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(III)
INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

FRIDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 1978

House of Representatives, Select Committee on Assassinations, Washington, D.C.

The select committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 9:10 a.m., in room 345, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Louis Stokes (chairman of the select committee) presiding.


Also present: G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel and staff director; I. Charles Mathews, special counsel; Ken McHargh, staff counsel; Ronald Adrine, staff counsel; William Webb, staff counsel; and Elizabeth L. Berning, chief clerk.

Chairman Stokes. The committee will come to order.

Mr. Fauntroy, are you seeking recognition?

PERSONAL REMARKS BY DELEGATE WALTER E. FAUNTROY

Mr. Fauntroy. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I have asked for this opportunity to speak as we open the hearings this morning as a matter of personal privilege because a public allegation by James Earl Ray's attorney, Mark Lane, has called into question my integrity, the integrity of this committee, and the integrity of others for whom I have the highest respect and esteem. I should say, Mr. Chairman, that I hesitate to dignify a charge by Mr. Lane for he is a man who thrives on publicity, whether it is good or bad.

Certainly as a minister I am one who takes very seriously the teachings of Jesus in matters like this that we turn the other cheek and go the second mile and "pray for those who spitefully use us and say all manner of evil against us falsely," for I believe that, without my raising a finger, such persons will be rewarded according to their works.

But Mr. Lane's repeated attempts to spitefully use the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., for his own purposes and to spitefully use several Black leaders who were associated with Dr. King in his life requires that I remain silent no more. For apparently Mr. Lane will make any charge, call into question any person's character, and crassly exploit any situation in pursuit of his own ends.

So, Mr. Chairman, were the charges only directed at me, my reaction would be to simply turn the other cheek.

But the truth that Mr. Lane seeks to pervert, touches upon more than me and more than Ambassador Andrew Young. It is indeed an affront to the integrity of the Black nation. The life of Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr., meant much to millions of Black people, and I would say, indeed, to millions of white Americans as well, and his death deeply affected all of us. Any effort to pervert the truth associated with his death attacks the very life of Dr. King. Because there are those who, out of a genuine concern for the truth in the matter of Dr. King’s death, may be deceived by the clever words of this consummate pitchman, I must speak out, not for myself, but for the truth, and for the reputations of others who, as I have noted, I hold in high esteem, lest my silence be construed as fear or worse as consent to these lies.

The essence of Mr. Lane’s charge is that Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., was assassinated by a squad of off-duty FBI agents, under the direction of FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, that this committee has in its possession evidence that proves such an FBI plot including the names of the agents, and that I informed Ambassador Andrew Young that this committee had such evidence in its possession, but that I am afraid to make that information public.

It happens, Mr. Chairman, that the weighty question of FBI complicity in the murder of Dr. King is, in fact, the subject of today’s hearings, but before we proceed in a responsible way to consider the serious evidence to be laid before us, I believe it is incumbent upon us to address Mr. Lane’s baseless, irresponsible and blatantly false accusations.

Mr. Lane has in recent weeks announced plans to file a motion for a new trial in hopes of freeing Mr. Ray, saying he will rest the motion on sensational new evidence he claims to have obtained.

I first heard of this intention over the air here in Washington when Mr. Lane said that he knew who killed Dr. King, that he knew who paid for it, and the names of the persons responsible for the assassination. So as you recall, Mr. Chairman, when he requested a meeting with me to provide the committee with his newly discovered evidence, I readily accepted. You met with me on October 27 together with Mr. Lane, Dr. Ralph Abernathy, the Reverend James Lawson, and Mr. Dick Gregory. We came to that meeting, Mr. Chairman, we sat there expectantly, hoping that somehow Mr. Lane, as Mr. Ray’s attorney, had been able to extract from Mr. Ray or someone what 40 hours of information interviews with Mr. Ray and on our part 2 days of public interrogation of him had been unable to uncover. We looked forward to sensational newly discovered evidence that would represent a major breakthrough in the case.

Mr. Chairman, as you know, the only new evidence that Mr. Lane submitted to us at the meeting bearing on FBI complicity consisted of an affidavit by Daniel Ellsberg, the individual who attained national prominence by leaking the Pentagon Papers.

In pertinent part, the affidavit recounts a conversation Mr. Ellsberg says he had with Brady Tyson, an assistant to U.S. Ambassador Andrew Young. According to Ellsberg, Tyson related that he, the Ambassador and Mr. Young’s aide, Stoney Cooks, were informed by me that this committee had possession of evidence that established “beyond reasonable doubt” that Dr. King was assassinated by a squad of FBI men under Mr. Hoover’s direct control.

Mr. Chairman, I state categorically that the committee was not, is not, nor has it ever been, in possession of any such evidence. Nor
have I told Ambassador Young or anyone that this committee has such evidence. In fact, upon receipt of this information, the committee immediately contacted the aide to Ambassador Young who was identified as the original source of the charge, in order to determine if there is any corroboration at all of the charge that the FBI and Mr. Hoover were directly responsible for Dr. King's death.

Mr. Chairman, Ambassador Young is here this morning, as is Mr. Tyson, and Mr. Cooks, who are available to testify before this committee, if you would allow it. May I suggest that it would be appropriate to get this unfortunate diversion out of the way in order that we may get down to the serious business of examining the real evidence bearing on the FBI role in this question, and I would make that request as I urge the people around this country who have been praying that this committee would at last get at the truth about the assassination of Dr. King, would pray also for Mr. Lane, that he may come to himself and see the error of his ways before it is too late.

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman having exercised a point of personal privilege, without objection the Chair will permit the gentleman from the District of Columbia to call such witnesses as he deems best in support of this matter.

Mr. FAUNTROY. Mr. Chairman, may I then call our distinguished Ambassador to the United Nations, Andrew Young, who was one of Dr. King's closest associates, former Director of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, and with Dr. King at the time of his assassination.

Chairman Stokes. The Chair calls Ambassador Andrew Young.

TESTIMONY OF ANDREW YOUNG, U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS, REPRESENTED BY CHARLES MORGAN, ESQ.

Chairman Stokes. May I ask you to stand, raise your right hand, and be sworn. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you give before the committee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. YOUNG. I do.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you, sir. Have a seat. Can we have identified for the record counsel with the Ambassador?

Mr. MORGAN. Charles Morgan, Jr.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you, Mr. Morgan.

Mr. Ambassador, first, on behalf of the committee permit me to welcome you as a former colleague in this Congress and now our highly respected and esteemed Ambassador to the United Nations. It is indeed an honor to have you appear before this committee.

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you, very much.

Chairman STOKES. Mr. Ambassador, at this time we would ask you to proceed in any way you would prefer to proceed with reference to any allegations you are aware of made against Chairman Fauntroy and this committee by Mr. Lane. The Chair recognizes you for your own presentation.

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Let me, first of all, say that I really do appreciate the work of this committee. I was instrumental, I think, in some way helping to put it together as a member of this House. I did not choose to be a
member of the committee because the events surrounding the assassination have always been much too heavy for me to handle objectively, and yet I felt that it was important that the people of the United States and the Congress of the United States thoroughly investigate and understand the events surrounding the period which brought so many tragic assassinations to our Nation.

I have not kept up with the details of the committee's work. I was asked to come down to talk with staff counsel and with Congressman Fauntroy. I did do that. I discussed with the committee what I knew about the events surrounding the assassination in the presence of two of the staff counsel and Congressman Fauntroy, and essentially was simply attempted to assure them I wish their investigation well, I was glad to help with it in any way, and that I would be very interested in what they found out. At no time during that discussion or at any other time privately did Congressman Fauntroy suggest that he knew more information than has been generally shared in the newspaper or that was pretty much common knowledge as a result of some of the work done by committees in the Senate as well as this committee.

I guess I did not read the charges of Mr. Lane, or anybody else, but thought that I would be glad to talk with the committee about anything that I know about the situation and would gladly submit to your questioning.

Chairman Stokes. Specifically with reference to the allegation in the Ellsburg affidavit, to which Mr. Lane refers, has Mr. Fauntroy ever said to you that he or the committee had evidence that Dr. King was killed by a squad of former or off-duty FBI agents or anything of that substance?

Mr. Young. No, he has not.

Chairman Stokes. The Chair would recognize Mr. Fauntroy for any specific questions he has.

Mr. Fauntroy. I would only ask Mr. Young, if he has ever heard that Dr. King was killed by a squad of off-duty FBI agents under the direct control of J. Edgar Hoover.

Mr. Young. No; I have never heard it quite that way. I think it is one of the general conspiracy notions that flourished in that region, that the FBI and the CIA may have been involved, and I think the general and almost paranoia of those times have suggested that. In the civil rights movement there was no secret that we were constantly followed and harassed. I met with the Director and his assistant Mr. DeLoach. We did not get any satisfactory explanations. The Congressman and Ralph Abernathy, and myself met at a later time with Mr. DeLoach, and we always tried to operate openly, we had no secrets. Most of the things that went on in our movement we wanted the press to know about, and yet we were always under suspicion by what was then the kind of government in our Nation.

I say that because I think, quite clearly, many of the excesses of that period I hope have been reformed out of our Government, and we do have, I think, a completely different administration, and I think that is being transmitted down through the ranks of those agencies, but I think it was a kind of legitimate paranoia. We used to say if you weren't paranoia living under those conditions, you were really sick.
Mr. FAUNTROY. Thank you, Ambassador Young, and I do appreciate your troubling yourself to come to the committee and to publicly share your views at this time.

Chairman Stokes. The Chair will at this time recognize the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Devine.

Mr. DEVINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ambassador, we very much appreciate your making yourself available this morning. You made reference to the paranoia of the time? You, I think, were in a dramatically close position, being there at the time Dr. King was assassinated. I think you were down in the parking lot at the time; is that accurate?

Mr. YOUNG. That is correct.

Mr. DEVINE. And on the scene. I am sure that you very closely followed the events immediately thereafter and the investigations as best you could within your present capacity.

Recognizing the paranoia of the times and the rumors that were floating around, do you have any or know of any evidence either directly or indirectly placing the FBI in on any assassination plot of Dr. King?

Mr. YOUNG. No, I don't know of any evidence or have any proof. There were strange connections that we all were concerned about, and it was one of the things we wanted this committee to look into.

Mr. DEVINE. But your answer is you know of no direct or indirect evidence that the FBI was involved in the assassination?

Mr. YOUNG. No, I don't.

Mr. DEVINE. Thank you very much.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Preyer.

Mr. PREYER. I have no questions.

We welcome you back to Congress, Mr. Ambassador, and we have missed you here.

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ford.

Mr. Ford. I have no questions but I would like to say to the U.N. Ambassador, Mr. Young, we want to thank you for appearing before the committee today and when you come back again maybe we can get a good tennis game going.

Chairman Stokes. There being nothing further, Mr. Ambassador, at the conclusion of any witness testimony before the committee the witness is entitled to 5 minutes during which time the witness may explain or amplify or make any further comment he so desires, and I would extend to you at this time the 5 minutes.

Mr. YOUNG. I would just like to say that I am anxiously looking forward to the report of this committee and I would be grateful for any information which you could uncover that would not only lead to the person or persons involved in the assassinations of Martin Luther King and President Kennedy but also any information in the circumstances and methods surrounding his assassination that might be uncovered. I think it is important for the health of our Nation to understand the nature of the sickness, whether it was individual or collective, that led to these tragic events.

Thank you very much.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador.

Mr. FAUNTROY. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. Yes, Mr. Fauntroy.
Mr. FAUNTROY. May I request now that we call Mr. Brady Tyson for a few basic questions.

Chairman Stokes. The committee calls Mr. Brady Tyson.

Mr. Tyson, will you raise your right hand and please be sworn. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you will give before this committee is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God.

Mr. Tyson. I do.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you. You may be seated.

The Chair recognizes staff counsel, Mr. Charles Mathews.

Mr. Mathews. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Tyson, will you state your name and address for the record, please.

TESTIMONY OF BRADY TYSON, ASSISTANT TO U.N. AMBASSADOR ANDREW YOUNG

Mr. Tyson. My name is Brady Tyson. I live in New York City and I work at the United States Mission to the United Nations, 799 U.N. Plaza.

Mr. Mathews. Would you describe the type of work you perform at the U.N. Mission.

Mr. Tyson. My title is Foreign Affairs Officer. I work in the area of human rights, humanitarian affairs and social development and I see people who come to the mission with various human rights and humanitarian problems and who want to see various officers of the U.S. Government because they have complaints.

Mr. Mathews. How long have you been so employed?

Mr. Tyson. Since February 1977.

Mr. Mathews. Mr. Tyson, will you describe your relationship with Ambassador Young, please.

Mr. Tyson. I came to know Ambassador Young during the Poor People's campaign when he was a professor at American University. I have been a volunteer trying to assist him in various projects since that time.

Mr. Mathews. So you have known the Ambassador since approximately 1968?

Mr. Tyson. Yes, sir. 1967.

Mr. Mathews. Have you worked for him since 1968?

Mr. Tyson. Not on a professional basis except since February last year.

Mr. Mathews. So you started working for the Ambassador in February of 1977?

Mr. Tyson. Yes; I do. Before that I was a sometimes volunteer.

Mr. Mathews. In any given week, Mr. Tyson, how many times would you meet as a staff person with the Ambassador?

Mr. Tyson. I perhaps see him six or seven times a week, almost all of those in meetings about particular issues at the mission that we are working on together and with other people.

Mr. Mathews. So you would be included in top-level meetings at the U.N.?

Mr. Tyson. No, sir, not top level.

Mr. Mathews. Staff level?

Mr. Tyson. Staff level; yes, sir.
Mr. Mathews. Is that something in which other people also participate, staff meetings in which the entire mission comes together?

Mr. Tyson. Some of the meetings are like that and some of the meetings are smaller groups.

Mr. Mathews. Do you know Congressman Walter Fauntroy?

Mr. Tyson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mathews. How would you describe your relationship with Congressman Fauntroy?

Mr. Tyson. I began to know Congressman Fauntroy at the same time during the beginnings of the Poor People's campaign when I came to Washington. I have worked also as a sometimes volunteer to him through the years.

Mr. Mathews. Have you ever been employed by Mr. Fauntroy?

Mr. Tyson. No, sir.

Mr. Mathews. So your relationship with Mr. Fauntroy is basically professional?

Mr. Tyson. Basically political.

Mr. Mathews. I see.

Mr. Tyson, do you recall meeting Mr. Daniel Ellsberg on or about Monday, June 19, 1978?

Mr. Tyson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mathews. How did that meeting occur?

Mr. Tyson. It was at the beginning of the special session of disarmament, and I am not involved as an expert in disarmament. One of my tasks, because I knew many of the peace movement people through past association with the peace movement, was to be available to meet with people who came to the special session on disarmament, the lobby for disarmament, so I met with Mr. Ellsberg and many other groups and persons who came to the mission to present their views and their petitions to the special session.

Mr. Mathews. So Mr. Ellsberg was there for what purpose?

Mr. Tyson. He came to New York City to lobby for disarmament.

Mr. Mathews. In your capacity as ad hoc person for meeting certain people who would come to the U.N., you met with Mr. Ellsberg?

Mr. Tyson. Yes; we received all those who wanted to come, and I assisted in that process, and in that process I met Mr. Ellsberg.

Mr. Mathews. Had you met Mr. Ellsberg before?

Mr. Tyson. No, sir.

Mr. Mathews. That was your first meeting with Mr. Ellsberg. How many conversations did you have with Mr. Ellsberg?

Mr. Tyson. I don't recall. I would think probably seven or eight over a 10-day period.

Mr. Mathews. So you met with him for at least 10 days?

Mr. Tyson. Off and on. He was out of town part of that time and came back.

Mr. Mathews. Was anyone else present when you met with Mr. Ellsberg?

Mr. Tyson. Several times; yes.

Mr. Mathews. Did there come a time, Mr. Tyson, when the conversation you had with Mr. Ellsberg turned to the assassination of Dr. King?

Mr. Tyson. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mathews. Will you explain to the committee the substance of that conversation you had with Mr. Ellsberg?

Mr. Tyson. We were discussing the problem of whether or not the military and the intelligence services of the United States were effectively under civilian control. I had never had an opportunity to talk to a former high-level official who had been in the Government during the period of Vietnam, and this was my opportunity to hear from Mr. Ellsberg his opinions on this matter. So we discussed the whole wide variety of questions relating to intelligence agencies and to the control of the military.

One of his purposes, as he told me, was that he wanted to convey to the U.S. delegation his concern that how to press the button in case of a nuclear attack was not adequately safeguarded and in civilian hands. I don’t recall exactly how we got on the question of the assassinations except that we were talking about the commonalities of all the assassinations and trying to determine if we felt there were some common theories behind this. I think it was two professors talking. He is a professor of economics and I am a professor of political science by background, and we were talking in theoretical terms. Then we began to discuss the question of the assassination of Dr. King, or, strangely, I think we were more generally discussing the whole question of the conspiracies against Dr. King.

Mr. Mathews. Excuse me. Specifically now, tell the committee what you said to him and what he said to you, if you can remember.

Mr. Tyson. Referring to the affidavit, he said that I said—let me see if I can refer to the affidavit.

Mr. Mathews. One minute.

Maybe at this point, Mr. Chairman, could we have the Clerk give to the witness MLK exhibit F-430, which is a copy of the Ellsberg affidavit. In addition, could you hand the witness MLK F-431, which is a copy of the affidavit by James M. Lawson. May we have both of those affidavits incorporated in the record, please?¹

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, both may be entered into the record at this point.

[The exhibits follow:]

¹ The affidavit of Reverend Lawson appears in the record with the first page missing, since this is the form in which it was originally received by the committee (see infra, page 47).
In the Matter
Of
The Assassination
Of
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.
And
The Investigation Of That Murder
By
The Select Committee on Assassinations
Of
The United States House
Of Representatives

State of California
County of

DANIEL ELLSBERG, being duly sworn, deposes and says
that:
I served as a Strategic Analyst in the Economics Depart-
ment of the Rand Corporation in Santa Monica, California, from
1958 to 1964 and from 1967 to 1970. I had previously been
a member of the Society of Fellows at Harvard, where I received
a Ph. D. in Economics in 1962.
I worked in the area of Command and Control of strategic
nuclear weapons and in the area of strategic nuclear war
planning. Much of my work was done as a direct consultant
to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, to the State
Department and to the White House. I served on various Presidential and Department of Defense Task Forces on national security matters. I had clearances higher than Top Secret. (The existence of the clearances is still regarded as classified including the very names of the clearances.)

During 1964 I joined the Department of Defense as Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs with the grade of GS-18, the highest Civil Service super-grade. In 1965 I transferred to the State Department when I volunteered to work in Viet Nam, where I served until June, 1967, first in General Lansdale's Special Liaison Office and then as Special Assistant to the Deputy Ambassador to Viet Nam. I served with the rank of FSR-1, the highest rank in Foreign Service Reserve. This rank is equivalent to a military rank between Major-General and Lieutenant-General. After contracting hepatitis in Viet Nam, I returned to the Rand Corporation, where I worked as an original member of Secretary of Defense McNamara's Task Force, producing a history of United States decision making in Viet Nam, which came to be known as "The Pentagon Papers." Subsequently I gave a copy of the 43 volume set in my authorized possession to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and later to seventeen newspapers published within the United States, including the New York Times. The reason I released this material to the United States Senate and to the American news media is that upon reading the full history which I had been authorized to use as a Rand researcher, I found it to be a twenty-three year documented account of governmental deception and illegalities which had been improperly withheld from the Congress and from the American public.
It seemed to me that my obligation as a citizen and as a former official was to share with the Congress and the public such information which neither the Rand Corporation nor the Executive Branch had a right to conceal.

My purpose in hoping to see Ambassador Andrew Young was to ask him to convey directly to the President information of the highest importance on the control of nuclear weapons.

I had good reason to believe that this information might have been improperly concealed even from the President of the United States by the military services, as it had been concealed from President John F. Kennedy during the early months of his presidency.

In retrospect, I believe that it may have been this unusual context to my initial discussion with Ambassador Young's assistant, Brady Tyson, that led him to share with me, early in our acquaintance and without any restriction upon my use of the information, an extraordinary disclosure on his part relative to the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

I arrived in New York on the evening of Sunday, June 18, 1978, where I planned to spend several days talking to as many of the members and staff of the United Nations Special Assembly on Disarmament, then taking place, as were interested in hearing me. I wanted to give my views on the neutron warhead and on the question of first use of nuclear weapons, both of which I opposed. I hoped that some delegation would choose to press this as a resolution of the Assembly as a whole.

My background from my work in the Pentagon in the late 1950's and early 1960's was precisely on the question of nuclear war planning and the command and control of nuclear weapons. I had been, in fact, opposing the neutron warhead since it was first invented by a colleague of mine.
at the Rand Corporation, Sam Cohen. I had regarded it then as the most dangerous possible development, and I was happy when the Kennedy administration, without particular input from me on this precise question, chose not to move ahead with the neutron warhead for what I thought were sound reasons—that it was likely to trigger the use of other nuclear weapons precisely because it was a relatively usable weapon, one that I thought would be used primarily outside Europe.

Because President Carter now was on the verge, or had already considered, going ahead not only with production but deployment of this weapon to NATO, I regarded this as a very urgent moment for public discussion and opposition to this development. I regard it as an extreme danger to the United States and to the world at large, and a threat to the United States national security since it makes nuclear war more likely. It also is a first use weapon, indeed, a weapon only for first use, and not a retaliatory weapon, and that gave particular urgency to a resolution by the United Nations and by the United States eschewing first use nuclear weapons.

Since this had been a matter of highest importance to me for a generation and was then a very urgent matter, I was in New York at my own expense to urge people to take the issue as seriously as I did. I was there basically as a private individual. I was, however, informally representing two other groups who shared these views; namely, the Mobilization for Survival, a coalition of anti-war, generally pacifist, nonviolent groups that had opposed the Viet Nam war and before that, nuclear testing, and were subsequently joined together in a mobilization against the dangers of nuclear war. I was also representing the Rocky Flats Truth Force, an ad hoc group which was engaged in an ongoing action involving nonviolent civil disobedience obstructing railroad
tracks at Rocky Flats, sixteen miles from the center of Denver. Rocky Flats is the plant that makes all of the plutonium triggers, or fission bombs, that trigger all of our thermonuclear, or fusion, H-bomb warheads. Rocky Flats is scheduled to be the plant that will produce the neutron warhead if the President should decide to go ahead on that.

I asked Dorothy Maas of the Fellowship of Reconciliation ("FOR") to arrange for me to meet some delegations, because she was in charge of a coffee shop that the FOR was running continuously during the Special Assembly, which was a meeting place and a lecture room for disarmament issues during the special session of disarmament. I had been referred to her by my friend, Jim Forrest, of The Catholic Worker and now of the International Fellowship of Reconciliation, who had spoken to me by telephone in San Francisco and urged me to make this trip. He wanted me to go to New York in part because he himself had had a long session with Brady Tyson of the staff to the United States delegation to the United Nations and others. He had found this discussion with Tyson fruitful and Tyson surprisingly helpful and receptive for a member of the United States government, and thought that on the whole it would be very helpful for me to make the trip at this time, even though it was quite inconvenient for me to do it at the time that the special session was meeting.

Dorothy Maas, on her own, had arranged for me to see Brady Tyson first of all, in my first meeting, which was scheduled at 3 o'clock on Monday afternoon, June 19, 1978. I looked forward to that meeting because of what Jim had said, though in fact I did not expect then to be spending much time with the United States delegation, since I felt that they would have to deal with me at arm's length at best and could not be very forthcoming with me as a controversial
political figure. I expected to spend most of my time with foreign delegations.

This was ironic because what I would be urging these delegations to do would be to support what was then the position of the President of the United States, Jimmy Carter, who almost alone in the administration, according to newspaper reports, had tried to end our program to produce the neutron warhead. According to news accounts, he had been urged by the other members of his cabinet, such as Cy Vance, Harold Brown, and Brzezinski, to put it into full production. There had been a compromise on April 7 postponing the decision, but it was understood that it had been the President's preference to end production. In effect, I wanted to tell everybody who was receptive to my point of view to help the President sustain that position and to postpone production indefinitely.

I ended up spending most of my time in the offices of the United States delegation and in particular, with Tyson, because he was so helpful and so interested in having me present my story to other members of the United States delegation. I recalled in talking to Tyson that one of the less than a handful of people who were reported by the newspapers to have supported the President's opposition to any production was Ambassador Andrew Young, for whom Tyson worked.

I had met Stoney Cooks, to whom I talked at length on this visit, another aide to Andrew Young, in July of 1971 on my way to arraignment in Los Angeles for the release of the Pentagon Papers. I had been invited by the Southern Christian Leadership Conference ("SCLC") to address their national conference in New Orleans. I was so glad to have that invitation that I left without having time to pack, and went immediately to New Orleans on my way to Los Angeles so that I could say to the members of the SCLC, as I recalled to
Cooks, "I have come here to say, 'Thank you.' Because if it were not for this organization and your late leader, Martin Luther King, I would not be where I am today; on my way to trial for having found a way to resist a wrongful war." I had the occasion at that conference to meet two people who had become heroes of mine and whose example had been an influence on me in releasing the Pentagon Papers; one was Rosa Parks whose refusal to move from her seat on the bus had sparked the Montgomery Bus Boycott, and the other was Mrs. Martin Luther King, Jr., Coretta King. Cooks later told me, I believe, that it had been his idea to invite me to speak at that conference in 1971.

Incidentally, after speaking to the SCLC in early August of 1971, I flew at Jesse Jackson's request from New Orleans to Chicago to address Jackson's Saturday morning convocation in a converted theater in Chicago. I flew with Mrs. Jackson, the wife of Rev. Jackson, and stayed at their home that night. The next morning I met Walter Fauntroy, who addressed the congregation after my own talk; he closed the speech, I recall, by singing "The Impossible Dream."

This background meant in effect that I was accepted by this particular - unusual - group of U.S. officials more warmly than I had expected to be. I hadn't really thought about the fact that it represented a group of people with ties to the SCLC. If I had remembered that, I would have thought earlier about dealing with the group.

Ambassador Young's aides did arrange for me to see him, which I had not expected, and although the appointment was set for to slip me in between other appointments for about fifteen to twenty minutes, I ended up spending about thirty-five minutes with Ambassador Young. Those days were so filled with appointments from one person to the next that it is difficult
for me to pin down dates easily after the first day, but I had a date with Brady Tyson at 8:45 on Wednesday, June 21, according to my calendar, and I know that I saw Ambassador Young first thing in the morning. I believe, therefore, that I very likely saw Ambassador Young on June 21, 1978.

I said to Ambassador Young that I wasn't asking him to confirm it but it was my understanding from the newspapers that he had been one of the three people who had supported the President's desire to end production of the neutron warhead, the others being Hamilton Jordan and Jody Powell. I said that I wanted to try to give him some confidence that the position of the four men from Georgia was in fact a sounder position than the one adopted by Vance, Brown, Brzezinski, and the others who favored the production of the neutron bomb.

Ambassador Young said, of course, that in his eyes and that of the others there was considerable political aspect in their judgment. I said I presumed that his opposition to the bomb was political and moral, which was a more than adequate basis, but that my own opposition was based, as well, upon my evaluation as a weapons systems analyst. I said, "Indeed, you don't have to be a weapons analyst to be, correctly, against the neutron bomb." Where I thought I could add something to their degree of assurance from my background was that the position of the Pentagon in endorsing that weapon was not a well founded position even from a military or national security point of view. I wanted to bring my technical background to bear, to reinforce Young's judgment, because I said I was sure the issue would come up again and that they should not feel that because they did not have a direct background in weapons analysis that their judgment on this point was not valid. Therefore, I wanted to talk about the neutron warhead, among other things.
I ended up spending about thirty-five minutes with Andrew Young, going over with him a range of matters which I hoped he would pass onto the White House, because they concerned issues of nuclear control that I suspected might be secrets even from the President as they had been secret from earlier presidents to my knowledge. These considerations added to the potential risks of deploying neutron warheads, even in Europe, where they were least likely to be used.

It occurred to me now that I had this opportunity, that Ambassador Young was a marvelous and reliable channel for getting this information to the President, information which I had very good experience to know would not come spontaneously from the Pentagon to the President. I had told Tyson, and in particular Stoney Cooks, I was going to discuss this with Young, and that is why, in fact, Cooks urged me to see him.

In addition to seeing Young, Tyson had me address the Mission as a whole; that is, it was announced by poster that I would speak to a special luncheon session where they would bring their own brown bag lunch. That was in fact attended by Paul Newman, a member of the special delegation, and it was attended by twenty or so other members of the regular staff, largely Central Intelligence Agency and people interested in the nuclear matters that I discussed. I talked for about an hour and a half and it was recorded on tape. This was the second meeting, I believe, of a discussion series that had been inaugurated by Young.

Tyson also wanted me to talk to the whole of the Special Delegation on Monday morning at the regular meeting, and for that purpose I stayed in New York over the weekend and did not go to the Seabrook demonstration which was that weekend.

I had through Tyson's introduction fairly long talks
with Paul Newman and with the two Congressional delegates to
the Special Assembly and to Marjorie Benton and Harold Willens
at breakfast, and with a number of the staff people. I spent
a very long evening discussion with Tyson and several other
members of the staff in the Roosevelt Hotel, I believe, that
first night, Monday, June 19, or Tuesday, June 20.

At Tyson's request I also spent a long time Saturday
morning, June 24, in his apartment giving an interview to a
Brazilian friend of his who was a correspondent for what was
described as the major Brazilian news magazine, on my views on
nuclear weapons, nuclear sharing and proliferation.

During the week when I went to the Mission I had to go
through a receptionist every time and I believe it is all
recorded. I did operate generally from Tyson's office. It
should be mentioned that Tyson's job, as I understood it, was
liaison with external organizations, so he was the natural
person to be dealing with someone from the mobilization on
such matters. I used his phone and there was a xerox machine
in the hall; I wanted to give copies of all the various
documents about Rocky Flats and the neutron warhead to members
of the delegation. Tyson used the machine for me on some
occasions and I used it directly myself on other occasions to get
out copies, with his permission.

On another occasion he had a secretary come in to do it
for me. She was very friendly and copied a great deal for me.
He remarked that she was in fact a CIA secretary, but since my
whole purpose was to get information into the United States
Government, that was fine with me, assuming that she ran off
some extra copies.

I thought of my job that week in fact as being to leak
formerly top-secret information into the White House if
possible, information that I knew in the Kennedy administration,
at least, had been deliberately withheld from the White House by the Pentagon.

In these matters, I was very conscious of the opportunity that I was having to get this information into the administration through an authoritative channel. I had no desire at all either to exploit that relationship otherwise or to embarrass Ambassador Young, whom I regarded as being perhaps the most valuable member of the administration, or Tyson for whom I acquired a warm regard. Since experience has taught me that any public association with me has risks for a public figure, I did not, on my own initiative, reveal the fact that I was seeing these people at all. Indeed, Tyson at one point asked me who I had told that I was addressing the Mission, and I told him I had told no one, no newspaper person, no public person. He said, "Oh, by all means, tell anybody you want." And I got the impression that at that moment they actually wanted to get the credit for being open to a variety of views, including critical views.

However, I did not want to operate that way myself, and I told Tyson, "If you want to put out the information, feel free to do so." In fact, I refused an interview from two reporters in connection with this, one of whom was covering the events of the Special Assembly for a special newspaper being put out for the delegates. She had heard that I was going to address the Mission and wanted to talk to me about it. I referred the two reporters to the Mission for any comments and said that I preferred not to make any comments. I left it up to them.

I did not speak to anyone, other than one or two close associates, of the fact that I had given Ambassador Young documents on the nuclear question, hoping that those documents would be sent to the White House. Further, I did not reveal what was discussed by Brady Tyson with me during our first meeting.
I am saying it now, voluntarily, because it involves matters of the highest urgency for our country and our Constitution, and because I feel that I have no right to be silent when it concerns the constitutional rights of a defendant in this country, a man now serving a life sentence. I refer to James Earl Ray.

On the first day I met Tyson, which was Monday, June 19, we spent an hour or so first in his office discussing my background and views on nuclear questions and he took me through the halls, introducing me to everyone present. I was surprised, by the way, because I had not been inside a United States Government facility since 1971 and had not met any U.S. officials but prosecutors during that time and certainly not many friendly faces, as these were. (That is just the sort of revelation, by the way, that I am usually silent about, lest I embarrass the very people who have shown this friendliness. I am reporting all these details now because they have a bearing on the story I was told and why I was told it.)

Tyson discussed his own background with me at that time, in his first meeting on June 19, and revealed then, as he did later, that he had in effect mixed feelings talking to me. He said it was very rare for him to talk to someone who had been as close to the Pentagon as I had been for ten years, and that in effect I had been one of the enemy as far as he was concerned in those years, the sort of person he really would not have talked to. He said that it was still hard for him to overcome those associations as he talked to me even now after the Pentagon Papers and my other anti-war activities.

There was an irony, of course, in this aspect of our discussion because we had in fact gone in opposite directions. He had gone inside the government: though only to be with Andrew Young. He said he had always sworn he would not ever
sign a security agreement or accept a security clearance, and

now he had. And despite what he saw as my war criminal past,

nevertheless I had moved away from the sphere of security

clearances and could not, would not under any circumstances

accept such a clearance, even if it were conceivable that I

would be offered one. I certainly did not, myself, have any

thought of making invidious comparisons or raising that as an

issue to trouble him in this first meeting, but I believe

that he felt somewhat defensive about the fact that he was the

person with a security clearance and was in fact working inside

the U.S. Government, which may bear on why he told me on our

first meeting something of such great sensitivity.

We left his office to walk over to the Roosevelt Hotel,

which was eight or ten blocks away, where I was hoping to meet

someone who turned out not to be available. Just as we were

leaving the Mission at the U.N. Plaza, we got on to the subject

which we discussed during the walk over. We walked over and

continued the discussion there while I waited for the person

that I wanted to meet. We discussed this subject, which was

the killing of Dr. Martin Luther King, for at least half an hour.

I do not recall how we got on that subject but it was a

natural one to come up. We did, of course, discuss the circum-

stances of my going to the SCLC and I certainly had brought out

to him the fact very much in my mind that it had been Martin

Luther King's book, *Stride Toward Freedom*, which I read when I

was at the Rand Corporation in the Fall of 1968 after his
death, that had great influence on me in the course that led
me later to reveal the Pentagon Papers. I always thought of
King, and particularly his Gandhian principles that he describes
in detail in *Stride Toward Freedom*, as the basis of my
decision.
One of us, either Tyson or I, raised the subject of the killing, and I asked Tyson whether he thought there had been a conspiracy and who he thought might have done it. He said very flatly to me, "We know there was a conspiracy and we know who did it." I was very surprised to hear that and did not know whether he would go any further. Finally after a pause, I asked him who it was, if he would feel free to say, and he said again in a way that was very surprising to me in its lack of equivocation or reservation, "It was a group of off-duty and retired FBI officers working under the personal direction of J. Edgar Hoover." He said further that this was a group working secretly and known to almost no one else in the FBI. This group, which I believe - I am less sure of this recollection than of the rest of the discussion which remains very vivid - Tyson said included "a sharpshooter," who had actually done the shooting. I know Tyson said they reported directly to Hoover and worked under his direction.

This was an astounding statement to hear from anyone, although I am used to hearing conjectures from people interested in conspiracies and assassination theories. But to hear this presented as an absolute fact from someone who is in the U.S. Government was very startling. I asked him - prefacing a number of my remarks by saying, "If you can say," or "If you don't mind saying," not to embarrass him, - "How do you know that?" I did not expect to be told precise sources but to be told the kind of basis that he had. He said, "That has turned up in Walter Fauntroy's investigation and he's told us." "Us," he said, included Ambassador Young, Stoney Cooks and himself.

I got the impression from things he subsequently said that Ambassador Young and his associates had actually gone over a good deal of the evidence directly and had not simply been told this in general terms. I asked, "How sure are you of this?"
He said, "We are eighty percent sure that we know who they are."
I said, "You mean, eighty percent sure there was such a group, a conspiracy?" And he said, "No, we're sure of that. We know that. We're eighty percent sure that we know the names of all the people who were involved." And again with some diffidence, I asked if he could say how they could know that. And he said, "It's all circumstantial but very detailed." It was, he said, circumstantial but factual and accurate evidence having to do, among other things, with exactly who was on or off duty at the time, and who was removed. I think I mentioned hearing that some of the security people had been moved off just before the death, and he said, "Yes, that's the kind of thing." Obviously they had gone into it in much greater detail. He said they believed that with eighty percent likelihood that they could identify the actual members of the group who had done this; but that the new evidence made them sure beyond doubt that the killing had been planned and carried out by FBI agents directed by Hoover. In this fundamental sense, I understood him to be saying that he, Cooks and Ambassador Young, believed the assassination to have been recently solved.

Several times I asked him, "Do you mean that Andy Young believes this?" I was very conscious of the amazing experience of being told facts of this nature by a member of the U.S. Government, whatever his background was, and especially on short notice, short acquaintance. In particular, I was thinking in the back of my mind what it could feel like to have been so emotionally and politically close to a murdered man like Martin Luther King and to feel you are in the same government with his murderers. That was after all a revelation that I did not expect to hear from him. I was asking myself how I would feel in that situation.
I believe he was in part telling me this to convey to
me his own sense of what it felt like to be in the U.S. Government
for a person of his background, and, in effect, the anguish of his
position, but at the same time the dangers of it in a certain
sense and the opportunities that it might offer.

I thought I knew how I would feel and what I would do,
but I was asking myself what he must be planning to do with this
information, and I did not want to press him too hard on that
subject. I was already amazed that he had told me as much as
he had.

He said that Walter Fauntroy's investigation basically
had established this. I said to him then, having established
how precisely he believed this - namely less than certainty in
terms of the names but still with high confidence - I said,
"How long have you believed this?"

I asked that question because at some point early on,
he had indicated that they had "always assumed" that it was a
conspiracy. At some point in the conversation he said to me,
"We always believed that there was a conspiracy and we always
thought that the FBI was involved." He did say both those things
to me at some point. In the half hour in which we discussed it,
I wanted to disentangle those statements from the other
assertion.

So I said, "When you say you are now 'sure,' are you
talking about your general assumption from the beginning that
this was FBI?" He said, "No, I'm talking about the more recent
evidence and conclusion from the Fauntroy Committee." I said,
"Well, how long have you felt that sure, in terms of that
evidence?" He said, "That's just a couple of months."

I asked him, of course, what was going to be done
about this. In particular, was that evidence going to come out

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in the forthcoming hearings? He said that he "didn't know"

just what Fauntroy was going to do with the information because

he said that the trouble is that "We don't have courtroom proof

of this, of the names, it is all circumstantial evidence,

although as we see it, it fits a very tight pattern. It is

very strong evidence."

Of course, as someone who had been on trial for a long
time myself, I was thinking that over afterwards and it seemed
an odd statement to me, because after all, circumstantial
evidence is enough to convict, on the one hand, and certainly
enough to indict. And on the other hand (although no one
would want to charge J. Edgar Hoover - even dead - or his
assistants without the strongest possible case to start with),
it also struck me that Congressional investigation could, after
all, bring out relevant facts that would be harder to bring out
in the court room.

It seemed self evident that it was their duty to make
sure that this information was made available to the public
some way or other.

I did, however, assume in my own mind that the
information would come out in these hearings, or at least that
a foundation would be laid for later testimony. I took for
granted that this was their intent; the very fact that I was
being told seemed to manifest that. No doubt of this even
occurred to me - nor did it seem appropriate for me to take any
initiative - until the recent hearings. To my surprise, neither
of these took place. For that reason, on my own initiative,
I have now given Mark Lane this information. Having seen him
for the first time in those Congressional hearings, it was my
feeling that the lawyer of James Earl Ray had an absolute right
to know this. It was clearly my obligation to let him know for
the defense and for the crucial enlightenment of the public.
Before the hearings, I told only a very few people, emphasizing to each of them - as Tyson had, strikingly, omitted to caution me - that I did not propose to pass this information out or make it public and that they should not, prior to these hearings. I assumed that the hearings would bring it out in a systematic way, and I did not want to upset that timetable of the investigation by prematurely revealing it.

Tyson himself did not at any time caution me either to be silent about this or even so much as show discretion by what I did with it. I was very struck by his failure to do that. I even inferred to some degree that he might want me to pass it along, using discretion, to people who in my judgment ought to know it. I could not think otherwise as to why he was telling me this at all, unless it reflected a somewhat defensive frame of mind in which he wanted me to understand the position that he felt himself to be in in the government.

People do - despite the charges that were brought against me and the acts that I actually took in revealing the Pentagon Papers - give me confidences very often and trust me to show discretion in keeping or using them, and that trust is justified. Their understanding of my character is that I will use good judgment in using or revealing information or holding it, and they would very often indicate more specifically they did not want this information to go in a particular direction, or that I should not tell anyone else, that they were telling me this for background use and to check with them before I used it at all. At no time in any of our conversations did Tyson make any such statement at all.

Of course, that did not, as I say, lead me to think that I should broadcast it immediately; quite the contrary. I had never, never heard a revelation of this nature, one so astounding. Astounding precisely because of the alleged source
and because of the actual person who was in fact telling me the information. His actual position impressed me; his closeness to King, his concern for the subject, his closeness to Young, and the fact that he was an official of the U.S. Government, the first friendly one I had seen in some seven years. A story that would have been a run-of-the-mill assertion in the mouths of the myriads of conspiracy theorists—though quite a striking hypothesis coming from anyone—had enormous weight coming from him.

In discussing the belief that it was an FBI conspiracy run by Hoover, he always used words like "We know," "We are sure," "We are certain," and so forth. (Damon Runyon's father used to tell him, "Son, nothing is better than 7 to 5." But not everybody goes by that rule.)

The question then was what was going to be done. Fauntroy had this information and I presumed was going to bring it out in the hearings, although some question was raised about that by Tyson. I did delicately raise the question of what the others were going to do with the information. I got the impression they were leaving it up to Fauntroy at this point, which seemed reasonable, for the moment.

I pressed further the question of what it felt like to be in the same government with the known murderers of your closest friend and leader. Tyson did express the belief on all of their parts, including Young, Cooks, Fauntroy and himself, that part of that feeling involved some risk of death.

He then said that Fauntroy had said that when he told Carl Albert, then the Speaker of the House of Representatives, that he wanted to be on a committee to investigate King's assassination, or head the committee; Albert said to him, "Walter, you don't want that job." Fauntroy answered, he said, "But I do want it, why not?" And he said Albert took him slightly
aside and whispered, "Walter, they will kill you." Fauntroy said, "Who will kill me?" and Albert answered, "The FBI."

Fauntroy told Tyson, or someone else who told it to Tyson, that that was the most startling statement that he had ever heard. I said to Tyson, "Well, but he took the job anyway." Tyson answered, "Yes, he did take the job."

I recall, as I say this, the plane ride that I had from New Orleans at night to Chicago with Mrs. Jesse Jackson in 1971. I will always remember what she said after she asked me if I was not afraid of being killed. Actually in those days, that was a fear that my wife had but that I thought from my years in the government was quite unfounded. I knew that our government killed people, when need be, abroad. I knew of the Diem coup and of the fears of the Vietnamese that I knew who had been assaulted or whose friends had been killed by those who they believed to be CIA. I said to Patricia that "I did not think they do that to Americans."

She was very worried for me in front of large audiences. I was not, at that time; I thought that they would not do that to an American citizen. Not just that it is too risky for them, but it is not what they do, they are Americans too, after all. Granted, they do do it to foreigners, but that is in the nature of wars and covert operations.

Ironically, as I was flying with Mrs. Jackson to Chicago and then to Los Angeles, Hunt and Liddy were flying to Los Angeles on their White House mission to case the office of my former psychiatrist, Dr. Fielding, which they reconnoitered while I was in Los Angeles.

I have been informed that Cuban Americans working with Hunt and Liddy for the White House - all of whom had worked for CIA - took a vote the next month, September, 1971 - on whether to kill me. The vote was allegedly 7 to 5 against killing me.
at that time (Bernard Barker had asked Hunt what was, apparently, the natural question for a professional, "If this guy is as bad as you say, why are we fooling around with his doctor's files, why don't we kill him?") I asked my informant, a journalist who had interviewed Barker and a number of the others, "How could they take a vote on something like that?" He told me, "Hunt and Liddy wanted the Cubans to feel that they were participating."

Later (after, Charles Colson has testified, a serious investigation was undertaken by Hunt to "disorient Ellsberg with drugs") the same team and others — all of those who had broken into Fielding's office, all of those who would go into the Watergate some three weeks later, and several others — were brought up from Miami to Washington on May 2, 1972, with orders in the words of William Merrill, the prosecutor of Erlichman, from the White House to "incapacitate Ellsberg totally." Jeb Magruder says that the order to assault me on the steps of the Capitol while I was making a public speech at a rally against the bombing of Haiphong — five days before the mining of Haiphong, which I was foretelling, to the dismay of the White House — came to him from Charles Colson, who said it came from the President.

I asked Merrill's assistant whether "incapacitate me totally" meant to kill me. He replied simply, "The words were 'to incapacitate Ellsberg totally', but official orders to these guys never say 'kill,'" Bernard Barker told journalist Lloyd Shearer, "My orders were to break both his legs." There were, however, ten members of the team on the steps of the Capitol that afternoon, some of whom might have had somewhat different orders. Much later, after Charles Colson had pled guilty to a much lesser crime and Erlichman's trial had led to conviction, William Merrill told me, "There was no doubt in my mind that the
The plan aborted because the cover story given to the team backfired. According to the journalist who interviewed most of its members, they had been told that I would be interfering with the ceremony mourning the death of J. Edgar Hoover, whose coffin was in fact being viewed publicly at another entrance to the Capitol at the same time. Presumably, they expected that when they called me "traitor" as directed, and began their assault, the crowd of Hoover mourners would complete the job, or at least provide perfect cover for them. When they found the crowd, instead, friendly to me, the members of the team sensed that they had been deceived and that they might not be able to escape safely.

Eugenio Martinez - a veteran of over 300 covert intrusions into Cuba for the CIA - told Barker, "Bernie, these people don't like it when we call Ellsberg 'traitor.' I don't like the feel of this." As highly experienced contract employees for CIA and various other intelligence organizations (every man present was an informant to one or more intelligence groups) they even guessed the possibility that they were being set up as scapegoats by higher-ups on this job and were quite possibly not meant to escape after incapacitating me. They therefore proceeded to "throw" it. Frank Sturgis picked a fight with a young demonstrator on the fringe of the crowd, as did several other team members, and they were led away by the police, aborting the mission. Two men, one showing FBI credentials and the other CIA credentials, then told the police, "These men are good Americans, we will vouch for them" and the team members were released from custody.

I know nothing like this back in August, 1971, but Mrs. Jackson then said that in the aftermath of the shooting of Dr. King, all of King's associates, and very especially her husband
Jesse, were all sure that they were going to be killed and that they all felt in danger of their lives from moment to moment. She then said that she was concerned for my wife's state of mind, living with these fears, and she said this: "Tell her that fear is like happiness; it comes and it goes."

A stunning statement. She said that after living with it for a month or more, her fear finally went away.

I just now recalled that, because Tyson did say that those who had this knowledge of the assassins - not only Fauntroy - were worried, and that they had to live with this fear. I took that, whether he intended it or not, as bearing on the question on what they might plan to do with the information, and that it was something to be dealt with discreetly.

This conversation with Tyson was very much in my mind in the next few days after I had talked to Tyson, and I really tried to put myself in the skin of someone who knew that my best friend had been killed by other members of the government. It is hard enough for me to imagine now being inside the government given what I feel about it, but under these circumstances it would be quite extraordinary. I could appreciate the extreme anguish of the question of what they should do with that information.

My assumption was at that time that the facts about the FBI conspiracy to assassinate Dr. King were going to come out in the investigation and the major reason why I did tell Mark Lane of what I had learned when I met him a little more than a week ago was my disappointment with the pattern of those hearings, which seemed to point entirely to a different direction from what I had heard was known to Fauntroy.

I did not listen to much of the hearings precisely because of that disappointment, and so I am not judging Fauntroy that much, because I gathered from the newspaper that he was
reserving his main case on the conspiracy question until later
in the fall. So possibly that is when this is all meant to
come up; in my mind, I would still give him the benefit of the
doubt on that.

However, what I did read in the newspaper accounts
was so extremely at odds with the tone of what Tyson had told
me that it was very hard for me to believe at this point that
an FBI conspiracy to kill Dr. King was going to be pursued that
strongly; it certainly had not been yet.

In any case, I would have found it very hard to justify
to myself keeping this information any longer from Mark Lane.
Even if I had heard it under some restriction, which I had not,
this would have been an instance where my judgment would have
had to be that James Earl Ray had an overriding interest in
having this information now, even if the public was going to
got it later.
During my meeting with Andrew Young, I gave him documents, some of which had earlier been public. There was an account of a press conference that was reprinted as a transcript in Win Magazine and some clippings about Rocky Flats, but I also gave him information that I had not ever made public. Certainly I had not ever made the actual documents public, and again, I have not discussed this with anyone but my wife and one or two others, and would not except under these extraordinary circumstances where I can see that the question of my entire transactions with Young, Cooks, and Tyson have a bearing on the question of how it came about that I received such extraordinary confidential information from Tyson.

My discussions with Cooks and Tyson and Young were such that I was volunteering information that had been held in great secrecy: improperly so in my judgment, because it had been withheld in particular from at least one President, John F. Kennedy. One consideration in addition here, is that I have publicly revealed this information since talking to Young - without revealing, of course, that I had discussed it at the U.S. Mission - at a press conference on the railroad tracks at Rocky Flats on August 9, the anniversary of the bombing of Nagasaki. (Nagasaki was destroyed with a plutonium weapon of the kind that is still made at Rocky Flats.)

We held a non-violent "die-in," obstructing the road at the plant at Rocky Flats - we had urged the management to close down the plant for a day in memoriam - to assure that no plutonium weapons, in addition to the 30,000 nuclear weapons the U.S. now has, should be produced in the U.S. at Rocky Flats on that day without having to arrest Americans protesting their production. That morning I gave a press conference on the tracks (just shortly before being arrested for the fourth time in the vicinity of the plant) at which time I revealed the
information on U.S. nuclear weapons in Japan that I had given
to Cooksand to Ambassador Young.

I gave Young a fairly detailed written account of what
I had to say, urging him to send it by whatever channel or
whatever means he chose, to the White House. These accounts
dealt with two matters which in turn were related to the neutron
warhead. I went over very briefly my concerns about the neutron
warhead which, though generally being a defense matter outside
his immediate interest, particularly concerned our Ambassador
to the U.N. since it is my evaluation that this weapon is of
relevance primarily to areas outside Europe. This is in contrast
to public discussion of the weapon by the government, which has
focused exclusively on Europe. Since in Europe, the use of that
warhead -- like the use of any other nuclear warhead -- would
meet the certain retaliation of the Soviet nuclear weapons in
Europe, it is least likely to be initiated in that area. It is
much more likely, and indeed quite likely, to be used by the
United States or anyone else who acquired it against opponents
who do not themselves have nuclear weapons; namely, the kinds of
opponents we have actually fought in the last thirty years, like
the Indo Chinese or the Koreans, or, as I have pointed out,
conceivably South Africans. This, of course, was an area that
Young is directly concerned with.

I pointed out that the neutron warhead is an ideal
counter-insurgency weapon for people who owned the buildings
where the weapon was to be used, since it has the peculiar
property of just clearing the people out and leaving most of
the buildings standing. So some future conflict in the vicinity
of Johannesburg would be a very logical place for the use of
this weapon, far more logical than using it against Soviet tanks
which would be certain to return the fire with their own
divisional or higher nuclear weapons.
There remained, however, the question of whether it might be actually used in Europe. I pointed out that the President had said that since he regarded first use of that weapon to be as likely to lead to nuclear war as the use of any other nuclear weapon, he was not more likely to use it than any other weapon. That would question his claim that somehow it was more deterrent. I said the resolution of that apparent contradiction could be that he would not be the person making the decision; and in fact, I said, the neutron warhead almost had to be used at the discretion of front line commanders, for two reasons. First, the vehicles for which it is intended have very short range, usually 17 miles or at the most 70 miles, so they have to be used very close to the front, and on a broad front. Second, it is not a deterrent weapon, a retaliatory weapon. It has no advantages at all if someone else has used dirty fission weapons beforehand and blown down the buildings and made the rubble radioactive. It is only for first use. It is for operational use to stop a fast-moving attack, but to do that, it must be used very quickly as the attack develops and before the tanks and troop formations have dispersed.

Both those counts point toward releasing the decision to use the weapon to low-level commanders early in conflict. In fact, the weapon is virtually unusable unless that delegation of authority to use it was made by the President either well in advance of the conflict or at the very earliest stage of the crisis. Otherwise the weapons would be more likely to be captured than to be used. In Europe that would mean delegating it to the operational control of low-level German commanders, since German units were crucial on the central front. And that meant, in effect, openly giving the Germans their own nuclear weapons, as opposed to the de facto control that they may have at this point, but where control is nominally
at least in the hands of Americans.

That raised the question, whether the President would conceivably delegate such authority, and in particular, whether he would do so to Germans.

President Carter has said that he has not delegated authority to anyone and would not do so. But in fact, to my knowledge, three previous Presidents said the same thing, and they were lying: President Eisenhower, President Kennedy, and President Johnson. Each had occasion to say more than once that they had not and would not delegate authority to any subordinate commander (even an American) to use nuclear weapons without the express and immediate authorization by the President. But in fact each of them had delegated such authority in writing to their Senior Commanders, the so-called Unified and Specified Commanders, who control nuclear weapons. Those correspond to theater or regional Commanders, along with the Commander of the Strategic Air Command. The principal theater Commanders would be Commander-in-Chief Pacific, CINCPAC; and CINCEUR, Commander of the U.S. Forces in Europe, who is also SACEUR, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, in his capacity as head of Nato forces, now General Alexander Haig.

Moreover, one of those Presidents, John F. Kennedy, was not aware for six months into his Administration that his own commanders were holding such letters from his predecessor, President Eisenhower, which continued to be still in force.

I know that because I myself brought to the attention of McGeorge Bundy (President Kennedy's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs) my report that commanders in the Pacific believed that such authority had been delegated by President Eisenhower, and McGeorge Bundy was unaware of any such delegation. He was sure President Kennedy was likewise unaware.
He named me as a committee of one representing the White House and the Defense Department to investigate this question as to whether any such delegation existed. And in that capacity I interviewed, with White House authority, Commander Tazewell Shepherd, the President's Naval aide who controlled the execute codes that were to be constantly in the presence of the President. He was unaware of any such delegation, as were the other officers to whom I spoke at several underground command posts in the vicinity of Washington, and at the Joint War Room in the Pentagon. However, McGeorge Bundy's deputy, Carl Kaysen, carried the investigation further and did discover a black notebook which he showed me in the White House containing the copies of the signed letters from President Eisenhower, giving the authority to use nuclear weapons to the Unified and Specified Commanders individually under certain specified conditions, such as an outage of communications during a crisis.

