Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

AGENCY: HSCA
RECORD NUMBER: 180-10110-10484
RECORD SERIES: REPORT ON LEE HARVEY OSWALD'S TRIP TO MEXICO CITY
AGENCY FILE NUMBER:

October 7, 1996

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 437
Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 301

The redactions in this document have been postponed under the provisions set forth in The John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992. The postponement dates and the substitute language for the redactions contained within this document are as follows:

All redactions with the substitute language: "CIA A," "CIA B," "CIA C1," CIA C2", "CIA D," "CIA E," "CIA F," and "CIA G" are CIA Employees. They have been postponed under Section 6(1)(A) of the JFK Act until 05/1997, at which time the Review Board will reconsider the postponements based on additional evidence provided by the Central Intelligence Agency.

All redactions with the substitute language: "Describes technical operation," "Describes organization," "Describes group," "Describes operation," "Describes people," "CIA Senior Official," "Describes location," "Describes individuals," "Describes technical operation and individuals," "No suitable substitute language," or "Describes meeting" have been postponed under Section 6(1)(B) of the JFK Act until 10/2017, when they have been scheduled for release.

All redactions with the substitute language "Crypt," "Crypts," "Source," "None," "Identifying Information," or "Name" have been postponed under Section 6(1)(B) of the JFK Act until 08/2006, when they have been scheduled for release. (There are two exceptions to this. The first appears on page 13 of the footnotes where two "crypt" redactions have been postponed under Section 6(1)(B) of the JFK Act until 10/2017, when they have been scheduled for release. The second appears on page 57 of the footnotes where four "source" redactions have been postponed under Section 6(1)(B) of the JFK Act until 12/1996, at which time the Review Board will reconsider the postponements based on additional evidence provided by the Central Intelligence Agency.

The sole redaction without substitute language (p. 44) might properly be postponed under Section 6(1)(B) of the JFK Act. The Review Board will reconsider this postponement by 09/1997.

Board Review Completed: 08/06/96
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* includes 4 missing pages
** 4 pages missing - 484, 5, 6, & 7

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21 Aug 1993
OSWALD, THE CIA, AND MEXICO CITY

WRITTEN BY DAN HARDWAY AND EDWIN LOPEZ
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

OUTLINE: LEE HARVEY OSWALD, THE CIA AND MEXICO CITY.

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Some controversy has arisen in regard to the question of whether the tapes existed at the time of the assassination due to a memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the head of the Secret Service which said:

The Central Intelligence Agency advised that on October 1, 1963, an extremely sensitive source had reported that an individual identified himself as Lee Oswald, who contacted the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City inquiring as to any messages. Special Agents of this Bureau, who have conversed with Oswald in Dallas, Texas, have observed photographs of the individual referred to above and have listened to a recording of his voice. These Special Agents are of the opinion that the above-referred-to individual was not Lee Harvey Oswald.

(Memorandum from Hoover to James J. Rowley, 11/23/63, pp. 4-5.) The HSCA has determined that this statement was probably based on another FBI memorandum which said:

Inasmuch as the Dallas Agents who listened to the tape of the conversation allegedly of Oswald from the Cuban Embassy to the Russian Embassy in Mexico and examined the photographs of the visitor to the Embassy in Mexico and were of the opinion that neither the tape nor the photograph pertained to Oswald, I requested Shanklin to immediately send a photograph of Oswald to our Legal Attaché.

(Memorandum from Belmont to Tolson, 11/23/63, p. 1. Mr. Belmont was reporting the results of a conversation with the Special Agent in Charge in Dallas, Gordon Shanklin, that occurred at 11:50 A.M.)
Later that same day SAC Shanklin informed the Director that the tape of Oswald's voice had been erased: "It should be noted that the actual tape from which this transcript was made has been erased." (Teletype from SAC Dallas to Director, # 232220, 7:30 P.M. CST, 11/23/63. Emphasis in the original.)

The confusion about whether or not there was a tape apparently continued for several days after the SAC in Dallas informed the Director that such a tape did not exist. On 11/25/63 the FBI Legat in Mexico City sent a Cablegram to the director which said:

There appears to be some confusion in that no tapes were taken to Dallas but only typewritten transcripts supplied by CIA, the tapes not being available because they had been erased.

(Cablegram # 182 & 183, p. 2.)

The FBI was asked to explain the paragraph from the Hoover memorandum quoted above. It responded:

The paragraph appearing on pages 4 and 5 of the letterhead memorandum, which is quoted in your (FBI) request of March 17, 1978, contains some incorrect information regarding a tape recording of the voice of an individual who identified himself as Lee Oswald.

Retrievable information contained in files of the FBI indicates that this Bureau received information derived from transcripts of tape recordings furnished by another government agency which conducts intelligence-type inves-
I. INTRODUCTION

A. Issues Addressed

The House Select Committee on Assassinations' investigation into Lee Harvey Oswald's activities in Mexico City has been directed at answering the following questions:

1) Did Lee Harvey Oswald visit the Soviet and Cuban Consulates or Embassies in Mexico City?
2) In addition to the visits which may have been made to the Embassies, what were Lee Harvey Oswald's activities while he was in Mexico City?
3) Was Lee Harvey Oswald alone in Mexico City? If not, who were his associates and what were their activities?
4) Did the Central Intelligence Agency maintain any surveillance operation(s) aimed at the Cuban and Soviet diplomatic missions in Mexico City? If so, what kind?
5) What information, if any, about Oswald's stay in Mexico was known by the CIA Mexico City Station prior to the assassination and what was the source of that information?
6) Was the information, if any, in the possession of the CIA Mexico City Station reported to the CIA Headquarters accurately and expeditiously prior to the assassination?

7) Was the information in the possession of the CIA Mexico City Station reported to the CIA Headquarters accurately and expeditiously after the assassination?

8) Was the information developed by the CIA in Mexico City communicated to the Warren Commission in an accurate and expeditious manner?

9) Did the CIA photo-surveillance of the Cuban and Soviet diplomatic compounds in Mexico City, if such photo-surveillance existed, obtain a photograph of Lee Harvey Oswald? If so, what became of that photograph?
B. Differences Between the Warren Commission
Investigation of Lee Harvey Oswald's
Activities in Mexico City and the House
Select Committee on Assassination's
Investigation.

The approach taken by this Committee's investigation
differs from that of the Warren Commission primarily
in terms of scope. The Warren Commission and the
investigative agencies at its disposal went to
great lengths to establish Oswald's travel to and
from Mexico, but devoted minimal effort to
evaluating Oswald's contacts with the Cuban and
Soviet Consulates. It is the conclusion of this
Committee that the Warren Commission correctly
established that Oswald had traveled to Mexico
City. Hence, this Committee has chosen not to
reinvestigate Oswald's travel to and from Mexico City.
Instead, the Committee's approach has been to focus
narrowly on Oswald's contacts with the Soviet and
Cuban diplomatic missions in Mexico City and on
evidence that was not available to the Warren
Commission that could possibly shed light on Oswald's activities in Mexico City outside of the Soviet and Cuban installations.

The Warren Report limited its discussion of Oswald's contacts with the Soviet and Cuban diplomatic missions to information obtained from Sylvia Duran and the Cuban Government.1/

At one point in the Report the Commission referred to other information:

By far the most important confirmation of Senora Duran's testimony, however, has been supplied by confidential sources of extremely high reliability available to the United States in Mexico. The information from these sources establishes that her testimony was truthful and accurate in all material respects. The identities of these sources cannot be disclosed without destroying their future usefulness to the United States.2/

The Warren Commission did not print anything in the twenty-six volumes of evidence to support its statement that Silvia Duran's testimony was confirmed by "confidential sources of extremely high reliability."
In an attempt to answer the questions posed by Lee Harvey Oswald's visit to Mexico City in September and October of 1963, the House Select Committee on Assassinations has pursued the following investigative procedure:

1) Conducted extensive interviews, depositions, and executive session hearings involving Central Intelligence Agency personnel;

2) Interviewed Cuban citizens who could have knowledge of Oswald's sojourn in Mexico;

3) Interviewed Mexican citizens who could have knowledge of Oswald's activities and associations while he was in Mexico;

4) Conducted an extensive review of the files of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation that pertain to Oswald and Mexico City.

C. Conclusions

1) Someone who identified himself as Lee Harvey Oswald called the Soviet Consulate on 1 October 1963. This
individual indicated that he had visited the Soviet Consulate at least once. Other evidence from the CIA wiretaps, and witness testimony, indicates that the individual visited the Soviet and Cuban Consulates on five or six different occasions. While the majority of the evidence tends to indicate that this individual was indeed Lee Harvey Oswald, the possibility that someone else used Lee Harvey Oswald's name during this time in contacts with the Soviet and Cuban Consulates cannot be absolutely dismissed.

2) This Committee has not been able to determine Lee Harvey Oswald's activities outside of the Cuban and Soviet Embassies with certainty. There is a report, which has not been confirmed, indicating that during his stay in Mexico Oswald attended a "twist party" at the home of Ruben Duran Navarro, the brother-in-law of...
Silvia Duran. There is also unconfirmed evidence which, if true, would indicate that Oswald spent one night and parts of two days with a group of pro-Castro students from the University of Mexico.

3) There is a report that Oswald may have been in the company of a tall, thin, blond-headed man while in Mexico. This report has not been confirmed. If true, it is possible that this same individual may, on occasion, have used Oswald's name in dealing with the Cuban and Soviet Consulates. The man's name, if there was such a man, is not known.

4) On the dates that Oswald was in Mexico, the CIA had photographic surveillance operations which covered entrances to the Soviet Embassy and the Cuban Embassy and Consulate. The CIA also had electronic surveillance on telephones in the Soviet Consulate and Military Attache's Office and Cuban diplomatic compounds. The

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telephone at the Cuban Consulate was not subject to that surveillance.

5) The CIA's Mexico City Station definitely knew of Oswald's contacts with both the Soviet and Cuban diplomatic compounds and of his desire to obtain an intransit visa for travel to Russia via Cuba. The source of this information was the electronic surveillance on the Soviet Consulate and Soviet Military Attache's Office.

6) All information in the possession of the CIA Mexico City Station was not reported to CIA Headquarters in an accurate and expeditious manner prior to the assassination.

7) With the exception of a few, possibly benign, irregularities, and considering the possibility that not all of the information available to the Station has been provided to this Committee, the information in the possession of the CIA Mexico Station was reported in an
accurate and expeditious manner after
the assassination to headquarters.

8) With the exception of those areas that
involved sensitive sources and methods,
such as the information pertaining to the
electronic and photographic surveillance
of the Soviet and Cuban diplomatic
compounds, information developed by
the CIA in Mexico was generally relayed
to the Warren Commission in an accurate
and expeditious manner.

9) It is the conclusion of this Committee
that the CIA's photo-surveillance
operations in Mexico City probably
obtained a photograph of Lee Harvey
Oswald entering either or both the
Soviet and Cuban Consulates. The CIA
denies that such a photograph exists.
Hence, the disposition of this photograph
is unknown.
10) The CIA telephone surveillance on the Soviet Embassy taped several calls of a man using the name "Lee Oswald." These tapes were retained for a routine two week period and were most likely erased shortly after 16 October 1963. These tapes were probably in existence at the time of the assassination.

11) The Committee is aware of the allegations that Silvia Tirado de Duran may have been an intelligence agent for either the Cubans, Mexicans or Americans. Ms. Duran was probably never employed by Cuban intelligence. While there is no direct evidence on the question other than Ms. Duran's denial, the Committee believes that the circumstantial evidence that tends to indicate that Ms. Duran had a relationship of some type with either Mexican or American intelligence is of such a nature that the possibility cannot be dismissed.
D. Structure and Relevancy

The following report detailing the results of this Committee's investigative efforts regarding Mexico City is divided into general areas:

1) CIA surveillance operations in Mexico City during September and October of 1963;

2) Information about Lee Harvey Oswald's stay in Mexico City that was known prior to the assassination;

3) Reconstruction of the CIA Mexico City Station and Headquarters activity regarding Oswald prior to the assassination;

4) Mexico City reporting of information after the assassination;

5) Witnesses from the Cuban Consulate;

6) Investigation of related information that was not available to the Warren Commission; and

7) Reconstruction of Oswald's activities in Mexico City.
The reader should be advised at the outset that the first section following is technical in nature and may not appear directly relevant at first blush. But the report is cumulative in nature. The specific, detailed analyses of the standard operating procedures in the first section are necessary to, and form a partial basis for, the reconstruction of the Mexico City Station's handling of the Oswald case. There are many gaps left by the documentary and testimonial evidence concerning the manner in which the CIA's Mexico City Station and Headquarters reacted to Oswald's presence in Mexico City. A knowledge of the way in which the Mexico City Station operated and the procedures involved in those surveillance operations which detected Oswald is valuable in filling the gaps of the specific case which is the subject of this report.

II. Central Intelligence Agency Surveillance Operations in Mexico City in September and October 1963
A. Photographic Surveillance Operations Aimed at the Cuban Diplomatic Compound

1. Introduction

The Mexico City Station of the Central Intelligence Agency maintained photographic surveillance on the Cuban diplomatic compound during September and October of 1963. The purpose of this operation was to get identifiable photographs of all individuals who visited the Cuban diplomatic compound.

2. Physical Positioning of Surveillance Bases and Targets

The Cuban diplomatic compound covered one city block in Mexico City between Tacubaya, Francisco Marquez and Zamora Streets. The entrance to the Cuban Embassy was located on the corner of Tacubaya and Francisco Marquez. Next to this entrance on Francisco Marquez Street was another entrance for automobiles. The entrance to the Cuban Consulate,
which was in a separate building from the Embassy, was located on the corner of Francisco Marquez and Zamora.7/ The CIA surveillance post was located at 149 Francisco Marquez Street.8/ An agent photographed visitors to the Embassy from one window in the third floor apartment at 149 Francisco Marquez Street.9/ A pulse camera covered the entrance to the Consulate from a second window in the same third floor apartment.10/

3. Objectives of Operation and Scope of Coverage Provided

One CIA officer, who claimed to have had a marginal role in this surveillance operation, remembers that they had trouble covering both the Cuban Embassy entrance and the Consulate entrance.11/ "The Cuban Embassy coverage had more sophisticated equipment using a pulse camera which frequently developed mechanical difficulties."12/ Two former CIA employees who were in Mexico City in 1963 remembered that there were two cameras covering the Cuban diplomatic compound.13/ Ms. Goodpasture, a case officer in the
The CIA staff technician who serviced the cameras and trained the agents at the CIA photographic base that covered the Cuban compound was interviewed by the House Select Committee on Assassinations. The technician stated that he had set up the cameras in the photographic base at the inception of an operation in the early 1960's designed to provide photographic surveillance of the Cuban compound. For a short time after the inception of the operation, the technician had been responsible for maintaining liaison between the agents inside the base and the Station. After the agent's training was completed, Mexico City Station, testified that she could not remember the locations of the two cameras. David A. Phillips, Chief of the Cuban Section in the Mexico City Station, testified that the Consulate entrance was covered along with the Embassy entrance. Mr. Phillips was not absolutely sure of his recollection, but thought that it was possible that the Embassy entrance had been covered by a manned photographic base and the Consulate entrance was covered by a pulse camera.
the technician turned the liaison responsibilities over to a case officer. He could not remember with certainty the identity of that case officer, but thought that it may have been Robert Shaw. The technician remembered that the operation had originally covered the Cuban Embassy entrance with a manually operated Exacta or Leica camera. He said that this camera had been set up on a tripod and was equipped with a Bal-Scope. Later, according to the technician, a pulse camera was installed in this base. The pulse camera was set up to cover the Consulate entrance, while the agents continued covering the Embassy entrance with the manual camera. The technician could not remember with certainty when the pulse camera was installed in the base. The technician told the House Select Committee on Assassinations that the exact time of installation could be checked by reviewing the project files maintained at CIA Headquarters.

The technician remembered quite a few details about how the pulse camera had been set up and how it worked. He remembered that the shutter was triggered by a device attached to a spotting scope. The

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triggering device was activated by changes in light intensity. The spotting scope was trained on a very narrow area of the door latch of the Cuban Consulate entrance. The camera itself covered a much broader field than the spotting scope. The camera was set up so as to make sure that a person triggering the camera by passing between the spotting scope and its target, the door latch, would be photographed from the waist up.22/

The technician stated that the agent in the photographic basehouse serviced his own cameras, and developed the film and made contact prints in the basehouse.23/ The agent covering the Embassy entrance kept a log corresponding to the photographs taken.24/

The project files for this operation bear out the technician's recollections. An examination of these files by the House Select Committee on Assassinations revealed several of the technician's monthly reports. An examination of the chronological file of dispatches passing between CIA Headquarters and the Mexico City Station turned up one additional monthly report that was not located in the project file. A third relevant
dispatch was made available to the Committee on 20 November 1978. The report in the dispatch chronology covers the period of 1 September to 30 September 1963.25/ The dispatch reports that on 23 September 1963 the agent who ran the Cuban photographic basehouse called the technician into the basehouse to discuss the layout of the Cuban Consulate.26/ The entrance to the Cuban Consulate had been closed in 1961 due to harassment and stink bombings.27/ A few days prior to the 23rd, the Consulate had once again opened its door to the public. Prior to this reopening of the Consulate door, the photography agent had limited his coverage to the main Embassy gate.28/ He used an Exacta camera with a Bal-Scope with a 30-power eyepiece. The dispatch reported, however, from the position he had to cover the main gate, he could not cover the newly reopened Consulate entrance.29/ The base agent told the technician that at that time, approximately seventy percent of all the visitors to the Cuban compound were using the Embassy entrance and the remainder used the Consulate entrance.30/
The technician discussed this problem with the case officer for the project, Robert Shaw. Mr. Shaw asked the technician to add additional photographic coverage to the basehouse so as to cover the Consulate door. On 26 September the technician tested equipment for use in the basehouse. The dispatch goes on to say:

On the morning of 27 September, PARMUTH installed the VLS-2 Trigger Device at the LIERODE basehouse and used the 500 mm lens issued with this system, one 400 mm Telyt, one reflex housing to be used with the Telyt adapted to fit the Robot Star camera, one Robot Star Camera, one solenoid release for mounting and triggering the Robot Star camera, one Kodak K-100 adapted for single or burst type exposure, one solenoid release to be used with the K-100... one 152 mm f/4 Cine Ektar Lens, and two additional tripods.

The photography agent was instructed to test each camera for four days. The report says that the results of these test days will be forwarded to the Technical Services Division at Headquarters as soon as they become available.

On 7 November 1963 the Mexico City Station filed a report on the functioning of the pulse camera. This dispatch is referenced to

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HMMA-22307, paragraph 5, c. 37/ It says that the VLS-2 triggering device had been performing well with little false triggering. The 500 mm lens was replaced with a 6-inch lens so as to obtain wider coverage of the Consulate door. 38/ During the first two weeks that the pulse camera was in operation, the VLS-2 triggered the camera anytime that anyone entered or left the Consulate door. This dual photography used an excessive amount of film, so the base agent adjusted the VLS-2 so that it only photographed people leaving the Cuban compound by the Consulate door. 39/ The base agent used "the K-100 camera with the 152 mm lens for one day and turned in 10 fee (sic) of 16 mm film." 40/ Samples of the photos taken "on that day" with the camera are enclosed with the dispatch. 41/ The Robot Star camera that was placed in the base on September 27 broke down after four days of operation and was replaced with a second Robot Star camera. 42/ This Robot Star broke down after five days of operation. At the time of this dispatch in November, a Robot Star camera was in operation. 43/ Samples of this camera's photographs...
were also sent with this dispatch. Hence, between September 27, 1963 and November 7, 1963, at least three, and possibly four, cameras were used in the photo base with the VLS-2 automatic triggering device. On the 27th, the photo-technician installed two cameras, the K-100 and the first Robot Star, with the VLS-2 triggering device. The K-100 was used for one day. The first Robot Star worked for four days; a second Robot Star worked for five days. On 11/7/63 a Robot Star was in operation at the base. It is not clear whether the Robot Star which was working at the time of the November dispatch was a third camera or one of the earlier ones which could have been repaired. In any event, the Station asked that a new camera be sent to replace the Robot Star.

On June 1964 the CIA Mexico City Station sent a cable to Headquarters alerting them that they were sending up the negatives from the pulse camera coverage of the Cuban Embassy. All available negatives and five packages of undeveloped film were sent to Headquarters by transmittal manifest #252572.
The cable apologizes for the delay in sending the negatives caused by "consolidation and dating." 52/ The cable suggests that Headquarters retain possession of the negatives and informs Headquarters that the negatives will be forwarded to them on a regular basis. 53/

A transmittal manifest is "unaccountable." 54/ That means that the document and the material it transmits is not made part of the record and is, therefore, unretrievable. 55/

The CIA made the photo-technician's monthly report for December available to the Committee on 16 November 1978. 56/ On the morning of 17 December 1963, a 35 mm Sequence camera was installed in the base house with the VLS-2 trigger device. 57/ The installation of this Sequence camera was probably in response to the request for a replacement camera in HMMA-22433.

On 22 June 1965 the CIA Mexico City Station sent a dispatch to Headquarters to familiarize them with the details of the pulse camera operation. 58/
This dispatch is intended to familiarize Headquarters with the details of the Pulse Camera operation in Mexico City, which was mounted in December 1963 and is targeted against the (Cuban) Embassy and Consulate.59/ The dispatch goes on to report that a technician from Headquarters brought a pulse camera to Mexico City in mid-December 1963, installed and tested it, and instructed the technician resident in Mexico City and the base agent in the use and maintenance of the camera.60/

On the basis of HMMA-22307, HMMA-22433 and MEXI 9940, the Committee believes that it is probable that the pulse camera was in operation on the days that Lee Harvey Oswald visited the Cuban Consulate. This Committee requested the photographs produced by the pulse camera by the project's cryptonym on 22 June 1978. The CIA informed a House Select Committee on Assassinations researcher on 7/20/78 that the cryptonym did not refer to a photographic project.61/ A more specific request for the photographs was made on 21 July 1978.62/

On 13 October 1978 the Committee, as a result of a review of materials taken by James Angleton from Win Scott's safe at the time of his death,63/ addressed another letter to the CIA on this matter.64/ This letter
These visits and conversations are not heresay; for persons watching these embassies photographed Oswald as he entered and left each one; and clocked the time he spent on each visit. The conversations are also known to have taken place, including the one in which he told the Soviet to whom he was talking that he should have heard, received a message, from the Soviet Embassy in Washington, indicating...
obviously that a Soviet Embassy official in Washington had offered to help Oswald.

Scott's comments are a source of deep concern to this Committee, for they suggest your Agency's possible withholding of photographic materials highly relevant to this investigation.

Therefore, the Committee reiterates its request of May 2, including but not limited to any and all photographs in the CIA's possession of Lee Harvey Oswald resulting from CIA surveillance operations directed against the Soviet and Cuban Embassies and Consulates in Mexico City. In addition, the Committee requests a detailed explanation regarding the withholding of any and all photographs in the CIA's possession of Oswald resulting from CIA surveillance operations directed against the Soviet and Cuban Embassies and Consulates in Mexico City.65/

The CIA responded to this letter on 25 October 1976.66/ The CIA informed the Committee that it was their belief that the pulse camera was not in operation during September of 1963.67/

First, there was no pulse camera...opposite the entrance to the Cuban Consulate until December 1963...In fact, there had been no photographic coverage of the Consulate entrance prior to the visit of Lee Harvey Oswald to Mexico City...The Consulate entrance had been closed for some time, and after it was reopened the 27th of September was scheduled as the day for installation of photographic equipment for its coverage. Difficulty was experienced in the installation and the technicians had to machine a part for
the equipment...The technicians probably had to make the part in question. On that date, or at some date not long afterwards, there was test photography of the entrance... Various difficulties were experienced with the equipment, which seems eventually to have been resolved by installation of the pulse camera in December 1963. There is no question about the sequence set forth above.68/

HMMA-22307 definitely reports the installation of the two cameras and a VLS-2 trigger device on 27 September 1963.69/ But the cameras did not function smoothly.70/ HMMA-22433 reported that the K-100 camera broke down after one day's operation.71/ It was replaced with the first Robot Star, which had also been installed on September 27. The first Robot Star broke down four days after its installation.72/ A second Robot Star broke down after five days of operation.73/ A Robot Star was working on 7 November 1963, when HMMA-22433 requested that Headquarters send a replacement camera to Mexico.74/ In all likelihood, that request was filled with the installation of the Sequence camera on 17 December 1963 detailed in HMMA-22726.75/ Under this interpretation of the documents, the operation would have gone into continuous
operation in mid-December 1963 as claimed by the CIA. But the first pulse camera was set up on Friday, September 27, 1963. The documents do not specify the days that the original cameras functioned. HMMA-22307 says:

(The base agent) was requested to test the Robot Star Camera for four days and the K-100 for another four days.\(76/\)

HMMA-22433 says:

(The base agent) used the K-100 with a 152 mm lens for one day, turning in 10 fee (sic) of 16 mm film...The Robot Star and the Telyt 400 mm lens are now being used with the VLS-2 on this project...The Robot Star camera which was given to (the base agent) with the VLS-2 broke down after four days of photographing. (The technician) replaced this with another Robot. Five days later the second camera failed to advance properly.\(77/\)

This Committee believes that it is reasonable to assume that the base agent started using the equipment immediately after it was installed.\(78/\) Hence, the one day that the K-100 was used would have been either the 27th (the day it was installed), the 28th (a Saturday) or the 30th (the following Monday). It is also reasonable to assume that the Robot Star was put into action the day of, or the day following, the breakdown of the K-100. This camera worked for four
days. So the Consulate was probably the subject of photographic surveillance from 27 September to 1 October, assuming that the five days of coverage from the original cameras started on the day of installation and ran continuously, except for Sunday, September 30th.

The base agent developed the film from the pulse camera and turned it over in negative form to his contact.\textsuperscript{79/} The film was probably routinely sent to Headquarters.

The technician who set up the cameras in the base house said that the objective of the operation was to get identifiable photographs of all visitors to the Cuban compound.\textsuperscript{81/} The goals of the operation were spelled out in the 1966 Project Renewal request. Its original objectives, still current, include furnishing photographic coverage during daylight hours of the Embassy and Consulate entrances.\textsuperscript{82/}

Even though this was the stated objective, Ann Goodpasture testified that she was not sure, but thought that the coverage of the Cuban Consulate and Embassy would have been continuous only during office hours.\textsuperscript{83/} This was also the recollection of David
Phillips.84/ During September, October and November of 1963, the Cuban Consulate was open to the public from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.; the Embassy was open to the public from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.85/

A blind memo, dated 11/27/64, entitled "Memo passed to Mr. Papich of FBI with info on photo coverage of Embassies and info on Kostikov," implies that the coverage on the Cuban Embassy was of a continuous nature during daylight hours. This memo also implies that there was a coverage of the Cuban Consulate.86/ The technician who serviced this operation in Mexico City remembers that he tried to get full daylight coverage of the compound but that it was very difficult.87/ He said that the manual coverage was usually good but that human error had to be taken into account when considering the manual coverage. He pointed out that it was hard for a person to maintain constant attention in such a sedentary job and, hence, some visitors would get by the manual operation.88/ The technician also remembered that he had set up the pulse camera to provide constant daylight coverage.89/ By 1965 the pulse camera was
only working for six hours a day.\textsuperscript{90} The House Select Committee on Assassinations has not been able to determine the scope of the pulse camera coverage during September and October 1963 by examination of the production because that production, if it exists, has not been made available for review.\textsuperscript{91}

The CIA has made the photographic production and logs from the manual coverage of the Embassy entrance available for House Select Committee on Assassinations review.\textsuperscript{92} All production from the manual camera coverage of the Cuban Embassy for the months of September, October and November was examined.\textsuperscript{93} This examination revealed that the coverage of the Embassy was fairly consistent between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m. on weekdays.\textsuperscript{95} There was coverage, with a few exceptions, on every weekday.\textsuperscript{96} There was no coverage on weekends.\textsuperscript{97} During the three-month period examined by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, only four weekdays were not covered by the photographic surveillance operation aimed at the Cuban Embassy.\textsuperscript{98} There was no evidence in the files of serious technical difficulties or camera
problems in the manual operation during these three months.99/

4. Disposition of Production from the Operation

The photographs from the manual camera were maintained in a chronological file at the CIA station in Mexico City.100/ These photographs were routinely shown to a penetration agent in the Cuban Embassy for identification purposes.101/ After this agent left the employment of the Cuban Embassy in 1965, the photographs were sent to the JMwave Station in Miami, Florida for review by Cuban defectors such as AMMUG/1.102/

The disposition of the pulse camera photographs in general, beyond the fact that as of 1965, and possibly earlier, the production was routinely sent to Headquarters, is unknown.103/ The CIA denies that the pulse camera was functioning during the time Oswald was in Mexico.104/ If the Committee's belief that the pulse camera was functioning on the days that Oswald visited the Cuban Consulate is correct, then the ultimate disposition of the photographs produced on those days remains a mystery.
B. Photographic Surveillance Operations Aimed at the Soviet Diplomatic Compound

1. Introduction

The Mexico City CIA Station maintained photographic surveillance on the Soviet diplomatic compound in Mexico City in 1963. Three photographic sites, or bases, were used in this operation. The primary objective of the operation was to photograph people who visited the Soviet Embassy. The operation, generally, covered the main gate of the Soviet compound between 900 and 1800 (or dark) on weekdays and from 900 to 1400 on Saturdays.

LILYRIC (second photo-base located in a 2nd floor apartment)

LIMITED (primary photo-base located in a 1st floor apartment)

GELATI

LILYRIC (second photo-base located in a 2nd floor apartment)

CHICONTEPEC

Soviet Compound

TACUBAYA

Gate

Embassy

Pavilion

Classification: 201-088

148

Classified by derivation: [Redacted]
There were three bases which provided photographic surveillance of the Soviet diplomatic compound in 1963. One of the bases overlooked the enclosed garden or "backyard" area of the Soviet Embassy. The other two bases, of primary concern to this Committee, covered the entrance to the Soviet compound. The primary base, LIMITED, was directly across the street intersection from the main Soviet Embassy gate; the secondary, or "back-up," LILYRIC base was across the street and down a little way from the main Embassy gate.

3. Objectives of Operation and Scope of Coverage Provided

The purpose of this operation has also been described as being to obtain photographs of Soviet officials and their families; all foreigners (non-Latin) who visited the Embassy; and cars with foreign license plates. One of the main purposes of the photographic bases that covered the Embassy gate was to obtain a photograph of every "foreigner," or non-Latin, in contact with the Soviet Embassy.
This was done in an attempt to identify possible Soviet espionage agents.

My understanding of that was that it was to be used to identify those people who might be working for the Soviets as espionage agents who were U.S. citizens who went down there driving a car with a U.S. license plate on it, or people we did not know but could identify. The same procedure was also used for trying to identify people other than U.S. citizens...115/

It is reported that the Mexican nationals who manned the photographic bases and actually took the photographs had an "uncanny ability" to pick out foreigners.116/

The House Select Committee on Assassinations next attempted to determine the scope of the photographic coverage on the main gate of the Soviet Embassy. At a minimum, the Embassy was probably covered by the photographic operations during office hours. "The instructions were to cover the entire work day (office hours)..."117/ "Instructions were to cover office hours, photograph each new Soviet and family, all foreigners and foreign license plates."118/ The normal work hours of the Soviet Embassy during September and October of 1963 were from 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.119/
There are some indications that the photographic coverage was more extensive than just office hours. Even though the Embassy was not open past 6:00 p.m., visitors could still gain entrance by ringing the gate bell. "Russian speakers can get in any time."120/ One CIA officer who was in Mexico City remembers "that the photo surveillance was constant except for instances where it would be down for security reasons or equipment malfunction."121/ A blind memorandum, dated 11/27/63, entitled "Memo passed to Mr. Papich of FBI with info on photo coverage of embassies and info on Kostikov," says, in part,

We have photographic coverage during daylight hours on the USSR, Cuban, Czechoslovak and Polish Embassies. Their consulates are located in the embassies and therefore the coverage of the embassies would include coverage of the consulates. The photographic coverage is of a continuous nature during daylight hours. However, weather conditions and other factors affecting any photographic efforts require that the coverage not be considered as total or complete.122/

Ann Goodpasture was questioned about the scope of the photographic coverage on the Soviet compound. She said:

I cannot give you the exact time (of coverage). I can guess, and my guess is that they were
open most of the time when the Consulate was opened for business hours. But the person who would have that information, the only person who would know, is the case officer who was handling the project at that time.123/

Ms. Goodpasture explained the discrepancy between the time of coverage as stated in her notes and testimony and that in the 11/27/63 memorandum by saying that the memorandum referred to the coverage instituted after the assassination of John Kennedy.124/ An examination of the photographic production from the LIMITED base shows that the coverage from that base prior to the assassination was fairly uneven.125/ The log sheets for this operation show that, if anything, coverage decreased after the assassination.126/

The House Select Committee on Assassinations reviewed production and log materials from one base, LIMITED, which covered the gate of the Soviet diplomatic compound.127/ The LIMITED base was referred to as the "primary" base because it began operation before the LILYRIC base opened.128/
The following chart lists the production from the LIMITED base which was made available to the House Select Committee on Assassinations.

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<td>830-1800</td>
<td>1001</td>
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<td>43</td>
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Classification: 

(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled documents.)
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>N.A.</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| 26    | N.A.     | N.A. | 14   | (Saturday) 

+Not Available.
Given the somewhat uneven nature of the coverage maintained by LIMITED,131/ the House Select Committee on Assassinations staff asked whether the two bases were run in conjunction so as to provide more comprehensive coverage. [CIA B] the project's case officer did not remember that this was the case. He did remember that both bases operated at the same time so as to get the most complete coverage possible.132/ [CIA B] was not sure whether there was routine coverage of the Soviet Embassy on weekends.133/ He said that it was possible that there was routine coverage on Saturday mornings.134/

An examination of the project file maintained by the CIA on the photographic coverage of the Soviet Embassy does not bear out [CIA B] assertion that the two bases duplicated efforts. In fact, the project file confirmed that the bases complemented each other rather than duplicated efforts. This was the case in 1960 when a project review stated:
LIMITED - This base compiles daily logs indicating all arrivals, departures and where possible, identities of every person visiting or working at the LIMERICK target. LIMITED's photographic coverage is still concentrated on visitors, as opposed to employees, to the LIMERICK installation. LILYRIC photographs also are concentrated on visitors to the target, as opposed to employees. It should be noted that LILYRIC operates for photographic coverage during the hours from daylight to 1400 hours each day of the week except Sunday. The LIMITED base maintains photographic coverage from 1400 hours to darkness each day except Sunday.135/

In 1961 the project review said:

1. To collect operational information pertaining to LIMERICK personnel and physical facilities through use of photographic base houses. Three photographic bases, LIMITED, LILYRIC...contribute to this objective. To avoid repetition, the Station is omitting the usual description of the functions of these three bases and how they contribute to the above objective. There has been no change in the coverage as described in the 1960 Request for Project Renewal.136/

Similar statements are included in the project reviews for 1962 and 1963.137/ At one point a move was made at Headquarters to close the LILYRIC base:
FI/OPS recommends strongly that the photo coverage be reviewed from the standpoint of value and usefulness with a view to determining whether the LILYRIC activity could not be safely eliminated and the additional photographic coverage conducted on a more selective basis, without materially affecting overall usefulness.\textsuperscript{138/}

The Mexico City Station took exception to this recommendation:

While HMMA 14093 correctly referred to LIMITED, LILYRIC...as "photographic base-houses," the Station would like to emphasize that photographic coverage is only one of their functions. LIMITED is used as a radio dispatch base for automobile surveillance teams in addition to physical surveillance of persons entering the front gate. Their photography is negligible compared to their other duties. The LILYRIC base performs the best photography of persons visiting the front gate, perhaps because the vantage point for taking the pictures is from the second floor and above the street traffic which partially blocks LIMITED photographs. LILYRIC also does individual reports on LIMERICK personnel entering and leaving the main gate...\textsuperscript{139/}

In 1964 the Mexico City Station restated the operating procedures of the two bases in a dispatch referenced to the above paragraph from HMMA-14793:
The Station feels that it would be helpful to summarize at this time information previously reported to Headquarters (see paragraph 3, reference B) concerning the photo basehouses under this project and thereby give Headquarters an updated frame of reference in which to view the roles of the various basehouses.

The LIMITED and LILYRIC basehouses provide coverage of front of the LIMERICK installation. Although on the surface it may appear that these two basehouses provide duplicate take, this is not the case. It has been the Station's experience in running the unilateral LIEMPTY operation that a 0900 to evening workday, which would be required of a single basehouse in order to cover the LIMERICK target effectively, is just too long for any pair of agents to remain effective. This is especially true when it is considered that these basehouse operators are essentially unsupervised during their workday. It would also be impossible for a single basehouse to provide the kind of coverage this station needs on the target installation, especially during the peak hours of activity, namely late morning and early afternoon. For these reasons, the LILYRIC basehouse generally operates from 0900 to 1400 or 1500 weekdays. LIMITED operates from 1200 to 1800 or dark (as the daily situation dictates) on weekdays, and 0900 to 1400 on Saturdays. (These hours are subject to change to fit Station needs.) Special coverage for Sunday is arranged on a need basis; however, past experience has shown regular coverage of Saturday afternoons and Sundays is not rewarding. This schedule provides for both basehouses to be in action.
during the peak activity hours of the LIMERICK target. Although even this arrangement is not completely airtight, anything less than this would present unacceptable gaps in the coverage. It must also be considered that without two basehouses covering the front of the target installation, any illness, personal problem or vacation for operators of one basehouse would terminate Station coverage...

It is the Station's opinion that as long as the LIMERICK installation is a prime target of the Station, it will be necessary to maintain the present three basehouses. To eliminate any one of the three would create a gap in the Station's coverage that would not be compatible with the emphasis placed on this target.

But the information in the preceding chart does not correlate with the statement of the coverage in HMMA-23343. The above chart, on pages 37-38, refers to the coverage of the Soviet compound by the base that the review of HMMA-23343 reveals covered the compound from 1200 to 1800 or dark. The chart shows that while 1200 to 1800 coverage is sometimes the case, the base's coverage of the Embassy, at least during the months of September and October, on days when the base operated at all, was not always in that time period. This is the base that the dispatch also states covered Saturday morning. Out of the nine Saturdays covered by the above chart, this base
was in operation on only four of those days. This Committee has not been able to establish or disprove the possible inference that LILYRIC covered those days when there was no coverage from LIMITED because—the production and logs from the LILYRIC base were not made available for review. That material was requested but has not been made available.\textsuperscript{141} An explanation of why this material is missing was requested on 7/25/78.\textsuperscript{142} The CIA's explanation stated that the photographs and logs "may have been destroyed in a purge of Mexico City Station files and that the folders for the destroyed material were reused to forward more recent photographic material to Headquarters for retention."\textsuperscript{143} The folders which once contained the production were located at the National Archives' Records Center but, according to the CIA's explanation, the folders contained production material from 1967.\textsuperscript{144} Because the CIA has not provided the photographic production and logs from the LILYRIC for examination, no precise determination detailing the effectiveness of the coverage of the Soviet compound can be made.
Regardless of the scope and effectiveness of the two bases, a question that may never be resolved due to the conflicting evidence and missing production, the surveillance was considered adequate:

Q: How thorough was the coverage?
A: They covered the categories that we asked them for on a routine basis, which was to identify any people who appeared to be non-Latin and any Soviets.

Q: I understand that was the purpose. Given that purpose, how thorough was the coverage?
A: I think it was accurate.

Q: Was Win Scott satisfied with the performance of the photo operation at the Soviet Embassy?
A: To the best of my knowledge he was.145/

4. Procedure and Timing Involved in Processing Production from the Operation

The CIA photographic bases were manned by at least one agent who took photographs and kept a log sheet of people entering and leaving the Embassy and of the photographs that he took.146/ The film remained in the camera until the whole roll was exposed, which often took two or three days.147/
After the assassination of John Kennedy, this procedure was changed and the film was cleared from the camera on a daily basis.\textsuperscript{148}/

The CIA contract agent outside of the United States Embassy who was in charge of the photographic bases was\textsuperscript{149}/\textsuperscript{150}/\textsuperscript{151}/\textsuperscript{152}/\textsuperscript{153}/\textsuperscript{154}/\textsuperscript{155}/
picked up the film, prior to the assassination, from the photo bases three times a week.\textsuperscript{150}/\textsuperscript{151}/ then took the film to his brother-in-law, who worked at night, to develop it. The brother-in-law also printed the film into eight-by-ten contact prints.\textsuperscript{151}/

After the film was developed and printed,\textsuperscript{151}/ turned over the negatives and contact prints to \textsuperscript{152}/

Ms. Ann Goodpasture picked up the photographic production if \textsuperscript{153}/ or Ms. Goodpasture, would then bring the photographic production back to the Mexico City Station in the American Embassy.\textsuperscript{154}/ did not remember with certainty to whom he turned over the material, but believed it was either Ms. Goodpasture or\textsuperscript{155}/
5. Responsibility for the Operation

There is some controversy as to who had overall responsibility for this project. Ms. Goodpasture testified that the responsibility was [CIA B]156/ [CIA B] according to Ms. Goodpasture, made all the decisions and had all the responsibility involved in the operation.157/ [CIA B] was the most junior Operations Officer in the Mexico City Station in 1963, and claims that his role in the operation was largely limited to legwork.158/ Ms. Goodpasture testified that her role in the operation was limited to acting as an alternate Case Officer, internal routing of the production, and review of the photographs to insure the maintenance of technical quality in the operation.159/ Ann Goodpasture's annual Fitness-Report for the period 1 January 1963 to 31 December 1963 specifies her duties in regard to this operation. The fitness report says,

Working with [CIA B](regular contact and case officer), supervises work of three photo bases operating against Soviet Embassy; processes take; identifies Soviets and intelligence function. "Alternate contact with
Staff Agent.160/

Ms. Goodpasture denied that she had any supervisory role in relation to this operation.161/ The House Select Committee on Assassinations redeposed Ms. Goodpasture in November 1978 and asked her about this apparent inconsistency between her Fitness Report and her testimony:

Q: Now, having read your Fitness Report for 1963, are there any portions of your prior testimony that you wish to modify?

A: No, not really. Now, this LIEMPY project, this is a case of where I cannot seem to make it clear how our functions were. Now, the case officer had responsibility for the operation of the project. He decided how much to pay the agents, what hours they worked, where the meetings were held. He hired them; he fired them and he knew the identities; he met with all of them.

He brought in the photographs, the product. He dumped it on my desk and he was finished with it. I took the product film and prints and the contact file and distributed those.

I could levy any requirements of him or other people in the Station which as he remembered it it might have been for supervision, but when he was out of town I met with one agent with his so-called cut-out...162/

Q: This (Fitness Report) is not accurate?
A: It is not precise the way the work was divided...163/

Q: Now, I don't understand why, if you knew this description was inaccurate, you let this document go to Headquarters?

A: I think it was made on the basis of trying to get a promotion for me.164/

Alan White, who was Deputy Chief of Station in Mexico City in 1963, testified that Ann Goodpasture was "a Special Assistant" to the Chief of Station and that "her main responsibilities were to handle the surveillance operations."165/ Mr. White stated that this included both the photographic and electronic surveillance.166/ Mr. White remembered that "did help Annie with some of the pickup (of production)" but that his main responsibilities were with another operation.167/ Mr. White also testified that:

(Ann Goodpasture) carried with her a lot of invisible authority that devolved upon her because of her operational relationship with the Chief of Station, who had absolute confidence in her. She had a marvelous memory. She was meticulous in detail. I think he had every reason to put that kind of trust in her.
She reported directly to him. While she may not have been invested with any command authority by virtue of her position at the Station, certainly she was a kind of unofficial deputy for the purposes of the operations that she was involved in.\textsuperscript{168} Ms. Goodpasture was asked about Mr. White's statements as well as similar statements by other people associated with the CIA's Mexican operations.\textsuperscript{169}

Ms. Goodpasture: Well, I made more of those statements as those people saw it in their relationship with Mr. Scott's projects. They are true the way they saw it but I had no responsibility outside the projects that we worked on, but the \[ \times \] projects and the telephone tapping project touched every operation in the Mexico Station...I just didn't think I was as important as other people seemed to imply that I was.\textsuperscript{170}

Ms. Goodpasture also testified that her relationship with Mr. Scott could be termed special in that she was responsible for the day-to-day handling of the telephone tapping operation of which Mr. Scott was the case officer.\textsuperscript{171} [\textsuperscript{CIA B}]

\[ \text{recollection that he turned the photographic production over to}\ [\text{CIA C}] \text{or Ms. Goodpasture was confirmed by Ms. Goodpasture.}\textsuperscript{172} \]

Ms. Goodpasture also testified that the primary responsibility for the photographs after they were in
the Station was that of [CTA CI] 173/ Ms. Goodpasture testified that she was responsible for routing the photographs and that the complete production went to the [CTA CI] before it was filed.174/

Copies of the important photographs were given to the [CI/C2] for them to retain for routine use in the course of their work.175/

The [CTA CI] recollection of their role in this operation is very different from that of Ms. Goodpasture. [CTA CI] testified that Ann Goodpasture held the photographic production very tightly.176/ Her recollection was confirmed by her husband.177/ [CTA CI] stated that they did not routinely review or see all of the production from the Soviet Embassy photographic surveillance operation.178/

They claim they only saw the photographs that Ms. Goodpasture thought were important enough to bring to their attention.179/ According to [CTA CI], access to this file was tightly controlled by Ms. Goodpasture.180/
6. Coordination of Photographic and Electronic Surveillance Operations

The Mexico City Station employed an operating procedure whereby the functioning of the photographic base and the electronic intercept base could be coordinated. If the listening post monitor heard something that would lead him to believe that there was someone at one of the Embassies that should be photographed, he would alert the CIA technician in the listening post who would then alert Ann Goodpasture. Ms. Goodpasture could then alert CIA B who would then notify the photographic base. The reporting to Headquarters of information generated by the photographic surveillance operation and the electronic operation was also coordinated. The Station was able to go back to the photographic chronological file to check for photographs of people that were picked up on the tap operation when the transcripts were reviewed. It was a matter of routine to check the photographic production when reporting information developed from the tap operation.
that indicated a contact with an Embassy that was subject to photosurveillance.185/

A name trace could have been requested on the basis of the name alone but that wasn't the way Win Scott ran that Station. He wanted the photographic coverage tied in with the telephone coverage...sometimes there was a U.S. automobile license number. It was also part of the "numbers game" of justifying a project by the number of dispatches, cables or reports produced.186/

C. Electronic Surveillance of Telephones at the Soviet and Cuban Diplomatic Compounds in 1963

1. Existence

The Soviet and Cuban compounds were, in 1963, the targets of a multiple line telephone intercept operation.187/ [describes technical operation] 188/

2. Responsibility

a. General

Win Scott, the Chief of the Mexico City Station, was, nominally, the case officer for the telephone
surveillance project. Even though Mr. Scott was the nominal case officer, the "routine case officer functions" were performed by Ms. Ann Goodpasture.

