 1, feel that there would have been any different result in what the Warren Commission came up with or how long it took to come up with that answer?

Or do you feel that perhaps the Warren Commission’s final conclusions would not have been open to such tremendous criticism and skepticism?

Mr. Katzenbach. Well, I think obviously things would have been investigated that were not investigated or investigated in more
depth than they were investigated. I have no way at all of knowing whether what light that would have cast.

I have been personally persuaded that the result was right and I do not think it would have changed any of the evidence that they had that led to that result. But I suppose one has to say, an investigation that did not take place, it is impossible to know what would have come out of it.

And I think on the third part of your question, it is clear to me that had that been done, had that been investigated, had those facts been made public, perhaps what is going on here today would not have taken place, would not have been necessary.

Mr. McKinney. In other words, the opening would not have been there. It is luck perhaps that the Warren Commission may have hit the right result but there were so many avenues in which individual bureaucratic decisions were made not to open and were not discovered that it is relatively lucky they did not lead anywhere.

Mr. Katzenbach. I think lucky is too strong a word. They did an awful lot of work and had an awful lot of facts and an awful lot of good investigation was done in the areas where it was done.

Mr. McKinney. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions—one more question I guess I would ask. In general, we discuss the pressure from the State Department in the beginning and the reasons for that pressure and your memorandums.

Do you feel that the pressure from, say, the State Department, the pressure from the White House, general pressures of the time really made the Warren Commission do its work too quickly and the FBI do its work too quickly so that also subjected them to criticism?

Mr. Katzenbach. I think more true of perhaps the initial FBI report, but I don’t think it is possible in that period of time to do the kind of investigation that had to be done, nor do I think in essence that was what they were doing. I think they were trying to arrive at a conclusion on the basis of a very intensive, massive, but hasty investigation so as to get the most salient facts out.

The Warren Commission, my recollection is, too, about a year, and it would seem to me that is not—I don’t think there was any great pressure to get it out within a year. If they felt it was 18 months, I think it would have taken 18 months.

Mr. McKinney. It is known the Chief Justice definitely wanted to get it out before the heat of a political campaign rose to the front?

Mr. Katzenbach. Yes, and I am sure he wanted to get back on the bench.

Mr. McKinney. It is safe to say you found yourself in the uncomfortable position of being pressured to get information out but at the same time realized that speed was certainly not going to make the FBI investigation as accurate as you would like to see it?

Mr. Katzenbach. The conclusions might be accurate but the investigation couldn’t conceivably be as thorough in that period of time as the assassination of a President ought to require.

Mr. McKinney. Thank you very much. I really appreciate your answer. I am finished.

Chairman Stokes. Time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Preyer.
Mr. Preyer. Just one question, Mr. Chairman.

You have served as Attorney General, and a very good one, and you were also instrumental in setting up the citizens committee.

In the awful chance that we might ever have had to go through this kind of thing again, would you recommend the setting up of a citizens committee once again, or would you prefer to rely on the judicial system solely to investigate such an assassination?

Mr. Katzenbach. The question is difficult, Congressman, because had Ruby not shot Oswald, then I think you would have had a very different state of facts. I assume in those circumstances that it would have been investigation by the agencies of the Government developing the evidence they had, for prosecution—at the time by State authorities—of Oswald for the murder of the President.

Whether subsequent to that, depending on what then happened, you would have had a commission, a citizens group, such as the Warren Commission, I suppose, would have depended on what all the surrounding facts were at that time.

Given the identical situation; yes, if that occurred I would take the same course again, and I think I would do it the same way. I think I would rely in the same way and hope that the reliance was not misplaced.

Mr. Preyer. So the fact that there was no public trial possible in the Kennedy assassination is one good reason for having a citizens committee?

Mr. Katzenbach. Yes sir. You might need one in any event, because a trial—

Mr. Preyer. Pardon me?

Mr. Katzenbach. You might need one in any event, because the nature of a trial might leave out, leave a lot, might establish the guilt of murder of the defendant without bringing in all of the collateral things which—

Mr. Preyer. That was going to be my next question, such as the guilty plea in the James Earl Ray case?

Mr. Katzenbach. Yes.

Mr. Preyer. Of Martin Luther King?

Mr. Katzenbach. Sure, exactly. Even without the guilty plea the limits of relevant evidence, there may be a lot of unanswered questions after the judicial process has been completed.

Mr. Preyer. You mentioned the FBI, you felt, was the most effective investigative agency in the world, but you have also noted a number of the difficulties of the citizens committee working with the FBI, certain institutional jealousies there. Do you think if you had to do it again that you would advise the Warren Commission to go the route of employing independent investigators, or would you rely on the FBI as the major investigative arm?

Mr. Katzenbach. I think the question is somewhat hypothetical because, you see, I don’t think there are other investigators who have nearly the competence. I don’t think they are available in the numbers that you would need them. So it seemed to me that even today, as then, not to use the investigative agencies of the Government, and particularly the FBI, is probably to waste one of the most valuable assets that you have.

Mr. Preyer. Thank you very much.

Chairman Stokes. Time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Dodd.

Mr. Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Katzenbach, nice to have you here with us today.

I suppose that an awful lot of the speculation that grew out of the Warren Commission, after the completion of its work, over the past 15 years, a lot of it stemmed, and I will ask if you agree or disagree with this—stemmed from the memorandum, the so-called memorandum from Mr. Moyers, the November 25 memorandum that you drafted and sent to Bill Moyers.

As I recall, over the past 15 years, on any number of occasions I have either read or heard people refer to that first paragraph in that memorandum, three points, and I will quote it for you, then—I don’t know if you have a copy or not, I will see that you get one in front of you. I am quoting here:

1. The public must be satisfied that Oswald was the assassin; that he did not have confederates who are still at large; and that the evidence was such that he would have been convicted at trial.

This was November 25, 1963, 3 days after the assassination.

Now, unfortunately they don’t always quote the other paragraphs in that memorandum, which I think to an extent mellow that single paragraph, but still that paragraph has been quoted extensively as an indication that the Warren Commission was really a self-fulfilling prophecy, that it was not designed to investigate the assassination of the President from a de novo position, but rather to confirm what the FBI had already concluded, what the Dallas police had concluded, and that, therefore, the Warren Commission didn’t really fulfill its obligation, the obligation that Chief Justice Warren outlined when he said our responsibility is to get at the truth.

I am creating that scenario for you because that is how I think it has been portrayed over the years.

I have listened today to you talk about the various motivations, and it is hard, one can only sympathize, not empathize, with your position in those days, what it must have been like to be in the position you were in and have the responsibilities you had.

Can you tell this committee, or help us try and straighten out what your motivation was at that moment that you wrote those words—and this is 3 days after the assassination—‘the public must be satisfied that Oswald was the assassin.”

Why was it so important that the public be satisfied that Oswald was the assassin?

Mr. Katzenbach. Because, very simply, if that was the conclusion that the FBI was going to come to, then the public had to be satisfied that that was the correct conclusion.

My whole attitude in that memorandum, and I think it is contained or reflected in other paragraphs that you mentioned, I think it was reflected in other conversations, other memorandums that you have, one overwhelming feeling that I had, and that was in the assassination of the President of the United States, all of the facts, all of the evidence, everything that was relevant to that had to be made public.

Mr. Dodd. You say then, I should quote—in fact, Mr. Chairman, I would ask unanimous consent that this memorandum, if it is not already admitted into evidence, be admitted now.
Chairman Stokes. I believe it is already in part of the evidence. Mr. Dodd. I think all of it should be there.

You say in the first paragraph:

It is important that all of the facts surrounding President Kennedy’s Assassination be made public in a way which will satisfy people in the United States and abroad all that the facts have been told and a statement to this effect be made now.

I think that is fine, but still I am perplexed, absolutely perplexed, on why it was in the public interest to prove that Oswald was the one, and that as reflected in the next sentence, did not have confederates who were still at large.

Why was it so important to prove that 3 days after the assassination?

Mr. Katzenbach. Because for the very simple reason, if that was not a fact, and all the facts were not on the table, then it seemed to me that nobody was going to be satisfied, and I thought that the public was entitled—if there was a conspiracy, then we ought to say there was a conspiracy. If there were confederates at large, it ought to be said there were confederates at large.

I knew then already that Oswald had been in Russia, Oswald had been in Mexico. Now, if you are going to conclude, as the Bureau was concluding that this was not part of a conspiracy, that there were no confederates, then you had to make that case, with all of the facts, absolutely persuasive. If you didn’t reveal these facts, somebody else was going to reveal them.

Now, if there was a conspiracy, there was a conspiracy, and you put those facts out. But if you were persuaded Oswald was a lone killer, you had better put all of the facts out and you better not cover up anything, and you better say now all of the facts are going to be made public.

That was the advice I was giving Moyers and that was the advice I was giving the President and that was the motivation for the Warren Commission.

I don’t think this is artistically phrased. Perhaps you have never written anything that you would like to write better afterwards, Congressman, but I have.

Mr. Dodd. You won’t get me to say that.

Mr. Katzenbach. But I think if you take that, take the other paragraphs of it, take other things I was quoted as saying, other things I said, that there is a consistent view on my part.

Mr. Dodd. I didn’t want to pull this out of context. I want to make sure it is all in there. In fairness to you, it should all be in there.

Mr. Katzenbach. I was very conscious of those facts which were going to be seized upon. Is this a Russian conspiracy? And I was very conscious, perhaps as a little bit of a history buff, that nobody ever put to bed satisfactorily the assassination of Abraham Lincoln.

Mr. Dodd. You seemed in the next paragraph—I quote you again here—you say:

Unfortunately the facts on Oswald seem about too pat—too obvious (Marxist, Cuba, Russian wife, et cetera). The Dallas police have put out statements on the Communist conspiracy theory and it was they who were in charge when he was shot and thus silenced.

Am I off base there in detecting a feeling that you had on November 25, 1963, that there was something more to this, that
you felt, in fact, whether intuitively or based on other information, that this guy had been set up, Oswald was not alone?

I sense that in that paragraph, reading it word for word, and carefully, that you had some thoughts running through your mind, and you were expressing them to Bill Moyers in those words.

Mr. KATZENBACH. I don’t think I had a view one way or the other, other than what I was being told the FBI investigation had, but I was saying you have got a lot of facts here, if you say Oswald was the lone killer, he wasn’t in conspiracy with anyone, had nothing to do with any foreign government, you have got a lot of awkward facts that you are going to have to explain, and you had better explain them satisfactorily. You had better put it all out on the table.

Chairman STOKES. Time has expired

Mr. DODD. May I have 1 more minute and I will terminate?

Chairman STOKES. Without objection.

Mr. DODD. On page 22, when asked by Mr. Cornwell—I won’t read the question to you, but basically he is talking to you about the assassination plots, asking, during the deposition, about the assassination plots, and your response is this:

No. In fact, I never believed there were such plots. I testified to this before but I remember at one time they were in the White House at the time of the Dominican upheaval and I remember Lyndon Johnson asking a direct question to Dick Helms about assassination and got a flat denial from Mr. Helms that the CIA had anybody involved. It was a short conversation and you can qualify it any way you want to, but I went home pretty confident.

Did you prepare any memorandum at that time, after that conversation, or do you remember that conversation so clearly that you have no doubt in your own mind that Mr. Helms told the President of the United States in 1965 there were no assassination plots?

Mr. KATZENBACH. I remember the conversation. It is hard to remember verbatim word for word. The question may well have been, “Have we ever been involved in any assassination of anybody,” and the answer to that may have been the flat “no.”

I don’t know, I don’t remember exactly how the question was phrased, but it obviously had to do at that time with Vietnam, and I was satisfied from that that we didn’t engage in that kind of activity in this country, and I suppose I was satisfied in part, Congressman, because it was so incredible to me that we should have.

Mr. DODD. You didn’t take any notes?

Mr. KATZENBACH. I almost never did. I never had time.

Mr. DODD. Thank you, Mr. Katzenbach.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman STOKES. Time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Sawyer.

Mr. SAWYER. I just have a single question. Mr. Hart, who was a spokesman for CIA here in connection with their having taken into custody for some 3 years Yuri Nosenko, the Russian defector, said that their authority for putting this man in a specially built isolation cell for 3 years, was you, that Helms had gone to you and gotten an OK for this. Is that true?
Mr. Katzenbach. I have no recollection of any conversation involving Mr. Nosenko with Mr. Helms. There may have been such a conversation. I don't think that I authorized putting anybody in jail for 3 years. I simply have no recollection of any such conversation occurring, but there may have been a conversation about a defector. I don't know.

Mr. Sawyer. But you don't believe that you would have authorized that kind of thing, if you had been asked?

Mr. Katzenbach. No, I think I would have—I think if somebody said we have a defector, we don't know whether he is a true defector or not, we have got him under some questioning, I wouldn't have—I don't suppose that would have bothered me that much. But when you talk about incarceration for 3 years, and so forth, that seems to me a different proposition.

One would expect a defector to be questioned by CIA.

Mr. Sawyer. But not put in solitary for 3 years in a specially constructed vault, in effect?

Mr. Katzenbach. No. But I would not have been surprised if he had been questioned intensively for a week or two.

Mr. Sawyer. Thank you.

That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ford.

Mr. Ford. Mr. Chairman, I don't have questions at this time. I yield my time to the Chair.

Chairman Stokes. Time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Fithian.

Mr. Fithian. I didn't expect Mr. Ford to pass. I don't have my document out here. I wanted to talk to you about it. It has to do with your views as to how, in keeping with your deposition, you said that we should leave no stone unturned and pursue every possibility, and so on, and particularly with regard to conspiracy.

There have been some questions here of the Cuban situation. What I would like to do is ask if you could shed any light as to how you would have advised the FBI to proceed with the alleged connections between Jack Ruby and organized crime?

Mr. Katzenbach. Well, I think it should have been explored in normal investigative ways, that is, they have some sources they were using and still use, to some extent, electronic devices, in appropriate circumstances, and I would have thought they would have made any effort, every effort that was possible, to see what those connections were, if any.

There is certainly a massive amount of data in the FBI with respect to organized crime. There even was at that time. I suspect there is a lot more today.

Mr. Fithian. I wonder if we might provide the witness with the February 24 memorandum from Hubert and Griffin to Howard Willens. JFK F-448, I think, is the number. If we could provide that to the witness, I would ask that it be introduced into the record at this time.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it might be entered into the record at this time.

[The exhibit follows:]
TO:      Mr. Howard F. Williams
FROM:   Mr. Leon D. Hubert
         Mr. Burt W. Griffin
SUBJECT: Further Telephone Records to be Obtained for the Commission

In furtherance of your conversation with Mr. Griffin on February 20th and our joint conference of February 19th, the following steps are suggested to be taken as soon as possible for obtaining and preserving telephone records which may be pertinent to the work of this Commission.

Some of the suggestions may impose burdens upon private parties which are not justified by the possible results to be obtained. If so, they should be rejected and the reason for such rejection recorded in order to assure future critics that such efforts were carefully considered.

Paragraph one, two and three seek telephone numbers of phones "reasonably available" to Ruby plus records of calls placed from phones under Ruby's direct control.

Paragraph four seeks telephone numbers of all phones reasonably available to certain persons.

Paragraph five seeks only phones listed to or under the control of certain people.

Paragraph six to ten are designed to lay a basis for further investigation.

1. The FBI should immediately obtain the telephone numbers, names of subscriber, location and type of service of all phones reasonably available to Jack Ruby. "Reasonably available" should include, but not be limited to, subscriber and pay telephones at the All Right Parking Garage, Adolphus Hotel, the Egyptian Lounge, Phil's Delicatessen, Cabana Hotel, Sol's Turf Bar, Dallas City Hall and Jail, Dallas Morning News, Radio Station KLIF, together with any pay phones within reasonable walking distance of said places or any other places which Ruby frequented. Numbers and information concerning phones "reasonably available" to Ruby in Dallas may be obtained by personal contact with subscribers or the telephone company. Information as to phones available outside Dallas should not involve contact with non-residents of Dallas.
2. The FBI should immediately obtain with respect to Jack Ruby, for the period August 1 to November 25, 1963, copies of all original telephone company records bearing upon the dates, time, length of call, calling number, billing number, person calling and number called with respect to all telephone calls (including local calls) utilizing any telephone listed to Jack Ruby or any of his clubs, including pay phones on or near the premises. If the telephone company has no records which would provide information concerning local calls, the FBI should so state.