This discovery was made in June of 1961, six months after Kennedy had taken office, and Kaysen informed me that Kennedy had then signed new letters giving this same authorization to his Commanders, rather than to be in the position of reversing the decision of President Eisenhower. I learned later that President Johnson, in his term, had signed new letters of authorization.

Ironically, this became the major issue of the 1964 campaign between Johnson and his opponent Senator Goldwater. Goldwater was a Major General in the Air Force Reserve at the time, and a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee; with the backing on this issue of a large panel of Republican defense authorities all of whom had served President Eisenhower and must have known of Eisenhower's actual delegation of authority. Goldwater claimed at the opening of the campaign that the
President should in fact delegate such authority to his Commanders, and in particular to SACEUR—who was then, I believe, General Lemnitzer, but who would now be General Haig—to use what Goldwater called "small conventional nuclear weapons" on his own authority, so that he could use them promptly in the event of an attack. This is the same argument that would be used today for delegating the prompt use of the neutron warhead.

Johnson picked this up as his primary issue at his opening speech of his campaign, and continued it as the major issue, defining it as a matter of nuclear responsibility and stating over and over that there were no such things as "conventional" nuclear weapons, and in view of the risks associated with any use of any nuclear weapon he alone would make the decision at the time, and would under no circumstance delegate it. But he had delegated that decision. And if Goldwater did not know that Johnson had (which is unlikely), Goldwater certainly did know that Kennedy and Eisenhower had so delegated it, and in fact Goldwater has admitted as much recently.

As I told Ambassador Young, I had raised this question in public in the previous year, and when journalists questioned the White House or the Pentagon for confirmation of my disclosure, they had gotten such statements as this: "Now as in the past, the President alone controls the use of any nuclear weapon under any circumstances."

That would appear an unequivocal statement to anyone but me, but it leaves the question in my mind what they mean by "now as in the past." In the past, the President had delegated. And in fact, another statement that has sometimes been made by the Pentagon in this connection is to point out that Presidential control includes the power to delegate that control to other people; whether he has done so, they go on to say, is a secret.
If in fact, as I told Young, the situation is not changed from the past, then we must assume that the authority is still being delegated. If it is not being delegated, then that is a change, and it is not clear why the White House is unwilling to say so. My interference is, in fact, that there is still some form of delegation which is not being disclosed to the Congress and the public, and about which the White House is still being misleading. But there is also the possibility, as in the case of John F. Kennedy, that President Carter is not in fact yet fully informed as to the status of the system of authorization.

The real risks of the situation were not at all confined to the possibility that General Haig might be making the decision instead of the elected President. Rather, if there was such a delegation, then the situation was probably the same as I had found it in the Pacific in the late 50's and early 60's: namely, that this delegation was being imitated by the Senior Commanders to their lower levels of command for essentially the same reasons as the President had delegated it to the Senior Commander. And thus I found Admirals in the Pacific, but also officers down as low as Major who believed that they had the implicit authorization to execute at least airborne alerts with nuclear weapons, with all the risks involved; and perhaps to execute war plans despite the letter of their orders which called for them to wait for explicit authorization.

There would inevitably be pressure on President Carter to delegate that control, in particular of the neutron warhead, if he should be induced to produce it; and that delegation would almost surely again be imitated down to very low levels, putting it in the explicit control of German low-level officers among others.
All this might explain the very extreme Russian reaction to the prospect of the production of the neutron warhead and their proposal mutually to forego it. But it was in itself, it seemed to me, a reason to sustain Ambassador Young's judgment along with that of President Carter, that the weapons should never come into existence.

As for the question of whether the President could be willing to leave such a weapon, in the authorized or de facto physical control of the Germans, despite memories of World War II, a second finding from my command and control work of the early sixties seems pertinent to that. In my work for Commander-in-Chief Pacific, CINCPAC, in 1959 and 1960, I learned from atomic control officers in the Air Force, that the Navy had been stationing permanently an LST - landing ship tank, immediately offshore the Marine Air Base of Iwakuni in Japan, in clear violation of our national security treaty with Japan, which provided that no nuclear weapons be introduced into Japan or stored there without the permission of the Japanese government. The U.S. officers who revealed this to me did so because they were sure that the Japanese Government had not given such permission, and that therefore, discovery of the presence of this ship permanently stationed in the tidal waters of Japan - a hundred yards or so from shore and thus for all legal purposes on the territory of Japan - would lose them all of their Air Bases in Japan and in Okinawa, as a consequence of the treaty being abrogated. So they saw U.S. national security being seriously jeopardized by what they saw as a reckless, irresponsible policy by the Navy.

When I brought this to the attention of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Paul Nitze, early in 1961, he discovered that this ship was not being carried on the books of the Secretary of Defense as being
in Japanese home waters at all. It turned out that the Navy reported it simply as home-ported in Okinawa, and was giving the Secretary of Defense's office no indication that it was permanently stationed offshore Japan, although the Special Assistant for Atomic Energy to the Secretary of Defense was supposed to know the minute by minute whereabouts of every nuclear warhead in the world.

I was told that it was this deception that particularly angered McNamara and led him to order the ship to remain in Okinawa where, by coincidence, it was at that moment under repair. But after objections from the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Burke, the ship was allowed to go back to Japan, where it remained except for periods of repairs throughout most of the sixties, to my knowledge—with nuclear warheads. During that time, it was subject at any time to disclosure, or actually to sabotage or to accident resulting in either high-explosive or nuclear explosion, perhaps in the course of periodic maneuvers in which the weapons were actually brought ashore for practice or for alerts.

(Subsequent to my discussion with Cooks and Young, while under arrest at Rocky Flats on August 9, 1978, I was in the custody of Lieutenant Earl Spenard of the Jefferson County Sheriff's Office. Referring to my public disclosures that morning about nuclear weapons offshore Iwakuni, he informed me that he had personally been a Marine pilot stationed at Iwakuni from 1959 to 1963, and had known nuclear warheads than to be permanently stationed ashore at the Iwakuni base, in quonset-hut "Disposal Shelters," having been flown in by air. He stated that he had personally sat in his plane on the alert "hot pad" during the "Laos crisis of May, 1961" with a 1-to-25 Megaton explosive equivalent to 25 million tons of TNT, variable-yield thermonuclear weapon slung underneath him. For the Laos crisis, in Japan.)
Again then, to my best understanding, we had a situation which jeopardized our national security in Pentagon terms, and immediately jeopardized, of course, the lives of the people in Iwakuni (which happens to be very close to Hiroshima). Where knowledge had actually been kept from the Secretary of Defense, as well as the President (as in the first instance). And then, where military pressures within the bureaucracy had apparently prevented the Secretary from using his normal authority to change the situation.

In short, I told Ambassador Young that so long as these matters remained "in house," highly secret, any one civilian — even if he were Secretary of Defense, or the President of the United States —, seemed powerless to affect the situation, in confronting the entire military bureaucracy. And thus democracy, and accountability, had no chance to function.

This particular incident -- which might or might not still be going on at the present time -- raised the question as to whether or not the President would even know the whereabouts precisely, or control status of weapons that might in fact be for all practical purposes, in German hands. In fact, if my understanding — not based on my personal investigation — it has been true for over two decades that U.S. nuclear weapons are stored on German bases for the operational use of German forces, with nominal U.S. control of the nuclear warheads being exercised merely by two U.S. officers or Sergeants on that base with a key to the storage, the nearest U.S. combat units being many miles away.

I made these points not to emphasize the likelihood that the President would be kept ignorant of the physical location or control of these weapons, but to emphasize the great likelihood that with his myriad responsibilities, he would be ignorant of details of location and of actual control which were
in fact of the highest importance to our survival, given the
nature of nuclear weapons even without any deliberate attempt
to deceive him.

I believe that it will take a very major effort to
achieve genuine democratic civilian control of this weapon
system, and that this will never come about unless Congress and
the American public, and even the President, come to learn how
seriously and how often they have been deceived and misled on
these matters in the past. (The same may apply to the F.B.I.
and the rest of the intelligence community.) I gave Ambassador
Young a brief account of what I have just stated, covering very
briefly all the points that I have mentioned but relying on his
reading a written account of the nuclear weapons in Japan that
I had taped and transcribed some years ago. I also gave him
the transcript of a press conference in which I had announced
the delegation of authority by previous Presidents, and, as
back-up to both of those documents, I gave him three documents
written by me which I had not previously made public. One of
these was my draft, which was subsequently issued by the
Secretary of Defense to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the top
secret Secretary of Defense guidance for the annual strategic
war plan of the United States, as of mid-1961. I had been
assigned as a consultant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security Affairs in 1961, to draft the general
war portion of a document previously called the Basic National
Security Policy of the United States, or BNSP, which is the
civilian guidance for all war planning: in particular, for
the top secret annual JCS operational war plan, known as the
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), the strategic nuclear
annex to which is called the Single Integrated Operational
Plan (SIOP). (I later helped Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense Alain Enthoven draft the alternative nuclear "options"
to be included in the SIOP.)

In order to explain why my draft, which became word-for-word, without any change, the official document, was as detailed as it was, in contrast to the much briefer guidances that were given in the Eisenhower years, I wrote two memoranda accompanying the draft, and which were given to and read by Secretary McNamara and Deputy Secretary Gilpatric, explaining the detailed way in which this draft diverged from existing operational procedures and existing plans; and therefore why it had to be so detailed.

To explain why the draft put so much emphasis on achieving survivable command and control capability, and why there should be no reliance on unauthorized or delegated authority, I pointed out in these two memoranda the nature of the existing situation in which in fact it was the case, and was understood in military circles to be the case, that action by lower commanders not immediately authorized by the President was not only possible, physically, but was relied upon for implementing war plans, in the event of war, in view of the vulnerability of high-level command centers.

These references, then, constituted a documentary record from the time I was describing — April, 1961 —, in official memoranda from me to these executive officers. The memoranda were, at the time, top secret. One was labelled, "Relation of Current Plans and Posture to Proposed Requirement," and the other, "Some Possibilities for Short-Run Improvement in Current Posture and Planning." And they both accompanied my draft of the BNSP.

I also gave Ambassador Young a summary statement labelled, "Outline of Themes for Testimony," which was a rough draft of possible testimony that I had expected to give before hearings on these matters, which I had hoped would be held by the House Committee on Government Operations and Information.
These promised hearings were never, in fact, held because the chairmanship of the sub-committee changed hands several times between 1974 and 1977 with the staff being reorganized. I was hoping to reveal these matters to Congress, and had briefed the sub-committee staff early on them over a period of two years. During that period, I did brief the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Clement Zablocki, for several hours on all these matters, and in fact, had given these documents to him.

In handing these documents [copies of which are appended to this affidavit] personally to Ambassador Young, and describing them to him (and I subsequently went over them in greater detail with his assistant, Stony Cooks), my hope was that they would find some way of making this information known to officials in the White House itself, and in particular to President Carter, since the import, ironically enough, was that the Commander-in-Chief -- despite his Naval background -- might well not be aware of the seriousness of possibilities that U.S. nuclear weapons were under the de facto control of very, very many other fingers than his -- on nuclear buttons -- and that some of those fingers could be foreign ones.

Again, as I see it now, it was in the context of disclosures such as these by me to Tyson, Cooks and Ambassador Young, that I received from Brady Tyson extraordinary disclosure -- not entirely dissimilar-- related here.

Executed this 20 day of Oct., 1978, at San Francisco, California.

[Signature]

DANIEL ELLSBERG
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

State of California } ss.
County of San Mateo } ss.

On __________, 1978, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in and for said State, personally appeared DANIEL ELLSBERG, known to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged that he executed the same.

WITNESS by hand and official seal.

Notary Public in and for said State.

[Signature]

[Seal]
Under our auspices, the late Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. came to Memphis in March. I was the contact person with Dr. King since we had worked intimately together from 1957 on. I was director of non-violent education for the Southern Christian Leadership Conference of which Dr. King was President. At various times I served on the executive staff and as part-time staff from 1958 through 1968. I am currently on the board of SCLC serving as Vice President of the western region.

On October 16 through the 19, 1978, I was in New York City attending the Riverside Church Ecumenical Convocation on Preaching. On Tuesday morning, the 17th, I called the American Mission to the U.N. to reach Stony Cook who is an aide to Ambassador Andrew Young. He was not in but called me back. I was able to speak to him on the afternoon of the 17th.

I said I wanted to talk at length with him (Stony) and Andrew Young. He first responded that he knew what I wanted, that we had an affidavit saying that Andy Young had said that he knew the truth about Dr. King’s death. I told him that that was not the case, that is not what the affidavit says. He knew that the affidavit was from Daniel Ellsberg. He proceeded to dismiss Daniel Ellsberg. I interjected by letting him know that whoever had told him the content of the Ellsberg’s affidavit had misled him.

We continued our conversation in which I tried to relay the reason for an in-depth conversation. He acknowledged in the process of our conversation that his office knew that information about the death of King was being repressed. He said that “Andy and I had hoped that the House Select Committee on Assassination—would release these matters and open them up.” As I listened to him I realized that he was affirming the affidavit we have from Ellsberg. I do not recall if he mentioned
specific details. My chief recollection is that he clearly indicated that there were names not released, information related to the death that the public did not know and that was not confirmed by the incarceration of James Earl Ray.

That night, Tuesday the 17th, I went to Brady Tyson's apartment, 174 East 74th Street, New York City, Apt. 6D. We had talked earlier on the phone and we had agreed that I would come by for a late supper. I arrived approximately 10 p.m. We did some personal visiting. I led him in a discussion about his work. He obviously was richly enjoying it and rehearsed with me the fact that as a traditional southern populist he found himself in a strange position and yet one where he felt he was able to do some good. I then shared with him my work on the death of Dr. King and the fact that Daniel Ellsberg had given us an affidavit which stated that he, Brady Tyson, in a conversation with Ellsberg, had said that the House Select Committee on Assassinations knew Dr. King's death was engineered by a special group of FBI agents, former agents and undercover people under direct orders from J. Edgar Hoover. He said that he could not remember all that he had told Ellsberg but he did say that Ellsberg was an honest and significant witness. He implied in his remarks that Ellsberg was unimpeachable.

We conversed for the better part of two hours.

Executed this ___ day of __________, 1978, at __________.

__________________________________________

JAMES M. LAWSON, JR.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

State of )
County of ) as.

On __________, 1978, before me, the undersigned, a Notary Public in and for said State, personally appeared JAMES M. LAWSON, JR., known to me to be the person whose name is subscribed to the within instrument and acknowledged that he executed the same.

WITNESS my hand and official seal.

Notary Public in and for said State.
Mr. Tyson. Specifically on page 14——

Mr. Mathews. Mr. Tyson, at this point what I would like you to do is, give me your best recollection of what occurred as opposed to what Mr. Ellsberg said. You had a conversation with Mr. Ellsberg, did you not?

Mr. Tyson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mathews. At that time the conversation centered on the assassination of Dr. King; is that not correct?

Mr. Tyson. Right.

Mr. Mathews. What did you say to Mr. Ellsberg and what did he say to you?

Mr. Tyson. As best I can recall, we were talking about general theories. I was talking about theories of assassinations and I said I have a pet theory, and my pet theory is that there might have been an off-duty and on-duty—off-duty squad and retired FBI men and other persons who were working together for whatever reasons, perhaps bound together by racism or money or some other sense of ideological loyalty, and such a group might have masterminded the group and have been under the control of the Director or some other group or might have been for hire.

I went on to explain that one of the reasons that I felt this way was because I had a difficult time, in spite of all the revelations that have been coming out over these many years, believing that such a plot could have been mounted officially within the FBI, and so therefore I found it easier to believe than a theory that it was done by a clandestine group within the FBI.

Furthermore, as a professor of political science and Latin American studies, I have had a deep interest for the past 15 years in the problem of police repression in Latin America. As it is well known in some countries in Latin America there are squads of off-duty policemen and security agents who carry out hit jobs and kidnapping jobs that were not officially allowed or acknowledged, and sometimes these squads are protected by their on-duty colleagues, knowledgeably or unknowledgeably. I offer this as a theory.

Mr. Mathews. To summarize your testimony, because of your background in Latin American affairs, Central American affairs, you surmised that because those countries may have off-duty federal authorities who may engage in death squads that in your opinion that may also have been the case in this country with Dr. King—off-duty or retired FBI agents; is that correct?

Mr. Tyson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mathews. What was Mr. Ellsberg’s reaction to that comment?

Mr. Tyson. I don’t think he reacted to it.

Mr. Mathews. Did you indicate to him it was your opinion?

Mr. Tyson. That it was my pet theory.

Mr. Mathews. Your pet theory?

Mr. Tyson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mathews. I take it at some point you and Mr. Ellsberg parted ways. Did you continue to talk about this?

Mr. Tyson. We parted ways. We engaged in some arguments but not about this. We were surveying all the assassinations and talking about this one, and I do not believe there was any disagree-
ment. We were offering theories as to how it might have been done.

Mr. Mathews. So I take it there came a time when you made the statement, you had the conversation, the conversation was dropped?

Mr. Tyson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mathews. Mr. Ellsberg left. You went to perform your normal duties at the U.N.?

Mr. Tyson. Yes. This was off duty. It was one night this conversation occurred.

Mr. Mathews. So you and Mr. Ellsberg did not just engage in a professional way, you liked each other and got together socially after work?

Mr. Tyson. Yes. Most of our conversations were socially after hours, not in the building at all. My contacts with him professionally were only to arrange interviews with him that he wanted inside the building, and the other conferences we had I think we found each other interesting because of our different backgrounds and our similar interests, and so we spent a good deal of time talking together.

Mr. Mathews. So is it fair to say that you liked him, he liked you, you were impressed with his style?

Mr. Tyson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mathews. He was impressed with yours, I take it?

Mr. Tyson. I found some very disturbing things about his style. I had never met a person who had a Ph. D. in war planning, for instance.

Mr. Mathews. But that didn’t stop you from going out socially with him, did it?

Mr. Tyson. No.

Mr. Mathews. Let’s try this. Specifically, did you meet at a later point in time with Rev. James Lawson?

Mr. Tyson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mathews. Would you describe the circumstances of that meeting and what occurred at that time.

Mr. Tyson. Reverend Lawson, who is a person I first met at the SCLC convention in Memphis in 1968, called me and said he had to see me on an urgent matter. I did not know what the urgent matter was but I considered Jim Lawson an old friend, and he and I are both Methodist ministers and share many values and have many common friends. And we set a time. And he came to my apartment one night, late. He was in New York for a preaching conference.

Mr. Mathews. What time was this you spoke to Mr. Ellsberg in June 1978?

Mr. Tyson. Sir?

Mr. Mathews. What time did Mr. Lawson appear in your apartment?

Mr. Tyson. This was October 17.

He came to my apartment and I did not know what he had in mind. So I launched into my agenda, which was to try to see if I could persuade him to help put together a human rights coalition in California to celebrate the 30th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. But he wasn’t interested in that,
and turned to the assassination and asked me how I felt about it. I told him I had no information except information that I had gained from reading in the newspapers through the years and that I had my theories, and I again gave him my theories.

We talked maybe 30 or 40 minutes about the assassination before he told me there was an affidavit that had been prepared by Mr. Ellsberg. I was shocked and asked what was the substance of the affidavit. And he told me that in the affidavit Mr. Ellsberg quoted me as saying that I had received information from Congressman Fauntroy to indicate that the committee knew who the assassins were, and I was shocked and said this was not true, that I had never discussed in any significant detail the assassination with Congressman Fauntroy, and that I would hope that before they took this affidavit that I would have a chance to converse with Mr. Ellsberg and to look at it, that maybe two might be better than one and we could come to a more clear understanding of what had transpired in the conversation.

Mr. Mathews: You spoke to Reverend Lawson for at least 40 minutes before he mentioned the affidavit; is that correct?

Mr. Tyson. Yes, sir.

Mr. Mathews. In the course of that conversation did you indicate to him your pet theory about the assassination?

Mr. Tyson. I believe I did, yes.

Mr. Mathews. Did you not know at the time that Reverend Lawson was and is a close associate of Mr. Lane, he is, in addition, an assassination buff, so to speak?

Mr. Tyson. No, I am sorry to state I did not know of his close association with the people who are concerned with the assassination. I did not know he had been following it. The only thing I knew, he had performed the wedding of Mr. and Mrs. Ray.

Mr. Mathews. You knew about that?

Mr. Tyson. I knew about that.

Mr. Mathews. Did that put you on guard at all?

Mr. Tyson. No, sir, I didn’t put it in context at all.

Mr. Mathews. So I take it when he informed you Mr. Ellsberg had an affidavit indicating that you had stated that an off-duty or retired group of FBI agents killed Dr. King you were shocked?

Mr. Tyson. I was, sir, and I stated, as I just did, that I had had no conversation and no information that was not available in the newspapers with anybody.

Mr. Mathews. Did there come a point in time subsequent to that meeting with Mr. Lawson where you had another conversation with Mr. Ellsberg?

Mr. Tyson. Yes, sir. I believe it was on Friday afternoon, October 20, that Mr. Ellsberg called me from some airport and said that he had heard that I had heard about the affidavit, and wanted to tell me what was in it. I immediately asked him why he didn’t talk to me about it before he did it so that we could clarify what the conversation was. After all, we had a loose spontaneous series of conversations 4 months before, on a personal basis I had assumed, because I was certainly not speaking as an official, I was speaking as a private citizen, and he said he had thought about it and wanted to do it but Mark Lane asked him not to do it in order that
Jim Lawson could take the affidavit to Ambassador Young and, as he put it, surprise Ambassador Young with it.

Mr. Mathews. Mr. Tyson, you have read the affidavit, have you not?

Mr. Tyson. Sir?

Mr. Mathews. You have read the Ellsberg affidavit?

Mr. Tyson. Yes, I have.

Mr. Mathews. Let me cite a few specific allegations made by Mr. Ellsberg. Do you have a copy?

Mr. Tyson. I do, sir.

Mr. Mathews. Why don’t you follow along with me. On page 14, line 4, Mr. Ellsberg indicates that you indicated “we know there was a conspiracy and we know who did it,” meaning, according to the substance of his affidavit, “we” being Andrew Young, Walter Fauntroy, and Stoney Cooks.

Mr. Tyson. Well, Mr. Mathews—

Mr. Mathews. Let me just go through it and take up a few points. In addition, along down at the bottom of the page he indicates that you indicated that information had turned up in Walter Fauntroy’s investigation which he said you indicated.

Along these lines let me ask you a series of three questions. Have you ever been involved in any conversations with anyone which led you to believe that information or evidence existed which would support the Ellsberg allegations?

Mr. Tyson. No, sir.

Mr. Mathews. Have you ever been made aware of any conversation between anyone which would have led you to believe that information or evidence existed which would support the allegation that Dr. King was killed by a group of off-duty and retired FBI agents?

Mr. Tyson. No, sir.

Mr. Mathews. Have you ever been involved in any conversation or briefing with Ambassador Young, Congressman Fauntroy or Stoney Cooks which would have led you to believe that they had information or evidence relating to a select group of retired or off-duty FBI agents who allegedly killed Dr. King?

Mr. Tyson. No, sir.

Mr. Mathews. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you, counsel.

Mr. Tyson, a few moments ago you made this statement, and I want to quote you. You said, “I had never spoken to Congressman Fauntroy in any significant detail about the assassination of Dr. King.” Was that your statement?

Mr. Tyson. Yes, sir.

Chairman Stokes. Can you tell us to what degree you have ever spoken to Congressman Fauntroy about the assassination of Dr. King?

Mr. Tyson. I have had two previous conversations about Congressman Fauntroy’s work on this committee, the last in September, in 1977, when he was in New York for a speaking tour, and I asked him how the committee work was going. And as best I can recall, he said it was going with great difficulty, and that was about the end of that conversation. He did not, I am certain,
discuss details of any sort or even mention things that were appearing in the newspapers.

The other conversation was in June 1976 at a wedding reception in the yard of a friend, in which he had just assumed the position of responsibility at this committee, and I asked him how he thought it would go. And he indicated to me he thought it was going to be a long, difficult task after so many years but he expected to find more information, and he told me the story he has repeated in his affidavit about his conversation about Mr. Ellsberg, and those are the two conversations I have had with Mr. Fauntroy about these matters—the only ones.

Chairman Stokes. Have you ever been asked or have you given an affidavit to anyone with reference to any of these matters that you have testified to today?

Mr. Tyson. No, sir. I offered to give one to this committee, but I take it the sworn testimony I am giving today is adequate. But I would be glad to give an affidavit.

Chairman Stokes. In the event you are subpoenaed to appear in a court of law, would your testimony with reference to these matters be the same as it has been before this congressional committee?

Mr. Tyson. Yes, sir.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you.

The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Preyer.

Mr. Preyer. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Devine.

Mr. Devine. No questions. I think you made it quite clear.

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from the District of Columbia, Mr. Fauntroy.

Mr. Fauntroy. I have no questions either, Mr. Chairman, but I do want to thank Mr. Tyson for coming to the committee and setting the record straight on this allegation. I regret very much that the allegation has required both Mr. Tyson and Ambassador Young to be away from their duties.

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ford.

Mr. Ford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have just one question of Mr. Tyson.

Mr. Tyson, isn’t it a fact that you have a reputation for exaggerating and distorting the truth in an effort to enhance your own personal status, that is, to impress those around you?

Mr. Tyson. I am not aware of that reputation, Mr. Ford.

Mr. Ford. I noticed the night Mr. Lawson had dinner with you at your home you went on to talk about the conversation you had had with Mr. Ellsberg, and I think it was at the dinner that you invited him over. I am wondering at that particular point, did you just talk too much wanting to impress him for some strange reason?

Mr. Tyson. Impress Mr. Lawson?

Mr. Ford. Yes.

Mr. Tyson. No, sir, I don’t recall that. We are old friends. I don’t feel any need to impress Mr. Lawson.

Mr. Ford. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Fithian.
Mr. Fithian. Mr. Chairman, I have thought from the beginning this is such a spurious charge, specious set of statements, that I would not honor them with questioning the witness further.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Tyson, a witness before this committee has, at the conclusion of his testimony, 5 minutes during which time he may in any way explain or amplify or make further comment on the testimony he has given before this committee. I would extend to you at this time 5 minutes for that purpose if you so desire.

Mr. Tyson. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I beg the indulgence of the committee for 2 minutes. I was not speaking in my conversations with Mr. Ellsberg officially or in anyone else's name, but offering my own opinions as an individual citizen. Because I work with the Government does not mean that I abandon my concern about certain matters for my opinions. I have no information other than what I have read in the newspapers. If I had any information as to names or as to probable plotters, I would certainly have shouted them from the mountaintops and not hinted to Mr. Ellsberg. I also think it might be difficult at this late date to uncover it. I want to thank the committee for its attention and consideration and for this opportunity to give this statement under oath and to present my understanding of what happened.

Thank you, sir.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you, Mr. Tyson.

There being nothing further at this time, you are discharged.

Mr. Fauntroy.

Mr. Fauntroy. Mr. Chairman, because another person who is highly respected in this country and in the movement of which we are all a part has also been mentioned in this allegation that my colleague Mr. Fithian has characterized properly as specious, I would like to have Mr. Stoney Cooks at least have an opportunity to make a statement to the committee.

Chairman Stokes. The committee calls Mr. Stoney Cooks.

Will you please stand and raise your right hand and be sworn.

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you will give before the committee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?

Mr. Cooks, I do.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you. You may be seated.

Welcome back to Capital Hill, Mr. Cooks.

For the information of those who do not know Mr. Cooks, he was the administrative aid to Ambassador Young when he was in the U.S. Congress and earned quite a reputation on the Hill and is held in very high esteem and respect.

It is nice to have you here.

Mr. Fauntroy. Also, for the information of those who may not know Mr. Cooks, he was one of the valiant workers in the civil rights movement of the 1960's. He was the executive director of the Southern Leadership Conference and enjoyed the trust and respect throughout all that period of all of us, particularly of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you.

The Chair recognizes Mr. Charles Mathews, staff counsel.
Mr. Mathews. I will be brief, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Cooks, you have heard the allegations here today and the testimony, have you not?

TESTIMONY OF STONEY COOKS, EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT TO AMBASSADOR YOUNG, U.S. MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Mr. Cooks. Yes, I have.

Mr. Mathews. You have had the opportunity to read MLK exhibit F-430, which is a copy of the affidavit of Daniel Ellsberg, and MLK exhibit F-431, a copy of the Lawson affidavit, have you not?

Mr. Cooks. Yes, I have.

Mr. Mathews. And you note basically the thrust of those affidavits indicate that you, along with Ambassador Young and Mr. Fauntroy, are in possession of evidence which would indicate that an off-duty secret group of retired FBI agents killed Dr. King?

Mr. Cooks. Yes, I do.

Mr. Mathews. In view of that, I really have three questions for you, Mr. Cooks.

Have you ever been involved in any conversations with anyone which would support the Ellsberg allegations?

Mr. Cooks. No, I haven’t.

Mr. Mathews. Have you ever been made aware of any conversations by anyone which would have led you to believe that information or evidence exists which would support the allegations that Dr. King was killed by a group of off-duty and retired FBI agents?

Mr. Cooks. No, I haven’t.

Mr. Mathews. Mr. Cooks, have you ever been involved in any conversation with Ambassador Young or Congressman Fauntroy or were you ever made aware of any conversations between Ambassador Young or Congressman Fauntroy which would have led you to believe that they had in their possession information or evidence which would have proved that a select group of retired and off-duty FBI agents killed Dr. King?

Mr. Cooks. None.

Mr. Mathews. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.

Chairman Stokes. Mr. Cooks, for the record, please state your present position.

Mr. Cooks. I serve as Ambassador Young’s executive assistant at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations.

Chairman Stokes. And have you had any conversation yourself with Congressman Walter Fauntroy in which the allegations made in the Ellsberg affidavit have ever been stated to you by Congressman Fauntroy?

Mr. Cooks. None, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you; nothing further.

The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Preyer.

Mr. Preyer. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman. I, too, want to wish you well in your important work now.

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Devine.

Mr. Devine. I also want to welcome you back and appreciate your contribution to the record here.

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from the District of Columbia, Mr. Fauntroy.
Mr. FAUNTROY. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, and thanks, Stony, for coming.

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ford.

Mr. Ford. Mr. Chairman, I have only one question of Mr. Cooks, and I would also like to thank him for appearing before the committee.

I would like to ask the question raised of Mr. Tyson. What is his reputation there at the U.N., Mr. Cooks, just briefly tell us.

Mr. Cooks. I really found all of these statements to be quite alarming, but I think that in fairness to Brady, in fairness to this committee, that I assume to be serious, Brady has been kind of a super volunteer probably since the Poor People’s Campaign.

He volunteers for good causes. He is a missionary, and I think that the reason that you find that a person like Brady Tyson spends several days with a Daniel Ellsberg, he was on order to be in his presence. He wanted to welcome him to the building. He wanted to assure him that this was a new U.S. Government and a new U.S. Mission, that people didn’t get arrested or turned away without questions and answers interchange, but I think that Brady probably was a bit overzealous in his conversations with Daniel Ellsberg. I think he realizes that.

Mr. Ford. Thank you very much, Mr. Cooks.

I yield back my time.

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman yields back the balance of his time.

The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Fithian.

Mr. FITHIAN. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank you for coming this morning.

Chairman Stokes. There being nothing further at this time, under the committee rules, Mr. Cooks, the Chair would extend to you 5 minutes for the purpose of any additional statement you would care to make during which time you may in any way explain your testimony or amplify it or make any further comments you care to make.

Mr. Cooks. Mr. Chairman, just a very brief statement.

I do come back to the Hill quite often. I come back more or less to get a cheap breakfast next door in the Longworth cafeteria, but I have always hoped since 1968 that somewhere along during this period that the circumstances surrounding Dr. King’s death would be unraveled. I have to admit I have my doubts. I think that 10 years is a long period of time for evidence to stay around and files and people to be present where they were, but I would hope that no one person is able to undermine the most valuable work of this committee.

As Ambassador Young said earlier, the country needs to know, the American people need to know who and under what circumstances was a man like Martin Luther King removed from this country.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you, Mr. Cooks. We are sorry that we have had to take the three of you away from your important work at the United Nations to come here and make a reply to what has been I think very appropriately described by Mr. Fithian as the specious charges, but nevertheless, in the interests of keeping the
record straight, so that the American people can know that this congressional committee is endeavoring to carry out the mandate of this Congress, we have had this morning to resort to this. We thank you for your presence.

Mr. Cooks. Thank you.

Mr. Fauntroy. Mr. Chairman?

Chairman Stokes. Mr. Fauntroy.

Mr. Fauntroy. I, too, want to thank you and the committee for its indulgence, and now I hope we can get on to the serious evidence we have developed with respect to the FBI.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you, Mr. Fauntroy.

The Chair at this time recognizes Professor Blakely.

NARRATION BY PROF. G. ROBERT BLAKEY, CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR

Mr. Blakely. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In the interests of time, I would ask, Mr. Chairman, that this narration, which is perhaps a little longer than most, be inserted in the record as if read in full, and I will make an effort to keep it somewhat shorter.

[The information follows:]
Mr. Chairman, it is now appropriate for the Committee to focus its attention on the possible complicity of the FBI, directly or indirectly, in the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

With respect to possible direct involvement, the Committee has addressed the question of whether the FBI hired James Earl Ray or others to kill Dr. King, or set Ray up to take the blame for an act which it committed. It can be said at this time, Mr. Chairman, that the Committee found no evidence of direct FBI involvement.

With respect to possible indirect involvement, the Committee has considered these questions:

* Did the Bureau's official Counterintelligence Program, initiated in September 1967 against the SCLC and in March 1968 against Dr. King, result in Dr. King's being in Memphis on April 4, 1968?

* Did the FBI pay members of the Invaders, a group of young Black activists in Memphis, or act through their informants in that group, to cause the violence in the March 28 march which led Dr. King to return to Memphis?

* Did the FBI have foreknowledge of the assassination on which it did not act?
To a lesser extent, the Committee also touched on the issue of whether the FBI's anti-King activities created a climate that encouraged the assassination.

FBI complicity has been a question raised persistently in books and articles on the assassination, and it has been an accusation frequently made by some prominent civil rights leaders. Much of the controversy first arose in the early 1970's, when information on the FBI's Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO) became known to the American people. More recently, James Earl Ray's attorney, Mark Lane, has stated flatly, "the FBI is responsible for the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King."

In 1976, the Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities completed its investigation of both the FBI's security investigations of Dr. King and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, as well as COINTELPRO. The Senate Committee produced a comprehensive study, but it did not specifically address the assassination.

In November 1975, in response to the findings of the Senate Committee, the Department of Justice initiated its own inquiry. One of the specific jobs of a Task Force created to conduct the inquiry was to determine whether the FBI undertook any actions that might have had a direct or indirect effect on the assassination. In its report, the Task Force condemned the Bureau's activities:
We think the security investigation which included both physical and technical surveillance, should have been terminated on the basis of what was learned in 1963. That it was intensified and augmented by a COINTELPRO type campaign against Dr. King was unwarranted;...

The Task Force concluded that the evidence pointed overwhelmingly to Ray's being the assassin and to his having acted alone. It, too, found no evidence of direct FBI involvement.

There are several reasons, however, why this Committee is re-examining the matter. The allegation is still frequently raised. The FBI's investigation of the assassination left many questions unresolved, and a number of people have suggested that evidence was covered up. The Committee questioned the manner in which the Department of Justice Task Force reached its conclusions, particularly the assumption that J. Edgar Hoover would not have wanted to make King a martyr.

In pursuing its inquiry, the Committee has focused on COINTELPRO and whether it included any activities that indicated complicity. Although COINTELPRO as it related to King and the SCLC was not officially begun until 1967, Dr. King was a target of the FBI from December 1963 on, and the Committee has analyzed the whole history of the FBI's anti-King campaign.

The Committee began its analysis with a review of earlier investigations. Then it reviewed all FBI files on Dr. King
and SCLC. FBI agents at Washington headquarters and in the field offices who had worked on the King case were interviewed. Simultaneously, the Committee spoke with associates of Dr. King.

It would be helpful in understanding this campaign to describe briefly the units of the Bureau which were involved in anti-King activities and how they relate to one another.

The security investigations of Dr. King and SCLC were the responsibility of the Domestic Intelligence Division, known as DID, at Washington headquarters. Within DID, the King investigation was first assigned to the Subversive Control Section. The SCLC investigation was handled by the Internal Security Section. DID generally was charged with gathering intelligence on individuals or organizations that posed a security threat to the U.S. In late 1964 or early 1965, the Internal Security Section of DID assumed responsibility for the King security investigation as well. In October 1967, a new unit of the FBI, the Racial Intelligence Section, was formed. Activities involving Dr. King, SCLC and the civil rights movement were transferred to it.

The other unit at headquarters that was extensively involved with COINTELPRO and anti-King activities was the Crime Records Division. It was the point of contact with the media and Congress, and throughout the King episode, it was the vehicle through which much of the information concerning King was disseminated.
The FBI field offices had a major role both in the security investigations and COINTELPRO. With respect to the security investigations, Atlanta was designated as the "office of origin." This office received all data and proposals obtained by other field offices which had contact with Dr. King.

With respect to COINTELPRO, most field offices were asked to submit proposals on ways to implement the programs. The large majority of all COINTELPRO proposals originated in the field offices and were immediately passed through the Bureau hierarchy for review.

It appears that the Bureau first became interested in Dr. King in 1957, following the Birmingham bus boycott and the subsequent creation of the SCLC. Although Dr. King had quickly become a national figure, the FBI's interest was not very apparent for the next few years. When Director Hoover asked to see the file on Dr. King in May 1961, he received a memo stating that no information had been accumulated.

It is unclear why the FBI initially became interested in Dr. King and the SCLC. In 1961, however, Mr. Hoover's personal interest may well have been occasioned by Dr. King's criticism of the agency. In that year, Nation magazine published an article by Dr. King in which he commented on the dearth of Black federal agents in the FBI and elsewhere. In subsequent years, Dr. King was also to criticize the FBI for its performance at civil rights demonstrations and activities.
Mr. Hoover's opinion of King was clearly negative. On February 2, 1962, James Bland, chief of the Subversive Control Section, sent a memo to William Sullivan, assistant director in charge of the Domestic Intelligence Division, asking whether King should be warned about the suspected communist background of one of his advisors. Mr. Hoover rejected the proposal, writing "King is no good anyway."

Dr. King's suspected link to communism was one of the reasons commonly offered for continued FBI interest in King. In 1961, the Bureau alleged that two of King's advisors, both of whom were connected with SCLC, were known to have communist ties. As a result, the Atlanta Field Office looked into the matter. In April 1962, it submitted a monograph in which it concluded that there was no significant communist influence being exerted on Dr. King.

Mr. Hoover strongly disagreed with this analysis. In fact, he added Dr. King's name to Section A of the reserve index. As described in the Senate Committee report, the index was for people who the FBI felt, "in time of national emergency, are in a position to influence others against the national interest or are likely to furnish material, financial aid to subversive elements due to their subversive associations and ideology."

By October 1962, security investigations of Dr. King and communist infiltration of the SCLC had been initiated. The FBI
was apparently concerned in general about communist infiltration of the civil rights movement. Many influential people - southern congressmen, for example - were claiming that the civil rights legislation pending before Congress was part of a communist conspiracy to overthrow the government.

In July 1963, the FBI opened a general investigation, formally called Communist Influence in Racial Matters (CIRM). In August, Dr. King led a Washington march to demonstrate for civil rights legislation. Just about that time, the Domestic Intelligence Division submitted to Mr. Hoover a synopsis of the Communist Party's effort to exploit the American Negro. It concluded that, although the party had expended enormous effort and resources to influence and control black Americans, it had been largely unsuccessful. Mr. Hoover took strong exception to this analysis as well.

In testimony before the Senate Select Committee in 1977, Assistant Director Sullivan defended the DID's report as an accurate assessment of the Communist Party's position with respect to the civil rights movement. At the time of his testimony, Mr. Sullivan had been forced out of the Bureau as a result of a feud with Mr. Hoover, and the Senate Committee cautioned that his comments might be self-serving. (Mr. Sullivan died before this Committee had an opportunity to interview him.)

The Committee did, however, interview several individuals who, along with Mr. Sullivan, were considered to be experts on
the American Communist Party. One was David Ryan, currently a Bureau official noted for his expertise in counterintelligence. According to Mr. Ryan, the DID synopsis was accurate and reflected the professional judgment of experienced agents.

As a result of the conclusions of the synopsis, the DID fell out of favor with Mr. Hoover. The division, attempting to regain the Director's favor, quickly changed its position on Dr. King. Reacting to Dr. King's famous "I have a dream" speech, Mr. Sullivan wrote apologetically to Mr. Hoover:

The Director is correct. We were completely wrong about believing the evidence was not sufficient to determine some years ago that Fidel Castro was not a communist or under communist influence. On investigating and writing about communism and the American Negro, we had better remember this and profit by the lesson it should teach us.

...Personally, I believe in the light of King's powerful demagogic speech yesterday he stands head and shoulders over all other Negro leaders put together when it comes to influencing great masses of Negroes. We must mark him now, if we have not done so before, as the most dangerous Negro of the future in this Nation from the standpoint of communism, the Negro and national security.

In testimony before the Senate Select Committee, Mr. Sullivan commented:
Here again we had to engage in a lot of nonsense which we ourselves really did not believe in. We either had to do that or we would be finished.

In December 1963, the DID submitted two memos detailing a plan of action against Dr. King and the SCLC. They marked the beginning of the Bureau's effort to defame the civil rights leader.

Up to this point, the nature of FBI activities vis a vis Dr. King had been principally investigatory, limited to information-gathering, although they were often excessive. Between January 1959 and January 1964, the Bureau conducted, for example, 20 surreptitious entries, or burglaries. Twelve of the break-ins occurred prior to the opening of the security investigations of either Dr. King or the SCLC. According to the Department of Justice Task Force, "(s)ome of these entries had as one purpose, among others, the obtaining of information about Dr. King."

Included in the items obtained from the entries were a letter about a book Dr. King had written, a letter regarding an award to be given Mrs. King, and a handwriting specimen. The point is that at least three years prior to the opening of the security case, the Bureau was conducting what the Justice Department later called "illegal surreptitious entries" to obtain materials related to King.
From 1964 on, the FBI's activities changed radically, and they were intensified. The campaign against Dr. King was aimed at discrediting him and neutralizing his influence. A number of the FBI's activities were illegal, many more clearly unethical and unjustified. Generally, the campaign involved:

- an extensive effort to smear Dr. King's reputation by spreading false or misleading information;
- intelligence-gathering that covered both Dr. King's professional and personal life and which included electronic surveillance around the clock;
- efforts to interfere with fundraising and awarding of degrees and other honors to Dr. King;
- efforts to create friction between Dr. King and his associates, even his wife.

The first of the two memos submitted by Mr. Sullivan to Mr. Hoover in December 1963 was dated the 23rd. It refers to a special conference held at Bureau headquarters on that date, attended by FBI officials, supervisors and field representatives. Three topics were on the agenda:

- the American Communist Party's involvement with Negroes;
- the Communist Influence in Racial Matters investigation;
- the internal security implications of communist ties to the civil rights movement.

As it turned out, the meeting was an occasion for the consideration of proposals for discrediting Dr. King and SCLC.
Less than two weeks later, Mr. Sullivan endorsed a proposal that the Bureau consider promoting a new leader who could provide a stabilizing influence within the minority community, when Dr. King was taken "off his pedestal" and his influence ended.

In response, Mr. Hoover wrote:

I am glad to see that light has finally, though dismally delayed, come to the DID. I struggled for months to get over the fact that the Communists were taking over the racial movement but our experts here couldn't or wouldn't see it.

While Bureau records reveal that Dr. King was not officially made a target of an FBI counterintelligence program until March 1968, they also show that Dr. King had been targeted as a man to be discredited and neutralized as early as December 1963. J. Edgar Hoover's own attitude was clear, as was the DID's decision to conform to it. A meeting between Dr. King and Director Hoover in December 1964, although described as a truce parley, in fact altered nothing. The Bureau's neutralization campaign continued. Sometime between October 24, 1963 and June 21, 1966, the Bureau put Dr. King and SCLC under electronic surveillance, using both wiretaps and microphones. FBI eavesdroppers were instructed to be particularly alert to contacts between Dr. King and people with alleged Communist Party
connections. Nevertheless, the taps were monitored indiscriminately. Purely personal conversations were recorded. Bureau memoranda indicate that obtaining personal information was as much the goal as was identifying communist connections.

The records show that the wiretaps were personally approved by Attorney General Robert Kennedy. The actual installation of microphones was okayed by the FBI director or associate director, acting under what they considered to be powers vested in the Attorney General, delegated to them.

Information obtained was the basis for an intensive campaign to smear Dr. King's reputation. It was disseminated to "friendly sources in the media," as well as to civic, social and religious leaders.

Electronic devices were not the only means of surveillance. Beginning in 1964, the FBI received thousands of items of information through its Atlanta field office from a paid informant who was a member of the SCLC executive staff. He provided the FBI with the information about Dr. King and SCLC on a regular, at times, daily basis up to the assassination.

The Committee interviewed the informant about the nature of his relationship with the Bureau; the type of information it sought; the instructions he received, particularly during March and April 1968; FBI counterintelligence activities directed at Dr. King or the SCLC; and his awareness of FBI activities in Memphis during April 1968. And with the informant's permission,
after obtaining a written release from the individual, the Committee reviewed all his FBI files - on payments, justifications, instructions and so on. Based on the interview with the informant, the review, and an interview with a case agent for Dr. King at the Atlanta field office (the one who controlled the informant), the Committee concluded that the informant's recollections are consistent with contemporaneous FBI records.

The informant was in Memphis during some of the time King was there in March and April 1968, but there is no indication he influenced events there.

Although the informant was paid $450 a month or more by the Bureau, he embezzled SCLC funds. When the Bureau learned of this, his case agent advised against the practice but took no action.

FBI field offices were heavily involved in the campaign against King. Atlanta was asked by DID to provide it with a daily memo. Al Sentinella, the special agent in Atlanta in charge of the King security investigation, told the Committee, "The daily memo procedure was senseless," and merely created paper. He felt that the security investigation "should have been closed long before he received the case" in late 1964 or early 1965.

FBI activities against Dr. King intensified greatly in 1967 and 1968, particularly during the year preceding the assassination. Two significant events caused this upsurge:

On April 4, 1967, Dr. King made a strong attack on the war in Vietnam and the policies of President Johnson, providing
the FBI with a new propaganda weapon. Memos began to appear characterizing King as a "traitor to his country," and his anti-war posture was labeled as evidence of pro-Communist leanings.

The second notable event took place following a SCLC meeting in Frogmore, South Carolina. Dr. King announced plans to lead a march on Washington in the spring of 1968. The proposed march, known variously as the Washington Spring Project and the Poor People's Campaign, raised the possibility of a confrontation with the national government. If its stated goals—guaranteed jobs and better conditions for the poor—were not achieved, then a plan of civil disobedience was to follow.

The Washington march became a primary FBI concern. An urgent teletype was sent to major offices, ordering them to alert available ghetto informants to take note of information concerning the Poor People's Campaign. Headquarters also encouraged the recruitment of new informants to report on Dr. King's activities in preparing for the march.

On August 25, 1967, headquarters sent a memo to 22 field offices, including Memphis and Atlanta, captioned Counterintelligence Program: Black Nationalist-Hate Groups. It names the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, the Revolutionary Action Movement, Deacons for Defense and Justice, Congress of Racial Equality, the Nation of Islam and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference as targets of a new counterintelligence initiative. Its purpose was to expose, disrupt, misdirect,
discredit or otherwise neutralize the activities of Black nationalist, hate type organizations and groupings, their leadership, spokesmen, membership, and supporters, and to counter their propensity for violence and civil disorder. Special attention was to be given to "extremists who direct the activities and policies of revolutionary or militant groups...."

The memo directed that the program be afforded "necessary and continuing attention and that no opportunities be overlooked for counterintelligence action." Although SCLC was a target, Dr. King was not specifically mentioned.

Simultaneously, the FBI set up a new unit called the Racial Intelligence Unit. The security investigation of Dr. King, previously assigned to the Internal Security Section within DID, was transferred to the new unit.

The counterintelligence program, or COINTELPRO, occasioned a new surge of activity in the field offices with respect to the civil rights movement. For example, on February 9, 1968, the New York Field Office proposed to take action under "COINTELPRO Communist Party USA." In a memo to Mr. Hoover, the office reported on an upcoming speech by Dr. King at a fund-raiser for a publication the FBI characterized as Communist-controlled. The New York office expressed concern that Dr. King would criticize the Vietnam War effort and promote the Washington Spring Project. As a disruptive measure, the New York office proposed discreetly providing information exposing the ties between the publication, Dr. King, and the Communist
Party. The release would claim that the Communist Party would be a powerful ally for Dr. King in his efforts to promote civil disobedience in the spring of 1968.

At Washington headquarters, Charles Brennan, Chief of the Internal Security Section, sent a memo to Assistant Director Sullivan, recommending the release be sent to "appropriate sources in the mass media field" by the Crime Records Division. Both Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Hoover initialed their assent. Headquarters praised the New York office for its initiative and advised that the proposal had been approved.

On February 27, 1968, New York suggested wider dissemination of the release, but headquarters vetoed the proposed method of dissemination. Once again, however, it praised New York for its interest.

On March 4, 1968, headquarters issued a second memo, titled Counterintelligence Program: Black Nationalist-Hate Groups, Racial Intelligence. It expanded COINTELPRO to 44 offices. For the first time, Dr. King was specifically targeted.

Five specific goals of COINTELPRO were enumerated. One was to "...Prevent the risk of a 'messiah' who could unify and electrify the militant Black nationalist movement. Malcolm X might have been such a 'messiah'; ...Martin Luther King, Stokely Carmichael and Elijah Muhammad all aspire to this position... King could be a very real contender for this position should he abandon his supposed obedience to white, liberal doctrines (non-violence) and embrace Black nationalism."
A second goal, described as "of primary importance," was to prevent violence by Black nationalist groups, consistent with the longstanding FBI goal of preventing violence in general.

Other goals were: to counter the coalition of militant Black nationalist groups; to prevent them and their leaders from gaining respectability by discrediting them with all segments of the white community, the responsible Negro community, and the Negro radical community; and to prevent the conversion of youth to the philosophies of the radical groups.

Primary targets of COINTELPRO were to be members and leaders of what the Bureau considered the most violent and radical groups. The memo once again specifically included the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, Revolutionary Action Movement, and the Nation of Islam. Offices handling these groups and their leaders, Dr. King included, were to be particularly alert to COINTELPRO opportunities. For the first time, specific reporting requirements were established. Imagination and initiative were stressed. Operations were to be approved by headquarters to avoid embarrassment.

The tone and scope of what was envisioned were exemplified in a memo sent from George C. Moore, the Section Chief of Racial Intelligence, to the Jackson, Mississippi field office. It was categorized under "Washington Spring Project," but a copy was also directed to the COINTELPRO Black nationalist file.

The memo confirmed that the Jackson office had been advised by telephone that the Poor People's Campaign had been
discussed at a conference at headquarters. Mr. Moore had suggested a rumor campaign to disrupt the campaign, using such rumors as: participants' welfare benefits would be cut off; demonstrators faced the threat of violence; the march lacked funds and organization; Dr. King was using the march for his own benefit; the Black community in Washington was furious at the threatened invasion of its territory. The memo also suggested using Bureau informants, without their knowledge, to effect the disruption by having them unwittingly spread the rumors.

Several suggestions, responses and comments concerning COINTELPRO schemes were exchanged between field offices and headquarters.

The Baltimore FBI office suggested that should Dr. King be successful in gathering support for the Washington Spring Project in Baltimore, a cartoon, anonymously distributed, could ridicule the hypocrisy of an association between the supposedly non-violent SCLC and the allegedly violent Nation of Islam.

Headquarters sent Baltimore's information about contacts between SCLC and Nation of Islam to the Atlanta and Chicago offices, noting that the proposed cartoon was being held in abeyance.

Atlanta responded that a newspaper article would be more effective than a cartoon. The article would highlight the conflict between Dr. King's non-violent rhetoric and the allegedly violent philosophy of the Nation of Islam, calling into question the
sincerity of King's claim that the Poor People's Campaign would adhere to nonviolent tactics.

The Detroit FBI office reported that, by means of a ruse, it had obtained information on plans for the Spring Project. A special agent claiming to be a "G. L. Whyte," a fictitious businessman, had called the Detroit office of SCLC and offered assistance, on condition that the source of the assistance be kept confidential.

"Whyte" would offer SCLC installments of $200 to assist with the project for as long as necessary to gain its trust. At that point, he would offer, again confidentially, to make buses available to carry demonstrators to Washington. The buses would, of course, not be provided, thereby preventing some people from participating in the Poor People's Campaign and creating doubt, suspicion, and resentment.

Headquarters responded on April 4, the date of Dr. King's assassination, expressing appreciation for Detroit's ingenuity and initiative. It did not, however, approve expenditures for the project, since the $200 might be used for buses, thereby accomplishing what the Bureau was attempting to prevent.

At headquarters, Mr. Moore sent a memo to Mr. Sullivan on March 26, recommending release of a news item designed to hamper fundraising for the Washington Spring Project. It would note that Dr. King had mailed a contribution request for the feeding and housing of marchers to 70,000 potential contributors,
although Washington churches had already offered food and shelter. The story, to be given national circulation, would suggest that Dr. King did not need the contributions, thereby limiting donations. The memo, initialed by Mr. Moore and Mr. Sullivan, was marked "handled 4/4/68."

The Mobile office proposed using an unwitting minister, one influential in the Selma area and somewhat hostile to Dr. King for personal reasons, to effect a COINTELPRO goal. He would be sent an anonymous letter stressing that Dr. King was using Blacks for personal aggrandizement, that demonstrators would be stranded without food or shelter, and that there might be violence. A copy of the letter would be sent to the Selma Times Journal, with a suggestion that the paper interview the minister. On April 2, headquarters authorized Mobile to issue the letter, suggesting that it be mailed from Baltimore to disguise the origin.

The March 4 memo expanding the COINTELPRO-Black Nationalist Hate Group effort had required that all offices reply with specific information within 30 days. As the deadline neared, there had been only a few responses relating to Dr. King and SCLC.