An American technician was stationed in the listening post to maintain the equipment and to protect the Station's interests there. Ms. Goodpasture's duties in this operation ranged from meeting with the technician/officer inside the base for the purposes of daily supervision of the operation to handling the collection and distribution of the tapes and transcripts.

Ms. Goodpasture worked in this capacity until 1968. With the exception of the technician, the listening post and the transcription room of this base describes technical operation. This listening post covered up to thirty lines at one time.

b. Analysis and Reporting of Information Obtained

was responsible for the analysis, processing, and daily review of the Soviet transcripts. The transcripts were reviewed on a daily basis by would 

Classification:
bring conversations of interest or importance to [CIA C1] attention. 197/

[CIA C1] was also responsible for reporting the information developed from the Soviet wiretaps. He indicated that the reports were usually written by himself or [CIA C2] 198/ These reports were usually in the form of cables or dispatches to CIA Headquarters. 199/ [CIA C1(C2)] also usually handled the notification of representatives of various other United States government organizations in Mexico City when the information warranted such notification. 200/

David A. Phillips, a CIA officer who was stationed in Mexico City in 1963, testified that information from the taps would be reported if the information was important, if it was useful to another Agency component, or if it was something that should "go in the record." 201/ Mr. Phillips said that only a small amount of the information developed from the taps would be formally reported to CIA Headquarters and that the information that was reported was generally something more important than the usual conversations that were routinely intercepted. 202/
The report notes that lines 14-92-14 and 25-07-95 at the Cuban Embassy were disconnected on 23 September 1963.\textsuperscript{205/}

The monthly report for October says that

3. Telephone Lines Covered

This Committee has made an attempt to determine which telephone lines at the Soviet and Cuban diplomatic compounds were subject to this electronic intercept operation in September and October of 1963. The monthly operational report of this project for the month of September lists the following phones as targets of the operation:\textsuperscript{204/}

- 14-42-37 Cuban Embassy
- 14-92-14 Cuban Embassy
- 25-07-95 Cuban Embassy
- 14-13-26 Cuban Embassy
- 15-60-55 Soviet Embassy (Chancery)
- 15-61-55 Soviet Embassy (Chancery)
- 15-69-87 Soviet Embassy (Military Attache)
- 15-61-07 Soviet Embassy (Commercial Office)
- 15-12-64 Soviet Embassy (Film Representative)

The report notes that lines 14-92-14 and 25-07-95 at the Cuban Embassy were disconnected on 23 September 1963.\textsuperscript{205/} The monthly report for October says that
there has not been any change in the lines covered since September. 206/

A review of the transcripts produced by this operation revealed that the CIA has transcripts on file from the two-month period of interest to this Committee from three Cuban lines: 14-42-37, 14-13-26, and 25-09-14. 207/ It is noted that the last telephone line was not listed in the monthly reports. 208/ A review of the Soviet transcripts revealed that the five lines listed in the monthly reports were tapped on 27, 28 and 30 September. 209/ Only two of the lines, 15-61-55 and 15-60-55, were covered on Sunday, 29 September. 210/

The House Select Committee on Assassinations has found some indications in testimony given before this Committee and CIA documents that more Cuban lines were tapped at that time. 211/ This Committee has not been able to determine with certainty whether three lines (the number of lines on file in the transcripts), two lines (the number given by the contemporaneous monthly report), or five lines (the number given by some witnesses and documents) were
subject to the intercept operation. It should be noted, though, that there were five lines tapped in the Cuban compound in 1964. They were:

- 14-42-37  The Ambassador's private telephone
- 25-07-95  The Chancery
- 14-13-26  The Chancery
- 25-09-14  The Commercial Office
- 11-28-47  The Consulate

One CIA employee who was involved in Cuban operations in Mexico City remembered that there were taps on the telephone of the Cuban Consulate. It is possible that the employee, Mr. Phillips, who was stationed in Mexico City from 1961 to 1966, was incorrect, after a fifteen-year hiatus, in placing this tap in 1963. As the above notes, an examination of the project files fails to support Mr. Phillips' memory, although those files do show that the Consulate telephone was tapped in 1964.

4. Production from Operation

The intercept listening post operated from approximately 7:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m. every day.
Thirty recording machines that were impulse activated every time a tapped telephone was used taped the surveilled conversations.216/ In addition, the intercepted conversations were monitored by personnel in the listening post.217/

a. Types

The production from this listening post was broken down into three categories for the purposes of handling the tapes and transcripts: (1) intercepts of interest to the [describes organization] these included such groups as the Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional, individual Communists, the [organization]; (2) Cuban intercepts; and (3) Soviet and bloc country intercepts.218/

b. Handling Procedures

(1) Resuma

A summary of the conversations deemed of sufficient interest by the listening post monitors was prepared as they were monitored.219/ These summaries were called "resuma."220/ The resuma were given to
Ann Goodpasture by the technician early in the morning the day after they were prepared. Ms. Goodpasture had the previous day's resuma on Win Scott's desk by 9:00 a.m. on the morning of the day after they were prepared. Win Scott marked these resuma for action by his case officers before routing them through the Station. This Committee has requested copies of these resuma from the CIA but they have not been made available for review.

The resuma covered all thirty lines that were covered by the intercept operation. Only important conversations were included in the resuma. The monitors made the decision as to which conversations were important. After the resuma were prepared, the tapes from the lines were held for approximately ten days and were then reused. The resuma were maintained in a chronological file at the listening post.

(2) Cuban Tapes

The Cuban tapes (tapes produced by taps on the Cuban telephones) were left on the machines until
the reel was used up. When the reels were full, they were removed and transcribed in the listening post. The transcripts would be turned over to Ms. Goodpasture at the same time as the resuma. The tapes produced by the Cuban taps were maintained in the listening post. There was a special rack for those tapes in the technician's workshop, which was situated on the floor above the room in which the listening post was located. This rack had thirty slots in it. The tapes from each day's production went into a separate slot, with the oldest tapes going back into use in the monitor room; i.e., the tapes from the Cuban intercept were held for thirty days prior to reuse. The tapes were not turned over to Ms. Goodpasture unless she requested a specific tape.

(3) Soviet Tapes
(a) General Handling

The Soviet tapes were removed daily from the machines. The Spanish language portions of the tapes would then be transcribed in the listening
post. 238/ The transcripts and tapes from the Soviet lines were then routinely turned over to Ann Goodpasture along with the resumà and Cuban transcripts. 239/ Ms. Goodpasture then turned the tapes over to [CIA + ] who then delivered them to Boris Tarasoff for translation and transcription of the Russian language portions of the tape. 240/

(b) Retention and Reuse of Tapes

There is some question about how long the Soviet tapes were retained before reuse. There are indications that the tapes were routinely held for two weeks and then reused. 241/ The technician who ran the listening post could not state with certainty what the practice regarding retention and reuse of the Soviet tapes was. He said that he did not hold the tapes at all once they were returned to him by Ms. Goodpasture. 242/ He stated that he assumed that some of the tapes were retained by either the station or the Russian translator because his supply of tapes for the Russian taps kept dwindling. 243/ The tapes were not retained by the translator. 244/ It is possible
that the tapes were held for two weeks in the station before they were erased and sent back to Arehart for reuse.245/ [CIA F] remembers that [CIA B] spent a lot of time in the Station erasing tapes on a special machine for that purpose.246/

One of the main sources for the two-week period being ascribed to retention of the Soviet tapes is DIR-88680, which says:

Upon receipt you may resume usual practice of keeping Cuban and Soviet tapes two weeks and then erasing.247/

This Committee has not found any evidence that would contradict the above-quoted statement in regard to the Soviet tapes.

There was a procedure whereby the tapes could be held for longer than two weeks if someone thought that the tape should be preserved as well as the transcript.248/ The interested officer could make a note on the transcript or he could notify Ann Goodpasture, orally or by note, that he wanted the tape preserved.249/ There were no written rules or regulations governing this procedure.250/
It is clear that the reels of tape with conversations in the Russian language were delivered to Mr. Boris Tarasoff for translation and transcription.254/

(c) English Language Conversations

There are some indications that English language conversations were transcribed at the listening post. The Tab F Draft says:

Reels which contained Russian or a language other than Spanish or English were taken to another location (other than the listening post) for translation and typing.251/

Goodpasture's notes say:

Those transcripts which had Russian or another language besides Spanish or English went out of the listening post the day after the transcript (of the conversations on the reel) was typed. These reels were taken to another location where they were translated and typed.252/

But, in her testimony before the House Select Committee on Assassinations in executive session on 4/13/78, Ms. Goodpasture said:

The transcribers, or the transcription that I picked up, the transcribers were working at the same place with the Spanish text. If the language were other than Spanish, it would have to be taken to another location to be transcribed. The material that was picked up the day after the date on which it occurred was in the Spanish language normally.253/

It is clear that the reels of tape with conversations in the Russian language were delivered to Mr. Boris Tarasoff for translation and transcription.254/
Mr. Tarasoff has testified that he was also responsible for the transcription of the English language conversations although his wife, Anna Tarasoff, usually did the actual transcribing. This testimony is confirmed by the testimony of Anna Tarasoff. Arehart, the technician in the listening post, could not clearly remember whether or not any of his Mexican transcribers did the English language conversations. He remembered that these tapes were usually sent to the Station. He said that he did remember that monitors would often come to his workshop and ask him to come downstairs to listen to a conversation in English.

All of the conversations in the Spanish transcripts are in Spanish. All of the conversations in Spanish were transcribed in Spanish. It is doubtful that the listening post transcribers, who were Mexican nationals, would have translated an English conversation into Spanish and then transcribed it. In light of this, Tarasoff's recollection and Arehart's recollection, it is probable that all the English language conversations were sent to the
Tarasoffs for transcription.

(d) Handling by Tarasoffs

Along with the reels of tape that contained Russian language conversations (and probably English language conversations), Mr. Tarasoff received a copy of the Spanish transcripts. When the Tarasoffs received the tapes, they transcribed only those conversations that were denoted on the Spanish transcript as being in Russian.

Mr. Tarasoff routinely received the tapes the day after they were made. Mr. Tarasoff testified that he would then immediately transcribe the tapes and turn over the completed tapes and transcripts to his contact the next morning.

Mr. Tarasoff said that the volume of work he had to do at any given time fluctuated, but the transcripts were always finished in one day. "Sometimes there was so little work in transcribing the Russian portion of the tape that I was just hanging around doing nothing." Ann Goodpasture, at one time, put the time lag for completion of the

Classification: [redacted]
Russian transcription at approximately one week. In her testimony before this Committee, Ms. Goodpasture stated that it generally took Mr. Tarasoff one or two days to complete the translations and transcriptions.

(e) Expedited Procedure for English Language Conversations or other Conversations of Special Interest

There was a procedure whereby Mr. Tarasoff's transcription could be expedited if there was a special interest in a particular conversation. When the monitor in the listening post encountered something he considered important enough to require expedited transcription, it was possible for him to bring this quickly to the Station's attention.

Although Arnold Arehart was not the Tarasoffs' contact in September or October of 1963, he did serve as such at one time. When he was interviewed by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, Mr. Arehart was asked whether there was a process whereby transcription of important conversations in English
or Russian could be expedited. He explained that there would not have been such a process for a Russian conversation, since the importance of the conversation could not be judged due to the fact that no one in the listening post could understand that language. Arehart did say that there was such a procedure for English language conversations. When one of the Mexican monitors encountered a conversation in English, he would ask Arehart to listen to that conversation. After listening to the conversation, Arehart would decide whether or not it warranted special attention. If he deemed that it was important enough, he would mark the tape "Urgent," put it in a box, and deliver it to Ms. Goodpasture.

Mr. Arehart's recollection was confirmed by an examination of the project files for this operation. One of the monthly project reports explains this procedure and its purpose:
Headquarters (is) not well informed on the way the Mexico Station exploits operational leads from (this operation). The outside staff agent, Arnold Arehart has instructions to alert the Station immediately if a U.S. citizen or English speaking person tries to contact any of the target installations. This is done by a telephone call from outside the tap center at a pay phone to (Ann Goodpasture) inside the Station. Emergency meetings are arranged in double talk... (Goodpasture) meets Arehart within fifteen minutes at a pre-arranged downtown location and receives the reel with an extract of the pertinent conversation. The reel is then taken to the Station and given to the case officer responsible for the target the person was trying to contact. Headquarters is notified by cable of the action taken. Only in rare cases is information on a U.S. citizen passed without prior Headquarters approval. 279/

If the tape was from a Soviet installation, the tape would have been delivered the same day to the Tarasoffs by [CIA F] 280/ Along with the tape, the Tarasoffs would receive a note indicating which conversation was to be transcribed on a priority basis. The Tarasoffs would then immediately transcribe that conversation and return it to their regular contact that same day. 281/ It should be noted that the monthly report says that the Soviet transcripts would be delivered to the case officer responsible for the target installation. 282/ In the case of the
Soviet target, that case officer would have been

\[ \text{CIA CI} \] \text{283/ } \text{CIA CI} \text{ testified that he had nothing to do with transporting the transcripts to or from the Tarasoffs except in rare instances when no one else was available to do the job.284/ Mrs. Tarasoff testified that the "urgent" tapes were delivered and picked up by their regular contact.285/

(f) Handling in the Station

All of the transcripts were brought into the Station to Ms. Goodpasture.286/ Ms. Goodpasture routed the copies of the transcripts and retained one copy for her own file.287/ One copy of all of the Soviet transcripts was put on the desk by Ann Goodpasture the morning they were received.288/ Ms. Goodpasture routed the Cuban transcripts to either Robert Shaw or David Phillips.289/ One copy of all the transcripts eventually went into a chronological file.290/ One copy of the Soviet transcripts was cut and pasted onto separate sheets of paper and filed in appropriate subject or personality files.291/ The resumé were also maintained...
in a chronological file. One copy of the Cuban transcripts was routinely sent to Headquarters on a weekly basis.

(g) Format of Transcripts

The format of the transcripts that Mr. Tarasoff produced was much the same as those of the Spanish language transcripts described above. Mr. Tarasoff's transcripts were from Russian into English.

Many of Mr. Tarasoff's transcriptions bear the notation "(previously transcribed)" after the meter number referring to the reel footage location of a conversation. Mr. Tarasoff indicated that this notation meant that the conversation had already been transcribed from a tap on another embassy phone:

"Previously transcribed" means, for instance, I went to the embassy first and the embassy number was 605055. Now this number 501264 belonged to the film's office. So consequently if that particular call went out of the main building to the films office and it had been transcribed before, that is exactly what I would do, put down "previously transcribed". So there was no question of doing it twice.
C. Voice Comparisons

In addition to his translation and transcription duties, Mr. Tarasoff as a matter of routine attempted to identify the voices of the participants in a conversation. This eventually led to Mr. Tarasoff's collecting voice samples from tapes of Russian officials whose voices he had identified. Mr. Tarasoff also made comments about the personality and dispositions of the participants in conversations that he transcribed. Generally, these comments, or "personality assessments" were made on separate pieces of paper and not on the transcripts themselves.

III. Information About Lee Harvey Oswald's Stay in Mexico that was Known by the CIA Mexico City Station Prior to the Assassination of John Kennedy and the Sources of that Information

A. Information that was Available

In 1963 the Central Intelligence Agency's Mexico City Station surveilled both the Cuban and Soviet diplomatic compounds electronically and
The Mexico City Station received daily transcriptions of the telephonic surveillance of the Embassies. The Station received twice, or three times, a week the photographic coverage of the Embassies and Consulates.

1. Information Available to the Mexico City Station from Electronic Surveillance Aimed at the Soviet Consulate and Military Attache's Office.

From the electronic surveillance of the Soviet Embassy, the CIA Mexico City Station learned of the following conversations that were subsequently linked by Station personnel to Lee Harvey Oswald:

a. September 27, 1963, Friday

(1) At or about 10:30 a.m. an unidentified man called the Soviet Military Attache looking for a visa to Odessa. He was referred to the Consulate. The man then asked for and was given directions to the Consulate office. The directions...
were not noted by the transcriber. The entire conversation was transcribed in Spanish.305/

(2) At 10:37 a.m. a man called the Soviet Consulate and asked for the Consul. He was told that the Consul was not in. The man outside stressed that it was necessary for him to get a visa to Odessa. He was told to call back at 11:30. This conversation was also transcribed in Spanish.306/

(3) At 1:25 an unidentified man called the Soviet Consulate and asked for the Consul. The man was told that the Consul was not in. The man outside asked, "when tomorrow?" The Soviet official told him that on Mondays and Fridays the Consul was in between four and five. This conversation was also in the Spanish transcriptions.307/

(4) At approximately 4:05 p.m. Silvia Duran called the Soviet Embassy. She told the person at the Embassy that an American citizen seeking a visa was at the Cuban Consulate. Silvia explained that the American citizen wanted to know the name
of the official he had dealt with at the Soviet Embassy. Silvia had sent the American to the Soviet Embassy, stating that his acquiring a Cuban visa was contingent on his previously acquiring a Soviet visa. Silvia explained to the Soviet official that the American had stated that he was assured that there would be no problem. At that point, the Soviet official put another official on the phone, causing Silvia to repeat the story. The official then asked Silvia to leave her name and number so he could call later. This conversation was also in Spanish.308/

(5) At 4:26 p.m. an unidentified Soviet official called Silvia Duran inquiring whether the American citizen had been to the Cuban consulate office. Silvia responded affirmatively, stating the American was at the office at that time. The Soviet official told Silvia that when the American visited the Soviet Consulate office he had displayed papers from the Soviet Consulate in Washington. He also had a letter stating that he was a member of an organization that favored Cuba. The American wanted to go to the U.S.S.R. with his Russian wife and remain there a
long time. The Soviet official had not received an answer from Washington to the American's problem. The problem traditionally took four to five months to resolve because Washington had to secure authorization from the U.S.S.R. The Soviet official added that the American's wife could get a visa in Washington very quickly and she could have it sent anywhere, but he felt that the American would not get a visa soon. Silvia said that the Cuban government could not give the American a visa because he had neither friends in Cuba nor authorization for a visa from the U.S.S.R. The Soviet official added that the Soviets could not give the American a letter of recommendation because they did not know him. This conversation was also in the Spanish transcripts.309/

b. September 28, 1963, Saturday

At 11:51 a.m. Silvia Duran called the Soviet Consulate. She said that there was an American citizen at the Cuban Consulate who had previously visited the Soviet Consulate. The Soviet asked Silvia to wait a minute. Upon his return to the
telephone, Silvia put the American on the line. At first the American spoke in Russian and the Soviet spoke English. The conversation then proceeded in English until the Russian discontinued it and put another Soviet on the line. The Soviet spoke in English, but the American, speaking in broken Russian, asked him to speak Russian. The conversation resumed in Russian at that point. It also became incoherent and is thus quoted in its entirety:

Russian: What else do you want?
American: I was just now at your Embassy and they took my address.
Russian: I know that.
American: /speaks terrible, hardly recognizable Russian/I did not know it then. I went to the Cuban Embassy to ask them for my address, because they have it.
Russian: Why don't you come again and leave your address with us; it is not far from the Cuban Embassy.
American: Well, I'll be there right away.310/
c. October 1, 1963, Tuesday

(1) At 10:31 a.m. an unidentified man called the Soviet Military Attache and, in broken Russian, said that he had visited the Consulate the previous Saturday and had spoken to the Consul. The man wanted to know if the Soviets had received an answer from Washington. At that point, the Soviet official gave the man the Consulate phone number and asked him to call there. This conversation is in the English transcripts, indicating the man spoke in either Russian or English.311/

(2) At 10:45 a.m.312/ a man who, according to the translator's comment, had phoned a day or so before and had spoken in broken Russian, called the Consulate and spoke to an employee named Obyedkov. The man calling introduced himself as "Lee Oswald" and stated that he visited the Soviet Consulate the previous Saturday. He told Obyedkov that he spoke with the Consul on that day. Oswald added that the Consul had stated that they would send a telegram to Washington and he wanted to know if they
had received an answer. Oswald also said that he did not remember the name of the Consul with whom he had spoken. Obyedkov asked if it had been Kostikov and described him as "dark." The man outside replied affirmatively and repeated that his name was Oswald. Obyedkov asked Oswald to hold on a minute while he inquired. When Obyedkov resumed the conversation, he stated that the Soviet Consul had not yet received an answer but the request had been sent. Obyedkov then hung up the telephone as Oswald began another sentence with the words "and what." This conversation is in the English transcripts.313/

d. October 3, 1963, Thursday

An unidentified man called the Soviet Military Attache and spoke in broken Spanish and then in English. When the man inquired about a visa to Russia, he was given the Consulate phone number. The man then inquired if they issued visas at the Consulate. The Soviet stated that he was not certain but that the caller should call the Consul nonetheless.314/
2. Information Available to the Mexico City CIA Station from CIA Headquarters

On October 11, 1963, three days after the Mexico City Station made the initial report to Headquarters of Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy, the Mexico City Station received some information about Lee Oswald from CIA Headquarters. Headquarters informed Mexico that the Lee Oswald who visited the Soviet Embassy may be identical to Lee Henry (sic) Oswald. Mexico City received this cable on 11 October 1963. This cable described Oswald as:

born 18 Oct. 1939, New Orleans, Louisiana, former radar operator in United States Marines who defected to USSR in Oct. 1959. Oswald is five feet ten inches, one hundred sixty five pounds, light brown wavy hair, blue eyes.

The cable reported Oswald's defection in 1959; his desire to return to the United States in 1962; his employment in Minsk; his marriage to a Russian citizen; the return of his passport; and the State Department's issuance of visas for Oswald and his family.
3. Information Available to the Mexico City Station from Electronic Surveillance Aimed at the Cuban Diplomatic Compound

An examination of the production from the electronic surveillance of the Cuban diplomatic compound's telephones failed to reveal any telephone conversation that directly mentioned Oswald or information that clearly and directly referred to him.319/

4. Information Available to the Mexico City Station from Photographic Surveillance of the Soviet and Cuban Diplomatic Compounds

An examination of the production from these operations failed to reveal a photograph of Oswald.320/

This Committee has not been able to rule out the possibility that a photograph of Oswald was obtained in Mexico City by these operations since the material made available for review was incomplete.321/ The possibility that such a photograph was obtained is discussed in Section III.A.6. below. The photograph that was mistakenly linked to Oswald by the Mexico City Station is discussed in Sections III.B.4.
5. Possibility that Additional Information from the Electronic Surveillance on the Soviet Compound was Available to the Mexico City Station

Ms. Anna Tarasoff assisted her husband, Boris, in the transcription of tapes from the Russian Embassy. Ms. Tarasoff testified before this Committee on 12 April 1978. She was shown the transcripts from the conversations that were intercepted on 10/1/63 at 10:31 a.m. and 10:45 a.m.; 9/28/63 at 11:51; and 10/3/63. She recognized these transcripts as being her husband's work. She testified that she could identify his work by the style of his writing or typing and the use of slash marks.

In addition to these transcripts, Ms. Tarasoff testified that she remembered one more conversation that involved Lee Oswald.
According to my recollection, I myself, have made a transcript, an English transcript, of Lee Oswald talking to the Russian Consulate or whoever he was at that time, asking for financial aid.

Now, that particular transcript does not appear here and whatever happened to it, I do not know, but it was a lengthy transcript and I personally did that transcript. It was a lengthy conversation between him and someone at the Russian Embassy.

Ms. Tarasoff testified that the transcript that she remembered was approximately two pages long. She testified that the caller identified himself as Lee Oswald. She was certain that the 10/1/63, 10:45 a.m. conversation was not the one that she recalled.

This would not be the conversation that I would be recalling for the simple reason that this is my husband's work and at that time probably the name didn't mean much of anything. But this particular piece of work that I am talking about is something that came in and it was marked as urgent.

In the call that Ms. Tarasoff recalled, Oswald spoke only English. Ms. Tarasoff testified that the 10/1/63; 10:45 conversation could not be the call she remembered because the transcript indicates that Oswald spoke in broken Russian as opposed to English; the transcript is shorter than the one she remembers; the transcript is in her husband's style as opposed...
to her own; and there is no mention of Oswald's finances in the transcript.332/

Ms. Tarasoff remembers the procedure for urgent tapes.333/ Her memory is confirmed in this narrow respect by the project files reviewed by House Select Committee on Assassinations staff members.334/

Ms. Tarasoff recalled that there would be a piece of paper enclosed with the reel which would indicate the footage number where the conversation occurred and ask for priority handling over the other conversations on the reel.335/ After the conversation was transcribed, the Tarasoffs would immediately notify their contact and then turn the transcript over to him on the same day that it had been delivered.336/

Ms. Tarasoff was questioned about the details of the conversation which she remembered. She stated that Oswald definitely identified himself and that he was seeking financial aid from the Russians.
(H)e was persistent in asking for financial aid in order to leave the country. They were not about to give him any financial aid whatsoever. He had also mentioned that he tried the Cuban Embassy and they had also refused financial aid.337/

Mr. Boris Tarasoff also testified before this Committee on 12 April 1978. Mr. Tarasoff also recognized the four transcripts from September 28, 1963 and October 1st and 3rd as his work:338/ Mr. Tarasoff testified that he recognized the 10/1/63 conversation as his work because the name Lee Oswald was underlined.

We got a request from the station to see if we can pick up the name of this person because sometimes we had a so-called "defector" from the United States that wanted to go to Russia and we had to keep an eye on them. Not I -- the Station. Consequently they were very hot about the whole thing. They said, "If you can get the name, rush it over immediately." Therefore, it is very seldom that I underlined the name because I put them in capitals. In this case I did because it was so important to them.339/

Mr. Tarasoff testified that he did not know how Oswald had come to the Station's attention prior to this conversation or what led to the request to get his name.340/ He speculated that it was possible...
that Oswald first came to the Station's attention through Oswald's contacts with the Cuban Embassy.\textsuperscript{341/}

Mr. Tarasoff did not confirm his wife's recollection of another conversation including Oswald.\textsuperscript{342/} He said that he did not remember any other calls involving Lee Oswald or any details of Oswald's conversations that were not reflected in the transcripts.\textsuperscript{343/}

Although Ms. Tarasoff's memory was not confirmed by the House Select Committee on Assassinations review of the transcripts for the period while Oswald was in Mexico, there are several points of circumstantial corroboration for her story. There was a procedure by which tapes could be expedited in the manner in which Ms. Tarasoff recalls.\textsuperscript{344/} There are also indications that this procedure may have been used when Oswald's conversation was intercepted.\textsuperscript{345/} The first report that the Americans received regarding Silvia Duran made mention of the fact that Silvia claimed that she had told Oswald that the only aid they could give him was to refer him to the Soviet Consulate.\textsuperscript{346/}
This statement in the original Mexican report given to the CIA in Mexico after the assassination would tend to add credence to Ms. Tarasoff's recollection that Oswald mentioned to the Soviets that he had also tried to elicit aid from the Cubans. At least one other CIA official who was in Mexico also remembers that Oswald indicated in his discussions with the Soviet Embassy that he hoped to receive assistance with the expenses of his trip.

Daniel Stanley Watson, a retired CIA employee who was Deputy Chief of the Mexico City Station from 1967 to 1969, told the House Select Committee on Assassinations staff that he had seen a file on Oswald in Mexico City that contained only one or two intercept transcripts and surveillance photographs of Oswald. Mr. Watson also told HSCA staff investigators that Win Scott had a private personal safe in which he maintained especially sensitive materials. According to Mr. Watson, these materials were removed from the safe

Classification: TOP SECRET
This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled documents.
by James Angleton at the time of Scott's death.\textsuperscript{351} This Committee requested access to any relevant materials from this safe on July 6, 1978.\textsuperscript{352} Access was granted on October 6, 1978.\textsuperscript{352} Two statements by Mr. Scott contained in these materials lend circumstantial support for Ms. Tarasoff's testimony.

In 1970 Mr. Scott wrote:

\begin{quote}
I had many experiences, some of which I can write in detail. One of these pertains to Lee Harvey Oswald and what I know (emphasis in original) of his activities from the moment he arrived in Mexico, his contacts by telephone and his visits to both the Soviet and Cuban Embassies and his requests for assistance from these two Embassies in trying to get to the Crimea with his wife and baby. During his conversations he cited a promise from the Soviet Embassy in Washington that they would notify their Embassy in Mexico of Oswald's plan to ask them for assistance.\textsuperscript{353} 
\end{quote}

In his unpublished manuscript, Scott refers to a conversation in which Oswald gave the Soviet Embassy "his name very slowly and carefully."\textsuperscript{354} Although the transcripts available do not bear out Scott's recollections, there are interesting parallels with the testimony of Anna Tarasoff and David Phillips.\textsuperscript{355}
There are indications also that there was one other additional call that may have been available to the Mexico City Station prior to the assassination of President Kennedy. In the first statement by Silvia Duran provided to the CIA by the Mexican government, Silvia says that the Cuban Consul called the Soviet Consular official who dealt with Oswald. This statement is also missing from most subsequent reports of Ms. Duran's statements, with the notable exception of the first CIA report to the Warren Commission. Ms. Duran's early statement was confirmed by Eusebio Azcue. This conversation was not discovered by a review of the transcripts from the intercept operation. It is possible that the call made by Azcue was to a phone at the Russian Consulate that was not subject to electronic surveillance. It is known that two of the phones at the Soviet Consulate were subject to surveillance. This Committee has not determined how many telephones were in the Soviet Consulate in Mexico City.
While this Committee has not been able to find any direct corroboration of Anna Tarasoff's claim, the circumstantial corroboration is such that the possibility that there was an additional transcript concerning Oswald that was available to the Mexico City Station in late 1963 cannot be dismissed. In all likelihood, the Azcue call to the Soviet Consulate concerning Oswald was probably made on telephones not subject to CIA surveillance and, hence, would not have been available to the CIA's Mexico City Station.

6. Possibility that the CIA Photosurveillance Obtained a Photograph of Lee Harvey Oswald

This Committee cannot state with certainty that a photograph of Lee Harvey Oswald was not obtained by the photosurveillance operations in Mexico City because of three reasons: (a) the photographs from LILYRIC, the "alternate" photographic base which covered the Soviet Embassy main gate, and the photographs from the pulse camera, which covered the Cuban Consulate entrance, with the exception of a...
few samples were not made available for review by the CIA; (b) testimony from knowledgeable people that it would have been unlikely that the photosurveillance would have missed someone whom it had at least five chances of recording; and (c) reports that such a photo did, in fact, exist.

a. Missing Materials

The documentation and elaboration of the first reason can be found in Sections II.A. and B. preceding. Simply put, this Committee has not seen all of the photographs produced by the photosurveillance operations in Mexico City. Hence, it cannot conclude that a photograph of Oswald does not exist among those photographs it has not seen.

b. Likelihood that the Photosurveillance Operation would have Missed Oswald

CIA officers who were in Mexico in 1963 and their Headquarters counterparts generally agreed that it would have been unlikely for the photosurveillance operations to have missed ten opportunities to have photographed Oswald. The transcripts of...
conversations about or involving Oswald intercepted at the Soviet Embassy reveal that a man later identified as Oswald was at the Cuban Consulate at least three times on Friday and Saturday, September 27 and 28. They also reveal that he was at the Soviet Embassy at least twice on those same days. The CIA technician who serviced the Cuban photographic installations said that it was possible that the operation missed Oswald if: (1) Oswald's visits were after dark; (2) Oswald's visits were on Saturday afternoons or Sundays; (3) the case officer had given the photographic basehouse agents the days off that Oswald visited; (4) the pulse camera was not working. It is known that Oswald's visits were on a weekday during daylight hours and a Saturday morning. This Committee has not been able to determine with certainty, because of the missing production, whether all of the basehouses were operating on the days of Oswald's visits. This Committee believes that the pulse camera was in operation on at least one of the days that Oswald visited (Friday, September 27, 1963) the Cuban
Consulate and that the LILYRIC base covering the Soviet gate should have been operating at the time of Oswald's visits to the Soviet Consulates on September 27th and 28th.369/

c. Reports of Existence of a Photograph

(1) Phillip Agee Allegation

On 6 January 1978, Phillip Agee telephonically contacted two House Select Committee on Assassinations staff investigators at their office in Washington, D.C. Mr. Agee informed the investigators that he "would give the true story on the photograph produced by the CIA which the CIA claimed was taken of Oswald in Mexico City in 1963."370/ Phillip Agee was interviewed by HSCA staff investigators on 11 and 12 January 1978.

Mr. Agee told the investigators that he had been assigned to the Mexico Branch of the Western Hemisphere Division of the CIA's Clandestine Services in September of 1966.371/ Mr. Agee was assigned to work on the Headquarters support for the Agency's operations in Mexico City that were aimed at the
Soviet Union and other Socialist countries, excluding Cuba. At the time that he assumed this job, a woman named Elsie Scaleti was in charge of the operational support projects for Mexico. She was the officer in Washington in charge of all of the paperwork and other administrative matters relating to the support in Washington to these operations which were underway in Mexico City.

Ms. Scaleti trained Mr. Agee for his new position. Mr. Agee characterized Ms. Scaleti as "the key figure in the Mexico Branch in Headquarters, because she had been there for so long."

After his transfer to the Mexico Branch, Mr. Agee heard a story about photographs of Oswald. Mr. Agee could not remember with certainty who it had been that told him the story, but thought that it may have been Ms. Scaleti. Mr. Agee's recollection of the story he had heard was that on the day of the assassination Ms. Scaleti was working in the Mexico Branch in much the same position that she occupied in 1966. When the news about Oswald's arrest reached Ms. Scaleti, she recalled seeing his name and a photograph taken by an observation post in Mexico City.
City.378/ Within an hour or two, Ms. Scaleti had located the photograph of Oswald visiting the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.379/ Mr. Agee went on to say:

I don't know, don't recall in fact how she had been able to reconcile or how they were able to reconcile in Mexico City the photograph with the name, unless someone had known the face. Because the problem with these observation posts is that you can get a lot of photographs from them, but to find out the exact identity of the people is not always an easy thing to do. And it may be that as they were listening to the telephones of the Soviet Embassy, and also the Cuban Embassy, that she remembered the name Oswald, or Lee Harvey Oswald from the telephone tap, if in fact he had identified himself over the telephone, and tried to make an appointment with the consul or whoever. And then they were able somehow to reconcile the telephone conversation with the photograph that was taken from the observation post the same day or more or less whenever the appointment was made. On the other hand it may be that this photograph had not been identified until the time of the assassination but that she had heard or recalled perhaps either reading the transcript: from the telephone tapping or getting a condensed report perhaps a weekly report or something of the take from the telephone tap that she remembered the name Lee Harvey Oswald and then went back into the files of all the photographs and looked through all the photographs until eventually she found a photograph that was similar to all the photographs of Oswald that immediately began to come over the television and the news services. So those details I don't remember.
exactly, but I do recall that it was considered a coup of some sort for her to act so fast in digging out the photograph and the information on Oswald's visit to Mexico City.380/

Mr. Agee could not remember whether he had actually seen the photograph that Ms. Scaleti allegedly found.381/ When Mr. Agee was told that the photograph that the CIA produced from the Mexico photosurveillance operations did not look anything at all like Lee Harvey Oswald, Mr. Agee said that that was the first time he had ever heard that.

I was led to believe all along that it in fact was Oswald's photograph...I had been led to believe that that was considered a very significant achievement on the part of the Agency and Elsie in particular for having done that so fast. And so accurately. But now there seems to be some doubt. And it wasn't anything that was particularly secret around the Branch. It was just one of those shop-talk stories that persist over the years.382/

Mr. Agee speculated that the production from the photosurveillance was routinely sent to CIA Headquarters and that Ms. Scaleti would have had access to the file at Headquarters.383/
(2) Daniel Stanley Watson Allegation

On June 4, 1978, the House Select Committee on Assassinations interviewed Mr. Daniel Stanley Watson in Mexico. Mr. Watson served as a CIA officer in Mexico City from approximately 1965 to 1969. Mr. Watson was the Chief of Covert Action (propaganda) from 1965 to 1967. He was the Deputy Chief of the Mexico City Station from 1967 to 1969.384/

Mr. Watson told the HSCA staff members that sometime between 1965 and 1967 he had had occasion to request Lee Harvey Oswald's Mexico City Station personality file.385/ When this file was delivered to him, it contained only one or two photographs and intercept transcripts.386/ Mr. Watson stated that the file was very thin and that the photo(s) was a 3/4 shot from behind -- "basically an ear and back shot."387/ Mr. Watson said that he did not think that there was anyone else in the photograph and he thought that it was a photograph of Oswald.388/
Mr. Watson said that he could not recall why he had requested to see Lee Oswald's file in 1965 or 1966. Mr. Watson said that it was his understanding that the file was the complete Mexico City personality file on Oswald. Mr. Watson said that he would be surprised if Oswald's Mexico City personality file was seven volumes long. Mr. Watson was asked whether or not Winston Scott, the Chief of the CIA Station in Mexico, would have destroyed files or photographs. Mr. Watson said that that would not surprise him. At that point, Mr. Watson volunteered that Mr. Scott often kept highly sensitive information in a personal safe in his office. He said that this information would not have been filed or indexed in the usual manner. Mr. Watson said that when Winston Scott retired he had taken the contents of this personal safe with him and stored them in a safe in his home. When Mr. Scott died, James Angleton flew to Mexico and removed the contents of this safe before Mr. Scott's funeral. Mr. Watson said he did not know what had been in Mr. Scott's safe or what happened to the contents.
things that Mr. Angleton removed at the time of Scott's death. Mr. Watson said that his source for this allegation was Winston Scott's widow, Janet.396/ Mr. Watson stated that he thought the CIA Mexico City Station had given the Warren Commission all the material in its possession but, he added, he also knew that Winston Scott was capable of "phonying a photo if asked to produce one. I never believed Win Scott the first time he told me something."397/

(3) Joseph Burkholder Smith Allegation

Mr. Joseph Smith, a retired CIA officer, was interviewed by the House Select Committee on Assassinations on 19 October 1977. At this interview Mr. Smith mentioned that the Mexico City Station had been very proud of finding "the picture of Oswald."398/ He mentioned this in connection with a woman who worked for Winston Scott in Mexico.399/ Mr. Smith was reluctant to speak about this at the time and the topic was not pursued.400/
Mr. Smith was reinterviewed by the House Select Committee on Assassinations on 20 April 1978. Mr. Smith was shown the omnibus CIA release letter and fully cooperated in answering the staff investigator's questions at this interview. At this time, Mr. Smith recalled hearing a story that someone, at the time of the assassination, had remembered seeing Lee Harvey Oswald's face somewhere in the photographic coverage of the Cuban or Russian Embassies. This person went back through the files and found the picture. Mr. Smith said that he does recall that the discovery of the picture had greatly pleased President Lyndon Johnson and that it had made Winston Scott his "number one boy."

Mr. Smith said that he could not recall when he had first heard this story about the photograph, but he said he was certain, however, that he had heard the story more than once. He said that the earliest that he could have possibly heard the story was in 1964 while he was stationed in Argentina. He said that not long after the assassination he may have heard the story from someone "coming through"
Argentina.

Des (Fitzgerald) might have even mentioned it when he came through, which was in early '64, or Gerry Droller might have mentioned it when he came through, talking about how the Mexico City Station was helping out during the investigation.

Mr. Smith stated that he did know Elsie Scaletti. He described her as a "very severe person and very diligent and very much the Counter-Intelligence mentality." Mr. Smith stated that he also knew Ann Goodpasture. He said:

Annie was another one of Win Scott's case officers. She was in Mexico City for about 14 years. Annie was what we called the "resource person." Annie knew everything.

Mr. Smith said that Win Scott also had another very knowledgeable woman who worked with Ann Goodpasture in the Mexico City Station whose name he recalled as Leach or Lynch. Mr. Smith's recollection associated Ms. Leach (or Lynch) with the discovery of the photograph of Oswald, but Mr. Smith was not at all sure of this recollection. When asked if he had any recollection of Ms. Scaletti finding the photograph, he said:
It could very well have been, and Annie, too. But I thought it was this other girl, Lynch. But no, I don’t think I ever heard specifically who found the damn picture. I guess...I didn’t care.413/

(4) Joseph Piccolo, Jr. Allegation

Mr. Joseph Piccolo, Jr. was interviewed by the House Select Committee on Assassinations on 11 August 1978. Mr. Piccolo is an operations officer in the CIA. He was stationed in Mexico City from December 1957 to January 1960 and again from August 1965 to January 1968. Mr. Piccolo was involved in anti-Cuban operations from 1962 to 1968.414/

During this interview, Mr. Piccolo told the HSCA that sometime after the assassination of John Kennedy he had seen photographs of Lee Harvey Oswald.415/ Mr. Piccolo said that he had been shown these photographs by an individual who told him that they were photographs of Lee Harvey Oswald that were obtained from the CIA's Mexico City surveillance of the Cuban diplomatic compound.416/ Mr. Piccolo could not remember the identity of the person who showed him the photographs, nor when nor where he saw the
photographs.417/

The first picture shown was a three-quarter full
shot of Oswald, exposing a left profile as Oswald
looked downward. The second photograph which Mr.
Piccolo remembered seeing was a back of the head view
of Oswald.418/ Mr. Piccolo remembered that both of
these photographs were taken from above Oswald and
to his left.419/ Mr. Piccolo was shown a copy of
Warren Commission Exhibit #237, the famous Mexico
Mystery Man photograph. He stated that this was
definitely not the man in the photographs exhibited
to him.420/ Mr. Piccolo correctly identified an
unlabeled frontal photograph of Lee Harvey Oswald
shown to him by the HSCA.421/

Mr. Piccolo was also asked whether he knew
anything about the circumstances surrounding the
Agency's initial discovery of the photographs he
claims to have seen. He stated that he did not have
any first-hand knowledge of their discovery, but
that it was the type of thing, "a coup," that would
have traveled through the Agency "grapevine."422/
Mr. Piccolo stated that he had heard stories about a surveillance photograph of Oswald being found both in Mexico City and at CIA Headquarters in Langley. He stated that Ann Goodpasture may have been the person who found a photograph of Oswald in Mexico City. Mr. Piccolo said that he has heard several times that Elsie Scaleti found a photograph of Oswald. The last time that he heard this story was two weeks prior to his interview by the House Select Committee on Assassinations.

Mr. Piccolo stated that he currently shares an office at CIA Headquarters with a man who worked on the Oswald case during a recent CIA "in-house" investigation. Mr. Piccolo said that they were discussing Oswald's case because of the House Select Committee on Assassinations' release of several unidentified photographs. Mr. Piccolo stated that during the course of this discussion his office-mate, [CIA D] stated that Elsie Scaleti, "the gal at the Mexico desk," had found the surveillance photographs of Oswald. Mr. Piccolo stated that he assumed [CIA D] had become aware of Ms. Scaleti's coup through his research into the Oswald case.
Mr. Piccolo was not certain as to when he first heard the story that Ms. Scaleti had found the photograph, but he was certain that he had heard it prior to hearing it from Mr. Piccolo speculated that the Mexico City Station may have routinely sent photographs of unidentified Americans who visited Communist Embassies to Headquarters for possible identification.

Mr. Piccolo also told the House Select Committee on Assassinations interviewers that he was aware, when he was in Mexico, that Win Scott had a personal safe in his office. He said that "restricted materials" were held in Mr. Scott's safe. "Restricted materials" were defined as very sensitive materials that did not find their way into the routine files and indexes.

(5) Statements of [CIA D]

[CIA D] stated that he had never been involved in any of the CIA's "in-house" investigations of the Kennedy assassination or Oswald. He did state, though, that he had once worked on an
"Oswald Task Force." He said that this occurred in late September or October of 1975. At that time, there were two or three FOIA suits brought against the Agency concerning the Agency's files on Oswald. These files had to be processed and the task was delegated to the Counter-Intelligence Staff and he was assigned to the task force.

stated that he was also one of the primary contacts with two investigators from the Senate Select Committee who were looking into the Agency's files on Oswald at approximately the same time. The task force that he was part of conducted no research and analysis of which he was aware.

stated that the only photograph he remembers seeing is the Mexico Mystery Man photo. He said that he did not recognize the name "Elsie Scaletti." He stated that he did not recall ever being told that there was a photo of Oswald from the Mexico City surveillance operations. He denied ever telling anyone that such a photo was found. He did admit, however, to discussing the assassination with Joseph Piccolo.
d. HSCA Investigation of the possibility that the Mexico City Photosurveillance Operation Produced a Photograph of Lee Harvey Oswald

(1) Introduction

This Committee has conducted a general investigation into the CIA's photographic surveillance operations in Mexico City in 1963 as well as a specific investigation into the allegations mentioned above. 444/

In an attempt to determine whether the CIA's Mexico City photographic bases did, in fact, photograph Oswald, this Committee requested the CIA to make available to the HSCA the production of these bases. 445/ The CIA has in part responded to this request. 446/ However, the production from LILYRIC, the second base that covered the Soviet Embassy entrance, and the pulse camera that covered the Cuban Consulate entrance, has not been made available for review. 447/ The Agency's withholding of certain production materials from the photographic bases has prevented the Committee from determining whether a photograph of Lee Harvey Oswald was taken by these photosurveillance operations.