It is unnecessary at this point to obtain call records from all phones "reasonably available to Ruby" since analysis of calls from such phones would be impossible without further information. However, we contemplate that if we establish a list of suspected intermediaries between Ruby and Oswald, it would be valuable to check telephones "available" to Ruby against calls to the "intermediaries". In addition, it may be valuable to examine records of telephones listed to or used regularly by suspected "intermediaries" for calls to phones "available" to Ruby.

3. With respect to all records requested in paragraph two, the FBI should indicate in its report what telephone company personnel were questioned, the questions asked and the answers received, in all investigations which were conducted, so that it may be determined that the records obtained are complete and accurate. We believe that the method of searching for records must be detailed since telephone information forwarded so far has been spotty and inaccurate.

4. To the extent not already provided, the FBI should be requested to obtain for the Commission a list of all telephones (but not call records) reasonably available to the following persons since March 1, 1963:

- Andrew Armstrong, 3821 Dickson Circle, Apartment C, Dallas, Texas
- Karen Bennett Carlin, aka Karen Bennett Karlin, aka "Little Lynn", 3809 Meadowbrook, Fort Worth, Texas
- Bruce Carlin, aka Bruce Karlin, 3809 Meadowbrook, Fort Worth, Texas
- Marion (aka Marian) Rubenstein Carroll, 1044 W. Loyola, Chicago, Ill.
- Eileen Rubenstein Kneissky, 6722 W. Tulman, Chicago, Illinois
- Lewis J. McWilling, Las Vegas, Nevada
- Hyman Rubenstein, 1044 W. Loyola, Chicago, Illinois
- Sue (Rubenstein) Ruby, 11616 Jamestown Road, Dallas, Texas.
Mr. Howard P. Willens  
February 2, 1964

Earl Rubenstein, Ruby, 25925 Woodland Drive, Southfield, Michigan  
Eva Rubenstein (Kagal) Grant, 3929 Pallis, Dallas, Texas  
Ralph Paul, Arlington, Texas  

c/o Bert Dozeman, Copeland Road, Arlington, Texas (home)  
Pudmah's Restaurant, Arlington, Texas (access)  
John W. Jackson, 1602 Browning, Arlington, Texas (access)  
Park Pan Drive-In, 1936 East Abner, Arlington, Texas (business)  
Arno Rubenstein Volpert, 1044 W. Loyola, Chicago, Illinois  

The date March 1 is chosen because it establishes a safe margin for inquiry prior to Oswald's trip to New Orleans. With respect to each of the above persons, the FBI should provide numbers, to the extent possible, not only of home telephones but nearby pay phones, telephones of any businesses in which the individual is employed, telephones of business partners or other close business associates, telephones of friends and relatives visited frequently, and telephones at restaurants and other businesses which the individual is known to frequent. For each telephone the FBI should indicate the type of service (pay phone, subscriber phone, limited service telephone), name of subscriber, location of phone, and reason for concluding the phone was accessible to the individual under investigation. This information should be obtained primarily by examining records which will not involve personal contact with persons outside of the telephone companies and without communicating the names of suspects to persons outside the FBI. We realize that such a means of investigation will not provide a complete answer to our questions, but we believe other modes of inquiry would be unsafe at this time. As to each individual under investigation, the FBI report should indicate what sources were checked and what other information as to possibly accessible phones might be available by direct contact with individuals.

5. The FBI should obtain from a telephone company records check the personal, family and business phones of the following persons during the period March 1, 1963 to present:

   Barney Baker, 5900 Sheridan Road, Chicago, Illinois (home)  
   Chicago Loop Auto Refinishing Co., Inc.,  
   3216 South Shields Ave., Chicago, Ill. (business)  
   Curtis LoVerne Crafard, aka Larry Crafard (including phones available to him on his 'Flight from Dallas to Michigan').
659

February 24, 1964

Mr. Howard P. Willcox

San Cordona, 755 Crescent Drive, Palm Springs, Calif.

Alex Canber, 5222 W. Olympic, Los Angeles, Calif. (213 5-1032)

Frank Goldstein, 640 Taracita Boulevard, San Francisco, Calif.

Lawrence Meyers, 3950 N. Lake Shore Drive, Chicago, Illinois (home)

Eric Gag Co., 714 West Monroe, Chicago, Ill. (business)

Bay Williams Pike, 3218 Connecticut Lane, Apt. C., Dallas, Texas

Ansel Umberto, Chicago, Illinois

Mario Umberto, Chicago, Illinois

Abe Weinstein, 11023 Western Circle, Dallas, Texas.

6. The FBI should confer with the appropriate officials of telephone companies in Chicago, Dallas, Detroit, New York, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and New Orleans to determine what means, if any, are available for obtaining information as to incoming long-distance telephone calls to any particular number if the name of the caller is unknown. It is conceivable, for example, that connecting or trunk-line telephone carriers may have automatic recording devices which record the calling exchange and the dialed number with respect to calls which they transmit. Or, it may be that most telephone companies in large cities are now so fully automated that such information is contained on their FPI cards and these FPI cards could be run through a computer or other device for every telephone subscriber in the area so that such information could be derived mechanically without undue expense or personal effort. Information as to city or telephone company from which a long-distance call originated could conceivably be meaningful in light of other data which we have.

7. The FBI should confer with telephone company officials of each company serving Jack Ruby and the persons listed in paragraph four and five to ascertain if that company has any means of providing information concerning local calls to or from the phones of those persons. Even if no records are maintained by such companies in the ordinary course of business, it may be that certain electronic mechanical or other entries are routinely made either by telephone transmitting equipment or in connection with business records ordinarily maintained by the telephone company so that by careful examination of such data information concerning local telephone activity on a particular telephone could be obtained. To whatever extent information can be obtained concerning local telephone activity, the Agent should report to the Commission the nature of the information which can be obtained and the means by which it would be obtained. This data should be secured without mentioning particular names or telephone numbers.
8. The FBI should obtain a list of all telephone companies and the Chief Executive Officer serving the following areas:

Texas
Nevada
Los Angeles, California
San Francisco, California
Chicago, Illinois
Detroit, Michigan and adjacent suburbs in the Detroit metropolitan area, including Southfield, Michigan
Boston, Massachusetts and adjacent suburbs, including Belmont, Mass.
New York metropolitan area, including suburban Long Island,
Connecticut and New Jersey
Miami, Florida
Washington, D.C. and adjacent suburbs
New Orleans, Louisiana

9. Mr. Randolph should address a letter to the Chief Executive of each of the telephone companies mentioned in paragraph eight requesting that such companies not destroy until June 1, 1964 any records they may have with respect to telephone service of all subscribers. The letter should request that the source of this policy not be disclosed.

Retention of records on a blanket basis would preserve security as to the thinking of the Commission and will afford the maximum assurance that telephone records will be preserved with respect to persons not yet suspect. We realize that blanket retention may be so burdensome or expensive as to make our request seem unreasonable. If there is any suggestion along these lines, a conference to work out a reasonable system should be suggested.

10. As soon as possible after the Ruby trial and after consultation with the Commission, the FBI should obtain copies of original telephone records uncovered as a result of the investigations requested in paragraphs four and five. These records should be analyzed to determine possible links to Ruby or Oswald. Thereafter, if deemed advisable, records of phones "reasonably available" to Ruby would be analyzed for possible calls to phones "reasonably available to suspected intermediaries between Ruby and Oswald."
Mr. Fithian. It is in today's briefing book under exhibit 5. At least that is its number.

Mr. Katzenbach. Did you want me to read it?

Mr. Fithian. If you would just glance over it quickly.

As I understand your experience in the Department during Attorney General Kennedy's tenure, you became fairly familiar with the whole effort on organized crime; is that not correct?

Mr. Katzenbach. Not really terribly familiar, Congressman. That was one of the areas that Robert Kennedy was most interested in himself and, therefore, one of the areas where he had far more extensive knowledge than I. What I usually picked up from him as deputy was the areas where he had less interest, so I was not an expert on organized crime.

Mr. Fithian. If you would like, just as we chat back and forth here, to glance over that four or five pages, I think you will find that there are recommendations here from these two junior attorneys on the Warren Commission that at least lead me to believe that they were recommending a much more ambitious program than obviously was pursued and, in fact, if you go to the page 5 with me, paragraph 9, their recommendation is really precise, and it said that Mr. Rankin should address the letter to the chief executive of each of the telephone companies mentioned in paragraph 8, requesting such companies not destroy until June 1, 1964, any records that they may have with respect to telephone services of all subscribers, and so on.

If you look above that it is a number of towns. If you look on the back in the document there are a number of names that they suggest that they might pursue, and if you look earlier on in the document you find a suggestion that they survey any telephone within the reach of Jack Ruby.

Now, I am not really vitally concerned about this document with this particular witness, Mr. Chairman, but I am interested in what recommendations you would have made to the Bureau to pursue, or either you or the Department would have made to the Bureau, to pursue the possible organized crime complicity in the assassination, and that is the first part of the question.

The second part is, isn't it reasonable to expect, given the expertise of Justice in this particular field, that this might be one of the areas that we as a committee could expect the greatest amount of interaction between Justice and the Bureau, given your widespread experience down at Justice in this and the necessity of the two groups really to cooperate?

Am I way off on that, Mr. Katzenbach?

Mr. Katzenbach. No. I don't know how you are using the term Justice on that. I think with respect to the Commission that we felt, in fact, the Commission should have, whatever investigation the Commission wanted should be done and should be performed in accordance with what they wished. I don't recall making any suggestion to the Commission as to what I thought they should go into.

Mr. Willins was liaison from the Department, using Department in the narrow sense of the lawyers in the Department. He had considerable experience with organized crime and I would have expected, because of the strange shooting of Oswald by Ruby, and
because of allegations of organized crime connections—I would have expected the Commission to go into those to whatever depth they thought appropriate in terms of coming to whatever conclusions they came to.

My point is I wouldn't have either interfered or wanted them to interfere or told them what to do.

Mr. FITHIAN. Wouldn't that expectation have been heightened by what Mr. Rankin told us today that is section No. 4 of their investigative plan had to do with the whole conspiracy, did anybody at least assist?

Question. I guess what I really want to get to, Mr. Katzenbach, is in light of the FBI's role as really the investigative arm, granted the Commission had some lawyers, but the real investigation was done by the Bureau?

Mr. KATZENBACH. Yes, sir.

Mr. FITHIAN. And the Bureau under the Justice Department. Are you satisfied—

Mr. KATZENBACH. The Bureau under the Warren Commission, really.

Mr. FITHIAN. All right. Are you satisfied, as you review the case, that the FBI, in assisting the Warren Commission, did an adequate job with regard to the approach to investigating the question of any possible complicity of organized crime via the Jack Ruby link?

Mr. KATZENBACH. I don't really feel in a position to answer that question. You gentlemen could answer that question far better than I because you have gone over all of this to a much greater degree than I have.

Mr. FITHIAN. At any time during the whole Warren Commission existence, did anyone from either the FBI, to your knowledge, or the Warren Commission, come over and sit down with the Organized Crime Section of the Justice Department, or the Attorney General himself, or anybody, you or anyone else, and sort of review the bidding as to the approach that they might use in trying to ferret out any possible association?

Mr. KATZENBACH. I know of no such thing, no such occasion. They certainly did not with me, but Mr. Willins, who was the liaison there, he was a very good lawyer, had a lot of experience in organized crime, and would have been quite competent to have helped to assist them as they wanted in this respect, and I simply have no knowledge as to what conversations he had with the Warren Commission or the staff on that subject, but he was certainly competent to do so.

Mr. FITHIAN. He never made any—

Chairman STOKES. Time has expired.

Mr. FITHIAN. He never made any reports to you?

Mr. KATZENBACH. No. He occasionally told me orally, but it was my view that the Warren Commission was doing this and our job was to do what they wanted done, to give them what support they wanted in the job that they were doing, and not to interfere in any way.

Mr. FITHIAN. And the last question, you never felt that Justice or the FBI ought to go to the Commission and say, "Look, if you are really going to look into the organized crime section, this is the way you want to do it."
Mr. Katzenbach. No, I don't think any occasion came up where I felt that was appropriate or necessary.

Mr. Fithian. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. Time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Devine. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Katzenbach, Mr. Sawyer asked you about the decision to sign off for Mr. Nosenko. Can you tell us whom it was that came to you and asked for your permission to begin the interrogation of Nosenko?

Mr. Katzenbach. I don't recall anybody doing so, Mr. Chairman. I understand that Mr. Helms has said that he had a conversation with me, or recalls that he had a conversation with me on it. I have no recollection of that conversation. But perhaps his recollection is better than mine. I don't know. I don't recall any such conversation.

Chairman Stokes. Was this your testimony, that you don't recall anyone talking to you about it?

Mr. Katzenbach. Yes, sir, that is my testimony.

Chairman Stokes. At any time?

Mr. Katzenbach. At any time.

Chairman Stokes. How did you learn of it?

Mr. Katzenbach. I learned of it when the gentleman writing a book called me up about 3 or 4 months ago or 6 months ago, and asked me about it. And I said, "Who is Nosenko"?

Chairman Stokes. That would be Mr. Epstein?

Mr. Katzenbach. Yes, sir, Edward J. Epstein, right. And that was the first that I heard of it, to my recollection.

Chairman Stokes. So then, so that the record is patently clear on this point, during your tenure you knew absolutely nothing at all of this situation?

Mr. Katzenbach. Nothing that I can recall at this time. It was quite a while ago, but I have absolutely no recollection of Mr. Nosenko or anything to do with him during that period of time.

Chairman Stokes. And while you held the office that you held, were you at any time requested to give your approval to treating any defector in this manner?

Mr. Katzenbach. No, sir, the only connections that I can recall with the CIA at all fell into two categories: One was when they wished to wiretap or some electronic device to be put within this country they came to me; and the only other thing is whenever they wanted a book suppressed they came to me and I told them not to do it.

Chairman Stokes. Told them what?

Mr. Katzenbach. Told them not to do it, that there wasn't any way you were going to do it. And those are the only, at least offhand the only—I had very little connection with the CIA when I—none that I recall as deputy, a little bit, I guess at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, and perhaps some at the time of the Cuban prisoner exchange. But I had very little connection with the CIA. And I don't recall, except for those occasions, their ever asking me any legal advice whatsoever, perhaps for good reason.
Chairman Stokes. And you are absolutely certain that you cannot recall any conversation with Mr. Helms about Nosenko?

Mr. Katzenbach. I am certain that I don’t recall it; yes, sir. I can’t flatly deny that such a conversation occurred, but I have no recollection of it. It is quite a while ago, and I believe—I believe if it was as dramatic as it was put by Congressman Sawyer, I would remember it. If I was simply informed that somebody was being questioned, there was a potential defector, I might not recall it.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you.

Any other questions?

Mr. Sawyer. Yes.

Mr. Katzenbach, I don’t know whether you are informed on the details of the situation, but we had testimony by a spokesman for the CIA, so that it is not just a statement of some employee or something; he was designated by the present Director to come here and present the story because he was supposedly the most familiar with it, since he had reviewed it for the CIA.

And he stated in substance that Mr. Nosenko was taken into custody in this country by the CIA after defection, or after alleged defection, held in a so-called safe house on a diet of tea and porridge twice a day, was allowed no reading material, the guards were instructed neither to talk to him nor smile at him, he was subjected to 48 hours at a crack interrogation. This being while they built a separate facility somewhere else in the country; namely, a device described by him as a bank vault, and then built a house around the bank vault to put this man in, and then kept him there under equivalent conditions for some 3 years, with that kind of thing, 1,277 days, to be specific.

At which point they finally gave up and gave him some emolument and put him on their payroll and let him go. And then they gave, as I questioned on the authority to do a thing like that, did they have any kind of process, and they said other than the fact that Mr. Helms had conferred with you and gotten your OK that this would be legal. And I just found it awfully difficult to believe that. And that is why—and I also don’t imagine it would be the kind of thing that you would be asked to OK enough that you wouldn’t rather clearly remember the incident, if it had occurred.

Mr. Katzenbach. If the facts as you have just set them forth to me, Congressman, had ever been made known to me, (A), I would recollect it, I am certain; and I hope to goodness I wouldn’t have given the legal advice that it is claimed.

Mr. Sawyer. It makes me feel better about it. Thank you.

That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Does counsel, Mr. Cornwell, desire to be recognized?

Mr. Cornwell. I only note, Mr. Chairman, that during the questioning by the committee members there have been various exhibits which have been referred to directly or indirectly. They include exhibits which have been marked for identification as JFK F-462, F-463, F-465, F-466, F-458, F-471, F-472, F-473, and F-448, and I might ask they be placed in the record at this time.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, they may be entered into the record at this time.