On April 2, Los Angeles proposed that an alliance between SNCC and SCLC could be forestalled by a rumor campaign creating suspicion and friction between the two. On April 4, Washington replied to L.A., generally endorsing the "probing of weaknesses" of targeted organizations by planting seeds of dissension.
The Jackson office proposed creating confusion over Dr. King's plans. Information could be circulated that Dr. King was to be at a certain gathering, when in fact he was not.

These COINTELPRO-related memos clearly reflected the Bureau's concern over the Washington Spring Project. Special agents in charge of several field offices were urged to do everything they could to carry out the instructions they received on how to deal with the project.

Many of the proposed activities had a potential for violence by raising levels of frustration. The Bureau either failed to recognize or was unconcerned about that possibility.

The security investigations of King and SCLC and much of the activity directed against them were originally predicated on allegations that two advisors of Dr. King, also members of SCLC, were communists. The Department of Justice Task Force concluded that one advisor had left the Communist Party in 1963 because it was not serving the civil rights movement adequately. Further, the Task Force said that the FBI files it examined failed to show that the advice of the advisors was dictated by the party or was inimical to the United States.

As to who was responsible, the Department of Justice Task Force concluded that "the illicit dissemination of raw investigatory data to discredit Dr. King, the efforts to intimidate him, to break up his marriage, and the explicit and implicit efforts to blackmail him were not fully known to the Department
but were nonetheless ordered and directed by Director Hoover, Assistant to the Director DeLoach, Assistant Director Sullivan, and the Section Chief under him."

Mr. Chairman, as our next witness we have a former FBI agent who was involved in the King and SCLC security investigations. Arthur Murtaugh served in the FBI from April 1951 until his retirement in September 1971. From November 1960 until his retirement he was assigned to the Atlanta field office, where he was a member of the security squad which gathered intelligence on both Dr. King and the SCLC. Mr. Murtaugh investigated some of the complaints about the FBI's performance at civil rights activities in Albany, Georgia in 1961 in which Dr. King participated. It should be noted that Dr. King's own criticism of the FBI for its handling of civil rights investigations is often cited as the genesis of the feud between Dr. King and Mr. Hoover. It was in this connection that Mr. Hoover labeled King "the most notorious liar in the country."

Mr. Murtaugh provided James Earl Ray's attorney, Mark Lane, with the title of his book on the King assassination, Code Name "Zorro". Statements attributed to Mr. Murtaugh in that book show the depth of the antagonistic feelings of FBI agents toward Dr. King, which, in part, continue to fuel the suspicion of official complicity in the assassination or a coverup in the investigation.

Mr. Chairman, at this time, it would be appropriate to call Arthur Murtaugh.
Mr. Blakey. Mr. Chairman, it is now appropriate for the committee to turn its attention in a serious matter and focus on the possible complicity of the FBI directly or indirectly in the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.

With respect to the possible direct involvement, the committee has addressed the question of whether the FBI hired James Earl Ray or others to kill Dr. King or set up Ray to take the blame for an act which it committed itself. It can be said at the beginning, however, that no evidence of direct FBI involvement has been developed by the committee.

With respect to possible indirect involvement, the committee has considered these questions:

First, did the Bureau’s official counterintelligence program initiated in September 1967 against the SLCL and in March 1968 against Dr. King himself result in Dr. King’s being in Memphis on April 4, 1968?

Second, did the FBI pay members of the Invaders, a group of young Black activists in Memphis, or act through their informants in that group, to cause the violence in the March 28 march which led Dr. King to return to Memphis.

Third, did the FBI have foreknowledge of the assassination on which it did not act?

To a lesser extent, the committee has also touched on the difficult issue of whether the FBI’s anti-King activities created a climate that encouraged the assassination were indeed a factor in creating a mind that could have been led to perform such an act.

FBI complicity has been a question raised persistently in books and articles on the assassination, and has been an accusation frequently made by prominent civil rights leaders. Much of the controversy first arose in the early 1970’s, however, when information on the FBI’s counterintelligence program (COINTELPRO) became known to the American people. More recently James Earl Ray’s attorney, Mark Lane, has stated flatly: “The FBI is responsible for the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King.”

In 1976 the Senate Select Committee To Study Government Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities completed its investigation of both the FBI security investigations of Dr. King, and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, as well as COINTELPRO. The Senate committee produced a comprehensive study, but it did not specifically address the assassination question.

In November 1975, in response to the findings of the Senate committee, the Department of Justice itself initiated its own inquiry. One of the specific jobs of the task force created to conduct the inquiry was to determine whether the FBI undertook any actions that might have been a direct or indirect cause of the assassination. In its report, the task force condemned the Bureau’s activities:

We think the security investigation, which included both physical and technical surveillance, should have been terminated on the basis of what was learned in 1963, that it was intensified and augmented by the Cointelpro type campaign against Dr. King was unwarranted; * * *

The task force, however, concluded that the evidence pointed overwhelmingly to Ray’s being the assassin and to his having acted alone. It, too, found no evidence of direct FBI involvement.
Nevertheless, there are several reasons why this committee ought to reexamine the matter. The allegation is still frequently raised. The FBI's investigation of the assassination itself left many questions unresolved, and a number of people have suggested that evidence was covered up.

The committee questioned the manner in which the FBI was examined by the Department of Justice task force and reached its conclusion, particularly the assumption that J. Edgar Hoover would not have wanted to make King a martyr.

In pursuing its inquiry, the committee has focused on COINTELPRO, and whether it included any activities that indicated complicity. Although COINTELPRO, as it related to King and the SCLC, was not officially begun until 1967, Dr. King was a target of the FBI from December 1963 on, and the committee has analyzed the whole history of the FBI's anti-King campaign.

The committee began its analysis with a review of earlier investigations. Then it reviewed all FBI files on Dr. King and the SCLC. FBI agents at Washington headquarters and in the various field offices who had worked on the King case were interviewed. Simultaneously, the committee spoke with the close associates of Dr. King.

It would be helpful in understanding this campaign to describe briefly the units of the Bureau which were involved in the anti-King activities and how they relate to one another. In this connection, Mr. Chairman, I would ask that Martin Luther King exhibit F-435 be inserted in the record and appropriately displayed.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the record.

[The information follows:]
Mr. Blakey. The security investigations of Dr. King and the SCLC were the responsibility of the Domestic Intelligence Division of the Bureau known as DID at Washington headquarters. Within DID the King investigation was first assigned to the subversive control section. The SCLC investigation was handled by the internal security section. DID generally was charged with gathering intelligence on individuals or organizations that posed a security threat to the United States. In late 1964 or early 1965, the internal security section of DID assumed responsibility for the King security investigation as well.

In October 1967, a new unit of the FBI, the racial intelligence section, was formed. Activities involving Dr. King, SCLC, and the civil rights movement were transferred to it.

The other unit at headquarters that was extensively involved with COINTELPRO and anti-King activities was the Crime Records Division. It was the point of contact with the media and Congress, and throughout the King episode it was the vehicle through which much of the information concerning Dr. King was disseminated publicly. The FBI field offices also played a major role in the security investigations and COINTELPRO.

With respect to COINTELPRO, Atlanta was designated as the office of origin. This field office received all data and proposals obtained by other field offices which had contact with Dr. King.

With respect to COINTELPRO most field offices were asked to submit proposals on ways to implement the programs. The large majority of all COINTELPRO proposals originated in the field offices, and were immediately passed through the Bureau hierarchy for review.

It appears that the Bureau first became interested in Dr. King in 1957 following the Birmingham bus boycott and the subsequent creation of SCLC. Although Dr. King had quickly become a national figure, the FBI's interest was not apparent for the next few years.

When Director Hoover asked to see the file on Dr. King in May 1961, he received a memo stating that no information had been accumulated. It is unclear why the FBI initially became interested in Dr. King and the SCLC. In 1961, however, Mr. Hoover's personal interest may well have been occasioned by Dr. King's criticism of the Bureau. In that year Nation magazine published an article by Dr. King in which he commented on the dearth of Black Federal agents in the FBI and elsewhere. In subsequent years Dr. King was also to criticize the FBI for its performance at civil rights demonstrations and activities. Mr. Hoover's opinion of Dr. King was clearly negative.

On February 2, 1962, James Bland, chief of the subversive control section, sent a memo to William Sullivan, assistant director in charge of Domestic Intelligence Division, asking whether King should be warned about the suspected Communist background of one of his advisers. Mr. Hoover rejected the proposal in writing: "King is no good anyway."

Dr. King's suspected link to communism was one of the reasons commonly offered for continued FBI interest in Dr. King. In 1961, the Bureau alleged that two of Dr. King's advisers, both of whom
were connected with SCLC, were known to have Communist ties. As a result, the Atlanta field office looked into the matter.

In April 1962, it submitted a monogram in which it concluded that there was no significant Communist influence being exerted on Dr. King. Mr. Hoover, however, strongly disagreed with this analysis. In fact, he added Dr. King's name to section A of the reserve index.

As described in the Senate Committee report, the index was for people who the FBI felt:

In time of national emergency, are in a position to influence others against the national interest or are likely to furnish material financial aid to subversive elements due to their subversive associations and ideology.

By October 1962, security investigations of Dr. King and Communist infiltration of SCLC had been initiated. The FBI was apparently concerned in general about Communist influence in the civil rights movement. Many influential people were claiming that the civil rights legislation pending before Congress was part of a Communist conspiracy to overthrow the government.

In July 1963, the FBI opened a general investigation formally called Communist influence in racial matters (CIRM). In August, Dr. King led a Washington march to demonstrate for civil rights legislation. Just about that time the Domestic Intelligence Division submitted to Mr. Hoover a synopsis of the Communist Party's effort to exploit the American Negro. It concluded that although the party had expended enormous effort and resources to influence and control Black Americans, it had been largely unsuccessful.

Mr. However, however, took strong exception to this analysis. In testimony before the Senate Select Committee in 1977, Assistant Director Sullivan defended the DID's original report as an accurate assessment of the Communist Party's position with respect to the civil rights movement.

At the time of his testimony, it should be noted, Mr. Sullivan had been forced out of the bureau as a result of a feud with Mr. Hoover, and the Senate Committee cautioned that his comments might be self-serving. Unfortunately, too, Mr. Sullivan died before this committee had an opportunity to thoroughly interview him.

Nevertheless, the committee did interview several individuals who, along with Mr. Sullivan, were considered to be experts on the American Communist Party. One was David Ryan, currently a Bureau official noted for his expertise in counterintelligence. According to Mr. Ryan, the original DID synopsis was accurate and reflected the best professional judgment of experienced agents.

As a result of the conclusions of the synopsis, however, the DID fell out of favor with Mr. Hoover. The division, attempting to regain the Director's favor, quickly changed its position on Dr. King. Reacting to Dr. King's famous "I have a dream" speech, Mr Sullivan wrote apologetically to Mr. Hoover:

The Director is correct. We were completely wrong about believing the evidence was not sufficient to determine some years ago that Fidel Castro was not a Communist or under Communist influence. On investigating and writing about communism and the American Negro, we had better remember this and profit by the lesson it should teach us.

* * * Personally, I believe in the light of King's powerful demagogic speech yesterday he stands head and shoulders over all other Negro leaders put together when it comes to influencing great masses of Negroes. We must mark him now, if
we have not done so before, as the most dangerous Negro of the future in this Nation from the standpoint of communism, the Negro, and national security.

In testimony before the Senate Select Committee, Mr. Sullivan commented:

Here again we had to engage in a lot of nonsense which we ourselves really did not believe in. We either had to do that or we would be finished.

In December 1963, the DID submitted two memos detailing a plan of action against Dr. King and the SCLC. They marked the beginning of the Bureau’s effort to defame the civil rights leader.

Up to this point, the nature of FBI activities vis-a-vis Dr. King had been principally investigatory, limited to information gathering although they were often excessive. Between January 1959 and January 1964 the Bureau, however, conducted 20 surreptitious entries, or burglaries. Of the break-ins, 12 occurred prior to the opening of the security investigation of either Dr. King or the SCLC. According to the Department of Justice task force, “Some of these entries had as one purpose among others obtaining information about Dr. King.”

Included in the items obtained from the entries were a letter about a book Dr. King had written, a letter regarding an award to be given to Mrs. King, and a handwriting specimen. The point is that at least 3 years prior to the opening of the security case, the Bureau was conducting what the Department of Justice itself was later to call “illegal surreptitious entries” to obtain the materials relating to Dr. King.

From 1964 on, the FBI’s activities changed radically, and they were intensified. The campaign against Dr. King was aimed at discrediting him and neutralizing his influence. A number of the FBI’s activities were illegal, many more clearly unethical and unjustified. Generally, the campaign involved:

An extensive effort to smear Dr. King’s reputation by spreading false and misleading information;

Intelligence gathering that covered both Dr. King’s professional and personal life and which included electronic surveillance around the clock;

Efforts to interfere with fundraising and awarding of degrees and other honors to Dr. King; and

Efforts to create friction between Dr. King and his associates, even his wife.

The first of the two memos submitted by Mr. Sullivan to Mr. Hoover in December 1963 was dated the 23d. It refers to a special conference held at Bureau headquarters on that date, attended by FBI officials, supervisors and field representatives. Three topics were on the agenda:

(1) The American Communist Party’s involvement with Negroes;
(2) The Communist influence in racial matters investigation; and
(3) The internal security implications of Communist ties to the civil rights movement.

As it turned out, the meeting was an occasion for the consideration of proposals for discrediting Dr. King and the SCIL.

Less than 2 weeks later, Mr. Sullivan endorsed a proposal that the Bureau consider promoting a new Black leader who could provide a stabilizing influence within the minority community,
when Dr. King was “taken off his pedestal” and his influence ended.

In response, Mr. Hoover wrote:

I am glad to see that light has finally, though dismally delayed, come to DID. I struggled for months to get over the fact that the Communists were taking over the racial movement but our experts couldn’t or wouldn’t see it.

While Bureau records reveal that Dr. King was not officially made a target of an FBI counterintelligence program until March 1968, they also show that Dr. King had been targeted as a man to be discredited and neutralized as early as December 1963.

J. Edgar Hoover’s own attitude was clear, as was the decision of DID to conform to it. A meeting between Dr. King and Director Hoover in December 1964, although described at the time as a truce parley, in fact altered nothing. The Bureau’s neutralization campaign continued.

Sometime between October 24, 1963, and June 21, 1966, the Bureau put Dr. King and the SCLC under electronic surveillance, using both wiretaps and microphones. FBI eavesdroppers were instructed to be particularly alert to contacts between Dr. King and people with alleged Communist Party connections. Nevertheless, the taps were monitored indiscriminately. Purely personal conversations were recorded. Bureau memoranda indicate that obtaining personal information was as much the goal as identifying Communist Party connections.

The records show, moreover, that the wiretaps were personally approved by Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy. The actual installation of microphones was merely OK’ed by the FBI Director or Associate Director, acting under what they then considered to be powers invested in them by the Attorney General.

Information obtained was the basis for an intensive campaign to smear Dr. King’s personal reputation. It was disseminated to “friendly sources in the media as well as civic, social, and religious leaders. It was also widely disseminated among the House and the Senate of the United States.”

Electronic devices were not the only means of surveillance. Beginning in 1964, the FBI received thousands of items of information through its Atlanta field office from a paid informant who was a member of the SCLC executive staff. He provided the FBI with the information about Dr. King and the SCLC on a regular, at times daily basis up to the day of the assassination.

The committee interviewed the informant about the nature of his relationship with the Bureau: The type of information it sought; the instructions he received, particularly during March and April 1968; FBI counterintelligence activities directed at Dr. King or the SCLC, and his awareness of FBI activities in Memphis during April 1968.

And with the informant’s permission, after obtaining a written release from the individual, the committee reviewed all of his FBI files on payments, justifications, instructions and so on. Based on the interview with the informant, the review, and an interview with the case agent for Dr. King at the Atlanta field office, the one who controlled the informant, it may be concluded that the FBI’s recollections, the informant’s recollections, are consistent with contemporaneous FBI records.
The informant was in fact in Memphis during some of the time Dr. King was there in March and April 1968, but there is no indication that he influenced the events that occurred there. Although the informant was paid $450 a month or more by the Bureau, he actually embezzled SCLC funds. The Bureau learned of this, his case agent merely advised against the practice, but took no action.

FBI field offices were also heavily involved in the campaign against Dr. King. Atlanta was asked by DID to provide it with a daily memo. Al Sentinella, the special agent in Atlanta in charge of the King security investigation, told the committee “the daily memo procedure was senseless” and merely created paper. He felt that the security investigation “should have been closed long before he received the case” in late 1964 or early 1965.

FBI activities against Dr. King intensified greatly in 1967 and 1968, particularly during the year preceding the assassination. Two significant events apparently caused this upsurge.

On April 4, 1967, Dr. King made a strong attack on the war in Vietnam and the policies of then President Lyndon Baines Johnson, providing the FBI with a new propaganda technique. Memos began to appear characterizing King as “a traitor to his country” and his antiwar posture was labeled as evidence of his pro-Communist leanings.

The second notable event took place following an SCLC meeting in Frogmore, S.C. Dr. King announced plans to lead a march on Washington in the spring of 1968. The proposed march, known variously as the Washington spring project and the poor people’s campaign, raised the possibility of a confrontation with the national government here in Washington. If its stated goals, guaranteed jobs, and better conditions for the poor, were not achieved, then a plan of civil disobedience was to follow.

The Washington march became a primary FBI concern. An urgent teletype was sent to major offices ordering them to alert available ghetto informants to take note of information concerning the poor people’s campaign. Headquarters also encouraged the recruitment of new informants to report on Dr. King’s activities in preparation for the march.

On August 25, 1967, headquarters sent a memo to 22 field offices, including Memphis and Atlanta, captioned “Counterintelligence Program: Black Nationalist Hate Groups.” It names the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, the Revolutionary Action Movement, Deacons for Defense and Justice, Congress of Racial Equality, the Nation of Islam, and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference as targets of a new counterintelligence initiative. Its purpose was to expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or otherwise neutralize the activities of Black nationalists, hate type organizations and groupings, their leadership, spokesmen, membership and supporters, and to counter their propensity for violence and civil disorders.

Special attention was to be given “to extremists who direct the activities and policies of revolutionary militant groups * * *” The memo directed that the programs be afforded “necessary and continuing attention, and that no opportunities be overlooked for
counterintelligence action.” Although SCLC was a target, Dr. King was not specifically mentioned.

Simultaneously, the FBI set up a new unit called the Racial Intelligence Unit. The security investigation of Dr. King previously assigned to the Internal Security Section within DID was then transferred to the new unit.

The counterintelligence program, or COINTELPRO, occasioned a new surge of activity in the field offices with respect to the civil rights movement. For example, on February 9, 1968, the New York field office proposed to take action under “COINTELPRO Communist Party USA.”

In a memo to Mr. Hoover, the office reported on an upcoming speech by Dr. King at a fund-raiser for a publication the FBI characterized as communist-controlled. The New York office expressed concern that Dr. King would criticize the Vietnam war effort and promote the Washington spring project.

As a disruptive measure, the New York office proposed discreetly providing information exposing the ties between the publication, Dr. King, and the Communist Party. The release would claim that the Communist Party would be a powerful ally for Dr. King in his efforts to promote civil disobedience in the spring of 1968.

At Washington headquarters Charles Brennan, chief of the Internal Security Section, sent a memo to Assistant Director Sullivan recommending the release be sent to “appropriate sources in the mass media field” by the Crime Records Division. Both Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Hoover initialed their assent. Headquarters praised the New York office for its initiative and advised that the proposal had been approved.

On February 27, 1968, New York suggested wider dissemination of the release, but headquarters vetoed the proposed method of dissemination. Once again, however, it praised New York for its interest.

On March 4, 1968, headquarters issued a second memo entitled “Counterintelligence Program: Black Nationalist Hate Groups, Racial Intelligence.” It expanded COINTELPRO to 44 offices. For the first time, Dr. King was specifically targeted.

Five specific goals of COINTELPRO were enumerated. One was to:

Prevent the rise of a “messiah” who could unify and electrify the militant Black nationalist movement. Malcolm X might have been such a “messiah,”—Martin Luther King, Stokely Carmichael and Elijah Muhammad all aspired to this position—King could be a very real contender for this position should he abandon his supposed obedience to white liberal doctrines, nonviolence, and embrace Black nationalism.”

A second goal, described as of primary importance, was to prevent violence by Black nationalist groups, consistent with the long-standing FBI goal of preventing violence in general.

Primary targets of COINTELPRO were to be members and leaders of what the Bureau considered the most violent radical groups. The memo once again specifically included the Students Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, Revolutionary Action Movement, and the Nation of Islam. The office handling these groups and their leaders, Dr. King included, were to be particularly alert to COINTELPRO opportunities. For the first time, specific reporting
requirements were established. Imagination and initiative were stressed. Operations were to be approved by headquarters to avoid embarrassment.

Several suggestions, responses and comments concerning COINTELPRO schemes were exchanged between field offices and headquarters.

Many of the proposed activities had a potential for violence by raising levels of frustration. Nevertheless, the Bureau either failed to recognize or was apparently unconcerned about that possibility.

The security investigations of King and SCLC and much of the activities directed against them were originally predicated on allegations that two advisers of Dr. King, also members of SCLC, were Communists. The Department of Justice Task Force concluded that one adviser left the Communist Party in 1963 because it in fact was not serving the civil rights movement adequately.

Further, the task force said that the FBI files examined failed to show the advice of the advisers was dictated by the party or was inimical to the United States.

As to who was responsible, the Department of Justice task force concluded that:

The illicit dissemination of raw information data to discredit Dr. King, the efforts to intimidate him, to break up his marriage, and the explicit and implicit efforts to blackmail him were not fully known to the department, but nonetheless were ordered and directed by Director Hoover, Assistant to the Director De Loach, Assistant Director Sullivan and the section chief under him.

Mr. Chairman, as our next witness we have a former FBI agent who was involved in the King and SCLC security investigations, Arthur Murtagh, who served in the FBI from April 1951 until his retirement in September 1971. From November 1960 until his retirement, he was assigned to the Atlanta field office, where he was a member of the security squad which gathered intelligence on both Dr. King and the SCLC.

Mr. Murtagh investigated some of the complaints about the FBI's performance at civil rights activities in Albany, Ga., in 1961 in which Dr. King participated. Dr. King's own criticism of the FBI for handling of civil rights investigations is often cited as the genesis of the feud between Dr. King and Mr. Hoover. It was in this connection that Director Hoover labeled King "the most notorious liar in the country."

Mr. Murtagh also provided James Earl Ray's attorney with the title of his book on the King assassination, Code Name "Zorro." Statements attributed to Mr. Murtagh in that book show the depth of the antagonistic feelings of FBI agents toward Dr. King which, in part, continue to fuel the suspicion of official complicity in the assassination or a cover-up in the investigation.

Mr. Chairman, at this time it would be appropriate to call Arthur Murtagh.

Chairman Stokes. The committee calls Mr. Arthur Murtagh. Mr. Murtagh, would you stand, raise your right hand and be sworn?

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you give before this committee is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Murtagh. I do so swear.
Chairman Stokes. Thank you. You may be seated. Would you pull the mike up a little closer to you. Thank you.

The Chair recognizes Mr. William Webb, staff counsel.

Mr. Webb. Thank you.

Before we begin to question Mr. Murtagh, I would like to point out for the record that in his narration Professor Blakey alluded to Mr. Murtagh as being "an individual involved in the King and SCLC investigations." As will be developed through his testimony, while Mr. Murtagh has information about that subject, he had little direct involvement with the King security or SCLC security investigations.

Would you state your full name, sir.

TESTIMONY OF ARTHUR L. MURTAGH, RETIRED FBI AGENT

Mr. Murtagh. Arthur L. Murtagh.

Mr. Webb. You are a retired agent of the FBI?

Mr. Murtagh. Yes, I am.

Mr. Webb. And you are by professional training an attorney?

Mr. Murtagh. Yes.

Mr. Webb. Will you state the dates of your service with the FBI?

Mr. Murtagh. 1951 to September 1971.

Mr. Webb. And during the course of your duties with the FBI, you were assigned to the Atlanta field office?

Mr. Murtagh. That is correct.

Mr. Webb. What were your dates of service in Atlanta, sir?

Mr. Murtagh. 1960 to 1971.

Mr. Webb. Did there come a time during your duties in Atlanta that you were detailed to the resident agency in Albany, Ga.?

Mr. Murtagh. Yes. I was sent down to Albany along with about 40 other agents in connection with demonstrations that were taking place down there, and I believe it was 1961.

Mr. Webb. And did those agents later become involved in investigating civil rights complaints that originated in Albany, Ga.?

Mr. Murtagh. They were investigating them and had been for some time before I arrived. The investigation had been underway and there was a steady flow of civil rights complaints through the office on a daily basis, I don't know how many, maybe one or two every couple—every day or so.

Mr. Webb. Did your duties directly involve the investigation of those complaints, sir?

Mr. Murtagh. No. I was designated as one out of the 40 to handle the regular criminal work of the office, and I was also designated to attend the conferences that were held in connection with the investigation, and these conferences usually ran from about 8:30 in the morning until 11:30, so I spent considerable time at the conferences. They went over what investigations and what work they were doing in connection with the demonstrations.

Mr. Webb. So it would be fair to say that you were kept pretty well abreast of what was happening in Albany, Ga.?

Mr. Murtagh. I was specifically instructed to keep abreast of it, in case I would be needed for investigative purposes.

Mr. Webb. And in 1961 Dr. King was conducting demonstrations or participating in these demonstrations in Albany, Ga.?
Mr. MURTAGH. Dr. King was attempting to get the swimming pool and the libraries integrated in Albany at that time.

Mr. WEBB. Mr. Murtagh, will you describe the racial climate, that is whether it was violent or nonviolent, and the type of activities that were being carried on when you arrived in Albany, Ga.?

Mr. MURTAGH. I came in in the middle of the afternoon, and the demonstration was underway at the time, and I wanted to see what was involved. The news media had it somewhat exaggerated, and it took me some time driving around a city of 60,000 to find the area where about 200 Blacks were circling around the block, and giving a peaceful protest demonstration.

Mr. WEBB. Had your office received reports of violent incidents in Albany?

Mr. MURTAGH. We received—civil rights complaints generally that, as I mentioned earlier, were reports of violence that had happened. Usually they were charges of police violence or other groups, shooting into houses where civil rights workers were staying, assaulting them, different types of cases like that.

Mr. WEBB. So when we talk about the civil rights complaints, beside the lack of access to facilities, we are talking about rather substantive incidents involving shooting?

Mr. MURTAGH. Yes, yes. They were serious incidents that were being reported.

Mr. WEBB. While you were in Albany, Ga., did you know an agent by the name of Marion Cheeks?

Mr. MURTAGH. Yes.

Mr. WEBB. And will you tell us what his position was in the resident agency?

Mr. MURTAGH. He was the second oldest agent, that is in terms of service in Albany, and he had sort of arrogated to himself the responsibility for running the show. We had a decision in Albany at that time, the bureau had, but never did break into a very—well, it would have been a scandal had it come out at the time, but the agent in charge of the Albany office, I mean of the Atlanta office, who was down in Albany with us had gotten himself involved in some flirtations with a local barmaid, and he had for all purposes relinquished his authority in running the office, and Cheeks took over the responsibility and ran the office.

Mr. WEBB. Mr. Murtagh, while you were in Albany were you aware of Mr. Cheeks’ attitude toward the civil rights movement, Dr. King, or Blacks in general?

Mr. MURTAGH. Mr. Cheeks came from someplace in either Georgia or Alabama originally, and I liked Marion Cheeks. I considered him on all matters except matters relating to race, I considered him a friend, but on the questions of race I could not discern much difference between his view and the view of Ku Klux Klansmen that I would have occasion to interview from time to time.

Mr. WEBB. Did you have discussions with other agents who were down in Albany?

Mr. MURTAGH. I remember a specific discussion that I had with an agent whose first name was Don, I can’t remember him now, but he was on the squad with us at the time, Don Burgess. He was in Albany at that time or perhaps a little later, and he mentioned to me that he had talked to people, to Blacks, that had told him
that they would not report or would not go near the FBI man in charge and it was an unfortunate thing.

Cheeks had a scarred face, and the Blacks referred to him as that scar-faced FBI agent, because of the way that Cheeks responded to the Blacks. And I had personally, in some interviewing that I was doing, I had some Blacks bring up the question that they would not have anything to do with Cheeks, that they were afraid of him, that he treated them with disrespect.

Mr. Webb. But in your discussions with other agents assigned to Albany, did they tell you about an informal orientation process of Mr. Cheeks?

Mr. Murtagh. Yes, I had two or three young agents that went to Albany over a period of time, not necessarily at the time that we are speaking of now, and I was known as, well, I was known in the Bureau as an extreme radical. I think I would be known politically generally as a moderate liberal, but because of the attitudes of most of the agents, I looked pretty far to the right—to the left.

Now I am teaching in a college in northern New York, and I am viewed as being pretty far to the right, so it depends on where you are how you are characterized.

In the office over the years, the 10 years that all of what the chief counsel was telling us about in the material that he read, while that was taking place, I got to be the guy that the younger agents, those who were questioning the system, would come to and say "Hey, what is going on here?" And three that I can remember, I can't remember their names, but three of them came back from Albany after a stay down there and told me that Cheeks had given them specific instructions not to shake hands with any Negroes. The expression that he used is that:

We don't do that down here. We don't give a damn what you do up North but you don't have that kind of relationship with Blacks, with Negroes, in this area.

Mr. Webb. And sir, from your observations, did this attitude at the top of the office have an impact on the way in which civil rights complaints were handled?

Mr. Murtagh. Well, I would like to explain to the committee how civil rights cases were handled, in some detail, so that you can see how this—what was happening.

Civil rights cases had a unique type of method in the Bureau. They were handled differently than any other cases that I know of other than possibly antitrust cases. The Bureau would not initiate any investigation in a civil rights case beyond the point of taking the initial complaint, without getting specific instructions from the Department of Justice as to what they were supposed to do. And in each case the agents were required, and you had to show this on the report, that you had advised everybody that you had interviewed that the civil rights investigation was instituted by an assistant attorney general of the U.S. Department of Justice, thus letting the public know that the FBI was not investigating these things because they wanted to but because they were told to. And a further control on the scope of the investigations consisted of the initial AIRTTEL that went to the Bureau being edited.

Mr. Webb. Mr. Murtagh, let me interrupt right there.

Mr. Murtagh. Yes.
Mr. WEBB. Would you describe for the committee what an AIRTÉL is?

Mr. MURTAGH. An AIRTÉL would be an air mail letter. The investigation would be instituted. The complaint would come in and you would prepare an air mail letter to the Bureau explaining what the complaint was. In Albany, Marion Cheeks made it very clear in all of his conferences that he would handle the AIRTÉL’s before they went out, that he would initial them, and agents spoke of the fact that he was editing them, and that he was playing down the complaints so that the Justice Department would see no grounds for further investigation and the matter would be dropped.

Mr. WEBB. Would this be true in cases that would normally have warranted a full investigation?

Mr. MURTAGH. Yes, in cases that warranted. Well, further investigation, not necessarily full investigation.

Mr. WEBB. Why do you believe this occurred, sir?

Mr. MURTAGH. I believe it occurred because, while Marion was a nice guy, he was a racist, and he had very strong feelings and he made them known to everybody around him, and it was a result of this type of activity I think that prompted the blacks in the Albany area to bring it to Dr. King’s attention and prompted Dr. King to conclude that we weren’t doing our job properly.

Mr. WEBB. Sir, in your opinion was it unusual for FBI offices in the South to be headed by people who had these kinds of feelings?

Mr. MURTAGH. I have tried to think of a circumstance where a resident agency in one of the small towns or one of the towns in the South was in the control of, or where the senior resident agent was anything other than a native southerner. And of all the offices that I was in, and I was in a lot of them because I worked especially throughout the South, I never knew of the situation where someone who wasn’t a good old local boy wasn’t assigned to the senior resident agency position.

Mr. WEBB. And in the case of those individuals you knew, would you describe their racial attitude to the best of your ability?

Mr. MURTAGH. We have talked here, I heard Hon. Andrew Young speak of this being a different era. We are talking now of a period 10 to 20 years ago, and we are talking of senior resident agents who, for the most part, would be older than I am, people that today would be in their late sixties—early seventies. Their racial attitudes were the racial attitudes of the South in the pre-civil rights, pre-Brown decision times. They were racists.

Mr. WEBB. Thank you.

Were you aware of the criticisms Dr. King made about the FBI's activities in Albany, Ga?

Mr. MURTAGH. Yes, I was aware of them at the time and discussed them with agents.

Mr. WEBB. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like a teletype from the special agent in charge of Atlanta to the Director, FBI which has been premarked as Martin Luther King exhibit F-439A, entered into the record shown to the witness.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, it may be entered into the record.

[The information follows:]
AGENTS OF THE FBI IN ALBANY, GA., SIDED WITH SEGREGATION. IN WHICH HE SAID HE AGREED WITH THE REPORT ISSUED NOVEMBER FOURTEEN LAST IN ATLANTA BY THE SOUTHERN REGIONAL COUNCIL THAT THE FBI HAD NOT BEEN VIGOROUS IN LOOKING INTO DENIALS OF CIVIL RIGHTS IN ALBANY AND THE SURROUNDING AREAS. STATED QUOTE AGENTS OF THE FBI IN ALBANY, GA., SIDED WITH SEGREGATION. QUOTE ONE OF THE GREAT PROBLEMS WE FACE WITH THE FBI IN THE SOUTH. QUOTE HE SAID QUOTE "IS THAT THE AGENTS ARE WHITE SOUTHERNERS WHO HAVE BEEN INFLUENCED BY THE Mores OF THEIR COMMUNITY. TO MAINTAIN THEIR STATUS, THEY HAVE TO BE FRIENDLY WITH THE LOCAL POLICE AND PEOPLE WHO ARE PROMOTING SEGREGATION. EVERY TIME I SAW FBI MEN IN ALBANY, THEY WERE WITH THE LOCAL POLICE FORCE," QUOTE

END PAGE ONE

PAGE TWO

FIVE AGENTS, ONE FROM INDIANA, ONE FROM BOSTON, ONE FROM KINGSTON, N. Y., ONE FROM MINNEAPOLIS AND ONE FROM CA. CLIPPING BEING FORWARDED SPECIAL TODAY. RECOMMEND NO FURTHER ACTION IN THIS MATTER.

END AND ACK PLs

WASSSSSS

9-45 AM OK FBI UA TAT

TU DISC

MLK Exhibit F-439A
Mr. Webb. Mr. Murtagh, what I would like you to do is to read through this and, as I have identified it, it is a teletype to the Director of the FBI. What it attempts to do is to summarize for the director the nature of the criticisms Dr. King leveled. There are three that are interesting that I would like you to comment on them after I identify them.

In describing King it goes on to say:

He agreed with the report issued November 14 last in Atlanta by the Southern Regional Council that, one, the FBI had not been vigorous in looking in terms of civil rights in Albany or the surrounding areas.

Was that in fact a valid criticism?

Mr. Murtagh. Absolutely.

Mr. Webb. Two, and it goes on that "Agents of the FBI in Albany, Ga., sided with the segregationists."

Would that have been an accurate criticism?

Mr. Murtagh. I am sorry. Would you read that over. I forgot my hearing aid.

Mr. Webb. Certainly. It says "Agents of the FBI in Albany, Ga., sided with segregationists."

Mr. Murtagh. Cited for segregationists?

Mr. Webb. Sided with segregationists?

Mr. Murtagh. Oh, sided, yes. I would not say that all of the FBI agents in Atlanta, in Albany, Ga., sided with the segregationists. I would say that Marion Cheeks very definitely did, and some of the others that were assigned there on the special.

Now I knew all of them quite well, and there were five, and I would say that two of them would have sided with the segregationists, and the other three probably would have been neutral, not particularly pro-civil rights in any way. I never knew any older agent in my age group in the bureau that I could describe as being pro-civil rights or wanting to carry out the civil rights responsibilities of the Bureau.

Mr. Webb. The last item of criticism Dr. King made was that:

One of the great problems we face with the FBI in the South is that the agents are white southerners who have been influenced by the mores of their community. To maintain their status they have to be friendly with the local police and people who are promoting segregation.

Was it true, sir, that all of the agents in the southern offices were, in fact, from the South?

Mr. Murtagh. No, that wasn't true. The control was in the hands of the southern agents, in the sense that they were the senior agents in the areas.

Mr. Webb. So when Dr. King made his criticisms, only one of the three was false and the other two, to some extent, were, in fact, true?

Mr. Murtagh, so that 2 years later when the Director would call Dr. King the most notorious liar in the country, based on his criticisms in Albany, criticisms which have been reported to in this document, he knew at the time or should have known that only one of the three criticisms that Dr. King made was, in fact, untrue?

Mr. Murtagh. Let me say in regard to that something that I think should be kept in mind in trying to evaluate the Bureau's part in all of this, and it goes back a little further than the period that you are speaking of here. It goes back to 1958.
I made an effort in 1958 to communicate with the Director through channels and to make a criticism of the particular program that he had instituted in connection with personnel; and I was called in—I wrote the letter, sent it through, across the desk of my special agent in charge, Roy K. Moore—and I was called in by Mr. Moore and when I came in from work about 7 o'clock at night he was waiting for me, and he said, "Art, I can't send that letter to the Bureau." And I said, "Why?"

He said, "Well, you don't understand the political makeup of the Bureau or the attitude of the Director." He said, "You may be knowledgeable politically in areas outside, but you don't understand Bureau politics." He said, "I have been in the Bureau for 28 years and I have been at the Bureau in Washington"—and I won't make the exact quote because it was rather vulgar, but he said, "You must understand that you're working for a crazy maniac and that our duty—and there were some words in between—"that our duty is to find out what he wants and to create the world that he believes in, and to show him that that's the way things are; and you are wasting your time and you might as well"—he told me that he admired my morals and so forth, but that if I expected to pursue this type of attitude that I had better get out of the Bureau, because I would never get anywhere in the Bureau.

That was the type of blockage that existed between Mr. Hoover and the field agents, and I initially got into all of this, and I am here today because in 1958, along about that time, I could see the Bureau headed for serious difficulties because of the structure of the organization.

I testified before the House Intelligence Committee in connection with the same matter, and until the structure is changed there is a clique in the upper echelons of the Bureau that is going to bring us to the same kinds of problems we have had in the past.

I had dealings with the current No. 2 man in the FBI when I was in the Bureau in connection with the recruitment of applicants, and I found him to be a blatant racist. I was told so by my boss, Joe Palmer, who was the agent-in-charge in Atlanta, when we had dealings with this gentleman in trying to get them to accept Black applicants for clerical jobs in Washington when we couldn't get whites. We were at that time—we had four full-time agents spending their time going around Georgia recruiting whites and I recruited Blacks. I had 140 or so completed investigations at the Bureau where there was no derogatory information, no reason for not hiring them; and they still were using 4 full-time agents to find 7 whites, while I found 140 qualified Blacks; and Adams was the man that was stopping these Blacks from being employed.

Now as long as that structure persists in the Bureau and the lack of communication from the field to the Bureau, where they are doing exactly what they want to do, then the problems will persist.

I'm sorry that I diverged, but I would like the committee to understand the full nature of the problem.

Mr. Webb. Mr. Murtagh, do you know what happened as a result of Dr. King's criticism of the Bureau during the Albany period?

Mr. Murtagh. Well, immediately following that, the discussion in the squad that I was on—and this was a security squad—while I
didn’t work on the wiretap and work in connection with all the
details of investigating King, I did have many paid informants and
I worked racial matters almost exclusively for the last 3 or 4 years,
and following the Albany incident, the investigation and the atti-
tude toward King hardened. And from that time on the only way
that I could describe what we were doing was that we were operat-
ing an intensive vendetta against Dr. King in an effort to destroy
him.

Mr. Webb. Mr. Murtagh, you remained in Atlanta and on the
security squad through the date of the assassination, April 4, 1968?

Mr. Murtagh. That’s right.

Mr. Webb. Were you ever directly involved in the investigation
of either Dr. King or the SCLC?

Mr. Murtagh. I was obliquely involved in the investigation of
both. I had many Black informants. I think out of all the infor-
mants in the Atlanta office, there was only one Black informant
other than the ones that I had. We only had one other, and he was
the SCLC informant that was referred to earlier today.

So there was a lot of interplay between my work and investiga-
tion of what Al Sentinella was doing in the SCLC, and frequently I
was asked to have my informants get information from SCLC.

I always—when I saw Andrew Young here this morning, I re-
called that it was always amusing to me because a lot of the stuff
that we were bothering to get through informants—I had a nice
enough relationship with the SCLC so that I think I could have
just gone in and asked them for it and they would have told me,
like, “What time is your march going to start tomorrow in such-
and-such a place?” And we would go through the elaborate process
of using an informant rather than going downtown and asking
them or picking up the phone and asking them.

Mr. Webb. Mr. Murtagh, you mentioned Ambassador Young’s
name. Did there come a time in your duties in Atlanta when you
were asked to acquire information about the Ambassador?

Mr. Murtagh. Yes. I testified to this before the House Intelli-
gence Committee, and it happened this way: I came into the office.
Andrew Young had made an announcement that he was going to
run for Congress, run for the nomination for Congress; and some-
time within a month or a few weeks after that I was called in to
my supervisor’s office. My supervisor was a fellow named Harding,
whom I always—and some of the others—referred to as Colonel
Clink. He had a kind of a shifty personality, to say the least.

And he called me in and he—-I recall the time of day because the
time of day was important in this particular thing; it was after
working hours when the WATS line would be free and no record
would be made of the call—and he said, “Art, could you have your
man”—meaning an informant that I had that had daily access to
SCLC—“could you have your man get us some handwriting sam-
ples and some envelopes of the SCLC?” And at that time—now, my
knowledge of what was going on developed with time. I didn’t know
the seriousness of the Bureau’s vendetta against King when it first
started. I didn’t recognize it. I was for the Bureau in many ways
and still am. I would like to see it reformed and brought back to
where it would have the respect that it has had in the past.
But, at any rate, I was called in and I was asked if I would get these things, and I turned to Harding and I said, "Now, you know what they want these things for, don't you, Chuck?" And he said, "Yes, yes, I do."

I mean, it was implied between us that they wanted them to start a COINTEL operation—if COINTEL was in at that time, and if it wasn't, just to start an operation, because COINTEL wasn't necessarily the beginning of the COINTEL-type things that the Bureau did.

I said, "No, my informant won't get it for you, and you can tell that SOB at the Bureau that wants this information that if he persists in trying to use my informant for this particular type of operation when they have no reason whatsoever, not a scintilla of evidence that Andrew Young is in any way involved in any type of activity which should be watched or controlled by the FBI, you can tell him that I'm ready to go public on this whole show—"

Mr. Webb. Mr. Murtagh, was it unusual, the situation you described—after-hours activities, unrecorded instructions and communications given verbally over the WATS line?

Mr. Murtagh. No. In most of the things that were done of this nature, they would be done—well, not always—sometimes they would be done openly, as some of the records show. Other times they would be done in a clandestine manner without keeping a record of it.

Mr. Webb. Would you describe the establishment of the wiretap directed against Dr. King and the SCLC?

Mr. Murtagh. Well, following the incidents in Albany, Ga., it was probably a year and a half or so before they actually put the wiretap on. I don't know the dates, but I noted that a section of the office had been shut off, and there were signs on the doors saying, "No admittance into this area." And it was a secret that was not very well kept, that a wiretap had been put on Dr. King. There was no talk of it. We were cautioned not to have anything to say about it, even in the office.

So, of course, that generated quite a bit of conversation about the fact that behind those closed doors was a wiretap on Dr. King.

And shortly after that the Bureau rented what would be a plush downtown apartment in a skyscraper, Peach Tree Towers, across the street. I think it was a two-bedroom apartment, and up several floors a massive wiretap installation covered the whole end of one room and about 15 agents were detailed to run the wiretap. They were instructed not to come to the office at all.

They went directly to the wiretap, put in their hours, and went home. Al Sentinella and a fellow named Bob Nichols, who were in the same room with me—this was just a small office with office space for five or six desks—for a number of years I was in the same room at a desk across from one of them. During that time they instituted a separate filing section for the wiretap information, and the wiretap information on Dr. King got to the point where it had, I would estimate, 40 or 50 file cabinets, packed full of handwritten accounts of all the phone calls that were received on the various places that were wiretapped, identifying all of the people that were involved. And all of those people—and there must have been thousands of people's names in those records—were indexed in such a
way that the Bureau and Al Sentinella could tell whether or not they had any of those. I mean, what the calls were about.

That was the scope of the wiretap and it was on for 2½ or 3 years.

Mr. Webb. Mr. Murtagh, would you consider the manner in which the wiretap was handled to be a normal procedure?

Mr. Murtagh. I never saw anything in the Bureau in a field office handled with as much secrecy as the wiretap was handled.

Mr. Webb. Sir, can you describe the attitude of the agents on the security squad in Atlanta with respect to Dr. King, the SCLC, and the civil rights movement generally?

Mr. Murtagh. Well, the attitude was neither categorical nor continuous on the part of the agents. I could think of some agents who were from the very beginning hostile to Dr. King and said so openly; and I could think of some who said nothing; and I can think of one who over the years gradually changed his view and came closer to feeling like I did, that there was no justification for a prolonged, projected investigation of Dr. King. That was Al Sentinella.

So there were different views expressed by different agents from time to time. I would say that I never heard anyone say anything favorable about Dr. King in the 10 years that I was with these fellows. I heard many, many things of a derogatory nature concerning Dr. King and concerning the racial movement generally.

Mr. Webb. Was this in any way tied into—or the feelings that were known in the office—about how the Director viewed Dr. King and the SCLC?

Mr. Murtagh. Well, again, if you understood the way the Bureau worked, Hoover had been there for 40 years at this time, and if a newspaper article was critical of Mr. Hoover, everybody was busy at the typewriter the next day getting their letter off to the editor, telling him that Mr. Hoover was right, and sending a copy to Mr. Hoover.

There was a scramble for recognition, get something on top of your file that would show that you thought the way he did, because if you didn’t, if there was any indication that you thought differently than he did, then you weren’t a fit person to be an FBI agent.

Mr. Webb. Mr. Murtagh, in our interview you told me a story about an agent offering to play you one of the tapes about Dr. King as an evidence that his feelings about Dr. King had changed, at least. Would you relate that story to the committee?

Mr. Murtagh. Yes. The poor fellow has died of cancer since. His father was a New York police officer, and I had been in his home some socially on a few occasions while he was on the wiretap, and we had gotten into conversations—after we had gotten into the booze a little bit—and in each instance he and I almost came to blows. I would be defending King as not being a Communist, being a sort of a decent man that was trying to do some good for his people, and a justified cause; and he would be calling him a Communist, and so on, and that I didn’t understand the seriousness of having a charlatan like Dr. King take over the country, that he was Communist; and it would go on like that.
I recall one night it got so bad that my wife pulled me by the arm; she said, “Let’s go,” and we went home, because it got unpleasant.

Then about several weeks later—maybe months; I don’t know—this agent came to me in the office one day and he says, “Art”—incidentally, he was a hell of a nice guy, even though we disagreed on things—he came to me and he said, “Art, we got a tape on Zorro”—Zorro was the code name for King in the office—“We got a tape on Zorro that I would like you to hear.” He said, “You know, I don’t understand much about communism or any of these things,” and he said, “I have been listening to those tapes over there for months on end, to those telephone calls, and the other night King was on the phone with Levinson”—who was one of the persons that had Communist backgrounds—and was connected with King.

He said, “There was a discussion between Levinson and King about the policy that the SCLC would take in connection with the question of communism, and whether they would throw people out if they were Communists, and so forth.” And he said, “King was laying the law down to Levinson.” And, he said, “I thought Levinson was white,” and I said, “I thought that Levinson was running King,” and he said, “I was convinced after listening to that tape that it was the other way around, that Levinson might be helping King, but that he certainly wasn’t under his control in any way, and I would just like to let you listen to the tape and see what you think.”

Well, as it happened, I never heard the tape, for I don’t know what reasons. It may have been at that time that he got sick and was unable to let me hear it.

Mr. Webb. Mr. Chairman, at this time counsel has no further questions of Mr. Murtagh.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you.

I yield such time as I may consume, after which the committee will operate under the 5-minute rule.

Mr. Murtagh, as a retired FBI agent, do you have any present employment?

Mr. Murtagh. Yes. I have a small portion of a small law practice, and I hold an associate professorship at a really great college up in northern New York—Clarkson.

The Chairman. What do you teach?

Mr. Murtagh. Constitutional law, prisoners’ rights, courses relating to or mainly connected with the Constitution.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you.

Can you tell us how you became aware of Mr. Hoover’s feelings toward Dr. King?

Mr. Murtagh. Well, I heard the statement that was in the press, where he said that Dr. King was the most notorious liar in the country, and I also heard bits and dabs via the grapevine through agents as to things that Hoover had said.

I can’t recall things specifically but they were all negative.

Chairman Stokes. Can you tell us who William Sullivan was?

Mr. Murtagh. The Assistant Director—well, he was the head of the Intelligence Section, as far as I know.
Now, I was never at the Bureau, and I never paid much attention to the structure at the top of the Bureau, but I believe he was head of the Intelligence Section. I know he handled racial matters.

Chairman Stokes. That was here in Washington, D.C.?

Mr. Murtagh. Yes.

Chairman Stokes. Was there ever a time when he came to Atlanta?

Mr. Murtagh. Yes. He came, and it was the only time I ever saw an Assistant Director in the field office, that I ever saw, yes.

Chairman Stokes. And this was rather unusual?

Mr. Murtagh. Very unusual.

Chairman Stokes. Can you tell us what occurred when he came?

Mr. Murtagh. I knew he was coming; they had scheduled what was labeled some type of security conference being held on the Two Squad, which was the squad that I was on; and there had been talk of the fact that this Assistant Director Sullivan was coming down, and I believe he came—my recollection was that it was on a Monday. And I came into the office, and Bob Nichols, who was on the squad with me for many years and handled the technical end of the wiretap and other racial-type investigations, met me outside the door in the hall of the Two Squad and I remember his actions at the time.

He snapped his fist like that (indicating). He says, "Art, today we're going to get Zorro." I said, "What do you mean, we are going to get Zorro?"—meaning Dr. King. He said, "Sullivan is in there talking with Harding, and they're going to fix him good this time," or something to that effect.

And I went in the office, sat at my desk, and Sullivan—the door was closed into Harding's office, which was off ours, and was probably, I think, the only time I ever saw that door closed—and a little later Sullivan came out, went somewhere, I guess, probably to the boss' office. Harding came out and indicated that he and Sullivan were going out for the day. And Harding was a very typical colonel; he was so excited he could hardly contain himself that he was going to spend the day with a lot of VIP's.

And that night I came back in—I guess it must have been around 5 o'clock—and Sullivan was gone; Harding was in his office and I went in for some reason, and Harding said, "Well, Art, we're not going to have to worry about any of this so-and-so about Dr. King from the Atlanta Constitution today." He says, "I was with Sullivan and we went to the Atlanta Constitution, and Sullivan was closeted with Ralph McGill for about an hour and 20 minutes," and, he says—Ralph McGill, incidentally, was a noted newspaper editor in the South who was pro-civil rights and who wrote a great many articles praising Dr. King—he said, "You won't find any articles anymore where McGill will be praising King. We've got it stopped," or something to that effect.

And then, as luck would have it, a few days later I went to my personal physician, a Dr. Wilbur, in Atlanta. Dr. Wilbur was the doctor for our archbishop in the Catholic cathedral in Atlanta, and the archbishop had some type of terminal illness. He was only 43, and he went to the Vatican Council in Rome and Dr. Wilbur went with him. So the relationship between Dr. Wilbur and the archbishop was extremely close. He went with him as his personal
physician and stayed with him for a year during the time of the Council.

When I went in—my doctor was Dr. Wilbur, for my own personal reasons, and I was a personal friend of his—I went in to see him and he said—this was right after Sullivan had been down, and it was just before a planned salute, tribute, to Dr. King at the Dinkler Hotel in Atlanta, where a lot of dignitaries were coming, and the cardinal was to be the keynote speaker, or whatever you call him, for the event—and Dr. Wilbur said:

I went in to see the archbishop the other day and he asked me a peculiar question. He said that two men from the FBI had come to see him and that they said they had been to see the local rabbi and that the gist of what they were saying was that they wanted to dissuade the archbishop from offering any favorable reaction or even participating in the tribute to Dr. King, that if they did this sort of thing, that if the archbishop did it, that there soon would be released some personal information concerning Dr. King which would make the archbishop's activities embarrassing to him.

And the doctor told me that the archbishop said that he paid no attention to them because, as far as he was concerned, King was a great leader of a great cause and that he was doing a lot of good, and regardless of—even if they had private information—that the public good that Dr. King was doing was worth supporting; so he went ahead and made the speech, anyway.

So the whole thing came together and I realized that what had happened was that Sullivan had come to Atlanta, gone out with Clink and visited the archbishop, the newspaper reporter, and the rabbi, and God knows whom else, in order to try to undercut King's efforts. And they had threatened to expose information that they were getting over the wiretap at that time.

Chairman Stokes. You have used the term "Zorro." Did you know whom they were referring to when they used the term "Zorro"?

Mr. Murtagh. Always; yes.

Chairman Stokes. And tell us how you came to know that.

Mr. Murtagh. Well, I don't think I can, Mr. Chairman. They began to refer to King as "Zorro," and every time that they were talking about King, they used the word "Zorro" rather than "King."

Chairman Stokes. That was the code name?

Mr. Murtagh. The code name; yes. I don't know—you know, I don't recall the exact time that I learned it, or how I learned it, but I know it existed.

Chairman Stokes. Mr. Murtagh, are you familiar with the FBI acronym COINTELPRO?

Mr. Murtagh. Yes, I am.

Chairman Stokes. Tell us what it stands for.

Mr. Murtagh. Counterintelligence program.

Chairman Stokes. You heard Professor Blakey describe the COINTELPRO this morning in his narration?

Mr. Murtagh. Yes.

Chairman Stokes. Would you agree that the goals of the COINTEL program are as he stated them this morning?

Mr. Murtagh. Absolutely, yes.
Chairman Stokes. Would it be fair to say that this was the FBI's official "dirty tricks" program; could we characterize it in this way?

Mr. Murtagh. I think it would be fair to say that it was one of the FBI's dirty tricks programs.

Chairman Stokes. And in terms of the target or the goal of the COINTEL program, how did you as an agent understand the program?

Mr. Murtagh. Well, I have to confess to some, being a little slow in this regard, not just the COINTEL program but the whole approach.

You have to remember, these things unfolded on a day-to-day basis over a period of years, when I was being shifted from place to place to handle or to work on various special civil rights investigations throughout the South; and I kind of gradually began to sense what was going on. You see, I didn't see it at the beginning.