Also in the course of its general investigation into the CIA's surveillance operations in Mexico City
and Oswald’s visit to that city, the Committee has interviewed many CIA officers who were stationed in Mexico City, or worked in 1963 at CIA Headquarters in support of Mexican operations. They uniformly testified that the Station had not obtained a photograph of Oswald from the photosurveillance operations in Mexico City. 448/

(2) Investigation of the Allegations

Ms. Elsie Scaleti worked on the Mexico Desk in 1963. 449/ Ms. Scaleti could not recall her particular responsibilities while she was assigned to the Mexico Desk. 450/ She told the HSCA that she would have been doing routine case officer work which would have involved name traces, projects, budgets, et cetera. 451/ She could not recall any specific projects that she worked on and she stated that the case officers on the desk would not have had specific titles such as “Chief of Support Operations.” 452/ She stated that the work of the Desk was assigned to the case officers by project and that work that was levied that was not part of an assigned project would have been done by anyone on the desk who happened to be available. 453/

One of Ms. Scaleti’s supervisors, Mr. John
Scelso, Chief of the Mexico Branch in 1963, remembers that:

(Elsie Scaleti)...was the sort of the Major Dome of the Branch. She managed all the records, handled all of the cables from Mexico that dealt with security suspects, or asked for traces on security suspects. 454/

Ms. Scaleti was in the position that Mr. Agee said she was in 1963. 455/

A major part of the allegations is dependent upon whether or not the CIA Mexico Station sent the photoproduction to Headquarters. ESCA review of CIA files has revealed no evidence that the photoproduction was routinely sent to Headquarters in 1963. 456/

HMMA-22307 detailed the installation of a pulse camera to cover the Cuban Consulate on September 27, 1963. 457/ The dispatch states that the results of the testing would be sent to Headquarters as soon as they were available. 458/ This Committee did not find any indication that photographs from this camera were sent to Headquarters prior to 6/19/64, when Headquarters was notified that some production was being sent by unaccountable transmittal manifest, 459/ with the exception of HMMA-22433, 11/7/63 which sent samples of the photographic production from the camera. 460/ These
six samples when reviewed by the HSCA did not include a photograph. 461/

Ms. Scaletti was asked about the allegations, however, her memory of 22 November 1963 is not good:

Q: When was the next time after you sent a cable to Mexico City Station and you teletyped those other agencies, when was the next time you heard of Lee Harvey Oswald?

A: I don't remember. The only thing I can say is that based on what is in the file that I must have heard about it when the Station came in and asked—well, if there was nothing else in the file the name popped up again, I just don't remember about the assassination or whenever.

Q: Would the testimony be that to the best of your recollection the next time you heard the name was when you heard about the assassination?

A: Probably.

Q: At that time did the name Oswald ring a bell? Did you remember the earlier cable traffic about him?

A: I just don't know. When he was assassinated, I don't even remember how long it was before they got the name of Oswald.

Q: Oswald was picked up within two hours after the assassination and the name was made public.

A: Immediately?

Q: Yes.

A: If I were in the office unless I had the radio on—we didn't have a radio in the office neces-
sarily—I would not have heard the name Oswald until the next day probably. I would assume this was a little bit unusual, I might have tied it in. I am sure the first thing they would have done is make a name trace when they came up with that name and they would come up with a 201 file all over again.

Q: Do you recall where you were on Friday, November 22, 1963?

A: The only thing I remember about it is going home and finding my husband sitting in front of the TV and talking about it. I probably was at the office but I don't remember anything. I blanked out. I must have been at the office.

Q: Do you remember bringing John Scelso the Oswald file on that day?

A: I wouldn't remember that. If he had asked for it I probably did. It would have been natural for me to if I did. I just don't know.

Q: Did you ever find a photograph of Lee Harvey Oswald at CIA Headquarters?

A: I don't remember ever finding an Oswald photograph.

Q: Right around the time of the assassination?

A: I don't remember it.

Q: Did you find a photograph of someone whom you thought to be Lee Harvey Oswald?

A: I don't remember that either.

Q: Do you know Philip Agee?

A: Yes...
Q: Did you ever tell Joe Smith or Phillip Agee that you had found a photograph of Oswald or someone you thought to be Oswald?

A: I did not know Joseph Smith in Mexico City. I had never seen Joe except at the station in Mexico City and Phil I only saw when I was in Mexico.

Q: So your answer to the question is no?

A: I don't recall it and I don't see that I would have any reason.

Q: I guess for the purpose of clarification I would like to ask the question one more time. Did you ever tell Phillip Agee or Joseph Smith that you found a picture of Oswald or someone whom you thought to be Oswald?

A: Not that I can recall.

At the time of the assassination the CIA's 201 personality file on Lee Harvey Oswald was in the possession of the Mexico City Desk. That desk had had possession of the file from 10 October 1963 when it had received a report that a man claiming to be Lee Oswald had been in contact with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.

Fortunately, Ms. Scaleti's supervisor had a better memory of the events that transpired at CIA Headquarters on the day that President Kennedy was assassinated. He said:

A: ...I do not know how long after the actual shooting it was that Oswald's name became
known, perhaps an hour, hour and a half. Within minutes after that, they were out with the cables in their hands.

Q: Within minutes of the name Oswald being on the radio, an officer came in with Oswald cables?

A: Yes.

Q: Who was that officer?

A: I believe it was Mrs. (Elsie Scaleti) who was the sort of the Major Domo of the Branch. She managed all the records, handled all of the cables from Mexico that dealt with security suspects, or asked for traces on security suspects.

Q: Did you ask her how she was able to obtain the Oswald cables so quickly?

A: No, I know where she would have gotten them. We have copies of them right in our Branch.

Q: At that time, did she also have a photograph of Oswald?

A: No, I do not think so.

Q: Do you know whether Elsie Scaleti ever discovered a photograph of Oswald at CIA Headquarters?

A: I do not think so...I do not remember any photograph of Oswald at that time, the day of the assassination, or even later. I do remember our asking -- we had to ask ONI for a photo, and so on. As far as I recall, they never sent us one. It could be that later on she found one, but I don't recall.
The chief of the Mexico Branch quoted above was also responsible for the initial CIA investigation into the assassination of John Kennedy.466/

Mr. Scelso also testified that, at the time of the assassination, the name of Lee Harvey Oswald did not ring a bell with him because "thousands of names were crossing my desk every month."467/ He was asked why Ms. Scaleti, who came across as many names as he did, would have remembered Oswald when he had not.

She was concerned only with Mexico and I had five or six other countries to work with as well. She has a fantastic memory... (Elsie Scaleti) in her job as the manager of records, traces and files, in this Mexico desk, was an outstanding officer to whom I gave, in one of her fitness reports, the highest evaluation, outstanding, number 6 and so on, that can be given, that was very rarely given at that time. Her work was pretty near flawless and she also was an outstanding trainer of new employees.468/

Material removed from Win Scott's safe now in possession of the CIA provides critically important circumstantial evidence that the CIA photo-surveillance operations obtained photographs of Oswald:

"(Oswald's) visits and conversations are not hearsay; for persons watching these embassies photographed Oswald as he entered and left each one; and clocked the time he spent on each visit." 469/

This Committee believes that a photograph of Lee Harvey Oswald was probably obtained by CIA photosurveillance in...
Mexico. There are allegations that such a photo was found; there is testimony that such a photo should have been obtained; the CIA's withholding of materials; Ms. Scaleti's strange lapse of memory regarding the events of 11/22/63; and Mr. Scott's manuscript; these things, in the Committee's view, would tend to indicate that a photo of Lee Harvey Oswald was obtained. On the other hand the consistent testimony that a photo was not obtained in Mexico; the absence of any record of transmittal of the photo to Headquarters (The weight of this consideration is mitigated by the fact that there were methods of communication available that were not incorporated into the CIA's record keeping systems.); and the testimony of Ms. Scaleti and Mr. Scelso that a photo was not discovered would tend to indicate that, in fact, the allegations that Ms. Scaleti found a photo of LHO are false.

III. B. Information Connected to Lee Harvey Oswald by the Mexico City Station Prior to the Assassination.

1. Introduction

This study has demonstrated that the information from the Soviet Embassy taps and from Headquarters was available to the Mexico City Station prior to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. In addition to the Agency acknowledged information, there is a distinct possibility that
the Station had available to it one additional telephonic intercept transcript, and one or more surveillance photographs.

This Committee has made an attempt to determine when the available information was linked to Lee Harvey Oswald. The Committee has also made an attempt to determine whether all the intercepted telephone calls were in fact connected with Oswald or involved Oswald. It should be pointed out, however, that this analysis can only be directed at that information now known to have been available to the Mexico City Station. This information will be discussed briefly in the following section. In addition, the question of whether Oswald or an Oswald imposter visited the Embassies and made the phone calls, along with the possibility that Oswald was not alone in Mexico City, will be dealt with in greater detail in the final section of this report.

2. Information Available from the Soviet Wiretaps that was Connected with or involved Lee Harvey Oswald.

The Mexico City Station possessed nine intercepted telephone conversations that may have dealt with Oswald. The conversations are summarized below for easy reference. In the following discussion the conversations will be referred to by date and time of occurrence.
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<td>9/27/63</td>
<td>10:30 AM</td>
<td>Man calls Soviet Military Attache regarding a visa for Odessa. (Spanish.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/27/63</td>
<td>10:37 AM</td>
<td>Man calls Soviet Consulate regarding a visa for Odessa. (Spanish)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/27/63</td>
<td>1:25 PM</td>
<td>Man calls the Soviet Consulate and asks for the Consul. (Spanish)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/27/63</td>
<td>4:05PM</td>
<td>Silvia Duran calls the Soviet Consulate. (Spanish)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/27/63</td>
<td>4:26PM</td>
<td>Soviet Consulate calls Duran (Spanish)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9/28/63</td>
<td>11:51AM</td>
<td>Duran calls Soviet Consulate and puts a man on the phone. (Spanish Russian and English.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/1/63</td>
<td>10:31AM</td>
<td>Man calls Soviet Military Attache. (Russian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/1/63</td>
<td>10:45 AM</td>
<td>Man calls Soviet Consulate identifying himself as Lee Oswald. (Russian and English)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10/3/63</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Man calls the Soviet Military Attache. (Spanish and English.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
After the assassination the CIA's Mexico City Station passed copies of seven of the above listed conversations to the U.S. Embassy Legal Attaché. The 9/27 10:30 and the 9/27 1:25 calls listed above are not included in this dissemination. The cover memorandum states:

Attached are photostatic copies of transcripts of all conversations from technical operations of this office which are possibly pertinent in this case.

The HSCA has not been able to determine why the 9/27 10:30 and 9/27 1:25 calls were not included in this memorandum. While the 1:25 call could be considered unrelated, it is unlikely that the same would apply to the 10:30 call since the 9/27 10:37 call is included in the memorandum.

At the bottom of each attachment page to the Scott memorandum, a summary of the conversation is provided. The Station questioned the relevancy of only one of the seven calls presented in the memorandum. The summary of the 10/3 call says:

By the context of other conversations by Oswald and the fact that this called (sic) spoke in broken Spanish and English rather than Russian, which he used previously, it is probable that this caller is not Oswald.

(Ibid., p.9.)

A judgement that this call did not pertain to Lee Harvey Oswald could be based on the following facts:
1) the caller spoke broken Spanish; 2) the caller did not have the number of the Consulate; 3) the caller did not know that visas were issued at the Consulate; and 4) the caller states that he is seeking a visa, not that he is checking on an application already made. The majority of the evidence indicates that Lee Harvey Oswald could not speak Spanish.\footnote{476}

In light of Delgado's assertions, it is possible that Oswald had at least a limited knowledge of Spanish. It should be noted that the 10/3 transcript listed above indicates that the caller spoke in broken Spanish.\footnote{477} The fact that this conversation was in Spanish, should not by itself rule out the possibility that Oswald made the phone call. This is especially true in light of Delgado's allegations and the 9/27 10:30, 9/27 10:37 and 9/27 1:25 calls which were also in Spanish.\footnote{478}

The record reflects that Oswald had the phone numbers of both the Soviet Consulate and the Soviet Military Attache in his notebook.\footnote{479} It can not be determined when Oswald entered the numbers in the notebook. Since Oswald had previously called the Consulate it is likely that he had the number prior to 3 October. It is also clear that Oswald knew that the Consulate was responsible for issuing visas due to his prior dealings with the Soviet and Cuban Consulates. Thus, it is probable that the 10/3 conversation did not pertain to Oswald.
The 10/1 10:45 call is clearly relevant because the caller identifies himself as “Lee Oswald.” The 10/1 10:31 conversation is probably relevant due to the similarity with the 10/1 10:45 call and the marginal notations about the quality of the Russian spoken by the caller. The 9/28 11:51 call is clearly relevant, again due to the marginal notations and the involvement of Silvia Duran. Duran’s calls on 9/27 clearly related to Oswald due to the substantive information discussed in those calls.

In summary, the above listed calls contain the substance of the information available to the CIA MCS prior to the assassination from the Soviet electronic intercept operation. The first three calls on 9/27/63 and the one on 10/3/63, if they were indeed Oswald, add little of substance to the information that was available from the other calls.

3. When were the Intercepted Conversations Linked to Lee Harvey Oswald.

HSCA staff researchers reviewed the transcripts on the Soviet Embassy. The chronological production from this operation is on microfilm at CIA Headquarters. In addition to the chronological file, numerous copies of the transcripts that pertain to Oswald were found throughout the CIA’s files on Lee Harvey Oswald.

It is obvious that the Mexico City Station linked the
10/1 10:45 call to Lee Harvey Oswald because Oswald identified himself in the call and the Mexico City Station reported Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy to Headquarters on 10/8/63.

On this transcript the translator added the notation:

The same person who phoned a day or so ago and spoke in broken Russian.

The transcript from the 9/28 11:51 call also bears marginal notations from the translator. "MO (man outside) takes the phone and says in broken Russian ... speaks terrible, hardly recognizable Russian." The first copy of this transcript in Oswald's Mexico City "P" file also bears routing indications that show that the transcript was sent to Win Scott, Ann Goodpasture and Robert Shaw. These routing indications were made by [CIA C2] and [CIA C2] testified that these routing indications would have been made when she first saw the transcript. [CIA C2] also wrote an instruction on this transcript to file it in the "Soviet Contacts" file at the same time. The 9/27 4:05 transcript also bears [CIA C2] routing and filing instructions. In addition, this transcript also bears a notation from Win Scot which says "Is it possible to identify?" [CIA C1] wrote an instruction on this transcript to file it in Oswald's "P" file.

Classification: TOP SECRET

Classified by derivation.
The above four conversations which occurred on 9/27 and 9/28 contain almost all of the substantive information that was available to the Mexico City station on Oswald from the Soviet electronic intercept operation. These conversations were not linked to Oswald prior to 8 October 1963 when MEXI 6453 was sent to Headquarters reporting Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy on 1 October, 1963.494/ 

The conversations discussed above were linked to Lee Harvey Oswald by 16 October 1963, the date that the Mexico City station opened its "P" file on Oswald.495/ The process by which, and the events leading up to, the linkage of Oswald to the intercepted calls will be discussed in the following section on the Mexico City Station's actions regarding the Oswald case prior to the assassination.

4. The Photograph of the Mexico Mystery Man.

A photograph of an unidentified individual who visited the Soviet Embassy was incorrectly linked to Oswald prior to the assassination.496/ The manner in which this mistake was made and the consequences of that mistake will be discussed in the following sections on the Mexico City Station's actions prior and subsequent to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.
IV. Reconstruction of the CIA Mexico City Station and Headquarters Actions Prior to the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

A. Introduction--CIA Interest in and Liaison with FBI Regarding American Citizens in Contact with Soviet Bloc Embassies in Mexico City.

The Central Intelligence Agency has claimed that no investigation of Oswald was made in Mexico prior to the assassination of President Kennedy. For this reason, the Agency claimed, the fact that Oswald was seeking a visa and that he had also been to the Cuban Embassy was not discovered until after the assassination.

It was not until 22 November 1963, when the Station initiated a review of all transcripts of telephone calls to the Soviet Embassy that the Station learned that Oswald's call to the Soviet Embassy on 1 October 1963 was in connection with his request for a visa to the USSR. Because he wanted to travel to the USSR by way of Cuba, Oswald had also visited the Cuban Embassy in an attempt to obtain a visa allowing him to transit Cuba.

Inasmuch as Oswald was not an investigative responsibility of the CIA and because the Agency had not received an official request from those agencies having investigative responsibility requesting the Agency to obtain further information, the Station did nothing other than ask Headquarters on 15 October for a photograph of Oswald. 497/

Neither of the above assertions is accurate. An analysis of the information available will show that the first assertion of the above quote, that the Station did not learn of Oswald's contact with the Cuban Consulate and
the fact that he was seeking a visa until after the assassination is incorrect. 498/

CIA's IG Report inaccurately implies that no action would have been taken by the Mexican City Station with respect to an American in contact with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico other than merely reporting the contact unless the Station had received a specific request from an interested U.S. government agency. The IGR's implication is inaccurate because, as will become apparent in the following discussion, the CIA had an understanding with the FBI regarding this class of cases and often did more than just report without any specific interest being expressed by any other agency of the United States government. 499/ In fact, the station often monitored and mounted operations against Americans in contact with Bloc Embassies. 500/ At a minimum they attempted to collect as much information as possible on Americans in contact with the Embassies. This was routine, it was also the case with Lee Harvey Oswald.

B. Narrative of Mexico City Station Actions Prior to The Assassination

On 27 September 1963 Silvia Duran contacted the Soviet Consulate on behalf of Lee Harvey Oswald. 501/
Later that same day, the Soviet Consulate returned Ms. Duran's call. Under normal procedures, these transcripts would have been in the CIA Station by the first of October and Ms. Goodpasture brought these transcripts into the Station on that morning and put them on the C1A Q2 desk. Recognized the transcripts as containing information of a possible counterespionage or counter-intelligence interest and routed them to Mr. Shaw, Ms. Goodpasture and Win Scott (in reverse order.) Mr. Scott wrote, at the top of the 9/27/4:26 call, "Is it possible to identify?" This was the first interest in Oswald recorded by the Mexico Station even though the caller was as yet unidentified. It indicates a routine interest in an American who is in contact with the Soviet Embassy. After the transcripts were routed they were filed in a general subject file.

The 9/28/ call was probably received at the CIA Station on Monday, 30 September 1963. The routing and filing instructions indicate that it was handled in much the same way as the 9/27 conversations.

On 1 October 1963 a conversation in which an English speaking person identified himself to the Soviet
Consulate as Lee Oswald came to the attention of a monitor in the electronic surveillance base-house. The monitor immediately notified the American technician who then listened to the tape. The technician had instructions "to alert the Station immediately if a U.S. citizen or English speaking person tries to contact any of the target installations." The technician called Ann Goodpasture and a meeting was arranged. The technician marked the tape "Urgent," specifying where the conversation occurred on the reel, put it in a box, and delivered it to Ms. Goodpasture within fifteen minutes of the telephone call to Ms. Goodpasture. The tape was delivered to Boris Tarasoff who transcribed it and returned it to the Station on that same day.

As soon as the Station learned that an American had contacted the Soviet Embassy (Ms. Goodpasture began to screen the photographs from the Soviet Surveillance operations. The photographs from the coverage of the Soviet Embassy, however, were not delivered as promptly as the transcripts. The photographs from October 1, 1963, were not removed from the camera until 3 or 4 October. Hence, they would not have been received until 4 (Friday) or 7 (Monday) October by the Station.
A cable reporting Lee Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy was written and sent to Headquarters by [CIA CL] on 10/8/63. Various reasons have been advanced to explain the seven day delay in sending this cable. David Phillips explained the delay by saying that [CIA CL] was too busy to be bothered by something of such a routine nature. 516/

[CIA CL] was a busy man, sometimes procrastinating. His wife was working for him, and on one or two occasions I spoke to [CIA CL] kiddingly saying, hey, where is the cable about this fellow, or something like that, or maybe to his wife. I am not sure. In any event, what happened a few days passed and [CIA CL] prepared a message--she was working for her husband, and as I recall it she typed it herself, but I am not positive on that point, but in any event, she prepared the cable and took it to [CIA CL] at which time he signed off on it. During that process, it did come to me, also to sign off, because it spoke about Cuban matters, and then went to the Chief of Station and was released. 577/

A blind CIA memorandum entitled "Delay in sending the first cable about Oswald" was located in a soft file on the Unidentified Man photograph. This memorandum asserts that Dave Phillips "didn't know what he was talking about." The memorandum's assertion is correct. [CIA CL] did not sign off on the cable reporting Oswald's contact
with the Soviet Embassy. Mr. Phillips did not sign off on that cable. The cable did not mention anything about the Cuban Consulate or Oswald’s contact with it. Mr. Phillips never discussed the cable with the

In fact, Mr. Phillips was on a temporary duty assignment in Washington, D.C., and Miami, Florida, from at least late September to October 9, 1963.

The blind memorandum referred to above regarding the delay offers another explanation for the seven day lapse before sending the cable. After explaining that the photoproduction would not have arrived at the Station until Monday, 7 October, the memorandum says:

A name trace could have been requested on the basis of the name alone but that wasn’t the way Win Scott ran that Station. He wanted the photographic coverage tied in with the telephone coverage...sometimes there was a U.S. automobile license number. It was also part of the “numbers game” of justifying a project by the number of dispatches, cables or reports produced.

In all likelihood the delay in sending this initial cable was due to a combination of factors. testified that, in fact, he was not too concerned with the task and left it to his wife.
The only action I took was the action my wife took, was to send the cable to Washington summarizing the information we had on Oswald and his contact with the Embassy... We also asked our headquarters for a trace of an American. That was routine. 524/

The delay could also have been partially due to the wait for the photo-production. Ms. Goodpasture did check the photographs and did add a paragraph to the cable concerning a photograph. 525/

Another reason that the cable was delayed was that there was some question within the Station about who had the responsibility to report Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy.

Q: What action did you take after seeing this transcript (from the 10/1 conversation)?

A: I think I was the third or beyond person who saw it. It was brought to my attention by the chief, the Head of the Soviet Section, and by Ann Goodpasture who was discussing this and who was going to notify headquarters and whose responsibility it was. As I recall, I was told to write it up.

Q: Why was there discussion about whose responsibility it was?

A: I think because when it was an American it sort of fell between whether we should have to do it, whether it was our responsibility to send this up because it had to...
be accompanied by a memo and it took time, or whether it was Ann's responsibility. It was just a little, not argument, but a discussion about, well, "you do it, I don't want to do it, you handle it," and I had to do it. 526/

The reason that the responsibility would have lain with the Soviet Section is obviously because the American was in contact with the Soviet Embassy. Ms. Goodpasture also had a potential basis for responsibility because she was responsible for liaison functions with the Legal Attache, Army, Navy and Air Force on routine counter-espionage cases. 527/ She also assisted the Chief of Station and Deputy Chief of Station on these cases as they occurred. 528/

The primary reason for the delay was most likely a combination of the responsibility dispute and the routine nature of the case as perceived by the CIA officers at that time.

(Ann Goodpasture) probably came in— it was really a matter of here is another one of those things again and we were having a little gabble about who would send it up because it was pain to do these. I probably, I think I handled it as soon as I got it but I think there was a discussion, as I say maybe a half a day, about who was going to do it. It was done because it was required but it was considered unimportant. 529/
Important or significant information was usually sent to Headquarters by cable as opposed to the slower dispatch which was sent to Headquarters by diplomatic courier.

Cables were sent if the information was of such a nature that it had to be acted on within a day or a day and half or two days. Dispatches took so long that you really could not take any kind of operational action predicated on dispatch. 530/

[ CIA ] the Chief of the Soviet Section in Mexico City recalled that the criterion for a cable as opposed to a dispatch was the perishability of the information being transmitted.

The normal criterion would be the urgency attached to that information, the perishability of the information, not its importance necessarily. The perishability was the criterion...If it was something that concerned an event that was going to happen in the two or three days you did not want to use a medium which was going to take a week to get to Washington. 531/

Hence, it is possible that Oswald's contact was reported by cable because it was considered significant by the Mexico Station; but this interpretation is not supported by the weight of the testimony.

Two other criteria for reporting by cable were pointed out: information concerning Soviets, Cubans and Americans. Generally, "everything Soviet was of high
priority. Cuban Operations, a lot of cables were sent. 532/

And, in the case of Oswald:

In this specific case, a cable was used to send this information to Headquarters only because it concerned an American, not because it concerned a matter was considered to be of importance. 533/

The testimony of former CIA Mexico City officers consistently supports the position that Oswald's initial contact with the Soviet Embassy was considered fairly routine. 534/ The testimony indicates that the routine procedure of the Station was to report such a contact by cable whether it was considered routine or not. 535/ The Station had instructions to report Americans in contact with the Bloc Embassies to Headquarters because it was of interest to the FBI. 536/ The following quotes illustrate these points. Allan White said:

Q: Was Oswald's contact at the Embassies in Mexico considered to be important?

A: At the time it first occurred?

Q: Yes.

A: I would have to conclude that it wasn't recognized as anything extraordinary at the time it first occurred.

Q: Why do you conclude that?
A: Because had it been, it would have been pulled out and sent to Washington either with a complete transcription, a complete excerpt out of the transcription, or the entire tape and transcript would have been sent to Washington by the first available pouch, probably by special courier.

Q: Does the fact that Mexico City Station sent to Headquarters a cable reporting Oswald's contact suggest that the station considered the contact to be important?...

A: You are asking what is the significance of the cable?

Q: Yes.

A: Well, operational, that is all. Here is an American citizen, at least a man who appeared to be an American citizen, speaking broken Russian and in contact with the Embassy. This is of operational interest. This is the kind of information that we were directed among others, to get back to Washington because they passed that kind of thing to the Bureau.

Q: Were contacts by Americans with the Soviet Embassy considered to be unusual?

A: Well, we were 1963 then. They were considered worthy of note, let me put it that way. Of course, from an operational point of view we were looking for any way we could exploit a contact with the Soviet Embassy.

Q: Were such contacts by Americans frequent?

A: Not terribly frequent. Not terribly frequent. There were members of the exile
P

A colony in Mexico City who were in kind of routine contact with the Soviets, usually on cultural matters. No, I would say they were relatively infrequent. That is why--

Q: The cable was sent?
A: Yes. 537/

The Chief of the Soviet Section testified on this point also:

Q: Was this particular contact considered to be unusual or routine?
A: Routine.

Q: Why is that?
A: During the summer period, particularly, or toward the end of the summer period, a relatively large number of Americans, for various reasons, made contact with the Soviet Embassy. This appeared to me, when I had the information reported, to be just another case of an American contacting the Embassy, for no significant reasons.

Q: In each case that an American contacted the Embassy, would a cable be sent to Washington?
A: Yes, indeed. 538/

[CLA C2 ]the person who actually handled the reporting, also considered the case to be routine:

Q: Was the Oswald contact with the Soviet Embassy considered to be unusual?
A: No.

Classification: _______
(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled documents.)

Q: Why not?

A: Well, there were cases of other Americans who contacted the Embassy for various reasons. We were only obliged to report the contact of any American with the Soviet Embassy.

Q: So in Oswald's case it was just a routine contact by an American as far as you were concerned?

A: Yes.

Q: If that is the case, then why was the cable sent concerning Oswald?

A: That is why I asked you earlier, because in the case of Americans we were required to send it by cable and not by dispatch.

Q: Was that a written regulation?

A: I don't know if it was written but it was understood at our Station that any Americans who were in touch with the Soviet Embassy that that fact had to be known to Headquarters by cable. It was always sent that way, whether we considered it very unimportant or routine or not. So there must have been a regulation but I am not aware of it. 539/

The reader should be reminded here that the only conversation that had been linked to Oswald at that point in time was the one that occurred on 1 October. 540/ The other transcripts had passed over the Goodpasture's desk 541/ but had not been linked to Oswald because his name was not mentioned in them. 542/
did not recheck the earlier transcripts, but did check the Station's index system to see if it had any record of a Lee Oswald, which it did not. 542/

Q: (H)ere it says in brackets, comment by the translator, "the same who phoned a day or so ago and spoke in broken Russian."

A: Right.

Q: Despite this indication here I believe your testimony is that you did not go back to check the transcript because by virtue of your memory you knew that Oswald's name had not come up in any earlier conversation, is that correct?

A: Yes. 543/

So, [CIA C2] drafted the first paragraph of the 10/8 cable on the basis of the 10/1/10:45 conversation alone even though the other information was available. 544/

That paragraph of the cable provided an accurate summary of the intercepted conversation. It said:

Acc (Soviet wiretap) 1 Oct 63, American male who spoke broken Russian said his name Lee Oswald (Phonetic), stated he at Sovem on 28 Sept when spoke with Consul whom he believed to be Valeriy Vladimirovich Kostikov. Sujb asked Sov Guard Ivan Obyedkov who answered, if there is anything new re telegram to Washington. Obyedkov upon checking said nothing received yet, but request had been sent. 545/

Ann Goodpasture added a second paragraph to the
Q: Do you know how that photograph was linked to the person mentioned?

A: By date. It was taken entering the Soviet Embassy and leaving on the same date this conversation took place. I remember that proceeding because we were combing through the takes for that day to determine any person who looked like an American male. I believe this was the only one.

The testimony also corroborates that the photographs would have been checked for several days prior to the date of...
the conversation.

Q: You checked the photosurveillance materials for approximately a four or five day period, is that correct?

A: Yes, I think it is.

Q: During that four or five day period... this man was the only non-Latin appearing man whose photograph you found, is that correct?

A: I think it was the only non-Latin appearing person's photograph that we found that we could not identify as somebody else. A lot of the people who went to the Soviet Embassy all the time, we came to know who they were. After they had been identified, they made frequent visits there. 551/

The review of the photoproduction from LIMITED the one base that has been made available to this Committee makes the explanation of the mistake about the identity of the individual due to his being the only non-Latin implausible. The record reflects that unidentified American males were listed on the log sheet as "U A M" after the time was given. The photograph that was linked to Oswald was the only "U A M" that appeared on 2 October 1963. But on September 27, 1963 another "U A M" had appeared. The Committee has concluded from a review of a note that Ann Goodpasture wrote on the log sheet that this individual had not been identified by the time that
the 10/8 cable was written. The note says: "This is a Mexican named Gutierrez--license plate changed in Feb 64 to Mexican." 552/

This Committee cannot be certain that other "U A M"s did not turn up on the production from the LILYRIC base because that production has not been made available for review.

Ms. Goodpasture was asked about this and explained that the man, Gutierrez, was known in the station and that the base house agent was mistaken in identifying him as an American. 553/

This Committee finds the above quoted explanation hard to accept for other reasons. The October 1 transcript does not indicate that Oswald visited the Embassy on that day, however, it does indicate a visit on the previous Saturday. 554/ Even if he did visit the Embassy on the first of October, the photograph referred to in the cable was not taken until the second of October, 1963. 555/

The photographs from the one surveillance base for 1, 2 and 3 October were on one roll of film and one log sheet was prepared by the base. The text of
the log sheet is in black type. The separate days coverage is set off by a row of red typed percentage (%) marks. 556/

Ms. Goodpasture attempted to explain this mistake.

Q: Looking at the log, can you now explain to the Committee why the cable referred to a photograph taken on October 1st when actually it was taken on another day?

A: If you look at the log here you see at the top—it was just an oversight on the part of the person who was writing that cable. It looks as though the date is 1 October, but if you read it very closely you see there are only two frames that were shot on 1 October and 2 October, it starts up with frame number 3, et cetera, et cetera, and there the shots occur. That is the only explanation I can give.

Q: Is your explanation that whomever referred to the log simply looked at the date at the top of the page, the date being October 1st, and did not see any reference to the date October 2nd?

A: Right. 557/

This Committee finds it implausible that Ann Goodpasture, who had the specific duty of "processing for operational leads all Station photosurveillance info pertaining to the Soviet target" since 1960 and had received a rating of outstanding on her annual fitness reports,
would make such an oversight mistake and not discover it until 1976. This Committee thinks that the fact that the mistaken date of the photograph was not discovered for so long is especially suspect in light of the fact that on the day after the assassination CIA Headquarters sent a cable to Mexico which said:

"(FBI) says that photos of man entering Soviet Embassy which MEXI sent to Dallas were not of Oswald. Presume MEXI has double-checked dates of these photos and is also checking all pertinent other photos for possible shots of Oswald."

Headquarter's presumption was evidently mistaken. No record exists that would indicate a reply to this cable by the Mexico City Station.

The likelihood that a photograph of Oswald was indeed obtained makes the "explanation," proffered by Goodpasture, et al., even more implausible. At this time the Committee can not conclude why the original mistake was made even though it does find the explanation offered by Goodpasture, et al., to be highly implausible.

Regardless of why the mistake was made, Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy and the mistaken photographic identification of him were reported to Headquarters. The 10/8 cable was received at Headquarters on 9 October.
1963. The cable, as was routine, went to the Mexico Desk for action. The person who handled the case for the Mexico Desk was Elsie Scaleti. Ms. Scaleti initially considered the information routine. She took the routine steps of requesting a name trace. From the name trace she learned that there was a file on a Lee Henry Oswald but that it was restricted to a branch of the Agency known as "CI/SIG." The custodian of Oswald's file, in October 1963, was Ann Elizabeth Goldsborough Egerter of the Counter-Intelligence/Special Investigations Group. This group's purpose and interest in Oswald is detailed in another section of the final report dealing with whether or not Lee Oswald was an agent or asset of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Ms. Scaleti went to Ms. Egerter and asked to see Lee Oswald's file which was provided to her by Ms. Egerter. Once the information from the Oswald 201 and the information in the cable from Mexico City was combined, the Oswald contact took on more significance:

Q: Now, once the information...had been obtained by you, did that in any way increase the significance of Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy?
A: As I recall that is what I thought made it very significant.

Q: Can you explain why?

A: Any American who had tried to renounce his U.S. citizenship in the Soviet Union, now having again a relationship with the Soviet Embassy would lead one to wonder why he had tried to renounce his citizenship in the first place, and why he was still in contact with the Soviets, whether there was a possibility he really was working for the Soviets or what. 569/

Ms. Egerter remembers that the cable from Mexico City caused a lot of excitement. She was shown the 10/9 cable.

Q: Is this the cable that cause the excitement?

A: Yes, one of them.

Q: Why was excitement caused by this cable?

A: "Contact with Kostikov."

Q: What is the significance of the contact with Kostikov?

A: I think we considered him a KGB man.

Q: Any other reason for the excitement?

A: He had to be up to something bad to be so anxious to go to the Soviet Union. At least that is the way I felt. 570/

After reviewing Oswald's 201, which CI/SIG loaned to the Mexican Desk where it remained until the time of the assassination, Ms. Scaleti drafted a response to
the Mexico City 10/9 cable and also disseminated in-
formation about Oswald to other branches of the Ameri-
can intelligence community. 571/ These two documents
were drafted at the same time and were sent within several
hours of each other. 572/ Several aspects of these
two documents are interesting and illustrate various
points, as well as raise serious questions.

The cable which Ms. Scaleti sent to Mexico says,
in full:

1. Lee Harvey Oswald who called Sovemb 1
   Oct probably identical Lee Henry Oswald
   (201-289248) born 18 October 1939. New
   Orleans, Louisiana, former radar opera-
   tor in United States Marines who de-
   fected to USSR in Oct. 1959. Oswald is
   five feet ten inches, one hundred sixty
   five pounds, light brown wavy hair, blue
   eyes.

2. On 31 Oct 1959 he attempted to renounce
   his United States citizenship to the
   United States Embassy in Moscow, indicat-
   ing he had applied for Soviet citizen-
   ship. On 13 Feb the US emb Moscow re-
   ceived an undated letter from Oswald
   postmarked Minsk on 5 Feb 1961 in which
   subj indicated he desired return of
   his US ppt as wished to return to USA if
   "we could come to some agreement concern-
   ing the dropping of any legal proceedings
   against me." On 8 July on his own ini-
   tiative he appeared at the Emb with his
   wife to see about his return to the States.
   Sub stated that he actually had never ap-
   plied for Soviet citizenship and that his

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application at that time had been to remain in USSR and for temporary extension of his Tourist visa pending outcome of his request. This application, according to Oswald, contained no reference to Soviet citizenship. Oswald stated that he had been employed since 13 Jan 1960 in Belorussian Radio and TV Factory in Minsk where he worked as a metal worker in research shop. Oswald was married on 30 April 1961 to Marina Nikolaevna Pusakova, a dental technician born July 1941 USSR. No traces. He attempted to arrange for his wife to join him in Moscow so she could appear at Emb for visa interview. His American passport was returned to him. US Emb Moscow stated twenty months of realities of life in Soviet Union had clearly had maturing effect on Oswald.

3. Latest HDQS info was (State Department) report dated May 1962 saying (State) had determined Oswald is still US citizen and both he and his Soviet wife have exit permits and Dept State had given approval for their travel with their infant child to USA.

4. Station should pass info ref and para one to (U.S. Embassy, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Navy, and Immigration and Naturalization) locally. Info paras two and three originates with (State).

5. Ref and possible identification being disseminated to HDQS of (FBI, State, Navy and I&NS). Pls keep HDQS advised on any further contacts or positive identification of Oswald.

Ms. Scaleti wrote this cable. Ms. Egerter was one of the people who reviewed the cable for accuracy.

The cable was released by the Assistant Deputy Director
of Plans, Thomas Karamessines. 576/

The teltype which Ms. Scalati wrote was sent to the Department of State, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Department of the Navy. 577/ This teltype says:

1. On 1 October 1963 a reliable and sensitive source in Mexico reported that an American male, who identified himself as Lee Oswald, contacted the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City inquiring whether the Embassy had received any news concerning a telegram which had been sent to Washington. The American was described as approximately 35 years old, with an athletic build, about six feet tall, with a receding hairline.

2. It is believed that Oswald may be identical to Lee Henry Oswald, born on 18 October 1939 in New Orleans, Louisiana, a former U.S. Marine who defected to the Soviet Union in October 1959 and later made arrangements through the United States Embassy in Moscow to return to the United States with his Russian wife, Marina Nikolaevna Pusakova, and their child.

3. The information in Paragraph One is being disseminated to your representative in Mexico City. Any further information received is being made available to the Immigration and Naturalization Service. 578/

The first substantive conflict between these two documents are the dissimilar descriptions of Oswald. The response sent to Mexico gave a fairly accurate description of Oswald while the dissemination to other government
agencies gave the description that had mistakenly been connected to Oswald by the 10/9 cable from Mexico City. Ms. Egerter testified that she could not explain why the description discrepancies occurred. When Ms. Scaleti was asked why this occurred she first responded that there was a rule that prevented the Agency from disseminating any information obtained from a third agency of the government. Hence, the accurate description of Oswald which was from information furnished to the Agency by the State Department could not be included in the dissemination. It was pointed out to Ms. Scaleti that the information in the second paragraph of the teletype was from the State Department sources and that the Mexico City Station had been instructed to disseminate the description locally which she claimed could not be disseminated due to a third agency rule. She was asked the question again and the following exchange occurred:

A. Let us start over again. The actual physical description on Lee Henry Oswald from (the 10/10 cable) was sent to the Station to assist them in further investigation to see if they knew of anybody or had anybody down there that really fitted what we thought was an accurate physical description of the Oswald that we had a
Ms. Scaleti was interviewed by Committee staff members on 3/30/78. She was questioned, as she indicates in the above quote, at that time about the description...

Q: Were you aware when you sent out the cable and the teletype that you were giving different descriptions?

A: Yes. I assume I was. I don't remember now. This is some time...

Q: Was there any intention of your part to deceive any other agencies by giving a description contained in that paragraph in the teletype?

A: None at all. 

Ms. Scaleti was interviewed by Committee staff members on 3/30/78. She was questioned, as she indicates in the above quote, at that time about the description...
discrepancy. When Ms. Scaletti was shown the 10/9 cable on that occasion she stated that she would not have taken the description of the individual in paragraph two to be a description of Oswald. The description discrepancy was specifically pointed out to Ms. Bustos and she was specifically questioned on that point. The report of that interview says:

We next pointed out to Ms. Scaletti the fact that the response to Mexico had a correct description of Oswald and the dissemination had an incorrect one. She said that the info in the first paragraph of the dissemination came from MEXI 6453 and that explained the incorrect description. We pointed out to her the fact that she had the correct description and that had already told us that she did not associate the description in 6453 with Oswald, and that she had said that the cable and teletype had been prepared simultaneously by three knowledgeable people. She said, first, that the correct description would not have been put in the dissemination because it came from the file review. I pointed out that all of the information in the second paragraph of the dissemination was from the file review. She responded that they had not been sure that the "Lee Oswald" referred to in 6453 was the same as "Lee Henry Oswald" on whom they had a file, hence they would not have had included a description from 6453 that she did not think was connected to Oswald. She said that it had obviously been a mistake that doesn't matter now, but if she had it to do over again, she would not put any description in the dissemination because she was not sure that either applied to...
the man who identified himself as Lee Oswald at the Embassy in Mexico. 585/

The second point of interest that is illustrated by the 10/10 cable and teletype is the inference that can be made from reviewing paragraph 3 of the teletype, paragraph 5 of the cable, and Thomas Karamessines signing off on the cable, that the CIA was asking for, and promising, a further investigation of Oswald without a specific request from any other government agency who might have had, as the '77 IGR says, "investigative responsibility."

The Chief of the Soviet Section in Mexico City recognized such a routine investigative responsibility as part of the normal course of his duties.

One of our responsibilities was to assist the FBI in identifying people who might become Soviet agents, particularly in America. 586/

As a matter of fact, the Chief of the Branch of the CIA responsible for the Mexican operations at Headquarters thought this was one of the Mexico City Station's strongest and most successful areas of endeavor.

They (Americans) were detected enough so that J. Edgar Hoover used to glow every time that he thought of the Mexico City Station. This was one of our outstanding areas of cooperation with the FBI. 587/
The request for further investigation and dissemination contained in paragraph 5 of the 10/10 cable to Mexico was the reason that the cable was sent to the Assistant Deputy Director of Plans for release. 588/
The Chief of the Mexico Branch was questioned extensively on this point:

A: Well, it went up to Mr. Karamessines because it involved disseminating information on an American citizen to the U.S. government agencies, you see. At that time—probably still—the CIA did not investigate or pass around information on American citizens unless it were requested to by another government agency, either in that particular case or by some standard operating procedure.
In other words, the CIA, seeing an American abroad, observing an American abroad, observing an American abroad engaging in some skullduggery, would inform the responsible U.S. agency here and sit and wait for instructions before doing anything further. In this case, we were passing on information to other U.S. government agencies in Mexico City and this probably went to other places in Washington as well.

Q: This particular information was disseminated to other agencies without a request of any such agency. Is that correct?

A: Yes.

Q: This fit into the other category of cases where disseminations were made?

A: Disseminations would be made to other interested agencies, and any information we came across had action taken to follow up to take investi-
gative steps. Dissemination would only be taken if another agency requested it, either specifically in that case, or unless it were a part of standard operating procedure, which would have been agreed upon with another agency.

Q: Was any follow-up action contemplated by (the 10/10) cable?

A: Yes. "Please keep Headquarters advised of any further contacts or for positive identification of Oswald."

Q: That would be considered follow-up?

A: Yes. They were instructed to stay alert and report any further evidence of this man's presence. Therefore, Mr. Karamessines had to sign off on it.

Q: Mr. Karamessines had to sign off on it because follow-up action was contemplated?

A: With regard to a U.S. citizen abroad.

Q: For purposes of clarification, I think you said that there were two situations where Mr. Karamessines would have to sign off. One would be where another agency requested the dissemination?

A: Yes. No—not the question of the dissemination. It is a question of operational action being taken.

Q: A request for operational action. What is the second example?

A: Well--

Q: Would the Agency itself decide to take operational action?

A: Ordinarily, operational action in an ordinary case would not require Mr. Karamessines approval at all. It was only because an American citizen was involved. That interest in an American citizen might come about because of a specific statement of interest about
this individual from another U.S. government agency or it might come about because of a standard operating procedure.

For example, we had an agreement with the FBI that we would follow up leads on any American citizen in Mexico City who appeared around the Soviet Embassies, and so on, or anybody who was there appearing to defect, which we might learn through our telephone intercepts.

We could just as well have sent this cable out without Mr. Karmessines releasing it. I do not know why we did it.

Q: In fact, you pointed to something which I was going to ask you about. I was wondering why somebody as high up in the Agency as Mr. Karmessines was the releasing officer.

A: I would have been because of the U.S. citizen aspect, because so many other U.S. Government agencies were involved, State Department, FBI and the Navy. I suppose one of these things is the Navy. One of them could be the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

Q: Let me attempt to summarize again. Karmessines would be responsible for signing off on this because operational action pertaining to an American was taken?

A: Yes.

Q: Either pursuant to the request of another government agency or pursuant to some standard operating procedure of the Agency itself.

A: Yes.

Q: Any other reason that you can think of?

A: No.

Q: I believe you indicated that there was an arrangement,
or an agreement, with the FBI that any activities by Americans around the Soviet or Cuban Embassy would be reported and followed up on by the Agency. Was that agreement in writing?

A: I do not know. It probably was in writing somewhere. It antedated my tenure, and the agreement was not in the files. It would have been in the files of the DDP or of the CI Staff. 589/

The Chief of the Mexico Branch hence believes that further investigation of Oswald was requested by CIA Headquarters without the prior expression of interest from another government agency with "investigative responsibility." This request for "operational activity" concerning an American abroad is advanced as the reason for the Assistant Deputy Director of Plans signing off on the cable. Even though the cable was brought to Karamessines' attention and he did sign off on it, Mr. Scelso told this Committee that that was not necessary due to a standing agreement with the FBI under which the CIA had agreed to investigate Americans in Mexico in contact with the Soviet Embassy without any specific request from another agency. 590/

This recollection is corroborated by other testimony and documents. 591/ Elsie Scaleti also recalled that it would not have been necessary, in 1963, to bring such a request for operational action to the ADDP's attention. 592/ She suggested that the reason for bringing it to the ADDP's
attention did not have to do with the request for operational action, but because Oswald's contact was considered important enough to merit his attention:

Q: Why would someone as high up in the organization as Karamessines ask to be the releasing officer of this particular cable?