[The above mentioned JFK exhibits F-462, F-463, F-465, F-466, F-471, F-472, and F-473, follow:]

[JFK exhibits F-448 and F-458 were entered previously.]
Memorandum

To: Mr. Bellon

From: S. B. Donahoe

Date: November 22, 1963

Subject: ASSASSINATION OF THE PRESIDENT

Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach called at 5:09 p.m. He said he realized that things were happening very fast and he was calling to ask that he be kept informed if there are going to be any arrests of the person or persons who assassinated the President. In other words, he would like to be advised when it is apparent there is going to be a solution.

The Deputy Attorney General also commented that if it develops that Oswald is the man who did the assassination or was involved in it, then his pro-Cuban and pro-Soviet activities will come into mounting prominence. He said if Oswald is so identified, the State Department should be advised as there are definite foreign policy considerations and decisions here.

Assistant Deputy Attorney General William A. Geoghegan called at 5:15 p.m. on behalf of the Deputy Attorney General. He advised that two men in the State Department have definite coordination responsibility in connection with any State Department action which would be required, if it develops that Oswald is implicated in the assassination. If this implication develops State Department will need full details on Oswald’s background.

The people at State Department to be notified in this regard are as follows:

John Crimmins OR William Bowdler
Extension 4588 Extension 3736
Home phone FR 6-6151 Home phone PE 7-4712

I emphasized to Geoghegan that he must recognize, and I assure the Deputy Attorney General so understood, that we could not give out any blow-by-blow account of what is happening and that we would only be acting in this regard when it became apparent that the solution is imminent. He was in agreement.

Our reports on Oswald are in the possession of State Department SIO; Mr. Turner of the Domestic Intelligence Division is so advising Crimmins or Bowdler tonight.

1 - Donahoe
2 - Sullivan
3 - Evans
4 - Rosen
5 - Bellon

79 DEC 12 1963

JFK Exhibit F-462
Memorandum

This afternoon I advised SAC Shanklin in Dallas that we are sending down Supervisors Rogge and Thompson for the purpose of going carefully over the written interview and investigative findings of our Agents in the Oswald matter so that we can prepare a memorandum to the Attorney General, attaching exhibits such as photographs, et cetera, to set out the evidence showing that Oswald is responsible for the shooting that killed the President. We will show that Oswald was an avowed Marxist, a former defector to the Soviet Union and an active member of the FPCG, which has been financed by Castro. We will then show the background of Oswald, when and where he was born, et cetera, and then the story of what happened when the President was shot and subsequently until Oswald was picked up in the theatre. We will set forth the items of evidence which make it clear that Oswald is the man who killed the President.

Shanklin said results of the investigation have been reduced to written form and consequently the information will all be available for these two Supervisors.

I told Shanklin that he should contact the Chief of Police and arrange to be sure that any evidence such as the rifle, gun casings, paper bag containing Oswald's fingerprints, et cetera, be locked up in custody of the Chief so that no souvenir hunters or other persons would destroy or take away the evidence. Despite the fact that Oswald is dead, this evidence will be necessary to back up any statement that Oswald was the man who killed the President.

I also alerted our Laboratory to retain the bullets that were compared with the rifle and to hold on to any other evidence pertaining to this case.

I told Shanklin that Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach is reportedly sending Assistant Attorney General Miller of the Criminal Division down to Dallas to speak to the Mayor to see if he can keep the Chief of Police and Lieutenant Fritz off television and radio.
At 4:15 p.m., Mr. DeLoach advised that Katzenbach wanted to put out a statement, "We are now persuaded that Oswald killed the President; however, the investigation by the Department of Justice and the FBI is continuing." Guthman of the Department wanted the FBI to put this statement out. Mr. DeLoach advised Guthman that the FBI would not put out the statement and we are opposed to any statement being put out along this line.
Memorandum

To: MR. BULLYAN

From: A. H. Belmont

Subject: LEE HARVEY OSWALD

Assassination of the President

The Director advised that he had talked to Katzenbach, who had been talking to the White House relative to the report we are to render in the Oswald case. It is Katzenbach's feeling that this report should include everything which may raise a question in the mind of the public or the press regarding this matter, including such things as the return of the passport to Oswald in Moscow, and the furnishing of money to him by the State Department for the purpose of returning to the U.S. If the State Department regulations or law required State to do these things, we should get a copy of the law.

This report will have to contain anything of relevance to the case. We should get from the Defense Department Oswald's record and disciplinary action and discharge. We should cover the angle of Oswald going down to Mexico City, and his contacts down there.

In other words, this report is to settle the dust, in so far as Oswald and his activities are concerned, both from the standpoint that he is the man who assassinated the President, and relative to Oswald himself and his activities and background, etcetera.

At such time as the report is finished, Mr. Katzenbach will go over it, and will furnish it to other officials of the government, such as McCone of CIA, the Secretaries of Navy, Defense, and State, so that they can look it over and make sure they agree and do not have any objections.

The above change will, of course, require more time for the preparation of this report. However, the Director desires that it be put as quickly as possible. Division Six will continue to handle the portion of the report dealing with the assassination attempt and the evidence gathered to show that Oswald is responsible. This means that we will have to carefully check the evidence and Oswald's possessions that the police are now turning over to us, to see if additional information should go into the report from this.

Division Five will handle the other part of the report, which will show the background, associations, etcetera, of Oswald. We must be certain that anything that is put into the report can be backed up, as it will be subject to minute scrutiny from the press and the public. For Division Five's part of the report, we should be certain also that we get back into a position to move as quickly as possible.
Mr. Sullivan

Oswald's passport back to him, et cetera. We should be certain that agents thoroughly go through Oswald's effects to see if they can pick up any correspondence with the Communist Party, the Soviet Embassy, et cetera.

This is a difficult report to prepare, but we will have to concentrate our full attention on it in order to produce the desired results.
Memorandum

TO: Mr. Mohr

FROM: C. D. DeLoach

DATE: November 25, 1963

SUBJECT: ASSASSINATION OF THE PRESIDENT

Guthman of the Department called at approximately 3:00 p.m. He stated that the Attorney General of the State of Texas was having a press conference this afternoon in Washington and would undoubtedly indicate to the press that the State of Texas would convene a Board of Inquiry into the assassination of the President and the murder of Lee Harvey Oswald. Guthman stated that the Department had to prepare to answer a large number of inquiries which they undoubtedly will receive following the State Attorney General's press conference. Guthman then read to me the following proposed release he plans to make:

"President Johnson has directed the FBI to investigate every lead and every shred of evidence in the assassination of President Kennedy and the shooting of Oswald. A full report on the FBI's findings in the assassination of President Kennedy will be made public. All evidence in the shooting of Oswald will be made available to local authorities in Dallas who will have responsibility for the trial of Jack Ruby. The Department of Justice, of course, will lend whatever assistance it can to any properly constituted Texas Court of Inquiry."

Guthman asked me what I thought of the release. I told him I disagreed with the plan to make a release. I mentioned that everything had already been said in the release which was made last night and, therefore, there was no further need to state anything else. I told him that it would be far better to wait until the FBI had procured all facts in the matter and had submitted an investigative report. I told Guthman that it was particularly bad that he wanted to make the statement that, "All evidence in the shooting of Oswald will be made available to local authorities in Dallas who will have responsibility for the trial of Jack Ruby." I mentioned that despite the truthfulness of this statement it will invite criticism. Many responsible individuals across the Nation are pointing to the inefficiency of the Dallas Police Department and a statement of this nature will merely add fuel to the fire.
DeLoach to Mohr  11-25-63  
Re: Assassination of the President  

Guthman stated he would remove the statement at once, however, 
I wanted to go ahead and make the remaining statements. I told him I still disagreed, 
that there appeared to be no need whatsoever for any further press releases to be 
made by the Department. I told him that I, personally, believe that he should answer 
inquiries in the matter. He replied that he would think over the objections in question. 

-After talking with the Director, I called Guthman back and told him 
I wanted to reiterate my objections in the above regard. Guthman stated he had given 
the matter further thought and in view of FBI objections would not issue a press 
release but merely would answer inquiries. I told him I thought this was highly advisable.

ACTION:  
For record purposes.
At 6:10 P.M., Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach called. He said Chief Justice Warren had called a meeting of the Commission appointed by the President for 10:00 A.M., Thursday morning. Justice Warren wants a high-level liaison man from any interested agency. Katzenbach will attend the meeting but he feels that the FBI should have someone there also to answer any questions the Commission might have regarding the scope of the investigation, etc. Katzenbach thinks the Bureau representative should be the Director or Belmont. I made no commitment to Mr. Katzenbach, but I recommend we advise him that our report in this matter will speak for itself and until the report is ready, there is no real purpose in an FBI representative being present at the Commission meeting.

With respect to this, it is noted that Katzenbach felt it was better to show willingness to cooperate with the Commission in every respect.

Katzenbach said that there are problems arising between the Texas Board of Inquiry, headed by Texas Attorney General Carr, and the Presidential Commission headed by Justice Warren; that Texas wants to go ahead with an inquiry and Warren wants them to hold off. Attorney General Carr and the past president of the Texas Bar Association are to come and see Katzenbach tomorrow, at which time he will try to calm the waters and establish ground rules. Katzenbach wanted to know if we wanted to talk to Attorney General Carr and the others. I told him we did not, that we were busy investigating this matter and trying to get out our report.

Mr. Katzenbach asked whether I could give him a timetable on the report. I told him no I could not, that we were working as hard as we could and that was all I could say.
Mr. Tolson

On the morning of 12/4/63 I called Mr. Katzenbach—
and advised him that we see no real reason for us to have anyone
at the meeting of the commission on Thursday morning; that there
is nothing that we can contribute at this time. I pointed out
that we were working on the investigation and the report, and
will submit it to the Department as soon as possible, and until
that time we are not saying anything.

Katzenbach said he felt this puts him in a rather
peculiar position and at least he would like to have someone
come down before the Thursday morning meeting and brief him as
to what we are doing, so that he could be in a position to
answer questions. I told him that this was undesirable; that if
the question is raised as to what the FBI is doing, there is a
very simple answer, namely that we are pressing the investigation
and the writing of the report; that this is our major goal and
until this is completed there is nothing we can contribute. I
pointed out that there is no question of any reluctance on the
part of the FBI, as we are bending every effort to produce the
information the commission will need.

Relative to the second point, about the Texas board of
inquiry, I told Mr. Katzenbach that the Director feels it would
be very unwise for this board to conduct an inquiry now that
they would have to use our evidence, and this evidence is being
made available first to the President's commission; therefore,
the two inquiries would be at cross purposes. Katzenbach was
in full agreement and said his problem is one of convincing:
the commission of this.

Katzenbach said that he had been talking to Chief Justice
Warren, and Warren had indicated to him that the chief counsel
for the President's commission will be Warren Olney. Katzenbach
thought that this would be most undesirable. Katzenbach said that,
as we probably know, Chief Justice Warren thinks that Olney can
do no wrong, and he (the Chief Justice) had made the point that
Olney is conversant with the FBI's procedures and thus would be
operating in a familiar field. Katzenbach said if we have any
ideas as to how Olney can be blocked as chief counsel, he would
like to have them. I told him that, as far as I was concerned,
Olney was an undesirable choice, and if we had any thoughts we
would get them to him.
December 9, 1963

The Chief Justice
The Supreme Court
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Chief Justice:

At the direction of President Johnson, I am transmitting herewith to you and to the other members of the Commission copies of the report of the Federal Bureau of Investigation on the assassination of President Kennedy and on the subsequent shooting of Lee Harvey Oswald. You will note that in some aspects the investigation is continuing and further information will be made available to the Commission as it develops. The Secret Service and the Department of State have also prepared reports with respect to the preparations made to guard the President and certain background information in the hands of the State Department with respect to Oswald. You will have these promptly.

This report is not a classified document since it does not contain defense information. However, we have been treating it as a highly classified document and I trust that you and the other members of the Commission will do likewise until such time as you determine to release matters contained within it. Within the Government it is being read by a very limited number of people on a "need to know" basis.

You will recall that at the time of announcing the Federal Bureau of Investigation investigation, and prior to the appointment of the Commission, President Johnson announced that the FBI report would be made public. I have,
however, informed him of your request that this report not be released until the Commission has had time to review all of the facts and evaluate them. At the same time I am sure you are aware that there is much public speculation and rumor in this connection which would be desirable to allay as quickly as possible. For example, the latest Gallup poll shows that over half the American people believe that Oswald acted as part of a conspiracy in shooting President Kennedy, and there is considerable rumor in this country and abroad to the effect that Ruby acted as part of the same or a related conspiracy.

I think, therefore, the Commission should consider releasing—or allowing the Department of Justice to release—a short press statement which would briefly make the following points:

1. The FBI report through scientific examination of evidence, testimony and intensive investigation, establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that Lee Harvey Oswald shot President Kennedy on November 22, 1963. The evidence includes ballistic tests, fingerprints and palm prints, clothing fibers and other technical data which places Oswald at the scene of the crime and establishes that he fired the shots which killed President Kennedy and wounded Governor Connally of Texas.

2. The FBI has made an exhaustive investigation into whether Oswald may have conspired with or been assisted by any organization, group or person, foreign or domestic. In carrying out this dastardly act, in this regard, the FBI has questioned hundreds of persons and checked out numerous rumors and reports. To date, this aspect of the investigation has been negative. No evidence has been uncovered indicating that any organization, group or person, including Dallas nightclub owner, Jack Ruby, was involved with Oswald in the assassination of President Kennedy, or that the subsequent shooting of Oswald was part of a conspiracy.
I would be happy to discuss any of the matters contained in this letter or in the report with you or other members of the Commission at any time you should desire. I am, of course, always at your service.

Sincerely yours,

[N. Katzenbach's signature]

Nicholas D. Katzenbach
Deputy Attorney General
Senator Russell told Mr. Malley and me that he was glad to hear an FBI denial in this matter. He stated that Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach had directly implied that the "leaks" had come from the FBI. He quoted Katzenbach as telling the members of the Presidential Commission, "J. Edgar Hoover has chewed his men out for leaking information and they won't be doing any more of this." I told the Senator that Katzenbach was obviously lying in implying such action on the part of FBI representatives. The point was made that sometimes a person tries to cover up his own guilt by blaming others.

The Senator inquired as to the identity of the sources who had been "leaking" information. I told him it appeared quite obvious that considerable of the information came from the Dallas Police who had received the results of our Laboratory and Identification examinations. He stated he recognized this fact. I told him also that the Department undoubtedly had "leaked" considerable information as it was quite apparent that a number of their "favorites" had carried rather lengthy articles concerning information contained in the FBI report.

Senator Russell told Mr. Malley and me that he was glad to hear an FBI denial in this matter. He stated that Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach had directly implied that the "leaks" had come from the FBI. He quoted Katzenbach as telling the members of the Presidential Commission, "J. Edgar Hoover has chewed his men out for leaking information and they won't be doing any more of this." I told the Senator that Katzenbach was obviously lying in implying such action on the part of FBI representatives. The point was made that sometimes a person tries to cover up his own guilt by blaming others.

The Senator inquired as to the identity of the sources who had been "leaking" information. I told him it appeared quite obvious that considerable of the information came from the Dallas Police who had received the results of our Laboratory and Identification examinations. He stated he recognized this fact. I told him also that the Department undoubtedly had "leaked" considerable information as it was quite apparent that a number of their "favorites" had carried rather lengthy articles concerning information contained in the FBI report.

Senator Russell told Mr. Malley and me that he was glad to hear an FBI denial in this matter. He stated that Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach had directly implied that the "leaks" had come from the FBI. He quoted Katzenbach as telling the members of the Presidential Commission, "J. Edgar Hoover has chewed his men out for leaking information and they won't be doing any more of this." I told the Senator that Katzenbach was obviously lying in implying such action on the part of FBI representatives. The point was made that sometimes a person tries to cover up his own guilt by blaming others.

The Senator inquired as to the identity of the sources who had been "leaking" information. I told him it appeared quite obvious that considerable of the information came from the Dallas Police who had received the results of our Laboratory and Identification examinations. He stated he recognized this fact. I told him also that the Department undoubtedly had "leaked" considerable information as it was quite apparent that a number of their "favorites" had carried rather lengthy articles concerning information contained in the FBI report.