I felt that what we were doing—I know what I was doing with my 15 informants; I was doing what I could to prevent violence, and in some cases I perhaps, as I look back upon it, I may have done some things that invaded rights of individuals, but I didn't do them intentionally.

I recall one incident where Dr. Abernathy was leading demonstrations in a small town in Georgia and they had 700 or 800 Blacks parading around the downtown section at night, over a dispute in connection with the high school, and the Ku Klux Klan was around the square in the small town, with their shotguns on the back of their pickup trucks, I thought it was quite an explosive situation; so I sent an informant in to break it up; and I asked the informant to go in and work into the group and get them to agree to get a permit; and as soon as they got the permit it took the heat off of the thing; and we broke it up.

The informant got shot at by the group that were leading it. I tell this just to say that during the time that I was going through it I didn't really know what the proper procedure should have been in connection with—how to handle these intelligence matters, you see. We never received any schooling on it, or any education in the field.

I think the Bureau was—well, the Bureau was lax in it because the Bureau felt that all they needed to do was tell you what to do and you carried out the responsibilities.

Chairman Stokes. In terms of, let's say, the terms "neutralize" and "discredit" targets, what did you understand the program to mean by that?

Mr. Murtagh. In the later phases of it, probably by the time the COINTEL program came out, which, I think, was in 1967, by that time I knew what the Bureau was doing and I was very, very strongly opposed to it. I thought that they were picking targets without any basis, without any probable cause, and that the intent and purpose of their efforts was to destroy the civil rights movement.

But I had previously felt that it was for the purpose of preventing violence. I think there was a complete lack of understanding on the part of the Bureau of the whole nature of the civil rights movement.
Chairman Stokes. In terms of the part of the program that we refer to being a part of it, that is, the dirty tricks, are you aware of any of the unofficial actions on the part of any of the agents under the category "dirty tricks"?

Mr. Murtagh. Well, I am aware of what they call the "dirty trick incident" or "fire department incident" in Atlanta, only because I heard the agents talking about it. They picked up on the wiretap the fact that Dr. King was going to be at some address other than his home, and there was implication or innuendo that it involved some relationship with a woman; and as I understand it—and I only know it by hearsay, but the hearsay was from the agents that were actually involved in the thing—some one of the agents called the fire department and sent them to the location for the purpose of embarrassing Dr. King, and they talked about it as if it was a good prank, something that they were proud of.

Chairman Stokes. What happened when the fire truck was sent to the premises?

Mr. Murtagh. That I don't know.

Chairman Stokes. Are you aware of any file stripping, any reconstruction, alteration of FBI files?

Mr. Murtagh. Well, I think the committee should understand that the files of the Bureau were very fluid; they could be stripped and changed and jockied around to meet the needs of any particular situation; and by 1958 I was aware that that was where the trouble lie in the Bureau.

It was the petty lying about little things, and I can remember circumstances where files would be taken apart, serial 29 would be retyped; and then they'd call another office, call New York, and retrieve the serials from New York, so that they could make the file appear the way it should appear.

It might just be for the reason of protecting yourself against the inspectors looking into something where you had made a mistake. They changed things around and jockied files on a consistent basis. It was never thought of as being improper.

Chairman Stokes. Mr. Murtagh, how would you assess the integrity of the agents with whom you worked on the security squad?

Mr. Murtagh. Outside of the presence of some very pervasive racism, which I think would indicate a weakness, from my vantage point it is difficult for me to see that a person who is a racist to the extent that they would inhibit the enforcement, the constitutional rights of other people—if that relates to integrity, I would have to say that two or three of them of the seven or eight that I worked with were weak in that area; but otherwise, including those three, I would say that they were of the highest integrity or as high as any group of people that I have ever worked with, and I have been in several different work situations in my life.

I don't think it was a question of weakness of integrity that caused the trouble. I think the difficulty is in the structure of the Bureau. It has nothing to do with integrity.

Now, this may be a concept that is difficult to grasp unless you go through the kind of thing that I went through in the FBI, and the Congress, I think, should address itself to the structure and not worry about the integrity. There are a lot of fine people in the FBI—excuse me—and it isn't with pleasure that I sit here and tell
you things about the organization that I spent a lifetime in, but for God's sake get the structure straight, get the things corrected, get the clique in Washington straightened out. That is where the trouble is.

You have a lot of fine men that are doing good work in the field and they'll continue to do good work, but they can't do it with the type of structure they have in Washington, D.C. The oldtimers that are still running the Bureau—and Mr. Webster will go the way of all the other Directors that have come there since Hoover; they'll suck him in in some way, and he'll be damaged.

Chairman Stokes. Then essentially you believe that the problem lies with the hierarchy in the Bureau?

Mr. Murtagh. Absolutely. The system by which you work through and work up in the FBI requires you to give up your integrity; it requires you to be a party to a lot of things which guys like myself and other agents avoided by keeping themselves assigned someplace where they wouldn't have to do those sorts of things.

Chairman Stokes. Let me ask you this: Have you ever known an FBI agent to lie under oath?

Mr. Murtagh. I've never known much about testimony of FBI agents under oath, so I don't think that I know specifically of anybody.

Chairman Stokes. On March 28, 1968, Dr. King led a march in Memphis, Tenn., which was marred by violence. Do you recall that event?

Mr. Murtagh. Yes.

Chairman Stokes. Can you recall the reaction to that event in the Atlanta office?

Mr. Murtagh. It was a reaction that followed any circumstance when Martin Luther King's program faltered; it was a reaction of "our side won the ballgame yesterday." It happened when Martin Luther King—I recall discussion about Martin Luther King's activities in Birmingham, when they had the fire hoses and cattle prods and he was criticized for his activities there by the agents that I worked with. Everything he did, no matter what he did, he was the object of very strong criticism by the agents that I knew in the Bureau that were working on the squad with me.

Chairman Stokes. Mr. Murtagh, were you on duty on April 4, 1968, the day that Dr. King was killed?

Mr. Murtagh. Yes, I was.

The Chairman. And where were you on duty?

Mr. Murtagh. Well, the thing that I have recollection about is that on the night that the announcement was made—and I still have never looked it up to find out whether it was 5 minutes of 6 or 5 minutes of 7—I kind of think it was 5 minutes of 7—I was in the office, preparing to go home, and I had a little salmon card that we kept our time and all the other things we had to account for, I was making it out, and I heard the news of Dr. King's assassination over the radio.

Chairman Stokes. Was anyone with you at that time?

Mr. Murtagh. Yes.

Chairman Stokes. Tell us who that was.
Mr. Murtagh. I will, but I would like to make note that I would prefer not to. I'll do it, assuming that the committee is insisting on it.

When I got into this type of thing in criticizing the Bureau, I made a firm resolution that I would do the best I could not to bring embarrassment down on any of my former associates, because I don't think that they were bad people, and I don't think this fellow was a bad guy; but I will tell you if you want me to.

Chairman Stokes. Well, you have described him for our committee, haven't you?

Mr. Murtagh. Yes.

Chairman Stokes. And you have picked him out in a photograph, have you not?

Mr. Murtagh. Right.

Chairman Stokes. And I can say to you that the gentleman is here, and is going to testify subsequently, so I see no reason why you ought not be able to name him.

Mr. Murtagh. It was a Mr. Rose.

Chairman Stokes. Do you know his full name?

Mr. Murtagh. James Rose.

Chairman Stokes. Can you tell us what happened when the news came over the radio there at the Bureau?

Mr. Murtagh. My recollection of what happened was that the gentleman was with me. We were making out our three cards, and we were going to walk down to the parking lot, which was about a half a mile—not, not that far, maybe a quarter of a mile—from the office, and when the news came over that Dr. King had been shot in Memphis, Jim became very excited, agitated, and he said something to the effect, "We finally got" or "they finally got"—and I don't know which—"we finally got" or "They" "finally got the s.o.b."

And a few minutes later the announcement came over that Dr. King was dead, and he repeated about the same type of thing, with a great deal of indication, at least to me, that he was very happy that it had happened. And I walked to the parking lot with him.

I had a discussion with him, which was similar to many, many discussions I had with agents on the squad, to the effect that I felt Dr. King was a credible person, and he proceeded to tell me that he was a threat to the security of the United States, that he was influenced by the Communists, and that type of argument. And we stood for a few minutes, maybe 2 or 3, discussing it, and disagreeing; and I disagreed with him then and if he hasn't changed his mind I disagree with him today on that particular feeling.

Chairman Stokes. Do you recall in your interview with us that you said when the announcement was made, he literally "jumped with joy"—is that your statement?

Mr. Murtagh. I think I made that statement. I think that's what I was trying to get across to you, that he seemed to be extremely happy about the fact that King was dead.

Chairman Stokes. Now, in order to have the record clear on the identification of this gentleman, when members of the committee staff first contacted you, you could not recall the name of the individual to whom you had attributed those remarks; is that correct?
Mr. Murtagh. That's right.

Chairman Stokes. And then last week, even when you were being interviewed by our staff, you were shown a two-album photographic display and you were unable to identify the individual at that time; is that right?

Mr. Murtagh. That's correct. I don't know—I was unable to until they told me that his picture—an old picture—was in the book, and I didn't see it.

Chairman Stokes. And for the record, the two albums which were provided by the FBI contained the photographs of each agent who was assigned to Atlanta in 1968. Included among those photographs was a 1969 photograph of Mr. Rose. While you could not identify the individual by name, you were able to describe this man by height, appearance and duties in the office, and this then allowed the committee and the FBI to come up with the name, the individual who fit that description?

Mr. Murtagh. That's correct.

Chairman Stokes. And it was then when you had an opportunity to see this man that you were able to identify him by name; is that correct?

Mr. Murtagh. That's right. I saw him this morning, coming into the building, not this building, but the other building.

Chairman Stokes. Right. Can you tell us if this agent's reaction and views were shared by other members of the security squad?

Mr. Murtagh. I think they may have been shared by some other members of the security squad. I don't think Al Sentinella would have shared that view. I think that from things that were said to me over the years, I think that mainly two of the seven would definitely have shared the view.

Chairman Stokes. Now, Mr. Murtagh, did you participate in the investigation of Dr. King's murder?

Mr. Murtagh. Yes.

Chairman Stokes. And do you recall that the investigation was known by the FBI acronym MURKIN which stood for "Murder of King"?

Mr. Murtagh. Yes.

Chairman Stokes. Were you satisfied that the investigation was thorough and complete?

Mr. Murtagh. No.

Chairman Stokes. What additional steps do you feel could, or should, have been taken?

Mr. Murtagh. Well, I think it was incomplete, mainly because I think that the Bureau was so heavily weighted against King that it affected its ability to rationally and fairly carry out the investigation. They went through the motions of carrying it out, and I recall that the question of conspiracy was pooh-poohed from the very beginning, that any mention of it was looked upon as being the workings of some crazy imagination.

Chairman Stokes. So then, it was never pursued from the aspects of attempting to find a conspiracy?

Mr. Murtagh. I recall having been told—I think, by Harding; I'm not sure—that the Bureau had decided sometime within 24 hours after the killing that it wasn't a conspiracy; and I worked on the file A, Mississippi killings of the civil rights workers, and it
took us 2½ months of concentrated investigation before we could establish and prove the conspiracy in that case; and the difference between the way the two cases were worked is as different as night and day.

The file A, Mississippi case, was pushed by President Johnson. He called the office in Washington every day and asked about the progress of the investigation, and the Bureau conducted a full field investigation, going to the extent of getting U-2 flights over the area to take pictures and all of that sort of thing. They pulled out all the stops, because the President was pushing the investigation; and we solved that case, and we came up with a conspiracy.

We solved several cases along about that time, and in all of them there was pressure from the White House to get them solved.

In the King case, as soon as we identified Ray, for all practical purposes you couldn’t tell that there was any special investigation going on.

Chairman Stokes. Then in essence it was more of a fugitive investigation?

Mr. Murtagh. Right; it was handled like a fugitive case instead of an intelligence case, although our original interference with Dr. King was an intelligence matter; it was handled as a simple fugitive case.

Chairman Stokes. Just one further question: Then as an agent you also saw a flaw in it, in the sense that the same men who were assigned to survey and to investigate Dr. King were also assigned, with the kind of views that you have expressed here, to investigate his murder, which would certainly be a flawed effort?

Mr. Murtagh. It was a flaw as far as I was concerned, sir. I think that’s where the trouble lies, if the investigation had been done by—maybe by the Criminal Section of the Bureau rather than the Intelligence Section, there might have been a different result. There might have been; and I don’t mean to get into any crazy speculation.

I just think that it defies and assaults reason to think that people who have been engaged in a 10-year-long vendetta against Dr. King are the ones who should be investigating his death; and I don’t mean to imply by that that the FBI was necessarily involved. I don’t know whether it was or not.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you very much, Mr. Murtagh.

I have no further questions.

The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Preyer.

Mr. Preyer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Murtagh, you have given us a fascinating and not always pretty piece of history here this morning.

Ambassador Young stated earlier that he thought the committee was important, not only to find out who did it, the assassination, but also to outline the underlying and surrounding circumstances, that he thought that was necessary for the social health of the country; and I think you added a great deal to that.

Let me just ask you about the attitudes of FBI men below the top clique. You have paid your respects to the quality of the top clique here in Washington.

When did you leave the FBI?

Mr. Murtagh. 1971.
Mr. PREYER. At the time you left—let me first say you have given us a very graphic description of the pre-civil rights attitudes of your coworkers—at the time you left in 1971, had you noticed any change in that attitude?

Mr. MURTAGH. Yes, I had. I had noticed. I remember one fellow that even before that—a fellow that was on the wiretap, worked on the wiretap—came to me when he was being transferred—he was a new agent—maybe 1967, along in there. He knew that my views were extremely unpopular, and in connection with the recruitment of workers for Washington he had been assigned some of the cases, and he had been doing some recruiting. He came to me and in a rather emotional way pointed out that the attitude that I had was the one that he shared, that somehow or other we, the way he put it—he said, “Art, if you get one of these young black people from the ghetto in Atlanta into where they are in a Government job, where they wear a white shirt, even if they only push a chair, or push a cart, at the Bureau, you will be moving somebody from a family that has never done anything but menial work into the structure of society and doing some good.” And, he said, “Keep it up. It’s the way to go.”

Now there were some of those types of people coming into the Bureau at the time I got out, yes.

Mr. PREYER. So you would say at the present time there is more of a pro-civil-rights movement attitude among these people?

Mr. MURTAGH. Well, I wouldn’t know about the present time, but I would assume so. I know that I have noted in the 7 years that I have been teaching, a distinct change in attitude of the young people coming along, and that they are much more pro-civil rights. In fact, they have gone beyond the point of being pro; they are at the point now where they don’t recognize that there is a problem. They just accept the idea that—the ideas of equality.

I teach a course in race relations and I find that gradually as the years go on there is a softening of the attitude, and I’m sure that the same thing happens in the Bureau, except for the fact that this clique in Washington are in a position to decide who will go forward; and I think that that will prevent any real change in Bureau policy.

Mr. PREYER. Speaking of the clique in Washington, you mentioned that it is not a question of integrity of the average agent in the FBI, but it is more a question of organization.

I wonder if you really aren’t saying it is more a question of leadership, that we have to change the organizational structure or get rid of some people at the top?

Mr. MURTAGH. I think that Justice Frankfurter said one time—I think it was Frankfurter—said in an opinion one time, that the civil rights of human kind are largely the history of due process, of detailed regulation along the way. And I think that’s what we need, rather than thinking we are going to find a great messiah that is going to come in and correct things for us.

I think that Congress is going to have to analyze what’s wrong in the Bureau and correct it legislatively.

Mr. PREYER. I agree we ought to do any legislative correcting that is possible. I also get the impression from your testimony that at the last analysis we are going to come down to the competency
and the frailties of an individual, a lone man, can corrupt an operation even though your rules and regulations are pretty fair. Let me conclude by saying, Mr. Murtagh, that I don't think all the heroes of the civil rights movement were necessarily in the movement itself. There were even some in the FBI, and I would list you as one of those heroes.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. Devine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let's address the structure matter, Mr. Murtagh.
Mr. Murtagh. Yes.
Mr. Devine. You retired from the Bureau under honorable conditions, did you not?
Mr. Murtagh. Yes.
Mr. Devine. Are you a member of the Society of Former Special Agents?
Mr. Murtagh. No.
Mr. Devine. Any particular reason?
Mr. Murtagh. Yes.
Mr. Devine. Do you care to relate that?
Mr. Murtagh. When I came out of the Bureau, I decided not to aline myself with anybody because I had analyzed very carefully what was going on in the Bureau, particularly from 1958 on, and I had some pretty good ideas as to what changes should be made, and I did not feel that it could be done through an organization which was in the control and dominance of the old-time agents. I don't think that I could have addressed them, I don't think they would have listened. I may have been wrong, however.
Mr. Devine. What was your residence when you entered the Bureau?
Mr. Murtagh. Northern New York.
Mr. Devine. Yet you were assigned to the Atlanta office and stayed there for 11 years?
Mr. Murtagh. Right.
Mr. Devine. Were there other non-Southern agents assigned to the Atlanta office?
Mr. Murtagh. Oh, sure.
Mr. Devine. It wasn't unusual, was it, Mr. Murtagh, for an agent that had been in the Bureau some time to get either home or close to home in his assignment; is that right?
Mr. Murtagh. It wasn't unusual as long as you played the game. But if you bucked the system as I bucked it, it's lucky I didn't end up in the Philippines.
Mr. Devine. Nevertheless, with your civil libertarian attitude you were permitted by Mr. Hoover and the Bureau and the system to be in a Southern office for 11 years?
Mr. Murtagh. Yes. I was permitted—and I think that I would have been moved out if the relationship between the Bureau and the clique that I speak of, and Mr. Hoover, if there had been any passage of information between Hoover and the clique. I think I was left there and treated as a joke by the Bureau. The clique never expected that we would come to congressional hearings. I can recall talking to some of the old-time agents in 1958-59 when I predicted we would be sitting here today, and they pooh-poohed,
and they said: Aw, that will never happen. Mr. Hoover will take care of that.

They didn’t understand the nature of the problem.

Mr. Devine. Did you consider Mr. Hoover as a maniac, as some-one described him to you?

Mr. Murtagh. I wasn’t close enough to know whether he was or not. Except from knowing what was sent down from the Bureau. I think that he was a person who had arrogated to himself great power over a period of 40 years, and I believe in the adage that power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely. I think he was corrupted.

Mr. Devine. I have heard that quote before.

During your 20-year service in the Bureau, how many times did you personally have an interview or contact with the Director?

Mr. Murtagh. Never.

Mr. Devine. So you are making your judgments on extraneous evidence?

Mr. Murtagh. I saw his bulletins on a day-to-day basis for 20 years, yes.

Mr. Devine. You have been quite critical of the system or the structure. Mr. Hoover is dead, Mr. Tolson is dead, Mr. Belmont is dead, Mr. DeLoach is gone, Mr. Rosen is gone, Mr. Ladd is gone, Mr. Nichols is gone. What clique are you making reference to?

Mr. Murtagh. The ones that were cloned in their image and are running the Bureau today.

Mr. Devine. You made reference to 1958 when you say you discovered they were jockeying around serials and changing files to meet certain criteria. The question that occurs to me—and I don’t challenge the testimony you have given here at all, Mr. Murtagh, because you made reference to the integrity of the overwhelming majority of the personnel in the Bureau—why in heaven’s name did you stay in the organization for 20 years when 13 years before you quit you figured they were jockeying things around?

Mr. Murtagh. For those reasons, sir. I came out of the Depression from a poor family, not drastically poor but I saw poverty. In my career with the FBI I was not aware of these things until I was about 39 years old, was not in perfect health, by a long ways, and I felt that I was not doing anything wrong at all. I have a string of letters commending my functioning in the Bureau, that will cover almost the entire period of my time in the Bureau, from Mr. Hoover. I stayed in because I thought I had a constitutional right to stay in, and the mere fact that somebody in the Bureau, regardless of how high he was, was doing things that were wrong and unconstitutional, was no reason for me giving up my rights. It was my job just as much as it was Mr. Hoover’s job, and I didn’t intend to let him take my job, and I am glad I didn’t. OK?

Mr. Devine. I am just seeking the reason why you stayed in an organization that troubled you that much.

Mr. Murtagh. I stayed in, as I said, because I thought I had a right, and I think I, as an individual coming from the background that I had, probably lacked confidence to go and do anything else. I think I have overcome that in the last few years because I found there are some things I do very well. I don’t claim that I am any hero for staying or for not staying. I stayed because I felt I had a
right to stay, and furthermore—and I don’t want to be noble about it—I thought the Bureau needed cleaning up, and I thought getting out and not keeping track of what was going on would never bring us here.

Mr. Devine. The bottom line I think, Mr. Murtagh, in response to the inquiry proposed by our inquiry, even though you were in the Bureau prior to, during and post assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, you don’t know of any evidence that would lead you to believe that the Bureau was part of the plot to assassinate him?

Mr. Murtagh. I do not, and I have never indicated to anybody that I did.

Mr. Devine. Thank you.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Fauntroy. The gentleman from the District of Columbia, Mr. Fauntroy.

Mr. Fauntroy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Murtagh, I first want to associate myself with the remarks of the distinguished gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Preyer, that you will be viewed as a hero of the decade of the sixties when this Nation for one brief moment rose to the high ground for principles we enunciate but so often fail to live, I want to salute you for your honor and for your courage in telling it like it is or as it was.

Dr. King used to say truth crushed to Earth will rise again. I want to thank you for your efforts to extricate the truth and to resurrect what you in your experience as an employee of the FBI know to have been the truth about the agency’s efforts to discredit Dr. King’s efficiency as a civil rights leader.

I have several questions relating to your testimony. The first has to do with your admonition that this committee find out what was wrong with the FBI and correct it legislatively. You have been very explicit in some respects in recalling your experiences and noting some things in the FBI today that in your view need correction, both the structure and personnel. I am reluctant to ask you these questions but Ambassador Young indicated that it is so important that we know the truth. The truth sometimes is not pretty. You may choose not to answer these questions.

You mentioned at one point in your testimony that there are persons in the FBI today, if I may coin your phrase, cloned in the image of Director Hoover and his top aides at that time. Would you care to do two things for us? I would like you to outline legislatively what you think we need to do to correct the structure that could be responsible for the madness that you have described and that some of us have discovered to have surrounded the FBI attacks upon the character and civil rights of Dr. King.

Second, would you please identify for me and for the American people, those who may still be in the structure of the FBI who may retain the same sickness that you witnessed in your period of employment by the FBI.

Mr. Murtagh. I will take the second question first, if I may, and say that the FBI should get rid of the second man in charge, Mr. Adams, put him down in North Carolina, let him work the crops there, get rid of him somewhere because of the experiences that I had with him in connection with his racial attitudes. I gave this information to the Intelligence Committee regarding Adams, and
apparently no one paid much attention to it. He got promoted to second man in charge.

When I was recruiting Blacks in Atlanta in the early 1960's, Adams was sitting in a position in Washington where he could stop their coming if he wanted to. I don't want to take a lot of the committee's time in telling the story over again, but he effectively tried to stop my efforts to recruit Blacks into the Bureau. I had been asked by my boss in Atlanta to try to recruit Blacks because he couldn't get Whites to work for him.

My boss went to Washington, he had a conference with Adams, and he came back from Washington—this was way back in the early sixties—and he said, "Art, I went around the horn in Washington, I talked to everybody except that Adams, then I went to see him, and Adams told me that if I didn't stop the Murtagh movement, meaning the Black applicants coming into Washington, "we would get all them damn niggers back in Atlanta and we would have to work with them."

I don't think a man who reportedly said something—it came to me under circumstances that I believe. I don't think Joe Ponder was a liar, and I don't think he was a racist and I don't think that kind of man should be second in command in the FBI.

Now as far as others, I don't know by name who they are. What I am saying is that the process by which the agent comes into the Bureau and goes through training and is promoted leaves you with the same kind of people now that you had previously.

Mr. FAUNTROY. What can we do about that process?

Mr. MURTAGH. What you can do about it is this: No. 1—we are very serious here. At the moment I really don't hope for this but I would like to see it come to pass. You can legislate so that the Bureau is given a group of four or five people to select from, a cross-section of people as agent personnel, and are qualified and then let them draw it out of a hat as to who they will select rather than leaving it to the Bureau to scrutinize. Because what the Bureau has done for 50 years is to get people like themselves. We were told specifically to do that in training school when I went in, and I have no reason to believe that they are not continuing to do it now, that they are not continuing to have a good white Anglo-Saxon, preferably an Irishman with conservative views, find another good WASP and have him apply to the Bureau and see he gets the job—to hell with qualifications and everything else because qualifications never made any difference. If they wanted you and if they didn't want you, they didn't take you. It depended on what segment of society you came from. That could be stopped by legislation.

In addition to that, you need some system. I teach a course in environmental law and I am familiar with the Environmental Policy Act. A lot of the environmental legislation has been designed in such a way that it encourages the input of people being concerned with the problem. Now, the people who knew about that document the chief counsel read this morning, which I think is a sad commentary on the system, that document came about because no one in the FBI in the lower level was in a position where they could challenge this structure, challenge the system. So what you need—and there are some constitutional questions involved in how
it could be properly legislated—a system that would call for and allow some type of judicial review on things like illegal wiretaps, dirty tricks, and that sort of thing, where an agent himself could do something about it at the time that it happens, not 10 years later.

My wife used to say to me: For God's sake, Art, if we just had a sounding board, if we had somebody that we could talk to, that we could tell about these things. There was no sounding board under Hoover; you either did what he wanted you to do or you got transferred or fired. You couldn't even talk to him, you couldn't send him messages, you couldn't get any change in attitude, you see. There was no input. And when something wrong was going on as a prolonged wiretap on King, and the tricks they were playing on King, there was no way of correcting it. You need judicial review, and I would set it up in such a way that it would be quick, make it as much as within 7 days; have a hearing if an agent makes a complaint that there is some wrongdoing, or anybody else in Government; a judicial hearing to see whether there is any substance to the complaint. If there is no substance, OK, but at least give the agent some protection against retribution for trying to make the correction.

Then go on from that to educational programs for agents going into the Bureau. I think it is a shame that the agents who are handling basic constitutional rights of citizens on a day-to-day basis are not required to know anything about the Constitution. They need to be better educated and the educational requirements need to be increased.

I think that if you do those things, and if you put restrictions on the use of the FBI funds for propaganda reasons, and you legislate in some way to fix it so that if somebody like Harding is going to get carte blanche authority to get anything out of the FBI files, somebody else can do the same thing, and maybe we will get a story that is a little closer to the truth.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Fauntroy. May I respectfully request of the committee unanimous consent to continue for 5 additional minutes?

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, the gentleman is recognized for an additional 5 minutes.

Mr. Fauntroy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You mentioned two things in connection with the Andrew Young campaign for Congress after the assassination of Dr. King that troubled me. First of all, you said an effort was made to get envelopes from SCLC and a sample of Mr. Young's handwriting.

Mr. Murtagh. And other functionaries in the organization.

Mr. Fauntroy. All right. What was the purpose of that kind of thing?

Mr. Murtagh. I told Harding I knew the purpose was COINTEL, or a counterintelligence operation, and I heard discussions in the office then and at other times about the fact that the Bureau seemed to be obsessed with the idea that if you could so seize a discourse between members of SCLC in connection with their marital relations, you would be—somehow or other this was going to break up SCLC.
Mr. FAUN'TROY. Was the purpose to try to replicate Mr. Young's handwriting, using SCLC stationery?
Mr. MURTAGH. Yes.
Mr. FAUN'TROY. To sow dissension?
Mr. MURTAGH. Yes.
Mr. FAUN'TROY. Second, you mentioned that you, in response to him, said: Tell the s.o.b. I am not going to do it.
Mr. MURTAGH. Right.
Mr. FAUN'TROY. Is the s.o.b. still there?
Mr. MURTAGH. I don't know.
Mr. FAUN'TROY. Think about that. If you recall, let me know.
Mr. MURTAGH. Well, in the first place I don't know who the s.o.b. was.
Mr. FAUN'TROY. Who did you have in mind?
Mr. MURTAGH. Hoover was the head of COINTEL at that time.
Mr. FAUN'TROY. All right. Thank you.
Third, you said that this conversation took place after hours and it was unrecorded?
Mr. MURTAGH. Right.
Mr. FAUN'TROY. How often, to your knowledge, did after-hours unrecorded clandestine methods get discussed, in your experience?
Mr. MURTAGH. Not very often. I couldn't say. I would say it was very infrequent. I was just one agent. It wouldn't have been very often at all.
Mr. FAUN'TROY. You mentioned that Mr. Sullivan, who, as you know, was killed in a gun accident—someone mistook him for a deer—came to Atlanta and with Mr. Harding, did you say—
Mr. MURTAGH. Yes.
Mr. FAUN'TROY [continuing]. Went to see Mr. McGill? You mentioned in your testimony that someone said to you, "We are going to get him." Clarify against the background of what you know happened what you think he meant by getting him.
Mr. MURTAGH. I think it was merely expressing the idea that they were going to, as they say in the COINTEL, neutralize King, they were going to destroy his integrity and cause the Black people around the country to lose confidence in him—and Whites, those who were favoring him.
Mr. FAUN'TROY. I have some other questions but I'll just ask the following for now: You know the allegations that have been made about the possible direct role of the FBI in the assassination of Dr. King. The only thing that troubles me about your obvious candid and honest testimony is the fact that you have indicated that certain things could be said and done with no record of their having been said and done by FBI agents. Do you have any reason to believe that FBI agents could have been involved in any way in the assassination of Dr. King?
Mr. MURTAGH. No reason whatsoever, except the sum total of my testimony is that if that raises implications in some people's minds, they are raised; if it doesn't, it doesn't. I have no evidence of a firsthand nature, no.
Mr. FAUN'TROY. Again, Mr. Murtagh, I want to commend you for what is obviously a tremendous love that you have for this country and a love for the FBI and a love for decency in government, and
salute you for your courage and honor in helping us to get at the truth.

Mr. MURTAGH. Thank you.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ford.

Mr. FORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to be very brief.

Mr. Murtagh, I too would like to join my colleagues Mr. Preyer and Mr. Fauntroy in thanking you for having the courage to come before this committee today to relate to the American people the attitude of the FBI toward Dr. King.

I would like to follow up on the last question of Mr. Fauntroy. Early on, the chairman of the committee asked, were you satisfied that the investigation was thorough and complete? Another question, what additional steps do you feel could have been taken?

You indicated the idea of a conspiracy was never explored. Had they investigated the conspiracy element, do you feel that some FBI agents or personnel could have been a part of the conspiracy in the assassination of Dr. King?

Mr. MURTAGH. Do I feel it could have been?

Mr. FORD. Yes.

Mr. MURTAGH. I feel that it is possible that it could have been. I think it is rather remote. I would hate to believe it, but, on the other hand, facing facts, I have to say that I knew people in the FBI—some; not very many—that I would not be surprised if they might have been involved in leaking information or in some way aiding a conspiracy. But that is only an opinion based on years that I spent in the bureau. I think it could have happened. I am not saying it did. I hope it didn’t.

Mr. FORD. Some were capable of being involved in a conspiracy?

Mr. MURTAGH. I had an incident when I went into the Philadelphia, Miss. case on June 23, the day after the killing. I went into the office and there was a fellow there—I don’t recall his name—from Jax, either Houston or Dallas, an agent. He made a statement that indicated—that just floored me. I was waiting to see Sullivan—not the Sullivan we have been talking about; the inspector in charge of the investigation, to get my assignment—and this agent told me—he was a man about 40 years old—I was just in to see the inspector, and he said, “I told the inspector that when I heard that those three bastards had gotten killed, a thrill of joy went up my spine.” He says, “They got just what they deserved, the dirty bastards, being down here and trying to stir up racial trouble.”

And he worked on the investigation for a few weeks. He didn’t do any work. He would come to the conferences and finally they sent him home, but they didn’t discipline him, as far as I know. And he was free to, I guess—I guess I would have to say there is no way you can screen that type of thing out of any organization, and possibly people are entitled to those types of views. But I think the selection process in the Bureau made it highly likely that we would have a disproportionate number of that type of conservative thinking—extreme radical, conservative thinking.

Mr. FORD. After James Earl Ray was apprehended a few months after the assassination of Dr. King, from that period up until 1971, when you retired from the Bureau, did you ever hear any more talk about the investigation of the assassination of Dr. King?
Mr. MURTAGH. After they picked up Ray, the King case was a dead issue. There was occasionally mail came in on it.

Mr. FORD. But no talk among the agents in the Bureau?

Mr. MURTAGH. No.

Mr. FORD. Did you remain in the Atlanta office afterward?

Mr. MURTAGH. Yes.

Mr. FORD. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman STOKES. The gentleman yields back the balance of his time. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Fithian, is recognized.

Mr. FITHIAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Murtagh, I would like to ask you to amplify when you testified about specifically that there was no investigation of a possible conspiracy. Could you tell me what specifically was not done and you think ought to be done to amend that.

Mr. MURTAGH. That is the most difficult question of all to say what ought to have been done, looking back at it from now. I think that had I been running the investigation, that I would have run it more in the nature of the way the investigation of the three civil rights workers that were killed. In the civil rights investigation, after about 2 weeks in Philadelphia, Miss., a lot of the agents were coming up to me and saying, "Hey, Art, I wish we could get out of here. It's going to be a hot summer, and we have done everything, we have talked with everybody, we have been over all the ground, and we had talked to nearly everybody in the county in 2 weeks." We had 70 agents in there interviewing people. My attitude was that if there is truth somewhere, if you stay at it long enough you will find it. I encouraged the inspector to push forward, I made suggestions as to things that could be investigated, and I don't mean to claim credit for the solution of the case—a lot of other agents did a lot of good work on the case also—but we pushed forward in doing a lot of things.

Now as to just what needed to be done in the King case, I think that there was enough evidence in my mind to raise some suspicion as to how far the Klan might have been involved.

I think there was a cursory kind of an inquiry through informants as to whether anybody could come up with any information, whether the Klan had assisted in the killing.

If that had been the Philadelphia, Miss. thing, we would have interviewed every Klansman and some of them five and six times, and ultimately we would have developed informants as we did in Philadelphia, Miss.; we would have gone into an informant development stage that would have probably taken 2 or 3 months, and at the end of 2 or 3 months we would have some informants in some of the client groups.

I think I would have gone into, because of the violent attitude of some of the right wing groups that were never very thoroughly investigated by the Bureau, we should have gone into them in an effort to uncover a conspiracy if it existed. I think if it existed it is going to be very deep and going to be hidden, and I don't think any of that was done. In fact, I know it wasn't.

Mr. FITHIAN. Were you involved in any way in the investigation? Were you assigned?

Mr. MURTAGH. Oh, yes, I covered some leads on it. There weren't very many leads in Atlanta.
Mr. FITHIAN. Did you make any specific recommendations then of the nature that you are now making ex post facto?

Mr. MURTAGH. No, because I know it was hopeless. I did suggest the idea of a conspiracy, and I got shot down as if I was some kind of a nut by Hardy.

Mr. FITHIAN. So you did make some at least tentative gesture in the direction of trying to get the Bureau to look more carefully into the conspiracy thing?

Mr. MURTAGH. Well, I don’t mean to claim that I did very much, because I wouldn’t in the circumstances that existed in the Bureau at that time. I was aware of the fact that the Bureau had made up its mind there was no conspiracy, and I had been told in 1958 you don’t try to tell them anything. I had experience going way back to 1958, when there was a coverup on an investigation in which we were told by the boss not to do specific investigations because it might develop something and we would get into more investigation than we wanted in the office at that time.

I knew that was the attitude, and I didn’t want to fight it. I knew it wouldn’t do any good to fight it.

Mr. FITHIAN. I guess I am just trying to assess——

Mr. MURTAGH. Yes.

Mr. FITHIAN [continuing]. If you felt as strongly then as you do now.

I think this committee, by the way, if I may digress before I finish the question, has a tremendous responsibility. I think you as a witness have a tremendous responsibility. I do not think we can dangle out the possibilities of conspiracies and then kind of leave them hanging there.

Mr. MURTAGH. Well, let’s investigate them then.

Mr. FITHIAN. Let’s go back to the time when it would have been easier to investigate them.

Mr. MURTAGH. What?

Mr. FITHIAN. Let’s go back to the time when it would have been easier to investigate them.

Mr. MURTAGH. Yes.

Mr. FITHIAN. And I want to join my colleagues in welcoming you here and your refreshing testimony, but I must say that it seems to me—I have never been in the Bureau, but it seems to me—there would have been dozens of things that you might have done as an individual that you did not do then.

Mr. MURTAGH. That is because you were never in the Bureau, sir.

Mr. FITHIAN. Did you ever talk to anybody outside the Bureau, like newspaper people? There was such a——

Mr. MURTAGH. I thought of talking to news people outside the bureau but I knew what happened to some agents that did and I didn’t intend to go that route. Those agents aren’t here testifying. They didn’t find out what went on in the Bureau.

Mr. FITHIAN. I understand that. I am just suggesting that my general impression here is that you are coming on pretty strong many years later, but you really had quite an opportunity then confidentially to share your views.

Mr. MURTAGH. I had no opportunity whatsoever, sir. I know it is very difficult for a person who has never lived in a dictatorship to
understand it, but I would have had no more chance I think than “Hogan’s Heroes” and the scare that they put into everybody when they speak of the Gestapo. When you were in the Bureau under Hoover, you were an organization which was for all intents and purposes modeled on the same mold as the Gestapo, and to even raise the issue that anything was wrong would mean instant discipline.

Mr. Fithian. I have already perceived—

Mr. Murtagh. Yes.

Mr. Fithian [continuing]. What your feeling is concerned the Director, and we have been through all that.

Mr. Murtagh. Yes, I know.

Mr. Fithian. And the system.

What I am talking about now is your own role, and let’s go back just in our minds briefly to 1968. You are telling me that you had no confidential contacts outside the Bureau to which you could have turned with your theory?

Mr. Murtagh. Yeah; I had one. I had the doctor that I spoke of. I had at one time considered having, trying to use him as an intermediary, and then I thought, this is kind of sneaky business. This is doing the same kind of thing the Bureau would do underhandedly. I felt that if I couldn’t do it with a frontal attack and I couldn’t say what I believed, that I should wait the time. And I considered myself somewhat a student of history, and I was certain that the time would come, because I knew that within our democracy dictatorships will always fail. I had confidence and I hung on.

Mr. Fithian. But as a law enforcement officer, you must have also known that the trails of conspiracy get blurred by time, and I do not want to push the point any further.

Mr. Murtagh. No.

Mr. Fithian. But I just make the observation.

Mr. Murtagh. Well, I think so—

Mr. Fithian. Let me just finish.

Mr. Murtagh. Yeah.

Mr. Fithian. I believe that a person who had been in place in Atlanta for 10 years, had been working in your capacity, whether with local police or State troopers or investigative journalists or I could just go on—there must have been 50 different ways that you develop contacts—it is difficult for me to believe that you would not have had an opportunity to confidentially suggest to them that there was really something very potentially or probably more than this. I just want to make sure that in retrospect here 10, 11 12 years later, that the committee is not having this raised for it as a kind of an exercise in futility.

One of our jobs is to weigh the credibility of witnesses testimony. We have been doing this now for months.

This next question is difficult for me to ask because I really appreciate all the comments of my colleagues and share them. Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Fithian. I ask unanimous consent to proceed for 2 additional minutes.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, the gentleman is recognized for 2 additional minutes.
Mr. Fithian. I am wondering if you would just care to make a very candid observation. It seems to me likely that your frustrations in the Bureau built up over the years, because you felt you could not speak out, may now be giving perhaps considerably added weight, perhaps added fervor, to what you are telling us now. To what extent do you believe that what you are now taking as such a strong position is in some way to make up for not acting in the past?

Mr. Murtagh. I can understand your concern about that. I am, unfortunately, a very strong individual. I get the playback from my children, from my students, from everybody that I deal with. I find sometimes, after students have been in my class for a whole semester, they will be frightened of me because of the way I come on so strong with certain concepts, but believe me, sir, I laid awake all night last night thinking about how I could best, in the time allowed, impress upon this committee, upon Congress, upon the press, the drastic need for reform in these areas before it is too late. I am horribly afraid of what might happen if we went this route again and developed another J. Edgar Hoover and all the trappings that went with it.

We have got to plug the leak in the dike and we have got to do it now, or our kids aren’t going to live in a free society, and I really feel that. I feel it when I think it out. I feel it when you ask me the question the way you just asked it.

I am deeply concerned about our freedoms, and I think that the Bureau has to be reformed, and I am saying so very strongly. I realize that. I don’t think it has anything to do with the past.

I can tell you that from our own personal experience that the battle is getting old with me. When I was called and asked to come down, I toyed with the idea of trying to get out of it because it upsets my wife, it upsets my family, it upsets—it has upset our lives since 1958 in so many ways.

Does that help answer your question, sir?

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has again expired.

Mr. Fithian. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from the District of Columbia has an additional question.

Mr. Fauntroy. I just want to clarify one thing, Mr. Murtagh. In response to my question on suggestions of legislative steps we might take, did your proposals deal with an answer that you gave to counsel’s question? We have to do something about the process by which people have to do things that are antiethical to the best interests of the people of this country, in order to move up in the structure of the FBI. Did you cover that?

Mr. Murtagh. I think I did, yes.

Mr. Fauntroy. Thank you.

Mr. Murtagh. Thank you.

Chairman Stokes. The Chair recognizes committee counsel for an additional question.

Mr. Webb. Mr. Murtagh, in response to a question by the chairman concerning the firetruck incident and what happened, what was the outcome of it, you indicated you did not know. I would like to relate to you the information we have obtained through both
interviews and testimony from Allen Sentinella, who was, you know, the case agent.

He related to us the same story you did, and recalled that at the time the firetrucks arrived, rather than finding Dr. King in a compromising situation, they found out that he had been at the apartment writing and he was there by himself.

Would you have any reason to quarrel with Mr. Sentinella's recollection of that incident?

Mr. MURTAGH. If Al Sentinella tells you anything it will be the truth.

Mr. WEBB. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.

Chairman STOKES. Does any member of the committee seek further recognition?

Mr. Murtagh, at the conclusion of a witness' testimony before this committee, the witness is entitled to 5 minutes. During that period of time, he can amplify or explain or make any further comment he desires relative to his testimony before this committee. I would extend to you at this time 5 minutes for that purpose.

Mr. MURTAGH. I have in my lying awake last night prepared my 5-minute speech, and today, by the questioning of you gentlemen, you took the guts out of what I had to say. You seem to be attuned to what is needed, and I wish you well in shaping some type of legislation.

I might ask you if you are seriously interested to talk with our counsel. I gave him in detailed form some concepts about reform. I think you have to go step-by-step and analyze the Federal Bureau of Investigation, see why it works the way it does, and then write legislation which will keep it free and keep review open. And I don't think that congressional overview will do the job, not that I haven't great faith in Congress, I do, but congressional overview meets the question after the fact.

What you need to do is to put some system in that provides, as I said earlier, immediate, or almost immediate review of wrongdoing, and some kind of protection for the Government agent involved.

If you want to know what is going on in Government, you are going to have to get it from Government employees. They are the only ones that know, and unless you protect them, you cannot expect them to risk their jobs and their lives. There is not many that will do it.

I just say thanks again for your listening to me in such a kind manner.

Chairman STOKES. Mr. Murtagh, operating as we do here in Congress under what is known as the 5-minute rule, oftentimes a witness operating under that type of time constraint does not really have a full opportunity to answer some questions as fully as he would like, and I would like to extend to you the opportunity, in terms of the recommendations you have made to us today, to submit to the committee additional recommendations because you have obviously spent a great deal of time thinking on this subject. And in December the committee does contemplate meeting for the purpose of coming to final conclusions and making recommendations to the next Congress. You can be extremely helpful to us in this vein if you would do that.
Mr. Murtagh. I shall——

Chairman Stokes. At this point I would just like to say this: The assassination of Dr. King, a man who didn't have a violent bone in his body, shook the faith of many people in the system that would take his life, and there are many of us who happen to believe in the American system and who believe that the system does need to be changed, but that you have to work within the system to change it.

I just want to say to you that for me personally, for one who happens to believe in the system and believe that it can be changed by working within it, that you have been a welcome witness before this committee, because you have helped I think to restore not only my faith but the faith of a lot of people in the system. Thank you.

Mr. Murtagh. All I can say is that I would do anything I could to restore the faith under a system that will work.

Thank you, sir.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you, sir.

At this time it is now 10 to 1. The committee has a lot of business before it this afternoon, and I would suggest that when we recess that we recess until 2 p.m. Accordingly, the committee is recessed until 2 p.m.

[Whereupon, at 12:47 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m.]

Afternoon Session

Chairman Stokes. The committee will come to order.

The Chair recognizes Professor Blakey.

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Chairman, our next witness has requested, pursuant to rule 6.3(2), that there not be media coverage of his appearance. Under that rule, as you are of course aware, that means there would be no television cameras, no photographs and no audio of his appearance. And he requests from the Chair a rule to that effect.

Chairman Stokes. The witness having requested compliance under this particular committee rule is entitled to have compliance with it. Accordingly, at this time the Chair would order that all of the telephonic and other electronic connections be disconnected and there be no coverage of this particular witness by the media.

Mr. Blakey. I might add, Mr. Chairman, that the official interpretation of that rule includes pocket recorders held by the working press as well as similar devices.

Chairman Stokes. We will ask that everyone comply with the rule as has been enunciated here.

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Chairman, our next witness joined the Federal Bureau of Investigation in 1965. He was assigned to the Atlanta field office in 1967, where he worked on the security squad. He is appearing today voluntarily and without subpoena at the request of the committee. The Federal Bureau of Investigation was of assistance to the committee in bringing him here today. His name is Mr. James Rose. It would be appropriate, Mr. Chairman, to call Mr. Rose.

Chairman Stokes. The Chair calls Mr. Rose.
Stand and raise your right hand, please. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you will give before this committee will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Rose. I do, sir.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you. You may be seated.

Would counsel identify himself.

Mr. Mintz. My name is John Mintz. I am legal counsel at the FBI. I am here at the request of the witness.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you, sir.

The Chair recognizes staff counsel William Webb.

Mr. Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman

TESTIMONY OF JAMES J. ROSE, SPECIAL AGENT, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, REPRESENTED BY JOHN MINTZ, LEGAL COUNSEL

Mr. Webb. Mr. Rose, will you state your name for the record, please.

Mr. Rose. James J. Rose.

Mr. Webb. What is your current employment?

Mr. Rose. Special Agent, FBI, Albany office.

Mr. Webb. When did you join the FBI, sir?

Mr. Rose. I joined on September 13, 1965.

Mr. Webb. During the course of that employment, were you assigned to the Atlanta field office?

Mr. Rose. Yes, sir, I was.

Mr. Webb. When were you first assigned to Atlanta?

Mr. Rose. February or March of 1967.

Mr. Webb. Will you state briefly the nature of your duties while you were in Atlanta?

Mr. Rose. I handled a myriad of duties in the counterintelligence field concerning Cuban and satellite matters, investigations of Cubans, investigations of the Ku Klux Klan, investigations of Black extremist organizations.

Mr. Webb. Would it be fair to say all those things are generally what is known as security work?

Mr. Rose. Yes.

Mr. Webb. And you were in fact a member of the Atlanta security squad?

Mr. Rose. That is right.

Mr. Webb. For a period of time while you were in Atlanta were you what is known as a relief supervisor on that squad?

Mr. Rose. Yes, sir.

Mr. Webb. Do you know the previous witness, Arthur Murtagh?

Mr. Rose. Yes, sir, I know him well.

Mr. Webb. How did you first come to know Mr. Murtagh?

Mr. Rose. I met him upon entering into the Atlanta office.

Mr. Webb. For how long a period of time did you know Mr. Murtagh?

Mr. Rose. During my normal tenure there for 2 years.

Mr. Webb. Were you on duty April 4, 1968, the day Martin Luther King was killed?

Mr. Rose. Yes.

Mr. Webb. Can you tell us approximately what time you left work that day?
Mr. Rose. It was in the evening. I don’t recall the exact time, sir.
Mr. Webb. When you left work were you accompanied by anyone?
Mr. Rose. Yes, sir.
Mr. Webb. Who would that be?
Mr. Rose. Special Agent Murtagh.
Mr. Webb. While the two of you were in the process of leaving the building, did you learn that Dr. King had been shot?
Mr. Rose. Yes, sir.
Mr. Webb. Did a conversation ensue between you and Mr. Murtagh?
Mr. Rose. Yes, it did.
Mr. Webb. Describe it, please.
Mr. Rose. It was more of a heated argument. Art and I had argued before in the past having worked on the street together. We were constantly engaged in discussions of Dr. King normally on an academic level, but on this occasion, in view of the enormity of the event, the killing of Dr. King, our views polarized and we were engaged in a very heated argument. I took the position that Dr. King represented a threat to the national security, and Mr. Murtagh took an opposite view. We became involved in the altercation on our way to our cars, which were parked a number of blocks away.
Mr. Webb. Do you recall in any more detail the words that were used in the conversation either by yourself or Mr. Murtagh?
Mr. Rose. Sir, that conversation was 10 years ago and I had given it no further thought until last Wednesday, when I was advised by my superiors in Albany that I was to report here for testimony in this matter. So I can’t recall any words that I uttered or that Mr. Murtagh uttered.
Mr. Webb. You sat here today during Mr. Murtagh’s testimony; is that correct?
Mr. Rose. Yes.
Mr. Webb. Do you recall Mr. Murtagh said at a point in time the teletype operator interrupted the music and announced that Dr. King had been shot, and then he attributed words to you, either we—and I am quoting—“we finally” or “they finally got the s.o.b.”?
Mr. Rose. I don’t recall making that statement, sir.
Mr. Webb. Is it possible that you might have made that statement?
Mr. Rose. It is possible.
Mr. Webb. Later on he said as you proceeded down a corridor on your way out that—I am quoting—“with a great deal of indication, at least to me, that he was very happy.” Would you say that accurately assessed your state of mind upon learning of Dr. King’s death?
Mr. Rose. I can’t recall what my feelings were exactly at that time. I know I was involved in an argument with Murtagh. That is all that I can recall.
Mr. Webb. Can you recall, sir, whether or not you felt or expressed any grief upon learning that Dr. King had died?
Mr. Rose. I did not express any grief.
Mr. Webb. Will you tell us, sir, how did you feel about Dr. King’s passage from the political scene?
Mr. Rose. I was remorseful that a human life had been taken, but I viewed the passing of Dr. King as a removal of a threat to our national security.

Mr. Webb. I couldn't hear the last.

Mr. Rose. I viewed his passing as a passing of the threat to national security.

Mr. Webb. Thank you, Mr. Rose.
I have no further questions.

Chairman Stokes. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ford.

Mr. Ford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to yield back my time. I think counsel asked the appropriate questions.

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Fithian.
Mr. Fithian. I take it counsel's question was not intended to probe what he considers now what might be a change of thought, but at that time he was not at all grieved by Dr. King's passing and that he considered him a national security risk. Are those your words?

Mr. Rose. Yes, sir.

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Devine.

Mr. Devine. I have just one question, Mr. Chairman.

Agent Rose, I think in the testimony this morning by former special agent Murtagh he said that when the announcement was made concerning Dr. King's shooting and death, that you jumped with joy, or jumped with glee. Is that an accurate assessment of what occurred to the best of your recollection?

Mr. Rose. It is not, sir.

Mr. Devine. It is not true?

Mr. Rose. No, sir.

Mr. Devine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. Mr. Rose, you say you considered Dr. King a threat to the national security?

Mr. Rose. Yes, sir.

Chairman Stokes. I assume you base that upon something?

Mr. Rose. My personal beliefs.

Chairman Stokes. What did you base your personal beliefs on?

Mr. Rose. The image that Dr. King projected at that time.

Chairman Stokes. With reference to the national security of the United States?

Mr. Rose. The innuendoes in the paper concerning his alleged liaison with Communist elements in this country, sir.

Chairman Stokes. I don't want to talk about innuendoes and alleged things; I want to talk about what you as an agent of the FBI personally knew about it.

Mr. Rose. I did not know anything along those lines, sir.

Chairman Stokes. Then on what did you base the opinion that he was a threat to national security?

Mr. Rose. Public opinion at the time, sir.

Chairman Stokes. Whose public opinion?

Mr. Rose. Public opinion of people about me.

Chairman Stokes. Name the people.

Mr. Rose. Sir, I cannot name them as I can't recall them.

Chairman Stokes. You were an FBI agent, weren't you?
Mr. Rose. No, sir, I formulated that opinion prior to my entry on duty.

Chairman Stokes. You mean prior to becoming an FBI agent?

Mr. Rose. Yes, sir.

Chairman Stokes. At the time of his assassination were you an FBI agent?

Mr. Rose. Yes, sir.

Chairman Stokes. Isn’t that the time when you considered him to be a threat to national security?

Mr. Rose. Yes, sir.

Chairman Stokes. Then tell me what you based it on as an FBI agent.

Mr. Rose. I did not base it on anything as an FBI agent. I based it on my experience prior to entering on duty.

Chairman Stokes. You based it on your personal prejudice, didn’t you?

Mr. Rose. Yes, sir.

Chairman Stokes. I have nothing further.

Mr. Webb.

Mr. Webb. Mr. Rose, assuming that you actually said the words Mr. Murtagh contended, would that be that you were expressing a personal belief as opposed to some indication that you had that there was in fact an FBI conspiracy to kill Dr. King?

Mr. Rose. That is right, sir.

Mr. Webb. So, if in fact, you said “we,” or “they finally got them,” we should not construe that as your having indication or information or evidence about the assassination either through firsthand knowledge or information?

Mr. Rose. That is right, sir. I never made any statements to Mr. Murtagh or anyone else that would declare or imply that the FBI or myself was aware of or a party to an assassination conspiracy.

Mr. Webb. Thank you.

Chairman Stokes. Anything further from the committee?

Mr. Rose, at the conclusion of a witness’ testimony before this committee the witness is entitled under the rules of our committee in the House to have 5 minutes, during which time he may comment on his testimony, amplify it or explain it in any way. I would extend to you that 5 minutes at this time.

Mr. Rose. Thank you, sir. I have no comments.

Chairman Stokes. There being nothing further, then you are excused.

Mr. Rose. Thank you.

Chairman Stokes. The Chair recognizes Professor Blakey.

Mr. Blakey. I might note for the record that the next two witnesses have not requested that the various forms of media not be in operation.

Chairman Stokes. Then we will permit at this time the resumption of the electronics.

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Chairman, before we begin with the next several witnesses, it would be appropriate to note for the record that in the course of the staff and committee’s investigation and examination of this witness in connection with performance of the FBI, references will be made to numerous documents having to do with the security investigation of Dr. King. Because some of these docu-
ments contain classified information, they have been appropriately excised. The record should be clear, however, that either the committee or selected members of the staff have been able to view these documents in their entirety or have otherwise been able to satisfy themselves or itself that the excisions do not needlessly interfere with the committee's ability to thoroughly examine the issues that will be brought out in these public hearings.