A: I can only surmise now that I might have thought or what several of us might have thought at the time, that since it involved somebody of this nature who had tried to renounce his citizenship, who was in the Soviet Union, married to a Soviet, got out with a Soviet wife presumably, which is very strange, and now the contact with the Soviets, we could have a security, a major security problem. This was one way of informing him and getting attention at the higher level. 593/

Even though the CIA denies such an agreement (if it was in writing) that covered the CIA's investigation of American citizens in Mexico, this Committee is certain, on the basis of the above detailed evidence, that such an agreement existed, either formally or informally. 594/

Hence, the assertion in the 1977 IG report that "Oswald was not an investigative responsibility of the CIA" is seemingly inaccurate and misleading. 595/

This Committee has attempted to determine what actions, if any, were taken by the CIA's Mexico City Station after Headquarters responded to the initial report of Oswald's contacts with the Soviet Embassy. In this
respect, two assertions of the '77 IGR are important: 1) that it was not discovered that Oswald was seeking a visa to Russia and that he had also been in contact with the Cuban Embassy until November 22, 1963; and 2) that the Station did "nothing other than ask Headquarters on 15 October for a photograph of Oswald" because no other government agency had made an official request for further information. 596/ It has already been shown that the "official request" that the Agency claims was not forthcoming was, in fact, not necessary and that, as a matter of fairly routine operating procedure, the CIA Headquarters requested a follow-up on the information already reported about Oswald. It has also been shown that the Oswald matter, after the name trace was done at Headquarters, was considered to be fairly significant by the Headquarters officials involved. In this regard, it should be pointed out that Headquarters communicated its concern to Mexico by requesting in paragraph 5 of DIR 74830 more information on Oswald. It should also be noted that the CIA Headquarters also, by notifying the interested government agencies that "Any further information received on this subject will be furnished to you" 597/ belied the necessity of one of the agencies
making an official request for further action. Hence, the excuse offered for the claimed lack of action by the Mexico Station is invalid and the question becomes 1) whether or not that Station did any follow-up; 2) whether they did discover additional information about Oswald prior to the assassination; 3) whether that information, if any, was reported in an accurate and expeditious manner; and 4) if it was not reported, what was the reason for the failure to report.

The Mexico City Station received DIR 74830 on 11 October 1963. The Mexico City copy of this cable is in Lee Harvey Oswald's Mexico City "P" file along with the Station routing slip. There are several interesting aspects to this copy of the cable and there is evidence that provides indications of the Stations' actions and the timing of those actions.

There are several marginal notations on this document. Perhaps the most interesting is the notation "Sic" with an arrow drawn to the "Henry" in the name "Lee Harvey Oswald." That notation was made by Win Scott when he read the cable on the day it was received in Mexico. This notation struck Committee investigators as very strange because it was a possible indication that Win...
Scott knew, at the time the cable was received, that Lee Oswald's middle name was not "Henry." David Phillips was questioned about that possibility:

Q: Do you have any reason to believe that when this cable was received in October of 1963 Mr. Scott knew that cable's reference to Lee Harvey Oswald was incorrect?

A: No, I don't recall that, but reading this obviously at whatever time he wrote that "sic" on there he felt it was incorrect or he would not have spotlighted it that way. But I don't have any recollection. I don't have any recollection that we know before this cable came back down that it was Lee Harvey Oswald. 599/

The explanation most often advanced was that Mr. Scott often used the symbols "sic" and "aka" interchangeably and that all he was indicating here was that the "Lee Oswald" from the taps was also to be indexed and filed under the additional name "Lee Henry Oswald."

600/ Mr. Phillips was also asked about this explanation:

Q: Was he the kind of individual that would have interchanged or used interchangeably the words, the letters "aka" and "sic" interchangeably as having the same meaning? Do you appreciate that?

A: Yes. I don't think so. He was an intellectual. His great secret was that he wrote poetry. He didn't want anyone else to know that. He was very well educated, extremely well read, and no, he is not the kind of man--

Q: He would appreciate the distinction?
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A: He would appreciate the distinction between the two. 601/

If Mr. Scott did in fact make this notation prior to the assassination of John Kennedy, this Committee has not been able to determine why "sic" was used. 602/

The description of Oswald is marked on this cable with a double black line, a check mark and the notation "24 years old" in Ann Goodpasture's hand-writing. 603/ At this point at least Ms. Goodpasture and Allan White, the DCOS, realized that the photograph they had described in MEXI 6453 was not of Oswald. 604/ But this realization was evidently not shared by all the officers in the station. Ms. Goodpasture remembers that there was some controversy in the station about whether the man described in the 10/11 cable was the same man who had been picked up by the Station's photographic surveillance. Ms. Goodpasture remembers that she believed, based on the cable, that the photograph reported in MEXI 6453 was not of Oswald. She said that she argued over the identification with Win Scott and that he said, "Oh, that may be incorrect and so forth. But there was some quibbling over it." 605/

The routing slip on the 10/11 cable indicates some of
the dates when subsequent Mexico City Station actions occurred. Ms. Goodpasture noted that "We should ask HQ for photo. No?" [CIA C2 noted that the dissemination requested by Paragraph 4 of the cable was done on 15 October 1963. Win Scott wrote, "Please set up "P" file on Lee Henry OSWALD and put all data we have into it. Photos?" 606/ The document was sent to the files on 15 October 1963. 607/ Hence, we know that Oswald's Mexico "P" file was opened on or about 15 October 1963 and that Win Scott asked that "all" information be included in the file. There is substantial reason to believe that most, if not all, of the information available to the Station was incorporated into the file at that time. 608/

The 10/11 cable greatly increased the significance of Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy in the eyes of the Mexico City Station just as the name trace results reported by that cable had made the matter more significant to the officers involved at Headquarters. 609/ This cable aroused the Station's operational interest in Oswald.

Q: To your knowledge did that (the 10/11 cable) in any way enhance the importance of Oswald's
contact with the Soviet Embassy?

A: Oh, yes, sure, it did. The fact that he had that kind of background. Sure, he became someone of considerable operational interest. Again, there was nothing other than operational interest.

Q: In all likelihood that cable would have prompted the people at the station to go back and look at the earlier transcripts?

A: Yes, I would think so. 610/

This Committee believes that Station personnel did, between October 11 and October 15, go back and recheck the transcripts and connect the important substantive calls to Oswald. Under normal operating procedures a tape of Oswald's calls to the Soviet Embassy should not have been erased until 16 October, 4 to 5 days after the case took on added significance. 611/ The one transcript of the call on 10/1/63 that had definitely been linked to Oswald prior to receipt of the 10/11 cable bore a reference to an earlier conversation by a man who spoke broken Russian, the text of the 10/1 call allowed that the prior call had probably occurred on September 28, 1963. 612/ It should have been possible at that point to compare the tapes to see if they were in fact the same caller. Indeed, a notation made by Ann Goodpasture on a newspaper article in 1964 suggests that this was the case.
The notes say:

The caller from the Cuban Embassy was unidenti
tified until HQ sent traces on Oswald and voices
compared by (Tarasoff.) 613/

The cable traffic after the assassination confuses
this point rather than clarifies it. This will be dealt
with in more detail in a subsequent section. An examina-
tion of documents in Lee Harvey Oswald's Mexico City Sta-
tion P file and the cable traffic from Mexico City to
Headquarters after the assassination, raised a possibility
that at least one tape of Oswald's voice existed as late
as 16 October 1963. 614/

Assuming that the 10/1/63 call in which an individual
identifies himself as "Lee Oswald" was handled in an ex-
pedited manner, the tape and the transcript would have
been in the Station by the following day at the latest. 615/
If the tape had been held for the normal two-week reten-
tion period, it would have been erased on or about 16
October. The tape from the 9/28/63 conversation would
have probably been in the station by the first or second
of October at the latest. 616/ It would not have normally
been erased until on or about 16 October also. It seems
clear that the tapes, under normal procedures would have
been retained until at least the mid-
October. An examination of the documents does not clarify this question but rather adds confusion to the issue.

Several documents and cables deal with the tapes and a voice comparison of the recorded conversations. In Oswald's "P" file there is a newspaper clipping of an article from the 21 October 1964 Washington Post. The article, by Robert S. Allen and Paul Scott, is entitled "CIA Withheld Vital Intelligence from Warren Commission."

One paragraph from that article says:

The investigators also are trying to determine why the CIA in its preassassination report to the State Department on Oswald's trip to Mexico City gave details only of the defector's visit to the Russian Embassy and not the Cuban Embassy. The CIA did not report the latter visit until after Kennedy's assassination in Dallas.

Next to that paragraph Ann Goodpasture wrote:

The caller from the Cuban Embassy was unidentified until HQ sent traces on Oswald and voices compared by (Tarasoff). 617/

That statement is very clear in saying that a voice comparison was made. The cable traffic that went from Mexico to CIA Headquarters after the assassination is not so clear.
On 23 November, the CIA Headquarters asked the Mexico City Station to send the full transcripts of Oswald's conversations and "original tapes if available" to Headquarters as soon as possible by a special courier. 618/

On that same day, Ann Goodpasture sent a cable to Headquarters reporting the 9/28/63 conversation. That cable said, in part, "Station unable to compare voice as first tape erased prior receipt of second call." 619/

Later that same day Ms. Goodpasture wrote another cable which said:

(Tarasoff) who did transcriptions says Oswald identical with person para one speaking broken Russian who called from Cuban Embassy 28 September to Soviet Embassy. 620/

The next day the Mexico City Station informed Headquarters that it had been unable to locate any tape of Oswald's voice. "Regret complete recheck shows tapes for this period already erased." 621/

The statement in MEXI 7023 that a voice comparison was not possible because of the first tape being erased prior to the second tape being received is inconsistent with the statements made in testimony and in other cables 622/ and with the procedure then in effect at the station at that time. 623/

It is, therefore, considered highly
unlikely that a tape would be held only one or two days, the situation that is implied by the statement in MEXI 7023.

The other statements by Ms. Goodpasture in the cables and on the newspaper articles clearly indicate that a voice comparison was made. Ms. Goodpasture was questioned about this.

Q: To your knowledge, was a voice comparison ever made between the tapes to determine whether the same person was speaking in each one?

A: I do not know. I did not make one. I do not know whether someone else made one or not. There is a transcript, a cable here, in which the transcriber of the Soviet tape says that it is the same voice, which would lead one to believe that he made a voice comparison, but it just may have been that he, from his memory, came to that conclusion. 624/

Q: On the lower righthand corner of the newspaper article that is contained there, marked off with a dark line is a paragraph. Kindly read that paragraph, starting with the words "The investigators.."

(Pause.)

A: This would suggest--

Q: One moment.

A: --Tarasoff compared the voices on a tape of October.

Q: Whose handwriting appears?

A: That is mine.
Q: That indicates that the caller—could you please read that to us. Read what you wrote that day.

A: "The caller from the Cuban Embassy was unidentified until Headquarters sent traces on Oswald." Now, that would have been in answer to the cable that was dated 8th October. I believe their cable was 18 October, "and voices compared by Feinglass." Feinglass was the pseudonym used by Tarasoff.

Q: In fact, that indicates—

A: He compared the Cuban Embassy voices with the others, with Oswald's call, in which he used his name.

Q: When would that have happened?

A: I said 18 October because I thought that was the date of the cable. 10 October. 625/

Boris Tarasoff testified that he had not been queried at all about Oswald in 1963 and that he had not done a voice comparison. 626/ [CIA A] testified that Tarasoff did not do a voice comparison but connected the two conversations in his marginal comments in the transcripts on the basis of memory. 627/

Whether or not Mr. Tarasoff or someone else did a voice comparison of the tapes, it is likely that the tapes did exist until at least the 16th of October and would have been available for such a comparison. It is possible that the connection between the 10/1/63 call and the 9/28/63 call was made on the basis of Mr. Tarasoff's
In any event the record clearly indicates that the tapes should have been available, and probably were available, as late as 16 October 1963.\(^{628}\) This is significant because it was after receipt of the 10/10 cable from Headquarters that the Oswald case took on a more than routine coloring.

The increased significance that the Oswald visit took on during the period from October 11 to October 16, 1963, could have provided the station with reason to retain the Oswald tapes.\(^{629}\)

Ms. Goodpasture was asked what became of the Oswald tapes.

Q: What happened to that tape containing Oswald's voice?
A: What happened?

Q: What happened to that tape, yes?
A: I do not know.

Q: Do those tapes exist today?
A: What?

Q: Do those tapes exist today?
A: If they do, I do not know where they are.
Q: Are you aware of the fact that, after the assassination, it has been alleged that some tapes were given to the FBI to listen to and that it was said that these tapes contained Oswald's voice on them?

A: Someone asked me about that, but I do not think that I had those tapes. I do not remember if I did, and I was not aware that we gave any to the FBI. I do not know whether CIA got tapes from Mr. Tarasoff and passed them to the FBI, or if the Chief of Station or Deputy passed anything to the FBI. I just do not know.

On the whole most CIA officers who testified stated that, if a tape of Oswald's voice existed at the time of the assassination, they did not know anything at all about it. One CIA officer, the Chief of the Branch responsible for Mexico, testified that he believed the tapes did exist at the time of the assassination:

Q: Were they able to locate the original tapes?
A: I think so.

Q: Do you recall what was done with those tapes?
A: No.

Q: Did you ever--
A: I never heard them.

A: You never heard them?
A: No.

Q: On what basis do you say the original tapes were found?

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Classified by derivation:
A: I had the impression that after the assassination they did a lot of transcribing. I may be wrong...

Q: Let us look at (MEXI 7025.) Paragraph four there, which indicates that the person who did the transcript and says, "Oswald is identical with the person in an earlier paragraph who spoke broken Russian and called on 28 September." That indicates that some sort of a voice comparison was made.

A: Yes. Tapes were probably still in existence. 632/

The Tarasoffs do not remember ever doing, or being asked to do, a voice comparison of the Oswald tapes. 633/

But the evidence, albeit circumstantial, seems to indicate that the tapes were in existence and that the voices were compared by someone. 634/ The Station made the connections, whether by voice comparison and/or by comparison of the substantive information in the 10/11 cable to the substantive information in the transcripts, the conversations were linked to Oswald prior to the assassination and probably by the time that the "P" file was opened on or about 16 October 1963. 636/ Ms. Goodpasture was also asked about this:

Q: On October 1st, you found out that Oswald had been at the Russian Embassy the preceding
Saturday. Was any effort made to check your materials from the surveillance operation, the photographic surveillance operation, or from the telephonic surveillance operation to get additional information on this?

A: I do not know whether I checked it immediately or not at this stage. I do know that they were checked thoroughly after the assassination. In fact, I think they were checked thoroughly after the information came back from Washington identifying a Lee Oswald. 637/

On October 15, 1963, a "P" file was opened on Oswald. 638/ That same day the CIA Mexico City Station requested that Headquarters send them a photograph of Oswald. 639/ On that date also [CIA CL] drafted a local dissemination memo regarding Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy. 640/ By this date at least the 10/1/10:45 call, the 9/28/11:51 call, the 9/27/4:05 call, and the 9/27/4:26 call had been linked to Oswald. 641/

On 16 October 1963 the memorandum drafted by [CIA CL] was circulated at the U.S. Embassy. It said:

1. The following information was received from a usually reliable and extremely sensitive source: On 1 October 1963, an American male contacted the Soviet Embassy and identified himself as Lee OSWALD. This officer (sic) determined that OSWALD had been at the Soviet Embassy on 28 September 1963 and had talked with Valeriy Valdimirivoch KOSTIKOV, a member of the Consular Section, in order to learn if the Soviet Embassy had received a reply from Washington concerning his request. We
have no clarifying information with regard to this request.

2. Our Headquarters has informed us that the OSWALD above is probably identical with Lee Henry OSWALD, born on 18 October 1939, in New Orleans, Louisiana, a former radar operator in the U.S. Marine Corps who defected to the Soviet Union in October 1959.

3. This office will advise you if additional information on this matter is received. 642/

When [CIA C2] was asked why she had stated that it had been "determined" that Oswald had been in contact with the Soviet Embassy on 28 September she said that it must have been because she had rechecked the transcripts by this time as otherwise she would not have used such certain language. 643/ When asked why the 10/16 memo said that there was no clarifying information on Oswald's "request" when it was known by this time that he was seeking a visa, [CIA C2] said that "They had no need to know all those other details." 644/

There are no indications that any other actions were taken by the Mexico City Station prior to the assassination. 645/

Even though the Station's actions after the 10/11 cable were not highly extensive, it is inaccurate and misleading to say that those actions were limited to re-
questing a photograph of Oswald from Headquarters. Other actions included rechecking the transcripts and discovering the substantive ones that concerned Oswald and reporting the information in MEXI 6453 and DIR 74830 to various components in the U. S. Embassy in Mexico City in a misleading manner. Hence, the fact that Oswald was seeking a visa and had been in contact with the Cubans as well as the Russians was known prior to the assassination, and the Station's actions prior to the assassination were more comprehensive than merely requesting a photograph; although if any action other than a file check was taken, no record of that action has been made available to this Committee.

It is unlikely, but possible, that this information that was developed by the Mexico City Station after 10/11/63 was reported to Headquarters. Elsie Scaleti pointed out that a report of this additional information on Oswald's activities in Mexico "would have been expected." 646/ Ms. Scaleti's belief that the information should have been reported to Headquarters is shared for identical reasons by her superior at Headquarters. 647/

The testimony from the people involved, both at head-
quarters and in Mexico, while often uncertain, is, generally, that the do not remember that such a cable was sent. Ms. Scaleti said that she could not recall that Mexico had sent any other information to Headquarters prior to the assassination, but added, I "could not swear to that." 648/ The head of the Mexico Branch at Headquarters was certain that this information was reported but he could not recall the form of the report or whether it occurred before or after the assassination. 649/ Robert Shaw first testified that, to his knowledge, the information was not reported prior to the assassination and then added "but I would have no way of knowing." 650/ The Deputy Chief of Station in Mexico, Mr. Allan White, was also uncertain on this point:

Q: Did they ever indicate to Headquarters that Oswald had been to the Cuban Embassy as well as to the Soviet Embassy and that he wanted a visa?

A: I would have to assume that they did. I realize that "assume" is a bad word.

Q: You don't have personal knowledge one way or another?

A: No, prior to the assassination I would not. 651/ Ann Goodpasture was also unsure of her recollection in this area:
Q: But Headquarters was never appraised of that voice comparison?
A: I think they were in a cable.
A: Prior to the assassination?
A: No, I do not think they were prior to the assassination...

Q: It is determined that the same person was talking on each tape and there is no follow-up to Headquarters, even though Headquarters clearly considered this to be significant?
A: The follow-up was made by disseminating this information from the traces locally and trying to identify Oswald, trying to locate the man. That is the way the follow-up was made. We thought that he may still be in Mexico.

Q: The point is, however, that upon the making of a voice comparison, if, in fact, that was done, that information was not communicated to anyone.
A: I do not know if it was or not. You would have to check the file completely, the cable traffic, to see if it was. To the best of my knowledge, it was not until after the assassination...

Q: In fact, headquarters did not know that he had also been to the Cuban Embassy?
A: At that point, no.
Q: At least, according to your recollection, it was not until after the assassination that Headquarters was informed of that fact?
A: That is probably right. 552/

Only one person who was interviewed by this Committee was certain of her recollection.
certain that a second cable reporting Oswald's contacts with the Cuban Embassy had been sent to Headquarters prior to the assassination.

Q: It does not strike you as more significant that the American contacts the Soviet Embassy and he also contacts the Cuban Embassy? To me that would make him seem more significant and therefore, if you found out about this after the time the (first) cable was sent you would have sent another cable.

A: I did not send another cable but I know another cable was sent. I didn't send it.

Q: Another cable concerning Oswald was sent?

A: I think so. Where is the whole file? Wasn't there a cable saying he was in touch with the Cuban Embassy?

Q: We have not seen one.

A: I am pretty such there was.

Q: Did you send that cable?

A: No, I did not send the cable. When I found out about it I remember this, I said how come?

Q: Who did? Do you know?

A: I don't know who sent it. I think Ann (Goodpasture) might have. She might have sent a follow-up one with this information. 653/

The staff of this Committee suggested that Mr. Philip's clear recollection of involvement in reporting Oswald's visit to the Cuban Embassy and that he was seeking
a visa along with the fact that Mr. Phillips was not in
Mexico at the time that the first cable was sent, could possibly be an indication that he is recalling a
second cable. When asked about this, Mr. Phillips
stated that he had no knowledge of a second cable sent
prior to the assassination.

Some corroboration of assertions were found in the materials from Win Scott's safe.

"On page 777 of (the Warren) report the erroneous statement was made that it was not
known that Oswald had visited the Cuban Embassy until after the assassination! Every
piece of information concerning Lee Harvey Oswald was reported immediately after it was
received to: U. S. Ambassador Thomas C.
Mann, by memorandum; the FBI Chief in Mexico,
by Memorandum; and to my headquarters by cable;
and included in each and every one of these
reports was the conversation Oswald had, so
far as it was known. These reports were made
on all his contacts with both the Cuban Consulate and with the Soviets.

If the cable was sent it is not in the files made
available to the HSCA by the CIA.

The head of the Mexico Branch admitted that the
information should have been reported and that, if it
had been, the Oswald case would have been handled dif-
ferently, at least as far as the dissemination of infor-
mation about him was concerned.
Q: Had the information concerning Oswald's visit to the Cuban Embassy in addition to the Soviet one, that Oswald had been requesting a visa, if it had been sent to CIA headquarters, would his case prior to the assassination have been handled in any different manner?

A: It would have been in the case of dissemination of information about him, but I do not think that any operational action would have taken to apprehend him or to contact him or to try to force him back to the United States.

Q: ...how would the dissemination have been treated differently?

A: Well, it simply means that we would have disseminated any additional information that we got.

It cannot be determined with exactitude whether or not this additional information about Oswald was reported to Headquarters. In all likelihood it was not. The Chief of the Mexico Desk was asked whether or not the Station was ever criticized for this failure to report in the face of a specific request to do so by CIA Headquarters. He said:

No. That was not because we were trying to go easy on them, it is simply because it is in the nature of the business. What you are trying to do is engage, as I used to say, in important illegal manipulations of society, secretly.

We were running, at that time, a vast[ ]action program in Mexico City to try[ ]describes operation

Classification:
I do not know whether you informed yourself about the magnitude of our political action program at the time—absolutely enormous.

We were trying to follow the Soviets and all the satellites and the Cubans. At the same time, the main thrust of the Station's effort was to attempt to recruit Russians, Cubans and satellite people. 658/

Perhaps the nature of the CIA Mexico City Station's handling of the Oswald case prior to the assassination can best be summed up in Dave Phillips' response when he was asked how he would characterize that handling:

"At the very best, it is not professional, at the best." 659/

V. Mexico City Station Reporting of Information Concerning Oswald After the Assassination

A. Reporting of information concerning the photograph of the Mexico Mystery Man

Even though some people in the Station clearly dis-associated the photograph that was described in MEXI 6453 from Oswald after receiving the 10/11 cable, 656/ it is clear that some people still considered it possible for some reason that the photograph was of Oswald. In October, Ann Goodpasture had argued this very point with Winston Scott. 657/ On the day of the assassination, the Mexico City Station cabled Headquarters that it was sending as soon as possible "copies of only visitor to

Classification: ___________  
Classified by derivation: ________

*Classification: ___________  
Classified by derivation: ________
Sovemb 28 Oct who could be identical with Oswald. 658/
The date was later corrected to read 1 October. 659/
Mr. Scott was not the only person in the Mexico Station
who still thought that the photo could possibly be
Oswald. (CIA CI) testified on this point.

Q: As of the day of the assassination, you
thought that there was still a possibility
that there was a photograph of Oswald?

A: Indeed. As I recall, we tried to get that
photograph to headquarters as fast as we
could. As it turned out it wasn't neces-
sary to send it. But that was our intention. 660/

The photograph was sent to Dallas where Special Agent
Odum of the FBI showed it to Mrs. Marguerite Oswald on
23 November 1963. 661/ Mrs. Oswald would later claim
it was a photograph of Jack Ruby. 662/ beginning a period
of controversy and uncertainty about this photograph that
has continued to this day. The interaction of the Warren
Commission and the CIA on this question is detailed
in another section of this report. On 23 November Mexico
informed Headquarters that "It obvious photos sent to Dallas
were not iden with Lee Oswald." 663/ Since the time of
the assassination, this man has been identified as Yuriy
Ivanovich Moskalev, a Soviet KGB officer. The identifi-
cation is unconfirmed and comes from only one source. 664/

Classification: (This form is to be used for material extracted
from CIA—controlled documents.)
In any case, it is unlikely that this man had any connection with Oswald outside of the mistaken belief of several CIA officers in Mexico. 665/

B. Reporting of information concerning Lee Harvey Oswald from the electronic intercept operation aimed at the Soviet Embassy

The first cable that Mexico sent to Headquarters after the assassination referred Headquarters to the cable traffic concerning Oswald that had occurred prior to the assassination. 666/ Headquarters replied that they had also noted the "connection." 667/

The cable traffic on the day of the assassination, and the early traffic from the following day, deal almost exclusively with the photograph of the person who later became known as the Mexico Mystery Man. The first cable 668/ obviously referred to the October 1 contact and brought it to Headquarters' attention by referring Headquarters to MEXI 6453. The first cable that specifically refers to the transcripts occurred on the following day. Headquarters cabled Mexico that it was important that the station review all transcripts.
"since 27 September to locate all material possibly pertinent." 669/ The cable went on to instruct the station to send the full transcripts and original tapes to Headquarters by special courier. 670/ The cable also asks if the original tapes are still available. 671/

This Committee has not been able to determine how the CIA Headquarters knew, on 23 November 1963, that a review of the tap material should begin with the production from 27 September, the day Oswald first appeared at the Soviet and Cuban Embassies. There is no record that Headquarters had been informed of the 9/27 visits prior to this cable having been sent. It is possible, as some witnesses have suggested, that his information was provided to CIA Headquarters by the FBI in Washington. 672/ If that is the case then it merely shifts the question: This may indicate that the CIA Headquarters was aware of the 9/27 visits prior to the assassination. An even stronger inference is that they were aware of those visits at least by the day after the assassination. The manner in which they learned of these visits by that date has not been determined. It is possible that Headquarters was informed...
by telephone. Even though witnesses generally denied that there was telephone communication between Mexico City and Headquarters at the time of the assassination, there is strong evidence that there was such communication on at least two instances. 673/

As will become evident, the transcripts were cabled to headquarters that same day. It is not clear why Headquarters asked that the transcripts and tapes, if they existed, be sent to Headquarters by special courier as opposed to cabling the transcripts which would have been faster. 674/ There is no record that indicates that these transcripts of Oswald's calls were sent to Headquarters by special courier.

On the 23rd, the Mexico City Station reported all of the substantive Oswald conversations to Headquarters by cable. Logically, one would expect that since the circumstantial evidence indicates that these conversations were linked to Oswald prior to the assassination, that they would all have been reported in one cable, especially in light of the request from Headquarters in DIR 84886. 675/ At this point, according to the files and records made available to the HSCA staff by the CIA, the Mexico City Station had informed Headquarters of...
only the 9/28 and the 10/1/10:45 conversations. It should be noted that the 10/1/10:45 conversation makes reference to the fact that Oswald was also at the Embassy on 9/28. The next cable that Mexico City sent to Headquarters said, in part, "Other than Info already sent re Oswald's connection with Sov and Cuban Embs, no other info available." 675/ The next cable reports a literal transcription of the 9/28 and 10/1/10:45 conversations. 677/ The next cable that refers to the transcripts of Oswald's conversations reports the 9/27/10:30 call, the 9.27/4:05 call, the 9.27/4:26 call, the 10/1/10:31 call, and the 10/3 call. 678/ With this cable Mexico City informed Headquarters of all the substantive information available from the Soviet Embassy electronic surveillance. 679/

Mexico City also informed Headquarters on 11/24/64 that the tapes from the period in which Oswald had visited the Soviet and Cuban Embassies had been erased. 680/ A cable on the previous day had informed Headquarters that it was "probable" that the Oswald tapes had been erased. 681/ An earlier cable that same day reported that "Station unable compare voice as first tape erased
prior receipt of second call." 682/ This would imply that the tape of the 28 September conversation, which may not have been received at the station until the 30th or the 1st of October, was destroyed before the tape of the conversation on the 1st of October was received in the station on that same day. In light of the standard operating procedures in effect in the station at that time, that possibility is highly unlikely. 683/

In view of what is now known about the standard operating procedures and about the Station's actions prior to the assassination, the Station's confusing and somewhat contradictory reporting after the assassination is strange. 684/ It is possible that these confusions and contradictions arose out of the crisis atmosphere at the station and the rush to report information. This Committee has not found any solid evidence that there were sinister qualities in the reporting after the assassination.
When President John F. Kennedy was assassinated on November 22, 1963, the United States investigative agencies—FBI, CIA, Secret Service, etc.—were asked to investigate the assassination. When the Central Intelligence Agency's Mexico City Station remembered that Lee Harvey Oswald had visited Mexico City during late September and early October, it reviewed the electronic surveillance files and found evidence of phone calls to the Soviet Embassy made September 27th, September 28th, and October 1st, that could have been made by Oswald. 685/

Review of the electronic surveillance files also produced telephone calls on September 27, 1963 between the Russian Consul and Silvia Duran, a secretary at the Cuban Consulate, where Oswald was discussed. 686/ In addition, the Mexico City Station found a September 28, 1963 phone call from Silvia Duran to the Soviet Consulate where Silvia Duran stated that there was an American citizen at the Cuban Consulate who had previously visited the Soviet Consulate. 687/ A final phone call was made on October 1, 1963 where the “alleged” Oswald identified himself was also found. 688/

On November 23, 1963 the Mexico City Station deter-
mined that it would request the Mexican government—with whom it had a good relationship—to arrest Silvia Duran (as Silvia Duran was a Mexican citizen, she did not have diplomatic immunity) because she might shed some light on the circumstances surrounding the assassination. 688a/

The Mexico City Station sent a note to the Gobernacion head, Luis Echevarria, with Silvia Duran's address, her mother's address, her brother's address, her license plate number, her home phone number, her place of work and a request that she be arrested immediately. 689/ The Mexico City Station also suggested that Duran be held incommunicado until she could be questioned on the matter. 690/

The Mexico City Station did not receive prior authorization from CIA Headquarters to request the arrest of Silvia Duran by Mexican authorities. 691/ Headquarters feared that a request to arrest Ms. Duran would jeopardize the clandestine relationship between certain Mexican government officials and the CIA if it were disclosed that Americans were behind Duran's arrest. 672/ John Scelso, Chief of Western Hemisphere, stationed at Langley Headquarters, telephoned Winston Scott, the Mexico City Chief of Station, and requested that Silvia Duran not be arrested. 693/ Scott told Scelso that he could not rescind the request, and that Headquarters should already have received a cable stating that Silvia Duran had
been arrested. After Winston Scott's conversation with John Scelso, Scott called Luis Echevarria and stated that the Mexico City Station desired that all information received from Duran be forwarded immediately to the Mexico City Station, and that her arrest and statements not be communicated to any leftist groups.

On November 27, 1963, the Mexican government forwarded to the Mexico City Station a copy of Silvia Duran's ten-page signed statement. It said,

"Upon learning about the assassination she and her husband speculated that President Kennedy might have been assassinated for racial reasons. When she became aware that the assassin was Lee Harvey Oswald, she ascertained that it was the same man who approximately two months prior had been to the Cuban Consulate to solicit an intransit visa to Russia. Having taken his name from the special documentation he presented she knew that he was married to a Russian woman and belonged to the "Fair Play for Cuba Committee." She checked the data in the Consulate archives and became certain that it was the same individual who was blonde, short, dressed unelegantly and whose face turned red when angry. The Consul had denied the visa because to obtain an intransit visa from the Cuban government, it was imperative that he previously obtain a visa from the Soviet Consulate. Since obtaining a visa from the Soviets took four months and Oswald's Mexican visa expired soon Oswald was advised that he see the Soviet Consul, and calling the person in charge of that office. The Soviet official told her that they would have to consult Moscow which would take four months. That afternoon, Oswald returned to the
Cuban Consulate and Silvia Duran confirmed that he could get a Cuban visa only after he received a Russian visa. She gave Oswald her name and business phone number but never gave him her address because she had no reason to give it to him. The only aid she could give Oswald was advising that he see the Soviet Consul and calling the person in charge of that office. She knew that phoning the Soviet Consulate was not one of her duties and that if she did so she did it only to help Oswald. She gave Oswald her business phone number only because he would have to call subsequently to check whether he had obtained a visa. He never called back."

Silvia Duran, released on November 24, 1963, was rearrested November 27, 1963, when the Mexican government alleged that she was attempting to leave Mexico for travel to Havana. According to the Mexican officials who detained Duran a second time, there was no addition to her story.

The Mexico City Station forwarded Duran's ten-page signed statement to Headquarters on November 27, 1963. The following day, Headquarters sent a clarification cable to the Mexico City Station seeking to insure that neither Silvia Duran nor the Cubans would have any basis for believing that the Americans were behind her rearrest. The cable stated, "We want the Mexican authorities to take the responsibility for the whole affair."

When the Central Intelligence Agency began to work with the Warren Commission, Headquarters cabled the Mexico
City Station that its plan in passing information to the Warren Commission was to eliminate mention of telephone taps in order to protect their continuing operations. 702/ Headquarters cabled that it would rely on Silvia Duran's statements and on the Consular files which the Soviets gave the State Department. 703/ Headquarters stressed that exact, detailed information from Llcrypenetration agents in the Cuban Embassy—on what Silvia Duran and other officials had said about Oswald's visit and his dealings would be valuable and usable corroborative evidence. 704/

When the Central Intelligence Agency forwarded to the Warren Commission a copy of Duran's signed statement, it read as follows:

...she remembered...(that Lee Harvey Oswald) was the name of an American who had come to the Cuban Consulate to obtain a visa to travel to Cuba in transit to Russia, the latter part of September or the early part of October of this year, and in support of his application had shown his passport, in which it was noted that he had lived in that country for a period of three years; his labor card from the same country written in the Russian language; and letters in that same language. He had presented evidence that he was married to a Russian woman, and also that he was apparently the leader of an organization in the city of New Orleans claiming that he should be accepted as a "friend" of the Cuban Revolution. Accordingly, the declarant, complying with her duties, took down all of the
information and completed the appropriate application form; and the declarant, admittedly exceeding her responsibilities, informally telephoned the Russian Consulate, with the intention of doing what she could to facilitate issuance of the Russian visa to Lee Harvey Oswald. However, they told her that there would be a delay of about four months in processing the case, which annoyed the applicant since, according to his statement, he was in a great hurry to obtain visas that would enable him to travel to Russia, insisting on his right to do so in view of his background and his loyalty and his activities in behalf of the Cuban movement. The declarant was unable to recall accurately whether or not the applicant told her he was a member of the Communist Party, but he did say that his wife was then in New York City, and would follow him. (Senora Duran stated) that when Oswald understood that it was not possible to give him a Cuban visa without his first having obtained the Russian visa, he became very excited or angry, and accordingly, the affiant called Consul Ascue (sic), (who) came out and began a heated discussion in English with Oswald, that concluded by Ascue telling him that "if it were up to him, he would not give him the visa," and "a person of his type was harming the Cuban Revolution rather than helping it," it being understood that in their conversation they were talking about the Russian Socialist Revolution and not the Cuban. Oswald maintained that he had two reasons for requesting that his visa be issued promptly, and they were: one, that his tourist permit in Mexico was about to expire; and the other, that he had to get to Russia as quickly as possible. Despite her annoyance, the declarant gave Oswald a paper in which she put down her name, "Silvia Duran," and the number of the telephone at the Consulate, which is "11-28-47" and the visa application
was processed anyway. It was sent to the Ministry of (Foreign) Relations of Cuba; from which a routine reply was received some fifteen to thirty days later, approving the visa, but on the condition that the Russian visa be obtained first, although she does not recall whether or not Oswald later telephoned her at the Consulate number that she gave him. 705/

The Central Intelligence Agency had relied on Duran's statements but had deleted Duran's description of Oswald as blonde and short. 706/ It had also excised Duran's statement—"The only aid she could give Oswald was advising that he see the Soviet Consul, and calling the person in charge of that office" which alluded to Oswald asking for some type of aid at the Cuban Consulate. 707/ In addition, Ms. Duran's strong statement "He never called her back" 707a/ was changed to "she does not recall whether or not Oswald later telephoned her at the Consulate number that she gave him. 707b/ Had the statements been included, the Warren Commission's conclusions would not have seemed as strong.

The Warren Commission staff was not completely satisfied with Ms. Duran's ten page signed statement obtained by the Mexican authorities. W. David Slawson wrote:

We then discussed...the problem of (interviewing) Silvia Duran. We pointed out that our only interest in witnesses (in Mexico) other than Duran was to get their formal testimony for authentication purposes...This was not true of Duran, however, because she had been interviewed only by the Mexican police
and we considered that interview inadequate. (I should point out that we do not consider it totally inadequate, however. It is only on details such as Oswald's physical appearance, side comments or remarks he may have made, etc., that we would like to interrogate Mrs. Duran further. On the essential point of whether or not his contacts with the Embassy consisted of anything other than an attempt to travel to Cuba, Silvia Duran's knowledge has probably been exhausted.) 708/

The Warren Commission staff's attempts to interview Ms. Duran never succeeded. 709/ Ms. Duran was not interviewed by Americans until 1976, when two reporters from the Washington Post interviewed her. 710/ On June 6, 1978, representatives of the House Select Committee on Assassinations interviewed Ms. Duran in Mexico City.

VI. Information not available at the time of the Warren Commission investigation

A. Silvia Tirado (nee Duran)

1. House Select Committee on Assassinations 6/6/78
   Interview of Silvia Tirado

Ms. Tirado (Silvia divorced Horatio Duran in 1968) was never questioned by American officials in 1963. Thus, the Committee established contact with the Mexican government and requested that the Mexican government make Silvia Tirado available for an interview. 711/ The Mexican
government complied on 6/6/78. Ms. Tirado told the House Select Committee on Assassinations the following:

Lee Harvey Oswald visited the Cuban Consulate three times on September 27, 1963, not twice as the Warren Commission previously reported. 712/ Oswald first visited the Cuban Consulate at approximately 11:00 a.m., requesting an intransit visa to Cuba with Russia as the final destination. 713/ He showed her some documents, then left to obtain photographs needed for his application. 714/

Oswald returned at approximately 1:00 p.m. with four photographs. 715/ Ms. Tirado typed the application in duplicate, stapled a picture on top of each and had Oswald sign each in her presence. 716/ As identification, Oswald showed her documents he had brought: his Russian labor card, marriage certificate with the name of his Russian wife, his American Communist Party membership card and his "Fair Play for Cuba" membership card. 717/

Ms. Tirado found Lee Harvey Oswald's behavior suspicious because normally a Communist traveled only with his passport as belonging to the Communist Party was illegal in Mexico in 1963. 718/

There was a procedure whereby the American Communist Party would arrange visa matters for their members with the
Cuban Communist Party. The American would then come to Mexico, visit the Cuban Consulate, and receive his visa immediately. When Tirado asked Oswald why he did not have the American Communist Party arrange his trip to Cuba, he stated that he had not had the time.

After explaining to Oswald that he had to acquire a Russian visa before he could receive a Cuban visa, Tirado jotted her name and business phone number on a piece of paper and gave it to Oswald who then left to get his Russian visa.

Oswald returned to the Cuban Consulate between 5:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m., which was after normal working hours, 10:00 to 2:00 p.m. The guard called Tirado, stating that someone who did not speak Spanish was at the gate inquiring about a visa. As routine procedure, she asked the guard to escort the individual to her office. Oswald told her that he had acquired a Russian visa. Since he did not produce it when asked, she called the Russian Consulate. The Consul told Duran that Oswald had been to the Consulate requesting a visa and had been told that the reply would take approximately four months. When she relayed the message to Oswald, he got very excited, insisting that as a person who had been in jail because
of the Cuban Revolution he should receive a visa. 729/
Oswald stated that he could not wait that long because
his Mexican visa expired in three days. 730/ At this
point, Ms. Tirado informed Consul Eusebio Azcue of the
situation. 731/ Azcue had been in his private office
which he shared with his upcoming replacement, Alfredo
Mirabal. 732/ Azcue politely explained the requisites
for an intransit visa to Oswald. 733/ When he noticed
that Oswald was a stubborn man he told Oswald that he
was obviously not a friend of the Cuban revolution be-
cause he would otherwise understand that Cuba had to be
extremely careful with the people it allowed in the coun-
try. 734/ Azcue and Oswald yelled at each other. 735/
Then Azcue went to the door, opened it and asked Oswald
to leave. 736/ Oswald did not revisit or telephone the
Consulate. 737/ Ms. Tirado described Lee Harvey Oswald
as approximately five feet six, with sparse blonde hair,
weighing about 125 pounds. 738/

2. CIA information not available at the time of
the Warren Commission investigation
a. LIRING/3 allegation

In 1967 a report that Silvia Duran had had intimate
relations with Lee Harvey Oswald came to the attention
of the Central Intelligence Agency's Mexico City Station. The source, LIRING/3, stated that he had recently received a call from Silvia Duran. A telephone tap on LIRING/3's telephone confirmed that Silvia Duran had called LIRING. LIRING/3 reported that he had visited Silvia to renew acquaintances. During the visit, Duran told LIRING/3 that she had met Lee Harvey Oswald at the Cuban Consulate when he applied for a visa and had dated him on several occasions. Duran admitted that she had had intimate relations with Oswald, but insisted that she had no idea of his plans. In addition, Duran told LIRING/3 that when the news of the assassination became public knowledge, the Mexican government arrested her and during the interrogation beat her until she admitted that she had had an affair with Lee Harvey Oswald. Rowton counseled LIRING/3 against any further contact with Duran because the Cubans or the Mexican police might become suspicious of him. There is no indication in Rowton's report as to why contact with Silvia would make the Cubans suspicious.

The CIA Mexico City Station reported this information to Headquarters:

First, that Silvia Duran had sexual intercourse
with Lee Harvey Oswald on several occasions when the latter was in Mexico is probably new, but adds little to the Oswald case. Second, the Mexican police did not report the extent of the Duran-Oswald relationship to this Station. 749/

In the chronology of the Mexico City investigation of Oswald, Raymond Rocca notes: "Why didn't Mexico police give us all info?" 750/ This was not the first report of such a relationship between Oswald and Duran. Elena Garro had reported the same information to Charles Thomas in 1965. 751/

That the Mexican government did not disclose all the information in its possession to American authorities raises one of three possibilities:

1) the Mexican government did not want to disclose that one of its citizens had had intimate relations with the assassin of John Kennedy; or

2) Silvia Duran was a Mexican penetration agent in the Cuban Consulate and the Mexican government was protecting its informant by minimizing her relationship with Oswald; or

3) they forgot, i.e., a pure and simple mistake.
b. The possibility that Silvia Duran was an agent for either American, Mexican or Cuban Intelligence

Since the publication of the Warren Commission Report in September 1964, critics have written about the possibility that Silvia Duran was an intelligence agent for either the Americans, Mexicans or Cubans.

1) Was Silvia Duran an agent, asset or source for Mexican or American intelligence?

In an effort to resolve this question, the House Select Committee on Assassinations reviewed the United States investigative agencies' files on Silvia Duran. The Committee found no evidence in this file review that Silvia Duran was either an American or Mexican intelligence agent.

In addition, the Committee has interviewed most of the Mexico City Station employees about the possibility. Only David Phillips, Chief of Covert Action and the Cuban Section in the Mexico City Station in 1963, a position which made him very knowledgeable, considered that Duran was possibly an agent or source. Mr. Phillips stated that...
"at one time the agency pitched almost everyone at the Cuban Embassy." Mr. Phillips stated that he had first heard Duran's name from the telephone intercept transcripts. But Mr. Phillips asserted that the CIA had no interest in Ms. Duran because "she wasn't friendly with anyone." Mr. Phillips had previously mentioned the CIA Mexico City Station's interest in recruiting a former Cuban Ambassador to Mexico named Lechuga. Mr. Phillips was shown a memorandum written by W. David Slawson of the Warren Commission staff regarding a trip to Mexico by Warren Commission staff members which said:

Mr. Scott's (Chief of the CIA Station in Mexico City) narrative disclosed that the CIA's action immediately after the assassination consisted basically of alerting all its confidential sources of information throughout Mexico to immediately channel all information into their headquarters, and of compiling as complete dossiers as possible on Oswald and everyone else throughout Mexico who at that time the CIA knew had had some contact with Oswald... This meant especially Silvia Duran, who because she had previously been having an affair with Lechuga, the Former Cuban Ambassador to Mexico and presently the Cuban representative at the United Nations, had previously been of substantial interest to the CIA...

Mr. Phillips was surprised by this and stated that "No one let me in on this operation." But
Mr. Phillips added that he doubted that Duran would have been pitched because the Station could not identify any of her weaknesses. The Committee staff members then told Mr. Phillips about the reporting on file concerning Ms. Duran from one of the Station’s penetration agents, at the Cuban Embassy. At one point had reported to his case officer that all that would have to be done to recruit Ms. Duran was to get a blonde, blue-eyed American in bed with her. With this, Mr. Phillips said that it did indeed sound as if the Station had targeted Ms. Duran for recruitment, that the Station's interest had been substantial, and that the weaknesses and means had been identified. Mr. Phillips pointed out, however, that because Duran had been targeted did not necessarily mean that she had been pitched. In addition, he stated that he had never heard that Duran had been pitched.

Mr. Phillips did state that he would expect that Ms. Duran's file at the CIA would be "very thick" because of all the telephone intercepts that concerned her and the substantial interest that the Station had in her. He stated that much of the material in her file should predate the assassination.
he would be very surprised if Ms. Duran's 201 file was small and contained only a few pre-assassination documents. 767/ This is in fact the case of the Headquarters 201 file. 768/ This Committee has asked the CIA to make Ms. Duran's Mexican "P" 769/ (personality) file available for review. The CIA informed the Committee that there was no "P" file available on Ms. Duran. 770/

Another CIA employee, who worked on an "Oswald Task Force" in late September or early October of 1975 dealing with Freedom of Information Act law suits brought against the Agency concerning the files on Lee Harvey Oswald, stated that he believed that Ms. Duran may have been a source of information for either the CIA or the Mexicans. 771/ Mr. could not recall why he specifically had this recollection, but thought that it was due to something he had seen in Oswald's file. 772/ He said that it may have been the Agency's attempts to protect Ms. Duran after the assassination and the heavy cable traffic that those attempts generated that led him to his inference that she was a source of information for either the Agency or the Mexicans. 773/

Despite LIRING/3's case officer's asking LIRING/3 not to recontact Ms. Duran, Mr. Phillips' statements, and
At the time when this contact told me, of Silvia Duran I tied the two together, yes, sir. I don't know, how at that time it was obvious to me as an intelligence agent that there was some connection there, but it was of no interest whatsoever to me. I do remember that when I next saw this contact of mine I mentioned the fact to him and let him proceed to do whatever he needed to do.
When Lee Harvey Oswald allegedly visited the Cuban Consulate, Eusebio Azcue Lopez, a Cuban citizen, was the Cuban Consul. 779/ Because he had diplomatic immunity, the Cuban government had never been asked to make him available for questioning. 780/ The Committee, in an effort to investigate Oswald's contacts with representatives of the Cuban government, asked the Cuban government to make Eusebio Azcue available for Committee and staff interviews. 781/ The Cuban government complied with the Committee's request on April 1, 1978. 782/ During that interview, Mr. Azcue alleged that the man Jack Ruby shot in the Dallas Police Station was not the same individual who had visited the Cuban Consulate in 1963. 783/ In addition, Mr. Azcue stated that Alfredo
Mirabal, who in September 1963, had recently arrived from Cuba to assume the Consul's duties, had also been present during Oswald's visit. During a second trip to Cuba, the Committee interviewed Alfredo Mirabal. Subsequent to this second trip to Havana, the Committee asked the Cuban government to make Eusebio Azcue and Alfredo Mirabal available for the public hearings on September 18, 1978. The Cuban government complied with the Committee's request.