Senator Russell told Mr. Malley and me that he was glad to hear an FBI denial in this matter. He stated that Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach had directly implied that the "leaks" had come from the FBI. He quoted Katzenbach as telling the members of the Presidential Commission, "J. Edgar Hoover has chewed his men out for leaking information and they won't be doing any more of this." I told the Senator that Katzenbach was obviously lying in implying such action on the part of FBI representatives. The point was made that sometimes a person tries to cover up his own guilt by blaming others.

The Senator inquired as to the identity of the sources who had been "leaking" information. I told him it appeared quite obvious that considerable of the information came from the Dallas Police who had received the results of our Laboratory and Identification examinations. He stated he recognized this fact. I told him also that the Department undoubtedly had "leaked" considerable information as it was quite apparent that a number of their "favorites" had carried rather lengthy articles concerning information contained in the FBI report.

Senator Russell told Mr. Malley and me that he was glad to hear an FBI denial in this matter. He stated that Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach had directly implied that the "leaks" had come from the FBI. He quoted Katzenbach as telling the members of the Presidential Commission, "J. Edgar Hoover has chewed his men out for leaking information and they won't be doing any more of this." I told the Senator that Katzenbach was obviously lying in implying such action on the part of FBI representatives. The point was made that sometimes a person tries to cover up his own guilt by blaming others.

The Senator inquired as to the identity of the sources who had been "leaking" information. I told him it appeared quite obvious that considerable of the information came from the Dallas Police who had received the results of our Laboratory and Identification examinations. He stated he recognized this fact. I told him also that the Department undoubtedly had "leaked" considerable information as it was quite apparent that a number of their "favorites" had carried rather lengthy articles concerning information contained in the FBI report.

Senator Russell told Mr. Malley and me that he was glad to hear an FBI denial in this matter. He stated that Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach had directly implied that the "leaks" had come from the FBI. He quoted Katzenbach as telling the members of the Presidential Commission, "J. Edgar Hoover has chewed his men out for leaking information and they won't be doing any more of this." I told the Senator that Katzenbach was obviously lying in implying such action on the part of FBI representatives. The point was made that sometimes a person tries to cover up his own guilt by blaming others.

The Senator inquired as to the identity of the sources who had been "leaking" information. I told him it appeared quite obvious that considerable of the information came from the Dallas Police who had received the results of our Laboratory and Identification examinations. He stated he recognized this fact. I told him also that the Department undoubtedly had "leaked" considerable information as it was quite apparent that a number of their "favorites" had carried rather lengthy articles concerning information contained in the FBI report.
Senator Russell was told that we would, of course, be glad to be of assistance to him on an informal basis in connection with the inquiry by the Presidential Commission. He was advised that Inspector Malley had been appointed by the Director to serve as liaison man with Lee Rankin, the Chief Counsel, and that Malley also would be at his disposal any time service was needed. The Senator confided that he had argued with the President about being appointed to the Presidential Commission. He stated the President had called him early one afternoon to advise that he was being appointed to this Commission. Senator Russell told the President that he could not take the appointment, that he considered this to be somewhat of a nasty job. The President then asked Senator Russell if he would recommend any member of the Supreme Court. Senator Russell stated that he didn't know a single member of the Supreme Court he would recommend for anything. The President called Senator Russell back early in the evening of the same day and named the members of the Presidential Commission. When he came to the Senator's name, the Senator stopped him and told him again that he wouldn't be on the Commission. The President told Senator Russell that he had already issued a press release reflecting that he was a member. The Senator stated his hands were, therefore, tied and there was nothing he could do about the matter. He added it was very distasteful to him, however, to serve on the same Commission as Chief Justice Warren inasmuch as he had no respect for Warren.

We discussed a number of mutual interests in the State of Georgia before leaving. The Senator is driving home tonight and plans to take the FBI report with him. He has not yet had a chance to read it. He stated that upon his return, he would call if any questions whatsoever arose regarding the problems of the Presidential Commission.

ACTION:

For record purposes.
Mr. CORNWELL. I have nothing further, thank you.

Chairman Stokes. Mr. Katzenbach, as a witness before our committee, you are entitled at the conclusion of your testimony to have 5 minutes in which to make any comment that you so desire relating to testimony before this committee, and I extend to you at this time 5 minutes for that purpose, if you so desire.

Mr. KATZENBACH. I will be very, very brief, Mr. Chairman.

I regret that the Warren Commission report was inadequate, if it was inadequate in any respects, and that as a consequence this committee has felt, the Congress has felt through this committee, the necessity to reexamine the assassination.

I am sure that you, sir, and all the members regret that equally. I have confidence that what this committee is doing and will do in its report, will reflect the wisdom and integrity of its members.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you very much, and on behalf of the committee, we certainly thank you for your appearance here and for the cooperation you have given this committee and the time you have expended in giving us the benefit of your testimony. Thank you very much.

Mr. KATZENBACH. Thank you.

Chairman Stokes. You are excused.

There being nothing further to come before the committee, the committee adjourns until 9 a.m., tomorrow morning.

[Whereupon, at 4:08 p.m., the committee was recessed, to reconvene Friday, September 22, 1978, at 9 a.m.]

[The deposition of Mr. Katzenbach referred to previously follows:]
Stenographic Transcript Of

HEARINGS

Before The

President John F. Kennedy

SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

DEPOSITION OF NICHOLAS KATZENBACH

Washington, D.C.
August 4, 1978

Alderson Reporting Company, Inc.
Official Reporters
300 Seventh St., S. W. Washington, D. C.
554-2345
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

Friday, August 4, 1978

U. S. House of Representatives
Subcommittee on the Assassination
of President John F. Kennedy
Washington, D. C.

Deposition of

NICHOLAS KATZENBACH

called for examination by counsel for the Committee, pursuant to
notice, in the offices of the Select Committee on Assassinations,
Room 3501, House Annex No. 2, Second and D Streets, Southwest,
Washington, D. C., beginning at 10:00 o'clock a.m., before
Albert Joseph LaFrance, a Notary Public in and for the District of
Columbia, when were present on behalf of the respective parties:

For the subcommittee:

Gary Cornwell
Michael Ewing
Kenneth Klein
James McDonald

For the deponent:
(There was no representation.)
Mr. Cornwell. We will go on record.

Please state your name.

Witness, Nicholas Katzenbach.

Mr. Cornwell. What is your present home address?

Witness, 117 Library Place, Princeton, New Jersey.

Mr. Cornwell. Mr. Katzenbach, my name is Gary Cornwell, deputy chief counsel of the Select Committee on Assassinations. I have been designated as counsel to take statements under oath in depositions pursuant to House resolution 222 and committee rule four.

The deposition will be recorded. There is a certified shorthand reporter here.

Will you administer the oath?

Whereupon,

NICHOLAS KATZENBACH

was called as a witness by the committee and, having been first duly sworn by the Notary Public, was examined and testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

By Mr. Cornwell:

Mr. Cornwell. Mr. Katzenbach, you are appearing here voluntarily and not pursuant to a subpoena. Is that correct?

Mr. Katzenbach, Yes.

Mr. Cornwell. You have been provided copies of the committee
rules and House resolutions 222, 433 and 760. Is that correct?

Mr. Katzenbach. Yes.

Mr. Cornwell. In particular, have you had a chance to read rule four of the committee rules which govern the taking of depositions?

Mr. Katzenbach. Yes.

Mr. Cornwell. Do you have any questions about that?

Mr. Katzenbach. No.

Mr. Cornwell. Among other things, I take it you have noticed you have a right to counsel in connection with depositions before this committee?

Mr. Katzenbach. Yes.

Mr. Cornwell. The deposition of course will be transcribed and after it is transcribed, we will mail a copy to you and ask that you make any changes you desire in it to reflect accurately your testimony and to sign it and verify it and then return it to us at which time, if you desire, we will be happy to supply you with a copy.

I would like to direct your attention to November 22, 1963 and ask you if you will recall where you were on that day.

Mr. Katzenbach. I was in my office on that day in the Department of Justice. I was having lunch at a seafood restaurant, the name of which I forget, with one of my deputies, Joe Dolan at the time I heard the news of the assassination. I left immediately and returned to my office.
Mr. Cornwell. On that date, what was your official position with the Department of Justice?

Mr. Katzenbach. I was deputy attorney general.

Mr. Cornwell. Upon returning to your office, do you recall what conversations you may have had concerning the event that afternoon?

Mr. Katzenbach. I actually went directly to the attorney general's office, Mr. Kennedy. He was at home at the time and I asked his secretary, Angela Novello, what the latest news was from Dallas.

Mr. Cornwell. Did you that afternoon have a discussion with the attorney general?

Mr. Katzenbach. Yes, I did. I talked to him once, perhaps twice. He was out at Hickory Hill.

Mr. Cornwell. I would like to know if you can recall generally what the nature of the conversation was but in particular what, if any, problems were identified that the department faced at that point in time?

Mr. Katzenbach. I can recall what I believe were two conversations, but it might have been one. The first one I simply called him to tell him how devastated I was at the news. The second conversation was when he telephoned me and said that the vice president, Mr. Johnson, had called him from Texas and wanted to know where he should be sworn in and would I please call him back and tell him whatever my advice was on that subject, which I did,
Mr. Cornwell. Were there any other problems that were identi-
tified at that time that the Department of Justice or you needed
to focus upon?

Mr. Katzenbach. I do not believe so. The first conversa-
tion that Robert Kennedy said to me was that he had heard the news
from Mr. Hoover and he made some comment that Mr. Hoover had called
him and been very blunt in the conversation. But as far as what
the Department was doing in the investigation or anything of that
kind, I had no discussions of that kind with Bob Kennedy.

Mr. Cornwell. Did you discuss what position the Department
should take or any other problems with other persons in the Depart-
ment that afternoon that you can recall?

Mr. Katzenbach. Apart from the fact that the Bureau was
investigating it under whatever rather slim authority that it had
to do it, I had a conversation with Mr. Hoover, maybe more than
one. I had a number of conversations with my associates at the
Department because they were all kind of gathered into my office
at that point as we were awaiting news of what was happening,
what were the arrangements with respect to President Kennedy's
body, with respect to an autopsy, that kind of thing.

Mr. Cornwell. Let me ask you first about the question of
jurisdiction. Did the FBI seek from the Department authorization
to proceed with the investigation and, if so, what was your reply?
What statutes or whatever did you cite as authority for that?

Mr. Katzenbach. I do not really recall. I probably cited
some civil rights statute but I do not recall. I do not think
there was ever any question as to the Bureau getting into it
heavily although we all recognized that obviously primary juris-
diction lay with the state as far as the murder was concerned.
When the Bureau was in the mode of assisting or investigating
or whatever they were into it and there was never any question that
they would be into it heavily and pretty massively.

Mr. Cornwell. Without confining the question then to the
afternoon of the 22nd, let me ask you with respect to, say, the
next two to three days going up through Sunday afternoon, what
additional problems did you focus upon?

Mr. Katzenbach. I had a number of conversations that evening
of the 22nd until sometime after midnight, primarily with Barefoot
Sanders, who was U. S. Attorney in Dallas. I had a number of con-
cerns which I expressed to him about the numerous public statements
that were being made by the various police officials down there.

I had a particular concern, if indeed Oswald was in fact the
sole assassin of the President, as to whether the public statements
they were making, what they were doing might not lead to have his
counsel talking about the possibilities of fair trial, no right
to counsel and that kind of thing and I thought it would be an
absolute disaster if the President of the United States were
assassinated and for some due process reasons the police had screwed
it up to the point that you could not convict that person, assuming
him to be the guilty party.
There were a number of conversations about that. I had conversations I believe with Bernard Siegel in the ABA, perhaps with other people, in an effort to make sure that Oswald had somebody who was representing him and advising him, and awkward situation for me to be in, but one that I felt was important.

Mr. Cornwell. Do you recall any other problems that were identified on that day?

Mr. Katzenbach. That is a problem that sticks out in my mind. I was getting reports from the Bureau throughout that evening. I guess I probably was on the phone virtually -- I got home maybe 7:30 or 8:00 o'clock that night and I guess I was on the phone until 1:30 or 2:00 a.m.. That was the predominant problem. That is the one I recall.

Mr. Cornwell. Going back to the earlier question, expanding the subject to cover the two or three days up through Sunday, which would have been the 24th, were additional problems identified and, if so, what was their nature?

Mr. Katzenbach. Certainly, one additional problem that was dramatically identified was the murder of Oswald by Ruby, which I guess like millions of others, I saw on television. There were a lot of problems, I think, but not of great relevance to your inquiry, simply with respect to a number of arrangements, final arrangements and that sort of thing with respect to President Kennedy, trying to handle the Department personnel.

As far as the investigation is concerned I had numerous
reports from the Bureau of things that were going on. Again, I
cannot exactly tell you the time frame on this, but there were
questions of Oswald's visit to Russia, marriage to Marina and the
visit to Mexico City, the question as to whether there was any
connection between Ruby and Oswald, how in hell the police could
have allowed that to happen.

Those were the sorts of considerations at least that we had
during that period of time, I guess. The question as it came
along as the result of all those things was whether this was some
kind of conspiracy, whether foreign powers could be involved,
whether it was a right-wing conspiracy, whether it was a left-wing
conspiracy, whether it was the right wing trying to put the con-
spiracy on the left wing or the left wing trying to put the con-
spiracy on the right wing, whatever that may have been.

There were many rumors around. There were many speculations
around, all of which were problems.

Mr. Cornwell. What can you tell us about the mechanisms that
were designed or contemplated during this same period for solving
the kinds of problems you just identified?

Mr. Katzenbach. The principal recognition I have is that I
felt very early and continued to feel throughout, that the facts,
all of them, had to be made public and it had to be done in a way
that would give the public both in this country and abroad the
confidence that no facts were being withheld at all.

I felt that this would be difficult to do if the FBI, despite
the reputation of the FBI, were the only party involved in investig-
ing or doing the report and that would have to be reviewed
by somebody in whom the public had confidence. I think the FBI
at that time had been able to satisfy domestic public opinion with
its conclusions because of the reputation it had had.

I doubted that anybody in the government, Mr. Hoover, or the
FBI or myself or the President or anyone else, could satisfy a
lot of foreign opinion that all facts were being revealed and
that the investigation would be complete and conclusive and with-
out any loose ends.

So, from the beginning, I felt that some kind of commission
would be desirable for that purpose; and, in addition, because if
that were not done then it seemed to me that there would be a
number of commissions, because an event like the assassination of
a president of the United States is one that attracts a lot of
political inquiry.

That, in fact, developed in Texas perhaps that week, I do not
know when, and there were certainly House and Senate resolutions
contemplated, if not introduced. I do not recall. So that I felt
that it would be desirable, I felt from the beginning, it would
be desirable for the President to appoint some commission of
people who had international and domestic public stature and reput-
tation for integrity that would review all of the investigations
and direct any further investigation.

That was a difficult position in one sense for me to take
because the Bureau was at least formally under my jurisdiction and anybody who had even a nodding acquaintance with Mr. Hoover would appreciate the fact that he would regard that as a slap at the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

So that while I felt strongly that way and communicated that view to people in the White House, it was not easy for me to cope with it within the Department itself. Mr. Hoover was strongly opposed to it.

Mr. Cornwell. Was the opinion at least at the high management levels in the Department, essentially unanimous and in agreement with you on that issue?

Mr. Katzenbach. I think there was nobody who disagreed with it. I cannot remember now whom I talked it over with, but I would be certain that I talked it over with a number of the assistant attorneys general. I am sure I mentioned it to Robert Kennedy, but he really was not particularly interested one way or another.

His view, as he communicated it to me at that time, was do whatever I wanted to do, but nothing was going to bring his brother back to life.

Mr. Cornwell. What, if anything, specifically led to your feeling that some external review was necessary?

Mr. Katzenbach. I think a number of things. The first was the fact, almost unavoidable I suppose in an event of that kind where a lot of conflicting information and rumors did in fact come out from the various mouths of Texas law enforcement authorities.
and others, that there were a number of things of that kind, statements of that kind, that would have to be reconciled or would have to be explained.

There were a number of speculations about conspiracy made more dramatic by the facts that were uncovered fairly quickly about Oswald’s own background, the ones I have already mentioned.

The thing that influenced me personally perhaps more than anything else was the Lincoln assassination and the fact that a century later people were still coming out with books about Lincoln, who was the real assassin, who conspired and so forth and so on.

I thought it had foreign policy implications because of speculations about whether the Russians were behind this, could they have done this? Was it in retaliation for the Bay of Pigs?