In addition, two documents also contained a limited number of additional deletions that it was felt would be appropriate because of considerations of personal privacy to protect the unnecessary identification of individuals or aspects of their lives that have nothing significant in the examination of the issues before this committee.

It would be indeed ironic that a committee whose concern at this point would be privacy would be an agent of its violation.

Mr. Chairman, our next witnesses are two former Bureau officials who coordinated aspects of both the security investigations and the COINTELPRO activities.

First is Charles D. Brennan. He was the principal assistant to Frederick J. Baumgardner in the Internal Security Section of the Domestic Intelligence Division. Upon Mr. Baumgardner's retirement in December of 1966, Mr. Brennan was promoted to section chief. In 1970, when William C. Sullivan was promoted to assistant to the Director in charge of investigative matters, Mr. Brennan succeeded him as Assistant Director of DID.

During Mr. Brennan's tenure as section chief, Internal Security had responsibility for both the King and the SCLC investigations. On August 27, 1967, a letter to 22 field offices, targeting the SCLC for counterintelligence action, originated in his section.

It would be appropriate at this time, Mr. Chairman, to call Mr. Brennan.

Chairman Stokes. The committee calls Mr. Brennan.

Will you raise your right hand and be sworn. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you give before this committee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Brennan. I do.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you. You may be seated. The Chair recognizes Staff Counsel Ken McHargh.

TESTIMONY OF CHARLES D. BRENNAN, FORMER ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Mr. McHargh. Will you state your full name and address.


Mr. McHargh. Are you retired from the Federal Bureau of Investigation?

Mr. Brennan. Yes, I am.

Mr. McHargh. When did you retire?

Mr. Brennan. 1974.

Mr. McHargh. During your tenure with the Bureau, is it correct that you achieved as your highest position Assistant Director of the Domestic Intelligence Division?

Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir.
Mr. McHARGH. In that capacity were you close to Director Hoover and William Sullivan?

Mr. BRENNAN. I was close to Mr. Sullivan inasmuch as he and I had worked together approximately 20 years, but I wouldn't say I was close to Director Hoover.

Mr. McHARGH. Would you agree you were intimately familiar with the course of the Martin Luther King investigation?

Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, I was.

Mr. McHARGH. Would you describe your duties between 1960 and 1968.

Mr. BRENNAN. I was assigned to Bureau headquarters in 1956 and upon that assignment I worked in what was then known as the Central Research Section in the Domestic Intelligence Division. I worked on what we call training monographs, writing articles, speeches, and so forth. I worked in that capacity until approximately the summer of 1965, and I was transferred to become the assistant to the section chief of the Internal Security Section at that time. That duty involved, in effect, assisting him in the administrative duties of running the Internal Security Section.

Mr. McHARGH. Did you subsequently become chief of the Internal Security Section?

Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, in December 1966.

Mr. McHARGH. During the course of the security investigation conducted relative to Dr. King, is it correct that your section, the Internal Security Section, handled that investigation primarily until it was transferred in 1967 to another section?

Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, I believe that is correct.

Mr. McHARGH. Would you also agree, Mr. Brennan, that Director Hoover and Mr. Sullivan were the primary Bureau officials who determined policy as it would relate to the course of these security investigations?

Mr. BRENNAN. Yes.

Mr. McHARGH. At this point I would like, Mr. Chairman, to enter into the record copies of the exhibits which have been previously marked under tab A of the exhibit book MLK exhibit No. F-436, and they contain exhibits F-436AA through F-436D.

Chairman STOKES. Without objection, they may be entered into the record.

[The information follows:]
Beginning on page 91 of the captioned magazine Reverend King has an article entitled "The President Has The Power--Equality Now." A copy of the magazine is attached.

As would be expected King's article is a plea for faster integration of the races and he particularly makes the point that much can be done by the Kennedy administration through Executive Order and example which has not been done in previous administrations. At the top of page 94 the following statement regarding the Bureau and other law enforcement agencies is made:

"If, for instance, the law-enforcement personnel in the FBI were integrated, many persons who now defy federal law might come under restraints from which they are presently free. If other law-enforcement agencies under the Treasury Department, such as the Internal Revenue Service, the Bureau of Narcotics, the Alcohol Tax Unit, the Secret Service and Customs had an adequate number of field agents, investigators and administrators who were Negro, there would be a greater respect for Negroes as well as the assurance that prejudicial behavior in these agencies toward citizens would cease."

This is the only reference to the Bureau found in the article. Martin Luther King, Jr., is well known for his activities in behalf of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People in the south, and he reportedly planned the bus boycott in Montgomery, Alabama, and has participated in sit-in demonstrations in the south. He has been very active in attempts to integrate the races and has been put in jail and President Kennedy reportedly called him and was successful in obtaining his release. Some political analysts have stated that the President's action in calling King resulted in his receiving a heavy Negro vote in many parts of the country.

Enclosure

Re: To DeLoach memo
Re: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

Reverend King resigned his ministry in the Dexter Avenue Baptist Church of Montgomery, Alabama, early in February, 1960, and became co-pastor with his father in the Ebenezer Baptist Church, Atlanta, Georgia. (100-106670)

Although King is in error in his comments relating to the FBI, it is believed inadvisable to call his hand on this matter as he obviously would only welcome any controversy or resulting publicity that might ensue.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

MLK EXHIBIT F-436AA
Deputy Attorney General (DAG) White has requested that
Assistant Director Evans discuss with him the association of the
Reverend Martin Luther King and since he feels some action
be taken.

The Attorney General (AG) by letter dated 3/3/62 was advised
is allegedly
of the Reverend Martin Luther King, prominent southern
leader, and wrote the speech that King delivered at the American
Association of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations convention.
AG was also advised that reportedly, through his assoc-
with King

The purpose in advising the AG of
was to alert him and the President that
was apparently
his association with King a
Memorandum for Mr. Sullivan

TANLEY DAVID LEVISON

[Redacted]

It appears that White desires to furnish King, or some close to him, some information about and to suggest that King break off his relations with [Redacted]. White should be advised that under no circumstances should specific information as contained in the Director's letter be discussed with King, since it would definitely endanger our informant and the national security.

CONCERNING:

That this memorandum be forwarded to Assistant Director [Redacted] for his guidance in discussing this matter with DAG White.
July 26, 1962

Director, FBI

July 26, 1962

Priority correspondence received from Atlanta and New York indicates Communist who has had prior connections with CP are influential with Martin Luther King, Jr., head of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC).

It is noted O'Dell is employed by SCLC and is in charge of the New York office of this organization. Early this year the New York Office furnished information the New York Friends of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (NFF, SCLC) had been organized by CP members; however, this organization ceased activity on 2-22-62, and the matter was closed subject to reopening and reporting in the event additional information was developed concerning its continued existence. This latter organization was organized to give some financial support to the SCLC.

Atlanta and New York are instructed to review files, contact sources and determine whether the CP is exerting any influence on the SCLC through SCLC and/or whether the Party is making any attempts to infiltrate this organization. The Bureau should be furnished a comprehensive summary of the information available to each office concerning all Atlanta (100-5715) (SCLC, RD) 3 - New York (1 - 100-147533) (NFF, SCLC)

1 - 100-437326 (NY, SCLC)

HUBBLY (12/27). SEE NOTE ON YELLOW PAGE PAGE...
Letter to Atlanta

RE: COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF THE
SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE

Individuals connected with the CP who are influential in or
have a position in the SCLC.

Integrationist movement.

clearly shown for purposes of evaluating
whether a communist infiltration investigation should be
conducted on the SCLC.

New York should furnish the Bureau and Atlanta its
observations and analysis of the information it has developed
to assist Atlanta in making its recommendations. Atlanta,
upon receipt of New York's reply, should furnish the Bureau
the results of its review and its recommendations as to whether
a communist infiltration investigation is warranted in accordance
with the instructions contained in Section 87 E of the Manual of
Instructions. No investigation of this nature should be con-
ducted, however, without Bureau authority.

The Bureau has opened a separate file on this matter
and correspondence relating to the communist infiltration of
SCLC should be directed to this file rather than the Racial
Matters file (166-427079)-357-354.

NOTE ON YELLOW:
- has been identified as an administrative assistant to King and is
  employed by the SCLC, in charge of the New York office.
- has been identified as a CP member in the past.
Letter to Atlanta

RE: COMMUNIST INFLTRATION OF THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE

[Redacted text]

Concentrate on Martin Luther King and the CP felt it was

Martin Luther King group. As late as 11-21-61 the Atlanta Office has advised no information has been developed on which to base a security inquiry on SCLC. In view of the continued activity of Levison and O'Dell and the fact they exert influence on King it is deemed advisable to again ask for a review of the appropriate field office files to determine if any CP direction and infiltration of the SCLC has developed.
136

MLK EXHIBIT F-436C

Correspondence received from the Atlanta and New York Offices indicating the activities of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) has indicated the Communist Party (CP) has been attempting to exert influence on Dr. Martin Luther King, the southern integrationist leader, through him the SCLC. Dr. King is the President of SCLC which is actively engaged in the integration movement in the South. It has been identified in the past as officers of SCLC.

It is believed a communist infiltration investigation of SCLC is warranted to determine the CP influence in that organization.

COMMENTS:

That the attached letter to Atlanta with copies to other offices authorizing a communist infiltration investigation of SCLC be approved. The field is being cautioned that this investigation must be limited to and directed toward determining the extent of communist infiltration of the SCLC and any information developed concerning the integration or racial activities of SCLC must be reported under the racial matter section.

The interest is prepared spring 1963.

X:438794

J. C. R. 4-22-62
Letter to Atlanta

Re: Communist Infiltration of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference

100-439794

All offices are cautioned that any information developed concerning the SCLC relating to racial matters must be reported under the racial matters caption. It should be noted that the folder contains a separate file on SCLC relating to racial incidents (127-662). All investigation under the caption of this letter must be limited to and directed toward determining the extent of communist infiltration of the SCLC.

NOTE ON FILE:

Review of correspondence received at the Bureau under various captions relating to the activities of SCLC and its leader, Martin Luther King, Jr., indicated the FBI has been attempting to influence the King and through him the SCLC. New York and Atlanta were instructed to make a complete review of all information concerning this matter and to forward any pertinent recommendations concerning a communist infiltration investigation. JEMVet recommended a CO-HARD investigation of the New York chapter due to the dominant CP influence on the executives of the New York chapter of the SCLC. JEMVet also recommended a CO-HARD investigation of SCLC due to the fact that four CP members are presently associated with SCLC and that at least one of these members is an officer of SCLC and close to King.

It is believed a communist infiltration investigation is warranted. See memo Baumgardner to Sullivan, same caption, dated October 22, 1962, FBI file.
Re: L1et 10/11/62 and NY let 8/21/62. No copies of the last named letter were sent to New Orleans, Mobile, or Savannah.

Based upon the information furnished in relays to Atlanta, New York is authorized to conduct a communist infiltration investigation of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). Also, New Orleans is authorized to determine whether the SCLC has established a branch in the New Orleans territory and whether a communist party (CP) network exists or not. New Orleans should contact appropriate sources on behalf of the Bureau and Atlanta for the purpose of information development and make recommendations concerning a communist infiltration investigation in New Orleans territory in accordance with the instructions contained in Section 672 of the manual of instructions.

Atlanta and New York should be guided by the instructions in the above-mentioned section of the manual in conducting this investigation, New York and Atlanta should promptly prepare a report to reach the Bureau not later than 48 hours from the date of receipt of this letter. Atlanta, in office of origin, need not incorporate in its report information developed by the New York office function as New York will be submitting reports concerning the New York chapter and any infiltrations developed concerning the national organization. New York should include in its report, under appropriate topical headings, all information developed relating to the New York chapter and, where appropriate, include a separate section concerning any reference to the activities of the national organization. Atlanta will report all information concerning the organization when it develops within its territory using appropriate headings.

- Savannah (110-5027)
- New York (109-142154)
- Mobile (109-438794)
- SAC Atlanta (109-5712)
- SAC Atlanta (109-438794)
- New York (109-142154)
- Mobile (109-438794)

MLK Exhibit F-436D
Mr. McHargh. Those memos reflect the information which was referred to by Professor Blakey in his narration this morning, using Dr. King's initial criticism of the Bureau based on the absence of minority FBI agents. It also reflects the opening of the security investigation relative to Dr. King, and contains the comment from Director Hoover in 1962 that "King is no good anyway," and marks the opening of the security investigation.

I would like the witness to be provided at this time a copy of the exhibit book. Mr. Brennan, would you refer to the items under tab A beginning with the first marked MLK exhibit No. F-436.

Mr. Brennan. Where are these?

Mr. McHargh. In the upper right-hand corner generally appear the numbers.

Mr. Brennan. I have MLK F-435, MLK F-436AA, I have MLK F-436A.

Mr. McHargh. That is correct.

Mr. Brennan. MLK F-436B.

Mr. McHargh. Those are the memos. That is correct.

The next exhibit, which is marked MLK F-436C dated October 22nd, 1962, and appears to mark the opening of the COMINFIL investigation of the SCLC, does that comport with your recollection of the opening of that case?

Mr. Brennan. Well, this is October 1962. At that time I was in the Research Section. I wasn't in the Internal Security Section.

Mr. McHargh. So you have no independent knowledge of whether that is in fact the case?

Mr. Brennan. No specific knowledge of the basis other than just having worked through research, having worked on papers that in other terms detail the basis for the opening of the case, and this coincides with my recollection as the basis for the opening but I don't recall this particular memorandum.

Mr. McHargh. Next, Mr. Chairman, I would like to refer to the documents listed under tab B of the exhibit book.

Mr. Chairman, if there are no objections, I would like to have those entered into the record.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, they may be entered into the record.

[The information follows:]
August 23, 1963

W. J. C. Sullivan

"Mr. F. J. Baumgardner"

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
NEGRO QUESTION
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

Pursuant to the Director's request, there is attached a detailed memorandum concerning the efforts of the Communist Party, USA, to exploit the American Negro.

There is set forth below in this cover memorandum a synopsized version of the detailed memorandum.

SYNOPSIS

The 19 million Negroes in the United States today constitute the largest and most important racial target of the Communist Party, USA. Since 1919 communist leaders have devised countless tactics and programs designed to penetrate and control Negro population. It has spent hundreds of thousands of dollars propagandizing the Negroes in a variety of ways. These colossal efforts have been related to "equal opportunity" and "self-determination" policies (the latter being discontinued in 1959 with the approval of Soviet Russia because it was ineffective), front organizations, parades, demonstrations, articles, pamphlets, books, films, speeches, civil rights, "peaceful coexistence," etc. These efforts, among other things, have resulted in establishing today such active Negro communist front groups as the African American Heritage Association, Freedomways Associates, and Southern Conference Educational Fund (not yet cited by the Attorney General). Additionally, efforts have been and are being made to infiltrate with limited degrees of success such legitimate Negro organizations as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the Negro American Labor Council, and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference headed by Martin Luther King, Jr. Other legitimate Negro organizations not known to be infiltrated, influenced or controlled but are targets include Congress of Racial Equality, National Urban League and the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee.
While much propaganda is issued, there is no known substantial implementation of Communist Party aims and policies among Negroes in the labor field. The Communist Party has done all possible to exploit a great number of events and issues among Negroes such as the Scottsboro Case; Emmett Till Case; Montgomery, Alabama, bus boycott; 1956 March on Washington, D.C.; 1957 Prayer Pilgrimage to Washington; "sit-in" demonstrations; "freedom riders"; and school integration campaigns. While not the instigator and presently unable to direct or control the coming Negro August 28 March on Washington, D.C., communist officials are planning to fo all possible to advance communist aims in a supporting role. Martin Luther King, a key figure in the March, does have as an advisor, Stanley Levinson.

Despite the time spent by the Communist Party, USA, on the American Negro during the past 14 years, the Party has failed to reach its goal with the Negroes. The Director, on January 26, 1960, said publicly: "It is no secret that one of the bitterest disappointments of communistic efforts in this Nation has been their failure to lure our Negro citizens into the party. Despite every type of propaganda boasted at our Nation's Negro citizens, they have never succumbed to the party's saccharine promises of a Communist Utopia. This generation and generations to come for many years owe a tremendous debt to our Negro citizens who have consistently refused to surrender their freedom from the tyranny of communism."

Negroes represent ten per cent of the population of the United States or 19 million. If one was to apply this breakdown to Gus Hall's figure of 10,000 Communist Party members today, it would give to the Party 1,000 Negro members. (Applied to our classified figure of 4,453 active Communist Party members, the estimated number of Negro communists would be 445. This would not, of course, include communist sympathizers, supporters or dupes but only those included under our very strict and exacting Party membership requirements.) Despite the obvious failure of the Communist Party of the United States to appreciably
Memo reminds me of those I read when Castro took Cuba. You contended that Castro and his so-called Communists influenced you. Time alone proved you right. There is no reason to ignore the efforts of the American Negro by Communist propagandists. The efforts to infiltrate influence or control large numbers of Negroes in this country, the fact remains that the 19 million Negroes in this country constitute the greatest single racial target of the Communist Party of the United States. It would be foolhardy on anybody's part to ignore this very significant truth. Further, we are right now in this Nation involved in a form of racial revolution and the time has never been so right for exploitation of the Negroes by communist propagandists. The Communist Party in the next few years may fail dismally with the American Negro as it has in the past. On the other hand, it may make prodigious strides and great successes with the American Negroes, to the serious detriment of our national security. Time alone will tell.
Reference is made to the enclosed material on which the Director has written: "This memo reminds me vividly of those I lived when Castro took over Cuba. You contended then that Castro and cohorts were not Communists and not influenced by Communists. Time proved you wrong. I for one can't ignore the reasons ro King, et al as having only an infinitesimal act on the efforts to exploit the American Negro by the Communists."

The Director is correct. We were completely wrong about the evidence was not sufficient to determine some years ago Fidel Castro was not a communist or under communist influence. On investigating and writing about communism and the American Negro, we better remember this and profit by the lesson it should teach us.

I do think that much of the difficulty relating to the memo rightly questioned by the Director is to be found centered in the concept of "influence." We do not have, and no Government agency or private organization has, any yardstick which can accurately measure "influence" in this particular context, even when we know it does exist such as in the case of the obvious influence over Martin Luther King and King's influence over other Negro leaders. Personally, I believe in the light of King's powerful speech yesterday he stands head and shoulders over all other Negro leaders put together when it comes to influencing large masses of people. We must mark him now, if we have not done so before, as the danger of Negro of the future in this Nation from the standpoint of Communism, the Negro and national security.

On determining membership of Negroes in the Communist Party, we are not confronted with the same problem. We do have here accurate sticks for establishing membership. Of course, our standards are as rigorous as any. This means there are many Negroes who are fellow-travelers, sympathizers or who aid the Party, knowingly or unknowingly, do not qualify as members. These we must not ignore. The old capitalist principle still holds: "Communism must be built with non-Communist hands!" Therefore, it may be unrealistic to limit ourselves as we have been doing to a realistic proof or definitely conclusive evidence.
at would stand up in testimony in court or before Congressional
committees that the Communist Party, USA, does wield substantial
influence over Negroes which one day could become decisive.

The memoranda which the Director penetratively questioned,
lie showing in the details the communist impact on Negroes, did
der from such limitations. These limitations we will make every
effort to lift in the future. The great amount of attention this
division is giving to communist activities directed toward the Negro
would enable us to do this.

For example, here at the Seat of Government, the Negro-
communist question takes up as a whole the time of one supervisor and
the past few weeks four men have been so occupied. Additionally,
specialized instructions are regularly given the field on communist
filtration of the Negro; (2) monographs have been written on the
object and widely disseminated; (3) regularly disseminated are memoranda
reports; (4) August 31, 1963, we devoted the entire Current Intellig-
ence Analysis to the communist plans for the Negro March of August 28,
1963, (149 copies of this Analysis were disseminated to 44 agencies of
government); (5) much material on the issue is given to agents at
Service; and (6) an SAC Letter is under preparation in this Division-
giving the field the benefit of what we learned from the Negro March
Washington and issuing instructions for increased coverage of
communist influence on the Negro.

As the memorandum pointed out, "this Nation is involved in a
situation of racial revolution and the time has never been so right for
filtration of the Negroes by communist propagandists." Nineteen million
Negroes constitute the greatest single racial target of the Communist
Party, USA. This is a number reality we must never lose sight of. We
will do everything possible in the troubled future to develop for the
sector all available facts relating to Negro membership in the Communist
Party, plus the more complex and difficult to ascertain influence
of communist organizations and officials over the leaders and masses of
Negroes.

We regret greatly that the memorandum did not measure up to
what the Director has a right to expect from our analysis.

RECOMMENDATION:

For the information of the Director.
Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan
FROM : Mr. F. J. Baumgardner
DATE: August 27, 1963

SUBJECT: MARCH ON WASHINGTON
AUGUST 28, 1963
POSSIBLE SUBVERSIVE INFLUENCE

Memorandum Baumgardner to Sullivan dated 8/22/63 set forth information pertaining to communist influence and participation in the March on Washington 8/23/63. The purpose of instant memorandum is to bring the Director up to date concerning the Party's latest plans with respect to this March.

Leader of the Communist Party (CP), USA, has now decided to participate in this March. Plans to participate quietly and with no publicity. As an example of the Party's desire to participate in the March under a veil of secrecy, nine Party functionaries, headed by Editor-in-Chief of "The Worker," east coast communist publication, are attempting to gain accreditation as "press representatives" of "The Worker" rather than as March participants.

Information available to us as of 8/27/63 indicates that in excess of 100 CP members plan to participate in this March. While the majority of these individuals will come from the New York and Philadelphia areas, individuals in such widely scattered areas as Buffalo, New York; Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; Detroit, Michigan; Chicago, Illinois; Minneapolis, Minnesota; Denver, Colorado; States of Oregon and Washington; San Francisco and Los Angeles, California; and the New England area plan to attend.

Information received on 8/22 and 23/63 indicates that it has been rumored among Puerto Rican independentists in New York City that the New York Junta of the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico (NPPR) (designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450) desires to have one of its adherents participate in the March and to join the March leaders who will be received by the President. If successful this adherent, in the presence of the President, would attempt to create some unspecified type of disturbance to publicize NPPR demands for a free and independent Puerto Rico. Information concerning the NPPR has been furnished to the local Secret Service by our Washington Field Office and was promptly telephoned to Mr. John Nolan, Administrative Assistant to the Attorney General.
Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
RE: MARCH ON WASHINGTON
AUGUST 28, 1963
POSSIBLE SUBVERSIVE INFLUENCE
100-3-116

At this point, there is no information available indicating that the Nation of Islam, an antiwhite hate group, plans to participate in this March. Approximately six members of the Socialist Workers Party from Cleveland plan to participate.

All pertinent information received concerning communist influence in this March has been furnished to the Deputy Attorney General, Assistant Attorneys General Burke Marshall and J. Walter Yeagley, the military agencies and, where appropriate, to the Attorney General himself.

We will have sources in attendance at this March and any pertinent information developed by them will be furnished to the Washington Field Office and it will be appropriately furnished to the Department.

ACTION:

This matter is being followed closely and you will be kept advised of pertinent developments. Pertinent information received will continue to receive appropriate dissemination to the Department and military agencies.
This memorandum recommends increased coverage of communist influence on the Negro. The history of the Communist Party, USA (USA), is replete with its attempts to exploit influence and fraud the Negro. The March on Washington, 8-28-63, was a striking example of such communist activity as Party-leaders early put into action efforts to accrue gains for the CPUSA from the March. Well-informed information concerning the Party's influence on a principal leader, Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., is but an example of the Party's presence at the March of around 200 party members, ranging from several national functionaries headed by CPUSA General Secretary to many rank-and-file members, is clear indication of the Party's intense target (the Negro) today.

All indications are that the March was not the "end of the road" and that the Party will step up its efforts to exploit racial unrest and in every available way claim credit for gains relating to "gains" achieved by the Negro.

The entire field is being alerted to this situation in a supposed SAC Letter (attached). The field is being instructed to intensify our coverage of communist influence on the Negro by giving highest consideration to the use of all possible investigative techniques. In addition, the field is being told to intensify its coverage of those communist fronts through which the Party channels its influence and to intensify its investigations of the many Party members and dupes who engage in activities on behalf of the Party in the Negro field. Further, we are stressing the urgent need for imaginative and aggressive tactics to be utilized through our Counterintelligence Program—those designed to attempt to neutralize or to stop the Party's activities in the Negro field. Necessity for prompt handling of all facets of this matter to assure timely dissemination to the Department and other interested agencies is also being emphasized.
The proposed SAC Letter requires key security offices to submit to the Bureau, within 30 days, an analysis of their current coverage of communist activities in the Negro field plus details of their plans for intensification. Also, those 16 offices participating in the Counterintelligence Program on a regular basis are being required to include in their next monthly letters due 10-15-63 their plans to neutralize or disrupt Party activities in the Negro field.

RECOMMENDATION:

If approved, attached SAC Letter go forward apprising the field as above and urging full implementation so that the desired results may be achieved. Also attached for approval are necessary manual changes.

...
On returning from a few days leave I have been advised of the Director's continued dissatisfaction with the manner in which a Brief on the above-captioned matter and subsequent memos on the same subject matter. This situation is very disturbing to those of us in the Domestic Intelligence Division responsible for this area of work, and we certainly want to do everything possible to correct our shortcomings. We absolutely will not be stubborn about admitting any mistakes we have made or be stiff-necked and unbending concerning our analysis of this matter.

The Director indicated he would not approve our last SAC Letter until there was a clarification and a meeting of minds relative to the question of the extent of communist influence over Negroes and their leaders. In this memorandum I will sincerely and sincerely try to clarify a most regrettable situation. It is prepared not on official office memorandum but rather on plain bond believing that this discussion need not be made a matter of official record.

Common Agreement:

First, I am sure we all are in agreement on the following: (1) for the past 44 years the Communist Party, USA, has made ceaseless efforts to influence Negroes and to make communists out of them; (2) the 19 million Negroes in the country today; (3) the Communist Party, USA; (4) Negro leader Martin Luther King, Jr.; (5) the Communist Party, USA; (6) the serious detriment of our national security; (7) the material furnished contained many pages of specific examples of communist policies, programs and activities.

Reference is made to the enclosed memorandum dated 9/16/63 and to the attached proposed SAC Letter.
The essence of the situation seems to be this: We presented what facts there are in our files in the Brief in question and I know that the Director certainly would not want us to do other than this: The position taken at the time the Brief was written was that, while there is communist influence being exerted on Negroes and Negro leaders, it has not reached the point of control or domination. This historically has been the position of the Bureau in this matter in light of file reviews going back ten to twenty years.

The Historical Position:

For example, in a detailed document prepared on Communist Party and the Negro in 1943, we find the statement referring to "the failure of the Communist Party to attract even a significant number of Negroes in the United States to its number." Another example is to be found in an analysis in a same field prepared by the Bureau in 1955 to the effect that communist efforts have been "unsuccessful on a state or national level" in infiltrating "legitimate Negro fraternal, protest and improvement organizations," although they made "limited success in some isolated chapters." The Director's book, Masters of Deceit, published in 1952, states: "It became obvious that the party, despite great efforts, had failed to win over even a significant minority of Negroes." In 1950 the Director's statement to The Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, reads: "It is no secret that one of the bitterest disappointments of communist efforts in this Nation has been their failure to lure our Negro citizens into the Party." In 1952 similar public statements were made. On page seven of the Brief submitted to the Director under the date of August 23, 1963, this historical position was restated and it was said: "One of the bitterest disappointments of the communists has been their single failure to lure any significant number of our Negro citizens into the Party." This statement was set forth again in the cover memorandum which the Director marked.

The point I wish to make here is this: The fact that this has been our historical position in the Bureau for many years is no reason to assume that it is the correct position at this time, as the Director has clearly explained. Times and conditions change and, as the evidence mounts, naturally we need to change our position along with this evidence.
Interpretation:

As we know, facts by themselves are not too meaningful, for they are somewhat like stones tossed in a heap as contrasted to the same stones put in the form of a sound edifice. It is obvious to us now that we did not put the proper interpretation upon the facts which we gave to the Director.

Martin Luther King:

We have been aware of the communist influence that Martin Luther King, Jr., head of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, and that Martin Luther King, Jr., has been dealing with the Negro Question, USA, Negro Question," dated 3/23/62 to set out information to the effect that a number of Negro leaders in this country have had subversive connections in their backgrounds and that Martin Luther King, Jr., has been dealing with.

As previously stated, we are in complete agreement with the Director that communist influence is being exerted on Martin Luther King, Jr., and that King is the strongest of the Negro leaders. As we have stated before in a memorandum, we regard Martin Luther King to be the most dangerous and effective Negro leader in the country. In addition, we know the Party is directing a major effort toward strengthening its position among the Negroes inasmuch as we have information the Party plans to intensify its efforts to exploit the racial situation for the purpose of gaining influence among the Negroes. To this end, the Party plans to
Letter to the Field

I would like to set forth here briefly why I think that the enclosed SAC Letter, which was returned to us by the Director, should be sent to the field offices. My first reason is this: we need to renew our efforts and keep the pressure on and leave no stone unturned to develop every and all facts which exist on this matter. Some of these facts may not yet have been gathered by our field offices, and will not be unless we follow up this matter evermore closely with them. My second reason is why I think the SAC Letter should be sent is related to the present changing situation in the Communist Party - Negro Relations area. During the past two weeks in particular there have been sharp stepped-up activities on the part of communist officials to infiltrate and to dominate Negro developments in this country. Further, they are meeting with successes. This could be no surprise to us because since the Negro march on Washington on August 28 communist officials have been doing all possible to exploit the very troubled racial situation. As we said weeks ago, the end of the Negro march would be the beginning of evermore systematic activities on their part to inculcate and influence Negroes and Negro leaders. They are now in full force acting upon this intention of theirs expressed weeks ago. The field should be alerted to this fact and given instructions to investigate exhaustively new communist - Negro activities. The SAC Letter in question will be a great help toward this end, and it should result in our developing important facts relating to the current changes and pertinent activities going on during the past few weeks in this entire field.

Subject of Deep Concern

May I repeat that our failure to measure up to what the Director expected of us in the area of communist - Negro relations is a subject of very deep concern to us in the Domestic Intelligence Division. We are disturbed by this and ought to be. I want him
Morandum for Mr. Belmont

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
NEGRO QUESTION
COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN RACIAL MATTERS

...to know that we will do everything that is humanly possible to develop all facts nationwide relative to the communist penetration and influence over Negro leaders and their organizations.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That the Director reconsider giving approval for sending the enclosed SAC Letter to the field.

(2) In order that other agencies and prominent government officials will be aware of the determined efforts of the Communist Party to exploit the racial situation, if the Director approves we will prepare a concise document setting forth clearly those attempts to penetrate, influence, and control the Negro movement. By setting these facts forth, succinctly and clearly, the reader cannot help but be impressed with the seriousness of the communist activities.
Mr. McHARGH. Contained under that tab are the exhibits which have previously been marked MLK exhibits F-437A through E. This morning, Mr. Brennan, in the narration and exchange between Director Hoover and William Sullivan was referred to which had to do with the extent of Communist influence on the civil rights movement in 1963. Contained in the exhibits which I have just referred to are the paper record of that particular exchange between Director Hoover and Mr. Sullivan. Also indicated there is the Director’s strong disagreement with Mr. Sullivan concerning that particular analysis. In interviews conducted by this committee, agents have informed us that the assessment originally reflected in the memos that there was insignificant influence being exerted by the Communist Party on the civil rights movement, was in fact a correct assessment, yet and still the subsequent memos following Director Hoover’s criticism reflect that the Domestic Intelligence Division began changing its position relative to that point.

Is it likely that professional agents within that unit would change their minds and begin to alter their conclusions which were their own professional judgments based on criticism from Director Hoover?

Mr. BRENNAN. Well, in the first place, I think the assessment is absolutely correct. Over the years in our society there had never been any serious Communist infiltration into the American Negro movement. Mr. Hoover put a notation on here which, as he indicated, reminded him of the Castro situation. This note is not completely clear, but what he was saying is, in effect, that Castro moved into Cuba, and Hoover was of the opinion that Castro was a Communist and others were saying he was an agrarian reformer. Subsequently, of course, Castro turned out to be a very dedicated Communist, so in fact he was hitting Sullivan over the head with that club to remind him: You were wrong once and, in this particular instance, I am saying you are wrong again.

You must understand that Mr. Hoover was a very autocratic person in complete control of the FBI, and while he didn’t dictate the investigative progress of every investigation that we had going, if there was a major one in which he was personally interested, he would really make his feelings known as to what he believed to be the case, and I think that would sway people working underneath him. He had ways of convincing you. In other words, subsequent to this, if there was a memorandum which went up asking authority to do something or other, he just might say: No, last week you told me such and such wasn’t the case, so you can’t convince me we need this now.

In other words, he would inhibit your capacity to be able to operate until you finally bent to, in effect, support what his belief and opinion was.

Mr. McHARGH. You had an opportunity to review these documents in our interview yesterday; is that correct?

Mr. BRENNAN. Yes.

Mr. McHARGH. They do reflect a series of memos in which the Domestic Intelligence Division, according to Mr. Sullivan, was attempting to regain the favor of Director Hoover. Is that an accurate assessment of what appears in these memos?
Mr. BRENNAN. It would appear that was the direction that the thing was going, yes.

Mr. McHARGH. Mr. Brennan, I would like you to refer next to tab C of the exhibit book. The first memo contained therein refers to the conference at the seat of government or in Washington headquarters on December 23, 1963, at which time it appears that Dr. King was first targeted by the bureau. I might refer to a relevant paragraph. The second paragraph reads as follows:

Recognizing the delicacy of this entire situation because of the prominence of King, the primary purpose of the conference was to explore how best to carry out our investigation to produce the desired results without embarrassment to the Bureau. Included in the discussion was a complete analysis of the avenues of approach, aimed at neutralizing King as an effective Negro leader and developing intelligence concerning King's dependence on Communists for guidance and direction.

Would you agree that this memo marked the beginning of the campaign to discredit and neutralize Dr. King?

Mr. BRENNAN. Well, again, I can only go by what the appearance of the memo is. I was not present at the conference and did not have access to the information recorded herein, but this would appear to be the central purpose of the conference, yes.

Mr. McHARGH. All right. Once again, in testimony before this committee the case agent who was in charge of the security investigation of Dr. King at the time this memo was written told us that at that time the security investigation of Dr. King was still in its early stages, that no conclusions had been formed that the bureau was still at that point attempting to assess the extent of any subversive influence on Dr. King. That being the case, does it surprise you that Dr. King was at that time targeted even though the investigation was still in its early stages?

Mr. BRENNAN. It is difficult for me to make an assessment or judgment on that based on the fact that I had no specific knowledge at that time of circumstances that this memorandum relates to or the particular background as it affected Dr. King as of the time you are talking about.

Mr. McHARGH. Would you quarrel with the testimony that I have referred to from the case agent who indicated that at the time the investigation was still in its early stages?

Mr. BRENNAN. No. I would take his assessment of that as correct.

Mr. McHARGH. Can you think of any other instance in your experience with the bureau where an individual who was being investigated for the extent of subversive contacts or influence on him was nevertheless targeted for neutralization and discredited?

Mr. BRENNAN. Right offhand I wouldn't be able to. I would have to go back and study Bureau files to determine whether this had ever occurred before.

Mr. McHARGH. Mr. Chairman, if there are no objections, I would like to have the exhibits under tab C marked MLK exhibit No. F-438A through F entered into the record at this time.

Chairman STOKES. Without objection, they may be entered into the record.

[The information follows:]
In view of the influence the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), exerting on the racial situation, particularly through Martin Luther King, head of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), the Director approved a conference be held between representatives of our Atlanta Office and Seat of Government personnel.

Recognizing the delicacy of this entire situation because of the prominence of King, the primary purpose of the conference was to explore how best to carry on our investigation to produce the desired results without embarrassment to the Bureau. Included in the discussion was a complete analysis of the avenues of approach and of neutralizing King as an effective Negro leader and developing a sense of condemnation concerning King's continued dependence on communists for finance and direction.

The conference was held at the Seat of Government on December 23-24. It was attended by Security Supervisor Henry Rowse and Robert Nichols from our Atlanta Office. The Seat of Government representatives were Assistant Director W. C. Sullivan, Inspector A. Sizoo, Section Chief F. J. Baumgardner and Supervisors T. Gurley and David Ryan. The conference lasted from 9 a.m. to 11 a.m.

Assistant Director Sullivan briefed the conference on the matter and pointed out the necessity for good judgment and discreetness in conducting any investigation concerning this matter. He made it clear it was necessary for us to continue obtaining knowledge of the CPUSA's influence on King and, through King, influence the Negro people. Mr. Sullivan also stressed the fact that, although King is a minister, we have already developed information concerning his personal activities, such as

Mr. Sullivan pointed out that the field should continue to gather information concerning King's personal activities, such as...
ing drunk in that we may consider using this information at an opportune in a counterintelligence move to discredit him.

During the discussion which followed, the men from the outlined in detail the operation of the SCLC in Atlanta and manner in which it is managed by King.

Our discreet approach to this case has been necessitated ing's prominence and the delicate situation which surrounds the race movement. A wrong move could well result in extreme antagonism to the Bureau. As a result of the conference, it was decided we need to develop additional information in the following:

1. We must determine and check out all of the employees of the SCLC.
2. We must locate and monitor the funds of the SCLC.
3. We must identify and check out the sources who contribute to the SCLC.
4. We must continue to keep close watch on King's personal activities.
5. We will, at the proper time when it can be done without embarrassment to the Bureau, expose King as an opportunist who is not a sincere person but is exploiting the racial situation for personal gain.
6. We will explore the possibility of utilizing additional specialized investigative techniques at the SCLC office.

Our technical coverage on King and the SCLC is producing all some information. It was decided that, in view of this fact when we could not engage in active investigation at this time out embarrassment to the Bureau, we would hold in abeyance operation as outlined above for another 90 days. During this time, we will utilize the information obtained from our technical coverage and conduct whatever investigation can be made discreetly.
This conference proved to be most beneficial, and the field expressed their appreciation for the opportunity brought into the Seat of Government for the purpose of bringing this entire matter. They were both enthusiastic about the case and stated the conference was of exceptional benefit to them and will be of assistance in setting the future course of the investigation.

We will continue to give this case priority attention at the Seat of Government and in the field and will expose for the clerical fraud the first opportunity. At the end of the 90-day period, or sooner if conditions permit, we will make a further recommendation as to whether we are in a position at that time to take further action against King and the SCLC without embarrassment to the Bureau.
(1) Can enrolled Agents be of any assistance to us in the Atlanta area and, if so, how much will be needed?

(2) Possibilities of contacting newspaper sources at the 3 or 12 mid/ov.

(b) Then to we knew about the background of

(3) Could we convert any of their risks points to strong points for us?

(4) Does the office have any contacts from ministers, both colored and white, who are in a position to be of assistance and, if so, in what lines could we use them?

(5) Does the office have contacts among newspaper people aggressive enough to be of assistance to us, that is, and/or contacts with whom he is in contact?

(6) Could tours and/or misur

(7) That do we know about King's housekeeper? In that manner and to use any?

(8) What are the possibilities of using Mrs. King?

(9) That do we know about the background of people presently employed in the office or KLC and can we use any of them?

(10) Are there any disgruntled employees at KLC and/or former employees who may be disgruntled or disgruntled acquaintances?

(11) What is the setup of the KLC office? Do

and using a friendly newsman or TV station to record this activity? (This would be similar to CUB activity in Boston several months ago when that agency made a film of police officers visiting bookie joints in the Boston area.)
I think it would be wise to place a flower or a small plant in King's office. Do we have any information concerning any shady financial dealings of King which could be used to our advantage? Have these possibilities ever been explored before?

In this manner, the plant could be a source of the identity and/or discussion of the commission and could provide the possibility of a barrier in the event of a counterintelligence move, because in mind that when King leaves with a girlfriend, she could discuss him at some point along the route and King could be joined by his wife prior to reaching his final destination.

Instruct that in the future Atlanta is to call information to other offices when King is traveling rather than send a teletype and instruct the other offices to do likewise. In this manner the whole object of attempting to expose King can be frustrated.

Full and complete discussion on the fact that in the future King is traveling, rather than send a teletype and instruct the other offices to do likewise. In this manner the whole object of attempting to expose King can be frustrated.

In this manner the whole object of attempting to expose King can be frustrated. The discussion on the direct approach to King through the use of F.B.I. officials, such as Robert F. Ray and Assistant Director Sullivan as a compromise, points out to him the tremendous responsibilities which he has as a leader and emphasizing him with some of the information which we have. There are many dangers inherent in such an approach but it cannot be discounted and some discussion should take place as to the dangers and advantages.
(14) Since it is known that King and various associates or
acquaintances will meet in Atlanta, consideration should
be given to the use of all investigatory techniques in
covering such meetings. Consider all exculpatory
evidence in neutralizing or intercept such meeting and
submit your plans to the Bureau for approval.

(15) Full consideration must be given to any influence which
communist front groups are bringing to the racial situation.

(6) Are all employees of ECLC with subversive backgrounds
or connections being given appropriate attention? Are new
employees of ECLC checked out for subversive background
and/or possible use as sources?

(61) Because of the Bureau's responsibility for timely dis-
persal of pertinent information to the Department
and other interested agencies, it is more than ever
necessary that all facets of this matter receive prompt
handling. The success of our effort is dependent upon
the judicious application of all available investigatory
techniques coupled with meticulous. unassuming, balanced and
impartial, tempered with sound and sound. Our discretion
must not reach the point of timidity.
Memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to A. H. Belmont 12/24/63 summarized the results of a conference held at the Seat of Government 12/23/63 between Bureau officials and Supervisors and field representatives designed to explore how best to carry on our investigation of captioned matter to produce the desired results without embarrassment to the Bureau. We completely analyzed avenues of approach aimed at neutralizing Martin Luther King, Jr., as an effective Negro leader. One of the avenues explored was that concerning any facets of the financial operations of King and the organizations through which he operates which investigation might reveal either violations of the Civil Rights Act or other potentials for discrediting King or otherwise neutralizing his effectiveness.

Files contain two items of particular significance. A Washington Capital News Service release dated 10/22/63 reveals that King's integration organization had an income of more than $732,000 during the past fiscal year and spent only about half of it. It is stated that in a report of the financial status of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), of which King is President, King disclosed that the organization had a balance of $351,992.20 left 8/31/63 at the end of the fiscal year from a total income of $735,534.02. Another news release dated 11/4/63 revealed that Representative George Andrews (D-Ala.) asked the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to investigate the tax status of the SCLC. Andrews is quoted as saying, "Thousands and thousands of dollars are collected and spent each year by so-called civil rights organizations and many people are beginning to suspect they could be a front for a full-grown racket."

It is noted that King's operations revolve principally around the SCLC. However, fund-raising operations on his part are further supported by the activities of the Gandhi Society for Human Rights, which commenced operations in 1962.

Memorandum to Mr. U.C. Sullivan January 8, 1964

FROM: W. F. J. Baumgardner

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA

INTEREST

COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN RACIAL MATTERS

INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

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Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
RE: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
NEGRO QUESTION
COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN RACIAL MATTERS
100-3-116

OBSERVATIONS:

It is believed that an examination of recent income tax returns of King might well reveal information which could assist the Bureau in its efforts to discredit King or neutralize his effectiveness. This is possibly applicable also if the income tax returns of the SCLC and the Gandhi Society were reviewed. In view of the possibility that the SCLC has already been under some investigation by IRS, a request for the results of such investigation is indicated. We also had information in late 1963 that the Gandhi Society was negotiating with IRS relative to tax exemptions and therefore the results of any IRS investigation of that Society would be worth procuring.

To date we have been most discreet and circumspect in our handling of the King investigation, as well as corollary investigations such as revolving around organizations, because of the position King has not only as a clergyman, but also as a "respected" Negro leader. It is therefore essential that our current requests of the IRS which are herein being recommended be handled in a manner which would provide for optimum security so that neither King nor any other unauthorized individuals may become aware of the Bureau's interest and so that no embarrassment may come to the Bureau. For this reason, the attached memoranda are classified "Secret."

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the Liaison Section obtain two uncertified copies of each of the income tax returns available for the past five years pertaining to King, the SCLC and the Gandhi Society. Attached hereto are three memoranda for the use of the Liaison Section.
We know that Reverend Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. represents a very real security problem to the country. Apart from the security factor, obviously he has the capacity to deceive people very successfully. This was made evident most recently by his being selected "TIME" magazine as the man of the year.

Further, we know that he has been able to cleverly deceive the very important Protestant and Catholic organizations, securing their support from them which gives him added stature. It should be very clear to all of us that Martin Luther King must, at some propitious time in the future, be revealed to the people of this country and to his Negro followers as being what he actually is—a fraud, demagogue.

When the true facts concerning his activities are revealed, such should be enough, if handled properly, to take him off a pedestal and to reduce him completely in influence so that he will longer be a security problem and no longer will be deceiving and deceiving the Negro people.

When this is done, and it can be and will be done, obviously confusion will reign, particularly among the Negro people. There will be embarrassment, frustration, confusion, resentment, at the same time the emotional reaction that will set in, it is not likely that movements like the Nation of Islam could benefit greatly. Other, other ridiculous developments similar to the Old Father Divine and other religious organizations may appear. The Negroes will be left with no national leader of sufficiently compelling personality to steer them in the right direction. This is what could happen, but need not happen. The right kind of a national leader could at this time be developed so as to overshadow Dr. King and be in the position to assume the role of the leadership of the Negro people when King has been totally discredited.
For some months I have been thinking about this matter. Once
by I had an opportunity to explore this from a philosophical and
sociological standpoint with whom I have known for years. As I previously reported, this is a very able fellow, a former Oxford scholar and profesor, and one on whom I can rely. I chided to give the matter some attention and if he knew any Negro of outstanding intelligence and ability let me know and we would give a discussion.

Enclosed with this memorandum is an outline of a biography which is truly remarkable for a man so young, having been born September 8, 1922. On scanning this biography, it will be seen that it does have all the qualifications of the kind of a Negro I have in mind to advance to positions of national leadership. I can't go into all his accomplishments and qualifications in this memorandum, for it will only take a minute or two to scan the enclosed biography.

On first blush I know it can be said it is not the concern of the Bureau what happens to the Negroes when Martin Luther King has been born, that is our concern if large numbers of them go into the action of Islam and other extremist groups with which we are concerned as an investigative agency. It is our concern if the Communist Party would be able to capitalize upon this confusion. Further, from a positive and constructive standpoint it would be of great advantage to have leading Negro people a truly brilliant, honorable and loyal Negro who would carry the 30 Million Negroes away from communism. I think in a very understandable way this necessarily must be of great interest to us. It would be most helpful to have a man like this Negro to whom we can go, if necessary, and rely upon in sensitive matters over which this Bureau has jurisdiction.

I want to make it clear at once that I don't propose that the FBI in any way become involved openly as the sponsor of a Negro leader who overshadows Martin Luther King. As far as I am concerned, this is not a crisis at all. But I do propose that I be given permission to explore this entire matter with any other person known to me and myself who could be helpful. If this thing can be set up properly without the Bureau in any way becoming directly involved, think it would be not only a great help to the FBI but would be a fine thing for the country at large. While I am not specifying at this moment, there are various ways in which the FBI could give this entire matter.
the proper direction and development. There are highly placed contacts of the FBI who might be very helpful to further such a step. These can be discussed in detail later when I have probed more fully into the possibilities.

RECOMMENDATION:

(1) For the information of the Director.

(2) That approval be given for me to explore this whole matter in greater detail, as set forth above.

ADDENDUM (1/9/64), UCS/csh:
has been investigated by the Bureau as a Departmental Applicant (for the position of Assistant US Attorney, Southern District of NY), and no derogatory information of any kind was developed. The investigation showed, as does the biography, that he has a remarkably fine record.

W.C.Sullivan

Memorandum for Mr. Belmont

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W.C.Sullivan
Memorandum

TO: Mr. Mohr
FROM: C. D. DeLoach

DATE: December 2, 1964

SUBJECT: MARTIN LUTHER KING

APPOINTMENT WITH DIRECTOR

3:35 P.M., 12-1-64

At Reverend King's request, the Director met with King, Reverend Ralph Abernathy, Secretary of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC); Dr. Andrew Young, Executive Assistant to King; and Walter Fauntroy, SCLC representative here in Washington, at 3:35 p.m., 12-1-64, in the Director's Office.

I met King and his associates in the hallway outside the Director's Office. An attempt was made to rush them directly through the reception room, however, King slowly posed for the cameras and newsmen before proceeding.

Upon being introduced to the Director, Reverend King indicated his appreciation for Mr. Hoover's seeing him then stated that Reverend Abernathy would speak first. Reverend Abernathy told the Director it was a great privilege to meet the distinguished Director of the FBI—a man who had done so much for his country. Reverend Abernathy expressed the appreciation of the Negro race for the Director's fine work in the field of civil rights. He stated that the Negroes had problems, particularly in the South, and, therefore, had requested a discussion with the Director at the very time their people were continuing to "rise up from their bondage."

Reverend King spoke up. He stated it was vitally necessary to keep a working relationship with the FBI. He wanted to clear up any misunderstanding which might have occurred. He stated that some Negroes had told him that the FBI had been ineffective, however, he was inclined to discount such criticism. Reverend King asked that the Director please understand that any criticism of the Director and the FBI which had been attributed to King was either a misquote or an outright misrepresentation. He stated this particularly concerned Albany, Georgia. He stated that the only time he had ever criticized the FBI was because of instances in which Special Agents who had been given complaints in civil rights cases regarding brutality by police officers were seen the following day being friendly with those same police officers. King stated this, of course, promoted distrust inasmuch as the police sometimes "brutalized" Negroes.

Enclosure - 3 2/26/64

Mr. Belmont 1 - Miss Gandy
Mr. Rosen 1 - Miss Holmes
Mr. Sullivan 1 - Mr. Jones
Rev. Martin Luther King, Appointment With Director, 3:35 p.m., 12-1-64

Rev. King stated he personally appreciated the great work of the FBI which had been done in so many instances. He stated this was particularly true in Mississippi. He added that FBI developments in that State have been very significant. The FBI is a great restraining influence. Rev. King denied that he had ever stated that Negroes should not report information to the FBI. He said he had actually encouraged reporting in many instances. He claimed there were good relationships in many communities, especially Atlanta, Georgia, between Negroes and the FBI. He stated he would continue to strongly urge all of his people to work closely with the FBI.

Rev. King stated he has never made any personal attack upon Mr. Hoover. He stated he had merely tried to articulate the feelings of the Negroes in the South in order to keep a tradition of nonviolence rather than violence. He added that the Negro should never be transferred from a policy of nonviolence to one of violence and terror.

Rev. King said that the Director’s report to the President this summer on rioting was a very excellent analysis.

Rev. King advised that Negroes are currently laboring under a very frustrating situation. He stated that, “We sometimes are on the verge of temporary despair.” He added that it was a challenge and a duty for him to keep the Negro from coming to a boiling point. He stated that sometimes the cries coming from the Negro represent a real feeling of lonesomeness and despair. He, however, has pointed out that the path to success is nonviolence rather than violence.

Rev. King stated he has been, and still is, very concerned regarding the matter of communism in the civil rights movement. He stated he knew that the Director was very concerned because he bore the responsibility of security in the Nation. Rev. King stated that from a strong philosophical point of view he could never be a communist no matter how he recognizes this to be a crippling totalitarian disease. He stated that as a Christian he could never accept communism. He claimed that when he learns of the identity of a communist in his midst he immediately deals with the problem by removing this man. He stated there have been one or two communists who were engaged in fund raising for the SCLC. Rev. King then corrected himself to say that these one or two men were former communists and not Party members at the present time. He then identified one as an example. He stated that he had insisted that leave his staff because the success of his organization, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, was far more important than friendship with

The Director interrupted King to state that the FBI had learned from long experience that the communists move in when trouble starts. The Director explained that communists thrive on chaos. The Director mentioned that his riot report to the President reflected the opportunistic efforts of communists. He then stated that communists have no interest in the future of the Negro race and that King, of all people, should be aware this fact. The Director spoke briefly of communist attempts to infiltrate the labor movement.
The Director told King and his associates that the FBI shares the same despair which the Negroes suffer when Negro leaders refused to accept the deep responsibility they have in the civil rights movement. He stated that when Negroes are encouraged not to cooperate with the FBI this sometimes frustrates or delays successful solution of investigations. The Director told King that he had personally gone to Mississippi to meet with Governor Paul Johnson inasmuch as there had been practically no liaison between the Department of Justice, the President and the State of Mississippi beforehand. The Director stated that upon meeting Governor Johnson the Governor explained honestly that he was a segregationist, however, abhorred violence. The Director stated that he had told Governor Johnson they had a common meeting ground inasmuch as he was in Mississippi to put an end to violence and brutality. The Director told Governor Johnson that he would like to do this in collaboration with the State Police, however, if the FBI could not receive such cooperation we would do it on our own. The Director then made reference to watermoccasins, rattlesnakes and redneck sheriffs, in that order, who still exist in Mississippi who represent the trashy type of characters who are promoting civil rights violations. The Director told King that we had trained twenty representatives of the Mississippi State Highway Patrol and that this had represented a good move to promote better cooperation and solution of civil rights cases.

The Director told Reverend King that the FBI had put the "Tear of God" in the Ku Klux Klan (KKK). He told King that we knew of the identity of the murderers of the three civil rights workers and that these murderers would soon be brought to trial. The Director then spoke of the terror in Mississippi backwoods and of the fact that sheriffs and deputy sheriffs participate in crimes of violence. He summarized by telling King that we, therefore, are under the same strain that sincere Negro leaders are under. The Director added that the KKK constantly damns the FBI and that we have currently been classified as the "Federal Bureau of Integration" in Mississippi.

The Director told King that many cases, which have been brought about as a result of FBI investigation, must be tried in State Court. He spoke of the difficulty in obtaining a verdict of guilty in instances in which white juries are impaneled in cases involving white men. The Director spoke of the KKK involvement in the Lemuel Penn case just outside of Athens, Georgia. He stated this was an outrageous miscarriage of justice in that the defendants, despite the open and shut evidence on the part of the FBI, had been acquitted.