Eusebio Azcue Lopez told the House Select Committee on Assassinations at a public hearing on 9/18/78 the following:

An individual who gave the name Lee Harvey Oswald visited the Cuban Consulate on three occasions in late September and early October 1963. The individual first visited the Cuban Consulate during working hours, requesting an intransit visa to Cuba with Russia as the final destination. The man showed the secretary, Silvia Duran, some documents which he believed would be sufficient to obtain a visa. When the secretary would not grant him a visa, the man asked Azcue to see whether upon examination of the documents he could...
grant him a visa. 789c/ Azcue answered negatively. 789d/
The individual then left to obtain photographs needed for his application. 789e/

The man probably returned on September 27, 1963 789f/ with the photographs and completed the applications in Ms. Duran's presence. 789g/ As the amount of time required to process this document could have taken as long as twenty days or the response could have been negative, Azcue told the man that he could grant him an intransit visa to Cuba, without consulting his government, if he had a Russian visa. 789h/ The individual then left to attempt to obtain his Russian visa. 789i/

After the man left the Cuban Consulate, Azcue received a telephone call 789j/ from the Soviet Consulte. 790/ The Soviet Consul explained that the man's documents were legitimate, but that the Soviet Consulate could not issue a visa until it received authorization from Moscow. 791/

Emphasizing that the Cuban Consulate never received visitors after working hours 792/ Mr. Azcue opined that the individual probably returned to the Consulate on September 28, 1963. 793/ When Azcue explained to Oswald that he could not grant him a visa, the man made statements directed against Cuba and called Cuba a
bureaucracy. At that point, Azcue became upset and asked the individual to leave the Consulate. Oswald did not revisit the Consulate.

Mr. Azcue described the man who visited the Consulate as follows: a white male, between 5'6" and 5'7", over 30 years of age, very thin, long face, with straight eyebrows and a cold look in his eyes. Azcue alleged that he would never have identified Lee Harvey Oswald as the man who visited the Cuban Consulate in 1963.

2. Alfredo Mirabal Diaz

Alfredo Mirabal Diaz told the House Select Committee on Assassinations, at a public hearing on 9/18/78, the following:

Lee Harvey Oswald, seeking a visa, visited the Cuban Consulate twice in September 1963. Since Mirabal could not speak English though he was the new Consul, ex-Consul Azcue handled the matter. On both occasions there were such loud arguments between Oswald and Azcue that Mirabal thought that the man's visit to the Consulate was a case of provocation.

Though Mirabal caught only glimpses of the man he opined that the person whose picture appears on Lee
Harvey Oswald's visa application was the same Lee Harvey Oswald who visited the Consulate. 802/ Mirabel was about 4 meters away from Oswald each time he caught glimpses of him. 802a/ Oswald was at the Consulate between 15 and 20 minutes on each visit. 802b/

C. Elena Garro de Paz

On October 5, 1964, eleven days after the publication of the Warren Commission Report, Elena Garro de Paz' story alleging Lee Harvey Oswald's presence at a party in Mexico City attended by Cuban government personnel came to the attention of the Central Intelligence Agency. 803/

1. Elena's story as reported October 5, 1964

Elena Garro de Paz 804/ and Deba Garro de Guerrero Galvan, first cousins of Horatio, Ruben and Lydia Duran, were invited to a twist party at the home of Ruben Duran in the middle of the week in the fall of 1963. 805/ Lee Harvey Oswald was alleged to have been at this party in the company of "two other beatnik-looking boys." 806/ The Americans remained together the entire evening and did not dance. 807/ When Elena tried to speak with the Americans, she was "shifted" to another room by one of her cousins. 808/ The memo does not state whether Elena had mentioned which cousin had not allowed her to speak.
to the Americans. One of Elena's cousins told her at the time that (he or she) did not know who the Americans were except that Silvia Duran (an employee of the Cuban Embassy and the wife of Horatio Duran), had brought them to the party. 809/

The day after the party, Elena and Deba saw the three Americans on the Insurgentes, a main avenue in Mexico City. 810/ The Garros claimed that they had recognized Oswald's photograph when it was published after the assassination. 811/ Silvia Duran's arrest "underlined the Garros' certainty" that the man had been Lee Harvey Oswald. 812/

The source of the memo was a witting 813/ Central Intelligence Agency asset known by the cryptonym LICOOKIE/1 whom the Committee identified as June Cobb Sharp while reviewing the LICOOKIE file. According to Elena, Ms. Cobb was sent to her house shortly after the assassination for a few days, by a mutual friend, a Costa Rican writer named Eunice Odio. 814/ Ms. Garro asserted that while at her house, Ms. Cobb expressed interest in the Kennedy assassination. 815/ One night, Elena's sister Deba, who was visiting, got drunk and told the whole story. 816/

Claiming to be a CIA agent, Cobb suggested that Elena and
Deba go to Texas to tell their story. 817/ Elena stated that when Cobb's suggestion was rejected, Cobb stated that she would arrange a meeting with the CIA Station Chief. 818/ The meeting did not occur because Ms. Cobb was asked to leave the Garro house evidently because she kicked Elena's cat. 819/ A notation on the memo says that LICOOKIE/1 never regained contact with Elena Garro de Paz. 820/

The LICOOKIE memo was not inserted in either the Elena Garro or Lee Harvey Oswald "P" 821/ (personality) file but in a local leftist and Cuban project file. The Committee learned about the memo from Wx-7241, a chronological history of the Oswald case prepared by Raymond Rocca for the CIA in 1967. The memo was found in December, 1965 by Stanley Watson. A marginal notation on Wx7241 says, "Why was this not sent to Headquarters?" 823/

The Committee has been able to determine that the memo was forwarded to Headquarters shortly thereafter.

2. October 12, 1964 CIA Memo for the Record

On October 12, 1964 the CIA Mexico City Station's Chief of Covert Action, Jim Flannery, wrote a memo for the record reporting that Elena Garro de Paz had told...
her story to Eunice Odio. 824/

The Committee has not been able to determine if Elena Garro told Ms. Odio the story personally or if Ms. Cobb related the story to Ms. Odio who relayed it to "Tichborn." 825/

The story is not as detailed as the 10/5/64 version. There is no mention of Deba Garro Guerrero Galvan. The story, perhaps because it is third hand, differs from the previous story in two areas: It states that the party was at the Cuban Embassy, as opposed to Ruben Duran's; and that Elena talked to a Cuban Embassy official instead of her cousins about the three Americans.

Attached to the memo was a note from Flannery to the Chief of Station, Winston Scott, which read, "Do you want me to send the gist of this to Headquarters?" Scott then noted that the memo should be filed. 826/ The file indications show that the memo went into the Oswald "P" file and the Elena Garro "P" file. 827/


On November 24, 1964 a Central Intelligence Agency agent 828/ reported information 829/ derived from an asset. "LICHANT/7." 830/ The agent asserted that June Cobb was...
an "American Communist" who rented a room from Elena Garro. 831/ In addition, the informant claimed that Elena had also told her story to an American official at the Embassy, who claimed to represent the Warren Commission. 832/ The Chief of Station noted that he had asked LICHANT/1 to pursue the story 833/ but there is no indication that the Chief of Station followed through with the request. 834/

4. November 24, 1964 Elena Garro meeting with Mexico City Legal Attache officers

Elena and her daughter reported their story to the Mexico City Legal Attache on November 24, 1964. 835/ (The Legal Attache in 1964 was Clark Anderson.) They recounted the same story previously given to June Cobb Sharp in October 1964. 836/ Elena gave the date of the party as September 30, October 1 or October 2, 1963. 837/ The agent who wrote the report 838/ noted that Lee Harvey Oswald could not have been identical with the American allegedly observed by Mrs. Paz at the party if this party were held on the evening of October 1 or October 2, 1963. 840/

Elena was questioned regarding the identity of other persons attending the party at the Ruben Duran home.
who might have been in a position to observe the three Americans. Elena stated that in the course of the party her daughter met a young man named "Alejandro" at the party and danced with him. He was apparently quite smitten with the daughter and tried to call her on several occasions after the party. The daughter did not take the calls and as a result "Alejandro" wrote several letters to the daughter. Ms. Garro exhibited two of the letters, as well as a business card which identified the young man as Ario Alejandro Lavagnini Stenius.

The letter which Ms. Garro said was the first written by the young man to her daughter bore the date September 1, 1963 and the Mexico City Post Office postmark dated September 2, 1963. When this was pointed out to Ms. Garro she commented that the Communists probably had facilities for falsifying postmarks.

To investigate Ms. Garro's story further, representatives from the Legal Attache's office interviewed Ario Alejandro Lavagnini Stenius on November 27, 1964. Lavagnini recalled that there were approximately thirty people at Ruben Duran's party, few of whom he knew. He recalled having met a Mexican girl who had recently...
returned from living in France. He was unable to fix the date of the party but felt it was probably early in September because of a heavy rain which occurred as they were leaving the party about 2:00 a.m.

Lavagnini said that no Americans were present at this party. He was familiar with the physical description of Lee Harvey Oswald because of publicity following the assassination of President Kennedy, but otherwise had no knowledge of him and had never seen him except for news photographs following the assassination.

Lavagnini was the only person interviewed by the Legal Attaché representatives who attended parties at the Duran house in the September-October time frame.

There is no indication in the FBI document that this information was given to the Central Intelligence Agency's Mexico City Station.

5. Charles Thomas' first meeting with Elena Garro where Lee Harvey Oswald is discussed.

On 12/10/65, Charles Thomas, a political officer at the American Embassy, wrote a memorandum about a conversation with Elena Garro de Paz. The meeting with Elena had been about other matters, but the memorandum...
Elena's story reported here is the same as that given in the LICOOKIE memo dated 10/5/64, but with more details. She said that General Jose Jesus Clark Flores (a friend of Ruben Duran's), Silvia Duran, Eusebio Azcue, Emilio Carballido (a pro-Communist writer-friend of the Durans), and a Latin American Negro man with red hair (unidentified) were at the party. A marginal comment by this entry in Wx-7241 says, "How did Elena know about a red-haired Negro?" Elena also told Thomas that she had later learned that "Silvia Duran had been Oswald's mistress while he was there." A note by this entry in Wx-7241 says, "How did Elena Garro know about Silvia being the mistress of Oswald? This is 1965." The Mexico City Station did not hear about the Oswald-Duran "affair" until July 1967 when a CIA asset, LIRING/3, reported it. 

Elena told Thomas that she and her daughter had gone to the Cuban Embassy on November 23, 1963 and shouted "Assassins" and other insults at the Embassy employees. According to Elena, that same day, a friend, Manuel Calvillo, whom the Garros thought to be a Soviet in the...
Gobernacion took her and her daughter to a small hotel in the center of Mexico City. Calvillo kept Elena Garro and her daughter there for eight days under the pretext that they were in danger of being harmed physically by Communists. Elena claimed she told Calvillo her story and that she wanted to tell it to the American authorities at the U.S. Embassy but that Calvillo dissuaded her by telling her that the American Embassy was full of Communist spies. Elena said that some of the other people who had been at the party were taken to Veracruz where they were "protected" by Governor Lopez Arias. She said that Ruben Duran, reportedly "protected" by General Clark Flores, was very prosperous and was driving a big car. Elena also claimed that Ruben Duran told her months after the assassination that he was not really a Communist and that killing Kennedy had been a mistake. Ruben Duran claimed he had no reason to tell Elena that killing Kennedy had been a mistake since he had no involvement.

Charles Thomas circulated a copy of his memorandum concerning Elena's allegations in the American Embassy including the Central Intelligence Agency's Mexico City Station to aid them in their investigation of the John F. Kennedy assassination.
F. Kennedy assassination. The COS wrote a note on the memo: "What an imagination she has!! Should we send to Headquarters?" The Officer replied, on the memo, "Suggest sending. There have been stories around town about all this, and Thomas is not the only person she has talked to...If memory serves me, didn't LICOOKIE refer to Oswald and the local leftists and Cubans in one of her squibs?"

The Mexico City Station cabled the information in Thomas' 12/10/65 memorandum of conversation to CIA Headquarters. The cable reported that Elena's story would be checked with LICHANT/1, against the production from the Cuban surveillance operation "and other sources." Winston Scott wrote, next to the routing indications on the cable, "Please ask Charles Thomas if he'll 'follow up.' Get questions from Ann G. Please let's discuss. Thanks."  

After the December 10 memorandum of conversation, Winston Scott and Nathan Ferris called Charles Thomas for a meeting. They asked him to get a more detailed account of Ms. Garro's story. At this meeting, Winston Scott made it clear that the FBI had full responsibility for any further investigation in the case.
6. Charles Thomas' Meeting with Elena Garro on December 25, 1965

Thomas met with Elena again on December 25, 1965. On that date, he wrote a memorandum of conversation which provided a much more detailed restatement of Ms. Garro's alleged encounter with Lee Harvey Oswald. 885/

Elena admitted that she had spoken to two men at the Embassy, "presumably from the Legal Attache's Office." 886/ Elena said that she did not tell them the complete story because "the Embassy officers did not give much credence to anything she and Elenita said." 887/

She stated that the party had been at Ruben Duran's home. 888/ She was unclear about the date of the party. 889/ She thought it had been a few days before the Soviet Astronaut, Gagarin, visited Mexico; she thought that this would put the party around September 2 or 3, 1963. 890/ She believed that the party was on a Monday or Tuesday because it was an odd night for a party. 891/ Elena could not check her calendar to refresh her memory at the time of this interview because the calendar was in a desk that had been stored away. 892/
During the conversation, Elena described Oswald and his companions. The man who she thought was Oswald wore a black sweater. She said he was quiet "and stared a lot at the floor." One of his companions "was very tall and slender and had long blond hair and a rather long protruding chin." The other companion was also tall, with short, light brown hair and no distinguishing characteristics. The three Americans did not dance or mix with the other guests. Elena saw the same three men on the street the next day.

Elena was certain that Eusebio Azcue, Horacio Duran, Silvia Duran, Lydia Duran, Deba Guerrero, General Clark Flores and his mistress, a doctor from Dalinde Hospital, a young American couple who were honeymooning in Mexico, and several other people were at the party. She said that Ricardo Guerra, whom she claimed converted Horatio Duran to Communism, and his wife, Rosario Castellanos, were supposed to be at the party but did not attend.

Elena alleged that the red-haired man and Emilio Carballido were not at the party that Oswald attended but at another party where Carballido and Azcue got into...
a heated argument about President Kennedy. They came to the conclusion that the only solution was to kill him. Elena was not clear on whether this party was before or after the party where she met Oswald. Eusebio Azcue stated that this conversation never occurred.

Elena reiterated that the incident at the Cuban Embassy, where she and her daughter shouted "assassins," etc., at the Embassy employees, occurred on November 23 at or about 3:00 p.m. Elena and Elenita were driven to the Cuban Embassy by Elena's brother who was embarrassed by their behavior. This occurred before they had seen photographs of Oswald.

Ms. Garro claimed that later in the day she and Elenita were visited by Manuel Calvillo who told them that they were in serious danger from the Communists and that he would take them to a small hotel, where they would be safe for a few days. Elena said she trusted and believed Calvillo because he was a known undercover agent for the Mexico Government. He was also a friend of Noe Palomares and of President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz. Calvillo also told Elena and her daughter that Silvia Duran had been arrested.
Duran's arrest was not public information at that time. Elena could not remember the name of the hotel so that same day (12/25/65) she took Thomas to the section of Mexico City where she thought it was. They found the hotel, the Hotel Vermont. Elena said that she assumed that Calvillo had registered them as relatives or friends from San Luis Potosi. They stayed at the hotel until the following Friday, November 30, 1963, hardly leaving their rooms.

Elena claimed that while she and Elenita were at the hotel they saw the photos of Oswald and realized that he had been the man at Ruben Duran's party. When Calvillo visited them at the hotel, Elena told him that she wanted to report her story, which she related to Calvillo, to the American Embassy. Calvillo, however, dissuaded her by saying that the American Embassy was full of Communists. Elena stated that when she returned home, guards were posted outside her house.

Elena alleged that after she returned home she saw her sister, Deba Guerrero, who had independently come to the conclusion that Lee Harvey Oswald had been at Ruben Duran's party. Deba was "terrified" because approximately two months after the assassination
two "Communists" personally warned her never to reveal that she had been to a party with Oswald. 924/ Deba, consequently, would not accompany Elena to the American Embassy to tell her story on November 24, 1964. 925/

Elena stated that it was "common knowledge" that Silvia had been Oswald's mistress. 926/ When asked who could verify the allegation, she could only remember one person who had told her this. 927/ Elena claimed that person was Victor Rico Galan, 928/ a "pro-Castro journalist." 929/ (See Section VI, A, 2, a, above.)

Subsequent to December 25, 1965, Elena found her calendar and reconstructed the date of the party as late September and not early September. 930/ When Thomas went to Ferris' office and informed him, Ferris replied that Elena had given the late September date when she had originally reported her story at the American Embassy. 931/ However, Mr. Ferris explained to Thomas that someone who had been at the twist party had stated that there were no Americans there. 932/ Mr. Ferris did not tell Mr. Thomas that Ario Alejandro Lavagnini Stenius had provided this information in 1964. 933/ Mr. Ferris suggested that it was not necessary for Thomas to pursue Elena's allegations since he considered the
Oswald case closed and had heard all the rumors before. 934/

Thomas forwarded (the same day) a copy of his memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency's Mexico City Station to aid in its investigation of the John F. Kennedy assassination. 935/ On the first page of the memorandum of conversation, Winston Scott wrote, "Shouldn't we send to Headquarters?" Someone responded, "Of course." 936/

The Mexico City Station sent a cable to Headquarters on December 12, 1965, reporting that it was "following up" and would cable the results. 937/

7. December 27, 1965 Legal Attache Memo to the United States Ambassador re Elena Garro

On December 27, 1965 Nathan Ferris wrote a memo to the Ambassador reporting that Elena and her daughter were interviewed on 17 and 24 November 1964 by the Legal Attache's office in Mexico City. 938/ The memo recorded that Elena and her daughter had furnished information similar to the information reported in Thomas' 12/10/65 memo. 939/ The memo further stated.

"Inquiries conducted at that time (November 1964), however, failed to substantiate the
allegations made by Mrs. Garro de Paz and her daughter. In view of the fact that Mrs. Garro de Paz' allegations have been previously checked out without substantiation, no further action is being taken concerning her recent repetition of those allegations.

The Legal Attache forwarded a copy of the memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency's Mexico City Station prior to 12/29/65.

A cable written by Anne Goodpasture on December 29, 1965 reporting the Legat interview with Elena and the Legat Office's failure to substantiate Elena's story was sent to Headquarters. The cable promised to keep Headquarters advised if any further information was to be developed.

LICookie's 10/5/64 memo is attached to the 12/29/65 cable. Wx-7241 explained this in a marginal comment, "This document by LICookie was not in (Oswald's file), but was copied from (a project file) and attached to MEXI 5741, 29 Dec. 65."

A note stapled to this cable by Allen White stated, "I don't know what FBI did in November 1964, but the Garros have been talking about this for a long time and she is said to be extremely bright." Anne Goodpasture wrote that the FBI had found Elena's allegations...
unsubstantiated but that "we will try to confirm or refute Ms. Garro de Paz' information and follow up." 948/ Win Scott wrote, "She is also 'nuts.'" 949/

8. CIA Investigation of Elena's allegation that she created a disturbance at the Cuban Embassy on November 23, 1963

On February 3, 1966, Anne Goodpasture forwarded Thomas' December 25, 1965 memo to the Cuban section at the Mexico City Station with an attached note asking the Section to check whether Elena was "seen creating such a disturbance as they claimed in front of the Cuban Embassy." 950/

One Cuban section officer responded, "No bells ring with me." Another one wrote, "Me neither." The third officer wrote, "No pictures either." 951/ There is no indication, after reviewing CIA files, that the penetration agents in the Cuban Embassy were queried about Elena's allegation: 952/ That there are no pictures is reasonable since Elena claimed that the event happened: 1) on a Saturday at 3:00 p.m. when the Cuban Embassy was not normally photographically surveilled; 953/ and 2) the "disturbance" occurred inside the Cuban compound. 954/
Cuban Embassy photographic surveillance showed no surveillance on 11/23/63. The Committee found that Central Intelligence Agency made no other effort to corroborate Ms. Garro's allegations.

9. Legal Attache 2/23/66 Memo to the United States Ambassador Regarding Elena Garro's Allegations

On 2/23/66 the Legal Attache wrote a memo to the Ambassador reporting that "extensive investigation" failed to disclose that Oswald had traveled to Mexico prior to September 26, 1963 and that no information had developed that would show that he had not been in New Orleans in the early part of that month. The memo reiterated that no further action was being taken by the FBI because Elena's allegations had not been substantiated by it. The Legal Attache forwarded a copy of this memo to the Central Intelligence Agency's Mexico City Station. A marginal comment made by Raymond Zocca next to this entry in Wx-7241 says, "How can it be ascertained that Oswald did not travel to Mexico prior to early September 1963? There must be some basis for Elena's reporting."
10. Legal Attache Memo to Winston Scott re Elena's Allegation that She Had Stayed at the Hotel Vermont from the Day After the Assassination Until November 30, 1963

On 10/13/66, the Legal Attache wrote a memo to Win Scott reporting that a reliable confidential informant had reported that the records of the Hotel Vermont disclosed that one "Elena Paz, housewife from San Luis Potosi," had registered at the Hotel Vermont on November 23, 1963. She left on November 30, 1963. The memo said, "The above individual may or may not be identical with Elena Garro de Paz." The House Select Committee on Assassinations has been unable to determine why the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigations waited until 1966 to investigate this aspect of Elena's story.

Charles Thomas' 12/25/65 memo stating "She and her daughter did not personally register at the hotel. She thinks Calvillo registered them as relatives or friends of his from San Luis Potosi," corroborates Elena Garro's presence at the Hotel Vermont.
entry for the 10/13/66 Legat memo in Wx-7241 bore the notation, "This is what Elena claimed and no one would believe her." 963/


No further report on Elena's story was generated until 1969 when Charles Thomas was "selected out" of the United States Foreign Service. 964/ At that time, he wrote a memorandum to the Secretary of State which included a cover letter stating, "Since I was the Embassy Officer in Mexico who acquired this intelligence information, I feel a responsibility for seeing it through to its final evaluation." 965/

Charles Thomas' memorandum stated that "he got no reaction from Nathan Ferris and Winston Scott" regarding his memorandum of December 25, 1965. 966/ In addition, Thomas wrote that the only person to speak to him about the December 25, 1965 memorandum, Clarence Boonstra 967/ told him that Oswald had not been in Mexico on the date given for the party. 968/ Thomas noted that even when he reiterated that Elena had not changed her
story but rather that she had now given a more detailed account, Boonstra stated that the date was wrong and dismissed the entire affair. 969/

--One of the Mexico-City Legat Officers, Nathan Ferris, in reply to Thomas' letter and memorandum, asserted that Thomas' office had been advised by memoranda dated December 27, 1965 and February 23, 1966 that since Elena Garro's allegations had previously been investigated without substantiation, no further action was being taken concerning her recent repetition of those allegations. 970/

In its report, the Legat's Office concluded that either the Counselor for Political Affairs did not route the memoranda to Charles Thomas or that Thomas did not recall receiving them. 971/

Thomas wrote that when he went to Nathan Ferris' office to inform him that Elena had found her calendar and had reconstructed the date of the party as late September, Ferris replied that Elena had given the late September date when she had originally reported her story at the American Embassy. 972/ Thomas noted that Ferris explained that someone who had been at the party had stated that there had not been any Americans in attendance. 973/ Thomas wrote that he had assumed that Elena could have
clearly been mistaken about the identity of the American she saw there, but never doubted that she had seen some Americans. 974/ Thomas wrote that Ferris had suggested that it was not necessary for Thomas to pursue the matter since he considered the Oswald case closed and had heard all the rumors before. 975/

The Legal Attache's reply to Thomas' memo stated that Mr. Ferris had not told Thomas that someone who was at the party had stated that there had not been any Americans present. 976/ The Legal Attache's memo asserted that Thomas had been told that it would not be necessary for him to pursue the matter any further since Elena's story had been investigated previously without being substantiated. 977/ In addition, the memo stated that Thomas had been told that Elena's story was considered a closed issue, not that the Oswald case was closed. 976/

12. House Select Committee on Assassination's Investigation of Elena Garro's Allegations

The House Select Committee on Assassinations investigated Elena Garro's story both through file reviews and personal interviews. The Committee requested and
reviewed the CIA's, FBI's and State Department's files on Elena Garro de Paz, Elenita Garro de Paz, Manuel Calvillo, Noe W. Palomares, June Cobb Sharp, Victor Rico Galan, Eunice Odio, Sylvia Duran, Lydia Duran, Ruben Duran, Betty Serratos, Horatio Duran, Eusebio Azcue, and Emilio Carbballido. Only the Elena Garro de Paz file contained information on her allegations. Though all the names listed above played a role in Elena Garro de Paz's story, not one of their files included a reference to Elena Garro de Paz.

Furthermore, the House Select Committee on Assassinations requested and reviewed the Central Intelligence Agency's LICOOKIE/1, LICHANT/1, LIRING/3, and TICHBORN files. Once again, not one of the files included a mention of Elena Garro's allegations. The House Select Committee on Assassinations learned that LICOOKIE/1, who first reported to the CIA Elena's allegation, was June Cobb Sharp. 979/ [ none ]

Manuel Calvillo who had hidden Elena Garro and her daughter in a hotel the day following the assassination. 980/

He also told Elena that Silvia Duran had been arrested before this fact had become public knowledge. 981/

Since a file review was inconclusive, the Committee arranged interviews in Mexico with Ruben Duran, Horatio
Duran, Elena and Elenita Garro, Silvia Duran, Lynn Duran, Emilio Carbillido and Betty Serratos. The Mexican Government informed the House Select Committee on Assassinations that Elena and Elenita Garro disappeared in 1968 during the student uprisings and have never returned to Mexico. The officials stated that Elena and her daughter might be in Spain. The Mexican government reported that Emilio Carballido could not be found. The others were interviewed between June 1 and June 6, 1978. Betty Serratos, Lydia Duran, Ruben Duran and Horatio Duran all stated that Elena was not the dancing type and therefore did not attend any of the twist parties at the Duran homes. When Silvia Duran was asked if Elena or Elenita Garro ever attended twist parties at the Duran homes, she recalled Elena attending one twist party at Ruben's home in 1963 after the Garros returned to Mexico from France. All the Durans denied that Lee Harvey Oswald had attended any party at one of their homes. The Committee next asked the Central Intelligence Agency to arrange interviews with June Cobb, who may have had information related to Lee Harvey Oswald's trip to Mexico City.
Central Intelligence Agency declined to aid the Committee in this aspect of the investigation. 991/

The Committee returned to Mexico City on August 7, 1978 and attempted to locate June Cobb Sharp and Manuel Calvillo on its own. 992/

The Mexican government told the Committee that June Cobb Sharp received a tourist permit, number 72781, on June 27, 1947 when she entered Mexico through Nuevo Laredo. She asked, but was denied, permission to represent the magazine, Modern Mexico. On June 21, 1948, she received a courtesy permit, number 25556. Furthermore, the Mexican government explained that she disappeared in 1954 and never returned to Mexico. 993/

The Committee believes that this information is incorrect. According to Ms. Cobb's CIA file, she worked for the agency as an asset in Mexico from 1961 through 1966. 994/ Elena also stated that Ms. Cobb resided at her home in 1964. 995/

The Mexican government told the Committee that Manuel Calvillo did not live at Cuahhtemoc 877-5 as the Committee had informed it. The Mexican Government's agent-in-charge had spoken to the superintendent at the apartments at which Manuel Calvillo was believed to reside.
and was informed by the superintendent who had worked at the apartments for twenty-five years, said that no Manuel Calvillo had ever resided there. When Committee staffers gave the Mexican government Calvillo's pen name, the Mexicans gave the same answers. 996/

The Committee believes that there is a possibility that Mr. Calvillo lived at this address since it acquired the address from a recent CIA document. 997/

The Committee believes that there is a possibility that a U.S. Government agency requested the Mexican government to refrain from aiding the Committee with this aspect of its work. 998/ (See Procedural Write-up Trip 2 Mexico City and Section VII, C, below.)

The Committee made every attempt possible to locate Elena. On July 7, 1978 the Committee telephoned her publisher, Mortiz, in Mexico City and inquired about Elena's whereabouts. 999/ The publisher stated that Ms. Garro was living in the Hotel S.A.C.E. in Madrid, Spain. 1000/

The Committee telephoned the Hotel S.A.C.E. in Spain and spoke to the manager who told him that Ms. Garro had moved. 1001/ On July 14, 1978 the Committee called her publisher again and was told to contact the Mexican Embassy
in Madrid, Spain. The publisher stated that all Elena's payments were sent there because she did not even trust her publisher with her address.

The Committee called the Mexican Embassy in Madrid, Spain and spoke to Adolfo Padilla, a Mexican employee of the Embassy who stated that when Elena had visited the Embassy a couple of weeks before to pick up a check she seemed financially destitute. He stated that when he asked Elena her new address she declined to give one, stating that she would return every few weeks to pick up checks and mail. The Committee gave Padilla a telephone number and a message asking Elena to telephone the Committee collect.

On September 5, 1978 Elena Garro called the Committee. When it was explained that the Committee wished to talk to her in person and would pay both her daughter's and her travel from Spain to the United States, Ms. Garro asked why she should believe the Committee was what it claimed to be. The Committee asked Ms. Garro to call back collect in the next few days when it could explain to her when and where she could receive a Committee letter explaining why the Committee wished to interview her. The Committee wrote the letter and made arrange-
ments with the State Department for a letter to be hand-delivered to Elena at the American Embassy in Spain. On September 7, 1978, Elena Garro called the Committee and asked when the letter would arrive. The Committee explained that she could pick up the letter on Monday, September 11, 1978 from George Phelan, the Counsellor for Consular Affairs at the American Embassy. Ms. Garro stated that she would get the letter on September 11, 1978 and follow our suggestions. Ms. Garro never went to the American Embassy in Spain to pick up the Committee's letter. The Committee, hoping she would pick up the letter before her flight date, proceeded to purchase air tickets for both Elena and her daughter. Elena did not pick up the tickets at the airport. The Committee has not been able to regain contact with Ms. de Paz again.

The Committee also investigated whether Charles Thomas' "selection out" was related to the Oswald case. After interviewing his widow, Ms. Cynthia Thomas, the Committee has concluded that his dismissal was unrelated.

In sum, the House Select Committee on Assassinations has not been able to confirm the evidence that would indic...
cate that Lee Harvey Oswald, on one night while he was in Mexico, attended a "twist party" at the home of Ruben Duran Navarro, the brother-in-law of Silvia Duran. In addition, the House Select Committee on Assassinations has been unable to confirm the allegation that Lee Harvey Oswald travelled while in Mexico City with "two beatnik-looking boys." A large part of the Committee's attempts to investigate these issues has met with frustration.

- D. Oscar Contreras Lartigue

On March 16, 1967, B. J. Ruyle, the American Consul in Tampico, reported to the American Embassy that he had spoken to a reporter who allegedly had met Lee Harvey Oswald at the National Autonomous University of Mexico City in 1963. The reporter, stressing that he had only a fleeting contact with Oswald, had claimed to have known only about Lee Harvey Oswald's desire to travel to Cuba and the Embassy's unwillingness to grant him a visa. When B. J. Ruyle asked the reporter for permission to cable the story to the American Embassy, the reporter declined, stating that he feared losing his job. Subsequent to the assassination, the reporter had told his editor about his contact with Lee Harvey Oswald, who...
A letter from B. J. Ruyle to the State Department dated May 11, 1967 provided additional details of the reporter's story. The reporter alleged that he and some fellow students had met Lee Harvey Oswald as they exited the Cineclub at the Escuela de Filosofia (School of Philosophy) at the National Autonomous University of Mexico. Oswald told the group that he had gone to the National Autonomous University of Mexico looking for pro-Castro students who might help him persuade the Cuban Embassy to grant him a visa. Oswald claimed that he was from California and was a member of a pro-Castro group in New Orleans. Oswald remained with the students the rest of that day and evening, as well as the following day. The reporter described Oswald as a strange and introverted individual who spoke very little Spanish.
The State Department forwarded a copy of Ruyle's letter to the Central Intelligence Agency. On June 14, 1967, CIA Headquarters sent the Mexico City Station a copy of Ruyle's letter to Bowers. CIA Headquarters considered Ruyle's report "the first piece of substantive info about Oswald's sojourn in Mexico since the assassination." Consequently, Headquarters cabled that though it understood the source's reluctance to become involved "the fact remains that this info cannot continue to be withheld or concealed." Headquarters instructed the Mexico City Station to elicit the identity of the source from Ruyle. In addition, Headquarters asked the Mexico City Station to bear in mind, while interviewing Ruyle's source, that Lee Harvey Oswald was a homosexual. The final sentence of the dispatch, "It is our hope that the facts obtained through these interviews will help to confirm that several of Garrison's allegations about involvement of anti-Castro Cubans, the CIA, etc. are false," explained the Central Intelligence Agency's motives for pursuing the story.

On June 29, 1967, the Mexico City Station cabled
Headquarters that a station officer had gone to Tampico where he had interviewed Ruyle's source, Oscar Contreras. 1038/
The cable reported that Contreras was a reporter for El Sol 1039/ in Tampico; was circa thirty years old; married, with three children; studied law at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) from 1960 to 1964; belonged to a pro-Castro group at UNAM; was persecuted by the Mexican police for this affiliation and moved to Tampico to escape the persecution 1040/.

Contreras told the Mexico City Station official that he and four other individuals 1041/ had met Oswald as they exited a roundtable discussion held at the School of Philosophy at UNAM. 1042/ Contreras stated that Oswald had made inquiries on the UNAM campus about pro-Cuban groups and had been directed to his group. 1043/ Contreras reported that though the group initially mistrusted Oswald fearing he was a "CIA provocation," they allowed Oswald to remain with them that day and night and part of the following day. 1044/ Contreras noted that Oswald never mentioned assassination but kept emphasizing that he had to get to Cuba. 1045/ In addition, Oswald had exhibited no homosexual tendencies while he was with the
On July 4, 1967, Headquarters cabled the Mexico City Station that Contreras' story should be explored to the fullest even though he might have fabricated it. Headquarters suggested that the FBI handle the story. The following day, July 5, 1967, the Mexico City Station cabled that it preferred turning Contreras' case over to the Mexican authorities and to the F.B.I. The same day, the Chief of Station informed the Legat of Contreras' story, but asked him not to take any action without first consulting the Mexico City Station.

On July 10, 1967, Jeremy K. Benedum ("JKB") wrote a memo delineating the results of a Mexican government review of Oscar Contreras' file. According to a memo, a lone Oscar Contreras appeared in the UNAM law school records, Oscar Contreras Lartigue, born 2/14/39 in Ciudad Victoria, Tamaulipas. The memo also reported that a newspaper article appearing in "Excelsior" listed an Oscar Contreras as a signer of a protest for the Bloque Estudiantil Revolucionario which had been formed mid-1961. The memo speculated that Contreras probably signed the protest as a front man to protect the real leaders of the group.
City Station cabled the information to Headquarters the following day, June 11, 1969. 1056/

The Committee has determined that the Central Intelligence Agency's main interest in Oscar Contreras was "to confirm that several of Garrison's allegations about involvement of anti-Castro Cubans, the CIA, etc. are false." 1057/ After the CIA Mexico City Station official's interview with Contreras 1058/ revealed nothing that could be useful to the agency, it decided to allow the FBI to follow the story through. 1059/

Nonetheless, the Agency's Mexico City Station interviewed the key witness, reviewed pertinent files and records about the witness in the Mexican government's possession, and reported all the information to Headquarters expeditiously.

VII. Analysis of Lee Harvey Oswald's Activities in Mexico City

A. Introduction

After the Warren Commission published its report two very important allegations related to Lee Harvey Oswald's activities in Mexico City came to the attention of the United States investigative agencies. In 1964, Elena...
Garro de Paz reported that she had seen Lee Harvey Oswald, accompanied by two other men, at a party at the home of Ruben Duran Navarro, the brother-in-law of Silvia Duran. 1060/ In 1967, Oscar Contreras Lartigue reported that he met Lee Harvey Oswald on the campus of the National Autonomous University of Mexico. 1061/

In addition, the testimony of the Warren Commission's primary witness related to Mexico City, Silvia Tirado Duran, has been called into question by the critics throughout the years. 1062/ Some of the information that is inconsistent with Ms. Duran's original story—that Oswald visited the Consulate on two occasions which were the only times she saw him—was available at the time of the Warren Commission's inquiry although it was ignored. 1063/ Some of the information has developed after the publication of the Warren Report. 1064/

The Garro and Contreras allegations, in conjunction with the inconsistencies of Ms. Duran's story raise three major questions: (1) did Lee Harvey Oswald or an imposter visit the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City?; (2) other than his visits to the Cuban Consulate, what were Lee Harvey Oswald's activities in Mexico City?; and, (3) was Lee Harvey Oswald travelling alone in Mexico? These
three questions overlap somewhat in detail; e.g., if Oswald was not traveling alone, did one of his companions impersonate him at the Cuban Consulate? Nonetheless, each of the three questions will be dealt with in separate sections below.

In an attempt to answer these questions the House Select Committee on Assassinations has: 1) interviewed Mexican and Cuban citizens who could have knowledge of Oswald's visits to the Cuban Consulate; 2) interviewed Mexican citizens who could have knowledge of Oswald's activities and associations in Mexico City; 3) conducted an extensive review of the files of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation that pertain to Oswald's sojourn in Mexico City.

B. Did Lee Harvey Oswald or an Imposter Contact the Cuban and Soviet Consulates in Mexico City?

Lee Harvey Oswald himself probably visited the Cuban Consulate at least once since his application for a Cuban intransit visa bears his signature. Though the Cuban Consulate allowed visa applicants to take blank
applications out of the Consulate to be returned when completed, 1070/ Silvia Duran stated she was certain that Oswald signed the application in her presence. 1071/ Oswald's signature on the Cuban visa application, however, does not by itself rule out the possibility that someone impersonated Oswald in contacts with the Cuban and Soviet Embassies.

An analysis of the telephone conversations which the CIA's Mexico City Station intercepted by tapping the Soviet Consulate and the Soviet Military Attache's telephone reveals that someone, later identified by the CIA as Oswald, visited the Cuban Consulate at least two times and the Soviet Consulate at least three times. 1072/ On September 27, 1963, at 4:05 p.m. Silvia Duran called the Soviet Consulate. In this conversation she referred to an American seeking an intransit visa to Cuba. 1073/ The substantive information given indicates that she was discussing Oswald. 1074/ At this time the individual using Oswald's name already had been at the Soviet Embassy at least once, since Silvia requested the name of the Soviet Embassy official who dealt with the American. 1075/ Silvia also stated that the American was, at that time, in the Cuban Consulate. 1076/ At 4:26 p.m. a Soviet Consular official
returned Silvia Duran's call. 1077/ This official stated specifically that Oswald had visited the Soviet Consulate. 1078/

On September 28, 1963, at 11:51 a.m. Silvia Duran called the Soviet Consulate. 1079/ She put the American, later identified as Oswald, on the telephone. 1080/ The American, who was at the Cuban Consulate at the time, said that he had just been at the Soviet Consulate. 1081/ The conversation ended with the American stating that he was returning to the Soviet Consulate. 1082/

Analysis of Silvia Duran's and Eusebio Azcues testimony would tend to indicate that Oswald, or someone impersonating him, visited the Cuban Consulate at least one and possibly two additional times on September 27, 1963. Silvia Duran says that Oswald first visited the Cuban Consulate at approximately 11:00 a.m. requesting an intransit visa to Cuba with Russia as the final destination. 1083/ Ms. Duran sent Oswald to obtain photographs that he needed for the visa application. 1084/

Eusebio Azcue recalls that this visit probably occurred on the date on the visa application, 9/27/63. 1085/

Ms. Duran also stated that Oswald returned at approximately 1:00 p.m. with four photographs. 1086/
Azcue also stated that the individual later identified as Oswald returned to the Cuban Consulate about 1:00 p.m. with the photographs probably on "the date that appears on the application, that is to say on the 27th." 1087/ The Committee believes that there is a possibility that the argument between Azcue and the individual occurred during this visit. 1088/

Ms. Duran stated that Oswald's third and last visit occurred in the late afternoon after working hours on the 27th. 1089/ This visit is confirmed by the CIA's tap on the Soviet Consulate. 1090/

In addition to the alleged Oswald visits to the Consulates, there were other telephonic contacts that may have been between Oswald, or an imposter, and the Consulates. 1091/ Several details about Oswald's visits to the Cuban Consulate, and telephonic contacts with both Consulates suggest that the individual involved may not have been Oswald.

Silvia Duran's description of Oswald did not resemble Oswald's true physical appearance. 1092/ This description, which appeared early in the reporting of information obtained from Ms. Duran was deleted from subsequent reports and was not at all mentioned in the Warren
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Report. 1093/ (See Section V, C, for details.) Eusebio Azcue's description of Oswald was similar to Silvia Duran's, but more detailed. 1094/ Perhaps the most remarkable thing about these descriptions is their similarity to Elena Garra de Paz's description of one of Oswald's alleged companions. 1095/

Another possible indication that an imposter may also have visited the Consulate is the 9/28/63 intercepted conversation. 1096/ Silvia Duran adamantly denies that Oswald or any other American visited the Cuban Consulate on Saturday, September 28, 1963. 1097/ In light of the CIA intercept of that date, Ms. Duran has either lied to the Committee or the individual who visited the Consulate on September 28 was not Oswald. 1098/ Ms. Duran, in light of the inconsistencies detailed in Sections V, C and VI, A above, may not be the most credible witness, but there are indications that she was truthful when she stated that Oswald did not visit the Consulate on September 28. The September 28, 1963 conversation was linked to Oswald because of the marginal notations made by the CIA translator on the transcript. 1099/ The translator noted on the transcript that the caller spoke "terrible, hardly recognizable
Russian."

On October 1, 1963, a man called the Soviet Consulate and identified himself as "Lee Oswald." This man also stated that he had been at the Consulate on Saturday, the 28th. The translator noted that this was the same man who had called the Consulate "a day or so ago" and had spoken in broken Russian. From this information, and possibly a voice comparison, the 9/28 caller was identified as Oswald. The problem with assuming that the caller on 9/28 and 10/1 was Oswald is that Oswald spoke fluent Russian. Granted, Ms. Duran's denial of the Saturday visit and the proficiency of the caller's Russian is not sufficient evidence to conclude that the person who visited the Cuban Consulate on Saturday and who called the Soviet Consulate on Saturday and on October 1st was an imposter. Yet the information is sufficient to question the assumption that it was Oswald, especially in light of Azcue's and Duran's descriptions and Elena Garro de Paz's allegation.

The Committee notes the possibility, but does not conclude, that the missing production from the pulse camera and the LILYRIC base has something to do with the possibility that someone impersonated Oswald in Mexico.
Three calls that also occurred early on September 27, 1963 may have been by an imposter. At approximately 10:30 a.m. a man called the Soviet Military Attache looking for a visa to Odessa and was referred to the Soviet Consulate. 1108/ At 10:37 a.m. a man called the Soviet Consulate and asked for a visa to Odessa. 1109/ He was told to call back at 11:00. 1110/ At 1:25 p.m. a man called the Soviet Embassy and was told the Consul would return between 4:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m. that day.

While only the callers' requests for a visa to Russia 1112/ (Odessa) connect these calls to Oswald, the HSCA believes that they do fit logically into a time sequence created by what is known from testimony and the electronic intercepts about his actions on that day. For example, the following is a reasonable possible chronology of Oswald's actions on 9/27/63 based on analysis of the available evidence. Oswald probably arrived in Mexico around 10:00 a.m. on September 27. 1113/ By 10:30 Oswald had time to arrive at the Hotel del Comercio and to place a call to the Soviet Military Attache who referred him to the Consul. 1114/ The military attache also gave the caller directions to the Consulate. 1115/
During the 10:37 a.m. call to the Consulate, the caller learned that he could contact the Soviet Consul at 11:00 a.m. 1116/ This done, Oswald then visited the Cuban Consulate where he arrived around 11:00 a.m., on his way to the Soviet Consulate. This meeting lasted only approximately fifteen minutes. 1118/ Oswald was then sent to obtain photographs and to the Russian Embassy to get the necessary Russian visa. 1119/ Oswald returned to the Cuban Consulate around 1:00 p.m. 1120/ At this point he had his encounter with Azcue and completed his application. Oswald realized at this point that he would have problems obtaining the visas. 1122/ After this visit to the Cuban Consulate, which lasted approximately fifteen minutes 1123/ Oswald tried to contact the Soviet Consul whom Oswald claimed had assured him that he would have no problems obtaining a visa. 1124/ Hence, the 1:25 call. 1125/ During this conversation Oswald learned that the Consul would be in that evening between 4:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m. 1126/ Oswald returned to the Cuban Consulate at 4:00 and Silvia Duran called the Soviet Consul on his behalf. 1127/ Hence, the 4:05 and 4:26 a.m. calls involving Duran. 1128/ But there is a problem with attributing the first three calls on September 27, 1963 to Oswald. The conversa-
tions are all in Spanish. With the exception of the testimony of Delgado, the evidence indicates that Oswald did not speak Spanish. Hence, either the above detailed calls were not made by Oswald or Oswald could speak Spanish.