Finally, I think in terms of protecting President Johnson because people abroad in many countries, if they had a head of state assassinated, assumed that the person who succeeded him had something to do with it. That was a reason why it seemed to me in a sense President Johnson was disqualified and why some other people of enormous prestige and above political in-fighting, political objectives, ought to review the matter and take the responsibility.

My hope, I guess naive in view of my testimony today, was that if all the facts were put out, if everything were there, if the investigation were really done, however it came out, whatever happened, that would be the truth and we would not be exposed to
re-investigations as was the case with Lincoln, every five or ten
or fifteen years whenever anybody was inspired to do it.

Mr. Cornwell. Do I understand from your last answer that
the perceived need to protect President Johnson from allegations
of involvement would also be the primary reason that you requested
as an alternative the Department of Justice's conducting or hand-
ing the review function?

Mr. Katzenbach. That would be one factor. I do not think
the most important one. I think it was just the fact that the
Department of Justice would be identified, at least in foreign
countries, so closely with the government that there would be some
question as to whether all the facts had been put out or something
was being concealed.

The relations between Bobby Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson were
such that perhaps that would not have been suspected. On the
other hand, it seemed to me extraordinarily distasteful for Bobby
to head that up. In any event, he would not have been willing,

Mr. Cornwell. What specifically did you contemplate as the
best solution to the problem, the best mechanism? Was it the
Warren Commission or did you have some other view?

Mr. Katzenbach. It would be essentially the Warren Commission
or something very much like it. As far as the particular people
are concerned, I had not any great thoughts of particular people
outside of the fact that if you do not want to have a separate
House or Senate investigation, it would probably involve people of
prestige from those two bodies and whatever other persons were
acceptable and somebody of enormous prestige to head it.

I thought Chief Justice Warren probably had more credibility
abroad than any other American at that particular time in history.
I thought he would be ideal but I also was aware, as any lawyer
would be, of the fact that the Chief Justice of the United States
would find problems in undertaking that kind of role while a sitting
Chief Justice.

It was sort of hard to think of anybody who could serve that
role better than he.

Mr. Cornwell. You told us that of course Mr. Hoover dis-
agreed with this view and that the Department basically agreed
with you in the view. What about the President's view, for
instance?

Mr. Katzenbach. Well, initially, the President neither
rejected nor accepted the idea. He did not embrace it, I thought
there was a period of time when he thought that it might be unnec-
essary to do.

Mr. Cornwell. What was that, necessary or unnecessary?

Mr. Katzenbach. Unnecessary to do, but I really do not know.
I think you have to also realize that I was working as Bobby
Kennedy's deputy and that they were not particularly close people,
that he would be suspicious, it seemed to me, of information at
that particular time, of what advice he might be getting from
either me or from the White House staff left over from President
Kennedy, that he would want his own advice from people in whom he had confidence as the result of long friendship or political association.

Mr. Cornwell. Did you speak with anyone else about this solution to the problems that you faced before the decision, of course, was ultimately made?

Mr. Katzenbach. I believe I recommended it to Bill Moyers, whom I knew slightly at that time. I believe I raised it with Walter Jenkins and I believe I raised it with President Johnson.

Mr. Cornwell. What about people outside the President's immediate circle?

Mr. Katzenbach. I talked with people outside of the President's immediate circle.

Mr. Cornwell. Did you talk with the CIA?

Mr. Katzenbach. No, I did not talk with anybody at the CIA that I can recall now. I might have talked with somebody at the State Department about it, conceivably with Dean Rusk, more likely with Alexis Johnson.

Mr. Cornwell. Do you mean about what their views were?

Mr. Katzenbach. Yes. I am sure I talked about it with people outside the government entirely who called me and suggested old friends or former colleagues.

Mr. Cornwell. What were the views of the State Department and Dean Rusk?

Mr. Katzenbach. I think Dean Rusk was for it, but he is a
fellow who played things quite close to his vest. Whether he said it to me before it was decided or he said it was a good idea after the President decided to do it, I simply do not know.

Mr. Cornwell, What about Alexis Johnson?

Mr. Katzenbach, I think he thought it was a good idea. But they were very much interested in time. They wanted to get something out in a hurry. The State Department was constantly pressing because, I guess, of the rumors abroad or the accusations.

Mr. Cornwell, Did you speak to Earl Warren about the subject?

Mr. Katzenbach, When the President decided he wanted to do that, he asked me to go speak to the Chief Justice and ask him to serve in that capacity, which I did, and he declined. Later in the day, the President had him over to the White House and he changed his mind.

Mr. Cornwell, What, if any, arguments did you use to try to persuade him?

Mr. Katzenbach. Essentially the same ones I have given you now, that I thought that everything had to be done that would give public opinion all over the world confidence that the true facts had been revealed, that everything was out on the table, whether they were difficult facts or whether they were not, that they be made public and not subject to later discovery or like, this or that.

I thought it took a man of his experience and his prestige to do it. He, it seems to me, rather predictably said he thought that
was in conflict with being the Chief Justice and, therefore, thought somebody else ought to do it. I argued there was no other person, being the kind of man he was, which the Chief Justice vehemently denied.

Mr. Cornwell. Was there anything specific which had come to your attention out of the investigation which was known by any of the senior officials at the government at the time which made the international repercussions or potential repercussions particularly severe?

Mr. Katzenbach. No, other than what was really public information at the time. There was a great deal of writing about it in the foreign press as there was domestically. There was a great deal of speculation about the possibility of conspiracy from almost any direction you could make conspiracy.

The inherent facts of it were what kept fueling those rumors. Probably the most important was simply Jack Ruby's killing of Oswald. Why should that happen? Why should he have done this? I must confess to this day, I find that absolutely incredible, how it could have happened or even why it could have happened.

A number of the things I have mentioned, the connections, whether real or tenuous, that Oswald had with the Soviet Union, his trips to Mexico City, his marriage to Marina, all of those things were obviously risks for speculation.

Mr. Cornwell. Was there anything specific which had come to your attention in terms of either an agency relationship, FBI, CIA
State or anything else with Oswald or their involvement in any other matters which also pushed your thinking in the same direction which led you to conclude that it was necessary to have an independent review function over the agency's investigation?

Mr. Katzenbach. I think, apart from the things I have mentioned, nothing that occurs to me. I guess I had memos about the Department of State's returning the passport to Oswald or giving him money to get home or something of that kind. It seemed to me, in view of the facts, that in all probability it appeared he had killed the President of the United States, an unhappy public relations situation.

I take it your question is probably directed against CIA connections of one kind or another and I have no knowledge of that whatsoever.

Mr. Cornwell. As merely an example and not meaning to make this an exclusive list of possibilities, had anything like Mafia plots, CIA mafia plots against Castro come to your attention?

Mr. Katzenbach. No. I think if they had, I would have dismissed them as ridiculous, but I never heard of them.

Mr. Cornwell. You never heard of anything like that, that the CIA might have been reluctant to get into it and, therefore, you thought an independent review function was necessary?

Mr. Katzenbach. No, nothing really of that kind at all. It never occurred to me. Perhaps I was naive, but it never occurred to me that the CIA would be involved among its covert activities.
I was aware they had covert activities although I did not pretty much know what they were. But that they would have been involved in the assassination quite honestly never entered my mind.

It would have seemed to me then as it seems to me now, not on moral grounds, but on pragmatic grounds a very poor idea for the United States to expose its president to that kind of thing.

Mr. Cornwell. Apart from just general speculation that some law enforcement agency may have been culpable because people had a hard time believing that the event had occurred or was allowed to occur, was there anything specific along those lines about a connection between any agency of the government and Oswald that led you to believe that an independent review was essential?

Mr. Katzenbach. No, there was nothing of that kind.

Mr. Cornwell. Would you tell us what your views are today, using all the hindsight that is now available to you about the adequacy of the mechanisms that were ultimately chosen?

Mr. Katzenbach. I think the mechanisms were first-rate. They did not work entirely. If I were doing it again, I would do exactly the same thing. I think you have two inherent facts that you have to live with. One was that there is no investigative agency in the world that I believe compares with the Federal Bureau of Investigation then and I suppose it is probably true today. The notion that you could create a separate investigative agency to investigate something of that kind that would do the job better than the FBI I would have rejected then and I would reject now.
That does not mean that, as in many other instances that you had with the FBI and the Department of Justice, you did not ask the FBI, reading their reports, to go back to re-interview so and so to ask these questions and check on this and that which I thought ought to be done.

In other words, I did not think you should take their summary reports and conclusions without examining all of the stuff that came into the FBI.

Perhaps I could put it differently and say in terms of the capacity of the FBI, they are extremely good. When it comes to the synthesis of the information it seems to me at that point my own experience was that it was worth having other people review it and ask for, as we often did in civil rights matters and quite often in criminal matters, further investigation of various leads that had been rejected as being unproductive. That is what I asked the Warren Commission to do.

The other problem quite honestly never even occurred to me and I do not know how it would resolve other than in a strong direction to the President and that is the question of the CIA, or the FBI for that matter, concealing information.

Perhaps naively but I thought that the appointment of Allen Dulles to the Commission would ensure that the Commission had access to anything that the CIA had. I am astounded to this day that Mr. Dulles did not at least make that information available to the other commissioners. He might have been skeptical about how
far it was to go to the staff or how it might be further investigated because there was somewhat more of an aura of secrecy surrounding the CIA in 1964 than there is 1978. If there is a secret left, I do not know what it is.

Mr. Cornwell. And the information you are referring to is the Mafia plots?

Mr. Katzenbach. That is not really the information I am referring to. I am referring to generally anything that the CIA had in its files. I think if you were asking me then, I would have thought much more in the way of foreign intelligence, anything they had about Oswald, Oswald's connections, about Marina's connections, about marriage as connections, probably not Ruby unless Ruby had foreign connections.

We were unaware then of any Mafia plots. It would not really have gone through my head that that would have been a matter. It never would have occurred to me that the FBI would cover up anything. If you ask me the question, if the FBI failed to do something it should have done, would they have covered that up?

My answer to you is, even then, would have been yes, they probably would, not covering up information that somebody else was guilty of or something of this kind, but if the Bureau made any mistake or anything for which the public could criticize the Bureau, the Bureau would do its best to conceal the information from anybody.

Mr. Cornwell. Let us go back a small bit to your answer about the CIA. As I recall the way you worded it, it was in terms of
being astounded that Dulles did not make that information available
to the other Warren Commission members. The implication is that
you had some specific information in mind that you are now aware
of that Dulles possessed and did not make available. My question
is what is the specific information?

Mr. Katzenbach. It would be all of the various assassination
attempts with respect to Castro because certainly the Commission
ought to have known that.

Mr. Cornwell. In other words, not just Mafia plots, but all
of the CIA plots against Castro?

Mr. Katzenbach. Yes, all of that. There may have been other
stuff. I do not know. It would seem to me clearly that was some-
thing for the Commission to know. Whatever the conclusions from
it might or might not be, it clearly was something that they should
have been informed of. I know to this day Mr. Rusk resents very
strongly that the information was not made available to him at
that time or as Secretary of State. I rather agree with him.

Mr. Cornwell. What have been your sources of information
that Dulles did possess that information?

Mr. Katzenbach. I have none. I just assumed that the head
of the CIA knew about covert activities of that kind of importance.
He had been involved in the CIA for a very long period of time.
If he did not know that, I would have suspected he would have at
least the capacity to get it.

Mr. Cornwell, I believe some of the materials we sent you
included the Senate Report, book five, the Church committee's report. That, of course, has references in part to the extent of Dulles' knowledge of those matters. What I really want to find out is do you have any independent knowledge, did you ever talk to Dulles at any time or any of his associates by which directly or indirectly you obtained knowledge about the extent of his familiarity with the plots?

Mr. Katzenbach. No. In fact, I never believed there were such plots. I testified to this before but I remember at one time they were in the White House at the time of the Dominican upheaval and I remember Lyndon Johnson asking a direct question to Dick Helms about assassination and got a flat denial from Mr. Helms that the CIA had anybody involved. It was a short conversation and you can qualify it any way you want to, but I went home pretty confident.

Mr. Cornwell. What year was this?

Mr. Katzenbach. I can only relate it to the Dominican. I would relate it to being something like February or March of 1965, I could be off on that date, but that is about right.

Mr. Cornwell. Do you know how much prior to that date the President may have had at least question in his mind about the existence of such plots?

Mr. Katzenbach. I do not know. I do not think the President knew explicitly about any plots. I think Lyndon Johnson was deeply suspicious of what the CIA was doing and how much they were
telling him. That is why he sent the FBI down to the Dominican Republic.

Mr. Cornwell. Do you have any reason to believe that the President may have considered the possibility of such plots back as far as 1963 and 1974?

Mr. Katzenbach. I have no reason one way or the other. I just do not know.

Mr. Cornwell. You have told us that you were astounded that information about the plots was not made available at least to the Commission members. Obviously, that implies that you think it would have been relevant to the inquiry.

Mr. Katzenbach. Oh, yes, I think given that information, you would have pursued some lines of inquiry probably harder than you might have otherwise pursued them.

I have no reason to believe one way or the other it would have changed the result or turned it around or anything of that kind. I have no information on that. It is simply I believe if I had been a member of the Warren Commission, I would have believed that to be relevant information which would require investigation.

Mr. Cornwell. Looking back again, using hindsight, even though during 1963 and 1964 no one explicitly stated to you that there had been plots directed at Castro, were there any conversations you had with the President or any of his advisors or Bobby Kennedy during that period which again as I stated from hindsight indicated they had either a suspicion or some knowledge of the
plots?

Mr. Katzenbach. No, nothing that I can recall. You phrased your question fairly broadly. I assume you mean assassination plots?

Mr. Cornwell. Yes.

Mr. Katzenbach. Because certainly there was the Bay of Pigs and certainly there was a lot of effort to get intelligence out of there. There were a lot of Cubans in this country that would have been quite happy if the opportunity arose to have assassinated Castro, Fidel or Raoul or Che Guevera or any of the other people.

In that sense, I suppose any citizen had to be aware of that. But there was nothing at any time that ever led me then or now, any conversation I had or any memo I had, to believe that the United States was directly involved in this kind of activity.

Mr. Cornwell. Or that Johnson, his associates, or Bobby Kennedy had a suspicion that that may have existed?

Mr. Katzenbach. That is a little more difficult. The only person it is more difficult with is Lyndon Johnson who did from time to time come to take a conspiratorial view of the world. He was concerned about the CIA because he did not really know what they were doing and he was not sure they were telling him the truth. Only in that context, nothing more specific.

Mr. Cornwell. With respect to the FBI, was there anything that they possessed that you are now aware of which they did not communicate to the Warren Commission and should have?
Mr. Katzenbach. Apparently they were aware, if I read the report correctly, of some of the CIA activities, of at least the connection with the Mafia. That certainly should have been reported. I am very surprised that it was not. There was no love lost between the FBI and the CIA. I guess it must have been the FBI's view that they would have been as embarrassed as the CIA because I think they would have no hesitation telling the Warren Commission about it.

Mr. Cornwell. Do you have any other thoughts about the failure of the mechanism? Did it fail to perform in any other respect?

Mr. Katzenbach. I really cannot think of any. I think the Commission itself hired as good a staff as they could get. I think the staff they had was dedicated, they tried to get all the facts and get the truth out. Obviously, some Commission members were stronger than other Commission members in this regard.

I think the staff was well run. At the time they made a genuine effort to get at it. Probably the failure of the mechanism -- there was one that was inherent in that situation, was then at least, and that is really the unwillingness of the FBI, and I assume the CIA, although I know less about it, to really open up files.

They did produce them and they did produce the raw material for the Warren Commission, but it was subject to at least the potential, perhaps in actuality, of not producing all of the relevant information. There must have been information in the
files with respect to the Mafia which was not produced, I do not
know how you solve that problem. The people who have files are
the people familiar with files. If they are not leveling with
you, it may be difficult to get it.

Mr. Cornwell. Was the focus of the investigative effort
broad enough?

not

Mr. Katzenbach. It may have been in retrospect, I do not know.
I thought it was pretty broad at the time. I thought I was trying
to make it as broad as possible. I thought that any of these facts
had to be put out on the table and tell us what you knew about it.
I realize the Senate committee thought it was more focused than
certainly I thought it was focused.

I do not think that had to do with the focus of it. I think
that had to do with the reluctance of the CIA to divulge this
information and the reluctance of the FBI to divulge it, not with
what the focus of the investigation was. The Warren Commission
would not have any hesitation at all in thinking that was relevant
and within the focus of their investigation.

Mr. Cornwell. Were there any specific problems which you
observed in terms of the ability to put together the various
agencies in the Warren Commission and make the whole process work?