The Director made it clear to Reverend King and his associates that the FBI could not state whether a conviction would be obtained or not in the case involving the murdered three civil rights victims. He stated, however, that the FBI has excellent evidence in this case. The Director then explained that it was most necessary for the FBI not to "jump the gun" unless we had sufficient evidence in which a case could be brought to trial.
The Director made reference to Reverend King's allegation that the FBI deals or associates with law enforcement officers who have been involved in civil rights violations. He stated emphatically that, "I'll be damned if the FBI has associated with any of these people nor will we be associated with them in the future." The Director explained that the FBI, not only because of the very nature of the law but also because of the background of our investigative employees, was in full sympathy with the sincere aspects of the civil rights movement. He stated that the FBI constantly needs cooperation and assistance in order to solve cases. He added that he made it a point, several years ago, to transfer northern Special Agents to southern offices. He stated that, for the most part, northern-born Agents are assigned civil rights cases in the South. The Director added that he feels that our Special Agents, regardless of where they are born, will investigate a case impartially and thoroughly. He mentioned, however, that it was unfair to the Agent and the FBI to "have a strike against him" in that criticism had been leveled over the fact that southern Agents would not give Negroes a "fair shake." The Director stated that such criticism was entirely unjustifiable and that no case had ever been brought to our attention proving such a fact.

The Director made reference to the recent case in McComb, Mississippi, in which nine men had been charged with burning churches and violence against Negroes. He stated this again was a miscarriage of justice. He added that the judge's decision in releasing the defendants because they had learned their lesson and were merely youths was entirely wrong and that it caused some people to question where youth really began. He explained that some of the defendants had been in their 40's. The Director added that a deal probably, of course, had been made, however, this would certainly not represent any deterrent to future actions of violence by these men.

The Director explained that there is a great misunderstanding today among the general public and particularly the Negro race as to what the FBI can and cannot do in the way of investigations. The Director emphasized that the FBI cannot recommend prosecution or declination of prosecution. He stated that Agents cannot make "on the spot" arrests. He stated that the FBI merely investigates and then the Department of Justice determines whether prosecution be entertained or not. The Director added that the question is sometimes raised why prosecution is not scheduled sooner. He stated this, of course, was not the responsibility of the FBI in any way whatsoever. He pointed out that our civil rights investigations are conducted in a very thorough and expeditious manner once the Department has authorized such investigations.

The Director spoke of the FBI's successful penetration of the KKK. He stated that the FBI has interviewed all members of the KKK in Mississippi and has served notice to these members that if trouble occurs we plan to come to them first. He stated our penetration of the KKK has been as successful as the manner in which we infiltrated the communists and the Soviet espionage services. He stated that our program of infiltrating the KKK has been so rapid that Klan members now suspect each other and are fighting among themselves. The Director mentioned that we have two confessions to the killing of the three civil rights workers. He added that the Klan in Mississippi has failed to meet for some time because the members of this organization are apprehensive.
DeLoach to Mohr 12-2-64

Martin Luther King, Appointment With Director, 3:35 p.m., 12-1-64

as to the identity of FBI informants in their midst. The Director stated he had persons been an enemy of the KKK for a long time.

He spoke of the FBI’s case in Louisiana in the late 1920’s in which FBI evidence successfully culminated in the conviction of the top Klan leader. He stated the KKK fully concentrated on Negroes, Jews and Catholics; however, concentration now is strictly on the Negro race.

The Director told the group that in the Lemuel Penn case the defendants have recently been indicted and are to stand trial in Federal Court. He stated the trial would begin sometime next week. He mentioned that the same defendants were responsible for beating Negroes and participation in other acts of violence. The Director added that the FBI’s success in infiltrating the KKK has been so extensive that we now sometimes know in advance what the KKK plans to do and take preventive measures accordingly.

The Director explained that in Alabama the FBI cannot deal with the Highway Patrol because of the psychoneurotic tendencies of the Alabama Governor. He stated that the State of Georgia has a good Governor and that the Georgia Bureau of Investigation, while not comparable to the Mississippi Highway Patrol, has cooperated with the FBI.

The Director told Reverend King and his associates that FBI representatives have held several thousand law enforcement conferences in which southern police officers have been educated as to civil rights legislation. He stated this has clearly assisted law enforcement, particularly the FBI, however, admittedly, this represents slow progress, but progress nevertheless. He added that this educational campaign will be continued and that it will eventually take hold. The Director gave the example of a Mississippi Sheriff who recently broke a case as a result of FBI training.

The Director made it very clear to Reverend King and his associates that FBI Agents conduct very thorough interviews in civil rights cases. He stated he would like to know immediately if any of our Special Agents ever act in a supercilious manner or if they mishandle a complaint regarding civil rights. He stated that if the facts reflect that our Agent is in the wrong he will be called on the carpet fast. The Director asked that Reverend King or any of his representatives feel free to call the FBI at any time they have such complaints.

The Director told Reverend King he desired to give him some advice. He stated that one of the greatest things the Negro leaders could accomplish would be to encourage voting registration among their people. Another thing would be to educate the people in the skills so that they could compete in the open market. The Director mentioned several professions in which Negroes could easily learn skills. The Director also told King he wanted him to know that registrars in the South were now more careful in their actions. He stated that there were less attempts now to prevent Negroes from
The Director explained that we have civil rights cases not only in the South but also in the northern cities. He gave examples of New York and Chicago. He stated that there have been some cases in Miami, Florida.

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The Director spoke once again of the necessity of the Negro educating himself in order to compete in manual and professional skills. He mentioned the example of a shoeshine boy in Miami, Florida, who turned out to be, after questioning by the Director, a graduate of Howard University. This shoeshine boy, a Negro, explained to the Director that he could not get a job above the level of shoeshine boy because of the color of his skin. The Director stated this, of course, was wrong and that under no circumstances did he, or anyone in the FBI, share the opinion that the Negro, or any other race, should be kept down. The Director spoke of his pride in Negro Agents and particularly mentioned Special Agent Aubrey Lewis, the former Notre Dame track star who is currently assigned to the New York Division.

The Director spoke of a Miami Special Agent who was transferred to that office from St. Louis. This Agent explained to the Director on one occasion that he was first a little upset about being transferred to Miami because he felt that his race would be against him. He stated, however, much to his surprise, that the white people in Miami treated him with the greatest of courtesy while people of his own race referred to him as a "link" simply because he was a representative of law enforcement.

Reverend King interrupted the Director at this point and asked if this same Negro Agent is still assigned to the Miami Division. The Director replied in the affirmative. The Director stated that at a recent dinner, the President University, explained to the Director that his Institution had difficulty getting Negroes on the football team because their grades were never high enough. The Director told Reverend King the same thing is true of Negroes who apply for the position of Special Agent. He stated in most instances they lack the qualifications, however, we are very happy to hire any Negro who was qualified for the position. The Director told Reverend King that we, of course, could not set down our qualifications simply because of the color of a person's skin.

The Director told Reverend King and his associates that the problems that he and the Negro leaders have is a mutual problem. He stated in most instances in civil rights matters we have learned that "you are damned if you do and you are damned if you don't." The Director stated nevertheless the FBI would continue to do its job. He stated we additionally are very proud of 10 or 11 Indian Special Agents and of a number of special Agents who have Mexican blood in them. He stated that the color of a man's skin makes no difference to the FBI whatsoever, however, we do merit the cooperation and assistance of all groups and it is most unfair when these groups are taught not to cooperate with the FBI.

The Director mentioned that he wanted to make it very plain that the FBI will not tolerate any of our personnel being slapped around. He gave an example of the Lombardozzi case in New York where one of our Agents was jumped by five hoodlums in a church. He stated these hoodlums were immediately taught a lesson. The Director mentioned that in the war with hoodlums, for every man we lose we make certain, through legal means of course, that the hoodlums lose the same number or more.
The Director proudly spoke of the ability of Agents to outshoot and outfight hoodlums and other individuals who attempted to take advantage of our personnel. He stated the KKK is afraid to "mix" with our Agents. He mentioned that the Klan was "yellow." He stated they are brave as long as they have the majority with them but afraid when they face an equal number.

The Director spoke of the Mack Charles Parker case in Poplarville, Mississippi. He stated that our evidence in this case had been turned over to Governor Coleman, the then Governor of that State. He mentioned that Governor Coleman was a decent type of individual who had immediately seen to it that a State Court received the evidence contributed by the FBI. The Director mentioned that our evidence in this case was excellent, however, the Grand Jury refused to indict the subjects involved in the lynching of Parker.

The Director told Reverend King that in many instances our Agents have been spit upon, they have been refused food and lodging and many things are done to thwart hard-hitting investigations by the FBI. He stated that nevertheless we continue to gather evidence in an expeditious and thorough manner.

Reverend Abernathy stated that the Negroes have a real problem in getting down the current system of segregated voting tests in the South. He stated it was most important that there be kept alive in the Negro communities a ray of hope. He stated that the Negro people should not be allowed to fall into an atmosphere of despair.

The Director explained that this was a very important point. He stated that real progress has been made in higher wages, voting registration and housing matters. The Director pointed out, however, that such progress has not been emphasized by the rabblerousers who constantly attempt to stir up the Negroes against the whites. The Director gave as an example the communist, in New York City. The Director stated that is sometimes pointed to as a person the Negro should emulate because of his militancy. The Director stated this was wrong and it is also wrong to "mislead" Negroes.

Reverend Abernathy stated that the SCLC does not want Negroes like in their movement. He stated that Reverend King, more than anyone else, has prevented people like and the Muslims from taking over the civil rights movement. Reverend Abernathy stated that actually the Negroes are a part of the Federal Government, therefore, anything that represents the Federal Government is an encouragement to the Negro. He added that even the side of a post office building or a Federal courtroom is an encouragement to the Negro. He mentioned that when a Negro receives information that a case in which he has been brutally mistreated is going to Federal Court he feels encouraged over the fact that he will get a fair trial. Reverend Abernathy continued that the same problem is true when a Negro sees an FBI Agent. He stated that the Negro feels open encouragement inasmuch as the FBI will not only fairly handle his case but will serve as a great deterrent to violence.
The Director stated that the KKK today is represented by common white trash. He stated that the KKK was actually worse than the Communist Party inasmuch as the Klan resorts to violence while the communists usually emulate termites in their activities.

The Director reiterated that King and his associates should feel free to call him at any time when they have knowledge of possible civil rights violations. King replied that over the past few years he has noted amazing signs of progress in the civil rights field. He stated that he has been very surprised to see some communities comply with the new civil rights statutes. He stated there still are some pockets of resistance particularly in the South. He added that the SCLC is planning to stimulate voting registration activities in Selma, Alabama, in the near future. He mentioned that some members of his organization have been successful in infiltrating this white community and have learned there is a great potential for violence in Selma.

The Director interrupted King and briefly detailed five cases in which the FBI has gathered evidence in Selma, Alabama. The Director identified these cases fully, and specifically the case against Sheriff ___. The Director mentioned that these cases came about as a result of FBI investigation and that we were continuing our investigations in Selma, Alabama. He mentioned that one case would come to trial December 9, 1964. The Director particularly made reference to the fact that we had three excellent cases in Selma at the present time.

Reverend King inquired as to whether his representatives should notify the FBI when they arrive in Selma, Alabama. He quickly corrected himself that he but his representatives should contact the FBI upon arrival, however, he asked the Director what would be the possibilities of FBI agents being in Selma, Alabama, inasmuch as there appeared to be a potential for violence. The Director specifically asked Reverend King when his activities would take place. Reverend Abernathy indicated such activity would take place around January 1, 1965. The Director clearly explained that FBI agents would be in Selma, not for the purpose of protecting anyone but for the purpose of observing and reporting to the Department of Justice any possible violations of civil rights that might occur. Reverend King expressed appreciation in this regard.

Reverend King stood up and stated he wished to express his personal thanks for a most fruitful and necessary meeting. The Director told Reverend King that he should get in touch with us at anytime he felt it was necessary.

Reverend King mentioned that there were representatives of the press in the Director's reception room. He turned to me and asked if the FBI planned to make any comment regarding the meeting. I told him that the Director had instructed that we make no comment whatsoever. Reverend King asked the Director if there would be any objections if he read a short prepared statement to the press. The Director told Reverend King this, of course, was up to him.
In proceeding to the reception room, Reverend King pulled out a press release, hand-written in ink, out of his right coat pocket. This press release obviously had been prepared prior to the time Reverend King arrived at FBI Headquarters. A previous memorandum has been sent through reporting verbatim the comments by King in the Director's reception room.

**ACTION:**

It is suggested that the attached letter be sent to the President concerning the meeting between the Director, Reverend King and his associates.

The General Investigative Division, Civil Rights Section, should take due note of the proposed activities in Selma, Alabama, and should instruct the appropriate office to make certain that Agents are on hand to observe activities in Selma, Alabama, on or around January 1, 1965.
I fully agree that this work should eventually be done, particularly if an additional controversy arises with King. I see no necessity, however, in this work being done at the present time inasmuch as the controversy has quieted down considerably and we are not in need of transcriptions right now. In view of the transcription already accomplished, and because of the above-mentioned reasons, I would recommend that we hold off doing this tremendous amount of work until there is an actual need.

ADDENDUM: CDD: dcs, 12/10/84

[Handwritten notes]
MEMORANDUM

FROM: V. C. Sullivan


Re: Jack M. Rogers, Committee Counsel, Joint Legislative Committee on Un-American Activities, State of Louisiana, called me to advise he was sending to me a letter directed to "Friends of SCLC Everywhere," attacking Mr. Hoover and the FBI on behalf of Martin Luther King. A copy of this is enclosed. This attack is sponsored by The Southern Conference Educational Fund, Inc., which was the successor organization to the Southern Conference for Human Welfare, cited as a communist front organization by the Committee on Un-American Activities in its report dated 6/16/47. Bureau files show that its successor, The Southern Conference Educational Fund, is described as a progressive, liberal organization which one of our sources who has furnished reliable information in the past considers a communist front organization in that it has followed the Communist Party line, particularly in regard to the racial question.

The enclosed letter refers to the Director's criticism of Dr. Martin Luther King and urges all recipients to write a letter or send a telegram to President Johnson expressing the hope that Johnson will remove the Director. The letter also carries a critical article on the Director published in the "Washington Post" on 11/21/6...

It is evident from the enclosed document that it will be given widespread dissemination. This just highlights what to us is an indisputable fact that is this Bureau has not yet emerged victorious in its conflict with Martin Luther King. I think we are deluding ourselves if we believe that King and his followers and supporters around the country have run for cover and are not attacking the FBI in one way or another. In view of this situation, realism makes it mandatory that we take every prudent step that we can take...

Enclosures:

1. Mr. Delmont; 1. Mr. Sullivan;
2. Mr. DeLoach; Mr. Baumgardner;
3. Mr. Kosack

DATE: 1-14-56

FO: A. C.
to emerge completely victorious in this conflict. We should not take any ineffective or half-way measures, nor blind ourselves to the realities of the situation. This new attack on the Director and the Bureau should certainly be called to the attention of the President as it is very likely he will be receiving critical letters and telegrams. Enclose will be found a letter to Mr. Moyer and also a letter for the acting Attorney General.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the enclosed letters be approved for dissemination.

Mr. McHargh, Mr. Brennan, again referring to the items under tab C, with respect to MLK exhibit No. F-438D—do you find that memo?

Mr. Brennan. Yes.

Mr. McHargh. This memo refers to a proposal by Mr. Sullivan that a new leader be promoted once Dr. King was taken off his pedestal as the leader of the civil rights movement. At the end of the memo Director Hoover writes, and I quote, “I am glad to see that the light has finally come through, though dismally delayed.” Did you ever have occasion to discuss this particular memo or the idea of promoting a new leader with Mr. Sullivan?

Mr. Brennan. I knew that Mr. Sullivan had proposed and had suggested to the Director that he try to approach some individuals who would be prominent as possible successors to King as the Black leader of the civil rights movement.

Mr. McHargh. Do you know whether any steps were ever taken to pursue this particular proposal?

Mr. Brennan. No; I do not.

Mr. McHargh. MLK exhibit No. F-438E, the next memo following, refers to a meeting between Dr. King and Director Hoover, which was widely publicized, and as a result of which many concluded that a truce had been reached between the Director and Dr. King. The very next memo, however, MLK exhibit No. F-438F, indicate clearly that the campaign to discredit Dr. King was to continue.

I read from a relative portion of the third paragraph of that exhibit:

I think we are deluding ourselves if we believe that King and his followers and supporters around the country have run for cover and are not attacking the Bureau—the FBI—in one way or the other. In view of this situation, it really makes it mandatory that we take every prudent step that we can to emerge completely victorious in this conflict. We should not take any ineffective or halfway measures nor blind ourselves to the reality of the situation.

With respect to this memo, I think it is clear that it indicates that the campaign is to continue. References to Dr. King appear to be the means by which the Domestic Intelligence Division was able to regain Director Hoover’s favor, that is, these memos which talk about discrediting Dr. King. In your conversations with Mr. Sullivan, did that become apparent, that one way to get back into the Director’s favor would be to target Dr. King and implement a campaign against him?
Mr. Brennan. I don't think I ever had any discussion with Mr. Sullivan relative to targeting Dr. King to get back into Hoover's favor. It was just a course of events which I feel that Mr. Hoover shaped by the pressure which he brought to bear on Mr. Sullivan, as head of that division, to follow the course of action that Mr. Hoover felt was desirable.

Mr. McHargh. Mr. Brennan, were you present for the testimony this morning?

Mr. Brennan. Yes, I was.

Mr. McHargh. Were you also present as chief counsel read the narration?

Mr. Brennan. Yes.

Mr. McHargh. Reference was made to a comment by Director Hoover that Dr. King was the most notorious liar in the country.

Mr. Brennan. Yes, I remember that.

Mr. McHargh. You remember that situation?

Mr. Brennan. Yes.

Mr. McHargh. During your prior testimony before this committee the following question was propounded to you? "In the Bureau, either before you came to Internal Security or subsequent to that time, were you aware of any attitude that the Director held toward Dr. King?"

Your response was as follows:

"Well, obviously Mr. Hoover was very sensitive to any degree of criticism either to himself or the FBI, and I think he regarded the two as being synonymous, and anybody who had the temerity to either privately or publicly criticize either Mr. Hoover or the FBI, in effect virtually became an archenemy of Mr. Hoover."

Would you say that is an accurate assessment of your feelings relative to Director Hoover's response to criticism of the Bureau?

Mr. Brennan. Yes, it is.

Mr. McHargh. At this time, Mr. Chairman, I would like to refer to the exhibits that are marked under Tab G of the exhibit book previously marked as MLK exhibits F-442A through Z and have them entered in the record.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, they may be entered into the record.

[The exhibits follow:]
This is to advise you of past electronic surveillances that we had installed for the purpose of securing intelligence concerning the late Martin Luther King, Jr., former President of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC).

King had been in close association with individuals having a Communist Party background during his rise to prominence in the civil rights field. Among such individuals was his principal advisor, Mr. C. D. Brennan, a member of the Communist Party and in a position of leadership in the Labor Youth League, a communist front organization. Another close advisor of King, had been a member of the Communist Party League in the early 1940's.

In order to determine the subversive influence in racial matters, the following microphone and wiretap coverage was placed in effect which provided coverage on the activities of King and the SCLC:

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MLK EXHIBIT F-442A
Memorandum C. D. rennan to Mr. F. C. Sullivan
RE: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
-100-106679

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<td>Claridge Hotel, Atlantic City, New Jersey</td>
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<td>9/29/64</td>
<td>10/2/64</td>
<td>Microphone</td>
<td>Manager Hotel, Savannah, Georgia</td>
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<td>1/8/65</td>
<td>1/11/65</td>
<td>Microphone</td>
<td>Park Sheraton Hotel, New York, New York</td>
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<td>1/28/65</td>
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<td>Microphone</td>
<td>Americana Hotel, New York, New York</td>
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<td>3/29/65</td>
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<td>Sheraton Atlantic Hotel, New York, New York</td>
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<td>Microphone</td>
<td>Astor Hotel, New York, New York</td>
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<td>10/14/65</td>
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<td>Americana Hotel, New York, New York</td>
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<td>11/29/65</td>
<td>11/30/65</td>
<td>Microphone</td>
<td>New York, New York</td>
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In addition to the above coverage of King, the following coverage was afforded the SCLC.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Installed</th>
<th>Discontinued</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Location</th>
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<tr>
<td>11/8/63</td>
<td>6/21/66</td>
<td>Wiretap</td>
<td>Atlanta Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7/13/64</td>
<td>7/31/64</td>
<td>Wiretap</td>
<td>New York Office</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

All of the above wiretap surveillances were authorized under the signature of the then Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy who on 10/10/63 authorized the coverage of King's residence and another future address to which he may move, and the New York Office SCLC. He also authorized wiretap coverage of King and the Atlanta headquarters of SCLC on 10/21/63. These authorizations were given during the administration of President John F. Kennedy.

Attorney General Kennedy did not sign any microphone surveillance requests. Microphone surveillances were authorized to Bureau officials acting on general authority relating to the Attorney General.

**ACTION:**

None. For information.
The Attorney General orally informed me today that he had been considering the request he made on July 16, 1963, for a technical surveillance on Martin Luther King at his home and office and was now of the opinion that this would be ill advised.

At the time the Attorney General initially asked for such a surveillance, he was told there was considerable doubt that the productivity of the surveillance would be worth the risk because King travels most of the time and that there might be serious repercussions should it ever become known the Government had instituted this coverage. These were the very thoughts that the Attorney General expressed today in withdrawing his request.

With reference to the other technical surveillance requested at the same time, the Attorney General felt this was in a different category and we should go forward with this coverage. It is noted that this was previously approved in writing by the Attorney General.

The memorandum we sent to the Attorney General on July 23, 1963, requesting authority for the King surveillance has been retrieved and is attached.

**ACTION TO BE TAKEN:**

We will take no further action to effect technical coverage on Martin Luther King, either at his home or at his office at the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, in the absence of a further request from the Attorney General.

Enclosure

1. Mr. Sullivan
2. Mr. Rosen

MLK Exhibit F-442B
The AG was contacted at his request late this afternoon. He said that a NY attorney who has had close association with Martin Luther King, and with whom he had been in to see Duke Marshall about the racial situation. According to the AG, he had indicated he had some reservations about talking with King on the phone. Marshall thought he might have been referring to a possible telephone tap, and passed it off by telling the AG it was something he would have to take up with King.

The purpose of the AG’s contact was that this brought to his attention the possibility of effecting technical coverage on both King and Martin Luther King. I told the AG that I was not at all acquainted with but that, in so far as King was concerned, it was obvious from the reports that he was in a travel status practically all the time, and it was, therefore, doubtful that a technical surveillance on his office or home would be very productive. I also raised the question as to the repercussions if it should ever become known that such a surveillance had been put on King.

The AG said this did not concern him at all, in view of the possible communist influence in the racial situation, he thought it advisable to have as complete coverage as possible. I told him, under the circumstances, that we would check into the matter to see if coverage was feasible and, if so, would submit an appropriate recommendation to him.

If you approve, we will have a preliminary survey made to determine if technical coverage is feasible with full security.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C.
July 23, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
MR. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
EXECUTIVE LIAISON - COMMUNITY

Martin Luther King, Jr., resident at 500 Johnson
Avenue, S.E., Atlanta, Georgia, and is the President of the
Southern Christian Leadership Conference, 500 Johnson Avenue,
Atlanta, Georgia. He is actively involved within
the Democratic Party, etc.

Pursuant to your request that in view of the
possible Communist influence in the racial situation con-
sideration be given to placing a technical surveillance on
King, it is requested that authority be granted to place a
technical surveillance on King at his current residence or
at any future address to which he may move. It is further
requested that authority be granted to place a technical
surveillance on the Southern Christian Leadership Conference
of which King is President or at any future address to which
it may be moved.

Respectfully,

[Redacted]
Director

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

MLK EXHIBIT F-442D
URGENT 7-24-63
TO DIRECTOR
FROM S.ATLANTA 2124

JUNE. COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN RACIAL MATTERS.

SURVEYS COMPLETED. SERVICE FURNISHED TV RESIDENCE
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., 565 JOHNSON AVENUE, ATLANTA, BY
THE TRU SET USING NON-LISTED NUMBER. PUBLIC UTILITY WILL
FURNISH LEASED LINE TO FIELD OFFICE HEADQUARTERS FOR
TELEPHONE TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE FEASIBLE WITH FULL
SECURITY. NO OTHER TECHNICALS IN EFFECT ON RESIDENCE.

SERVICE FURNISHED TO OFFICE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN
LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE, 350 AUBURN AVENUE, ATLANTA, BY FOUR
TELEPHONE LINES. PUBLIC UTILITY WILL FURNISH LEASED LINES
TO FIELD OFFICE HEADQUARTERS. TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE
FEASIBLE WITH FULL SECURITY. NO OTHER TECHNICALS IN EFFECT
ON SOUTHERN OFFICE.

INSTALLATIONS RECOMMENDED. ADVISE IF DESIRED AND IF
OE FORWARD ATLANTA FOUR DIAL REPORTS, COMPLETE THREE
LINES, RECOMMEND USE PLAYBACK UNIT.

U.S.G. 2124

5:36 PM

REC-23

AUG 2, 1963

100-3/15-4/9

MLK Exhibit F-442E
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
SECURITY MATTER – COMMUNIST
COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN RACIAL MATTERS

Martin Luther King, Jr., resides at 563 Johnson Avenue, Northeast, Atlanta, Georgia, and is president of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). The New York office of the SCLC is located at 312 West 125th Street, New York City. He is closely associated with the Communist Party, USA.

In view of the possible communist influence in the racial situation, it is requested that authority be granted to place a technical surveillance on King at his current address or at any future address to which he may move.

It is further requested that authority be granted to place a technical surveillance on the SCLC office at the current New York address or to any other address to which it may be moved.

Respectfully,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED

DATE 10/16/63

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorised Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

MLK EXHIBIT F-442F
Memorandum

To: Mr. Belmont

From: C. A. Evans

Subject: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
SECURITY MATTER - C

The Attorney General was contacted at his request this afternoon. He had before him our memorandum of October 7, 1963, requesting authority for technical surveillances on Martin Luther King at his residence at Atlanta and at the office of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference of which he is president, at New York City.

The Attorney General said that he recognized the importance of this coverage if substantial information is to be developed concerning the relationship between King and the Communist Party. He said there was no question in his mind as to the coverage in New York City but that he was worried about the security of an installation covering a residence in Atlanta, Georgia. He noted that the last thing we could afford to have would be a discovery of a wire tap on King's residence.

I pointed out to the Attorney General the fact that a residence involved did not necessarily mean there was any added risk because of the technical nature of the telephone system. He was informed that the Bureau had had years of experience in this field and that we continually reviewed our procedures to insure that every measure possible to secure such installations was taken. It was nevertheless noted that of necessity we had to deal with established contacts in the telephone company to get the necessary leased lines, but once again we had procedures which minimized the risks to the nth degree.

After this discussion the Attorney General said he felt we should go ahead with the technical coverage on King for the Atlanta trial, and to continue it if productive results were forthcoming. He said he was certain that all Bureau representatives involved would recognize the delicacy of this particular matter and would thus be even more cautious than ever in this assignment. He asked to be kept advised of any pertinent information developed regarding King's communist connections.

Enclosure

1 - Mr. Sullivan
2 - Mr. Donohue

MLK EXHIBIT F-442G
Memorandum to Mr. Belmont

Our memorandum requesting authority for this surveillance signed by the Attorney General and handed to me. It is attached.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
SECURITY LETTER - COMMUNIST

COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN RACIAL MATTERS

The office of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference is located at 330 Auburn Avenue Northeast, Atlanta, Georgia. Martin Luther King, Jr., is President of this organization. He is closely associated with a member of the Communist Party, USA.

In view of the possible communist influence in the racial situation, it is requested that authority be granted to place a technical surveillance on the headquarters of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference at its current address or at any future address to which it may be moved.

Respectfully,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

APPROVED

DATE

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorised Disclosure

Subject to Criminal Sanctions

MLK EXHIBIT F-442H
The Attorney General spoke to me with reference to our memorandum of October 18, 1963, recommending a technical surveillance on the office of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference at Atlanta, Georgia. It is noted that last week the Attorney General authorized similar coverage on the residence of Martin Luther King, Jr., President of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

The Attorney General is apparently still vacillating in his position as to technical coverage on Martin Luther King and his organization, it being recalled that he had initially suggested such coverage and then changed his mind and felt it might be advisable.

The Attorney General said that he is still uncertain in his own mind about this coverage. I reminded him of our previous conversation, wherein he was assured that all possible would be done to insure the security of this operation.

The Attorney General advised that he was approving the October 18, 1963 memorandum but asked that this coverage and that on King's residence be evaluated at the end of 30 days in light of the results secured so that the continuance of these surveillances could be determined at that time. This will be done.

The original of our October 18, 1963 memorandum was handed to me by the Attorney General. It is attached hereto.

Enclosure

MLK Exhibit F-4421
TO: Mr. A. E. Belknap
FROM: Mr. W. C. Sullivan
DATE: January 6, 1964

SUBJECT: COMMISSARY PARTY, USA
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

COMMUNIST INFLUENCE IN RACIAL MATTERS

On this past weekend (1/4-5/64) it was determined that Martin Luther King, Jr., would be staying at the Tillard Hotel in Washington, D. C., from Sunday to Tuesday (1/5-7/64). Because of the importance of our investigation of the communist influence in racial matters and the intelligence and counterintelligence possibilities which thorough coverage of King's activities might develop and because this was of the utmost importance, I authorized Washington Field Office to make effort to secure microphone coverage of King provided full security would be secured.

On 1/6/64 Security Coordinator Supervisor L. E. Chenevert of the Washington Field Office advised that they had been able to obtain coverage on 1/6/64 with full security and that the Bureau would be kept promptly advised of the results of the coverage. (Provision arranged; however, no telephone instrument is being utilized in this operation.)

ACTIONS

For information. You will be promptly advised of positive results achieved.

100-3-118
l - 120-100/76 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)

1 - Mr. Belknap
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Eastover
1 - Mr. Lynn
1 - Mr. Donald
1 - Mr. Phillips

This report is prepared in accordance with your request and is not for dissemination to official proceedings by

MLK EXHIBIT F-442J
In connection with captioned case, we had a microphone surveillance cover the activities of Martin Luther King, Jr., and one of his associates while they were at the Willard Hotel in Washington, D.C., 1-5/7-64. The results of this coverage are contained in a letterhead memorandum, a copy of which is attached.

In accordance with the Director's instruction that the Attorney General be given the results of this coverage, it is suggested that Assistant Director Evans personally deliver to the Attorney General the copy of the letterhead memorandum which is attached.

The attached document is classified "Top Secret" to minimize the likelihood that this material will be read by someone who will leak it to King. However, it is possible despite its classification, the Attorney General himself may reproduce King's letter on the basis of this material. If he does, it is not likely we will develop any more such information through the means employed. It is highly important that we do develop further information of this type in order that we may completely discredit King as the "spokesman of the Negro people."

Recommendation:
This memorandum be routed to Mr. Evans so that he may furnish the Attorney General, personally, a copy of the letterhead memorandum. It is suggested Mr. Evans deliver this memorandum personally so it won't be passing through the hands of office personnel who might talk about it.
Inasmuch as King is seeking an appointment with President Johnson and as we have previously alerted the President concerning King's communist connections in particular, it may be the Director will want Mr. DeLoach to show a copy of the letterhead memorandum to Mr. Jenkins.
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-3-116)  
(Immediate Personal Attention, Assistant Director W. C. SULLIVAN)

FROM: SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (100-51914A)

RE: CONQUIST PARTY, USA - NEGRO QUESTION
CONQUIST INFLUENCE IN RACIAL MATTERS
IS - C

In order that the Bureau be fully apprised concerning the special assignment in Honolulu in the above-captioned investigation and for the possible future use of the Domestic Intelligence Division and the FBI Laboratory, it is believed desirable that the following chronological order of events be set forth, including difficulties encountered, effectiveness of the investigation, and the utilization of personnel.

Supervisor HARRY F. CLIFFORD, JR. of the San Francisco Office was fully briefed at a special conference in Assistant Director SULLIVAN's Office at the SOG on Monday, 2/3/64. He committed as much of the information as possible to memory and did not rely on making extensive notes. He arranged with the Bureau where the Atlanta Office would provide those serials necessary to him at San Francisco prior to his departure for Honolulu. He arranged his return trip to San Francisco via Los Angeles where he was met at the airport by two Security Supervisors who were given the necessary information in order that the Los Angeles Office would be prepared to carry out its part in the special assignment investigation.
Upon his return to San Francisco, he selected the following personnel based upon recommendations by the Domestic Intelligence Division, by the FBI Laboratory, and upon his own experience with the men involved: SA RMIDGE O. LYNCH, because he is the most experienced, most ingenious, the most unruffled, most consistent sound man for this type of operation in the San Francisco Office; SA ROBERT U. FASH, because in both the Security and Criminal Intelligence Programs he has shown unusual ingenuity, persistence, and determination in making microphone installations; SA ALBERT D. CLARK, running physical surveillances, and has been absolutely fearless in these types of operations for more than twelve years; SA RICHARD E. STEPHENS, who has just recently completed an advanced course in photography and because he has had many years experience in overcoming photographic problems in connection with

A conference was had with these Agents, the proposed investigation outlined, the possible problems to be encountered discussed, and each was given a specific assignment in order to prepare himself for the special investigation in Honolulu. The need for the utmost security was emphasized.

SAs CLIFFORD and LYNN arrived in Honolulu on the afternoon of Wednesday, 2/12/64. They proceeded to the office where the background of the investigation and the Bureau instructions in connection therewith were outlined over a period of several hours to SAC FICE. Mr. FICE was immediately cooperative to the fullest extent possible. He readily understood the delicacy of the situation and pledged all-out support of the Agents on special assignment.
The Honolulu Office had received sufficient correspondence from Mainland Offices so they could be aware in a general way of what type of investigation was to be conducted concerning the principal Subject's (KING) visit to Honolulu. It was apparent to the Honolulu Office from the copies of communications in its file that the Bureau had an intense interest in the extra-curricular activities of the Subject and the communist influence upon him and, therefore, the Honolulu Office was in a position to account for the principal Subject's public activities, appearances, speeches, etc.

SAC PRICE pointed out upon the arrival of SAS CLIFFORD and LYNMAR that Honolulu was in the midst of the peak of its winter tourist season. The various airlines had just inaugurated a $100.00 tourist flight to Hawaii and all of the principal hotels were filled to overflowing with tourists. He believed that it would be difficult to obtain, many days in advance, a block of rooms whereby coverage of the Subject could be effected, but he indicated that he did have the official and personal contacts whereby a beginning could be made immediately.

Through its public sources, the Honolulu Office had determined that the University of Hawaii had planned to put the Subject and his party up at the Hilton Hawaiian Village for the days and nights of 2/18 and 19/64, and the morning of 2/20/64, while he was making public appearances. Supervisor CLIFFORD requested that it possible he and SA LYNMAR be quartered in the Hilton Hawaiian Village. It was immediately determined by pretext telephone calls that the Hilton Hawaiian Village was filled to overflowing and was actually asking some of its guests to move elsewhere if possible.

It was pointed out to Mr. PRICE that if at all possible it was imperative for SAS CLIFFORD and LYNMAR to at least be in the same hotel where the Subject was scheduled to be a guest in order that full security could be established and in order that the equipment could be tested. By the evening of 2/12/64, through S/C contacts Mr. PRICE was able to obtain a room in the establishment for SAS CLIFFORD and LYNMAR.
The Hilton Hawaiian Village is a complex of five steel and concrete towers, each approximately fifteen stories tall, linked together by a series of 2-story concrete motel-like buildings with perhaps 75 independent shops, restaurants, bars, etc. around a huge open-air lobby. An inspection of the halls and the rooms revealed that the dividing walls were made of four-inch concrete blocks. The Hilton Hawaiian Village has approximately 1100 separate accommodations, rooms, suites, and pent houses with room for approximately 2500 people. Literally hundreds are moved in and out of the hotel every day according to a fixed schedule, whereby they spend a certain length of time at this hotel in Honolulu, move out to other islands to take way for other tourists to come in, and return to the Hawaiian Village when the other tourists move out.

Through a SAC contact and a personal friend of SAC PRICE, Mr. PRICE began a most discreet inquiry to determine where the subject and his party were to be located. It was discovered that the hotel is booked up so full and has so many commitments on a continuous basis, that it ordinarily books blocks of rooms and suites by type and price rather than making individual assignments to guests who have made reservations; thus, it would know that on a certain day it would need, for example, 100 $20.00 rooms, 50 $25.00 rooms, and 40 $30.00 rooms, but would not individually assign them until after the individual guest had registered at the hotel. This was the case with regard to the MARTIN LUTHER KING party. No specific space had yet been assigned and for security reasons it was determined best by the SAC and by the Agents on special assignment, that as far as possible, the hotel be allowed to follow normal booking procedures.

In the meantime, SAs CLIFFORD and LYMAN proceeded to establish their identities as tourists in the hotel and its environs. The Honolulu Office has ten cars assigned to it, all of which are relatively well known and all of which are equipped with 2-way radios. The Agents on special assignment explored the possibility with the SAC and experienced Agents of the Honolulu Office of switching license plates on one of their cars and utilizing it on the special assignment, but the considered opinion of all concerned was that security might be lost by such an arrangement and it was, therefore, resolved to rent a Hertz car right at the hotel for use during the special assignment.
Under secure conditions, SAs CLIFFORD and LYMAN unpacked and experimented with all of the equipment sent cut or brought cut to Honolulu under conditions as closely approximating what was anticipated in the actual investigation. They found that all of the equipment worked well and would be effective if we could arrange to be no more than one room away from the Subjects of our interest. Due to the heavy concrete construction of the towers composing the hotel, approximately one-half of the radio transmitting equipment would not be effective at any great distance because its signal was somewhat overshadowed by a powerful local TV station.

Over the weekend of Saturday, 2/15/64, and Sunday, 2/16/64, the experiments continued and in the meantime, SAC PRICE most discreetly pushed his efforts to have definite space assigned to the Subject's party and to locate the special assignment Agents along side the Subjects.

The Kahalé Hilton Hotel is the newest and perhaps the most luxurious in the entire Hilton chain. It was opened for business in January, 1964, has luxurious suites furnished at great cost, and is situated in an isolated area with its own man-made lake between a golf course and the sea. It is of solid concrete construction, ten stories high, and because of its prices attracts principally wealthy individuals who generally are older than the average tourist.

SAs CLIFFORD and LYMAN personally made a most discreet survey of the hotel during the afternoon and evening hours and discovered that at best it was a most sedate and formal place with almost no activity or action in the halls, elevators, and public places. Upon the arrival of the remaining three Agents on
special assignment in Honolulu, they were quickly acquainted with the situation at the Hilton Hawaiian Village and on Sunday evening, 2/16/64, made a survey as much as was possible of the situation at the Kahala Hilton.

It was possible to obtain a room for these Agents in another tower approximately 100 yards away from the room occupied by SAS CLIFFORD and LYMAN. On Sunday afternoon experiments were conducted with the equipment over this extended space and it was found that most of the equipment worked very well even at that distance through concrete walls and glass windows, but that the TV station interfered with some of the equipment on certain wave lengths.

On Monday, 2/17/64, SAC PRICE was able to arrange that the Subject and his party be placed in Suites 404 and 405 of the ocean tower building of the Hilton Hawaiian Village Hotel and that SAS CLIFFORD and LYMAN would be given the suite numbered 406 along side that to be occupied by the principal Subject (405) and that the other three Agents would be given the suite numbered 403. One complicating factor was that no place else in the entire complex did the hotel have unoccupied space available allowing the designation of four rooms in a row for our purpose.

Another complication was the fact that theSubjects were due to land at the airport at 12:50 p.m., Tuesday, 2/18/64, and could be expected to be at the hotel at approximately 1:30 p.m. on that day, but three of the four rooms were occupied and could be expected to be occupied until the checkout time of 2:00 p.m. on Tuesday, 2/18/64.

SAS CLIFFORD and LYMAN were able to move into Room 406 in the early evening of Monday, 2/17/64. The hotel arranged to move the guests out of Room 403 late that same evening and the other Agents were able to move in to Room 403. Investigation revealed that the occupants of Suite 405, which was designated for KING, were members of a folk dance group which was having its final dance in the ballroom on the second floor of the same building. By running most discreet surveillances and by utilizing a passkey obtained by SAC PRICE through the door connecting Room 406 with 405, the Agents were able to establish double wasp
coverage in Room 406 during the evening of Monday, 2/17/64, while the recording party was going on. This provided the necessary coverage which was activated when the principal subject and his party entered Room 405 at 2:17 p.m., Tuesday, 2/18/64. This coverage enabled us to contact a highly confidential source that evening which supplemented the information received from the microphone covers. In order to obtain clear reception and if possible to overcome the subjects' playing of the TV, on Tuesday morning, 2/18/64, a minilite was installed in another location in the subject's suite and monitored from Room 406.

It had been determined that SA J. STEFFING ADAMS of the Honolulu Office had conducted an Anti-Racketeering investigation concerning ... at the Kahala Hilton Hotel in January, 1964, and had established excellent working relationships with members of the staff on the working level at that hotel. At the request of Supervisor CLIFFORD, SA ADAMS was sent out to the Kahala Hilton Hotel and checked on reservations held by the hotel for all expected guests for the period from 2/15/64 through 2/25/64, and determined that there were reservations for single suites (each suite will sleep at least two people) for KING, WALKER, KEARSE (who accompanied the party to Honolulu), and DOLORES EVANS from Los Angeles. No reservation could be found for DOLORES SHEFFY, but apparently she could have fit in the room with EVANS since there were two beds in the room. Once this was discovered, through SAC PRICE's contacts, it was possible to arrange on Tuesday, 2/18/64, that specific rooms be designated for the above individuals and that we select adjacent rooms as desired.

This hotel, being a luxury hotel, was about 75% full and not as crowded as the other Honolulu hotels. Three of the Agents on special assignment accompanied SA ADAMS to the hotel on Wednesday morning, 2/19/64, and arranged the situation in such a way that by renting three rooms ourselves as of that date, we could cover the four rooms requested by the subject's party. These three Agents then checked into that hotel and worked all day Wednesday and nearly all night that same night, Wednesday-Thursday, 2/19-20/64. By 11:00 p.m. they had succeeded, most discreetly, in making nine different installations under most secure conditions in the four rooms to be occupied by the subjects.
Just as they completed their job it was discovered that the installations at the Hawaiian Village Hotel that three Agents had spent the night and morning hours removing the installations they had worked hard to make.

Shortly after midnight Thursday morning, 2/20/64, the installations at the Hawaiian Village provided information that

This information was provided telephonically to the Los Angeles Office and enabled the Los Angeles Office to dispatch the Los Angeles Office to determine where the Subjects would be and make, with Bureau instruction, the proper installations at the Ambassador Hotel.

In accord with Bureau instructions, SAs CLIFFORD and MAI gathered together the necessary material on the morning of Thursday, 2/20/64, and preceded the Subjects to Los Angeles in. In Los Angeles they aided the Los Angeles Agents in identifying the Subjects and their voices on the evening of Thursday, 2/20/64, and the early morning of Friday, 2/21/64, then later spent the day of Friday and Friday evening working with the Los Angeles Agents in order that their coverage would be as efficacious as possible.

SAs CLIFFORD and MAI returned to San Francisco from Los Angeles on Saturday, 2/22/64. The remaining three Agents had the more bulky equipment, packaged it for shipment to Bureau, San Francisco, and other offices, cleared out of the Is, and arrived back in San Francisco on Sunday afternoon, 2/22/64.

The cooperation of the Hilton Hotel system was such that the Bureau was not charged for the rooms at the luxury Hotel that were used by the Agents all day Wednesday, Wednesday night, and Thursday morning, nor for the four rooms we had blocked out the day before and offered to pay rent if they would be saved for the Subjects.
SAC PRICE of Honolulu, with funds from the San confidential fund, is settling the bill for the rooms use experiments and for the towers at the Hawaiian Village. He will forward the bills to SA CLIFFORD, who will voucher slip same.

OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) No matter what its size in population, Honolulu is basically a resort small town and all Bureau personnel who participated in the investigation felt that the Bureau was extremely wise in designating this to be handled as a special assignment in a semi-undercover capacity by Special Agents from another territory who are known as Special Agents in the Honolulu area. The Honolulu and the San Francisco Agents are convinced that such a project could not have been carried out with full security if Honolulu Agents themselves because they are too well known in this comparatively small town.

(2) Although using only five Agents to make surveys, technical installations, provide own security, conduct discreet near-surfors of subjects potential subjects, and contact anonymous sources men manpower is spread very thin especially where two or three hotels are involved, it is believed that the use of coordinated special assignment crew may very well be the way to attack this problem.

(3) The SAC and the local FBI Office are not to the successful operation of such a special assignment. The two big questions that the local SAC in a position to answer are: (a) Exactly where is going to be? and (b) Can we get a room next to this special assignment cannot walk in cold any area; a crowded resort area, and accomplish this with few. It is the considered opinion of the Agents who participated in this special assignment that we would have been sp
and last-minute improvisation if the Honolulu SAC could have been advised in advance, with utmost security, that he would be called upon to determine where the Subject was staying and to obtain adjacent space for the Agents on special assignment. This is a suggestion for the Bureau to consider in the event it plans future special assignments of this sort. This one worked well due to the excellence of the contacts.

(4) The playing of TV sets in the room and the operation of individual air conditioning units both presented a considerable problem which made some of the conversations almost, if not completely, unintelligible. These particular subjects seemed to have a tendency to turn the TV on most of the time when they were in the room, particularly in the evening hours. We do not believe that it would be wise to make either the TV or the air conditioning inoperable in a subject's room where a discreet installation is made with full security, but mutual coverage becomes almost ineffective no matter where it is placed if the TV is blasting away.

Transcripts of those parts of the conversations which are pertinent to this investigation are being forwarded under separate cover as soon as possible.
You will recall that our microphone surveillance (misur) of Martin Luther King and his associates while at the Willard Hotel in Washington, D.C., 1/5-7/64 developed positive information attesting to King's activities. At that time we prepared a "Top Secret" memorandum which related the Willard doings. Pursuant to the Director's instructions, Mr. DeLoach made a copy of the memorandum available for review by Walter W. Jenkins, who was to thereafter brief President Johnson on the matter. Also pursuant to the Director's instructions, a copy of the memorandum was not given to the Attorney General. At that time we noted that it was possible, despite the "Top Secret" classification, that the Attorney General, if given a copy, might reprimand King. If he did, it was likely that we would not again be able to develop any more such information through the means employed. It was highly important that we do develop further information of this type looking toward completely discrediting King.

During the period 2/18-25/64 we again had a misur on King and his associates during their stay in Honolulu, Hawaii, and Los Angeles, California. The attached memorandum classified "Top Secret" contains further excellent data indicting King as one of the most reprehensible individuals on the American scene today. The memorandum is replete with the testimony from King and his friends. Of particular interest is the information that has first of these paragraphs, where

We believe that a copy of the attached memorandum should be personally given by Mr. DeLoach to Mr. Jenkins so that President Johnson may be briefed on King's latest activities. We believe also, now, that the Attorney General should likewise be personally given a copy of the memorandum by Mr. Evans for the following reason. By letter 3/5/64 we
Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan

COLOMBIAN PARTY, USA

NEGRO QUESTION
COLOMBIAN INFLUENCE IN RACIAL MATTERS

100-2-116

advising the Attorney General of certain information we had received through our coverage of King in Atlanta indicating that King is to be a participant in a memorial to President Kennedy presently in the planning stage. There is scheduled for noon Monday 3/8/64 a conference between King and Berl I. Bernhard to take place in King's Atlanta office. Bernhard is to interview King and this will be one of several interviews of leaders in the civil rights movement. It is possible that the King interview, as well as the others, may be taped for television viewing. Our information is that the Attorney General's office, or at least persons close to the Attorney General, may be active in arranging this memorial. To now make the information as to King's availability to the Attorney General, and particularly that

should remove all doubt from the Attorney General's mind as to the type of person King is. It will probably also eliminate King from any participation in the memorial.

Our recent coverage of King also resulted in obtaining some photographs of him and his friends while in Los Angeles. I thought you would be interested in the attached selected six photographs, each of which contains the identities of the individuals and place where taken.

OBSERVATIONS:

In preparing the attached memorandum we have included a brief background introductory which succinctly summarizes the Willard Hotel incident. This introductory serves to acquaint the reader with that which the Attorney General was not previously advised about. We avoided mentioning specific dates as to when it took place or mention of when the information was received—thus to avoid, if possible, a question being raised by the Attorney General as to why he was not told earlier of the Willard incident.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Mr. DeLoach personally deliver to the Honorable Walter W. Jenkins, Special Assistant to the President, a copy of the attached "Top Secret" memorandum for purposes of briefing President Johnson.

2. Mr. Evans personally deliver to the Attorney General a copy of the attached "Top Secret" memorandum. It is also believed Mr. Evans should indicate to the Attorney General that in King's case it was to become aware of our coverage of him it is highly probable that we will no longer be able to develop such information through the means employed to date and that we, of course, are still desirous of continuing to develop such information.
Reuraitol 4/15/65 which advised that Martin Luther King, Jr., was planning to move his residence during the week of 4/12/65 to a recently purchased home located at 234 Sunset Avenue, N.W., Atlanta, Georgia, and that he was planning to have two telephone numbers at his new residence. It was stated that it was apparent that present source at King’s residence, ELSIE, would be discontinued as a result of the move. Bureau authority was requested to conduct a survey on the new residence so that appropriate recommendations might follow concerning technical coverage there. You assured full security for this survey.

Bureau authority is granted for the survey provided full security is assured. Take no action relative to installation, limiting your action to survey. Expedite so that any break in coverage may be minimized. Promptly advise Bureau of time and date of discontinuance at old residence.

Keep Bureau promptly advised of all pertinent developments.

NOTE: ELSIE is a technical surveillance on the residence of King, 553 Johnson Avenue, N.W., Atlanta, Georgia. It was authorized 10/19/63 and installed 11/5/63. It is noted that when we received the then Attorney General’s authority for installation of this coverage, it was to be on King’s residence at any future address to which he may move. This source has, of course, been a most prolific one for extremely valuable intelligence relating to King. After receipt of the results of survey and Atlanta’s recommendations, a record will be prepared along with any necessary correspondence with the Attorney General.

MLK Exhibit F-442N
Special Agent in Charge Roney, New York Office, called on 1/20/66 and advised that Martin Luther King, Jr., and some of his associates have a reservation at the Americana Hotel, beginning 1/21/66 for approximately four days, King and his party will have Room 3335 - 3337. The New York Office has available Room 3335 from which it advises it can maintain a microphone surveillance on King with full security assured and without the use of any wiring.

New York Office requested at 1/20/66 to conduct the microphone surveillance installation the site of 1/20-21/66, to be activated 1/21/66.

It also requested authority for expenditure of up to $35 per day for the monitoring room.

On New York's assurance that full security was available and since time was of the essence, New York was told to go ahead with the installation and was also authorized to make the necessary expenditure for the monitoring room.

Attached for approval is a memorandum to the Attorney General advising him that this microphone surveillance will be activated 1/21/66 and will be immediately discontinued upon King's departure on or about 1/25/66.

MLK Exhibit F-4420
Inspector JOSEPH A. SIZOO, Domestic Intelligence Division, called at 11:45 a.m. on 6/21/66. He instructed that our technical coverage on SCLC and MLTIN LUTHER KING, JR., be discontinued immediately. He said this coverage should be discontinued in such a way that it can be re-established on short notice, but it is not to be re-established without specific Bureau instructions.

I told SIZOO we would discontinue this operation at once, but that we would not remove any of our equipment from the plant, and that we would leave an Agent on duty round the clock to insure the security of the installation. We will continue to man the plant for security reasons for about a week at the end of which time we will check with the Bureau for further instructions if none have been received in the meantime.

I called DAVID then on duty at the plant at 11:55 AM and he at that time discontinued this source. The Bureau was subsequently advised by teletype that this source was discontinued at 11:55 a.m. 6/21/66.
Reference is made to your inquiry concerning the telephone surveillance on the Southern Christian Leadership Conference which was discontinued on 6/21/66 upon instructions of the Attorney General.

A telephone surveillance was instituted on the headquarters of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, 330 Auburn Avenue Northeast, Atlanta, Georgia, on November 8, 1963. The Southern Christian Leadership Conference is a racial-type organization headed by Martin Luther King, Jr.

This telephone surveillance provided considerable valuable intelligence information concerning communist influence on the Southern Christian Leadership Conference through King, as well as the communist influence evident in the outspoken position which King had taken in opposition to the United States foreign policy concerning Vietnam.

A memorandum from the Director dated 4/28/66 was forwarded to the Attorney General pointing out the valuable coverage being provided by the telephone surveillance on the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. Authorization was requested to continue the surveillance for an additional six months. The memorandum was returned by the Attorney General with a notation dated 6/20/66 stating "I think this coverage should be discontinued."
MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. W. C. Sullivan

FROM: C. D. Brennan

DATE: December 15, 1966

SUBJECT: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., SECURITY MATTER — COMMUNIST

This is to advise you of the microphone and wire tap coverage that we have afforded Martin Luther King, Jr., President, Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

As you are aware, King has been in close association with individuals having Communist Party backgrounds since his rise to prominence in the civil rights field.

Another close advisor to King was a former member and in a position of leadership in the Labor Youth League, a communist front organization.

Another of King's close advisors was a member of the Communist League in the early 1940's.

On October 10, 1963, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy approved technical surveillance on King's current residence or at any further address to which he may move. He also approved the technical surveillance of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference New York City Office or any other address to which it may be moved.

A wire tap was installed on King's residence, 563 Johnson Avenue, Northeast, Atlanta, Georgia, on November 8, 1963, and discontinued on April 30, 1965, when King moved from this address. It was not reinstituted on his new residence.

From October 24, 1963, to January 24, 1964, and from July 7, 1964, to July 31, 1964, a wire tap was maintained on the Southern Christian Leadership Conference New York City Office.

In addition, on October 21, 1963, Attorney General Kennedy authorized a wire tap on the Southern Christian Leadership Conference Headquarters at Atlanta, Georgia, which was maintained from November 8, 1963, to June 21, 1966, when Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach ordered it discontinued.
Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
RE: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
103-106870

In addition to the foregoing we maintained 16 microphones and 4 wire taps of a few days duration at various hotels and one temporary residence. These were installed because of the possibility of a meeting between King and his communist advisors. The 4 wire taps were installed under the original authority given by the Attorney General on 10/10/63 concerning King's residences.

Attorney General Katzenbach was specifically notified of three of these microphone installations. In each of these three instances the Attorney General was advised that a trespass was involved in the installation.

In addition, concerning microphone coverage of King, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy was furnished the pertinent information obtained, perusal of which would indicate that a microphone was the source of this information.