There is not enough evidence firmly to conclude that some one did impersonate Oswald in Mexico. On the other hand, the evidence is of such a nature that the possibility cannot be dismissed.

C. What were Lee Harvey Oswald's Activities in Mexico City?

When the Warren Commission wrote about Lee Harvey Oswald's activities in Mexico City, it concluded:

The Commission undertook an intensive investigation to determine Oswald's purpose and activities on this journey, with specific reference to reports that Oswald was an agent of the Cuban or Soviet Governments. As a result of its investigation, the Commission believes that it has been able to reconstruct and explain most of Oswald's actions during this time.

By Saturday, September 28, 1963, Lee Harvey Oswald had failed to obtain visas at both the Cuban and Soviet Embassies. From Sunday, September 29, through Wednesday morning, October 2, when he left Mexico City on a bus bound for the United States, Oswald spent considerable time making his travel arrangements, sightseeing and checking again with the Soviet Embassy to
learn whether anything had happened on his visa application. 1131/

Subsequent to the Warren Commission's Report, the allegations of Elena Garro 1132/ and Oscar Contreras Lartigue 1133/ came to the attention of the United States investigative agencies. The main allegation of both these people, that they met Lee Harvey Oswald in Mexico City, remains to this day without direct corroboration. Yet the Committee feels that it cannot dismiss these allegations without giving them any consideration.

The testimony of Silvia Duran and the Cuban Consulate Officials Azcue and Mirabal place Oswald's last contact with the Cuban Embassy on Friday evening, September 27, 1963. 1134/ The transcripts from the CIA's wiretaps on the Soviet Consulate place Oswald's last visits to the Soviet and Cuban Consulates on Saturday morning, September 28, 1963. 1135/ Oswald's last telephonic contact with the Soviet Consulate came on Tuesday, October 1, 1963. 1136/ Oswald's activities on the days between September 28 and October 1 are not clearly recorded. The Warren Commission speculated that he spent most of this time sightseeing and making travel arrangements. 1137/
It is entirely possible that Oswald did spend some of his time during this weekend sightseeing and making his travel arrangements. It is also entirely possible that, after his failure to obtain his visas on Saturday, September 28, that Oswald did not give up completely and did attend a party where he would have come into contact with the Cuban Consular officials and, later, sought help from pro-Castro students.

It is entirely possible that Ruben Duran had a "twist party" on September 30, or October 1, as Elena Garro has claimed. Ruben, Horacio, Lydia and Silvia Duran all admitted that they frequently had twist parties in 1963. Only Silvia Duran recalled Elena Garro attending any of the "twist parties" at the Durans' home. She recalled Elena and Elena's daughter, Elenita, attending one twist party at Ruben's home in 1963. The other Durans adamantly denied that Lee Harvey Oswald had attended a twist party at one of their homes.

Many of the details of Elena Garro's allegations have not been, or cannot be, corroborated. For example, Elena's allegation that some of the people who had been
at the party were taken to Veracruz under the protection of Governor Lopez Arias has not been verified. Ruben Duran denied that he had ever discussed the assassination with Elena Garro. Eusebio Azcue denied that he had discussed President Kennedy with Emilio Carballido at a party at the Durans' home as alleged by Elena Garro. The Committee has not been able to verify whether or not guards were posted outside of Elena's home in 1963 as she claims.

But other details of Elena's story are very credible. Perhaps the most striking is the suggestion that Oswald's relationship with Silvia Duran was more extensive than just the business contacts in the Cuban Consulate. Another detail is the manner in which Elena's allegations were handled, and the manner in which this Committee's attempts to investigate those allegations have been frustrated.

In 1965 Elena Garro reported that Silvia Duran had been Oswald's mistress while he was in Mexico City. In 1967 this report was confirmed by a CIA agent who talked to Silvia Duran. The CIA Station did not consider the information significant and told the agent to end his contact with Ms. Duran. If that information...
tion is accurate, then that Silvia invited Oswald to a party would not have been surprising. Silvia Duran admitted that the Mexican police had questioned her on this point but denied that she had had an affair with Oswald. 1151/ Ms. Duran denied having any extra-marital affairs while she was married to Horacio Duran. 1152/

This denial is not consistent with evidence of her reputation at the Cuban Consulate. A CIA penetration agent there reported to his case officer that all that would have to be done to recruit Silvia Duran, whom he referred to by using the Spanish word for whore, would be to get a blond blue-eyed American into bed with her. 1153/

There is also CIA information that indicates that Silvia Duran had an affair with a Cuban Ambassador to Mexico in the early 1960's. 1154/

The HSCA attempted to interview the CIA penetration agent about Ms. Duran. 1155/ An interview with the agent was also desired so as to attempt to verify whether Elena Garro had created a disturbance at the Cuban Embassy on November 23, 1963. 1156/ The Committee's attempts to interview this agent were frustrated. 1157/

Ms. Garro's claim that she stayed at the Hotel Vermont was verified by the Mexico City Legal Attaché on
October 13, 1966. 1158/ Ms. Garro claimed that she had been held there by Manuel Calvillo whom she believed worked for the Mexican Ministry of Government. 1159/

In 1963, Mr. Calvillo was an unwitting asset of the Central Intelligence Agency. 1160/ Ms. Garro claimed that she told Mr. Calvillo her story on November 23, 1963. 1161/

Yet the CIA Mexico City Station did not receive a report from Calvillo on this matter until November 24, 1964, the same day that Elena first told her story to American officials. 1162/ For these reasons it was felt that Manuel Calvillo could well be a key to determining the veracity of Ms. Garro's story. The Committee's attempt to interview Mr. Calvillo were also frustrated.

There is also circumstantial corroboration of Ms. Garro's allegations regarding June Cobb Sharp. For example, Ms. Cobb was indeed a CIA agent and she did file the first report of Ms. Garro's story. 1164/ It should be noted that this first report was accurate in its detail in that Ms. Garro's story remained essentially the same in subsequent repetitions. Ms. Garro claimed that she kicked Ms. Cobb out of her house. 1165/ There is a notation on Ms. Cobb's report that she was not able to regain
access to Ms. Garro. 1166/ The Committee attempted to obtain an interview with Ms. Cobb, but was once again frustrated. 1167/

Reviewing the manner in which the CIA Mexico City Station and the Legal Attache's office in Mexico City handled Ms. Garro's allegations reveals that, at best, her allegations were handled in an irresponsible manner because they were dismissed after a superficial investigation. The first report that came to the CIA was mis-filed and forgotten. 1168/ The Legat, after talking to Elena, dismissed her story after interviewing one person whom she said may have been at the party. 1169/ The manner in which the official American community handled Charles Thomas' reporting is detailed in Section VI, C, 11, above. Mr. Thomas speculated in 1969 about why Ms. Garro's story had been largely ignored by the American officials in Mexico:

It would appear that whereas the FBI has discounted the Elena Garro allegations, the CIA is still considerably disturbed by them. The CIA may not have pressed for further investigation, however, for a number of reasons: 1) considering the sensitive overlap and subtle competition between two intelligence collecting agencies, it had to yield to the FBI's clear jurisdiction; 2) there are obvious complications
in conducting such an investigation in a foreign country; 3)

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and 4) some of the people appearing in the Elena Garro scenario may well be agents of the CIA. Under the circumstances it is unlikely that any further investigation of this matter will ever take place unless it is ordered by a high official in Washington. 1170/

The Committee attempted to locate Elena Garro. Although the Committee established telephonic contact with Ms. Garro, the Committee was totally frustrated in this aspect of its investigation, but yet believes that there is a possibility that Lee Harvey Oswald did attend a twist party at the home of Ruben Duran.

The Committee also considers it possible that Lee Harvey Oswald contacted pro-Castro students at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, hereinafter UNAM) as claimed by Oscar Contreras Lartigue. 1172/ Silvia Duran admitted that she had told Oswald of two ways in which he could get a Cuban visa: 1) he could get an intransit visa by first obtaining a visa to another Communist country such as Russia; 2) he could obtain a regular Cuban visa by knowing someone in Cuba who would vouch for him. 1173/
It is possible that after Oswald's attempts to obtain a visa by the first method were frustrated on Saturday, September 28, that he made one final effort to locate someone trusted by the Cuban Consulate to vouch for him.

There is no direct evidence about how Oswald could have learned of the pro-Castro group at UNAM. There is a possibility that Ernesto Leffeld Miller, a friend of the Durans who borrowed Horacio's car often took Lee Harvey Oswald to the campus of the National Autonomous University. On the days when Lee Harvey Oswald allegedly visited the Consulate, Mr. Miller did also. It is possible that Silvia Duran asked him to escort Oswald to the campus. Mr. Miller denied having ever met Oswald. 1174A/ Oscar Contreras says that Oswald first contacted him as he was leaving a round-table discussion at the school of philosophy. 1174/ It is known that, in 1963, the Durans were close friends with the Chairman of the Philosophy Department at UNAM, Ricardo Guerra, who held seminars on Kant, Hegel and Marx in the Durans' home. 1175/ It is possible, if Silvia Duran had more than just a purely business relationship with Oswald,

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that she referred Oswald to one of Guerra's Marxist seminars in his search for help. Unfortunately, Contreras does not name who headed the round table discussion at which he met Oswald. 1176/ Silvia Duran denied that she referred Oswald to anyone for help. 1177/ Ricardo Guerra is presently the Mexican Ambassador to East Germany and was not available to the Committee for an interview. On both of the Committee's trips to Mexico, the Mexican Government told the Committee that Mr. Contreras would be made available for an interview. The interview never occurred. 1178/ Although the Committee's attempt to investigate Mr. Contreras' allegation met largely with frustration, the allegation cannot be dismissed.

D. Was Lee Harvey Oswald alone while he travelled to Mexico?

The Warren Commission concluded that Lee Harvey Oswald travelled alone while he was in Mexico. 1179/ All of the witnesses, with the exception of Elena Garro de Paz who stated that Oswald was accompanied by two "beatnik looking boys" 1180/ at Ruben Duran's party, have stated that when they saw Oswald in Mexico he was
alone. Although the American authorities did not handle the Elena Garro allegation properly, the Committee does not believe that it can readily dismiss Ms. Garro's allegation that Oswald had a companion in Mexico in light of: 1) the corroboration of details of Ms. Garro's story; 2) the possibility that someone impersonated Oswald in Mexico and 3) the similarity in the description of Oswald by Ms. Duran and Mr. Azcue and the description of Oswald's companion by Ms. Garro.
Appendix I: HSCA Procedural Write-up  Cuba Trip 1

Select Committee members Chairman Louis Stokes and Congressman Christopher Dodd, accompanied by G. Robert Blakey, Gary Cornwell and Ed Lopez of the Select Committee staff arrived in Cuba at 3:30 p.m., March 30, 1978. They were met and escorted through Cuban Customs by the Mayor of Havana, Honorable Oscar Fernandez Mell, the Minister of Justice, Dr. Armando Torres Santrayll, Señor Buergo, Ricardo Escartin and the Cuban government translator, Juanita Vera. At approximately 7:30 p.m. Señor Mell escorted the Select Committee staff to a restaurant in Old Havana. The following day Congressman Richardson Preyer arrived in Cuba at 7:00 a.m.

At 9:30 a.m. on March 31, 1978 the Select Committee representatives met with Ricardo Escartin, Señor Buergo and Captain Felipe Villa of the Ministry of the Interior. The Cuban Government gave the members and Committee its official reply to the Committee's questionnaire, given to the Cuban government prior to the Committee's trip to Cuba.

At 3:00 p.m., the Select Committee met again with
Ricardo Escartin, Senen Buergo, Felipe Villa and Juanita Vera. During this session, the two major areas of discussion were Lee Harvey Oswald's visa application and the dates of Jack Ruby's visits to Cuba in 1959. At 7:30 p.m. the House Select Committee on Assassinations staff dined with the Minister of Justice, Armando Torres Santrayll.

At 9:00 a.m. on April 1, 1978, the Select Committee staff again met with the same Cuban officials for a third session. Santo Trafficante was the major area of discussion. At noon, Committee members and staff representatives met with Cuba's Minister of Education, Honorable Jose Ramon Fernandez, who gave a presentation on the improvement in quality of Cuban education since the Cuban Revolution.

Following Señor Fernandez's discussion, at 3:15 p.m., Eusebio Azcue was interviewed by the Committee staff representative. Azcue was questioned extensively about Oswald's alleged trip to Mexico City, Oswald's alleged visits to the Cuban Consulate, and Señor Azcue's alleged argument with Lee Harvey Oswald.
At 7:30 p.m., April 1, 1978, Messers. Escartin and Hernandez accompanied the House Select Committee staff for dinner and show to the Tropicana Club which, prior to the Revolution, was operated by organized crime. The Tropicana Club is presently run by the Cuban government.

At 11:00 a.m. on April 2, 1978, the Committee staff again met with Senen Buergo, Ricardo Escartin, Felipe Villa, Aramis Guetierrez and Juanita Vera. Santo Trafficante, Jack Ruby and Mexico City were the major areas of discussion. [1187] This session terminated at 1:00 p.m. At 4:50 p.m., the morning's meeting resumed. During the afternoon session, the major area of discussion was the alleged pro-Castro involvement in the assassination. [1188]

At 9:15 a.m., April 3, 1978, the Committee staff met with the Cuban officials for a final work session. During this session, the intelligence agencies and general questions derived from the questionnaire which the Committee had provided to the Cuban government were the major areas of discussion. [1189] During the session, the Committee staff and Cuban officials also
exchanged listings of pending material which might be covered during a subsequent trip to Cuba by HSCA representatives and Congressmen. 1190/  

At 6:00 p.m. the Committee staff met with President Fidel Castro Ruz who assured the Committee that neither he nor his government had any involvement in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

The House Select Committee on Assassinations staff departed Havana, Cuba at 10:00 a.m., April 4, 1978, arriving in Washington, D.C. at 4:30 p.m.
Appendix 2: HSCA Procedural Write-up Mexico Trip

House Select Committee on Assassinations staffers—Gary Cornwell, Dan Hardway, Edwin Lopez and Harold Leap—arrived at the Mexico City airport at 8:30 p.m., May 30, 1978. (All times are Mexico City times, unless otherwise specified.) They were met and escorted through Customs by David Patton, an employee of the United States Embassy.

The following morning, May 31, 1978 the HSCA representatives met with U.S. Embassy Political Officer Richard Howard concerning procedure. Mr. Howard scheduled a meeting at 11:15 a.m. with CIA Senior Official. This meeting was preliminary in nature and concerned procedures regarding arrangement of the interviews of ex-CIA employees in Mexico.

At 12:00 noon, the HSCA representatives and Richard Howard met representatives of the Government of Mexico. The Mexican representatives were: 1) Dr. Jesus Yanes, Advisor to the Attorney General's Executive Officer; 2) Fernando Baeza, Chief Administrative Officer for the Attorney General; and 3) Commandate Florentino Ventura, Chief of the Mexican Federal Police. The Mexicans—
informed the staff members at this meeting that they had located Silvia Duran, Horacio Duran, Ruben Duran and Pedro Gutierrez Valencia and that each person was willing to be interviewed by the HSCA representatives. Procedure for conduct of the interviews was also discussed at this meeting.

The Mexican government decided that the initial interview would be an informal contact with the witnesses in which the Committee's objectives would be described. The witnesses' statements would be formalized at a later, taped interview. The Mexican officials informed the HSCA staff members that they had been unable to locate Oscar Contreras, Elena Garro de Paz, and Elenita Garro de Paz. The Mexican Government had not had contact with the Garros since 1968. The Mexicans said that they were trying to locate the Garros through the Foreign Ministry since Elena's ex-husband, Octavio Paz, had once been an important person in that ministry. The Mexicans asked that we determine the name of the Mexican Government contact during 1964 with the Warren Commission so that they could locate their records in the Archives.

The Mexican officials left to set up the preliminary
interviews with witnesses. The preliminary interviews were conducted by Gary Cornwell. HSCA staff members Dan Hardway, Edwin Lopez and Harold Leap were present during Cornwell's questioning. The Mexican Government was represented by Dr. Jesus Yañes, Commandante Florentino Ventura, and Jesus Meixueiro Kanty, second in command to Ventura. Pedro Gutierrez Valencia was interviewed at 2:30 p.m. Ruben Duran was interviewed at 5:00 p.m. Horacio Duran was interviewed at 5:30 p.m. Silvia Duran was interviewed at 6:15 p.m.

At 9:30 a.m. on June 1, 1978, the HSCA staff representatives met with the Mexican police representatives. The HSCA staff requested 1) the records of the company that employed Gutierrez Valencia in 1963; press clippings of the Mexican newspaper coverage of Oswald and Silvia Duran (attached); 3) once again, an interview with Oscar Contreras; 4) individual files on Elena Garro de Paz and Silvia Duran; 5) evidence related to Silvia Duran's assertion that Oswald was at the Cuban Embassy on one day only; 6) an interview with Deba Garro de Guerrero Galvan; 1195/ 7) an interview with Eunice Odio; 1196/ 9) an interview with Emilio Carballido; 1197/ and 10) an interview with Victor Rico Galan. 1198/ The
HSCA also asked to be shown the Cuban Consulate.

The Mexican representatives informed the HSCA staff that Victor Rico Galan had, at one time, been arrested on political charges but that he was subsequently pardoned by either Diaz Ordaz or Luis Echevarria. The Mexicans said that they were searching for all files and newspaper articles requested by the HSCA.

The Mexican officials also offered their observations orally on the preliminary interviews conducted the previous day. They pointed out that they found it strange that Silvia had told Oswald he could not travel while in Cuba. They wondered what Duran was trying to tell Oswald and whether she thought that Oswald had some objective in going to Cuba other than that ascribed by the popular version. They also considered the manner in which Silvia obtained employment at the Cuban Consulate unusual. Generally they noted that Silvia and her brothers seemed to have almost programmed responses and a defensive demeanor. They pointed out, however, that all the Durans had been very interested in talking to us. In their opinion, Ruben Duran was the most credible of those interviewed by the HSCA the previous day.
At this point, a Mexican official who had been checking the computer records informed us that Victor Rico Galan had died.

HSCA staff members provided the Mexican authorities with the names of the Mexican officials who had been involved in the investigation in 1963.

HSCA staff members met again with the Mexican police authorities at 10:00 a.m. on June 2, 1978. At this time, the Mexican police provided the copies of the newspaper clippings on the assassination of John F. Kennedy from the Excelsior. HSCA staff members asked if the Mexicans could persuade the newspapers to reveal the sources of their stories about Oswald and Silvia Duran. The Mexican officials' response was negative. The Mexican officials informed the HSCA staff members that most of the data we wanted from the files was in their Security Service files. The Mexican officials working with the HSCA explained that they were the Mexican equivalent of the FBI and that the Security Service was the Mexican equivalent of the CIA; hence there was the usual bureaucratic problem involved in obtaining access to the Security Service's files. The Mexicans informed the HSCA representatives that Emilia Carballido had been located.
that Deba Garro could not be located; and that there was no record of anyone named Eunice Odio. HSCA representatives told the Mexican officials that Odio, who was either Costa Rican or Guatemalan, had been the mistress of Emilio Carballido. The assassination and the reaction of the Mexican people to it was discussed.

At 1:00 p.m., HSCA staff members conducted an interview at the United States Embassy in connection with the CIA aspects of the Mexico City investigation.

At 2:30, Gary Cornwell discussed problems with [CIA Senior Official] He requested that [CIA Official]able Headquarters regarding restrictions placed on the HSCA staff in Mexico.

At 6:00 p.m., the HSCA staff members, accompanied by Jesus Meixuerio Kanty and his assistant, Honorio Escondon, met with the assistant chief of the Mexican Security Service Nazar. Mr. Nazar gave an oral resume of the interviews which Mexican officials conducted in 1963 of Silvia, Horatio and Ruben Duran and Betty Serratos. Mr. Nazar said that the files had to be formally requested before he could consider releasing them. He suggested that he secure statements admissible in United
States courts from the witnesses whom we wished to interview. Mr. Nazar suggested that our best investigatory avenue would be to concentrate on Oswald's interrogation after his arrest on November 22nd. Mr. Nazar had a very low opinion of Elena Garro de Paz' credibility. He felt that she confused fact and fiction.

June 3 and 4, 1978, were spent on CIA-related aspects of the Mexico City investigation. Two interviews were conducted. All interviews, with the exception of interviews with CIA personnel, were taped and later transcribed.

At 11:00 a.m. on June 5, 1978, the HSCA staff interviewed Horacio Duran for the record. At 1:00 p.m., HSCA staff member Edwin Lopez and Mexican officials Honorio Escondon and Dr. Alfonso Orozco Gutierrez interviewed Pedro Gutierrez Valencia for the record. At 5:00 p.m., HSCA staff members interviewed Lynn Duran, aka Lydia Duran, for the record.

On June 6, 1978 at 11:00 a.m., the HSCA staff interviewed Ruben Duran for the record. At 1:00 p.m., the staff representatives met with Commandate Ventura. The staff representatives agreed to supply the Mexicans with questions for two witnesses, Oscar Contreras and
Ernesto Lehfeld Miller, who could not then be interviewed. Commandante Ventura authorized Honorio Escondon to interview Oscar Contreras Lartigue and Ernesto Lehfeld Miller. At 5:00 p.m., the wife of Ruben Duran, Betty Serratos was interviewed for the record. At 5:45 p.m., Silvia Duran was interviewed for the record.

The HSCA staff representatives left Mexico City at 8:30 a.m. on June 7, 1978, arriving in Washington, D.C. at 5:30 p.m., Washington time.
Appendix 3: HSCA Procedural Write-up Mexico Trip 2

House Select Committee staffers Edwin Juan Lopez and Harold Leap traveled to Mexico City on August 7, 1978. The staff members were met by David T. Patton, a State Department official, at the Mexican airport at 10:15 p.m. Mr. Patton then checked the staffers into Room 1754 at the Maria Isabel Hotel. Mr. Patton informed the staff members that CIA wished to see us at 8:30 a.m. the following morning.

On Tuesday, August 8, 1978, Committee staffers met with CIA Senior Official. He informed the staffers that the two individuals the Committee wished to interview, CIA aka CIA and CIA were now available.

At 9:30 a.m., August 8, 1978, Committee staff members interviewed CIA. The interview ended at approximately 10:15 a.m.

Committee staff members returned to CIA office. CIA stated that it appeared that the Government of Mexico had only been able to locate two
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This form is to be used only for material extracted from CIA

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witnesses for the Committee, Oscar Contreras Lartigue 1210/ and Noe W. Palomares. 1211/ [CIA 5] asked the staff members to whom they wished to speak. The Committee staff members explained that they would like to interview LICHANT 1, 1212/ LICOOKIE 1, 1213/ [crypt 1214/ L[crypt 1215/ and LIRING 3, 1216/ [CIA 5] then stated that it appeared that the House Select Committee on Assassinations had already asked the Mexicans to locate the individuals listed above.

[CIA 5] stated that the HSCA's interview with [CIA 5] was considered "highly sensitive." He explained that three rooms at a nearby hotel would be used. In one room, [CIA 5] would sit, Committee staff members would sit in a second room and two CIA personnel officers would insure that the equipment worked properly in a third room. [CIA 5] then phoned Mr. Niles Gooding, who had been sent to the Mexico City location from Headquarters to arrange the procedures for the interviews. Mr. Gooding explained that in 1977 Stansfield Turner had created a new position at Headquarters to insure that important, sensitive meetings were within the guidelines previously...
arranged. Mr. Gooding stated that the Central Intelligence Agency had been under greater Congressional scrutiny the past two years. Therefore, Director Turner, in order to demonstrate the Agency's good faith, had engaged a retired Army officer to act as liaison at sensitive interviews by Congressional representatives. Mr. Gooding then explained that the HSCA staff would be escorted by two CIA personnel to the interview with

At 10:55 a.m., August 8, 1978, Committee staff members interviewed

At 12:30 p.m., Committee staff members telephoned Captain Fernandez Ventura Gutierrez. His secretary explained that Mr. Ventura was not in the office, but that she would have him call us when he returned. At 6:30 p.m., since Mr. Ventura had not yet returned the staffer's call, they again called his office. His secretary apologized for Mr. Ventura and explained that he had not yet returned to the office and she assured us that Mr. Ventura would telephone upon his return. At 9:15 p.m., Dr. Jesus Yanez, the Assistant to the official mayor telephoned the staff members explaining that Mr. Ventura was very busy on an important assignment and asked us
to visit the Police Station known as the Procuraduría General at 11:00 a.m. the following morning.

At 10:15 a.m., August 9, 1978, Committee staff members met with State Department Official Richard Howard to alert him that the Committee would request the Mexican officials to make Silvia Duran available in Washington for an HSCA hearing. Mr. Howard explained that once we had permission from the Mexican government, the State Department would insure that she was in Washington when necessary.

At 11:00 a.m., August 9, 1978, Committee staff members met with Dr. Jesus Yanes and Ciprianio Martinez Novoa. Mr. Yanes told Committee staff members that Ciprianio Martinez Nova, the Mexican agent in charge, would try to aid us in all our interviews. Mr. Martinez then briefed the Committee staff members on their up-to-date progress:

Oscar Contreras Lartigue had been located and pre-interviewed by Mr. Martinez in Tampico, Mexico. The Committee would fly to Tampico on Friday, August 11, 1978 at 7:35 a.m. to interview him.

Noe W. Palomares had been located and could be interviewed during the afternoon of Thursday, August 10.
1978 at his office, Cerrada de la Presa 4. His phone number, 595-0891, was made available to the Committee.

June Cobb Sharp received a tourist permit, number 72781, on June 27, 1947. She entered Mexico through Nuevo Laredo, Texas. She requested but was denied permission by the Mexican government to represent the magazine, Modern Mexico. On June 21, 1948, she received a courtesy permit, number 25556. She disappeared in 1954 and never returned to Mexico.

The Committee staffers did not tell the Mexicans that the House Select Committee on Assassinations had evidence from review of June Cobb's 201 file that she was in Mexico in the Sixties.

Eunice Odio Infante, a Costa Rican, received a three-month tourist permit from the Mexican government on February 9, 1964. She remained in Mexico, illegally residing at Nacas-45-a, until 1972. She applied to write for the Excelsior magazine on many different occasions, but was rejected every time. In 1972, Ms. Odio married a Communist painter, Rudolfo Sanabria Gonzalez and moved
to Rio Neba-16 Apartment 40. On May 24, 1972, Ms. Odio was found dead in her bathtub. The official presiding at her autopsy concluded that Ms. Odio had poisoned herself.

Emilio Carballido Fontanes was in Caracas, Venezuela, on vacation and scheduled to return to Mexico in early September. His address is Constituyentes 207. His phone number is 515-8345.

[ Source, encrypted ] personnel record in Mexico could not be located. When the Mexican officials inquired about her at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City prior to the Committee's trip, no one at the office remembered that she had worked there. Committee staff members were told that [ Source ] was probably dead. No basis was given for the Mexican government's conclusion.

[ Source ] (LIRING 3) was born in Cuba on November 3, 1927. He entered Mexico July 1, 1965 and taught Graphics and Art at U.N.A.M. until January 1, 1968 when he disappeared. The Mexican officials assumed that he returned to Cuba.
General Jesus Jose Clark Flores 1218/ died in the early 1970's. Ernesto Lehfeld Miller, 1219/ Academic Coordinator at the School of Interior Design, had not yet been located.

[Source, crypt] lives at [identifying information] Apartment [identifying information], Mexico City. His phone number is [redacted]. The landlady at his apartment explained to the Mexican officials that [source] had left town hurriedly on Monday, August 7, 1978. Mr. Martinez, wishing to know when he returned, had placed a piece of scotch tape on the bottom right edge of his door. Mr. Martinez explained that he checked it every four hours and would notify us if [source] returned before we left.

Manuel Calvillo [crypt] did not live at Cauhtemoc 877-5 as the Committee had stated. The landlady for the past twenty-five years at the apartments told Mr. Martinez that Manuel Calvillo had never resided there. Committee staff members explained that Calvillo went by a pen name which would be forwarded to the Mexican officials the following morning.
When Committee staff members inquired whether Ms. Silvia Tirado Bazan could testify at an HSCA hearing, the Mexican officials stated that they would have an answer for the staffers by Friday morning. The Mexican officials explained that they would have to speak to her to insure that she was willing to travel to Washington.

On Thursday, August 10, 1978, at 11:00 a.m. the Committee staff members met with Dr. Jesus Yáñez, Agent Ciprianio Martinez Novoa, Captain Florentino Ventura Gutierrez and Attorney General Licensiado, Manuel Calvillo's "pen name" was given to the Mexicans who stated that they would check it with the Landlady at his alleged apartment building.

Committee staffers returned to their hotel room with Agent Ciprianio Martinez Novoa after the meeting. Agent Martinez attempted without success to telephone Oscar Contreras Lartigue to inform him of our visit. At 3:30 p.m., Agent Martinez finally reached Mr. Contreras' child who informed him that Mr. Contreras was not in Tampico. He had traveled to Mexico City for a Partido Republicano
Institucional convention. When Agent Martinez asked the child if he knew where his father was staying in Mexico City, he responded that he did not. Agent Martinez explained to the child that he would call at a later time to speak to his mother.

Agent Martinez telephoned Noe W. Palomares at 4:00 p.m. and arrange an interview for 6:30 p.m. that evening. Mr. Martinez asked Committee staff members to meet him at his office at the Procuraduria General at 6:00 p.m.

At 6:00 p.m., August 10, 1978, Committee staff members met Agent Ciprianio Martinez at the Procuraduria General. Martinez then drove the HSCA representatives to Mr. Palomares' office. At 6:30 p.m., Committee staff members interviewed Noe W. Palomares. 1270/

Following the interview, Agent Martinez returned to the Maria Isabel Hotel with Committee staff members. He attempted to reach Mrs. Contreras telephonically at Tampico twice without success. At 9:45 p.m., he finally contacted her. Mrs. Contreras told Agent Martinez that Mr. Oscar Contreras had told her that he would try to get a room
at either the Hotel Regis or Hotel San Francisco. Mrs. Contreras explained that since there were a few conventions scheduled in Mexico City that weekend she could not assure that he would be at either hotel. Mrs. Contreras told Agent Martinez that she would notify him if her husband should call.

Mr. Martinez called both hotels and inquired whether Oscar Contreras Lartigue was registered. He was not registered at either; they were completely booked up.

Mr. Martinez attempted to reach by telephone Silvia Tirado Byazan at their home to ask her whether she would be willing to travel to Washington to testify at a HSCA hearing and to ask if she knew where Mr. Ernesto Lehfeld Miller could be located. She was not at home, however.

Agent Martinez explained that he would attempt to locate Oscar Contreras Lartigue at the hotel where the Partido Republicano Institucional (Institutional Republican Party) was holding its convention early the following morning; after which he would meet the staff members at 9:30 a.m. at their hotel room.
At 9:45 a.m., August 11, 1978, Agent Martinez met Committee staffers at their hotel room and explained that he was unable to locate Mr. Contreras Lartigue at the convention. Mr. Martinez then left to check the whereabouts of Mr. Alberue Suoto and Silvia Tirado Bazan. At 12:30 p.m., August 11, 1978, Agent Martinez returned to the Committee staff members' hotel room. He telephoned Mrs. Contreras in Tampico who stated that her husband had not telephoned her since she had last spoken to Agent Martinez. At 1:50 p.m., another agent, Honorio Escondon, telephoned Agent Martinez at the Committee staffers' hotel room to inform him that [name] must be back in town because the scotch tape placed at the base of his entranceway door was no longer in place. At 1:55 p.m., Agent Martinez telephoned [name]. During the phone conversation [name] denied that he had worked at the Cuban Embassy in the Sixties, stated that he knew nothing about the assassination, and declined the Committee staff members' request to interview him.

At 2:00 p.m., August 11, 1978, Agent Martinez telephoned
Silvia Duran. Agent Martinez then gave the telephone to Committee staffer Lopez. Mr. Lopez asked Ms. Tirado whether she would be willing to testify sometime in September at a Committee hearing in Washington; she answered affirmatively. She stated that September 13th, 14th and 15th would not be "good days" because the Mexican Revolution celebration would be taking place and she was a planner and participant. When Mr. Lopez asked Ms. Tirado if she knew Mr. Ernesto Lehfeld Miller's phone number, she stated that she did not, but she stated that if we telephoned her husband Horatio at either 516-0398 or 515-8621, he would be able to help us.

At 2:15 p.m., Committee staffer Lopez telephoned Horatio Duran, who have him Ernesto Lehfeld Miller's office phone number, 548-4839. At 2:20 p.m., Lopez telephoned Mr. Miller and arranged a meeting for 9:00 p.m. that evening.

At 2:30 p.m., Agent Martinez telephoned Captain Ventura to report on his progress, pertaining to his work with the HSCA. When Martinez told Ventura that he had located [name].
Ventura asked Martinez if he was alone. When Agent Martinez lied and stated that he was alone, Ventura told him that he should under no circumstances allow us to interview [name]. When Agent Martinez completed his phone call, he said, "I don't understand why nobody wants you to talk to him."

At 9:00 p.m., August 11, 1978, Committee staffers interviewed Ernesto Lehfeld Miller [2221/].

At 11:15 a.m., August 12, 1978, Committee staffer Lopez called [name] at his home. When Mr. Lopez identified himself, [name] immediately stated that he knew nothing. He further stated that he never worked for the Cuban Embassy. When Lopez explained to him that employees at the Cuban Embassy had stated that he had been employed there, [name] hung up. [name] voice quivered throughout the short talk.

At 11:45 a.m., Silvia Tirado called Lopez and stated that she had thought all night about travelling to Washington. She said she had seen a report in the newspapers in which Azcne had stated that the man who visited the Cuban Consulate...
In 1963 was not Lee Harvey Oswald. She stated that Azcue had only seen Oswald once while she had seen Oswald at least three times.

Ms. Duran further stated that if she testified in Washington and the Committee concluded that she was lying she would be crucified when she returned to Mexico. Mr. Lopez reassured her and explained that when he returned to Washington he would send her a long letter explaining procedures.

At 12:05 p.m., Agent Martinez met the Committee staff members at the airport. He stated that Contreras and Calvillo had not been located. The Committee staffers gave Martinez a list of questions to ask Oscar Contreras Lartigue. Agent Martinez stated that he would mail the results of the interview to Lopez at the Committee offices in Washington. The Committee never received any interview reports from the Mexican government.

The Committee staff members left Mexico City at 1:55 p.m. and arrived at Washington's Dulles Airport at 10:35 p.m.
Appendix 4: HSCA Procedural Write-up Cuba Trip 2

On August 25, 1978, Congressman Richardson Preyer and HSCA staff members G. Robert Blakey and Edwin Juan Lopez Soto traveled to Cuba from Miami at 8:25 a.m. on an Air-Taxi Service charter plane. The Committee representatives arrived in Cuba at 10:15 a.m. They were met by the Minister of Justice, Armando Torres Santrayll; Washington Consul Ricardo Escartin; American Department official, Senen Buergo; and translator, Nellie Ruiz de Zarade. The Committee representatives were escorted to their suite, room number 2003, at the Hotel Riviera at 11:00 a.m.

At 12:15 p.m., the Committee representatives met with Ricardo Escartin, Felipe Villa, Senen Buergo and translators Juanita Vera and Nellie Ruiz de Zarade. Also present were two Cuban stenographers. Senen Buergo, the spokesperson, welcomed the Committee representatives to Cuba and thanked the Committee for its correspondence. Mr. Buergo apologized on behalf of the Cuban government for the postponement of a previously scheduled trip of
May 24th and 25th, 1978. Mr. Buergo stressed that in his opinion there was a conspiracy to link Cuba to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. At that point, he handed four files to Congressman Richardson Preyer. The files consisted of: a) material concerning Santo Trafficante; b) a letter dated 25 November 1963 from Hernandez Armas (Mexican Ambassador in 1962 to Raul Roa (Minister of Foreign Relations in 1963); c) the results of the Cuban government's research into mis-information linking the Cuban Government to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy; and d) the report of the Investigative Committee of the International Tribunal of the Eleventh Festival reporting on the defamation campaign to link Cuba to the assassination of John F. Kennedy.

Mr. Buergo stated that both Eusebio Azcue Lopez and Alfredo Hirabal Diaz would that day be made available for interviews. Mr. Buergo stated that Nilo Otero would be made available for interview the following day, 26 August 1978. Mr. Buergo stated that Rogelio Rodriguez was presently stationed in West Germany. Buergo stated that Ricardo Escartin previously interviewed Mr. Rodriguez and
was told by Rodriguez that he had had no contact with Lee Harvey Oswald. Mr. Buergo stated that if the Committee still desired to interview Rodriguez, he would be made available to the Committee. Mr. Buergo stated that an interview with Rolando Cubela Secades 1224/ would be arranged.

Mr. Buergo asked if the Committee was still interested in interviewing Orestes Guillermo Ruiz Perez. 1225/ Mr. Buergo stated that the Cuban government had no record of a citizen named Griselle Rubio. 1226/ Mr. Buergo inquired whether the Committee representatives were interested in watching the videotaped statements of James Wilcott 1227/ and Phillip Agee 1228/ at the Tribunal. 1229/ Congressman Preyer responded that the Committee's representatives would want to view the Wilcott and Agee videotaped statements.

Mr. Buergo stated that our schedule included dinner with the Minister of Justice at 8:00 p.m. on 25 August 1978, fishing on 27 August 1978 (Sunday), and a farewell dinner on 28 August 1978.

Congressman Preyer thanked the Cuban officials for
making both the documents and witnesses available to the Select Committee.

Professor Blakey stated that the Committee was no longer interested in interviewing Rolando Cubela. Mr. Blakey stated that Griselle Rubio had been found in Miami and interviewed by a Committee investigator. Mr. Blakey stated that the Committee wanted to interview Oreste Guillermo Ruiz Perez for two reasons: He worked at the Cuban Embassy in September 1963 when Oswald allegedly visited the Cuban compound in Mexico City; and, he is married to the cousin of a counter-revolutionary, Antonio Veciana Blanch. Mr. Blakey stated that Rogelio Rodriguez need not be interviewed.

Captain Felipe Villa stated that the Cuban government, relying on the seriousness and honesty of the Committee's work, thought that the Committee should have knowledge of Cubela's statements. Mr. Villa stated that the Committee still needed to provide the Cuban government with the following: a) a workable formula on counter-revolutionaries that could be used by the Cuban government to aid the Committee in its investigation of such organizations.
b) copies of Lee Harvey Oswald's signatures that the Cuban government could use to perform its own handwriting comparison test; and c) E. Howard Hunt's aliases;

Mr. Blakey stated that examples of Lee Harvey Oswald's handwriting would be forthcoming. Mr. Blakey stated that the Committee had not yet developed a formula for identifying counter-revolutionary groups active against the Cuban government in 1963 or a method for providing E. Howard Hunt's aliases. Mr. Blakey stressed that both these areas would be discussed in the Committee's final report.

At 1:00 p.m. the first work session ended.

At 3:15 p.m. House Select Committee on Assassinations representatives interviewed Juan Nilo Otero in Room 2003 of the Hotel Riviera. Present were Congressman Richardson Preyer, G. Robert Blakey, Edwin Juan Lopez Soto, Senen Buergo, Ricardo Escartin, Captain Felipe Villa, translator Juanita Vera and two stenographers. The interview ended at 5:15 p.m.

At 8:00 p.m. the Committee's representatives met Senen Buergo and translator Nellie Ruiz de Zarade at the
Hotel Riviera's lobby. The group was chauffered to the Bodeguita del Medio--one of Cuba's most famous restaurants--where they dined with the Minister of Justice, Armando Torres Santrayll.

At 10:15 a.m., 26 August 1978, Select Committee representatives interviewed Alfredo Mirabal Diaz 1231/ in Room 2003 at the Hotel Riviera. Present were Congressman Richardson Preyer, G. Robert Blakey, Edwin Juan Lopez Soto, Senen Buergo, Captain Felipe Villa, Ricardo Escartin, translators Juanita Vera and Nellie Ruiz de Zarade and two stenographers. The interview ended at 12:45 p.m.

After the Mirabal interview Mr. Buergo asked whether the HSCA representatives wished to interview Jose Verdacia Verdacia, 1232/ the Warden of Trescornia while Santos Trafficante was a detainee. When Congressman Richardson Preyer stated that the Committee would indeed be interested in interviewing Jose Verdacia Verdacia, Mr. Buergo stated that he would be available for an interview at 3:00 p.m.

At 3:30 p.m., HSCA representatives interviewed
Jose Verdacia Verdacia in Room 2003 of the Hotel Riviera. Present were Congressman Richardson Preyer, G. Robert Blakey, Edwin Juan Lopez Soto, Senen Buergo, Captain Felipe Villa, Ricardo Escartin, Arais Gutierrez, translators Juanita Vera and Nellie Ruiz de Zarade, and two stenographers. 1233/ The interview ended at 4:20 p.m.

On Sunday morning, 27 August 1978, the Cuban Government's representatives took the Select Committee representatives to Veradero Beach.

At 8:35 p.m. Select Committee representatives interviewed Orestes Guillermo Ruiz Perez at the Hotel Internacional at Veradero Beach. Present were Congressman Richardson Preyer, G. Robert Blakey, Edwin Juana Lopez Soto, Ricardo Escartin, Captain Felipe Villa, Senen Buergo and translator Juanita Vera. 1234/ Because there were no stenographers present the Cuban representatives tape-recorded the interview. The interview ended at 9:20 p.m.

On 28 August 1978, at 10:25 a.m., HSCA representatives interviewed Rolando Cubela Secades in Room 2003 at the Hotel
Riviera. Present were Congressman Richardson Preyer, G. Robert Blakey, Edwin Juan Lopez Soto, Ricardo Escartin, Captain Felipe Villa, Senen Buergo, translator Juanita Vera and Nellie Ruiz de Zarade, and two stenographers. Also present was Antonio Hernandez who escorted Mr. Cuebla from prison to the Hotel. The interview ended at 11:45 p.m.

At 3:25 p.m., HSCA representatives interviewed Maria Teresa Proenza y Proenza in Room 2003 of the Hotel Riviera. Present were Congressman Richardson Preyer, G. Robert Blakey, Edwin Juan Lopez Soto, Ricardo Escartin, Captain Felipe Villa, Senen Buergo, Antonio Hernandez, translator Nellie Ruiz de Zarade and two stenographers. The interview ended at 4:15 p.m.

On 29 August 1978, at 9:30 a.m., the HSCA representatives met the Cuban delegation for a final work session in Room 2003 of the Hotel Riviera. Present were Congressman Richardson Preyer, G. Robert Blakey, Edwin Juan Lopez, Ricardo Escartin, Senen Buergo, Captain Felipe Villa, translators Juanita Vera and Nellie Ruiz de Zarade and two stenographers.
The Cuban delegation spokesperson, Senen Buergo, explained that Mr. Manuel Piniero 1238/ was out of the country and therefore an interview could not be arranged.

Mr. Buergo explained that the Cuban delegation had located Luisa Calderon Carralero 1239/ but because she was ill an interview could not be arranged. Mr. Buergo suggested that the HSCA forward questions to the Cuban Government. Ms. Calderon's answers would then be forwarded to the Committee.

Mr. Buergo explained that Raul Roa 1240/ had a very busy schedule. Mr. Roa felt that he could not add any more information to what Milo Otero had already provided and declined the interview.

Material handed to the HSCA representatives at this time included:

a) a list of persons whom the Cuban delegation believed to have had close relations with Santo Trafficante;

b) photographs depicting what the Cuban government believed to be a Central Intelligence Agency
photographic surveillance base targeted against the Cuban Consulate and Embassy in Mexico City during 1963;
c) an essay entitled "Imperialism's Political, Economic, and Military Organizations and Agencies of Crime, such as the CIA" and
d) an article entitled "Finally We Have Eliminated That Pinto in the White House, said Bob, When He Heard About JFK's Assassination"

The final work session ended at 11:00 a.m.
At 1:00 p.m., the Cuban delegation escorted the Committee's representatives to the airport. At the airport they were bid farewell by the Minister of Justice, Armando Torres Santrayll, Senen Buergo, Juanita Vera and Nellie Ruiz de Zarade.
At 3:30 p.m., the HSCA representatives and Washington Consul, Ricardo Escartin, departed Cuba.
Appendix 5: Biography: Elena Garro De Paz

Elena Garro de Paz was born of Spanish parents in Puebla, Mexico on December 11, 1917. (All information in this section culled from Biography Data form prepared by Charles Thomas.) Ms. Garro attended the National Autonomous University of Mexico and later did graduate work at Berkley in California and at the University of Paris. In 1963, Elena had long been married to Octavio Paz, a career diplomat who is also one of Mexico's finest poets and leading intellectuals. When Octavio was named Mexican Ambassador to India, the couple separated by mutual consent. Elena's daughter, also named Elena, has always resided with her mother.

Since Elena spent seventeen years of her early life in Europe she had a rather Mexican objectivity about her native land and had a reputation for being one of its more articulate detractors. At the same time, Elena was considered emotionally committed to many aspects of Mexican life and made an important contribution to its artistic development.
In the 1960's Elena became a significant writer. *Hogar Solido*, *El Rey Mago*, *La Senora en su Balcon*, *Ventura Allende*, *Andaise por las Ramas*, *Parada Empresa*, and *El Viaje* are plays that have had appreciative audiences in Europe, where they were translated into German, as well as in Mexico. Ms. Garro's short stories are collected in a volume called *La Semana de Colores*. The *Literacy Supplement* of the *London Times* has called her novel, *Los Recuerdos de Porenir*, "a splendid success." Critics have said of her: "For Elena Garro, there is no frontier between reality and fantasy; in any case, the latter is a second reality--perhaps more intense--to which one may penetrate without passport or forewarning, thanks to the effectiveness of a literature fired with passion, flavor and life." Many people who knew Elena have asserted that the frontier between reality and fantasy is also difficult for her to distinguish in real life. (Biography Data Form on Elena Garra de Paza prepared by Charles Thomas.)

Ms. Garro, for many years, was an active worker in the *Confederacion Nacional Campesina* (CNC), the agrarian...
arm of the Partido Reformista (PRI). Because Ms. Garro was a tireless propagandist and agitator on behalf of the poorer Mexican peasants, she was on close personal terms with and enjoyed the respect of peasant leaders from all over the country. (Ibid.)