Mr. Katzenbach. None that I can really think of. Anybody
in the government knew that there would be some tension between the
FBI and the CIA, less with the Secret Service than the FBI because
the Secret Service was so utterly dependent on a lot of FBI
information that they were really in the position of a poor
relation. We did review fairly quickly, within I guess a few days
of the assassination, whether the measures that were taken to
put people in the security index were the proper measures or not.

There was a meeting with all of the involved people, the
Secretary of the Treasury, the head of the Secret Service, head of
the CIA, Mr. Hoover and myself, I guess Allen Belmont was there,
perhaps Sullivan, I do not remember.

We reviewed that procedure. I think you could review that
procedure many hundreds of times without coming out with a very
satisfactory procedure because the problem is that the list gets
unmanageably big.

Mr. Cornwell. What contributions, if any, did the Department
of Justice provide for the overall investigation?

Mr. Katzenbach. Relatively little in the sense that the
Commission used its own legal staff, not the Department of Justice’s
legal staff, and then Howard Willens, the first assistant in the
Criminal Division to be liaison with the Commission and try to
help the Commission attorneys because of his familiarity with FBI
investigative processes and so forth, help to get them the infor-
mation that they wanted.

I think the Department of Justice was not really involved
in it, excluding the FBI.

Mr. Cornwell. Directing your attention to your analysis
earlier that it would have been ill-advised to attempt to create
an investigative organization specifically for the purpose of doing
this job and that, therefore, it was necessary to utilize the
resources of the FBI primarily, and the other agencies secondarily,
why was there no parallel thinking or implementation with respect
to the question of attorney resources, in other words, the existing
body of expertise in criminal investigations in the Department
of Justice but the decision to select an investigative staff from
scratch for the Warren Commission?

Mr. Katzenbach. That would be a question you would have to
address to the Warren Commission. Certainly, there was no reluc-
tance to provide any assistance or help that they wanted,

I am inclined to think that they had the view -- this is a
somewhat speculative answer -- they had the view that their own
independence was better established by an independent staff rather
than relying too heavily on the Department of Justice lawyers.
I would not be surprised if they thought the quality of the staff
they could attract would be better on the average than the quality
of the staff that the Justice Department could provide, which I
believe was in fact true.

Mr. Cornwell. Was the possibility of utilizing the Justice
Department's staff and running their own grand juries or anything
like that ever considered or specifically discussed?

Mr. Katzenbach. Not with me. I am sure I told Mr. Willens
when he was over there that the Department of Justice was totally
at the disposition of the Commission to be used as they wanted.
I do not recall now any specific conversations. They did not make any requests. They had all kinds of powers themselves. They were given all kinds of powers so far as subpoenas were concerned, testimony under oath. They had all the legal paraphernalia that was necessary.

Mr. Cornwell. Apart from however the question of the legal talents which were available, which in your opinion were very high with respect to the Warren Commission staff, let me ask you to comment on the differences between the Warren Commission staff's experience and knowledge in the organized crime field for instance as compared to the Department and Bobby Kennedy's staff who had been working on those matters for a long period of time?

What, if anything, was done to compensate for that apparent inequity?

Mr. Katzenbach. They had Mr. Willens who was totally and thoroughly in the organized crime thing working as liaison.

Mr. Cornwell. So there was no other reason particularly for failing to use the Department of Justice's staff?

Mr. Katzenbach. No. I think it would be wrong to act on the assumption that we thought organized crime had very much to do with the assassination. Now, if the CIA or the FBI had come out and talked about the so-called Mafia plot, then it may have been the Commission would have dug more into the organized crime picture and certainly there were lots of people in the Department who knew that.
On the other hand, after all, that was the FBI's baby, too. In terms of knowledge about organized crime, the FBI could certainly duplicate what attorneys in the Department of Justice could duplicate about names and numbers of all players. That was within Belmont's area of responsibility.

Mr. Cornwell. The Senate report, book five at page six, reaches a conclusion that "The committee has developed evidence which impeaches the process by which the intelligence agencies arrive at their own conclusions about the assassination and by which they provided information to the Warren Commission," and they go on to state that "Facts which might have substantially affected the course of the investigation were not provided the Warren Commission."

You, I take it, essentially agree with their conclusions?

Mr. Katzenbach. I think so. The first part is difficult for me, just in the way government operates. Let me see if I can explain what I mean by that. Repeatedly when I was in the Department, I wanted to get information from the Bureau promptly, mainly about civil rights demonstrations and that kind of thing. The Bureau had its own very tight bureaucracy. Mr. Hoover resented greatly when Mr. Kennedy or I talked directly to an agent in the field.

If we wanted information, he wanted it to come through him or through Tolson or one of the assistant directors, at least have them go through the Bureau and get the information, which would
come back in and then there the Secretary would write a report and they would send it to me. They could do it amazingly fast, but still another hour longer than if you simply had a conversation directly.

As long as Mr. Hoover was alive it was very hard to break that down. Agents really did not want to talk to you, so that you had this rather awkward way of getting everything filtered. I think this Warren Commission ran into that same problem. It was not simply a problem of Mr. Hoover although it may have been a problem because of his feelings about the Bureau, his very tight control of it, but still I think almost every Bureaucrat or almost every head of a department has a little bit of the same problem.

I did not like White House staff calling attorneys in the Department of Justice about a problem and I put a stop to it. "If you have something, call me." I felt responsible for their advice and I did not want people in the White House shopping around for advice or information.

So I say that because I have been critical of Mr. Hoover, but I am not unsympathetic with the notion that he is responsible for that group of people and, therefore, he wants to know what it is they are saying and whether or not he agrees with it. That certainly is different from the point of view of superimposing Warren Commission staff on an agency of the government.

The same thing I suspect is true of the CIA. I do not know how you beat that problem. The Senate can be critical of it, I
think if you did it today you would have an identical problem.
Indeed, I think the Senate in its own investigation ran into that problem.

Mr. Cornwell. The second part --

Mr. Katzenbach. The second part I agree with, yes. Clearly there was information they had that should have been made available to the Commission.

Mr. Cornwell. Let me ask you if you have any insight into what may be the ultimate question, also posed in the Senate report, and to which they provide there was no answer.

Their statement is: "Why senior officials of the FBI and the CIA permitted the investigation to go forward in light of these deficiencies and why they permitted the Warren Commission to reach its conclusion without all relevant information is still unclear."

That is the Senate report, page seven. Do you have any information which would shed light on that question, the answer to that question?

Mr. Katzenbach. I think I probably have already exhausted my intuition about it. Speaking of the FBI with which I am more familiar I see very little way that they could have made that information available without revealing to the Commission some of their own deficiencies and thus being subjected to some criticism.

Mr. Hoover just could not stand criticism. As a small example of that, from time to time I would get information about the Bureau doing something that it should not have done and I would
inquire. I would get back a five-page memo that everything the
Bureau had done was absolutely right. I would find out sometimes
a month later that the agent involved was now in Nome, Alaska. I
was never told that, anything about disciplinary action.

We used to joke about it. I tell you once an agent was driving
me out to the airport at LaGuardia and he missed a turn. I said
to him, "Have you missed a turn?" He looked at me. He said, "No."
I said, "You have." He said, "Do you not know that the Bureau
can make no mistakes?" Whereupon he did a "U" turn and went back.

I read the Senate report and the disciplinary action taken.
I find it kind of incredible because I do not think that Oswald,
under the criteria that then existed, would have been on any such
list. I do think the agents were disciplined because history
overtook them. The destruction of the letter and so forth, I can
understand. An agent would be disciplined for that.

Mr. Cornwell. The letter that was delivered to Special Agent
Hosty?

Mr. Katzenbach. I do not blame Hosty for not doing anything
about it particularly. At the time he had things that he regarded
as much more important, not having any idea that Oswald was going
to shoot the President. It certainly does not surprise me that
the Bureau would have covered that up and dealt with their own
internally, in their own way, which they always did.

Mr. Cornwell. Among the records that we sent to you to
review prior to your coming here, was a November 22, 1963 memo
from Donohoe to Belmont in the Bureau which in part states: "The
deputy attorney general also commented that if it develops that
Oswald is the man who did the assassination or was involved in
it ... the State Department should be advised as there are
definite foreign policy considerations and decisions here."

That, of course, is essentially what you told us earlier,
that that was a dominant concern of yours during this period,
Mr. Katzenbach. And of the State Department. I am sure that
that comment came because somebody in the State Department had
called me and said that to me, probably Alexis Johnson,
Mr. Cornwell. There is a similar statement in a memo written
by Walter Jenkins recording a conversation with Mr. Hoover dated
November 24 wherein apparently Mr. Hoover expresses the view that
he is opposed to the Warren Commission, to the possibility that
a presidential commission would be formed.

He explained there are several aspects which would complicate
our foreign relations. For instance, Oswald made a phone call to
the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City which we intercepted. It was
only about a visa, however. He also wrote a letter to the Soviet
Embassy here in Washington.

This letter referred to the fact that the FBI had questioned
his activities on the "Fair Play for Cuba" Committee and also asked
about extension of his wife's visa. That letter from Oswald was
addressed to a man in the Soviet Embassy who was in charge of
assassinations and similar activities on the part of the Soviet
government. "To have that drawn into a public hearing would muddy the waters internationally."

Mr. Katzenbach. I would not want the impression that I was ever aware of that, that any of the statements that Jenkins attributes to Hoover there were statements made to me.

Mr. Cornwell. The reason I direct your attention to it is that it has the same flavor, same general drift of the testimony you provided here today and of the first memo which reflects your comments that I read, mainly to the effect that there are international considerations that weighed very heavily in the minds of the people who were making decisions about how to investigate the matter at the time.

Mr. Katzenbach. I think they are two entirely different things. Let me explain why I believe that. There is no question in my mind that there were international ramifications and the State Department had problems on this. It has 125 embassies abroad and every American ambassador is being asked about this and they want to get as much information as they can on this and they do not know. They are reading speculation, hearing speculation about foreign conspiracies, about a plot by Vice President Johnson to take over the administration from Kennedy.

They had all those problems on their hands. That was the problem that I was focusing upon. Mr. Hoover is talking about a very different problem, as I understand it. As I understand that memo, he is saying: 'Gee whizz, if we put all of this out, then
they will know we had a tap on the Cuban Embassy. They will know
we had a mail cover on the Soviet Embassy, and that would be very
embarrassing." That is not what the State Department was saying
to me and that is not what I focused on at all.
In fact, I did not give a damn about embarrassment. I cared
about getting the facts out.

Mr. Cornwell. You, of course, were aware of those types of
investigative resources? You knew that sort of thing existed,
I take it?

Mr. Katzenbach. I knew that sort of thing existed. At that
time I was deputy attorney general and I had never seen any wire
tap authorization and I would not have known what the attorney
general knew or did not know about it. That the Bureau made wire
taps I was certainly aware of. I probably was aware of -- I do
not remember when -- observation of the embassy, that kind of
thing.

I became more aware of it later. It is hard to separate in
seems to me that Mr. Hoover is using foreign policy in a rather
different way than the State Department was using it.

Mr. Cornwell. Let me ask you this then.

Mr. Katzenbach. I was not concerned about straining our
relations with anyone.

Mr. Cornwell. Had you ever run into the expression of that
view, the one that you say was uniquely Hoover's and not yours,
in these two memos?

Mr. Katzenbach. No.

Mr. Cornwell. Did anybody express their views during this
time period?

Mr. Katzenbach. I do not recall anyone expressing their
views during this time period, nor would it have concerned me,
frankly. You had two conceivable problems, both of which were
difficult although for very different reasons.

One was if Oswald is the lone assassin and not connected
with the Soviet Union or any other group, right wing, left wing,
foreign, whatever it may be, and just a nut, how do you convince
people that you have done a thorough investigation and if that is
true, when you had enough information -- I have already mentioned,
mariage to Marina, visit to Russia, Mexico City -- you
have to put all that out on the table.

You cannot cover that up. You have to put all of that out
on the table, all the facts, everything you have done.

You had another potential problem although nobody seemed to
believe that. The belief was that Oswald had acted in this way,
and indeed that would have been the belief, alone and so forth,
that I would have arrived at as the probability.

But if indeed this were a foreign assassination plot, then
you had a different kind of problem, very different kind of prob-
lem. If you did not have any problem with believing that was a
foreign assassination, then you had a diplomatic problem. I do
not think that was a strong possibility but I did not know how
you could investigate one without the other. You had to follow
up all that information.

Then you have to come to one conclusion or another. You have
to put all the facts out on the table. Now, Mr. Hoover does not
seem to be saying that to Jenkins.

Mr. Cornwell. Would you agree that it indicates the possi-
bility that the investigation within the Bureau could have been
distorted from that sort of pressure, the feeling that there
were things that could not be revealed or discussed or looked into
if there were an independent review board?

Mr. Katzenbach, I do not think I would read it that way
myself. I would read it as Mr. Hoover reaching for arguments not
to have an independent review board and pulling out anything he
could find to avoid that which he took in and of itself to be a
reflection on the Federal Bureau of Investigation and probably in
the light of facts, now known but not known then, probably because
he was concerned about some of the goofs that the Bureau had made
and that they might come out and the commission might then criti-
cize them.

You know of his reaction to the actual commission report
which was -- I doubt whether you, sir, would have felt differently
if you were the head of the Federal Bureau of Investigation that
would have been highly critical of you. For Mr. Hoover anything
that was not lavish praise was terrible criticism, unjustified also.
I think you have to read internal Bureau memoranda in mysterious ways.

In the first place, most of those fellows when they write, in most memoranda want to tell the director something he wants to hear. It is only when they are pushed against the wall that they tell him something that he did not want to hear.

I think when you are quoting internal Bureau memoranda, you are quoting somewhat selectively in the light of what would serve the Bureau's purposes and not what will not.

Mr. Cornwell. Let me ask you about whether the next memo is accurate. I am going to assume although I have a poor copy that this is dated November 28, 1963. I will show it to you. I do not know whether you would read that as the 28th or not.

Mr. Katzenbach. I believe that is the 25th.

Mr. Cornwell. Let us say it is November 25, 1963. The first sentence in the memo from Mr. Belmont to Mr. Sullivan of the FBI reads: "The director advised that he talked to Katzenbach who had been talking to the White House relative to the report that we are to render in the Oswald case. It is Katzenbach's feeling that this report should include everything which may raise a question in the minds of the public or the press regarding this matter."

Now that, of course, is very similar to the view that you previously told us you had during this period of time. What I wanted to ask you about is further in the memo it describes this view as a change. It says: "The above change will, of course,
require more time for the preparation of this report." Are you aware of any changing viewpoints on what should be the scope of the investigation or the scope of the report during this period?

Mr. Katzenbach. Again, this is an internal Bureau report. It may be that I had put this to the director so broadly that it was broader than what they were then doing. Since I did not know what they were then doing outside of being assured that they were investigating everything, I would not have known whether there was a change or not. It was not a change from my viewpoint.

Mr. Cornwell. Your view then was from the beginning that all allegations and all rumors should be investigated and everything should be laid out before the public?

Mr. Katzenbach. It had to be. And if there were problems in doing that, you faced it at the time you did it.

Mr. Cornwell. In the materials from the Senate which we provided to you at page 41, there is the statement: "Richard Helms' sentiments coincided with this Bureau's supervisor's." The supervisor they had made reference to above that -- "In his November 28, 1963 cable to the CIA's Mexico station chief, Helms stated: For your private information their distinct -- I suppose the word "is" should be in there, but it is not in the quote. It reads: "Their distinct feeling here in the agencies, CIA, FBI, State, that ambassador is pushing this case too hard and that we could well create flap with Cubans which could have serious repercussions."
I would ask you whether you would interpret that to mean that he was worried about pushing an investigation into the Cuban field too far.

Mr. Katzenbach. Subject to that interpretation. I do not know.

Mr. Cornwell. Did you ever have any discussions with Helms or anyone else at the CIA during that period by which you could tell us more precisely what their viewpoint was on such matters?

Mr. Katzenbach. Not that I can presently recall. I remember the Mexican incident only because of complaints Mr. Hoover made to me and discussions again I had I think probably with Alexis Johnson, but they came in a somewhat different light.

Mr. Hoover was telling me that "The ambassador is trying to run this investigation. I want to run this investigation. He does not know. He is not experienced and he is interfering with it."

Mr. Cornwell. That, of course, is in a somewhat different concept.