ACTION:

None. For information.
PURPOSE: Attached for your approval is an airtel to our Atlanta Office instructing them to conduct a survey for possible technical coverage of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) Headquarters where Martin Luther King, Jr., is planning massive civil disobedience to disrupt ten to fifteen major cities in the United States including Washington, D.C.

BACKGROUND: Since August, 1967, Martin Luther King, Jr., President SCLC has publicly stated his group will stage a massive civil disobedience to disrupt ten to fifteen major cities throughout the nation. He has also stated recently that he will call the poor, the sick and the needy to our nation's capital to disrupt its operation in an effort to spur Congressional action to help the plight of the Negro. This may even include a camp-in at the White House. King has stated in part, "To dislocate the function of a city without destroying it can be more effective than a riot."

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: King recently held a one week retreat to plan his campaign in this regard. He is attempting to recruit 2,000 leaders throughout the nation to effect this plan. Two individuals have been assigned to Washington, D.C., and other cities to start recruiting. The early Spring of 1968 is the target date to start massive civil disobedience if certain demands regarding economic, housing and education legislation does not receive unequivocal commitment for prompt Congressional action.

OBSERVATIONS: Because of the effect this plan of King's will have on the racial movement and even possibly the internal security of the United States itself, we feel it is most necessary to have telephone surveillance coverage on King's headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia, where most of the planning concerning this operation will take place.

Enclosures

DMM:11c

UNCLASSIFIED

MLK EXHIBIT F-442S
Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
RE: SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE

In the past, we have had a telephone surveillance on SCLC, which was extremely productive, but it was discontinued on 6-20-66 upon receipt of instructions from Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach. He was concerned about jeopardizing the possible prosecution of a SCLC employee for an Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicles statute violation. On June 1, 1967, the Department advised the evidence against the SCLC employee was of insufficient strength to warrant prosecution. Since there are no prosecutive matters which this installation will jeopardize, it is felt it should be reinstalled.

RECOMMENDATION: That the attached airtel be sent to Atlanta so that a survey can be conducted to determine the feasibility of installing a secure installation on SCLC Headquarters. Upon receipt of results of survey from Atlanta, appropriate communication will be sent to the Attorney General requesting authority for this installation.

[Signature]

I doubt that the Attorney General will approve such an installation, but believe we should try for the record.
12/14/67

To: SAC, Atlanta (100-6670-E)
From: Director, FBI (100-438794)

Subject: Communist Infiltration
Southern Christian Leadership Conference

In view of the fact Martin Luther King, Jr., President of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, is attempting to lead a massive civil disobedience in an effort to disrupt ten to fifteen major cities including the Nation's capital, you are authorized to conduct a survey for possible telephone surveillance of his headquarters. This survey should be conducted only if full security is assured.

Results of the survey should be immediately transmitted to the Bureau. Take no steps relative to installation, limiting your action only to a survey.

DMW:11c

NOTE:

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-438794) "JUNE"
FROM: SAC, ATLANTA (100-6670E)

COMMUNIST INFILTRATION
SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE

Re Bureau airtel dated 12/14/67.

With full security, survey conducted and reflects telephone surveillance feasible of headquarters and would involve coverage on ten trunk lines, all of which terminate in a 756A switchboard at 330 Auburn Avenue, Atlanta, Ga. In the event installation authorized, it is suggested monitoring point would be within confines of Atlanta Office in order to provide required security. The same conditions prevail as before relating to final hookup in that it would be necessary for personnel from another office to be utilized in one phase of installation due to its location in proximity of SCLC Headquarters and fact sound man this area known to personnel of that office.

Recommend installation which can be accomplished with full security.

MLK EXHIBIT F-442U
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Mr. W. C. Sullivan

Mr. W. C. Sullivan

Mr. G. C. Moore

Mr. Rozamus

Mr. D. M. Wells

Mr. G. C. Moore

COMMUNIST INFILTRATION

SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE

PURPOSE:

Attached for your approval is a memorandum to the Attorney General requesting a telephone surveillance of Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), Atlanta, Georgia, in an effort to obtain intelligence of their plans for massive civil disobedience in the Nation's Capitol and 10 to 15 cities throughout the United States in the Spring of 1968.

BACKGROUND:

On December 13, 1967, you approved an airtel which was directed to Atlanta Office requesting them to conduct a survey as to the feasibility of instituting a secure telephone surveillance of SCLC's headquarters, Atlanta, Georgia. By communication dated December 20, 1967, Atlanta recommends installation and advises it can be accomplished with full security.

OBSERVATIONS:

Since SCLC's President, Martin Luther King, Jr., has urged massive civil disobedience throughout the country in an effort to spur Congress into action to help the plight of the Negro, it is felt that we need this installation to obtain racial intelligence information.

Enclosure:

100-438794

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HERETO IS CLASSIFIED
EXCEPTING SHOWN

9 Jan 1968
Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
RE: COMMUNIST INFILTRATION
SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE
100-438794

concerning their plans. King has warned that these massive
demonstrations may result in riots. Because of this, we
should be in a position to obtain intelligence so that
appropriate countermeasures can be taken to protect the
internal security of the United States.

RECOMMENDATION:

The attached communication be directed to the
Attorney General for his approval.

A. G. will not approve, but believe
we should go on record.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

RE: COMINTERN INTRUSION

SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE

Martin Luther King, Jr., President of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), has publicly stated that he will create massive civil disobediences in the Nation's Capital and in 10 to 15 major cities throughout the United States in the Spring of 1968 if certain commitments are not forthcoming from Congress in the civil rights field. An aide of King has stated "Jail will be the safest place in Washington, D.C., this spring."

The Atlanta Office of SCLC will be the focal point for planning and instructions concerning the massive civil disobediences and the telephone surveillance is highly desirable so that we can keep apprised of the strategy and plans of this group. Massive demonstrations could trigger riots which might spread across the Nation.

In view of the above, authority is requested to institute a telephone surveillance on the headquarters of the SCLC, 330 Auburn Avenue, N.E., Atlanta, Georgia, or on any office to which it may move.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
RE: COMMUNIST INfiltrATION
SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE

NOTE:

Classified "Secret" since it concerns a technical surveillance, the unauthorized disclosure of which could result in serious damage to the Bureau's security coverage and to the detriment of national security.

This memorandum recommends the installation of a telephone surveillance on SCLC headquarters, Atlanta, Georgia, for intelligence-type data concerning King's plans for massive civil disobedience in the Nation's Capital and 10 to 15 major cities throughout the Nation in the Spring of 1968.

See memorandum G. C. Moore to W. C. Sullivan, same caption, dated December 29, prepared by DAW:ekw.
Memorandum to: Mr. John Edgar Hoover, Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

From: Ramsey Clark
Attorney General

Re: Communist Infiltration
Southern Christian Leadership Conference
Your memorandum dated January 2, 1968

I am declining authorization of the requested installation of the above telephone surveillance at the present time. There has not been an adequate demonstration of a direct threat to the national security. Should further evidence be secured of such a threat, or re-evaluation desired, please resubmit.

Other investigative activities should be undertaken to provide intelligence necessary to the protection of the national interest.
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ULTED STATES GOVERNMENT

Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: March 29, 1968

TO: G. C. Moore

Mr. G. C. Moore
Mr. Rozamus
Mr. D. M. Wells

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST INFILTRATION
SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE

PURPOSE:

Attached for your approval is a memorandum to the Attorney General requesting a telephone surveillance of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) headquarters at Atlanta, Georgia, and Washington, D.C., in an effort to obtain intelligence data concerning massive civil disobedience planned for the nation's Capital the end of April, 1968, by Martin Luther King, Jr.

BACKGROUND:

On January 2, 1968, we requested the Attorney General to authorize the installation of a telephone surveillance on the headquarters of SCLC in Atlanta, Georgia, because of possible riots which might ensue with King's planned Washington march. By letter dated January 3, 1968, the Attorney General denied our request advising, "There has not been an adequate demonstration of a direct threat to the national security."

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS:

On March 28, 1968, King led a march in Memphis, Tennessee, which resulted in a riot. Concerning this riot, King was considering calling off the Washington march and Levison advised him to continue with his plans.

Enclosure

100-438794

DM: dsd (7) 11b

CONTINUED - OVER

3 APR 1968
Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
RE: COMMUNIST INFILTRATION
SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE
100-438794

OBSERVATIONS:
Since Levison, King to continue the Washington march in spite of the Memphis riot, it is felt we should again request the Attorney General to authorize a telephone surveillance of SCLC since it would appear that a threat to the national security now exists.

RECOMMENDATION:
The attached communication be directed to the Attorney General for his approval.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
RE: COMMunist INFILTRATION SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE

Despite this violence in Memphis, Levison and King are continuing their plans for this massive civil disobedience to start the latter part of April, 1968, in Washington, D.C.

In view of the internal security aspect involved, authority is requested to install telephone surveillances of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference at its national headquarters at the above-listed address and also at its local headquarters, 1401 U Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., so that we can keep apprised of the strategy and plans of this group.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover
Director

Approved__________________
Date_____________________

NOTE: Classified "Secret" since it concerns a technical surveillance, the unauthorized disclosure of which could result in serious damage to the Bureau security coverage and the detriment of national security.

This memorandum recommends the installation of a telephone surveillance on SCLC's headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia, and Washington, D.C., for intelligence-type data concerning King's plans for massive civil disobedience in the nation's Capital in the Spring of 1968.


SECRET

-2-

MLK EXHIBIT F-442Z
Mr. McHargh. Mr. Brennan, during the course of the security investigation the Bureau utilized technical surveillance with respect to Dr. King. Memos contained under that section recount the history of that technical surveillance. The memos also reflect that the last such installation relative to Dr. King was removed in 1966. At that time you were chief of the Internal Security Section. Do you recall the removal of that installation?

Mr. Brennan. Where is your 1966 figure?

Mr. McHargh. I believe with reference to the second page.


Mr. McHargh. That is correct.

Mr. Brennan. And your question is——

Mr. McHargh. Whether or not you recall the removal of what purports to be the final technical installation directed at Dr. King or the SCLC.

Mr. Brennan. Not specifically, no.

Mr. McHargh. Would you agree that until Dr. King's assassination in 1968 his case was considered an important case by the Bureau?

Mr. Brennan. Yes, I would say it was.

Mr. McHargh. Would you also agree that until the time of his assassination that the campaign to discredit and neutralize him had continued?

Mr. Brennan. Yes.

Mr. McHargh. Can you recount for the committee why it was that no technical installations were directed at Dr. King after 1966?

Mr. Brennan. I really don't know. I don't recall.

Mr. McHargh. Does it surprise you that there were no installations directed against him after that time?

Mr. Brennan. It seems to me that—no, I really just don't know. I don't know why that was removed. I don't know what the basis for the removal was in 1966.

Mr. McHargh. Many people concerned with Dr. King have alleged that he was constantly being surveilled by the Bureau, constantly being surveilled through the means of technical installations. Can you shed any light on whether or not that is in fact true?

Mr. Brennan. I don't think you can use the term "constantly" in talking about a surveillance. In my estimation, in the intelligence field it would mean physical as well as wiretap or microphone surveillance, and I don't think Dr. King was under constant physical surveillance. I think this memorandum here illustrates periods of time in which there were wiretaps or microphone surveillances used on him.

Mr. McHargh. So you have no independent recollections of any installations beyond what are reflected in this memo?

Mr. Brennan. I wouldn't know. What I would have to go by would be what is reflected in the Bureau records.

Mr. McHargh. Once Dr. King was targeted for neutralization in 1963, would you agree that the campaign to neutralize and discredit him included the gathering of personal information and that
information was often obtained through the use of these technical surveillances?

Mr. Brennan. Yes.

Mr. McHargh. With respect to the wiretap installations directed at Dr. King, were those obtained after having received written approval from the Attorney General to your recollection?

Mr. Brennan. To my knowledge every wiretap was utilized with a written authorization of the Attorney General.

Mr. McHargh. Were the microphone installations directed at Dr. King also installed after having received written approval from the Attorney General?

Mr. Brennan. No.

Mr. McHargh. Why was that?

Mr. Brennan. There is a problem in regard to asking the Attorney General for the authorization of use of a microphone. If you are talking in a general sense about the utilization of a microphone, in order to install one you are basically going to commit trespass and be guilty of breaking and entering, but you get into situations where there might be different applications of the law, and I think it arises, for example, in connection with the King case. It is my recollection that in most of these instances a microphone was utilized in connection with a hotel accommodation to be utilized by King, and it is my recollection also—I am not sure how the installations were made—but it is my recollection that in most instances they were made prior to the occupancy of the room by King. There I would assume it was done, the entry into the room, with the agreement of the hotel or motel management, and you get into a question of proprietorship and whether or not, then, the entry prior to the occupancy of the room constitutes what could be called a trespass or illegal entry.

You are getting into a shadowy figure of legal technicalities on the utilization of microphones.

Mr. McHargh. With respect to the predicate for the technical surveillances, would you say that the basis was often not so much to gather information concerning subversive contacts but at least as important would be the desire to gather compromising information which could be used to discredit Dr. King?

Mr. Brennan. The field was generally instructed to gather all types of information, whether pertaining to any Communist activities or pertaining to any personal activities.

Mr. McHargh. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like the items contained under MLK exhibit No. F-443, those items are located under tab H of the exhibit book and run from A through G. I would like those items entered into the record at this time.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, they may be entered into the record.

[The information follows:]
TO: W. C. Sullivan
FROM: F. J. Baumgardner
DATE: 11/10/64

SUBJECT: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
SECURITY MATTER—COMMUNIST

We are recommending dissemination to the White House, Secretary of State Rusk and the Acting Attorney General, information concerning plans which are under way by Martin Luther King, Jr., and his associates (men with communist backgrounds such as Bayard Rustin) for welcoming-back festivities when King returns to the U. S. from Norway where he is to receive the Nobel Peace Prize 12/10/64.

We have received information from our reliable sensitive sources in New York City regarding recent contacts between King, Rustin, Ralph Bunche of the United Nations (UN) and Harry Wacht.

Such activities are in the planning stage as a fund-raising speech by King at Carnegie Hall; King being received at the UN with the possibility that others present at the UN will include Leonid I. Brezhnev, First Secretary, Communist Party Soviet Union; Kwame Nkrumah, President of Ghana; and a possible ticker tape parade. Bunche is being considered as possible chairman of the committee honoring King and contact has already been made with White House aide Lee White to have President Johnson present in New York City although no commitment has yet been made by the White House. Efforts also being made to have King see English Prime Minister Harold Wilson in London and to have an affair in London honoring King which will raise funds for King's work in Mississippi.

Concerning King possibly meeting Wilson in London, Rustin is scheduled to go to London 11/11/64 to work on this matter. A separate memorandum from F. J. Baumgardner to W. C. Sullivan was prepared today (11/10/64) concerning the Wilson matter and recommending alerting the British to King's intentions and background.
Memorandum to W. C. Sullivan
From F. J. Baumgardner
RE: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
100-109670

RECOMMENDATION:

Attached for approval are letters to the Honorable Bill D. Moyers, Special Assistant to the President, The White House; Secretary of State Dean Rusk; and the Acting Attorney General, copies to other Department officials. These letters transmit a memorandum containing a summary of pertinent information in this matter. Copies of the letterhead memoranda from which this information was obtained are being separately disseminated to CIA, the military intelligence agencies, and Secret Service.
We know that in the past King has been very friendly with Rockefeller who has been a firm supporter of King and activities in the civil rights movement. We checked with our Albany office this morning (12/8/64) and find that the Bureau's relations with the Governor are most friendly and that the Governor has been cooperative with the Bureau.

Observations:

It is believed that we should consider taking steps to orally brief Rockefeller, on a confidential basis, so that he may be fully apprised as to the communist influence on King and King's associates. Such briefing may well change Rockefeller's intentions. In fact he has such intentions. There appears to be no reason why such action would work to the Bureau's detriment in any way; more likely, it would probably be received by the Governor with much thanks on his part. We have considered the following courses of action, listed in order of preference, any one of which would serve to implement the suggested action.

Enclosure

100-106670-643

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use in any F.B.I. official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized persons without the express written approval of the Director.
Memorandum to W. C. Sullivan
From F. J. Baumgardner
RE: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
103-106670

(1) The Director may desire to personally telephone Governor Rockefeller and brief him.

(2) We could have either Assistant Director Malone (RIC of the New York Office) or SAC Bailey of the Albany Office, acting as a personal representative of the Director, meet with the Governor and orally brief him.

(3) We could have former SAC Arthur Cornelius, who is head of the New York State Police, orally brief the Governor.

(4) We could have a responsible third party who is very influential with Rockefeller, such as New York's former governor, Thomas Dewey, orally brief Governor Rockefeller.

RECOMMENDATION:
That the Director consider orally briefing Governor Rockefeller, on a confidential basis, concerning King. Attached is a memorandum containing necessary pertinent information which may be used in an oral briefing of Rockefeller should any of the above considered courses of action be decided upon.
Memorandum

TO: W. C. Sullivan
FROM: F. J. Baumgardner
DATE: 2/1/65
SUBJECT: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. SECURITY MATTER - COMMUNIST

Martin Luther King, Jr., is still the leading figure in the civil rights movement in this country today. He is of vital interest to us because of the communist influences upon him. His actions and expressions (both private and public) are of importance in several different areas of the Bureau's operations such as relating to the communist influences in racial matters, racial matters generally, civil rights matters, and the like. Because of King's position, we must be, in many respects, extremely guarded in our efforts to gain information concerning King's activities. King frequently travels about the country and speaks to public gatherings. He often times discusses the future plans of himself and his organization, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. It is well, therefore, to avail ourselves of the coverage which may be given King through a review of news media, sources and through contact with established reliable sources.

We recently received information divulging a series of King's appointments for the period 1/20/65 through 6/19/65. These include many public gatherings such as at universities and colleges, churches, and the like. We are, therefore, recommending a letter to the appropriate offices instructing them to report information available from news media and established sources concerning King's appearances in their respective territories. By receiving letterhead memoranda with such information, we are also able to make prompt dissemination to such interested other agencies as the Department and the military intelligence.

RECOMMENDATION:

Attached for approval is a letter to the appropriate offices covering the territories in which King is scheduled to travel.

Enclosure

100-106670

SFP:jad

MLK EXHIBIT F-443C
The Governor of Massachusetts is John A. Volpe (B). He was elected 11/3/64 and had previously served as Governor from 1951-1962. No adverse security information concerning Volpe in Bureau files.

Relations with him have been cordial and in January, 1961, upon his first election as Governor he was sent a congratulatory letter and a copy of "Hastors of Deceit" by the Director. Pursuant to your request of SAC Handley, Boston, for discreetly-obtained available information concerning a planned "Day" for King, ASAC Whittaker, Boston, today (3/2/65) telephoned the following information to the Bureau. Arrangements for a "Day" for King have already been firmed up. It is to be 4/22/65. An award is to be made to King, the nature of which has not yet been determined. Neither has the place for the testimonial yet been determined. There is no information that the invitation to King has been definitely extended as yet. SAC Handley has met the Governor who is cordial and friendly to the Bureau and Handley believes that the Governor could be safely contacted on a highly confidential basis and briefed concerning King with the end result that the affair for King will be watered down.

OBSERVATIONS:

Because of the known communist influence on King coupled with the fact that, it is believed that it would be in the interest of the Bureau to have SAC Handley personally meet with the Governor and brief him concerning King. Although arrangements have progressed so far for the King Day that the affair will likely come off, our briefing of the Governor will likely induce him to minimize the affair and especially the award for King.

REC 37

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for circulation outside your Committee and the control step has been initiated to prevent such transmission.
Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
RE: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
100-106670

RECOMMENDATION:

If approved, this memorandum should be routed back to Assistant Director Sullivan who will telephonically contact SAC Handly and have him brief the Governor on a highly confidential basis and with the proviso that under no circumstances may there ever be any attribution to the FBI for the information furnished him. The Governor will be told that King for some time has been associated with and under the influence of present and former communists and that King,

The Governor will also be told that King and other civil rights leaders plan to go to Boston this Spring to

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3-3-65

Handled
It is believed that, in view of Collins' important position relative to the racial movement, he should benefit of the paper which we have already given to the White House and the Heads of the intelligence community. Our relations with Collins have been friendly; he is a long-time admirer of the Director and the Bureau.

Attached for approval is a letter to Collins enclosing a copy of the paper captioned as above.

DATE: March 23, 1965

You will recall that in December, 1964, with the Director's approval and after first checking with the White House, we disseminated to the Heads of the intelligence community a paper captioned as above which depicted the communist influence in the Negro movement. Emphasis was given in the paper to the communist influences on Martin Luther King, Jr., as well as facts relating.

As you are aware, LeRoy Collins, former Governor of Florida, is Director, Community Relations Service (CRS), Department of Commerce, and in this position serves as something of a "mediator" in problems relating to the racial field. He has been a key individual relative to the situation in Selma, Alabama. Information of interest to the CRS is regularly being disseminated to that agency. We just received reliable information concerning a conversation between Martin Luther King, Jr., and his wife, Coretta, during which Coretta made reference to the Selma situation and said that Collins was blinded by prejudice. We have disseminated the information concerning the King conversation to CRS.
To: Mr. W. C. Sullivan
From: Mr. J. A. Sizoo
Subject: Martin Luther King, Jr., Security Matter - Communist

May 24, 1965

Atlanta letterhead memorandum (LHM) 5-21-65 advised that Alfred Kuettner of the United Press International (UPI), has been in touch with King's office relative to a possible article to be written by Kuettner. SAC Ponder of our Atlanta Office telephoned me about noon today (5-24-65), made reference to the LHM, and stated that Alfred G. Kuettner has conferred with King and plans to write either a series of three articles about King or one article in three parts.

(1) Martin Luther King, Jr. - Who Is He?
This will be on King's background.

(2) Where Does King Go From Here?
Kuettner speculates as to King's interest in speaking and writing in that in recent speeches King indicates he is moving into international affairs and fancies himself as some sort of an authority.

(3) King's Associates
Kuettner has requested assistance concerning King's associates and desires public source material to use as well as any other information we can give him on a confidential basis which would serve to orient him. The latter information will not be used by him in his article.

Ponder recommends that the Bureau assist Kuettner. He stated that Kuettner has been an SAC Contact of the Atlanta Office since March 1960, and that Ponder is absolutely certain that Kuettner will not violate our confidence; that Kuettner is completely reliable and will write an objective article or articles concerning King. Ponder pointed out that Kuettner is UPI's authority in the South on the Negro movement and his articles carry a great deal of influence and Ponder does not believe that he would prepare anything slandering or favorable to King. Ponder further noted that several weeks ago Kuettner prepared an article on the Selma to Montgomery march which exposed sexual irregularities on the part of certain of the marchers. Kuettner contains no adverse information on Kuettner.

Enclosures - This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. It is not limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the contents thereof disclose unauthorized personnel information. The unauthorized dissemination of the FBI is prohibited.
Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
RE: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
100-106670

OBSERVATIONS:

Attached are two documents which it is believed should be made available to Kuehntner. Document number 1 contains only public source information which Kuehntner could use without, of course, any attribution to the FBI. Document number 2 is a short summation concerning King's communist connections with particular emphasis on his communist advisors. This document would not be used insofar as Kuehntner's article would be concerned but would be merely for orientation purposes. There would be no loss of security to our sources by making this information available to Kuehntner.

RECOMMENDATION:

Attached two documents be furnished to Ponder for the use of Kuehntner with the limitations as set forth above. If approved, this memorandum should be referred back to the Domestic Intelligence Division for appropriate advice to Ponder. The documents are attached.
Memorandum

TO: Mr. Mohr

FROM: C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 8-14-65

SUBJECT: SPEAKER JOHN MCCORMACK
BRIEFING RE MARTIN LUTHER KING
SATURDAY, 8-14-65
AT 2 P.M.

At his request, and with the Director's approval, I briefed Speaker John McCormack regarding the background and activities of Martin Luther King today in the Speaker's rooms.

The briefing lasted approximately 45 minutes. It covered King's activities as well as his connections with members of the Communist Party. The identity of the members of the Communist Party who have had control over and association with King were brought out. The latest incident in which King has advised the press that he will write a letter to General Ho Chih Minh of the North Vietnamese, in an attempt to establish himself as a "peacemaker" was related to Speaker McCormack. The communist efforts back of this incident and those individuals perpetrating the incident were mentioned.

Speaker McCormack was quite calm about the entire briefing. He stated he had heard much in the way of rumor previously, however, he wanted to know if the information he had received was accurate. He stated he now recognized the gravity of the situation and that something obviously must be done about it. He inquired as to whether the President knew these facts. I replied in the affirmative.

The Speaker stated that he thought that "Edgar Hoover did not call King a notorious liar for nothing." He stated he now recognized why the Director branded King as he did. He added that he was in complete sympathy with the Director taking this action.

The Speaker spoke lengthily concerning the desperate need to educate Negroes today with the fact that they cannot defy the law and get away with it.

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
I - Mr. Johnson

MLK EXHIBIT F-443G
Mr. McHargh. Mr. Brennan, the next series of questions I have for you will be very brief. What I would like to do is get your agreement as to whether or not certain tactics were employed by the Bureau during the course of the security investigation of Dr. King.

With respect to MLK exhibit No. F-443A—

Mr. Brennan. Under which tab now?

Mr. McHargh. Those items appear to represent instances where information concerning Dr. King that had been gathered in the course of the security investigation were transmitted to private individuals outside of the Bureau. Would you agree that was a tactic employed during the campaign to discredit Dr. King?

Mr. Brennan. Yes.

Mr. McHargh. Referring to the items under tab I, Mr. Chairman, I would like to have those items previously marked MLK exhibit No. F-444A through D entered into the record at this time.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, they may be entered into the record.

[The information follows:]
Memorandum

TO: Mr. W. C. Sullivan

FROM: F. J. Baumgardner

DATE: October 27, 1966

SUBJECT: MARTIN LUTHER KING, Jr. SECURITY MATTER - C

The attached article has been prepared with no letterhead relating it to the FBI and is on unwatermarked bond paper.

RECOMMENDATION: That this memorandum and the attached article be referred to the Crime Records Division for appropriate handling.

The article was prepared because the cry of "black power" is a most timely issue in the country today. This issue has split the civil rights movement and has caused civil rights leaders to take sides for and against "black power." However, Martin Luther King has been attempting to straddle the issue, based on advice given him by his advisors with communist backgrounds. The attached article indicta King for his failure to take a stand on the issue and at the same time exposes the degree of communist influence on him.

It is felt the public should again be reminded of this communist influence on King, and the current controversy among civil rights leaders makes this timely to do so.

The attached article has been prepared with no letterhead relating it to the FBI and is on unwatermarked bond paper.

Enclosure


Is the civil rights movement dead? Floyd McKissick, National Director of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), says it is. He reportedly commented to that effect during a panel discussion on October 25, 1966, at a Philadelphia conference of radio-television broadcasters sponsored by the Westinghouse Broadcasting Association. In addition, McKissick is quoted as having added that "what we have now is a black revolution, for black people to take what they can for themselves."

If the movement is dead, as McKissick asserts, he is one of the individuals most responsible for its demise. McKissick has loudly echoed the "black power" cries of Stokely Carmichael, leader of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, and it has been their demands for revolutionary action which stopped the civil rights movement in its tracks.

In so doing, they have brought to a halt ten years of concentrated effort on the part of moderate Negroes and whites who support the movement. When the movement began, it seemed to signify the end of an era of disenchantment and disillusionment for Negroes throughout the land and the beginning of a period in which true justice and equality for all would be established in fact as well as in name.

Thanks to the McKissicks and the Carnichaels, progress toward that goal has stopped and the big question today is whether the movement is "dead as a doornail" as McKissick claims, or whether the setback is temporary in nature.
Responsible civil rights leaders have been appalled at the harm done by the cries of "black power." In addition, they have taken a strong stand in an effort to right the wrong. Roy Wilkins, A. Philip Randolph and Whitney M. Young, Jr., joined forces and issued a public statement in which they clearly and unequivocally denounced "black power" and its inherent danger to both the Negro and the Nation.

Unfortunately, their courageous action was undermined by the one man in the civil rights movement who holds in his hands the power to silence the rabble rousers and give the movement renewed momentum. That man, of course, is Martin Luther King, Jr., whose activities have invested him with the mantle of leadership in the movement since it began in Montgomery in 1955.

At first it appeared King had wholeheartedly joined with Wilkins, Randolph and Young in their renunciation of "black power." He reportedly endorsed their statement which appeared in "The New York Times" on October 14, 1966. For the first time in many months, millions had reason to believe and hope that the civil rights movement had rid itself of a cancerous growth and would resume its progress with renewed health and vigor.

Much to the amazement and dismay of many, King killed this hope almost immediately. Within three days after the statement appeared denouncing "black power," "The New York Times" reported that King had "clarified" his position concerning it. Reportedly, he agreed with it in essence but did not wish to be included as a signer.
King's palliating and ambiguous position on the issue is difficult to understand or justify. Those who cry "black power" have continually claimed it has been mis-understood and misdefined. But the record is clear that it stands for open advocacy of violence, insistence on an all-Negro organizational structure in civil rights groups, and reverse racism.

It is equally clear that these things are direct contradictions of the principles underlying the legitimate civil rights movement: a nonviolent approach, combined Negro-white action, and the elimination of racism.

The great American tragedy of our time would be the failure of Martin Luther King, Jr., to meet the current challenge which "black power" represents to the civil rights movement. His failure to do so would mean that for some reason King is willing to let the legitimate civil rights movement die. This, in turn, would seem to indicate that King's goal is different than that of Wilkins, Randolph and Young.

It appears that King's decision to straddle the fence on the issue of "black power" was a carefully calculated one. "The Atlanta Journal" of October 13, 1966, reported that King, as head of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), was having an important meeting with his advisors. Undoubtedly the move Wilkins, Randolph and Young proposed to make through the issuance of public statement was known to King and he was seeking advice on what his stand should be.
It may have been that King's advisors deemed it best for him to avoid condemning anyone. Or, they may have felt that with the battle lines drawn between McKissick and Carmichael on the one hand and Wilkins, Randolph and Young on the other, everyone would suffer and only King would stand to benefit and would be left the unchallenged leader. Or, they may have had still other interests in mind.

In this connection, it is interesting to note that the newspaper article identified King's advisors as Bayard Rustin, Clarence Jones, Stanley Levison and Barry Wachtel.

If these individuals constitute Martin Luther King, Jr.'s brain trust, the civil rights movement may well be dead and King's supporters and followers, both Negro and white, may well rue the circumstances of fate that led them to bank so much on one man.

The backgrounds of Rustin, Jones, Levison and Wachtel raise serious questions regarding their degree of influence over Martin Luther King, Jr. The Congressional Record of August 13, 1963, for example, indicated that Rustin is a past member of the Communist Youth League and attended the national convention of the Communist Party as an observer in 1957.

In addition, Rustin reportedly traveled to Russia in 1958 to participate in a communist propaganda spectacular called "Nonviolent Action Committee Against Nuclear Weapons."
Upon his return, he played a key role as an organizer of a student march on Washington which the east coast communist newspaper, "The Worker," hailed as a communist project.

There is no doubt that King has relied heavily on Rustin for guidance for a long time. In fact, Rustin reportedly was King's part-time aide for a five-year period from 1955 to 1960.

There are reports that Stanley Levison also has acted as a counselor to King for a long period of time. As a matter of fact, he once held a position as a vice president in the SCLC. The Congressional Record indicated that Clarence Jones is an attorney who, during the 1950s, held a position of leadership in the Labor Youth League, which has been cited by the Attorney General as a subversive organization under Executive Order 10450.

Harry Wachtel reportedly is a New York attorney, like Stanley Levison, and has become active in King's behalf through his acquaintance with Levison.

The spectre of communist influence on King is not a new development. The nationally syndicated columnist Joseph Alsop referred to it in April, 1954, in a column concerning King's employment in the SCLC of an individual named Jack O'Dell. Alsop stated that King had been warned by Government officials that O'Dell was a "genuine communist article," and warned too that an even more important associate
of his was "known to be a key figure in the covert apparatus of
the Communist Party."

Such associations and, more particularly, guidance
from such individuals could well explain King's failure to
take a strong stand in opposition to McKissick and Carmichael.
They have been exhorting their followers not to support the
Administration's action in Vietnam, to refuse serving if
drafted, and to tear apart our cities with violent acts of
civil disobedience. These demands well serve communist aims
to bring about a communist victory in Vietnam and to divide
the masses along class lines to foment disorder in the streets.

Such guidance would help to explain also why King
split with men like Wilkins, Randolph and Young on the issue
of whether civil rights leaders should be speaking out on
matters of foreign policy or whether their role should be
confined to civil rights matters. It will be recalled that
King attempted to project his views to criticism of fighting
in Vietnam but the responsible civil rights leaders took a
stand in opposition to him.

It would appear that King's advisors have a broader
goal than the civil rights movement in this country. There
is talk that King will travel extensively abroad to areas such
as Latin America to speak out in behalf of the poor, Negro
and white alike, in underdeveloped countries.
Perhaps being the recognized leader of 22 million Negroes in this country is not enough. If the image of him can be projected as the “savior” of the downtrodden throughout the world, his prestige and influence will grow to a degree which will enable him to dictate demands in a voice that will ring loud and clear through the halls of Congress and in the White House. Much would depend on the backgrounds of his advisors and the nature of the demands they would be whispering in his ear.

Should that come about, the religious groups, foundations and others who have contributed millions to support King and his activities could find that their generous support had spawned a monster seeking to devour them.

The saddest part of it all is that the American Negro may well be left in the lurch with his dreams of true equality and justice in a united country free of prejudice and bigotry shattered.

To repeat, Martin Luther King, Jr., could be the great American tragedy of our times.

Memorandum

TO: Mr. Sullivan
FROM: T. J. Baumgardner

SUBJECT: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
SECURITY MATTER - C

DATE: 10/28/66

PURPOSE: To obtain authorization for the attached article concerning Martin Luther King, Jr.'s contacts with James R. Hoffa to be given to a friendly newspaper contact for publication.

BACKGROUND: As you have been advised, a former member of the Labor Youth League, a communist-front organization, and now a principal advisor to Martin Luther King, Jr., President, Southern Christian Leadership Conference, was in contact with Paul O'Dwyer, New York City attorney and brother of former New York City Mayor William O'Dwyer. He wanted O'Dwyer to arrange a meeting between King and James Hoffa, President, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers Union. O'Dwyer promised to help arrange this meeting and does not want any publicity concerning it. If a meeting could be arranged, King, accompanied by O'Dwyer, would be willing to meet Hoffa at Hoffa's convenience. Hoffa's previous record of freewheeling with union funds would indicate a reluctance on his part to pour union funds into the civil rights movement; a move which could accrue no direct benefit to him individually. This appears borne out by his indicated reluctance to meet with King and thereby be confronted with King's version of his (Hoffa's) responsibility to aid the 450,000 Negro members of Hoffa's union by contributing financial and moral support. Disclosure of King's transparent attempt to blackmail Hoffa with the large Negro membership of Hoffa's union to solve the Southern Christian Leadership Conference's financial problems would cause an uproar among leaders of organizations having large Negro memberships pointing out their own vulnerability to such a sordid move by any unscrupulous civil rights leader. This potential collusion between large labor unions and the civil rights movement could also react to the detriment of the Negro in that through large financial donations, an unscrupulous labor leader could subvert the legitimate aims and objectives of the civil rights movement to his own purposes.

Enclosure:

Mr. Sullivan

(6) CONTINUED OVER 12 NOV 22 1966
Baumgardner to Sullivan Memorandum  
Re: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.  
100-106670

Public disclosure of King's intentions in this instance appears timely, in that it points out Hoffa's susceptibility to King's plot and the intention of King to virtually engage in extortion to obtain needed funds. Disclosure would be mutually embarrassing to both men and probably cause King's quest for badly needed funds to fail in this instance.

RECOMMENDATION:

That this memorandum and the attached article be referred to the Crime Records Division for appropriate handling. The article is on plain unwatermarked bond paper.
MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. Sullivan
FROM: F. J. Baumgardner
DATE: 11/3/66
SUBJECT: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. SECURITY MATTER - C

PURPOSE: To obtain approval to alert friendly members of the news media field of the meeting between Martin Luther King, Jr., President, Southern Christian Leadership Conference, and James Hoffa, President, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers Union.

BACKGROUND: You were previously advised that according to a former member of the Labor Youth League, a communist-front organization, and now a principal adviser to King, was attempting to arrange a meeting between King and Hoffa. This person informed Hoffa's attorney that King thought Hoffa's union might want to support the civil rights movement to a greater degree because of its 450,000 Negro members. This person advised that King is very sensitive regarding this meeting and does not want any publicity concerning it.

On October 30, 1966, this same source advised that Hoffa had agreed to meet with King in Hoffa's office in Washington, D.C., on either the second, third, or fourth of November, 1966. This was to be a luncheon meeting.

On October 31, 1966, it was advised that in contact with the Teamsters Union. Since King was unable to meet on any of the above dates, tentative plans were made to hold the meeting on the ninth or tenth of November, 1966. If these dates are not satisfactory, an alternate meeting date was scheduled for one day during the week of November 14, 1966.

The New York Office has been alerted to notify the Bureau immediately when a date and time have been set for this meeting.
Observations: From the above, it is apparent that King is in dire need of funds. Secondly, he dislikes going to Maffa because of Hoffa’s unsavory reputation. King undoubtedly feels that this association might reflect unfavorably upon his public image. On the other hand, it would appear that Hoffa might be concerned with the white backlash within his own union ranks should it become known that union funds may be expended to promote Negro objectives. It is therefore felt that both men have just reason for keeping this meeting secret. Any publicity concerning it would probably be extremely embarrassing to both parties.

It would appear that the meeting may be virtually spontaneous and time in this instance could be very critical.

Recommendation: A Bureau official be designated now to alert friendly news media of the meeting once the meeting date is learned so that arrangements can be made for appropriate press coverage of the planned meeting to expose and disrupt it.

Addendum: Domestic Intelligence Division, 11/3/66, FJB: deh

Special Agent in Charge Donald E. Roney of the New York Office called at 3 p.m., this date. He said that through a reliable source they had learned that King had contacted King today. He told King that arrangements have been made for King to meet with Hoffa in Hoffa’s office in Washington, D.C., on November 9, 1966. King agreed and they then discussed the possibility of having a principal adviser to King, attend the meeting. They thought this was a good idea and would try to work it out.
Mr. DeLoach

R. E. Wick

MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. SECURITY MATTER - C PROPOSED MEETING WITH JAMES R. HOFFA, 11/9/66

It was previously recommended and approved that Crime Records alert friendly news media regarding a proposed meeting between King and Hoffa 11/9/66.

Through a reliable source we learned late last night that in view of publicity in the New York Daily News regarding this proposed meeting, King and his aides had decided that it would be unwise to meet with Hoffa. It was further ascertained that King was still due to arrive in Washington at 11:30 AM this morning, it being noted that he had a speech scheduled at Howard University this evening.

We alerted Julian Morrison, a very friendly reporter with the Washington News, and Sid Epstein of The Star regarding King's arrival time in Washington. The reporters cornered King as he came off the plane and quizzed him about the meeting with Hoffa. King at first told the reporters that the meeting had been cancelled and he seemed to be flustered at the reporters' appearance. He then ducked into a men's room at the airport with his aides and upon emerging told the reporters that there had been discussion regarding his meeting Hoffa but that he had no further comment at this time, and he had decided to hold a press conference later on this afternoon at the Statler Hotel.

King then left the airport with Clarence Jones who had come down earlier from New York, and with an attorney with Jones by the name of Philip Sipser, who identified himself as a labor lawyer.

Morrison advised at 3:15 PM this afternoon that he had finally gotten through to King's party at the Statler and had talked to King's aide Reverend Andrew Young. Young at this time informed Morrison that the meeting between King and Hoffa was off and he claimed that the meeting had been cancelled last night.

Enclosure

CONTINUED - OVER
Wick to DeLoach
Re: Martin Luther King, Jr.
Security Matter - C
Proposed Meeting with James R. Hoffa 11/9/65

Morrison pressed him for details and Young said that the proposed purpose of this meeting had been "misinterpreted." He said King had wanted to have an off-the-record discussion with Hoffa regarding the problems of the Negroes in the Teamsters and Young claimed that King's outfit had worked closely with the Teamsters in Atlanta and Chicago and they felt it was time for them to meet the Teamster head. Young said it was difficult for King to have a private conversation with anyone in view of his prominence and reiterated that the whole matter had been "misinterpreted and distorted." Reporter Morrison continued to press Young and Young finally acknowledged that King might try to have a meeting with Hoffa at some other time.

Morrison advises that The News will carry a picture tomorrow of King arriving in town, together with the information set out above. The Star is also going to report this meeting.

It is felt that our counterintelligence aim to thwart King in receiving money from the Teamsters has been quite successful to date.

The above is for your information, and certainly highlights the excellent results which have been achieved through close cooperation between the Domestic Intelligence Division and Crime Records. We have just received a copy of the late edition of today's Star which carries the story by Ronald Sarrq, captioned "King Denies Going to Hoffa for Funds."
Mr. McHargh. Mr. Brennan, with reference to those items, they appear to exemplify that tactics used again during this campaign against Dr. King included the dissemination of information to members of the media as a way of spreading derogatory information concerning Dr. King. Would you agree that was a tactic employed?

Mr. Brennan. Yes.

Mr. McHargh. Mr. Chairman, I would like the items marked under tab K of the exhibit book previously marked MLK exhibits F-446A through G entered into the record at this time.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, they may be entered into the record.

[The exhibits follow:]
MEMORANDUM

TO: W. C. Sullivan
FROM: F. J. Baumgardner

SUBJECT: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
SECURITY MATTER - COMMUNIST

DATE: 2/1/65

We have learned that Martin Luther King, Jr., is scheduled to appear in Davenport, Iowa, 4/28/65, at a banquet sponsored by the Davenport Chapter of the Catholic Interracial Council (CIC). King will reportedly be paid $1,000 for his appearance and also be given the "Pacem in Terris" award, the second year such an award has been given by the CIC. The first such awards were given in 1964 to the late President Kennedy and to John Howard Griffin, a writer. The award is in memory of Pope John.

You will recall that in August, 1964, we recommended, and the Director approved, that Francis Cardinal Spellman be orally briefed concerning King's communist connections so that such information could be passed on to the Pope as it was anticipated that King would seek an audience with the Pope. Such briefing of the Cardinal subsequent was made by Assistant Director Malone in New York City.

It is shocking indeed that King continues to be honored by religious groups. Inasmuch as commitments have apparently been made by the CIC for the award in Davenport, there is little likelihood that anything can be done in this instance to prevent such an award. It is believed, however, that it would be desirable to have Assistant Director Malone recontact Cardinal Spellman and bring to his attention the information we continue to receive about King being given honors by Catholic groups, citing the Davenport CIC award as a current instance. It could be tactfully suggested that in the end it might well be embarrassing to the Catholic Church for having given honors to King. A discussion with the Cardinal might well suggest to him the desirability for the Cardinal to initiate such action as he deems appropriate, through church circles, to alert Catholic institutions and organizations concerning King. It would appear that the Cardinal would certainly be appreciative for the information we are giving him.

100-106670

SFP: jad

CONTINUED - OVER

FEB 11 1965
Memorandum to W. C. Sullivan
From F. J. Baumgardner
RE: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
100-106670

RECOMMENDATION:

If approved, this memorandum should be routed back to Assistant Director Sullivan who will telephone Assistant Director Malone and have him discuss the matter along the lines indicated above.

[Signature]

[Date]

[Handwritten notes]
Reference is made to my memorandum to you in this matter dated August 31, 1964, in which the Director approved the recommendation to have Assistant Director Malone orally brief Francis Cardinal Spellman concerning Martin Luther King, Jr.’s communist connections to avoid the possibility of having the Pope grant an audience to King in connection with his proposed visit to Rome later this month.

Malone was briefed in this matter and told to stress two things in his contact with Cardinal Spellman, the first being that he should stress of course the confidential nature of our briefing so that the DuQuan would not be drawn into the picture, and, secondly, to ascertain if Cardinal Spellman could take the necessary action in a relationship with the Pope so that if he could not, we could take appropriate steps through other channels.

Malone called today and stated that he had discussed the situation with Cardinal Spellman over the weekend and he said that the Cardinal took instant steps to advise the Vatican against granting any audience to King. He stated that Cardinal Spellman assured him that he would respect the confidential nature of the information and added that the Cardinal was most pleased and gratified that the Director thought enough of him to take him into his confidence and to rely upon him to handle such a delicate matter. Cardinal Spellman is going to Rome next week to attend the Ecumenical Council and thus will be on the scene personally and further insure that the Pope is not placed in an embarrassing position through any contact with King.

Recommendation:

For your information.

- Mr. Belmont
- Mr. Mohr
- Mr. DeLoach
- Mr. Sullivan
- Mr. Bland
- Mr. Baugardner
- Mr. Phillips

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. It was submitted to official proceedings by request and is intended for authorized persons.

MLK Exhibit F-446B
The "Washington Post and Times Herald" contained a small article in today's edition stating that Martin Luther King, Jr., had announced through his office in Atlanta that he had been granted an audience with Pope Paul VI to take place on Friday, 9-18-64, at which time he hopes to discuss the racial situation in the United States with the Pope.

You will recall that several weeks ago, when we first learned of King's intention to travel abroad, we anticipated the possibility of King's asking for an audience with the Pope and arranged to have Assistant Director Malone of the New York Office contact Francis Cardinal Spellman to see if appropriate action could not be taken to prevent such an audience. Malone did brief Cardinal Spellman in the matter and told us the Cardinal had in fact called the Vatican immediately after being contacted by Malone.

Malone was contacted telephonically today to see if he could shed any further light on the report that King was to have an audience with the Pope. He contacted Cardinal Spellman's office and was told that the Cardinal, who presently is recuperating from an operation, had spoken personally several weeks ago by telephone to the Secretary of State at the Vatican and had strongly recommended that no audience be granted King because of very serious but highly confidential information which had come to his attention but which he could not discuss in detail over the telephone.

Malone was asked to determine if there possibly could have been a slip-up so that the Pope did not actually receive Cardinal Spellman's warning. He was advised by Cardinal Spellman's office that with the information being furnished to the Secretary of State at the Vatican it would be mandatory for the Secretary of State to furnish the information directly to the Pope and that there was every assurance the Pope had received the information. Cardinal Spellman's office advised Malone today that it is possible that arrangements for such an audience had already been made and could not be
Memorandum to W. C. Sullivan
RE: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

canceled without embarrassment or it is equally possible that the Pope, viewing King's important role in racial matters in the United States, decided to overrule the recommendation not to meet with King.

Malone was advised through Cardinal Spellman's office that the matter would, again be delicately brought to Cardinal Spellman's attention.

Malone is to keep us advised as soon as he learns anything additionally pertinent.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.
You will recall that shortly after the Director’s interview with the women reporters, Dr. Robert S. Denny, Associate General Secretary of the Baptist World Alliance (BWA) and a personal friend of SA C. Benjamin Fulton, contacted Fulton concerning King. Dr. Denny pointed out that the Program Committee of BWA had been encouraged by some members to invite King to speak at the 1965 Congress in June next year at Miami Beach. About one half of the Program Committee members objected, pointing out that it was their feeling if Director Hoover had publicly identified King as a “notorious liar,” there most certainly must be even worse derogatory information concerning him which would make his appearance on the program questionable. You instructed SA Fulton to furnish Dr. Denny the general facts relating to King’s appearance before the BAPTIST WORLD ALLIANCE CONGRESS IN JUNE, 1965, MIAMI BEACH, FLORIDA.

On 12-7-64 Dr. Denny again contacted Fulton and advised that the matter has been brought up again. He pointed out that while he objects to having King on the program and has made his position known, unless he is able to share the information with at least Dr. Joseph Nordenhaug, the General Secretary of BWA, and perhaps one other program official, either Dr. Theodore F. Adams, Program Committee Chairman and minister of the First Baptist Church of Richmond, Virginia, or perhaps Dr. E. H. Pruden, minister of the First Baptist Church of Washington, D.C., and a prominent leader in the American Baptist Convention, it is unlikely that he can keep the Program Committee from excluding King an invitation. He would like for us to make the general facts relating to King as similar to what we told him, known to Dr. Nordenhaug and either Dr. Adams or Dr. Pruden, whichever is available. Dr. Denny advised that we may have explicit faith in the reliability and discreetness of these men and that he knows they would be exceedingly grateful for the Bureau’s consideration in this matter.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by the FBI.
M. A. Jones to DeLoach Memo
Re: Martin Luther King, Jr.

This, of course, would be only brief oral statements concerning
King's . You will recall the Director earlier on
a memorandum dated 11-27-64 disapproved the proposal of arranging for
Dr. Denny and Dr. Nordenhaug to listen to sources we have concerning this
matter.

Baffles reflect no derogatory information concerning Dr. Nordenhaug.
We have had friendly relations with Dr. Pruden and very cordial relations with
Dr. Adams.

RECOMMENDATION:

That approval be granted that through Dr. Denny arrangements
be made for Dr. Nordenhaug and either Dr. Adams or Dr. Pruden be given the
genral facts relating to King's on a discreet and confidential
basis.
Last evening, Dr. R. R. Edwin Espy, General Secretary, National Council of the Churches of Christ, New York City Headquarters, while en route from the South, stopped at the National Airport for a couple of hours to discuss with me the subject of Martin Luther King. As I have reported in previous memoranda, he has been informed concerning certain basic facts relating to King's work and his connections with communism.

Later that evening Dr. Espy told me that he has been working on this matter whenever the opportunity presented itself and he said he wanted the FBI to know that steps have been taken by the National Council to make certain from this time on that Martin Luther King will never get "one single dollar" of financial support from the National Council. Further, Dr. Espy told me that since our first conversation he has heard from several sources concerning...

In view of this, he felt that he was free to discuss the matter with a few key Protestant clergymen, including Dr. Calvin Hinke, Presbyterian leader who has been active in the civil rights movement. Naturally, said Dr. Espy, they were surprised and Dr. Hinke said that he could not understand a Christian clergyman could give any moral support to a man like King. Dr. Espy also told me this week he intends to confer with Roy Wilkins, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, for the purpose of persuading Wilkins that the Negro leaders should complete isolate King and remove him from the role he is now occupying in civil rights activities. In Dr. Espy's opinion, the most effective way to do this is to get King out of the public eye to have the important Negro leaders united in their determination to do this.

Dr. Espy in a few weeks will be leaving for Africa and will return from there in about 2 or 3 months. I will meet again with him at that time.

As I have previously said, Dr. Espy, a Baptist theologian, is a very fine man in every respect. He has a most sensitive...
Home to Mr. Belmont  
RE: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.  
SECURITY MATTER - C

conscience and he is a person on whom considerable reliability can be placed. I know the extent of his concern about King and I feel positive that he will try to do as much as he can to remove King from the powerful social position he now occupies. Dr. Eddy deplored to me very strongly the fact that King was able to be named "Man of the Year" by "Time" magazine, was the recipient recently of the Nobel Prize, secured an audience with the Pope, and has been the recipient of different awards from both Protestant and Catholic groups. I agreed with him most heartily and said it was too bad those people responsible for giving such recognition to King were not more circumspect. He replied that it was probably due to their lack of knowledge concerning King's communist connections but he believes this condition is being corrected, at least among the clergymen.

ACTION:

For information,
Sergeant Edward McClellen, Human Relations Unit, Chicago, Illinois, Police Department, advised that on 2/3/66 Martin Luther King, Jr., President, Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), met with Reverend John F. Cody, Archbishop of the Chicago Diocese of the Roman Catholic Church. The meeting was in the nature of a courtesy visit, at King’s request, during which King reportedly informed the Archbishop of the nature and purpose of his campaign to end segregation and discrimination against the Negro in Chicago. King has selected Chicago to be the site of the first SCLC invasion into the northern civil rights problem. It is recognized by King that the future of the organization will rest in the success or failure of the SCLC Chicago program.

King stated at a press conference, after his meeting with the Archbishop, that he and Archbishop Cody were in substantial agreement upon the goals they were both seeking and intended to keep in touch with each other. King declared he was hopeful of the active participation of priests and nuns in connection with his SCLC program in Chicago and had gained the impression from the Archbishop that such participation was a matter of individual conscience and would not be a matter of discipline insofar as the Diocesan hierarchy was concerned.

King continues to rely heavily on the advice of his foursome. In connection with all major SCLC problems and activities, these individuals have all been members of the Communist Party or Communist Party front groups in the past. As long as King utilizes these advisors with subversive backgrounds, the danger remains that his SCLC activities will be influenced by communist-oriented thinking. Should communists or communist sympathizers succeed in influencing the SCLC Chicago program, it would be a major breakthrough for the communists in the civil rights field.
Baumgardner to Sullivan
Re: HARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
100-106870

King's meeting with Archbishop Cody has been discussed with Special Agent in Charge Harlin W. Johnson of our Chicago Office. Johnson has given assurance that he can talk to Archbishop Cody in complete confidence and Archbishop Cody will not violate this confidence. Bureau files show that Archbishop Cody, while serving as a Bishop in the St. Louis Archdiocese in the early 1950's, was purported to have an excellent knowledge

At that time,

It is felt that it would be desirable to have Special Agent in Charge Johnson brief Archbishop Cody regarding the subversive backgrounds of King's key advisors and to emphasize to the Archbishop the vast influence these individuals exert on King. In addition, Special Agent in Charge Johnson would disclose to the Archbishop King's activities. Such a briefing would benefit the Archbishop in determining the degree of cooperation his archdiocese will extend to King's program in Chicago and would probably result in a lessening of King's influence in Chicago. This would be a serious blow to any possible communist attempt to exploit King's program in Chicago.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that Assistant Director Sullivan be authorized to telephonically contact Special Agent in Charge Johnson and instruct him to brief Archbishop Cody regarding the strong influence being exerted on King by his key advisor with communist backgrounds and to inform him of King's own hypocritical behavior. Special Agent in Charge Johnson will inform the Archbishop that under no circumstance may there ever be any attribution to the FBI for the information furnished.
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
ATTENTION: Assistant Director WILLIAM C. SULLIVAN
FROM: SAC, CHICAGO
RE: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
- SH-C (Security matter - Communist)

Re Bureau phone call from Assistant Director SULLIVAN to SAC JOHNSON

Today I visited His Excellency, Archbishop of Chicago, at his residence. He had a most pleasant visit concerning matters in general, during which time His Excellency expressed his very high regard for the Director and the work of the FBI. He indicated that he had had the opportunity during past years to cooperate with the Bureau representatives and he appeared most appreciative of my visit. He indicated that during the past six months, he has tried to become acquainted with the various problems which face his church in the Chicago area, but that a big part of the six months he has spent in traveling and, therefore, is not as well versed in the entire situation concerning Chicago as he would like to be.
At this point he commented that he was worried about the presence of Reverend MARTIN LUTHER KING in Chicago and stated that KING had visited him here in Chicago some time ago. This gave me an opportunity to ask him his impression of KING. His Excellency stated that this was the first occasion he had talked with KING and he was "not impressed". He stated that during the conversation, KING embellished a very glib tongue and His Excellency could not help but question his sincerity. His Excellency stated that he felt KING was not a truthful man and gave as an example that KING agreed that the conversation between KING and His Excellency would remain in strictest confidence. He pointed out, however, that the press was "conveniently available" outside the Archbishop's residence upon the departure of KING and KING spoke at length to the press concerning his visit with the Archbishop, even though the two men had agreed the conversation was confidential.