Elena was considered a witty, urbane and opinionated woman with an unflagging sense of humor. Her forthright opinions and sharp wit tended on occasion to ruffle feathers in Mexico, but her important social, literacy, and political connections rendered her fairly immune from serious counter-attack until 1968. Then, Ms. Garro was forced to flee the country with her daughter, Elenita and her sister, Deba Guerrero de Galvan, in the midst of the student strikes. The House Select Committee on Assassinations has been unable to determine the exact reason Ms. Garro had for fleeing Mexico.

Before her disappearance from Mexico, Elena was well disposed toward the United States and had been friendly with Embassy officers. Her broad range of significant personal friends, the views of many important to the
American Embassy, made her a useful Embassy target. (A "useful Embassy target" is a person deemed important enough because of acquaintances to merit frequent contact, either witting or unwitting, with American Embassy officials.)
APPENDIX SIX: GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED IN REPORT.

Agent: A person who knowingly works for the CIA on a contract or job basis.

Asset: A general term for persons, not officers, used by the CIA. For example, both agents and sources are assets. An asset is anyone used in an operation or project, whether or not that is aware that he is being used.

Case Officer: See Operations officer.

Coverage: Surveillance.

Cryptonym: A series of letters used by the CIA to identify someone or something while protecting that person or things true identity. All the letters in a cryptonym are capitalized. The first two letters are assigned by the subject matter or local to which the person or thing belongs. The rest of the cryptonym is randomly assigned. See LIMITED for example. The "LI" designates that the project was located in Mexico. 2) The planet on which Superman was born.

Chronological File: A folder in which material is stored in chronological order. Usually used for production or communications type material.

Electronic Intercept Base: House, apartment, or building that contains equipment used in intercepting and taping telephone conversations subject to electronic surveillance.


LIMITED: CIA cryptonym for photographic project aimed at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.

LIERODE: CIA cryptonym, pre-1964, for surveillance operation aimed at the Cubans in Mexico City.

LILYRIC: CIA cryptonym assigned to one of the three bases which provided photographic surveillance of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.
LIMERICK: CIA cryptonym meaning "Soviet".

LIMITED: CIA cryptonym of one of three bases which provided photographic surveillance of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.

LIONION: CIA cryptonym for photographic surveillance operations aimed at the Cuban diplomatic compound in Mexico City after July, 1964.

Listening post: See electronic intercept base.

Logs: A list of photographs taken and the times they were taken prepared by agents in the photographic base houses.

Monitors: A group of agents who worked in the electronic intercept base listening to conversations on telephone lines subject to wiretaps and summarizing those conversations they deemed to be important.

Officer: CIA career employee.

Operation: A subpart of a project. Often used interchangably with "project".

Operations officer: CIA career employee; term usually used in connection with an employee with responsibility for a particular operation or project.

Penetration agent: An agent who works inside a target institution. For example, LIONION worked for the CIA in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City.

P file: Designation assigned to a personality file in the CIA's Mexico City Station. A file for the retention of information in written form arranged according to individual's names.

Photographic base: House, apartment, or building used for housing of photographic surveillance equipment and the agents who operate it. Always located near the target.
Pitched: Made an effort to recruit as an agent, asset or source.

Production: Materials or information generated by an operation or project.

Project: A group or set of operations by the CIA aimed at a specific person, institution or thing, with the aim of collecting information, influencing behavior, etc.

Project files: A folder for the retention of information generated by, or relating to a project. Generally broken down into four sub-files: Development and plans, production, support, and operations.

Pseudonym: False name assigned to CIA officers for use in communication channels.

Pulse camera: A camera with a shutter that is automatically tripped by a triggering device activated by changes in light density.

Resuma: Daily summary of important conversations on surveilled telephone lines prepared by monitors in the listening post.

Selected Out: Phrase used when a Foreign Service officer is retired after having been in one grade for the maximum period of time and is not considered qualified for promotion to a higher grade.

Source: A person who either wittingly or unwittingly provides information to the CIA.

Station: A CIA overseas installation. It is the Headquarters for operations in a particular country and is usually located in the country in which it is situated.

Subject file: Folder for the retention of information in written form arranged by the subject matter of the information contained.
Target: A person, institution or thing at which a project, operation or pitch is aimed.

VLS-2 trigger device: A machine which automatically triggers the shutter of a camera when it senses a change in light density. Used along with a camera and a spotting scope in a "pulse camera."
APPENDIX SEVEN: LISTING OF CIA DOCUMENTS CITED.

Annual Fitness Report on Ann Goodpasture, 1/14/64.

Article, with note in margin, in Oswald P file, by Robert S. Allen and Paul Scott, "CIA Withheld Vital Intelligence from Warren Commission," 10/21/64.

Blind Memorandum entitled "Delay in sending the first cable about Oswald."


DIR 74830, 10/10/63. (A "DIR" is a cable from Headquarters to a field station. In this report the field station is always Mexico City.)

DIR 84886, 11/23/63.

DIR 84888, 11/23/63.

DIR 84916, 11/23/63.

DIR 85371, 11/28/63.

DIR 87770, 12/9/63, with attached note.

DIR 88680, 12/13/63.

DIR 90466, 12/21/63.

DIR 16823, 7/4/67.

Draft of letter from Win Scott to John Barron, 11/25/70.

Foul Foe. The, by Winston Scott writing as Ian Maxwell.

HMMA 4300, 3/12/56. (An "HMMA" is a dispatch from Mexico City to Headquarters.)

HMMA 14793, 4/8/60.
HMMA 21845, 7/30/63.
HMMA 22005, 8/23/63.
HMMA 22135, 9/13/63.
HMMA 22267, 10/8/63.
HMMA 22307, 10/18/63.
HMMA 22433, 11/7/63.
HMMA 22452, 11/7/63.
HMMA 22536, 11/9/63.
HMMA 22726, 1/16/64.
HMMA 23343, 4/30/64.
HMMA 26006, 4/30/65.
HMMA 26160, 5/21/65.
HMMA 26414, 6/22/65.
HMMA 31303, 2/7/67.
HMMA 32497, 7/11/67.
HMMW 12725, 7/8/64. (An "HMMW" is a dispatch from CIA Headquarters to Mexico City.)
HMMW 13645, 5/13/65.
HMMW 15557, 6/14/67.
HMMW 15488, 5/18/67. (Mexico City Copy.)
Log Film 143, 9/25/63 through 9/27/63, CIA file.
entitled "LIMITED 17 July 63 (J110) to 9 Dec 1963 (J163) from Archives-Job # 70.209 Box # 1, LIMITED Production material.

Log Film 144, 10/1/63 through 10/3/63, in CIA file entitled "LIMITED 17 July 63 (J110) to 9 Dec 1963 (J163) from Archives-Job # 70.209 Box # 1, LIMITED Production material.

LIONION Project Renewal Request, 1/1/66.


Memorandum for the Record from W. David Slawson re: Trip to Mexico City, 4/22/64.

Memorandum from Chief DDP/PG to Chief of Operations/DDP, 2/3/61.

Memorandum from Chief of FI/OPS to Chief of Operations/ DDP, 1/8/60.

Memorandum from Chief/WHD, to COS/Mexico City, 12/30/63.

Memorandum from "JKB" re: Oscar Contreras, 7/10/67.

Memorandum from Shepanek to Scott Breckinridge, 7/31/78.

Memorandum from Winston Scott to the files re: June Cobb, 11/25/64.

Memorandum to Clark Anderson from Winston Scott, 11/27/63, with seven attachments.

Memorandum to DDP from Chief/WHD, 1/21/64.

Memorandum to the Legal Attache from the COS/Mexico City, 7/5/57.

Memorandum to the Ambassador from Winston Scott, 10/16/63, re "Lee Oswald Contact with the Soviet Embassy."

Mexico City Investigation Chronology, Bulky # WX-7241,
Volume I
(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled documents.)

MEXI 6453, 10/8/63. (Mexico copy. A "MEXI" is a cable from Mexico City.)

MEXI 6453, 10/9/63. (Headquarters copy.)

MEXI 6534, 10/15/63.

MEXI 7014, 11/22/63.

MEXI 7023, 11/23/63.

MEXI 7024, 11/23/63.

MEXI 7025, 11/23/63.

MEXI 7029, 11/23/63.

MEXI 7033, 11/23/63.

MEXI 7054, 11/24/63.

MEXI 7101, 11/27/63.

MEXI 7105, 11/27/63.

MEXI 7364, 12/13/63.

MEXI 9332, 5/6/64.

MEXI 9440, 6/19/64.

MEXI 5621, 12/16/65.

MEXI 5741, 12/29/65.


Note from Ann Goodpasture to Mexico City Station Cuban Section, 2/3/66.

Note to Luis Echeverria, 11/23/63.

Notes made by A. Goodpasture for John Leader, IG Staff.
re: "Background on Mexico Station Support Assets (Coverage of Soviet and Cuban Embassies)," 2/10/77.

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Project Renewal Request, 1/11/65, attachment to HMMA 25141.

Report on Oswald from John Scelso, C/WH/3, to James Angleton, C/CI, 12/24/63.

Review of Project LIEMPTY, attachment to HMMA 15979 11/18/60.

Review of Project LIEMPTY, attachment to HMMA 17999, 10/31/61.

Review of Project LIEMPTY, attachment to HMMA 20054, 10/18/62.

Review of Project LIEMPTY, attachment to HMMA 22387, 10/25/63.

Routing and Record Sheet for DIR 74830, 10/11/63.

Routing and Record Sheet for MEXI 7028, 11/23/63.

Routing and Record Sheet for MEXI 7033, 11/23/63.

Teletype from the CIA to the State Department, FBI and Navy, DIR 74678, 10/10/63.

Transcript from Cuban Embassy, 9/27/63.

Transcripts from Russian Embassy, 9/27/63, 9/28/63, 10/1/63 and 10/3/63.

Undated Draft of 1977 CIA Staff Report, Tab F, "Mexico Station Coverage of Soviet and Cuban Embassies (1963)."


Note: in addition to the above listed documents many summaries of file reviews, depositions of employees, interviews of employees, etc., are cited in the report.
FOOTNOTES
FOR LEE HARVEY OSWALD, MEXICO CITY
AND THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

1/ See Warren Report, pp. 299-304, 733-736. In support of its account of Oswald's contacts with the Soviet and Cuban diplomatic missions, the Warren Commission published the following as exhibits:

1) A note from the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Swiss Ambassador in Cuba. (Commission Exhibit 2445.)

2) Lee Harvey Oswald's visa application and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba's letter denying the visa. (Commission Exhibit 2564.)

3) Letterhead Memorandum to J. Lee Rankin from Richard Helms re: "Technical Examination of Photographs of Lee Harvey Oswald's Application for a Cuban Visa." (Commission exhibit 3127.)

4) The pages of Lee Harvey Oswald's notebook with the telephone numbers of the Cuban Consulate, the Soviet Consulate and the Soviet Military Attache's office. (Commission Exhibit 2121.)


6) A letter from J. Edgar Hoover to the Warren Commission listing the contents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's file holdings on Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination. (Commission Exhibit 834. This document listed a Central Intelligence Agency "release" dated 10/9/63 that reported Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.)

7) A memorandum dated 5/14/64 to the United States Embassy in Mexico City from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Mexico. (Commission Exhibit 2120.)

8) A memorandum dated 6/9/64 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mexico to the United States Embassy in Mexico City. (Commission Exhibit 2123.)
9) A letterhead memorandum to J. Lee Rankin from Richard Helms re: "Hours of Work at the Cuban and Soviet Consulates." (Commission Exhibit 2568.)


CIA F Interview, 6/3/78, p. 4.

See JFK Exhibit F-438, reprinted at page 5.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.; see also Section II, A, 3, below.

See JFK Exhibit F-438 and Section II, A, 3, below. A pulse camera is a camera equipped with a device that automatically triggers the shutter of the camera thereby exposing the film.

CIA B Interview, 3/24/78, p. 1/2.


Ibid.


Interview, 6/3/78, p. 2.

Ibid., p. 6.

Ibid., p. 3.

Ibid.

Ibid. 73-4.

Ibid., p. 4. Cf. Phillips Testimony, 11/27/76, pp. 107-108 and Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, pp. 46-47 in which CIA is said to have printed the contact sheets.

Classification Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, undated, pp. 1-2.

HMMA 22307, 10/18/63.

Ibid., para. 5, c. There were two common means of communication between the CIA Mexico City Station and CIA Headquarters: cables and dispatches. A dispatch from Mexico City to Headquarters always has the letter prefix "HMMA." A dispatch from Headquarters to Mexico City always has the letter prefix "HMMW." A cable from Mexico City to Headquarters always has the letter prefix "MEXI." A cable from Headquarters always has the letter prefix "DIR."

HMMA 22307, 10/18/63, para. 5, c.

Ibid.

See JFK Exhibit F-438.

HMMA 22307, 10/18/63, para. 5, c.

Ibid. There is general agreement that Robert Shaw was the case officer for this operation. The only person
who takes exception to that characterization of Mr. Shaw's role in the project is Mr. Shaw. (See: Phillips Testimony, 11/27/76, pp. 107-108; Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, pp. 45-46; C.A.F. Interview, 6/3/78, p. 6. But see: Deposition of Robert Shaw, 5/16/78, p. 34.)

\[\text{Ibid}\]

\[\text{HMA 22307, 10/18/63, para. 5, c.}\]

\[\text{HMA 22433, 11/7/63}\]

\[\text{Ibid.}\]

\[\text{Ibid., para. 1.}\]

\[\text{Ibid., para. 2.}\]

\[\text{Ibid., para. 3.}\]

\[\text{Ibid., attachment B.}\]

\[\text{Ibid., para. 3.}\]

\[\text{Ibid.}\]

\[\text{Ibid., Attachment C.}\]

\[\text{HMA 22307, 10/18/63, para 5, c.}\]

\[\text{HMA 22433, 11/7/63, para. 3}\]

\[\text{Ibid.}\]
(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled documents.)

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48/ Ibid.
49/ Ibid., para. 4.
50/ MEXI 9440, 6/19/64.
51/ Ibid.
52/ Ibid.
53/ Ibid.
54/ HSCA Classified notes of discussion with CIA employee, 7/20/78.
55/ Ibid.
56/ HMMA 22726, 1/16/64, CIA #4098.
57/ Ibid., para. 5, g.
58/ HMMA 26414, 6/22/65.
59/ Ibid., para. 1.
60/ Ibid., para. 3.
61/ HSCA Classified Notes of discussion with CIA employee, 7/20/78. The cryptonym was changed on 8 July 1964. (HMMW 12725, 7/8/64.)
62/ Letter from Blakey to Breckinridge, 7/21/78.
63/ See Sections III, A, 5 and 6 below.
64/ JFK Classified Document #142.
65/ Ibid.
66/ JFK Classified Document #146.
67/ Ibid.
68/ Ibid.

Classification: TOP SECRET

Classified by derivation:
This assumption is considered reasonable in light of the desire of the Mexico City Station to establish coverage of the newly reopened Consulate entrance. See HMMA 22307, 10/18/63.

See MEXI 9440, 6/19/64; HMMA 26414, 6/22/65, para. 5.

CIA F Interview, 6/3/78, p. 4.

1966 LIONION Project Renewal Request, 1/1/66. "LIONION" was the CIA cryptonym for photographic surveillance operations aimed at the Cuban diplomatic compound.

Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, pp. 43-44-45


MEXI 9332, 5/6/64.

See discussion of this memo in Section II, B, below.
Review of Project LIEMPTY, attachment to HMMA 15979, 11/18/60; Memorandum from Chief DDP/PG to Chief of Operations/DDP, 2/3/61.

HMMA-23343, 4/30/64, para. 2. It is possible that the Saturday coverage was more extensive in 1963 during Oswald's visit. See following discussion of Review of Project LIEMPTY, attachment to HMMA-15979, 11/18/60;

Review of Project LIEMPTY, attachment to HMMA 17999, 10/31/61; Review of Project LIEMPTY, attachment to HMMA-20052, 10/18/62; Review of Project LIEMPTY, attachment to HMMA-22387, 10/25/63; and Section B. 4, following. "LIEMPTY" is the CIA cryptonym referring to the overall photo-surveillance operation aimed at the Soviet diplomatic compound.

Sketch based on HMMA-4300, 3/12/56 with attachments; Goodpasture Notes, 2/10/77, p. 1; Tab F Draft, p. 1; HMMA-14793, 4/8/60, para. 3; Goodpasture Exhibit #1, 11/20/78.

Goodpasture Notes, 2/10/77, p. 1; Tab F Draft, p. 1; Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 15.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid. See Map above. Even though LIMITED is referred to as the "primary" base because it was the first to be put into operation, the LILYRIC base produced the best photographs. (HMMA-14793, 4/8/60, para. 3)

Tab F Draft, pp. 2 and 5; HSCA Executive Session Testimony of Ann Goodpasture, 4/13/78, p. 13; HSCA Staff Interview of CIA B, 3/24/78, p. 3.

Ibid. on all preceding; HSCA Staff Interview of CIA C, 3/20/78, p. 5; HSCA Deposition of CIA C, 4/28/78, pp. 18-19; Memorandum from Chief DDP/PG to Chief of Operations/DDP, 2/3/61.

Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 13.

Classification: Top Secret

Classified by derivation: [Redacted]
Interview, 3/20/78, p. 5.

Tab F Draft, p. 5; parenthetical in original.

Goodpasture Notes, pp. 6-9.

MEXI 9332, 5/6/64.

Ibid.

CIA C1 62

Interview, 3/20/78, p. 5.

See also Section II, A, 3 above.

Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 23. Ms. Goodpasture stated that the case officer handling the project was 

Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 34

Could not remember with certainty the scope of the photographic coverage of the Soviet Embassy gate.

Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, pp. 28-29.

See below for more detail.

Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, 5/12/78; Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, 10/31/78; CIA File entitled "LIMITED 17 July 63 (J 110) to 9 Dec. 1963 (J 163) from Archives-Job #70.209 Box #1 LIMITED Production Material."

Ibid.

Goodpasture Notes, p. 2; HSCA Staff Interview of CIA C3

Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, 5/12/78; CIA C3

MMAN-31303, 2/30/67 with attached

map; MMAN-23343, 4/30/64, para. 2.

Goodpasture Notes, p. 2. See also map printed above at p. 32.

Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, 5/12/78; Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, 10/31/78; CIA File entitled "LIMITED 17 July 63 (J 110) to 9 Dec. 1963 (J 163) from Archives-Job #70.209 Box #1 LIMITED Production Material."

Classification: TOP SECRET

(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)

Classification: CLASSIFIED

Classification: CLASSIFIED

(Classification by derivation.)
There is evidence that when the LILYRIC base was originally set up that it was planned to have it operate in this manner.

"The LILYRIC base will be principally used for photographic surveillance of the LIMERICK targets, working alternately but without any pattern, with the LIMITED base" (HMM-4160, 2/20/56, para. 5.) The station planned the operation in this manner so that many of the outward signs of photographic surveillance will be reduced." (Ibid., para. 6.)
31/ See above chart.
32/ Review of Project LIEMPTY, attachment to HMMA 15979, 11/18/60. Emphasis added. "LIMERICK" is a CIA cryptonym meaning "Soviet."
33/ Review of Project LIEMPTY, attachment to HMMA 17999, 10/31/61.
34/ See Review of Project LIEMPTY, attachments to HMMA 20052, 10/18/62 and HMMA 22387, 10/25/63.
35/ Memorandum from Chief of FII/OPS to Chief of Operations/DDP, 1/8/60.
36/ See Review of Project LIEMPTY attachments to HMMA 20052 10/18/62 and HMMA 22387 10/25/63.
37/ Memorandum from Chief of FII/OPS to Chief of Operations/DDP, 1/8/60.
38/ Memorandum for the Record, 5/19/78 from Gabielson/Cornwell.
39/ Letter from Blakey to Breckinridge, 7/25/78. See also JFK Classified Documents #'s 142 and 146.
40/ Memorandum entitled "Response to HSCA request of 25 July 1978," 8/20/78; HSCA Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, 10/31/78, p. 1. CF. Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, pp. 47-51; Goodpasture Deposition, 11/20/78, pp. 50-51, where Ms. Goodpasture testified that although the logs and the contact prints from the LILYRIC base are missing, the negatives are on file at the CIA.
41/ Memorandum entitled "Response to HSCA request of 25 July 1978," 8/20/78; HSCA Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, 10/31/78, p. 1.
42/ Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 41. HMMA 23343, 4/30/64, para. 2. Win Scott was the Chief of Station in Mexico.
City in 1963. He was a demanding and "hard" boss. (Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 10.) He was also a stickler for detail and for recording information in a retrievable form. (Ibid.; Goodpasture Notes, p. 6; Interview, 3/24/78, p. 6; Phillips Testimony, 4/25/78, p. 30.)

In 1962 or 1963 a cut-out was instituted in CIA dealings with the LIMITED photographic base. The films were still developed and processed by CIA. (Project Renewal Request, attachment to HMMA-22387, attached to Memorandum for DDP from J. C. King, 11/27/63, section I, B, 1.)
163/ Ibid., p. 40.
164/ Ibid., p. 41.
165/ Alan White Deposition, 5/18/78, p. 7.
166/ Ibid.
167/ Ibid., p. 9.
168/ Ibid., p. 15.
169/ See CIA C1 Deposition, 4/28/78, p. 4; where he calls Ms. Goodpasture "an assistant to the Chief of Station;"
170/ CIA C2 Deposition 4/28/78, p. 9; where she calls Ms. Goodpasture "Win Scott's right-hand person;" Robert Shaw Deposition, 5/16/78, p. 22; where he calls Ms. Goodpasture "sort of the special assistant to Win Scott;" Robert Shaw Deposition, 5/16/78, p. 11; where he says that Win Scott "relied very heavily on Ann Goodpasture.
171/ Goodpasture Deposition, 11/20/78, p. 34.
172/ Ibid., pp. 34-35. See Section II, C, below for detail on the telephone tapping operation.
173/ Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, pp. 34-35.
174/ Ibid., p. 35.
175/ Ibid.
176/ HSCA Deposition of CIA C1, 4/28/78, pp. 11-12.
177/ HSCA Deposition of CIA C1, 4/28/78, p. 15. CIA C2 was in charge of the Soviet Branch of the CIA Station in Mexico City. CIA C2 was his assistant.
Classified

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178/ Ibid.

179/ Ibid. [CIA C1] and [CIA C2] Interview, 3/20/78, p. 3.

180/ HSCA Deposition of [CIA C1] 4/28/78, p. 11-12.

181/ Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, pp. 64-69; Arnold Arehart Interview, 6/2/78, p. 4.

182/ Ibid.

183/ Blind Memorandum entitled "Delay in sending the first cable about Oswald"; Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, 3/15/78, p. 4; Goodpasture Testimony, 3/15/78, p. 6.

184/ Ibid. pp. 64-65.

185/ [CIA C1] and [CIA C2] Interview, 3/20/78, p. 12.

186/ Blind Memorandum entitled "Delay in sending the first cable about OSWALD"; Classified HSCA Staff Summary of Review of CIA files, 3/15/78, p. 4.


188/ CIA Component report on wiretap operations prepared by Paul Levister entitled [Crypt] and [Crypt: Two Telephone Tap Operations]; pp. 10-11. Hereinafter cited as Levister Memo. Paul Levister (pseudonym) was a Headquarters technician. He was in Mexico City from 22 September to 1 October, 1963, preparing a report on this electronic intercept operation. (HMMA-22267, 10/8/63, para. 8.) This report will be referred to in some cases in this discussion of the intercept operation. The report, however, was simplified in order "not to risk losing the reader." (Memorandum from Chief, WHD, to GOS, Mexico City, 12/30/63, para. 2.) This simplification was mainly in the area of a distinction between reels of tape and transcripts and in the procedures.
used in the collection and distribution of the reels and transcripts. (Ibid.) In this discussion of the operation other sources will be relied upon in these areas.

In addition to the telephone surveillance maintained by the CIA Station (describes technical operation and individuals) the Station also maintained (describes) surveillance on the Soviets (describes technical operation and individuals) not directed at the Soviet diplomatic compound but rather at the private apartments of Soviet officials in Mexico City. (Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 51-52.) Ann Goodpasture testified that she believed that some of these targets were located in the Cuban diplomatic compound. (Ibid.) Ms. Goodpasture's memory is not borne out by the project file (describes technical operation). The only Cuban target of this project was the name of the Cuban Commercial Attaché. (HMMA-22536, 11/9/63, para. F.2.)

Project Renewal Request, 1/11/65, attachment to HMMA-25141; Goodpasture Notes, p. 5.

HMMA 21845, 1/30/63, para. 8.

Goodpasture Notes, p. 4; Arehart Interview, 6/2/78, p. 1; Levister Memo, p. 22.

Goodpasture Notes, p. 5; Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 54.

Goodpasture Notes, p. 7.

Tab F Draft, p. 4; Levister Memo, p. 21.

Tab F Draft, p. 4; Memorandum to DDP from Chief WHD, 1/21/64, para. 5.

Interview, 3/20/78, pp. 1-2; HSCA Deposition of [CIA]. 4/28/78, p. 4.
Memorandum to the Ambassador from Winston M. Scott, 10/16/63, re: Lee Oswald/Contact with the Soviet Embassy. [CIA C1]

Interview, 3/20/78, p. 2.

HSCA Deposition of [CIA C1], 4/28/78, pp. 22-24.

Ibid., p. 20.

HMMA-22005, 6/23/63, para. 4. See also HMMA-22267, 10/8/63, para. 4; HMMA-22235, 9/13/63, para. 4; HMMA-22452, 11/7/63, para. 4 which all list reports of intercepts of American citizens, or English speaking people, in contact with Communists in Mexico. HMMA-21845, 7/30/63, para. 4, reports that the "traffic" is reviewed daily for English speaking persons making contact with the Soviet or Soviet satellite embassies.

HMMA 22267, 10/8/63, para. 2.

Ibid. In addition to the lines at the Soviet and Cuban compounds, describes technical operation lines at the Czechoslovakian and Yugoslavian Embassies were subjects of taps. (HMMA-22267, 10/8/63, para. 2.) The two lines disconnected on 23 September at the Cuban Embassy were put on lines at the Yugoslavian Embassy on the same day. (Ibid.)

HMMA 22452, 11/7/63, para. 2.

Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, 5/12/78, p. 1.

See above; HMMA 22267, 10/18/63, para. 2.

Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, 7/26/78, p. 1.

Classified by derivation: 315
See Tab F Draft, p. 4, which states that five Cuban lines were covered; Goodpasture Notes, p. 8, which also states that 5 Cuban lines were covered; and Phillips Testimony, 11/27/76, p. 11, and Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, pp. 51-53, in which they state their belief that more than three lines in the Cuban diplomatic compound were covered by this operation.

Project Renewal Request, 1/11/65, attachment to HMMA 25141, section D, 1 , (b), (1).

Phillips Testimony, 11/27/76, p. 11. See also Section III, A, 3, below.


Arehart Interview, 6/2/78, p. 5; Levister Memo, p. 22.

Arehart Interview, 6/2/78, p. 2.

Ibid., Levister Memo, p. 11.

Arehart Interview, 6/2/78, p. 3.

Ibid., p. 2; Levister Memo, p. 11; HSCA Deposition of R. Shaw, 5/16/78, p. 20.

Ibid. See also Tab F Draft, p. 4. Cf. [CIA CI] and [CIA C 2] Interview, 3/20/78, p. 5, in which the Chief of the Soviet Section in the Mexico City Station claims never to have heard of such summaries.

Arehart Interview, 6/2/78, pp. 2-3.

Ibid.; Goodpasture Notes, p. 8; Levister Memo, p. 11; Memorandum from Paul Levister to Chief/FL, 10/2/63, para. 2.

Ibid.
The resumé provided quick summaries with the full detailed transcripts arriving at the Station one or two days after the resumé.
After the assassination Headquarters asked Mexico City not to destroy any of the Soviet tapes from this operation. (DIR 87770, 12/9/63.) A note written by Ann Goodpasture in 1963 seems to confirm Arehart's assumption that the tapes were retained at the station.

(The Soviet tap operation) people just keep bringing in the reels to me (the ones I give them are not labeled so they don't necessarily know which ones return.) The storage problem is one for us and as the reels come in with transcriptions, I store them. When we can erase them, I'll take off the labels and send them back out.

(Note by Ann Goodpasture, 12/10/63, attached to DIR 87770, 12/9/63. Second parenthetical in original.)

Emphasis added. Mr. Arehart was absolutely positive that Cuban tapes were retained for thirty days because he maintained them in the special rack. (Arehart Interview, 6/2/78, p. 3.) Hence, the two week "usual practice" is probably not correct insofar as the Cuban tapes are concerned.

Classification:

(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)

19

3 and 8; HMMR-21845, 7/30/63, paras. 3 and 8; CIA
Interview, 6/3/78, p. 4; Arehart Interview, 6/2/78, p. 4.


266/ A. Tarasoff Testimony, 4/12/78, pp. 2-3.

257/ Arehart Interview, 6/2/78, p. 6.

258/ Ibid.

258/ Ibid. See also Section (e) below.

262/ Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, 3/9/78, pp. 2-4.

262/ Levister Memo, p. 32.

62/ A. Tarasoff Testimony, 4/12/78; Boris and Anna Tarasoff Interview, 4/11/78, Boris and Anna Tarasoff Interview, 11/30/76, p. 17. The Spanish transcriptions had the name of the Embassy which was taped at the top of the first page of each transcript. (Transcript here means one day's coverage on one telephone line.) Following the name of the Embassy, the number of the phone covered is given. The date and times of coverage follow immediately after the phone number. The reel number is also given at the top of the page. Along the left-hand column of the page is the cite to the meter number on the tape recorder where the transcribed conversation is located. Generally, the time that the conversation occurred, and a notation as to whether it was an incoming or outgoing call, appears at the beginning of the transcribed conversations. (Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, 3/9/78, p. 1; Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, pp. 69-70.) The format of the transcripts from the Cuban Embassy was essentially the same as the format of the Spanish language transcripts from the Soviet Embassy. (Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, 5/12/78, pp. 1-2; Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, 3/9/78, pp. 1-2.) Conversations that were in Russian were noted on the Spanish transcript were a number referring to the place on the reel where the conversation occurred. (Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, 3/9/78, p. 1; CIA Transcript/CIA No. 32.)

Classification: [Redacted]

Classified by derivation: [Redacted]
Mr. Tarasoff prepared an original and two carbon copies of all of his transcriptions. All three copies were delivered to the Station. (B. Tarasoff Testimony, 4/12/78, p. 15.) One carbon was cut and pasted onto a separate sheet of paper, with the conversations grouped by identity of the caller or by subject matter. This was done by Mrs. Tarasoff. (Ibid., and p. 19.) The original, one intact carbon and the one cut up carbon were all delivered to the station. (Ibid.)
The daily resuma for Spanish language conversations (See Section II, C, 4, b, (1), above) largely negated the need for a similar procedure for Spanish language conversations in that the important and/or interesting ones were summarized in the resuma.
Classification: [REDACTED]

(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)

\[2.28855\]

\[284/ \text{Ibid., p. 6. Interview, CIA C1/C2, 2/2/78, p. 4.}\]

\[285/ \text{A. Tarasoff Testimony, 4/12/78, pp. 8-12.}\]

\[286/ \text{Ibid., p. 12; Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, pp. 62-63.}\]

\[287/ \text{Ibid.}\]

\[288/ \text{Ibid.; HSCA Deposition of CIA C1, 4/28/78, p. 8.}\]

\[289/ \text{Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 63; Phillips Testimony, 11/27/76, p. 14.}\]

\[290/ \text{CIA C1, Interview, 3/20/78, p. 3; Phillips Testimony, 11/27/76, pp. 14-16; Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, pp. 54, 63.}\]

\[291/ \text{Ibid.}\]

\[\text{par DC2(a)}\]

Project Renewal Request, 1/11/65, attached to HMMMA 25141.

\[293/ \text{HMMMA-22135, 9/13/63, para. 3; HMMMA-22005, 8/23/63, para. 3.}\]

\[294/ \text{Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, 3/9/78, p. 1.}\]

\[295/ \text{B. Tarasoff Testimony, 4/12/78, p. 7.}\]

\[296/ \text{Ibid., pp. 16-19; Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, 3/9/78, pp. 3-4.}\]

\[297/ \text{Ibid., pp. 2-3.}\]

\[298/ \text{B. Tarasoff Testimony, 4/12/78, p. 30.}\]

\[299/ \text{Ibid., p. 13.}\]

\[300/ \text{Ibid.}\]

\[301/ \text{Ibid., p. 14; CIA C1, Interview, 3/20/78, pp. 4 and 11.}\]

\[302/ \text{See Section II above.}\]

\[303/ \text{See Section II, C, 4 above.}\]
See Sections II, A and B above.


Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, 3/9/78, pp. 6-7; CIA Transcript from Russian Embassy, 9/27/63.


Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, 3/9/78, pp. 10-12; CIA Transcript from Russian Embassy, 9/28/63.

Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, 3/9/78, p. 12; CIA Transcript from Russian Embassy, 10/1/63.

CIA Mexico City Investigation Chronology, Bulky WX-7241, Vol. I, p. 3. The transcript of this call does not give the time the call occurred. (CIA Transcript from Russian Embassy, 10/1/63.)

Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, 3/9/78, pp. 12-14; CIA Transcript from the Russian Embassy, 10/1/63.


DIR 74820, 10/10/63. See also MEXI 6453, 10/8/63 and Section IV, B, below.

DIR 74830, 10/11/63. (Mexico City copy.)

Ibid.

Ibid.
On September 27, 1963, at 10:54 a.m., the following call occurred. A woman named Silvia named Guillermo Ruiz. Ruiz tells her that he has not yet been able to reach the consul and because of that he has not called her. Silvia tells him that "we" have no time for that and asks him for the consul's phone number. Ruiz responds by asking her not to get annoyed and he wants to know if Silvia wishes to speak to the consul personally. Silvia responds that she does. Ruiz says that the number is 11-28-47. Silvia says that is fine and the conversation ends. (CIA transcript from Cuban Embassy, 9/27/63.) It cannot be determined whether this caller was indeed Silvia Duran or if she subsequently called the consul since Duran's office phone was not tapped. The tap was on the telephone used by Ruiz.

Classified Staff Summaries of Review of CIA Documents, undated and 5/12/78.

327/ See Sections II, A and B above.
328/ See Sections II, C, 4, b, (2), (c) and (d) above.
329/ HSCA Ex. Testimony; 4/12/78.
330/ See Section III, A, 1 above.
331/ HSCA Ex. Testimony; 4/12/78, p. 4.
332/ Ibid.
333/ Ibid., p. 6.
334/ Ibid. 77
335/ Ibid.
336/ Ibid.
337/ Ibid. See also Sections II, C, 4, b, (3), (c) and (e), above.
332/ A. Tarasoff Testimony, 4/12/78, pp. 7-8.

333/ Ibid.

334/ See Section II, C, 4 b, (3), (e) above.

335/ A. Tarasoff Testimony, 4/12/78, pp. 7-8.

336/ Ibid., p. 9.

337/ Ibid., p. 10.

338/ B. Tarasoff Testimony, 4/12/78, p. 25.


340/ Ibid.

341/ Ibid., p. 27.

342/ Ibid., p. 33.

343/ Ibid.

344/ See Section II, C, 4 b, (3), (e), above.

345/ See Section III, B below.


347/ A. Tarasoff Testimony, 4/12/78, p. 10. It is also interesting to note that Ms. Duran's statement that Oswald had blond hair, is also left out of subsequent CIA and Mexican official reports. (See Section V, C and VI, A below.)


350/ Ibid., p. 2.

351/ Ibid. James Angleton testified that he had in fact cleaned out Win Scott's safe but that he had not found any
photographs or intercept transcripts pertaining to Lee Harvey Oswald. (HSCA Deposition of James Angleton, 10/5/78, p. 116.)

352/ Classified Letter from Blakey to Breckinridge, 7/6/78, p. 2.


354/ Foul Foe manuscript, p. 267.

355/ See discussion above.

356/ Blind Memo re: Lee Harvey Oswald/Silvia Tirado de Duran; Source: LI/4, 11/26/63, p. 5.

357/ See Sections V, C and VI, A, below.

358/ Eusebio Azcue Public Testimony, 9/18/78, pp. 33-35.

359/ See Section II, C, 3 above.

360/ See Sections II, A and B, above.

361/ See below.

362/ See below.

363/ It should be noted that the two sets of photographs which are missing are the most relevant of all the photographs produced by the Mexico City surveillance operations. Had a photograph of Oswald been obtained, it would have most likely have been done by one or both of the bases from which production is missing. Oswald visited the Cuban Consulate which was covered by a pulse camera. The photographs of people entering the Cuban Embassy have been made available to this Committee for review but the material from the pulse camera which covered the entrance to the Consulate which Oswald visited has not been forthcoming. (See Section II, A, 3, above, for details.) The documented standard operating procedure of the Soviet target bases indicates that LILYRIC, the base from which production was not forthcoming, would have been the one in operation at the time of
Oswald's visit. (See Section II, B, 4 above and Section (b) below for details.) In addition, HUMA-14793, 4/8/60, indicated that the base from which production is missing "performs the best photography of persons visiting the front gate."

- See preceding Section III, A, 1. In fact, Oswald may have visited the Soviet Embassy 3 times also. See analysis in Classified Letter from Turner to Stokes, 10/25/78, JFK Classified Document #146.

- "Elsie Scaleti" is the CIA assigned pseudonym of this individual.

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<td>190/ Ibid. (see also: see HSCA Deposition of James Angleton, 10/5/78, p. 116.</td>
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<td>198/ Joseph B. Smith Interview, 10/19/77, p. 2, JFK Document No. 003012.</td>
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Classification: Top Secret

(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled documents.)
Des Fitzgerald was the Chief of the CIA's Cuban Task Force in 1964. Droller was a CIA Officer.

Mr. Smith explained the "Counter-Intelligence mentality" by saying that people who had it were "rabid anti-Communists" (Smith Interview, 11/2/77, p. 3, JFK Document No. 003012) and "confirmed believers in the world Communist conspiracy theory...These guys actually believed that the split between the Russians and Chinese was a great deceptive operation. Colby (former Director of Central Intelligence) even says something more amazing. He claims that Angleton absolutely believed that all CIA operations were run by the KGB. (Soviet Intelligence.) He says Angleton (former Chief of Counter-Intelligence for the CIA) believed that every top Soviet defector we took in was a plant. I think that's incredible but I know there were some guys on his staff were his true believers." (Smith Interview, 4/20/78, p. 3, JFK Document No. 008279.)
Classification: **TOP SECRET**

(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)

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415/ Ibid., p. 4.
416/ Ibid.
417/ Ibid.
418/ Ibid.
419/ Ibid.
420/ Ibid., p. 4.
421/ Ibid.
422/ Ibid.
423/ Ibid.
424/ Ibid.
425/ Ibid.
426/ Ibid.
427/ Ibid.
428/ Ibid.
429/ Ibid.
430/ Ibid.
431/ Ibid., p. 4-5.
432/ Ibid., p. 6.
433/ [CIA Interview, 8/29/78, p. 1] JFK Classified
434/ Ibid.
435/ Ibid.
436/ Ibid.

Classification: [Redacted]

[Redacted]
In considering the above detailed allegations, it is important to distinguish between the allegation that a photograph was found at headquarters as opposed to the assertion that a photograph was found in Mexico City. It is also important to remember that these allegations are what can be termed "grapevine stories." There was a photograph found in Mexico City of a man that was thought possibly to be Oswald. This photograph and the circumstances surrounding it will be dealt with in a subsequent section. Ms. Anne Goodpasture of the Mexico City Station found this photograph. (See below.) In the absence of any evidence otherwise—Note: The Watson allegation says there was a photo in Mexico City in the mid-60's; not that it was found there—it is most likely that the grapevine stories about a photo being found in Mexico arise from Ms. Goodpasture's reporting the photo of the man who has since become known as the Mexico mystery man in the same cable that reported Oswald's visit to the Soviet Embassy. (See below.) The findings of this Committee regarding the general Mexico City surveillance operations are presented in Section II, A and B above. In summary, this Committee has found that there were three photographic surveillance bases (four cameras) that may have photographed Lee Harvey Oswald in September and October of 1963. This was determined from analysis of project files for these operations and the testimony of CIA officials. (See preceding sections.)

Letter from Blakey to Carpentier, 3/2/78, JFK Document No. 005879.
This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.

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46/ See JFK Classified Document No. 146; HSCA Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, undated; HSCA Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, 5/12/78; JFK Classified Document No. 142; and Sections II, A, 4 and II, B, 3 above.

47/ See JFK Classified Document No. 142; JFK Classified Document No. 146.


HSCA Deposition of Elsie Scaleti, 5/19/78, pp. 6-7.

50/ Elsie Scaleti Interview, 3/30/78, pp. 3-5.

51/ Ibid., p. 4.

52/ Ibid.

53/ Ibid., pp. 4-5.

54/ HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, p. 31.

55/ Ibid.

56/ In addressing this question, the HSCA staff reviewed all the cable and dispatch traffic between Mexico City and Headquarters for the period from October 1, 1963 to 26 November 1963 in an attempt to determine whether Oswald's photo may have been sent to Headquarters. This examination also revealed no evidence that a photograph of Oswald was sent to CIA Headquarters. This Committee did find that there were several types of communications between Headquarters and field stations that were treated as non-record material. Because of the non-record nature of these communications, it was not possible to review that material.
157/ See Section II, A, 3 above.

158/ HSCA 22307, 10/18/63, para. 5, c.

159/ See Section II, A, 3 above.

60/ Ibid.

61/ HSCA 22433, 11/7/63, attachments B and C.

62/ HSCA Deposition of Elsie Scaletti, 5/19/78, pp. 44-47.

63/ HSCA Deposition of Ann E. G. Egerter, 5/17/78, p. 70; HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, p. 31.

64/ Ibid.

65/ HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, pp. 31-32.

66/ Ibid., p. 32.

67/ Ibid., p. 47.

68/ Ibid. Emphasis added.

69/ Foul Foe manuscript, p. 273.

70/ See Section III, A, 1 above for a more detailed exposition of the conversations.

71/ Memorandum to Clark Anderson from Winston Scott, 11/27/63, with seven attachments.

72/ Ibid.

73/ Ibid., p. 1.

74/ Ibid.

75/ Ibid., p. 9.

In which it is claimed that Oswald spoke Castilian Spanish.

If one assumes that Oswald could not speak any Spanish then only two conclusions about the first three calls of 9/27/63 are possible: 1) either these calls do not pertain to Oswald, or 2) they do pertain to Oswald but were made by someone other than Lee Harvey Oswald. This second possible conclusion will be addressed in a more detailed fashion in subsequent sections due to its ramifications vis-à-vis Oswald's activities and possible associates as opposed to the substance of the information available to the CIA Station prior to the assassination.

This cable was sent from Mexico on 8 October and was received by Headquarters on 9 October. Hence, it is alternately referred to as either the 10/8 or 10/9 cable.

A "P" file is simply a personality file. It was the Mexico City Station equivalent of a 201 file.
Classification: TOP SECRET

(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA-controlled documents.)

489/ HSCA Deposition of CIA C1 4/28/78, p. 46.
490/ Ibid. CIA Transcript from Russian Embassy, 9/27/63.
491/ Ibid. CIA Transcript from Russian Embassy, 9/27/63.
492/ Ibid. HSCA Deposition of CIA C2 4/28/78, p. 76.
493/ Ibid. HSCA Deposition of CIA C1 4/28/78, p. 46.
496/ Ann Goodpasture, Testimony 4/13/78, pp. 107; MEXI 6453, 10/8/63, para. 2.
498/ See Sections III, B, 2, above, and IV, B, below.
499/ D. Phillips Interview, 8/24/78, A Report on Oswald from John Scelson to J. Angleton, 12/24/63, p. 4. ibid.
500/ Ibid.
501/ CIA Transcript from Russian Embassy, 9/27/78.
502/ Ibid.
503/ See Section II, C, 4, b, (3), above.

Classification: TOP SECRET

Classified by derivation:
Classification: TOP SECRET

(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled documents.)

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507/ Tab F Draft, p. 5.

508/ Arehart Interview, 6/2/78, pp. 4-5; JFK Classified Document No. 151.

509/ HMAA-22005, 8/23/63, para. 4; see also Section II, C, 4 above.


511/ Ibid.: Arehart Interview, 6/2/78, p. 5; Testimony of B. Tarasoff, 4/12/78; p. 10.

512/ Testimony of Boris Tarasoff, 4/12/78, p. 11; Testimony of A. Tarasoff, 4/12/78, p. 14.

513/ Tab F Draft, p. 5.

514/ Ibid.

515/ Tab F Draft, p. 5: Preceding Section II, B, 5; Log Film 144, 10/1/63 through 10/3/63.

516/ See Nightwatch, pp. 140-141. Couldn't locate.

517/ David A. Phillips Testimony, 11/27/76, p. 64.

518/ MEXI 6453, 10/8/63.

519/ Ibid.

520/ Ibid.

521/ HSCA Deposition of [CTA C2]; 4/28/78, pp. 158; HSCA Deposition of [CTA C1]; 4/28/78, p. 35.

522/ Classified HSCA Staff Summary of CIA documents, undated, entitled "Periodic File Summary: Dave Phillips - 3 Components."

Classification: TOP SECRET

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 Classified by derivation: 336
523/ Blind Memorandum entitled "Delay in Sending the first Cable about Oswald."

524/ HSCA Deposition of CIA C1, 4/28/78, p. 30.


526/ HSCA Deposition of CIA C2, 4/28/78, pp. 56-57.

527/ Classified HSCA Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, 6/26/78, p. 4.

528/ Ibid.

529/ Deposition of CIA C2, 4/28/78, p. 65. Cf. "Foul Foe" manuscript, p. 268, where Win Scott writes: "In fact, Lee Harvey Oswald became a person of great interest to us during this 27 September to 2 October, 1963 period"; and on page 269, where he writes: "Because we thought at first that Lee Harvey Oswald might be a dangerous potential defector from the U.S.A. to the Soviet Union, he was of great interest to us, so we kept a special watch on him and his activities."

530/ HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, p. 25.


533/ HSCA Deposition of CIA C1, 4/28/78, p. 36.

534/ See above. Cf. "Foul Foe" manuscript, pp. 268-269.