Mr. Katzenbach. In a somewhat different concept, I was again concerned about that for an entirely different reason. I did not know the nature of his interference, but that was one of the few ambassadors who was quite close to Lyndon Johnson. He was a fellow Texan. So, I had a totally different perspective on it.

Mr. Cornwell. In other words, you were worried about the
same potential allegations about tainting the investigation that you mentioned to us earlier?

Mr. Katzenbach. Yes. I was more worried about the other side of the coin. I was perfectly happy to have whomever the legal attache in Mexico City was who wanted to help to follow everything up. But I did believe, A, that they could do it more professionally than the ambassador and I was not unaware of Mr. Hoover's strong feelings that he did not like people mucking around in FBI investigations, even attorneys general.

Mr. Cornwell. Following the same line of inquiry in order to determine whether or not there is anything that came to your attention indicating that the investigation may have been distorted or sidetracked because of considerations of potential international repercussions, on the same page of the Senate report, page 41, there is reference to a legat cable to FBI headquarters suggesting in pertinent part, "The Bureau may desire to give consideration to polling all Cuban sources in United States in effort to confirm or refute this theory," meaning the theory that Oswald may have been involved with the Cubans.

And on the cable, according to the Senate report, at FBI headquarters the supervisor wrote a handwritten notation, "Not desirable. Would serve to promote rumors." The same question from the perspective of the Bureau: When, if ever, did it come to your attention that there may have been that sort of thinking in the FBI?
Mr. Katzenbach. I do not know. Never. I can understand the supervisor's comment, depending on how you go about the investigation. Maybe the idea was a good or bad one, I do not know. That it occurred or that it was recommended by the legal attaché, I did not know that. All I am saying is whether going around to the Cuban sources is a good or bad idea to nail that point down, I did not know, I did not know who they were, Whether that would promote rumors, I did not know, if done in the way that was suggested.

It should have been followed up or anything should be followed up that would be productive, I certainly expected. It would have been consistent with what I thought had to be done.

Mr. Cornwell. To do what?

Mr. Katzenbach. To follow up in any way that you could. Whether this particular way of investigation is the best way of going about solving that problem or not, I do not know. We should have checked into every conceivable connection that Oswald had, potential connection, and done our best to follow it up, and it should have been done.

Mr. Cornwell. I suppose at least in theory more so if it were known that there were plots, assassination plots against Castro perhaps.

Mr. Katzenbach. Yes, I think so. Quite apart from that, I think that should have been done. If you do not do it, somebody else is going to do it. My point was, don't leave anything here.
for somebody else to uncover, get it all out.

Mr. Cornwell, How big a role in the thinking of yourself and those who were making decisions at those levels of government during 1963 was the consideration that any investigation should be possibly foregone, if it had the possibility of creating additional rumors?

Mr. Katzenbach. It never entered my mind or anybody else’s that I ever talked to. This was the President of the United States who had been assassinated. Not only would the government want to know anything they could about it, but so would the public and so would the world.

Mr. Cornwell. I take it, however, that even though neither you nor the persons with whom you spoke considered diverting or foregoing an investigation because of the possibility of rumors, there was a substantial pressure to quash unfounded rumors at an early stage. Is that correct?

Mr. Katzenbach. Yes, that is correct. In a very modest way, I would have liked the Bureau to say we have not uncovered any evidence that Oswald did not act alone, but the investigation was continuing. I would have liked some statement of that kind, which I knew in fact to be true. I knew in fact what they were telling me.

Mr. Cornwell. The memos that we forwarded to you included one on November 24 from Belmont to Tolson in the FBI, one on November 25 which was a memo from you to Mr. Moyer and had also
been attached to a memo of the same date from Evans to Belmont in the FBI?

Mr. Katzenbach. Yes. Another one of November 26 from Evans to Belmont. Those memos, I suppose we could say in part, reflect what appears to be a disagreement between you and the FBI on the very subject matter you just mentioned, which was your feeling that some press release should be made in order to tell the public that no hard evidence of conspiracy had been developed. Is that correct?

Mr. Katzenbach. Yes. If that were the fact, then it was the fact that they were telling it to me orally. I think equally important in that what I wanted was a public commitment that we would put all the facts on the table.

When the report was done it would all be available. I would have liked to have done that, but obviously, the Warren Commission did not want that done.

Mr. Cornwell. There is a similar letter which I believe we also forwarded to you which you wrote to Earl Warren attaching the first FBI report.

Mr. Katzenbach. It would probably be accurate to say which I signed. It reads to me very much as though the Bureau drafted it.

Mr. Cornwell. Dated December 9, 1963?

Mr. Katzenbach. I would be surprised if it were not a Bureau letter.
Mr. Cornwell, Why in your mind was there such an urgency to make the preliminary findings of the FBI that there was no conspiracy available to the public? The memos and the letter are all dated within days of the assassination.

Mr. Katzenbach, I think because the speculation that there was conspiracy of various kinds was fairly rampant, at that time particularly in the foreign press. I was reacting to that and I think reacting to repeated calls from people in the State Department who wanted something of that kind in an effort to quash the beliefs of some people abroad that the silence in the face of those rumors was not to be taken as substantiating it in some way.

That is, in the face of a lot of rumors about conspiracy, a total silence on the subject from the government neither confirming nor denying tended to feed those rumors. I would have liked a statement of the kind I said, that nothing we had uncovered so far leads us to believe that there is a conspiracy, but investigation is continuing, everything will be put out on the table. Indeed, I still think today it would have been a good idea to have done it. We might have gotten a better report.

Mr. Cornwell. That last comment is sort of related to the question I was getting ready to ask you. You said you might have gotten a better report. Is that true even in light of what you testified earlier was the Bureau's apparent inclination to justify their own acts and their failure to admit their shortcomings?
Mr. Katzenbach. Probably not in the light of that, but at the time they were complaining about pressure to get the report out.

Insofar as that could be used as an excuse not to follow everything up or something of that kind, I believe if you had been able to make an interim statement of the kind that I suggested, you would have taken some timing pressure off getting the report out because the failure to make that statement was the only alternative you had in view of the adamant position that the Bureau was taking, which I understand.

You see, nobody really could do it other than the Bureau, with the Bureau's acquiescence. Nobody else knew. I did not know what was going on. Nobody in the government knew what was going on other than very short conclusionary statements which you got from liaison people, from the director himself.

I did not know who they were interviewing or why they were interviewing, what they uncovered.

Mr. Cornwell. Was there in fact a disagreement, apart from what these memos say, between you and the Bureau on the releasing of information about the progress of their investigation?

Mr. Katzenbach. Sure. You know, it would drive you absolutely wild to see the Bureau release it.

Mr. Cornwell. That was the point of the question.

Mr. Katzenbach. I do not know who the Washington Star reporter was, but my guess would be that it was Jerry O'Leary.
You could bet it would be the Star or the News and not the Post.
I would go further than that.
The ticker on the day the Bureau delivered the assassination
report to my office, five minutes before it came to my office,
Ed Guthman came running in, or Rosenthal, with the ticker saying
I have the report. I said, "Where is it?" He said, "I haven't
got it yet." While he was standing in the office, the report was
delivered to me,

The Bureau took the position that it must have been leaked
by my office and not by them. I said, "I cannot leak something I
do not know."

Mr. Cornwell. We found a memo relating to such a matter.
I do not know if we found it in time to provide it to you or not.
It was dated December 20, 1963. Near the bottom of the first page
it reads: "Senator Russell stated that Deputy Attorney General
Katzenbach had directly implied that the leaks had come from the
FBI. He quoted Katzenbach as telling the members of the prestig-
iou s commission J. Edgar Hoover has chewed his men out for leaking
information and they will not be doing any more of this.
"I told the Senator that Katzenbach was lying in implying
such action on the part of the FBI representatives. The point is
made that sometimes a person tries to cover up his own guilt by
blaming others."

Let me ask you first about the facts.

Mr. Katzenbach, I cheated because I knew when I read it who
had written that memo, I see that it was Mr. DeLoach.

Mr. Cornwell, I take it your testimony would be that it was
not you who leaked the information?

Mr. Katzenbach. That is correct.

Mr. Cornwell, Do you have reason to believe then that it
was the Bureau?

Mr. Katzenbach. Yes. The Bureau knew it and I think that
the Bureau leaked it. The Bureau constantly leaked things of this
kind and constantly denied it and constantly blamed it on other
people. There is not a reporter in town who does not know that,

Mr. Cornwell. Why would the Bureau have overtly opposed
your earlier request that a limited press release be made if they
were intending to leak the information themselves?

Mr. Katzenbach. I do not know. For one thing, they did not
really leak on matters that they were investigating, having state-
ments about them made by the Department of Justice. They wanted
to make their own statements about them. Secondly, I suppose with
their own leaks, they controlled what was said. If it is done
in the form of a leak, it is deniable. I wanted a rather formal
statement.

The Bureau really had a policy, and quite a good one, of
saying that they did not want to make any partial statements about
an investigation until the investigation was completed. That is
perfectly sound policy. Like all policies, it is conceivable there
might be circumstances that would justify an exception. But
basically, it was a good policy. When the Bureau leaked, it leaked as a formal matter. The bureau agents did not leak. It was their form of press release.

Mr. Cornwell. Directing your attention to a memo dated December 3rd, 1963, from Belmont to Tolson, the general subject matter concerns the first meeting of the Warren Commission and your view, as recorded by the memo at least, that you felt the FBI should have someone at the first meeting and Belmont stating that he made no commitment to you.

"But I remember we advised him that our report in this matter will speak for itself. Until the report is ready, there is no real purpose in an FBI representative being present at the Commission meeting."

It concludes thereafter stating, "Katzenbach felt it was better to show willingness to cooperate with the Commission."

Were there any specific examples that come to your attention along this line of specific FBI antagonism toward the Commission, failure to cooperate with it, other than what we have already discussed?

Mr. Katzenbach. I do not think so. I was satisfied at the time -- obviously wrong -- that the Bureau was cooperating. They were in fact doing more than I think they would have ever done for me in terms of making the raw data available and so forth.

So I was satisfied that they were. I am not surprised. This is the kind of thing you get from Belmont to Tolson, Hoover, 
knowing Hoover's opposition to the Commission, not really wanting
to have anything to do with it and also thinking it fairly funny
having me sitting over there and not knowing what was going on.
The reason I wanted the Bureau there was I wanted somebody
telling me what was going on. I did not know. I could not even
suggest the answer that I would give which was that I am sure that
they were thoroughly investigating everything.

Mr. Cornwell. Were you aware of the FBI's maintenance
of dossiers on the Commission members at the time?

Mr. Katzenbach. No, I do not believe so, except that it may
have been that the Chief Justice asked for the FBI checks to be
done on people he was putting on his staff, I do not know. If
he did, I would be obviously aware of that request and whatever
dossier was the result of it, but nothing else.

Mr. Cornwell. You, I take it, read the part in the Senate
report that we forwarded to you on that subject?

Mr. Katzenbach. Yes.

Mr. Cornwell. Which was not a security background investiga-
tion of the nature you just referred to, but in fact a dossier
in terms of derogatory material that, if the Senate report is
correct, Hoover gathered in order to potentially have leverage
over Commission members?

Mr. Katzenbach. Apparently so, at least according to the
Senate report. I was unaware of that at the time, although I knew
his opposition to the Commission -- he was concerned about the
Commission. I thought he had less so, in all candor, because he had some very strong friends on the Commission and I thought maybe that would relax him.

Mr. Cornwell. What was your assessment of the impact that the formation of the Commission had on the FBI's or CIA's willingness to continue the investigation in fact in an openminded fashion until it was concluded?

Mr. Katzenbach. I do not know. That would be very speculative.

Mr. Cornwell. Let me ask you to focus on a couple of time periods. First, what the FBI generated on its own prior to the time that the Commission was selected and empaneled versus what they produced based on specific requests of the Commission thereafter and, second, the pledges that both the CIA and the FBI gave at the termination of the Warren Commission and then the fact as we know it today, that no investigation was thereafter conducted?

Mr. Katzenbach. With respect to the first part of the question, I would not have expected any problems from the Bureau in terms of going out and following up all the things that the Commission wanted to do.

In the ordinary course of things that was done repeatedly in the Department of Justice prosecutions and I would not have expected great problems from that if they were satisfied, as they appeared to be, with the conclusions they came to and the basic reasons they came to, I would have thought they would have no
particular problems in running down a lot of alleys they had not run down if it did not develop any information that was flatly contrary to their conclusions.

What would have happened if they came across that kind of information, God only knows. What the reverberations of that in the FBI would have been, again, speaking of the FBI talking about minor embarrassment -- in really uncovering something that would have changed some result they had reported, God only knows.

I think people's heads would have rolled and they would have swallowed hard and done it. I think my view at the time would have been that in a matter as important as the assassination of a president, I think the Bureau would have swallowed and taken it and found some graceful way out, explaining why they had come to the wrong conclusion would have been a fairly high-powered neutron bomb in the Bureau, questioning any basic conclusion that they had come to.

With respect to the second part, I regarded the investigation continuing as pretty much a formal statement that they made at the time, that "if something comes up that seems to be sufficiently important, I assure you we will follow it up."

I do not think anybody thought that was going to happen. I think it was fairly pro forma.

Mr. Cornwell. The question really is in your assessment, would either one of those have been different, either one of those situations been different, had someone else conducted the
investigation? Had the Department of Justice assumed primary responsibility, would the FBI's investigation have in fact been more openminded? If the Department of Justice had made the investigation, would in fact it have continued until everything was run out as opposed to what apparently was the fact in 1964, that there was a time deadline set and the Warren Commission went out of business? What kind of impact did the existence of the Commission have on those problems?

Mr. Katzenbach. I would think, if anything, they would have had more clout than the Department of Justice would have had in terms of getting the Bureau to follow up, at least in the time period of its existence, all of those things.

Mr. Cornwell. In your view, no substantial price was paid in terms of the effective duration of an open-ended investigation which accrued by virtue of the formation of the Warren Commission?

Mr. Katzenbach. I think not. I think in that period of time what information would have been available in that period of time would have been followed up under its direction.

My only qualification is that sometimes something happens five years later. There was no way that you could have known at the time.

Mr. Cornwell. Of course the Senate report suggests an example of that. It did come up later and conclude that the Bureau failed to follow it up.

Mr. Katzenbach. Yes, but the only one I remember is the
Drew Pearson one. If you had told me those facts and asked me
whether the Bureau was likely to have followed up something Drew
Pearson told them or attributed to Drew Pearson, I would have said
no. The bias against Drew Pearson was very strong.

I think that is a more plausible explanation for anybody
familiar with the Bureau than unwillingness to engage in the
assassination investigation. They would not believe Drew Pearson
under oath. Hoover hated him and Johnson liked him.

Mr. Cornwell. The dominant result would not have been that
the Commission terminated and the Bureau at that point in time
washed its hands of the investigation?

Mr. Katzenbach. Not in my view. Drew Pearson had committed
serious errors from the Bureau's viewpoint because he had been
critical of the Bureau.

Mr. Klein. You alluded to Bobby Kennedy's desire to be
detached from the entire investigation. Could you go into that
a little bit more about what he said and when he took this position
for the first time?

Mr. Katzenbach. I guess he took it from the outset. He was
about as devastated a human being as I had ever seen. He really
never had any interest in any part of the investigation. I doubt
if he ever read the FBI report. I do not know whether he ever
read the Warren Commission's report. I told him at the time it
came out it probably would be helpful if he would say he thought
it was a thorough investigation, if that was the way he felt, and
I think he said it, but I never had any great confidence that he
read it. I attributed it simply to what I said, the fact that
his brother was dead and what the hell difference did it make
apart from that fact.

Mr. Klein. Do you have any knowledge as to whether Bobby
Kennedy had any inkling about the CIA's Castro plots?

Mr. Katzenbach. I do not know. Independently, I have no
knowledge at all of that other than what is obvious and that is
that after the Bay of Pigs fiasco he got heavily involved in the
Cuban thing, sitting on the committee with Dulles and Maxwell
Taylor, if I recollect correctly, reviewing what had happened on
the Bay of Pigs.

He afterwards took an interest in the brigade, the Cuban
prisoner exchange, that kind of thing. So, he obviously knew
whatever the members of that review committee knew about the Bay
of Pigs. Those were not areas that he very often shared very much
with me.

During those periods when he was heavily doing that, I was
running the Department and when we had conversations, it was usually
about my problems in running the Department, not what he was doing
over in the CIA building.

Mr. Klein. From what you knew about his character, his
personality, was it surprising that his attitude would be that
"He is dead and nothing can bring him back" or "I do not want
anything to do with it," as opposed to the attorney general of
of the United States, "I will turn over every stone to make sure if anybody else was involved they are brought to justice?"

Mr. Katzenbach. No, his attitude was exactly what I would have expected his attitude to be.

Mr. Klein. That is all I have.

Mr. Cornwell. To be sure you are focusing on that last question that was asked, was anything ever said, again looking back -- I know at the time it did not hit you this way -- by Bobby Kennedy that indicated he felt any personal responsibility for the assassination, that he had known something or possessed some information that if he had acted differently on the basis of it, could have averted the assassination?

Again, the possibility, among others, that he had knowledge of the plots and after the assassination occurred he felt that his knowledge of that he should have used differently?

Mr. Katzenbach. There was nothing he ever said to me on that subject that would have led me to believe that was of any concern whatsoever to him. He found parts of it distasteful, maybe what Jackie did, I do not know, the whole autopsy business, revealing all that medical information he just found extremely distasteful, I would say I would have also under the same circumstances. With respect to that kind of matter, he would ask, "Is it necessary?" and I would say, "es, it is. You know, we do not have to circulate those pictures around to everybody. Competent people have to look at them and examine them," and so forth, and he would
accept that. Those are the only areas that I ever recall even
talking to him about with respect to the assassination.

I never saw anything that indicated he felt any responsibility
at all for what had occurred.

Mr. McDonald, Mr. Katzenbach, your testimony here and the
record of the Warren Commission and just history reflect there
was great concern to allay public fear of a conspiracy, and the
Bureau within weeks after the assassination, Mr. Hoover apparently
within a few days, concluded that in his estimation, Oswald acted
alone and then the public report came out a few weeks later.

In light of that, I am going to show you a memo dated June
3rd, 1960. It is an FBI memo from J. Edgar Hoover to the Office
of Security, Department of State. The subject of the memo -- again
this is 1960 -- is "Lee Harvey Oswald, Internal Security." The
memo is regarding Oswald's trip to Russia and the whole matter
of his passport, and then Hoover's memo and it is interesting
because it is a memo from Hoover.

The Xerox copy indicates J. Edgar Hoover in the last para-

graph saying: "There is a possibility that an imposter is using
Oswald's birth certificate. Any current information the Department
of State may have concerning subject will be appreciated."

It is an interesting memo dated almost three and a half years
prior to the assassination. First of all, were you ever aware
of that memo?

Mr. Katzenbach. No.
Mr. McDonald. If you had been aware of that memo and the attachments, at the time of the assassination, what would your reaction have been to that kind of information, the fact that the Bureau had a case file on him, an internal security file vis-a-vis the possibility of foreign involvement, foreign conspiracy? Would that have changed your outlook in the early days after the assassination and your outlook as to what occurred subsequently?

Mr. Katzenbach. You mean if I had been aware of this kind of memo I would have wanted to know what the follow up was, was there an imposter?

Mr. McDonald. Yes.

Mr. Katzenbach. Was this Lee Harvey Oswald? That kind of question? Apart from that, I would not have been the slightest bit surprised if they had the file. In fact, I probably knew they had a file on Lee Harvey Oswald because if there had not been a file on him, there would not have been a question of whether he should have been on the security, what do you call it, potential assassins' list.

I would have just wanted to know more detail about this if I had known this. Perhaps I am repeating myself, but everybody appeared to believe that Lee Harvey Oswald had acted alone fairly early. There were rumors of conspiracy. Now, either Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone or he was part of a conspiracy, one of the two, or somebody paid him. That is what I mean by conspiracy, somebody else was involved.
If he acted alone and if that was in fact true, then the problem you had was how do you allay all the rumors of conspiracy. If he, in fact, was part of a conspiracy you damned well wanted to know what the conspiracy was, who was involved in it and that would have given you another set of problems.

The problem that I focused on for the most part was the former one because they kept saying he acted alone. How do you explain? You have to put all of this out with all your explanations because you have all of these associations and all of that is said, you put out all the facts, why you come to that conclusion. I say this because the conclusion would have been a tremendously important conclusion to know.

If some foreign government was behind this, that may have presented major problems. It was of major importance to know that.

I want to emphasize that both sides had a different set of problems. If there was a conspiracy, the problem was not rumors of conspiracy. The problem was conspiracy. If there was not conspiracy, the problem was rumors. Everything had to be gone into.

If another president, God forbid, ever gets assassinated we will face the same problems and not all the facts will ever come out. I think it is almost hopeless. It is an objective, but it is almost hopeless. Fifteen years from now, 25 years from now, somebody will dig through all of this and come out with a new book.

Mr. McDonald. If there was a conspiracy and Hoover apparently within a few days was satisfied in his mind that Oswald had acted
alone, and it has been speculated that that would have been a fact even though Hoover had not officially concluded that informally in the Bureau, if the old man said this, do you think that would have colored the way the Bureau subsequently investigated, if they really were not looking for a conspiracy, but were trying to bolster the conclusion?

Mr. Katzenbach, I do not know. That is difficult to speculate about. It would seem to me in any event they would have had to have done what I was asking them to do and that is follow down everything because if you are persuaded that there is no conspiracy and you believe that to be correct and that is the conclusion you want to publicly come out with, you are going to have to follow down everything that anybody who believes that there might have been a conspiracy is going to suggest establishes the possibility of a conspiracy.

I do not know whether I have phrased that in a way that you have asked it. It may be just proving a negative, if you are in fact right, but you had better do it and you had better follow that. I cannot say if you did that and it turned out that this was something more and something more and something more, why you would not change your mind about it or begin to wonder.

So, even if you went into it with a bias of the kind you described, I would think that your investigation itself would begin to create problems. I continue to this day to have a high regard for FBI agents and for their ability to uncover facts.
Mr. Cornwell. If I could hopefully summarize your testimony in order to ask you one final question -- if I misstate your views, I am sure you will let me know -- but as I understand, basically what you have told us is that when confronted with the enormous problem that the Department, the FBI, and all the leadership of our country faced in the days right after the assassination, you perceived that one of the most pressing problems was Johnson's ability to take over the government and to be able to operate, particularly in the international field, without suspicion and that perhaps the two principal mechanisms that you suggested or were in favor of to accomplish that were an independent commission to supervise the FBI's reports or suggest any additional investigation coupled with limited press releases stating that the investigation which had been conducted disclosed no conspiracy. Is that correct?

Mr. Katzenbach. Yes, but the investigation was continuing, there was no evidence of the conspiracy at the time.

Mr. Cornwell. Right. In addition, I believe you stated to us -- these are not the words you used, but I gather the gist of what you were saying is that you did obviously have to pay potentially some price for the suggestion that an early press release go out, the price being that at least it was possible that that would tend to distort the Bureau's investigation.

It would tend to lock them into the early investigation results, but you had to be told the results of the investigation
and the facts suggested no conspiracy and, therefore, that seemed
to be the best of the alternatives available to you. Is that
essentially correct?

Mr. Katzenbach. I think that is correct. You left out one
thing in terms of what was important. That was an important con-
sideration, what you described. I think an equally important con-
sideration was that the American people had a right to know, when
their President is killed, everything about it.

Mr. Cornwell. Of course, I take it that the urgency of their
need to know might be somewhat less?

Mr. Katzenbach. That is correct.

Mr. Cornwell. They would have had absolute right to know
ultimately at some point in time.

Mr. Katzenbach. Yes. I wanted to couple that press release
you talked about with the statement that "We will make all the
facts available at the conclusion of our investigation."

Mr. Cornwell. Right.

Mr. Katzenbach. I wanted both.

Mr. Cornwell. I understand. At least, there was an element
of hard decision in there from your point of view because if you
pushed for some press release you made some sacrifice in exchange.

Mr. Katzenbach. Yes, I think I was pushing largely because
the State Department was pushing me.

Mr. Cornwell. I understand. That brings me to the question,
if you had known at that point in time what you now know or have
reason to believe, based on the Senate report and other sources of
information, that there were plots directed at Castro, that Hoover
in fact was worried about internal repercussions, if the Jenkins
memo is correct, that the FBI at least in one small segment had
destroyed a piece of evidence indicating on its face, maybe not
in reality but at least on its face, the possibility of some
association between the FBI and Oswald -- there is, incidentally
we did not show you, a CIA memo which indicates that they had
contemplated using Oswald as an agent -- if you had known those
types of things, been told them within a day or two of the assassi-
nation, would you have opted for the early press release, early
FBI report, that you had suggested?

Mr. Katzenbach. I do not think under those circumstances
you could have. I think you would have had to say there is more
here to sort out than we are now able to sort out.

If I had known about those things, I would have said, "How
are we going to cope with all this? We had better wait." I might
add to that something that I suppose is obvious, that those rea-
sons were never given to me as reasons not to do this,

In fact, no reasons were ever given to me other than "The
investigation is not completed. We do not want to make a state-
ment."

Mr. Cornwell. Taking that idea one step further, let me ask
you in light of the revelations that we just talked about, which
have come out in the years since 1963, do you feel confident with
the Warren Commission's conclusions today?

Mr. Katzenbach. I think the Warren Commission's conclusions are probably right. There are obviously some things that should have been checked at that time and it may be more difficult to check on now. It always seems to me inherently improbable that Oswald was acting as part of a conspiracy, mainly because of the number of footprints.

It seems to me if the Russians were prepared to do this kind of thing to an American president, which is an extremely volatile potentially explosive kind of thing to do, talking about the Russians, you know, it could lead to war, it could lead to almost anything.

If they were prepared to do that, which seemed to me improbable, they surely would be prepared to do it with somebody else with less footprints around than Lee Harvey Oswald.

I think in general I would feel the same way about the Cubans but with less confidence because I do not think that Fidel Castro has quite the rationality of the leading Russian politicians.

That still seems to me to be the fact, that I really think putting the Russians into it is virtually incredible.

Even with the Cubans, one would think that you would not have had somebody who was a member of the "Fair Play for Cuba Committee," had all of those obviously traceable associations back to Cuba, and as unstable as Oswald appears to have been, to be your assassin.

Nor do I think that in a well thought out assassination scheme you
would have done something so inherently chancey as the assassi-
ination of President Kennedy.

By that I mean you would have been more sure to get your
target than Lee Harvey Oswald could conceivably have been in that
situation. That is a long answer. I am inclined to think that
the conclusion of the Warren Commission is probably correct.

Mr. Cornwell. We supplied you, of course, with a number of
pieces of documentation for background in order mainly to refresh
your memory before we asked you questions. Is there any subject
matter about the investigation as it was conducted or anything that
has come to your attention since that you wish to offer to us or
could offer to us for consideration, anything outside of the
paperwork or the questions that we have asked you?

Mr. Katzenbach. I really cannot think of anything. I think
we have covered it.

Mr. Cornwell. We certainly appreciate your taking the time
to talk to us. I guess there are no further questions.

I think for the record, we will incorporate into it both the
specific memos we asked you about and those we sent to you to
refresh your memory in advance.

Mr. Katzenbach. Fine.

(Whereupon at 12:25 p.m., the taking of the deposition was
concluded.)
CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Albert Joseph LaFrance, the officer before whom the foregoing deposition was taken, do hereby certify that the witness whose testimony appears in the foregoing deposition was duly sworn by me; that the testimony of said witness was taken by me in shorthand to the best of my ability and thereafter reduced to typewriting under my direction, that said deposition is a true record of the testimony given by said witness; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which this deposition was taken; and further that I am not a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties thereto, or financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of the action.

Notary Public in and for the District of Columbia

My commission expires November 14, 1980.
I have read the foregoing pages one through sixty-six, inclusive, which contain a correct transcript of the answers made by me to the questions therein recorded. Signature is subject to corrections.

/S/Nicholas Katzenbach

I, /S/Flora A. Marchigiani, Notary Public in and for the County of Westchester, State of New York, do hereby certify that I am notarizing and witnessing signature for the deposition of Mr. Nicholas Katzenbach on this 15th day of February 1979.

/S/Flora A. Marchigiani
Notary Public in and for the County of Westchester State of New York

My commission expires

March 30, 1980
On September 25, 1978, Mr. Katzenbach mailed to the committee the following letter supplementing his testimony:

Nicholas deB. Katzenbach  
Old Orchard Road, Armonk, New York 10504

September 25, 1978

The Honorable Louis Stokes  
Select Committee on Assassinations  
U. S. House of Representatives  
331 House Office Building, Annex 2  
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In my testimony before the Committee on Thursday, September 21, I stated that I had absolutely no recollection of meeting with Mr. Helms with respect to the Nosenko case. I understand that Mr. Helms said there was such a meeting, and it took place on April 2, 1964.

On my return to my office this morning I checked on the notes of meetings which were kept by my secretary, and they confirm Mr. Helms' recollection. I am attaching a copy of the relevant page of the calendar. Although it is clear from this page that there was such a meeting, I continue to have absolutely no recollection of it, and therefore cannot tell you what was discussed beyond what is stated in the calendar itself.

It was not my custom to make notes on such meetings, and I doubt that there are in the files of the Department any notes made by me. However it is possible that Mr. Yeagley or Mr. Foley made such notes. I believe Mr. Foley is now deceased, but Mr. Yeagley is now a judge in the District of Columbia, and perhaps he would have some recollection of the meeting.

I had, prior to my testimony, checked my calendar diary for the period dealing with the assassination and the creation of the Warren Commission, but had not thought it relevant to the Committee's investigation to go as far as April. Hence I was unaware of this entry. While
this calendar does not refresh my recollection and therefore would not change my testimony, it did seem to me that in fairness to both the Committee and Mr. Helms I should make it available to you.

Respectfully yours,

[Signature]

cc: Mr. Gary Cornwell  
    Hon. Richard C. Helms  
    Edward Bennett Williams, Esq.
### Thursday, April 2, 1964

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Harold Reis</td>
<td>9:35 a.m.</td>
<td>SAW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sol Lindenbaum</td>
<td>9:35 a.m.</td>
<td>SAW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Dolan</td>
<td>9:35 a.m.</td>
<td>SAW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Filvaroff</td>
<td>9:35 a.m.</td>
<td>SAW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Douglas</td>
<td>9:35 a.m.</td>
<td>SAW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jack Rosenthal</td>
<td>9:35 a.m.</td>
<td>SAW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burke Marshall</td>
<td>9:35 a.m.</td>
<td>SAW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Filvaroff</td>
<td>11:55 a.m.</td>
<td>SAW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Foley</td>
<td>12:27 p.m.</td>
<td>SAW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Orrick</td>
<td>1:50 p.m.</td>
<td>SAW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshall McShane</td>
<td>2:37 p.m.</td>
<td>SAW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Filvaroff</td>
<td>3:10 p.m.</td>
<td>SAW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Geoghegan</td>
<td>3:25 p.m.</td>
<td>SAW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edgar Cah, O.L.C.</td>
<td>3:30 p.m.</td>
<td>SAW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burke Marshall</td>
<td>3:32 p.m.</td>
<td>SAW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burke Marshall</td>
<td>4:07 p.m.</td>
<td>SAW</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Lawrence Ludston, CIA] 4:08 p.m. SAW
[Richard Helms, CIA] 4:08 p.m. SAW
[David Hursh, CIA] 4:08 p.m. SAW
[J. Walter Yeagley] 4:08 p.m. SAW
[William Foley, Crim. Div.] 4:08 p.m. SAW
[Defector Case]

Addressed Brandeis Univ. 4:40 p.m. SAW

Students (40) in AC's office

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sol Lindenbaum</td>
<td>6:45 p.m.</td>
<td>SAW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Douglas</td>
<td>6:56 p.m.</td>
<td>SAW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>William Orrick</td>
<td>7:06 p.m.</td>
<td>SAW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Filvaroff</td>
<td>7:12 p.m.</td>
<td>SAW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Dolan</td>
<td>7:15 p.m.</td>
<td>SAW</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Friday, April 3, 1964

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>John Burner (white motor)</td>
<td>9:15 a.m.</td>
<td>SAW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sol Lindenbaum</td>
<td>9:30 a.m.</td>
<td>SAW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harold Reis</td>
<td>9:30 a.m.</td>
<td>SAW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Filvaroff</td>
<td>9:30 a.m.</td>
<td>SAW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burke Marshall</td>
<td>9:30 a.m.</td>
<td>SAW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jack Rosenthal</td>
<td>9:30 a.m.</td>
<td>SAW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joseph Dolan</td>
<td>9:30 a.m.</td>
<td>SAW</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NdeBK to Puerto Rico 10:15 a.m.