535/ HSCA Deposition of CIA C2, 4/28/78, p. 52.


537/ Ibid., p. 27-28.

538/ HSCA Deposition of CIA C1, 4/28/78, p. 30.
The HSCA has requested a copy of any internal regulations or any liaison agreement with the Federal Bureau of Investigation that may have been in existence in 1963. (Letter to Breckinridge, 7/20/78.) The CIA responded "that there are not now, nor were there any, agreements between the CIA and FBI or other U.S. government agencies concerning CIA responsibility to report on contacts of U.S. citizens with Communist Embassies or officials. The CIA under operative legislation has a counterintelligence responsibility for counterintelligence cases but it is not a matter of agreement with other agencies nor does it concern simple contacts of Americans abroad with Communist Embassies or officials." (Memorandum to Breckinridge from Shepanek, 7/31/78.)

See Section III, B, 2, above.

The connection of this photograph to Oswald by including the description in the cable that reported Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy has created more confusion and controversy than perhaps any other CIA related issue stemming from assassination. Consequently, this Committee has made an attempt to determine the circumstances surrounding the mistaken linkage of this photograph to Oswald as well as the consequences of that mistake. The consequences
of the mistake will be dealt with in more detail in subsequent sections.

49/ HSCA Deposition of CIA, 4/28/78, p. 33; HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, p. 35; Ann Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, pp. 33, 36-37.

50/ HSCA Deposition of Allan White, 5/18/78, p. 28.

51/ Ann Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 107. See also Ann Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 84; and HSCA Deposition of Allan White, 5/18/78, p. 32.

52/ Log Film 143, 9/25/63 through 9/27/63.


54/ CIA-Transcript from Russian Embassy, 10/1/63.

This mistake was evidently not discovered until 1976. See WX7241, a chronology of the Mexico City investigation prepared by Raymond Rocca in 1967 which lists the date as 1 October; A note on HMMW-15488, 5/18/67 which indicates that Ann Goodpasture checked the photographs and that "negatives are in LIMITED photo chrono for 1 Oct 1963."

56/ Log film 144, 10/1/63 through 10/3/63.


58/ See Classified HSCA Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, 6/26/78, pp. 3-5.


60/ See Section III, A, 5 above.

61/ MEXI 6453, 10/9/63.

62/ Ibid.

63/ HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, p. 34; HSCA Deposition of Elsie Scaletti, 5/19/78, p. 26.
564/ Ibid.

565/ Ibid.

566/ Ibid. A restricted file is a method of keeping abreast of any information that develops on the subject of the file. The file is marked to indicate that it cannot be reviewed without the permission of the person who made the restriction. The effect is that if anyone wants to see the file, the custodian of the file learns of that desire and the information leading to it. (HSCA Deposition of Ann E. G. Egerter, 5/17/78, p. 51.)

567/ See Section

568/ HSCA Deposition of A. Egerter, 5/17/78, p. 77.

569/ Deposition of Elsie Scalaleti, 5/19/78, p. 29.

571/ Ibid., pp. 70-71; HSCA Deposition of Elsie Scalaleti, 5/19/78, p. 33.

572/ Ibid. The Zed (Greenwich) times stamped on the cable and the teletype indicates that the teletype was sent before the cable.

573/ DIR 74830, 10/10/63.

574/ Ibid.

575/ Ibid.

576/ Ibid.

577/ Teletype from CIA to State, FBI and Navy, DIR 74678, 10/10/63.

578/ Ibid.

579/ The mistaken identification of Oswald as "Lee Henry" is dealt with in another section of this final report.

581/ HSCA Deposition of Elsie Scaleti, 5/19/78, pp. 34-35.
582/ Ibid.
583/ Ibid., pp. 35-37.
584/ Elsie Scaleti Interview, 3/30/78, p. 8.
585/ Ibid., pp. 11-13.
586/ HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, p. 51.
587/ Report on Oswald from John Scelso, C/WH/3, to James Angleton, C/C1, 12/24/63, p. 4.
590/ Ibid.
591/ See preceding text.
592/ HSCA Deposition of Elsie Scaleti, 5/19/78, p. 31.
593/ Ibid., p. 30; See also HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, pp. 27, 28.
595/ '77 IGR, Tab G.3, p. 3.
596/ Ibid.
597/ Teletype from CIA to State, FBI and Navy, 10/10/63, DIR 74678.
598/ HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, 4/28/78, p. 43; HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, 4/28/78, pp. 89-90.
Scott's manuscript may provide a clue when he writes that during his first contact with the Soviet Embassy, Oswald gave his name very slowly and distinctly." (Foul Foe Manuscript, p. 267.) If Oswald used his middle name at that time it would explain why Scott wrote "sic." by "Henry." But it should be noted that Oswald's name does not come up in any of the transcripts made available by the CIA until 10/1/63, and Oswald's middle name is not given in that transcript. It is possible that there is one additional transcript, possibly of the conversation that Scott, on page 267 of his manuscript, refers to as Oswald's "first contact," which, if in existence, has not been made available to this Committee. (See Section III, A, 5, above.)

DIR 74830, 10/11/63.

HSCA Deposition of Allan White, 5/18/78, p. 35; Ann Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 104.

Ann Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 105.

Emphasis in original.

Routing and Record Sheet for DIR 74830, 10/11/63.

HSCA Deposition of Allan White, 5/18/78, pp. 33-34; HSCA Deposition of CIA, 4/28/78, p. 46; HSCA Deposition of CIA, 4/28/78, pp. 84-86, 88-89.

HSCA Deposition of CIA, 4/28/78, pp. 43-44; David A. Phillips Testimony, 11/27/76, p. 89.

HSCA Deposition of Allan White, 5/18/78, p. 37.

See Section III, A, 7, above.
See Section III, A, 1, above.

Note on Article by Robert S. Allen and Paul Scott, "CIA Withheld Vital Intelligence from Warren Commission," 10/21/64.

The Chief of the Mexico Branch at Headquarters has told this Committee that it is his belief that the tapes were probably still in existence at the time of the assassination. (HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, p. 76-77.) But the testimony of the persons at the Mexico City Station is consistent in saying that the tapes did not exist at the time of the assassination. (See HSCA Deposition of Robert Shaw, 5/16/78, p. 29; HSCA Deposition of Allan White, 5/18/78, pp. 20; David A. Phillips Testimony, 11/27/76, p. 63; David A. Phillips Testimony, 4/25/78, pp. 17, 23; Ann Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 94.)

See Section II, C, 4, b, (3), (e); Tab F Draft, pp. 5-6.

If the 9/28/63 conversation received expedited handling, it is possible that it would have been in the Station prior to the first or second of October.

A. Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 95.

DIR 84886, 11/23/63, para. 2.

MEXI 7023, 11/23/63, para. 2.

MEXI 7025, 11/23/63, para. 4.

MEXI 7054, 11/24/63, para. 3.

See discussion in text above and below.

See Section II, C, 4, above.

Ann Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 94.

Ann Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, pp. 95-96; See also pp. 77, 93, 110.
Classification:

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626/ B. Tarasoff Testimony, 4/12/78, pp. 12, 13.

627/ HSCA Deposition of [CTA C1] 4/28/78, p. 28.

628/ See discussion above.

629/ See footnote 614 above.

630/ Ann Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 96.


632/ HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, pp. 76-77.

633/ B. Tarasoff Testimony, 4/12/78, pp. 12, 13.

634/ See Ann Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, pp. 94-95, 77.

635/ HSCA Deposition of [CTA C1] 4/28/78, p. 28.


637/ Ann Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 75. Emphasis added.

638/ Routing and Record Sheet for DIR 74830, 10/11/63.

639/ MEXI 6534, 10/15/63.


Classification:

Classified by derivation:

*Note: The document contains references to various sources and testimony dates, and appears to be a catalog of documents and references related to a specific investigation or research project.*
42/ Memorandum for the Ambassador from Winston M. Scott, re:
Lee OSWALD/Contact with the Soviet Embassy, 10/16/63.
Emphasis added.

43/ CTA cl Interview, 3/28/78, p. 17.

44/ Ibid., p. 18.

45/ There are some cryptic references to the CIA Station trying
to determine Oswald's whereabouts after receiving the
10/11 cable. (See Testimony of Ann Goodpasture, 4/13/78,
p. 113.) The procedures used in this attempt and the
actions that may have been taken have not been deter-
mind. If any records exist of these efforts, they have
not been made available to this Committee.

46/ HSCA Deposition of Elsie I. Scaletti, 5/19/78, p. 43.

47/ HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, pp. 61-62.

48/ HSCA Deposition of Elsie I. Scaletti, 5/19/78, pp. 29-30.

49/ HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, pp. 44-47.


51/ HSCA Deposition of Alan White, 5/18/78, p. 36.

52/ Ann Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, pp. 111-114.

53/ HSCA Deposition of [CTA cl 4/28/78, pp. 74-75;
Ibid., p. 81.

54/ See discussion above.

55/ Phillips Interview, 8/30/78, p. 5.

56/ Foul Foe manuscript, pp. 268-269. Emphasis added.

57/ HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, pp. 63-64.

58/ HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, pp. 64-65.

The sequence of the cables can be determined in that they were numbered sequentially as they were sent. In this regard it should be noted that this system can indicate the order in which the cables were sent but not the order in which they were written because, at least in Mexico, several of the Station officers were drafting and sending cables. Hence, the order of writing them may not be the same as the order in which they were sent.
HSCA staff have wondered whether or not the Mexico City Station was entirely forthcoming of their own will with Headquarters. This speculation was based on three pieces of information. The first is the report in MEXI 7024 that Headquarters had all the available information. The second is a note from Win Scott on the Routing and Record Sheet for MEXI 7033 which says:

I had a call from Washington (John Scelso) at 1620 hours on 23/XI. I told John Scelso at 1630 hours (our time) on 23/XI that this would be on route to him.

The third is a cable reporting that on the 23rd Win Scott had an urgent call to see the President of Mexico. The cable reports that Scott expected the President to express his condolences over the assassination but "developed that [Source] had located call to Soviet Embassy of Lee Oswald made on 28 September."

The Committee declines to speculate that the Mexico City Station was possibly considering not reporting all the information available to them. It was considered that this may have been contemplated in order to protect themselves from a charge about their failure to report the information prior to the assassination.
You get a psychological question. The Chief of Station is called in to speak to the new Ambassador when the new Ambassador got there--no, it wasn't that. It was a very peculiar situation in Mexico whereby the then-Ambassador whose name I have forgotten.

Q: Thomas Mann?

A: Yes. He was a very fine guy and recognized the usefulness of this arrangement. The next Ambassador, Mr. Freeman,

So, the result was, eventually, Winston Scott and Ambassador Freeman went to the White House and talked to President Johnson and straightened the whole thing out in favor of Winston Scott.
So, Scott is just remarking that it is interesting that

No substitute language.

Q: He should have been since it was a [describes technical operation.]

A: Yes. But you do not always know whether he was informed. I think we always knew he was informed. I think we always knew he was informed. It is just significant that the person calls you in and says, here is some intelligence about the Kennedy thing.

(HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, pp. 83-84.)

Win Scott indicated that he was going to write a memorandum concerning his meeting with the President of Mexico. (Routing and Record Sheet for MEXI 7028, 11/23/63.) If Mr. Scott wrote such a memo, it has not been made available to the HSCA. David Phillips, who after serving in Mexico, went on to accumulate quite an impressive record as a Chief of Station in several countries himself, told Committee investigators that a memorandum of this sort, along with other "sensitive" information would be the type of thing that Win Scott probably kept in his private safe. (David A. Phillips Interview, 8/24/78, p. 10.) Mr. Phillips added that he did not know what happened to Mr. Scott's safe after he died but he had heard vague stories about someone finding a lot of documents that Scott had kept. (Ibid.)

680/ MEXI 7054 11/24/63, para. 3.
582/ MEXI 7023, 11/23/63, para. 2.
583/ MEXI 7023, 11/26/63, para. 2.
584/ See Section II, C, 4, above.
585/ For example, MEXI 7023 reports that a voice comparison was not done while MEXI 7025 implies that one was done.
and a year later Ann Goodpasture noted on a newspaper article that such a comparison was done. Note also the MEXI 7024 reported that EQ had all the available information when in fact all conversations were reported in a later cable, MEXI 7033.

685/ See Section III, A, 1, above.
686/ See Section III, A, 1, above.
687/ See Section III, A, 1, above.
688/ See Section III, A, 1, above.

688a/ Note to Luis Echevarria, November 23, 1963, CIA No. 444; Cable re Oswald-Duran, MEXI 7029, November 23, 1963, CIA No. 441; Raymond Rocca Chronology WX 7241, Entry 36, November 23, 1963, CIA No. 635.

689/ Ibid.
690/ Ibid.
691/ See below.

692/ Note written by Winston Scott re phone call with John Scelso, November 23, 1963; Chronology prepared by Raymond Rocca, WX 7241, entry 37, November 23, 1963, CIA No. 635.

693/ Ibid.
694/ Ibid.

695/ Chief of Station phone call to Luis Echevarria, November 23, 1963, CIA No. 440; Flash Cable from Karamessines to Mexico City Station, November 23, 1963, DIR 84916, CIA No. 403; Chronology of Raymond Rocca, entry 46, November 23, 1963, CIA No. 636.

696/ Blind Memo re Lee Harvey Oswald and Silvia Duran, November 26, 1963, CIA #473.

697/ Ibid.

698/ Cable from Mexico City Station to Headquarters, November 27, 1963, MEXI 7101, CIA #493.
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699/ Cable from Mexico City Station to Director, December 12, 1963, MEXI 7364, CIA No. 557-558.

700/ Cable Mexico City Station to Headquarters, November 27, 1963, MEXI 7105, CIA No. 479; Chronology of Raymond Rocca, November 27, 1963, entry no. 127, CIA No. 562.

701/ Cable from Headquarters to the Mexico City Station, November 28, 1963, DIR 85371, CIA No. 464; Chronology of Raymond Rocca, Nov. 28, 1963, WX 7241, entry No. 141, CIA No. 658.

702/ CIA Cable from Headquarters to Mexico City Station, December 21, 1963, DIR 90466, CIA No. 549; Chronology of Raymond Rocca, December 21, 1963, Entry No. 268, CIA No. 682.

703/ Ibid.

704/ Ibid. also see Section VI, B, 1.


6/ Supra, p. 186.

707/ Supra, p. 187.

707a/ Supra, p. 187.

707b/ Supra, p. 190

708/ Memorandum for the Record re Trip to Mexico City, from W. David Slawson, 4/22/64, pp. 39-40. Last Parenthetical in the original.

709/ Ibid.

710/ HSCA Interview of Silvia Duran, 6/6/78, JFK Document #011775, p. 17.

711/ Letter HSCA to Mexican government,

712/ HSCA interview of Silvia Duran, 6/6/78, JFK Doc. #011775, p. 20.

713/ Ibid., p. 19-23.
737/ Ibid.
738/ Ibid., p. 96.
740/ Ibid.
741/ LIRING/3 was a source the CIA rated reliable.
742/ Ibid.
743/ Ibid.
744/ Ibid.
745/ Ibid.
746/ LIRING 3's case officer's pseudonym.
747/ Ibid.
748/ Ibid.
750/ See Section, VI, C, below.
751/ W -7241, entry no. 613.
752/ FBI, CIA, State Department.
753/ "Pitched" is a term used by the CIA to designate an attempt to recruit an individual.
754/ HSCA Interview of David Phillips, 8/3/78, p. 8. See also HSCA Testimony of Ann Goodpasture, 11/20/78, p. 63.
756/ Ibid.
757/ Ibid.
758/ Memorandum for the Record on Trip to Mexico City, from W. David Slawson, 4/22/64, pp. 22-23. Emphasis added.

759/ HSCA Interview of David Phillips, 8/3/78, p. 8.

760/ Extremely reliable source.


762/ HSCA Interview of David Phillips, 8/3/78, p. 9.

763/ Ibid.

764/ Ibid.

765/ Ibid.

766/ Ibid.

767/ Ibid.

769/ Summary of CIA file review of Silvia Duran.

769/ Personality.

770/ The HSCA requested of the CIA on August 20, 1978 an explanation of why there was no "P" file on Silvia Duran, Luisa Calderon Carralero, Teresa Proenza Proenza, Eusebio Azcue Lopez, Guillermo Oresta, Ruiz Perez, Gilberto Policarpo Lopez, Juan Manuel Calvillo Alonso and June Viola Cobb Sharp

The agency responded the following on September 11, 1978:

Station index cards show the following information re 201 numbers and "P" numbers:

1) Silvia Duran (No info re "P" number)

2) Luisa Calderon Carralero P-8292 Destroyed

3) Teresa Proenza Proenza (No info re "P" number)
4) Eusebio Azcue Lopez  P-6613 Destroyed

5) Guillermo Orestes Ruiz Perez (No info re "P" number)

6) No index card on Gilberto Policarpo Lopez, there is an index card on one Gilberto Policarpo Lopez which does not list any 201 or "P" number.

7) Juan Manuel Calvillo Alonso (No info re "P" number)

8) June Viola Cobb Sharp  P-7381 Destroyed.

771/ HSCA Interview of [ATA D], 8/29/78, p. 1.

772/ Ibid.

773/ Ibid., p. 1.

774/ CIA, FBI, State Department.

775/ HSCA Testimony of Barney Hidalgo, 8/10/78, p. 16.

776/ Ibid.

777/ Ibid.

778/ Ibid.

779/ Warren Commission, p. 302.
780/ The U.S.-Cuba relations in 1963-1964 were not very good. See U.S.-Cuban Relations Section. Also, Azcue traveled from Mexico to Cuba on November 18, 1963.

781/ Letter from HSCA to Cuban government, JFK Doc.

782/ See Transcript Cuba Trip 1, April 1, 1978.

783/ HSCA Interview of Eusebio Azcue, April 1, 1978, pp. 12-21, JFK Doc. # 007005. See p. 205

784/ Ibid.

785/ See Cuba procedural write-up trip 2.

786/ Letter HSCA to Cuban government, JFK Doc. #

787/ Mr. Azcue could not pinpoint the exact dates of the visit.


789/ Ibid.

789-A/ Communist party membership card, Fair Play For Cuba membership card, Soviet Union residence card, marriage certificate with the name of his Russian wife.

789-B/ HSCA Public Hearing Testimony of Eusebio Azcue Lopez, 9/18/78, p. 32.

789-C/ Ibid., p. 29-30.

789-D/ Ibid., p. 30.

789-E/ Ibid., p. 20.

789-F/ Azcue could not pinpoint the exact date.

789-G/ HSCA Public Testimony of Eusebio Azcue, 9/18/78, p. 32.

789-H/ Ibid., p. 33.
Ibid. pp 50-51

789-J Azcue could not pinpoint the time of the phone call.

790/ HSCA Public Hearing Testimony of Eusebio Azcue Lopez, 9/18/78, p. 34.

791/ Ibid., p. 35.

792/ 10:00- 2:00

793/ HSCA Public Testimony of Eusebio Azcue Lopez, 9/18/78, p. 36.

794/ Ibid., p. 38.

795/ Ibid.

796/ Ibid.

797/ Ibid., pp. 50-51. 797a/ AMMUG, a CIA Defector, alleged that Mirabel Diaz was a DGi agent.

798/ Mr. Mirabal could not pinpoint the exact dates of Oswald's visit but opined that the second visit occurred on September 27, 1963.

799/ HSCA Public Testimony of Alfredo Mirabal Diaz, 9/18/78, p. 117.

800/ Ibid.

801/ Ibid., p. 118.

802/ Ibid., p. 120. 802a/ Ibid. p. 199 802b/ Ibid.

803/ WX 7241, p. 94, entry no. 430; Blind Memo dated 10/5/64.

804/ See appendix 5 for biography.

805/ WX 7241, p. 94, entry no. 430; Blind memo dated 10/5/64.

806/ Ibid.

807/ Ibid.

Classification: TOP SECRET

See appendix 5 for biography.
A "witting" asset is the title given to a CIA source whose information is being used by the CIA.

CIA No. 580-583, WX 7241, Entry #427, p. 92, CIA #719.

Ibid. circa October 1964.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Also, Winston Scott was the Mexico City Chief in 1964.

CIA No.'s 580-583; WX 7241, Entry #427, p. 42, CIA #719.

WX 7241, p. 94, Entry #430, CIA #721; Blind memo dated 10/5/64, CIA #576.

Personality.

See WX 7241, p. 94, CIA #721.

WX 7241 p. 87, CIA #714.

CIA 10/12/64 memo, CIA #596; WX 7241, p. 87, CIA #714.

Tichborn was [Source] crypłonym. [Source] was a witting asset who wrote propaganda pieces for the CIA. After careful review of [Source] CIA file, the HSCA has not been able to establish a link from [Source] to either Ms. Odio or Cobb.
Classification: TOP SECRET

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826/ The Committee has not been able to determine why the memo was not sent to Headquarters.

827/ CIA 10/12/64 Memo, CIA #596; WX 7241, p. 87, CIA #714.

828/ The House Select Committee has been unable to determine the agent's identity since his name does not appear in any CIA files.

829/ Memo from Winston Scott to the files, re June Cobb, 11/25/64, CIA No. 592-593; WX 7241, p. 88, Entry #404, CIA #715.

830/ While reviewing file the Committee determined that was Manuel Calvillo who Elena claimed escorted her and her daughter to the Vermont Hotel for protection the day following JFK's assassination.

831/ Memo from Winston Scott to the files, re June Cobb Sharp, 11/25/64, CIA Nos. 592-593, WX 7241, p. 88, Entry #404, CIA No. 715.

832/ Ibid.

833/ Ibid.

834/ HSCA Review of Classified CIA Documents.

835/ The Legal Attache in 1964 was Clark Anderson.


837/ Ibid.

838/ To be checked at FBI.

839/ FBI investigation of President Kennedy's assassination had established that Lee Harvey Oswald had departed Mexico City by bus at 8:30 a.m. on October 2, 1963. Elena Insurgente.

A review of CIA files corroborated that the FBI never forwarded the information to the CIA.

The Committee has been unable to determine who initiated the discussion re Lee Harvey Oswald.
862/ CIA #586-587, Wx-7241, Entry No. 425, CIA p. 718.

863/ See Section VI, A, 2a.


865/ Ibid.

866/ Ibid.

867/ Ibid.

868/ Ibid.

869/ Ibid.; also see HSCA investigation of Elena Garro de Paz/ allegations.


872/ HSCA pre-interview of Ruben Duran, 5/31/78

873/ The House Select Committee has determined that the Central Intelligence Agency received the copy of the Thomas memorandum prior to December 25, 1965, his next meeting with Elena Garro; Also, see below.

874/ CIA No. 588, note from Stanley Watson to Chief of Station.

875/ Ibid.

876/ Cable from Mexico City to the Director, MEXI 5621, Dec. 16, 1965, CIA No. 584-585.

877/ Ibid.

878/ Ann Goodpasture.

879/ Cable from Mexico City to the Director, MEXI 5621, Dec. 16, 1965 CIA Nos. 584-585.

880/ Chief of Station in Mexico City.
Sucessor to Clark-Anderson as Legal Attache in Mexico City.


Ibid.

Ibid.

CIA Nos. 580-583, Wx-7241, Entry #427, p. 92, CIA #719.

Ibid.; The meeting with the Legal Attache officer occurred on November 24, 1964. Also, see supra, p.

CIA Nos. 580-583, Wx-7241, Entry #427, p. 92, CIA #719.
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902/ Ibid.
903/ Him: John F. Kennedy.
904/ CIA Nos. 580-583; Wx-7241, Entry #427, p. 92.
   CIA #719.
905/ Ibid.
906/ HSCA Public Testimony of Eusebio Azcue, 9/18/78, p. 84.
907/ CIA Nos. 580-583; Wx-7241, Entry #427, p. 92, CIA #719.
908/ Ibid.
909/ Ibid.
910/ Ibid.
911/ Ibid.
912/ Noe Palomares was the Mexican Minister of Immigration in 1963.
913/ CIA Nos. 580-583; Wx-7241, Entry No. 427, p. 92, CIA #719.
914/ Ibid.
915/ Ibid.
916/ Ibid.
917/ Ibid.
918/ Ibid.
919/ Ibid.; Also, for confirmation see Memo from Legat to
   Winston Scott, 10/13/66, CIA No. 564; Wx-7241, Entry
   #466, p. 98, CIA #725.
920/ CIA Nos. 580-583; Wx-7241, Entry No. 427, p. 92, CIA #719.
921/ Ibid.

Classification: TOP SECRET

2001049 Classified by derivation
VICTOR RICO GALAN is dead. The Committee could not verify Ms. Garro’s allegation.

CIA Nos. 580-583; Wx-7241, Entry No. 427, p. 92, CIA p. 719; also, Silvia Duran denied the allegation, (see HSCA Interview at Silvia Duran, 6/6/78, JFK Document No. 011775, p. 81. Also, see Section VI, A, 2a.)

CIA Nos. 580-583; Wx-7241, Entry No. 427, p. 92, CIA, p. 719.

FBI Report, 9/30/69, pp. 3-4, JFK Doc. No. 011684.

FBI Report, 9/30/69, pp. 3-4, JFK Doc. #011684.

CIA Nos. 580-583; Wx-7241, Entry #427, p. 92, CIA #710.

Ibid.

MEXI 5621, Dec. 16, 1965; Wx-7241, Entry #426, p. 92, CIA #710.

Memo to the Ambassador from the Legal Attache, 12/27/65, CIA #578; Wx-7241, Entry 429, p. 94, CIA #721.
Winston Scott superimposed a note to Ann Goodpasture on this memo which read, "Can we send in a report to Headquarters 'dismissing' our cable?" Goodpasture responded, "Done." The cable Winston Scott wanted dismissed was MEXI 5621 which reported that station was "following up" and cabling results. The new cable was written and sent on December 29, 1965; see text.

Cable from Mexico City to the Director, 12/29/65, MEXI 5741, CIA #575; Wx-7241. Entry #430, p. 94, CIA #721.

Note from Ann Goodpasture to Mexico City Station, Cuban Section, 2/3/66, CIA No. 579; Wx-7241, Entry 428, p. 94, CIA #721.

See Section II, A, 3 above.

Classified Summary of Staff Review of CIA Documents, undated, p. 3, CIA #763.

Memo from Legat to Ambassador, 2/23/66, CIA #571; Wx-7241, Entry #455, p. 95, CIA #722.

Ibid.
The House Select Committee has been unable to determine when the copy was forwarded to the CIA.

Ibid.; see also 12/25/65 Thomas memo for corroboration.

Memo from Legat to Winston Scott, 10/13/66, CIA No. 564; Wx-7241, Entry #466, p. 98, CIA #725; Thomas' 7/13/66 memo.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Memo of Conversation by Charles Thomas, 12/25/65, p. 3, CIA #582. JFK Doc. #011684.

Wx-7241, Entry #466, p. 98, CIA #725.

"Selected out" is a phrase used when an officer is retired after having been in one grade for the maximum period of time and is not considered qualified for promotion to a higher grade.


Ibid.

Deputy Chief of Mission, State Department, Chief of Affairs at the time of President Kennedy's assassination and subsequent Oswald investigation.

Letter from Charles Thomas to William Rogers, Secretary of State, July 25, 1969. JFK Doc. #011684.

Ibid.

FBI Report, 9/30/69, pp. 3-4, JFK Doc. #011684.

Ibid.

Letter from Charles Thomas to William Rogers, Secretary of State, July 25, 1969. JFK Doc. #011684.
The Committee was unable to determine when Elena found her calendar.

972a/ Ibid.
973/ Ibid.
974/ Ibid.
975/ Ibid.
976/ FBI Report, 9/30/69, p. 4. JFK Doc. # 011684.
977/ Ibid.
978/ Ibid.
979/ Supra, p.
980/ Supra, p.
981/ Supra, p.
983/ See Mexico City Procedural Write-up, Trip I.
984/ Ibid.
985/ Ibid.
986/ Ibid.
987/ See HSCA Staff Interview of Betty Serratos, 6/6/78, p. 6, JFK Document No. 013392; HSCA Staff Interview of Lydia Duran, 6/5/78, p. 6, JFK Document No. 011681; HSCA Staff Interview of Horatio Duran Navarro, 6/5/78, p. 25, JFK Document No. 011683; HSCA Staff Interview of Ruben Duran, 6/5/78, p. 16, JFK Document No. 011680.
988/ HSCA Staff Interview of Silvia Tirado Duran 6/6/78, p. 90, JFK Document No. 011775.
(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled documents.)

989/ HSCA Staff Interview of Silvia Duran, 6/6/78, JFK Doc. #011775, p. 54; HSCA Staff pre-interview of Lydia Duran 6/5/78; HSCA Staff pre-interview of Betty Serratos, 6/6/78; HSCA Staff Interview of Horacio Duran Navarro, 6/5/78, JFK Document # 011683, p. 9; HSCA Staff pre-interview of Ruben Duran, 5/31/78

990/ Letter from HSCA to CIA.

991/ Letter from CIA to HSCA.

992/ See Procedural Write-up Trip 2, Mexico City.

993/ Ibid.

994/ HSCA Staff Review of June Cobb Sharp file at CIA Headquarters.

995/ Supra, p.

996/ See Procedural Write-up Mexico City Trip 2.

997/ HSCA Staff Review of Manuel Calvillo file.

998/ See procedural write-up Trip 2, Mexico City and Section VII, C, below.

999/ HSCA Staff Contact Report, 7/7/78, JFK Document No. 10016.

1000/ Ibid.

1001/ HSCA Staff Contact Report, 7/7/78, JFK Document No. 013486.

1002/ HSCA Staff Contact Report, 7/14/78, JFK Document No. 9950.

1003/ Ibid.

1004/ HSCA Staff Contact Report, 8/31/78, JFK Doc. # 013487.

1005/ Ibid.
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1006/ Ibid.

1007/ HSCA Staff Contact Report, 9/5/78, JFK Document No. 011268.

1008/ Ibid.

1009/ Ibid.

1010/ Letter to Elena Garro from Committee, 9/6/78, JFK Document No. 011383; see also, HSCA Staff Contact Report, 9/5/78, JFK Document No. 011268.

1011/ HSCA Staff Contact Report, 9/7/78, JFK Document No. 011345.

1012/ Ibid.

1013/ Ibid.

1014/ HSCA Staff Contact Report, 9/15/78, JFK Document No. 013488.

1015/ HSCA Staff Contact Report, 9/12/78, JFK Document No. 011344.

1016/ HSCA Staff Contact Report, 9/15/78, JFK Document No. 013488.

1017/ HSCA Staff Contact Report, JFK Document No. 011344.

1018/ UNAM - Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México

1019/ American Embassy Incoming Telegram # A-43-570, p. 110, CIA #737.

1020/ Ibid.

1021/ Ibid.

1022/ Ibid.

1023/ Ibid.

1024/ Ibid.

1025/ Letter to Wesley D. Bowles, Chief of Mexican Political Affairs, Office of Mexican Affairs, Department of State from B. J. Ruyle, American Consul, Tampico, 5/11/67; Wx-7241 Entry #597, p. 114, CIA #741.
The Committee could not determine when the State Department forwarded the letter to the CIA.

Dispatch from the Director to Mexico City, 6/14/67, HMMW 15557; Wx-7241, Entry #616, p. 117, CIA #744.

Cable from Mexico City to the Director, MEXI 1950, 6/29/67, Wx-7241, Entry #622, p. 118, CIA #745.

El Sol is a newspaper, The Sun.

When Contreras was asked to identify the other four individuals who had met Lee Harvey Oswald, he refused to reveal their names because he feared that informing on them might endanger his family.
The leaders of the group were Victor Manuel Barcelo, Carlos Andaluz, Hugo Castro Aranda, Antonio Tenario Adams, Jose Guerrero Guerrero, Carlos Ortiz Fejeda, Daniel Molina, Bron Balvez, Humberto Biriarte, Oscar Gonzales, Hiram Garcia, Pedro Sainz Zepeda, Alberto Cerecer, Jose Eduardo Pascual, Juan Saldana, Martin Reyes Baissadel, Vicente Luillamar, Rubelio Fernandez Durado and Jesus Ochoa.

Memo from JKB re Oscar Contreras, 7/10/67; Wx-7241, Entry #634, p. 120, CIA #747.

Memo from JKB re Oscar Contreras, 7/10/67; Wx-7241, Entry #634, p. 120, CIA #747.

Memo from JKB re Oscar Contreras, 7/10/67; Wx-7241, Entry #634, p. 120, CIA #747.

Memo from JKB re Oscar Contreras, 7/10/67; Wx-7241, Entry #634, p. 120, CIA #747.

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Memo from JKB re Oscar Contreras, 7/10/67; Wx-7241, Entry #634, p. 120, CIA #747.

Memo from JKB re Oscar Contreras, 7/10/67; Wx-7241, Entry #634, p. 120, CIA #747.

Memo from JKB re Oscar Contreras, 7/10/67; Wx-7241, Entry #634, p. 120, CIA #747.
Cable from Mexico City to the Director, 7/5/67, MEXI 1991, Wx7241, Entry 627, p. 119, CIA #746.

See Section VI, C.

See Section VI, D, above.

See Warren Commission Report, pp. 299-304, 733-736; also, Section I, B, VC and VI A above. Some of the more prominent are Paul Hoch and Peter Dale Scott in the Assassination in Dallas and Beyond and A. T. Weberman in Coup d'etat in America.

See Sections V C, VIA and B respectively.

Tbid.

Silvia Duran.

Eusebio Azcue Lopez, Alfredo Mirabal Diaz, Orestes Guillermo - Ruiz Perez, Nilo Otero, Maria Teresa Proenza y Proenza.


See Glossary.

The Handwriting Panel concluded that the signature on the visa application was identical to other samples of Lee Harvey Oswald's handwriting.

HSCA Interview of Silvia Duran, 6/6/78, JFK Document 011775. Consul Azcue stated that standard operating procedure at the Cuban Consulate did not allow applications to be removed from the office. (HSCA Public Testimony of Eusebio Azcue, 9/18/78, p. 41)

Tbid., pp. 31-33.


See Section III B 2 above.

Tbid.

classification:

(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled documents.)
1095/ See Section VI C above and VII B below.

1096/ See Section III A 1 above. Telephone taps.

1097/ HSCA Staff Interview of Silvia Duran, 6/6/78, JFK Document No. 011775, p. 44.

1098/ The CIA's classification of the transcript of this conversation prevented the HSCA from directly confronting Ms. Duran with the information.

1099/ See Sections II, C, 3, 4 and III Al above.


1102/ Ibid.

1103/ Ibid.

1104/ See Section IV, B above.

1105/ Ibid.


1108/ Ibid.

1109/ Ibid.

1110/ Ibid.

1111/ Ibid.

1112/ The caller said Odessa.

This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled documents.


1115/ Ibid.

1116/ Ibid.

1117/ HSCA Staff Interview of Silvia Duran, 6/6/78, JFK Document No. 011775, p. 31.

1118/ HSCA Public Testimony of Alfredo Mirabal Diaz, 9/18/78, p. 119.

1119/ HSCA Staff Interview of Silvia Duran, 6/6/78, JFK Document 011775, p. 23.

1120/ Ibid., p. 31.

1121/ Ibid.

1122/ Ibid.

1123/ HSCA Public Testimony of Alfredo Mirabal Diaz, 9/18/78, p. 119.


1125/ Ibid.

1126/ Ibid.

1127/ Ibid.; also HSCA Staff Interview of Silvia Duran, 6/6/78, JFK Document No. 011775, p. 41.

1128/ Ibid.


1132/ See Section VI C, above.
1133/ See Section VI D, above.
1134/ See Section VII D, above.
1136/ Ibid.
1138/ A night when Oswald's activities are not known.
1139/ HSCA Staff Pre-interview of Ruben Duran, 3/31/78, No. 011680, p. 54; HSCA Staff Pre-interview of Lydia Duran, 6/5/78, HSCA Staff Interview of Horacio Duran, 6/5/78, JFK Document No. 011683 p. 9; HSCA Staff Pre-Interview of Betty Serratos, 6/1/78, HSCA Staff Interview of Silvia Duran, 6/6/78; JFK Document No. 011775, p. 54.

1140/ HSCA Staff Interview of Silvia Duran, 6/6/78, JFK Document No. 011775, p.91.
1141/ Ibid.
1143/ See Section VI C, above.
1144/ HSCA Staff Pre-interview of Ruben Duran, 5/31/78.
1145/ HSCA Public Testimony of Eusebio Azcue Lopez, p. 84-85.

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Classification: TOP SECRET

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(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled documents.)

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1146/ See Section VI, C above.

1147/ See Mexico City Procedures Write-up Trip 2 Appendix 3.

1148/ See Section VI, C above.

1149/ See Section VI, C above.

1150/ See Section VI, A 2 above.

1151/ HSCA Staff Interview of Silvia Duran, 6/6/78, JFK Document No. 01775, p. 81.

1152/ Ibid., p. 87-88.

1153/ HSCA Staff Review of Document file.

1154/ HSCA Staff Review of CIA Silvia Duran file.

1155/ See Appendix 3.

1156/ Ibid.

1157/ Ibid.

1158/ See Section VI, C 10 above.

1159/ See Section VI, C above.

1160/ See Section VI, C above.

1161/ See Section VI, C above.

1162/ See Section VI, C above.

1163/ See Appendix 3.

1164/ See Section VI, C 1 above.

1165/ Ibid.

1166/ Ibid.

Classification: 503

2001054

Classified by derivation.
See Appendix 3.

See Section VI, C 1 above.

See Section VI, C, above.


See Section VI, C, above.

See Section VI, D above for details.

HSCA Staff Interview of Silvia Duran, 6/6/78, JFK Document No. 011775, p. 95.

See Section VI, D above.


See Section VI, D above.

HSCA Staff Interview of Silvia Duran, 6/6/78, JFK Document No. 011775, p. 95.

See Appendices II and III.


See Section VI C above.

See Section VII, C above.

See Section VII, B above.

See Sections VI ABC above.

See Verbatim transcript of meetings prepared by Cuban government. Hereinafter, called transcript. JFK Doc. #012212.

Ibid.
4/1/78 JFK Document No 007005

1187/ See transcript.
1188/ Ibid.
1189/ Ibid.
1190/ Ibid.

1191/ See HSCA Interview of Fidel Castro Ruz, April 3, 1978. JFK Document # 007004

1192/ Pedro Gutierrez Valencia claimed that he bumped into Lee Harvey Oswald at the Consulate on September 27, 1963. Valencia was at the Consulate doing a credit check on one of the Cuban employees.

1193/ See Section VI, D above for details on Oscar Contreras' allegations.

1194/ See Section VI C for details on Elena and Elenita Garro's allegations.

1195/ Elena Garro's sister who came to the conclusion that Lee Harvey Oswald was at one of Ruben Duran's twist parties in the fall of '63.

1196/ Eunice Odio reported on Elena Garro's allegations in 1965. See Section VI, C, above.

1197/ Elena Garro reported that at one of the twist parties, Emilio Carballido and Eusebio Azcue had come to the conclusion that Kennedy had to be assassinated. (See also, Section VI, C, above.

1198/ Elena Garro alleged that Victor Rico Galan had claimed that Lee Harvey Oswald had been Silvia Duran's lover. See also, Section VI, C, above.
Díaz-Ordaz and Echevarría were the two presidents of Mexico respectively from 1964 to 1970 and 1970 to 1976.

See HSCA Staff Interview of Horacio Duran, 6/5/78, JFK Document No. 011680.

See HSCA Staff Interview of Pedro Gutierriz Valencia, 6/5/78, JFK Document No. 011682.

Lynn Duran is the sister of Horatio and Ruben Duran. The Committee wished to ask her whether Lee Harvey Oswald had attended any twist parties at the Duran homes.

See HSCA Staff Interview of Lynn Duran, 6/5/78, JFK Doc. # 011681.

See HSCA Staff Interview of Ruben Duran, 6/6/78, JFK Doc. # 011680.

The Committee never sent the Mexican government the questions because a 2nd trip to Mexico was arranged.

The Committee wished to ask Ms. Serratos whether Lee Harvey Oswald had attended any twist parties at the Duran homes. See HSCA Staff Interview of Betty Serratos, JFK Doc. # 011392.

See HSCA Staff Interview of Silvia Duran, 6/6/78, JFK Document No. 011775.

CIA A was one of AMMUG's (a Cuban DG1 Defector in 1964) Security Officers. The Committee wished to ask about AMMUG's statements about Lee Harvey Oswald's Trip to the Cuban Consulate.

CIA B was a CIA agent in charge of picking up the photographic surveillance film from personnel stationed at the three bases and delivering it to his brother-in-law (unknown) and later delivering it to his case officer Ann Goodpasture.
1209/ See HSCA Staff Write-Ups of Interview 8/8/78.

1210/ Oscar Contreras Lartigue claimed that he met Oswald in Mexico City in the fall of 1963. See Section VI, D above.

1211/ Elena claimed that when she told Noe W. Palomares about meeting Lee Harvey Oswald, he advised her to send an anonymous letter to Texas, explaining her account. The Committee wished to question Mr. Palomares about Elena’s credibility.

1212/ [Source] See Section VI, C for details and significance.

1213/ LICOOKIE I is June Cobb Sharp. See Section IV, C for details.

1214/ [Crypt] is[Source] The Committee wished to ask about commentary after the assassination at the Cuban Embassy about both Lee Harvey and John F. Kennedy’s assassination.

1215/ [Crypt] was[Source] The Committee wished to question[Source] about the Cuban Embassy employees’ reactions to the assassination. The Committee also wished to question[Source] about Silvia Duran and his knowledge of Lee Harvey Oswald.

1216/ LIRING.3 was a Cuban citizen,[Source] who was a source for the CIA. He had reported that Silvia Duran had told him that she had had an affair with Lee Harvey Oswald. The Committee wished to question him about Silvia Duran.

1217/ See HSCA Staff write-up of Interview with[CTA G]
General Jesus Jose Clark Flores escorted Ruben Duran to Russia in 1962 and was considered by many to be Duran's protector. Also, Elena claimed that Flores was at the party that she stated Lee Harvey Oswald was in attendance. The Committee wished to ask Mr. Clark Flores about all the above.

Ernesto Lehfeld Miller is a Mexican citizen that resembled Eusebio Azcue's description of the man that allegedly visited the Cuban Consulate. All the Durans recognized Miller. Horatio and Silvia said that Miller was a close friend and borrowed Horatio's car often.

See House Select Committee on Assassinations Staff Write-Up of Noe W. Palomares, 8/10/78.

See HSCA Staff write-up of interview with Ernesto Lehfeld Miller, 8/11/78.

In 1963 Nilo Otero as an official in the Cuban government's Ministry of Foreign Relations, interviewed Eusebio Azcue about Lee Harvey Oswald's visits to the Cuban Consulate.

In 1963 the Cuban government employed Rogelio Rodriguez at the Cuban Embassy. The Committee wished to interview Mr. Rodriguez about Lee Harvey Oswald's visits to the Cuban Embassy employees' reactions to the Kennedy assassination.

Rolando Cubela, known as AMUSE, was prominent in the Senate Select Committee's Book V which reported the possibility that the Central Intelligence Agency's attempts to assassinate Cuban President Fidel Castro provoked the Cuban government to orchestrate the assassination of President Kennedy in retaliation.
1225/ In 1963 the Cuban government employed Orestes Guillermo Ruiz Perez at the Cuban Embassy. The Committee wished to interview Mr. Rodriguez about Lee Harvey Oswald's visits to the Cuban Consulate and about the Cuban Embassy employees' reactions to the Kennedy assassination. In addition, Mr. Ruiz is the cousin-in-law of one of the most active anti-Castroites, Antonio Veciana Blanch.

1226/ Griselle Rubio claimed in a letter Dec. 1963 to DRI that Ruby had been in Cuba in 1962 or 1963 visiting Solomon Pratkins. The Committee located and interviewed Ms. Rubio in Miami.

1227/ James Wilcott is an ex-CIA employee who appeared voluntarily in August 1978 at the Cuban Government's Tribunal which accused the CIA of complicity in the John F. Kennedy assassination.

1228/ Philip Agee is an ex-CIA employee who appeared voluntarily in August 1978 at the Cuban government's Tribunal which accused the CIA of complicity in the John F. Kennedy assassination.

1229/ The Tribunal, held in August 1978 was an effort by the Cuban government to accuse the CIA of complicity in the John F. Kennedy assassination. Ex CIA agents, James Wilcott and Phillip Agee testified at the Tribunal along with ex-Cuban Consul in Mexico, Eusebio Azcue.

1230/ See HSCA Interview of Juan Nilo Otero, 9/25/78, JFK Document No.

1231/ Alfredo Mirabal Diaz assumed the Consul position in the Cuban government's Mexico City Consulate on September 2, 1963. He was present during all of Oswald's visits to the Consulate. Also, see HSCA Interview of Alfredo Mirabal Diaz, 8/26/78, JFK Document No.
The Committee wished to question Mr. Verdacia about the identities of the organized crime figures detained in Trinidad at the inception of the Cuban revolutionary government.

HSCA Interview of Jose Verdacia Verdacia, 8/26/78, JFK Doc. # 012224.

See HSCA Interview of Orestes Guillermo Ruiz Perez, 8/27/78, JFK Doc. #

See HSCA Interview of Rolando Cubela Secades, 8/28/78, JFK Document #

In 1963 the Cuban government employed Maria Teresa Proenza y Proenza at the Cuban Embassy. The Committee wished to interview Ms. Proenza about Lee Harvey Oswald's visits to the Cuban Consulate and about the Cuban Embassy employees' reactions to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. Also, See HSCA Interview of Maria Teresa Proenza y Proenza, 8/28/78, JFK Doc. #

See Verbatim transcript of 8/28/78 session. JFK Doc. # 012208

In 1963, Manuel Piñiero, Chief of the Ministry of Foreign Relations, interviewed Eusebio Azcue about Lee Harvey Oswald's visits to the Cuban Consulate. In addition, Mr. Piñiero was the Cuban revolutionary government official who met with Santo Trafficante and gave him 24 hours to leave the country.

In 1963 the Cuban government employed Luisa Calderon Carralero at the Cuban Embassy. The Committee wished to interview Ms. Proenza about Lee Harvey Oswald's visits to the Cuban Consulate and about the Cuban Embassy employees' reactions to the assassination of John F. Kennedy.
In 1963 Raul Roa interviewed Eusebio Azcue in Cuba about Lee Harvey Oswald's activities in Mexico City.