I then, in strictest confidence, briefed His Excellency along the lines discussed with Assistant Director SULLIVAN. It was obvious that His Excellency sincerely appreciated receiving this information and indicated to me that he would be most circumspect in his dealings with KING.

His Excellency is a very forceful individual, and from his comments and demeanor, I feel certain that he will do everything possible to neutralize KING's effect in this area.

I feel that this visit was highly productive. He has accepted my invitation to visit the Chicago Office. He gave me his private telephone number and asked that we stay in very close touch on matters of mutual interest.

Bureau will be kept advised of developments.
Mr. McHargh. Mr. Brennan, with respect to these items, they appear to reflect that attempts were made to discredit Dr. King before various religious leaders. Was that also a tactic that was employed during the course of the security investigation relative to Dr. King?

Mr. Brennan. Under tab K now?

Mr. McHargh. Yes.

Mr. Brennan. Yes.

Mr. McHargh. For the record, Mr. Brennan, is it correct that you did in fact review these documents yesterday?

Mr. Brennan. Yes.

Mr. McHargh. You are familiar with them?

Mr. Brennan. Yes.

Mr. McHargh. Mr. Chairman, I would like the items under tab L of the exhibit book previously marked MLK exhibit No. F-447 A through D entered into the record at this time.

The Chairman. Without objection, they may be entered into the record.

[The exhibits follow:]
This memorandum recommends that an extremely discreet course be taken with the Chancellor of Marquette University to prevent the awarding of an Honorary Degree to Martin Luther King, Jr.

We recently learned that Marquette University, Milwaukee, is considering the awarding of an Honorary Degree to King. The University had proposed giving King a Degree on 6/7/64 but King was unable to make that date since he had another commitment on the day. At the present time negotiations between Marquette and King in a state of suspense relative to the selection of a date, Marquette, however, is favorably disposed toward giving King such a Degree.

Marquette is the largest Jesuit university in the country. The Director, on 6/11/60, at Milwaukee, was presented with an Honorary Degree on behalf of Marquette University by the then President of the University, Reverend Edward J. O'Donnell. O'Donnell has for some time been an active contact of the Milwaukee Office and most favorably disposed toward the Director and the Bureau. On 2/18/62 Father O'Malley was replaced as President of Marquette and was designated Chancellor of the University. Father O'Donnell is a personal contact of the Milwaukee Office and Baker advises that the Father relies upon completely if we were to make any information available on a strictly confidential basis.

It is shocking indeed that the possibility exists that King receive an Honorary Degree from the same institution which honored Director with such a Degree in 1950. We ought to take positive steps to head this off if at all possible within the framework of the security of our information and sources. By making pertinent information concerning King available to Father O'Donnell at this time, on a strictly confidential basis, we will be giving the University sufficient to enable it to take positive action in a manner which might avoid contact to the University.
Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
RE: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
100-105670

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that SAC Baker be telephonically apprised of the information in the attached blind memorandum which succinctly sets forth the facts concerning not only King's communist connections but his political views as well. Baker should be instructed to personally, and in the strictest of confidence, orally brief Father O'Donnell on the basis of the information in the blind memorandum. It will be emphasized to Baker that he should in turn emphasize to Father O'Donnell that under no circumstances might this information be traced back to the Bureau.
My memorandum to you March 19, 1964, concerning the communist influence in racial matters advised that we had learned that Springfield College, Springfield, Massachusetts, and Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, were considering the conferring upon Martin Luther King of honorary degrees in June, 1964, but that to date no definite plans had been perfected relative to either institution. We indicated that we were initiating appropriate checks as to the availability of established and reliable sources at these institutions which would permit the heading off of the conferring of honorary degrees to King. We indicated an intention to proceed along lines similar to that recently which prevented King from getting an honorary degree from Marquette University. The Director noted "OK" relative to these intentions of ours. Instant memorandum recommends that an extreme discreet contact be made with Senator Leverett Saltonstall (Republican Massachusetts) who appears to be in a position to assist the Bureau in the matter relating to Springfield College. A separate memorandum will follow relative to Yale University.

Boston SAC Handley has advised that although the Boston Office files are negative concerning Springfield's President, Dr. G. Olds, Handley has been able to determine that Olds is very close to Sargent Shriver and Olds spends half of his time in Washington, D.C. assisting Shriver in matters relating to the Peace Corps and study on poverty. Bureau files on Olds are favorable; he is a theologian and has visited Russia on one occasion.

Handley suggested as a possible contact as he is a member of the Board of Springfield College, is on the Special Correspondents' List and we have had limited but friendly relations with him for a number of years. He is usually written a congratulatory letter upon his re-elections.

Enclosure

LX-115
100-106670-348

1964

Bureau 100-3-116 (Communist Party, USA, Negro Question, Communist Influence in Racial Matters)
OBSERVATIONS:

Because of Olds' close association with the... it would not appear to be prudent to attempt to deal with him. It appears from our study that Assistant Director DeLoach is the most logical individual to deal with and that if he were personally approached by Assistant Director DeLoach and orally briefed, in the strictest of confidence, concerning King, he would be in a position to take the necessary action to prevent King from receiving an honorary degree from Springfield College.

RECOMMENDATION:

If approved, DeLoach should personally orally brief the indicated King's communist connections... (This is the same summary we previously used in the Marquette University situation). It should be made clear to Saltonstall that the information is being given to him in the strictest of confidence with the thought that he might desire to use it in preventing King from receiving an honorary degree from Springfield College and thus save the institution from embarrassment. It should be emphasized to Saltonstall that under no circumstances may this information ever be attributed to the Bureau.
Memorandum

Mr. Mohr

C. D. DeLoach

April 8, 1964

MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
SECURITY MATTER - COMMUNIST

Mr. Baumgardner's memo to Mr. Sullivan 4/2/64 recommended that I
brief Senator Saltonstall in accordance with an attached "Top Secret" summary
calling Reverend Martin Luther King's communist connections and the
make up of potential embarrassment to a college he obviously was very personally interested in.

I called upon Senator Saltonstall at 10:30 a.m., 4/7/64 in his office. At the
beginning of our conversation I told the Senator that my remarks should be held in the
strictest of confidence. He agreed to this. I then mentioned that he had long been a
letter of the FBI's and, therefore, the Director wanted me to brief him concerning
Reverend Martin Luther King's communist connections and the make up of potential embarrassment to a college he obviously was very personally interested in.

Senator Saltonstall was told that the captioned individual was to be
briefed by C. D. DeLoach as a very outstanding individual who could be trusted implicitly.

Senator Saltonstall told me he was shocked to receive this information. He said it was hardly believable. He said if it were not for the integrity of the FBI he would believe such facts. I told him that our information was very obviously truthful and upon indisputable facts.

Senator Saltonstall told me that while he wanted to respect our confidence, information placed a great burden upon him. He stated he felt duty bound to tell
Glenn/olds. I reminded Senator Saltonstall that I had advised him of the above-captioned facts in strict confidence. He then inquired if I would speak to Dr. Olds. I told him Dr. Olds as a very outstanding individual who could be trusted implicitly.
old the Senator I preferred not to speak with Dr. Olds about this matter and that I rated him Senator Saltonstall, to know that under no circumstances should this information be attributed to the FBI. The Senator assured me that he would treat our information on a confidential basis; however, he might possibly have to take Dr. Olds into confidence.

I had been back in my office approximately 30 minutes when Senator Saltonstall called me. He stated that Dr. Olds was in his office at the time, having hoped as a result of a trip to Washington to work on the President’s poverty program, Senator Saltonstall inquired if I would see Dr. Olds right away. I told him that I was up on other matters and it would be impossible. He next inquired if I could see Dr. Olds at 6:00 a.m. on the morning of 4/8/64. I told Senator Saltonstall I couldn’t do it as much as I had a commitment to attend a breakfast meeting of a civic group. He then closed the conversation by stating Dr. Olds would call me and arrange an appointment. I asked Senator Saltonstall if he had disclosed the remarks made during our previous conversation to Dr. Olds. He stated that he had absolutely certain that I told him at under the circumstances then that I would see Dr. Olds.

Dr. Olds, after making an appointment, came by my office at 4:00 p.m., 8/64. He opened the conversation by stating that he fully recognized the necessity to keep the information concerning King in strict confidence. He stated he wanted us to know that he would maintain this confidence and would not advise anyone of this information. He pointed out that he had been very shocked when Senator Saltonstall told him of these facts and had insisted that Reverend King be prevented absolutely certain that I told him at under the circumstances then that I would see Dr. Olds.

Dr. Olds who impressed me as being a very intelligent individual, stated that due to the fact that he will keep this information confidential, it would be impossible for him to "uninvite" King. He stated that the "liberals" on his Board of Trustees and the FBI had given Senator Saltonstall this information. Dr. Olds did say that he would take immediate steps to arrange for the commencement address at Springfield College. However,
Loach to Mohr Memo

s: Martin Luther King, Jr.

The Director's schedule had caused him to not accept these invitations. I explained the Director's heavy schedule and the fact that he was reluctant to leave Washington while Congress was in session.

Upon leaving, Dr. Olds assured me that no information would be released and none would be attributed to the FBI. I told him that we would, of course, deny any such information had been furnished. At this point he advised me that, of course, his main reason for coming to the FBI was to determine if we could suggest any course of action he might take. I told him we could suggest nothing, that any action taken was entirely up to him.

ACTION:

For record purposes.
Memorandum

TO: W. C. Sullivan
FROM: F. J. Baumgardner

DATE: 2/19/66

SUBJECT: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

INFORMANT

Mr. Wasmmer of the St. Peters Jesuit School in New Jersey recently contacted the headquarters of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference at Atlanta, Georgia, which Conference is headed by Martin Luther King, Jr. Father Wasmmer indicated that St. Peters wanted to give King an honorary degree on 6/6/66. King's secretary indicated to Father Wasmmer that King would advise at a later date whether he could accept the degree.

OBSERVATIONS:

It will be recalled that we previously were able to alert proper authorities at Marquette University when that institution was considering King for an honorary degree. As a result of information furnished on a highly confidential basis concerning King, Marquette did not give King an honorary degree. It may be possible that similar action on our part in the current instance will avert the action which is contemplated by St. Peters Jesuit School.

RECOMMENDATION:

If approved, we will determine from our Newark Office what its relations are with the St. Peters Jesuit School and whether there is some individual there in high authority who can be confidentially briefed concerning King. St. Peters will not be given an honorary degree. Upon approval, this memorandum should be routed back to Assistant Director Sullivan for the necessary telephone call to the SAC Newark in this matter.

MLK Exhibit F-447D
Mr. McHARGH. The first memo, MLK F-447A, refers to the Bureau becoming aware of the fact that Dr. King was to receive an honorary degree from Marquette University and also recount the steps that the Bureau took to attempt to prevent that from happening. The memos which follow refer to similar incidents where honorary degrees were to be bestowed upon Dr. King and the Bureau took steps to keep that from occurring. Was that also a tactic that was employed during the course of the security investigation?

Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, it was.

Mr. McHARGH. Mr. Chairman, I would like the items under tab N of the exhibit book, N as in “now” previously marked MLK exhibit No. F-449A through E to be entered into the record at this time.

Chairman STOKES. Without objection it is so ordered.

[The information follows:]
Attached for your approval for dissemination are copies of a communication revealing the Ford Foundation is giving Martin Luther King, Jr.'s group, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), a quarter of a million dollars.

BACKGROUND:

Mr. G. C. Moore, President of the Ford Foundation, was about to give SCLC a grant, but the Ford Foundation was sympathetic to the financial problems of SCLC.

With your approval, John Bugas, former Special Agent in Charge of the Detroit Office and presently Vice President of the Ford Motor Company, was briefed as to the subversive backgrounds of King's principal advisors. Bugas expressed alarm and indicated that although the Ford Motor Company had little control over the Ford Foundation, he, nevertheless, would immediately attempt to get in touch with Bundy and do something about this matter. Bugas advised that when he confronted Bundy with this matter, Bundy was rather high-handed in the conversation. Bugas indicated his company had quite a number of "hard blows" from the Ford Foundation over the years and most certainly a liaison between this foundation and Martin Luther King, Jr., would be a serious blow to the company. No additional information was received concerning this matter until recently. We did not disseminate this information so that our counterintelligence measures would not be divulged.

Enclosure
Memorandum G. C. Moore to W. C. Sullivan
RE: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
SECURITY MATTER - COMMUNIST

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS:

At a staff meeting recently, King announced the Ford Foundation had granted his organization a quarter of a million dollars. King did not state how this money was going to be used.

OBSERVATIONS:

It is interesting to note that King's group will only get $250,000, a large sum, but considerably smaller than the original amount. Perhaps our measures had some effect in causing this reduction. In view of King's current announcements indicating he will hold a camp-in at Washington, D. C., across from the White House, it is felt the President would be extremely interested in the source of these new funds being made available to SCLC.

RECOMMENDATION:

The attached be forwarded by routing slip to Mrs. Mildred Stegall at the White House; Mr. William Welsh, Administrative Assistant to the Vice President; Secretary of Defense McNamara; the Attorney General; Deputy Attorney General; Assistant Attorneys General Doar, Yeagley, and Vinson; Army, Navy, and Air Force.

\[\text{Signature}\]
Memorandum

TO: Mr. Sullivan

FROM: F. J. Baumgardner

DATE: 10/24/66

SUBJECT: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
SECURITY MATTER - C

BACKGROUND

OBSERVATIONS: Information has recently come to our attention indicating that King and his group are in need of financial support. This contact with the Ford Foundation would undoubtedly be of great assistance to him at this particular time.

It is felt that the Ford Foundation is not aware of the subversive backgrounds of King's principal advisers and that if the proper officials of the Ford Foundation were briefed concerning these, this might preclude any assistance being granted. Listed below are four principal advisers to King with subversive backgrounds:

1. Deloach
2. Wick
3. Sullivan
4. Baumgardner
5. D. Wells
RECOMMENDATION: In an effort to preclude the possibility of the Southern Christian Leadership receiving Ford Foundation funds, it is recommended that a Bureau official be designated to contact John Bugas, former Special Agent in Charge of the Detroit Office and presently a vice president of the Ford Motor Company, concerning the above-set forth facts so that he might bring them to the attention of whomever he feels appropriate in either the Ford family or the Ford Foundation.

I doubt this will accomplish anything. D. In the event the above recommendation is not approved, it is recommended that a Bureau official be designated to brief McGeorge Bundy of the subversive backgrounds of the advisers to King.
Memorandum

TO: MR. TOLOSON

FROM: C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 10/25/66

cc Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Wick

SUBJECT: MARTIN LUTHER KING;
SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (SCLC)
POSSIBLE GRANT OF $3,000,000 FROM FORD FOUNDATION

CONTACT WITH JOHN BUGAS, VICE PRESIDENT,
FORD MOTOR COMPANY

My memorandum to you of 10/25/66 reflected a call to Mr. Bugas, relative to confidentially advising him that Mr. George Bundy, President, Ford Foundation, had contacted Martin Luther King offering a grant of $3,000,000 to the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). Mr. Bugas was grateful for the information furnished him yesterday. He expressed alarm and indicated that although the Ford Motor Company had little control over the Ford Foundation, he nevertheless would immediately attempt to get in touch with Bundy and do something about this matter.

Mr. Bugas called me back at 11:30 this morning. He stated he had contacted Bundy and had asked him for an appointment within the next several days. Bundy asked why he wanted to see him. Bugas replied he was in receipt of information concerning the fact that the Ford Foundation wanted to have dealings with the SCLC. Bundy asked for the source of his information. Bundy stated under the circumstances he would refuse to talk to Bugas and would discuss the matter only with the source. Bundy then asked if the source was the FBI. Bugas refused to reveal the source and the conversation was terminated.

Bugas stated he thought Bundy had been rather high-handed in the conversation; however, he wanted to request that the Director give serious consideration to an FBI representative contacting Bundy, inasmuch as this matter represents one of great importance to the Ford Motor Company. Bugas indicated his company had had quite a number of "hard blows" from the Ford Foundation over the years and most certainly a liaison between this foundation and Martin Luther King would be a serious blow to the company.

UNClassified

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Mr. Tolson

I told Bugas that, in view of Bundy's attitude, it appeared rather doubtful concerning the advisability of our going further in this matter. Bugas stated he realized this; however, he wanted to express again the importance of this matter to the Ford Motor Company. He stated he did not know Bundy; however, Bundy had apparently been rather snobbish in dealing with the Ford people. He explained that when Bundy first took this job, Bundy had been invited to Detroit to meet Henry Ford III and the top people of the company. At that time Bundy was point-blank advised that he should be careful in administering the Ford Foundation, inasmuch as this Foundation had caused serious harm to the sales of the Ford Motor Company. Bundy allegedly stuck his nose in the air and stated "I have a social responsibility to fulfill."

Mr. Bugas once again stated that any liaison between the Ford Foundation and Martin Luther King would "set his company back to butt hell." He asked again that we consider contacting Bundy directly and stated he would appreciate knowing of any action taken in this regard.

ACTION:

I personally feel that Bundy is of the pseudo-intellectual, Ivy League group that has little respect for the FBI. He was friendly on the surface while at the White House and I met him frequently. Under the circumstances, it appears rather doubtful that contact with him by the FBI will convince him one way or another. It is, therefore, recommended that I advise Mr. Bugas that, while we appreciate his concern, there is some doubt that contact by us with Bundy would amount to anything. It will be suggested to him that he might desire to bring this matter to Mr. Henry Ford's attention, in the event Mr. Ford desires to attempt to exercise any control over Bundy. Mr. Bugas, during our conversation, noted that Mr. Ford was out of the country at the present time.

Mrs. Martin Luther King
By memorandum in captioned matter dated 10/17/67 (attached), our Atlanta Office advised of information received from a confidential source 10/15/67 to the effect that the Department of Labor was negotiating a contract with Martin Luther King’s Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) in the amount of $87,000 to train Negroes in the Atlanta, Georgia, area for employment. The Director approved the furnishing of such information to the Secretary of Labor together with a copy of the “Top Secret” document entitled “Communist Influence in Racial Matters—A Current Analysis” dated 4/10/67, the latter for the Secretary’s confidential information. This document set forth in detail the extent of communist influence within the SCLC and King’s involvement with such elements.

Mr. James J. Reynolds, Undersecretary of Labor, was contacted by Liaison 10/23/67 and furnished a copy of the Atlanta memorandum mentioned above together with the “Top Secret” document. Reynolds was asked whether or not Labor was, in fact, negotiating such a contract with the SCLC and he responded that he would immediately look into this and advise the Bureau.

Mr. Reynolds recontacted Liaison 10/25/67 at which time he advised that the Community Action Group, Atlanta, Georgia, had, in fact, recently negotiated a contract with the SCLC in the amount of $61,000 such contract to provide for on-the-job training for Negroes with retail grocers. Reynolds explained that while this contract was between the Community Action Group and SCLC, it had, in fact, been approved by the Labor Department. The amount of the grant was $61,000, $13,000 of which would go to the SCLC for administering the program and $48,000 to the grocers for the on-the-job training. Reynolds stated that King had set up the program by contacting grocers and getting assurance that they would set aside 15% of the employment openings for on-the-job training of Negro youths.
Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
RE: SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE

Reynolds advised that upon receipt of the information provided by the Bureau and ascertaining that such a contract was in effect, he immediately conferred with Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz. Both agreed that there was no way at this time that the contract could be gracefully canceled without causing severe and embarrassing repercussions. He stated, however, that in view of the information received, both he and the Secretary are in agreement that steps will be taken to insure that no further contracts will be awarded to King's group.

Reynolds stated that both he and the Secretary appreciated very much the Director's bringing this information to their attention. Reynolds stated that he realized the extent to which he was under communist influence. He conjectured that this possibly explains King's recent anti-Vietnam campaign. He remarked that he had considered King an opportunist motivated by financial considerations but now he could only conclude that communist elements were, to a large extent, "calling the shots" for King.

The sensitive nature of the information furnished was emphasized with Mr. Reynolds.

ACTION:

For information.
Attached for your approval for dissemination are copies of a communication containing information regarding a contract in amount of $61,000 funded and approved by Department of Labor and negotiated by the Community Action Group, Atlanta, Georgia, with Martin Luther King's organization Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC). Also included is information indicating King's involvement with such elements.

BACKGROUND:

Recently advised that the Department of Labor was negotiating a contract with the SCLC to train Negroes in the Atlanta, Georgia area for employment.

The Director approved furnishing Willard Wirtz, Secretary of Labor, a copy of the "Top Secret" document entitled "Communist Influence in Racial Matters - A Current Analysis" dated 4/10/67. This document sets forth in detail the extent of Communist influence within the SCLC and King's involvement with such elements.

Mr. James J. Reynolds, Undersecretary of Labor, subsequently advised that the Department of Labor had recently approved a contract in the amount of $61,000 negotiated by the Community Action Group, Atlanta, Georgia, with the SCLC. The contract is for on-the-job-training for Negroes with retail grocers. SCLC will receive $13,000 for administering the program and the grocers will receive $48,000 for providing on-the-job-training.

Enclosure

CONTINUED - OVER

COPY MADE FOR HIR FULSON
Memorandum G. C. Moore to W. C. Sullivan
RE: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
SECURITY MATTERS - COMMUNIST

Reynolds advised that upon receipt of the document covering King, he conferred with Secretary of Labor Wirtz. Both agreed that there was no way at this time that the contract with SCLC could be gracefully canceled without causing severe and embarrassing repercussions. He stated, however, that in view of the information received, both he and the Secretary are in agreement that steps will be taken to insure that no further contracts will be awarded to King's group.

... has advised that King recently completed a tour throughout the United States with the purpose of participating in benefit programs to raise funds for the SCLC.

RECOMMENDATION:

The attached be forwarded by routing slip to Mrs. Mildred Stegall at the White House; Attorney General; Deputy Attorney General; and Assistant Attorney J. Walter Yeagley.
Contract Awarded

The Department of Labor recently approved a contract in the amount of $61,000 negotiated by the Community Action Group, Atlanta, Georgia, with the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. The contract provides for on-the-job-training for Negroes with retail grocers. The Southern Christian Leadership Conference will receive $13,000 for administering the program and the grocers will receive $48,000 for providing on-the-job-training.

Martin Luther King, Jr., President, Southern Christian Leadership Conference, was instrumental in establishing this program. He contacted grocers and obtained their assurance that they would set aside 15 percent of the employment openings for on-the-job-training of Negro youths.

Martin Luther King, Jr., recently completed a tour throughout the United States for the purpose of participating in benefit programs to raise funds for the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.
Mr. McHargh. Mr. Brennan, items contained under this tab refer to steps the Bureau took to prevent Dr. King or the SCLC from receiving funding from such agencies as the Ford Foundation, the Federal Government, et cetera. Would you agree that that was also a tactic that was employed by the Bureau?

Mr. Brennan. Yes, it was.

Mr. McHargh. Mr. Brennan, with respect to the items that we have just recounted, is it not true that the Bureau at that time had a policy that nonpublic source information or information that was gathered during the course of the security investigation would not be disseminated outside of the Bureau?

Mr. Brennan. Yes, that was the rule within the Bureau.

Mr. McHargh. So that this in fact represents that, relative to Dr. King, that general policy was not in fact implemented?

Mr. Brennan. I don't recall. I would have to go through every item that was discussed or disseminated, and I am not familiar with the details, but the basic rule was that anything to be disseminated outside was not to include any classified information.

Mr. McHargh. Do you recall whether or not relative to Dr. King the Bureau did in fact disseminate information which it had gathered during the course of its security investigation to sources outside of the Bureau?

Mr. Brennan. Yes.

Mr. McHargh. So that it was a tactic that was employed relative to Dr. King?

Mr. Brennan. Yes, it was a tactic that was employed, but the question is whether or not the information so gathered was in the public source domain or whether or not there was divulgence of any classified information.

As I say, the basic rule we had to operate under in preparing any type of information was that it had to be strictly public source information.

Mr. McHargh. Do you know whether or not classified information relative to King was in fact included in these disseminations?

Mr. Brennan. Offhand, I cannot recall really. I would say that if they were prepared, information of this type was prepared in our section, that it was not supposed to have included classified information.

Mr. McHargh. I would like to refer you to the items under tab O of the exhibit book.

Mr. Chairman, those have been previously marked as MLK exhibits F-450A and B and I would like to have them entered into the record at this time.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, they may be entered into the record at this time.

[The information follows:]
Memorandum

TO: Mr. Sullivan

FROM: C. D. Brennan

DATE: 3/3/67

SUBJECT: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. SECURITY MATTER - C

PURPOSE: To obtain approval to furnish a suggested list of questions to a friendly news source to be used in interviewing Martin Luther King, Jr., President, Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

BACKGROUND: King has been on a two-month vacation in Jamaica writing a new book. During this time he has been attempting to determine what direction he should take in regard to national issues. His inclination is to direct his entire efforts in opposition to the war in Vietnam. During the past two weeks, he has started making public appearances again. In California on 2/25/67 he attacked the war in Vietnam and suggested cutting Vietnam, according to an article in "The New York Times." At one point he made a statement that might be considered revolutionary. He stated in part, "we have got to get out and demonstrate and protest until it rocks the very foundations of this Nation."

Also, while King was out of the country, the voter registration drive in Chicago failed miserably. He is very sensitive about this failure and feels it hurt his public image. He is also sensitive about allegations his personal appeal to the ghetto Negro is waning.

Another factor that is influencing his decision is Reverend James Bevel's leaving his post as Project Director, Chicago Southern Christian Leadership Conference, to become Executive Director, Spring Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, New York, New York. This also transpired while King was in Jamaica. In addition, Bevel's wife traveled to Hanoi, North Vietnam, late in 1966. Bevel and his wife continue to be paid salaries by the Southern Christian Leadership Conference even though they have new employment.

OBSERVATIONS: It is felt that King would be very vulnerable to an interview by the press, providing the interviewer was furnished a list of suggested questions. The press

Encl.
100-106670

DMF: deh

4 APR 1 1967

CONTINUED - OVER
Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan
Re: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
100-106670

representative could arrange for an interview ostensibly to question King concerning his new book. During the interview the above-interrelated activities could be developed, particularly to bring out the political reorientation of King's major efforts in relation to United States foreign policy as contrasted to the position taken by other civil rights leaders who have continued to direct their efforts at civil rights. This then could be linked to show that King's current policies remarkably parallel communist efforts. This would cause extreme embarrassment to King. Further, it is felt that since the position and paths taken by King and his group closely parallel that advocated by the Communist Party, this fact should be made known to the public.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

That the attached list of questions be furnished the Crime Records Division in an effort to interest a friendly news media representative in interviewing King.
MEMORANDUM

FROM: G. C. Moore

TO: Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: October 18, 1967

SUBJECT: Martin Luther King, Jr.

Security Matter - Communism

PURPOSE:

Attached for your approval for dissemination to friendly news media sources is a copy of a Negro newspaper editorial attacking Martin Luther King, Jr., President, Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

BACKGROUND:

King's group is in desperate need of funds. In an effort to combat this problem, King has organized a variety show starring Harry Belafonte, well-known Negro vocalist with a subversive background, to tour seven major cities in the United States. The proceeds will go to the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. King is touring with the group and speaks during each performance.

The attached editorial entitled "Think Twice Before Going to Coliseum Tuesday Night" appeared in the "Forward Times," the leading Negro newspaper in Houston, Texas. This paper attacks King for his stand on Vietnam and claims his appearance in Houston is "an imposition on the community." King is also referred to as "a misguided Moses who has lost himself." In addition, the article claims King's position regarding the Vietnam war "borders upon treason." Further, "a man who will not fight for his country hasn't got any civil rights or any respect due him."

Enclosure

100-106670

Dw: skg (3)
Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
RE: MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
100-106670

OBSERVATION:

This news item is extremely irritating to King. In addition, the advanced ticket sales were slow in Houston, Texas, prior to the performance on October 17, 1967. This newspaper story may have caused many of the citizens of Houston to "think twice before going" and indeed, not go at all.

It is felt that if this article is given wide-spread publicity as how thinking Negroes really feel about King, two objectives can be accomplished. One, publicize King as a traitor to his country and race. Secondly, reduce his income from these shows since he has five more performances to give; namely, Chicago, Illinois, October 19; Cleveland, Ohio, October 21; Washington, D. C., October 23; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, October 26; and Boston, Massachusetts, October 27.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

The attached be forwarded to Crime Records Division for dissemination to appropriate friendly news media sources.
THINK TWICE BEFORE GOING TO COLISEUM TUESDAY NIGHT
Several weeks ago FORWARD TIMES made an editorial expression which stated, among other things, that Dr. Martin Luther King had strayed off onto an extremely dangerous course which ran in the opposite direction from the civil rights leadership course that vast numbers of citizens had come to know and respect him for over a wide span of years.

Now, we wish to make it crystal clear that this newspaper, of course, respects and upholds Dr. King's right to take a position that is, what we think to be, contrary to good judgement. If he wishes to be the spokesman for the 'peaceniks', that's his business. When, however, Dr. King joins with others and tries to impose that poor judgement upon the entire Negro community which is already beset with more in-depth and complicated problems than can apparently be coped with, at that point we call it our business.

FORWARD TIMES takes the position that Dr. King's visit to Houston next Tuesday night is an imposition upon this community of the first order. We also think that the fact that he is shrouding his 'remarks' behind a big name popular singer like Aretha Franklin suggests subterfuge. If Aretha Franklin, who is now at the peak of fame, permits this group of 'peace-niks' to use her name to further their efforts, all that we can say is, "that's her business." If she wakes up later and finds that she has acted just like Tokyo Rose and Axis Sally, all that we can say is that she brought it all upon herself.

Our concern is not so much with what course Dr. King and Miss Franklin elect to follow. What concerns us is that the innocent public, if not properly forewarned, might be taken in by their visit to Houston. We think that if what Dr. King has to say isn't within itself meritorious enough to draw a crowd, he shouldn't be coming to town in the first place to say it. As it stands now, Aretha Franklin's name has been added to the show and many people will pay the fee expecting to hear her sing. She will be the 'bait' to help get the crowd into the Coliseum. Once inside, the trapped ticket purchasers will have to sit quietly while Dr. King speaks about the "immorality" of the war in Viet Nam. Whether we like it or not, the United States of America is at war with a determined aggressor. How we got into this war matters little at this point. The bold truth is that we are shooting 'live' ammunition at them and they are shooting the same type back at us with remarkable effectiveness.

Looking at the conflict logically and realistically, we cannot escape the fact that we have absolutely no course open to us but to disregard all of the babble of weaklings. We, as bonafide American citizens, must take a stand with our country. In our actions, in our conversations and in our preaching, we must give no aid and no comfort to the enemy.

We must remember that all wars are immoral and when Martin Luther King preaches about how immoral the American bullets are and fails to offer us an alternative for stopping those immoral bullets being fired at our boys, we have got to take the ex-civil rights worker to task for his oversight. There is no middle ground here for any misguided "Moses" who has lost himself. King got lost just outside of Chicago.
In a town called Cicero and as hasn't been the same since. We cannot sit by and allow him to lose thousands of Negro citizens also just because he can't find his own way.

Crispus Attucks didn't call the cause at Boston Commons "Immoral". He stood up like a man and fell like a proud soldier. From that moment on, both black and white men have stood up for America. Negro citizen soldiers have stood like men and fallen, if need be, on battlefields in far away places all over the world every since Crispus Attucks first stood up back in the beginning. This nation has grown strong and it is respected and, yes, even feared, because we have been blessed by the Almighty Grace of God to have strong men at the right place at the needed time who didn't mind standing up for right, for God and for Country. It then is not reasonable that we now should settle for anything less than what the most courageous have done.

As we see it, Dr. Martin Luther King is suggesting that we Negroes take something lesser than the courageous route. If he follows the same pattern that he has followed in his other "remarks" made in other cities, he will dwell upon Negro problems just long enough to get the attention of the listeners and then he will suddenly shift to the hard-sell of taking the lesser route in the war that this country is now engaged in.

FORWARD TIMES firmly believes that in the long run we will lose any and all respect that the total community might now hold for us. Our job is to try and build more respect and not tear down the little we already have.

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FORWARD TIMES firmly believes that in the long run we will lose any and all respect that the total community might now hold for us. Our job is to try and build more respect and not tear down the little we already have.

Even though Negro citizens have had differences at home they have always stood firmly shoulder to shoulder with the remainder of America when the going got rough. FORWARD TIMES believes that this will continue despite people like Martin Luther King and company.

It puzzles us how Harry Belafonte was selected to headline a show that was supposed to be aimed in the Negro interest. We cannot help but wonder how much real concern he has for the suffering of Negro womanhood. As we recall, once he got famous, he quit his Negro wife and married a white woman. We don't have anything against marrying white women, but when you do, don't come into Houston and try to charge hardworking Negro women $7.50 admission just under the pretext that they are going to hear one thing and something else is up your sleeve.

Of course, Houston citizens are free to do anything that they choose about attending this show. All that we ask is that you THINK TWICE BEFORE GOING.
Mr. McHargh. Before I follow up on my previous question, Mr. Brennan, reflected in that memo or in those memos are statements relative to the Bureau’s response to Dr. King’s antiwar speech which he gave in 1967. At that time you were running the operation out of Internal Security, and is it true that you are familiar with the event which I just referred to, that is Dr. King’s antiwar speech in 1967?

Mr. Brennan. Yes.

Mr. McHargh. Our investigation has revealed that once Dr. King made that particular speech that Bureau documents began to include references to him as a traitor to his country and to his race. Was that the assessment that you maintained at the time?

Mr. Brennan. Well, by the time he made that speech, the supervision of the case was no longer in the Internal Security section, so I might not be that familiar with the wordage. I might not be that familiar with the wordage of characterizations of that type.

The situation as I recall was that it appeared to us at least that Dr. King was suffering from a lack of financial contributions from the white segments of society, that it appeared that he had begun to lose some degree of his leadership of the civil rights movement, that many individuals were more attracted to individuals like Stokely Carmichael through the cry of Black power and the like. And it appeared to us, and the information we had was that King was searching for a way to regain his supremacy as leader of the civil rights movement. And the information again we had was that one of his advisers with previous Communist affiliation was putting pressure on him and trying to convince him that a new area for him to go into, to take a stand, would be in the antiwar field, and that this particular individual shaped if not completely wrote the speech which King delivered at the Riverside Church in April of 1967.

Mr. McHargh. Isn’t it true, Mr. Brennan, that at that time numerous American citizens, Congressmen, religious leaders, individuals from all walks of life, were taking positions in opposition to the war in Vietnam, and that was a general feeling in the population?

Mr. Brennan. I think along about that time there began to be a feeling among an increasing number of people of the type that you have mentioned. I think that the war became increasingly an unpopular war but, on the other hand, we had no indication that spokesmen of the type that you mentioned were having their speeches written for them by an individual who, with his previous Communist affiliations, had been basically responsible in the beginning for the FBI’s interest in the Communist infiltration of the SCLC and the influence on King. I think there is a little bit of difference and separation there.

Mr. McHargh. Isn’t it also true that by that time, whether or not Dr. King had criticized the war at the behest of anyone else, that the attitude of the Director and of the Bureau was such that it still would have occasioned the opportunity or occasioned another example of an opportunity for the Bureau to attempt to use that against Dr. King in its effort to discredit him.

Mr. Brennan. It was one more item. I think that the mold had already been cast, and that the feelings, particularly projected by
Director Hoover at King, were so well-established by that time that it was just another item to be added to the list of those which increased Director Hoover's particular form of ire in regard to King.

Mr. McHargh. Earlier we discussed whether or not information which had been gathered through the course of the security investigation had been disseminated outside of the Bureau, information that was of classified nature. Would you agree that information that had been obtained through the use of technical installations would fit into the category of information that should not have been disseminated outside of the Bureau?

Mr. Brennan. I would agree that it should not.

Mr. McHargh. Would you also agree that that information or information of that nature was gathered relative to Dr. King and was in fact disseminated outside of the Bureau?

Mr. Brennan. Yes, it was. Of course, again I think that here you have to consider the degree of Dr. King's prominence in the civil rights movement, at that time, the degree of his political influence, the degree to which he had acceptance at the White House, and the degree to which he had acceptance by the Attorney General, and I think that the feeling of the Bureau was that as long as he was dealing at these levels, that it was proper to advise the President, to advise the Attorney General and others in the major political field of the information that had been obtained.

Mr. McHargh. Mr. Brennan, I would like to have you turn now to tab P of the exhibit book.

Mr. Chairman, the items contained under that tab have been previously marked MLK exhibit No. F-451 A through S, and I would like to have them entered into the record at this time.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, they may be entered into the record.

[The information follows:]
PERSONAL ATTENTION TO ALL OFFICES

CIA, Albany

August 25, 1967

PERSONAL ATTENTION TO ALL OFFICES

Director, FBI

Personnel Security, FBI

Counterintelligence Program

BLACK NATIONALIST - RACE GROUPS

INTERNAL SECURITY

Offices receiving copies of this letter are instructed to immediately establish a control file, captioned as above, and to assign responsibility for following and coordinating this new counterintelligence program to an experienced and imaginative Special Agent well versed in investigations relating to black nationalist, hate-type organizations. The field office control file used under this program may be maintained in a pending inactive status until such time as a specific operation or technique is placed under consideration for implementation.

The purpose of this new counterintelligence endeavor is to expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or otherwise neutralize the activities of black nationalist, hate-type organizations and groupings, their leadership, spokesmen, membership, and supporters, and to counter their propensity for violence and civil disorder. The activities of all such groups of intelligence interest to this Bureau must be followed on a continuous basis so we will be in a position to promptly take advantage of all opportunities for counterintelligence and to inspire action in instances where circumstances warrant. The pernicious background of such groups, their duplicity, and devious maneuvers must be exposed to public scrutiny where such publicity will have a neutralizing effect. Efforts of the various groups...
Letter to SAC, Albany

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS

- To consolidate their forces or to recruit new or youthful adherents must be frustrated. No opportunity should be missed to exploit through counterintelligence techniques the organizational and personal conflicts of the leaderships of the groups and where possible an effort should be made to capitalize upon existing conflicts between competing black nationalist organizations. When an opportunity is apparent to disrupt or neutralize black nationalist, hate-type organizations through the cooperation of established/local news media contacts or through such contact with sources available to the State of Government, in every instance careful attention must be given to the proposal to insure the targeted group is disrupted, ridiculed, or discredited through the publicity and not merely publicized. Consideration should be given to techniques to preclude violence-prone or rabble-rouser leaders of hate groups from spreading their philosophy publicly or through various mass communication media.

Many individuals currently active in black nationalist organizations have backgrounds of immorality, subversive activity, and criminal records. Through your investigation of key agitators, you should endeavor to establish their unsavory backgrounds. Be alert to determine evidence of misappropriation of funds or other types of personal misconduct on the part of militant nationalist leaders so any practical or warranted counterintelligence may be instituted.

Intensified attention under this program should be afforded to the activities of such groups as the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Revolutionary Action Movement, the Deacons for Defense and Justice, Congress of Racial Equality, and the Nation of Islam. Particular emphasis should be given to extremists who direct the activities and policies of revolutionary or militant groups such as Stokely Carmichael, H. "Zap" Brown, Elijah Muhammad, and Maxwell Stanford.

At this time the Bureau is setting up no requirement for status letters to be periodically submitted under this program. It will be incumbent upon you to assure the program is being afforded necessary and continuing attention and that no opportunities will be overlooked for counterintelligence action.

This program should not be confused with the program entitled "Communist Party USA, Counterintelligence Program, Internal Security - C," (Buttles 100-3-104), which is directed
to SAC, Albany

RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS

against the Communist Party and related organizations, or the program entitled "Counterintelligence Program, Internal Security, Disruption of Hate Groups," (Butile 157-9), which is directed against Klan and hate-type groups primarily consisting of white memberships.

All Special Agent personnel responsible for the investigation of black nationalist, hate-type organizations and their memberships should be alerted to our counterintelligence interest and each investigative Agent has a responsibility to call to the attention of the counterintelligence coordinator suggestions and possibilities for implementing the program. You are also cautioned that the nature of this new endeavor is such that under no circumstances should the existence of the program be made known outside the Bureau and appropriate within-office security should be afforded to sensitive operations and techniques considered under the program.

No counterintelligence action under this program may be initiated by the field without specific prior Bureau authorization.

You are urged to take an enthusiastic and imaginative approach to this new counterintelligence endeavor and the Bureau will be pleased to entertain any suggestions or techniques you may recommend.
To: SAC, Albany

From: Director, FBI (100-448006)

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST-HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE

Title is changed to substitute Racial Intelligence for Internal Security for Bureau routing purposes.

PERSONAL ATTENTION FOR ALL THE FOLLOWING SACs

2 - Atlanta
2 - Baltimore
2 - Birmingham
2 - Boston
2 - Buffalo
2 - Charlotte
2 - Chicago
2 - Cincinnati
2 - Cleveland
2 - Denver
2 - Detroit
2 - Houston
2 - Indianapolis
2 - Jackson
2 - Jacksonville
2 - Kansas City
2 - Los Angeles
2 - Memphis
2 - Miami
2 - Milwaukee
2 - Minneapolis
2 - Mobile
2 - New York
2 - Omaha
2 - Philadelphia
2 - Phoenix
2 - Pittsburgh
2 - Portland
2 - Richmond
2 - Sacramento
2 - San Diego
2 - San Francisco
2 - Seattle
2 - Springfield
2 - St. Louis
2 - Tampa
2 - WFO
Airtol to SAC, Albany
RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST-HATE GROUPS.

BACKGROUND

By letter dated 8/25/67 the following offices were advised of the beginning of a Counterintelligence Program against militant Black Nationalist-Hate Groups:

Albany
Atlanta
Baltimore
Boston
Buffalo
Charlotte
Chicago
Cincinnati
Cleveland
Detroit
Jackson
Los Angeles
Memphis
Newark
New Orleans
New York
Philadelphia
Phoenix
Pittsburgh
Richmond
St. Louis
San Francisco
Washington Field

Each of the above offices was to designate a Special Agent to coordinate this program. Replies to this letter indicated an interest in counterintelligence against militant black nationalist groups that foment violence and several offices outlined procedures which had been effective in the past. For example, Washington Field Office had furnished information about a new Nation of Islam ( NOI) grade school to appropriate authorities in the District of Columbia who investigated to determine if the school conformed to District regulations for private schools. In the process WFO obtained background information on the parents of each pupil.

The Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM), a pro-Chinese communist group, was active in Philadelphia, Pa., in the summer of 1967. The Philadelphia Office alerted local police, who then put RAM leaders under close scrutiny. They were arrested on every possible charge until they could no longer make bail. As a result, RAM leaders spent most of the summer in jail and no violence traceable to RAM took place.

The Counterintelligence Program is now being expanded to include 41 offices. Each of the offices added to this program should designate an Agent familiar with black
nationalist activity, and interested in counterintelligence, to coordinate this program. This Agent will be responsible for the periodic progress letters being requested, but each Agent working this type of case should participate in the formulation of counterintelligence operations.

GOALS

For maximum effectiveness of the Counterintelligence program, and to prevent wasted effort, long-range goals are being set.

1. Prevent the coalition of militant black nationalist groups. In unity there is strength; a truism that is no less valid for all its triteness. An effective coalition of black nationalist groups might be the first step toward a real "Mau Mau" in America, the beginning of a true black revolution.

2. Prevent the rise of a "messiah" who could unify, and electrify, the militant black nationalist movement. Malcolm X might have been such a "messiah." He is the martyr of the movement today. Martin Luther King, Stokely Carmichael and Elijah Muhammad all aspire to this position. Elijah Muhammad is less of a threat because of his age. King could be a very real contender for this position should he abandon his supposed "obedience" to "white, liberal doctrines" (nonviolence) and embrace black nationalism. Carmichael has the necessary charisma to be a real threat in this way.

3. Prevent violence on the part of black nationalist groups. This is of primary importance, and is, of course, a goal of our investigative activity; it should also be a goal of the Counterintelligence Program. Through counterintelligence it should be possible to pinpoint potential troublemakers and neutralize them before they exercise their potential for violence.

4. Prevent militant black nationalist groups and leaders from gaining respectability, by discrediting them to three separate segments of the community. The goal of discrediting black nationalists must be handled tactically in three ways. You must discredit these groups and individuals to, first, the responsible Negro community. Second, they must be discredited to the white community,
both the responsible community and to "liberals" who have vestiges of sympathy for militant black nationalist simply because they are Negroes. Third, these groups must be discredited in the eyes of Negro radicals, the followers of the movement. This last area requires entirely different tactics from the first two. Publicity about violent tendencies and radical statements merely enhances black nationalists to the last group; it adds "respectability" in a different way.

5. A final goal should be to prevent the long-range growth of militant black nationalist organizations, especially among youth. Specific tactics to prevent these groups from converting young people must be developed.

Besides these five goals counterintelligence is a valuable part of our regular investigative program as it often produces positive information.

TARGETS

Primary targets of the Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist-Hate Groups, should be the most violent and radical groups and their leaders. We should emphasize those leaders and organizations that are nationwide in scope and are most capable of disrupting this country. These targets should include the radical and violence-prone leaders, members, and followers of the:

- 'Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee' (SNCC)
- Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC)
- Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM)
- Nation of Islam ( NOI)

Offices handling these cases and those of Stokely Carmichael of SNCC, H Rap Brown of SNCC, Martin Luther King of SCLC, Maxwell Stanford of RAM, and Elijah Muhammad of NOI, should be alert for counterintelligence suggestions.

INSTRUCTIONS

Within 30 days of the date of this letter each office should:

1. Advise the Bureau of the identity of the Special Agent assigned to coordinate this program.
Airtel to SAC, Any
RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST-HATE GROUPS

2. Submit a very succinct summary of the black nationalist movement in the field office territory. Include name, number of members and degree of activity of each black nationalist group. Also state your estimate of each group's propensity for violence. This is for target evaluation only, not for record purposes. Second, list Rabble-Rouser Index subjects who are militant black nationalists and any other militant black nationalist leaders who might be future targets of counterintelligence action because of their propensity for violence. Include a minimum of background information on each person listed; a few descriptive sentences should suffice.

3. List those organizations and individuals you consider of such potential danger as to be considered for current counterintelligence action. Briefly justify each target.

4. Submit any suggestion you have for overall counterintelligence action or the administration of this program. Suggestions for action against any specific target should be submitted by separate letter.

5. Submit, by separate letter, suggestions for counterintelligence action against the targets previously listed as field-wide. These should not be general, such as "publicize Stokely Carmichael's travel to communist countries," but should be specific as to target, what is to be done, what contacts are to be used, and all other information needed for the Bureau to approve a counterintelligence operation. Thereafter, on a ninety-day basis, each office is to submit a progress letter summarizing counterintelligence operations proposed during the period, operations affected, and tangible results. Any changes in the overall black nationalist movement should be summarized in this letter. This should include new organizations, new leaders, and any changes in data listed under number two above. Suggestions for counterintelligence operations should not be set out in this progress letter. Use the following captions:

1. Operations Under Consideration, 2. Operations Being Effected, 3. Tangible Results, and 4. Developments of Counterintelligence Interest. These 90-day progress letters are due at the Bureau the first day of March, June, September, and December, excepting March, 1968.
Airtel to SAC, Albany
RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST-HATE GROUPS

The effectiveness of counterintelligence depends on the quality and quantity of positive information available regarding the target and on the imagination and initiative of Agents working the program. The response of the field to the Counterintelligence Program against the Communist Party, USA, indicates that a superb job can be done by the field on counterintelligence.

Counterintelligence operations must be approved by the Bureau. Because of the nature of this program each operation must be designed to protect the Bureau's interest so that there is no possibility of embarrassment to the Bureau. Beyond this the Bureau will give every possible consideration to your proposals.
Memorandum

Mr. W. C. Sullivan

G. C. Moore

DATE: March 29, 1968

SUBJECT:

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE
(MARTIN LUTHER KING)

PURPOSE:

To publicize hypocrisy on the part of Martin Luther King.

BACKGROUND:

Martin Luther King has urged Negroes in Memphis, Tennessee, to boycott white merchants in order to force compliance with Negro demands in the sanitation workers' strike in Memphis.

When violence broke out during the march King led in Memphis on 3-28-68, King disappeared. There is a first class Negro hotel in Memphis, the Hotel Lorraine, but King chose to hide out at the white owned and operated Holiday Inn Motel.

RECOMMENDATION:

The above facts have been included in the attached blind memorandum and it is recommended it be furnished a cooperative news media source by the Crime Records Division for an item showing King is a hypocrite. This will be done on a highly confidential basis.

Enclosure

TJD:ted/ (7)

1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. T. E. Bishop
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
1 - Mr. D. Ryan (Mass. Hadia)
1 - Mr. T. J. Deskin
March 29, 1968

DO AS I SAY, NOT AS I DO

Martin Luther King, during the sanitation workers' strike in Memphis, Tennessee, has urged Negroes to boycott downtown white merchants to achieve Negro demands. On 3-29-68 King led a march for the sanitation workers. Like Judas leading lambs to slaughter King led the marchers to violence, and when the violence broke out, King disappeared.

The fine Hotel Lorraine in Memphis is owned and patronized exclusively by Negroes but King didn't go there from his hasty exit. Instead King decided the plush Holiday Inn Motel, white owned, operated and almost exclusively white patronized, was the place to "cool it." There will be no boycott of white merchants for King, only for his followers.
Transmit the following in AIRTEL (Type in plaintext or code)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-3-104-34)
FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-129802)
SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM IS-C (FREEDOMWAYS ASSOCIATES, INC.)

Be New York letter and LEM, 1/29/68, captioned, "Freedomways Associates, Inc., IS-C", reflecting that MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., head of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), is to give the keynote address at the 100th anniversary celebration of the birth of W.E.B. DU BOIS, on 2/23/68, in Carnegie Hall, New York City, which affair is sponsored by Freedomways Associates, Inc.

This affair has been publicized in newspapers such as "The Village Voice" and the "National Guardian".

There can be little doubt that the main purpose of this affair is to raise money to help finance the magazine "Freedomways", published by Freedomways Associates. The NYO has received indications that the affair is going to be a financial success and the fact that MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., is advertised as the main speaker would help to insure its success.

Special agent in charge

Approved: 

Sent: 

Per: 

Date: 2/9/68

FROM SAC NEW YORK (100-129802) 
SUBJECT COMMUNIST PARTY USA COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM IS-C (FREEDOMWAYS ASSOCIATES, INC.)
The NYU has not received any indication, to date, about the contents of KING's speech. However, it is reasonable to assume that he will comment on the two items with which he is primarily concerned at the present time; namely, the campaign of civil disobedience which his organization, the SCLC, is planning for the spring of 1968 in Washington, D.C.; and the involvement of the United States in the Vietnam war which he opposes. It is believed that if publication is given to KING's appearance at Carnegie Hall on 2/23/68, on behalf of "Freedomways," linking it with his Washington, D.C. campaign, it could serve as a disruptive measure adversely affecting both "Freedomways" and KING's spring project in Washington, D.C. It is suggested that the Bureau, through its contacts with the mass media, release the following communication:

"In Martin Luther King, Jr. courting Red favor to bolster his civil disobedience campaign in Washington, D.C., "Freedomways," the Communist-backed publication in the civil rights field, is holding an affair in New York City, to raise money to help finance its operation. This affair is advertised as an observance of the 100th birthday of W.E.B. Du Bois, the well-known Negro educator who flirted with left-wing causes for many years before he finally announced his official joining of the Communist Party. This announcement was greeted with great fanfare by the CP press, so it is understandable why the 100th birthday of W.E.B. Du Bois was chosen as the setting to raise funds that will ultimately benefit the CP."

It is no coincidence that KING's old friend from the SCLC, who is one of the editors of "Freedomways," magazine, it is recalled, was reluctantly released by KING from his post in the SCLC in 1963, after it became public knowledge that a leading CP figure, was a member of KING's hierarchy in the leadership of the SCLC.

The CP has only recently issued a new and more militant line concerning the civil rights struggle in this country. The Party would welcome any opportunity to involve itself in a program such as KING has proposed for Washington, D.C. With its years of experience in agitation and fomenting conflicts, the CP would be a powerful ally for KINO in his efforts to promote civil disobedience in the spring of 1968. It appears that he has chosen effectively if not wisely.
Date: 2/15/68

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-3-104-34)
FROM: SAC, ATLANTA (100-66700)

COMMUNIST PARTY USA
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
IS - C
(FREEDOMWAYS ASSOCIATES, INC.)

Re New York airtel to Bureau 2/9/68 captioned as above and Atlanta airtels and LMs 2/12/68 and 2/15/68 captioned "WASHINGTON SPRING PROJECT, RM".

Re New York airtel suggests a communication which the Bureau might release through its mass media contacts. Re Atlanta communications reflect as of 2/7/68 and 2/12/68 MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., evidenced considerable skepticism as to the probable success of SCLC's WSP.

Atlanta is of the opinion that New York's suggested communication is excellent and has no desire to materially amend it.

The communication submitted by New York is designed, or course, to cause the reader thereof to ask himself the question whether KING is inviting CP assistance for the Washington Spring Project. It is felt possible additional impact might be given this question if New York's communication is introduced by pointing out that recently (for example, during the 2/6 and 7/68 Executive Board meeting in Washington, D.C.) it is understood KING evidenced some discouragement as to the probable success of the Washington Spring Project.
This is to recommend release of the attached article to sources in the mass news media field regarding Martin Luther King, Jr., leader of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, who is scheduled to give the keynote address at a fund-raising activity sponsored by Communist Party-controlled Freedomways Associates, publishers of the magazine, "Freedomways," which is self-described as a quarterly review of the Negro Freedom Movement. The objective is to show that King appears to be courting the communists to bolster his forthcoming civil disobedience campaign in Washington, D.C., in the Spring of 1968.

The communist publication, "National Guardian," recently publicized the fact that King is to give the keynote address at the 100th anniversary celebration of the birth of the late W.E.B. DuBois, well-known Negro educator who joined the Communist Party, USA, at the age of 93. This affair is scheduled to be held on 2/23/68 in Carnegie Hall, New York City, and is sponsored by Freedomways Associates. The main purpose of this affair is to raise money to help finance "Freedomways" magazine, and information has been received indicating that with King as the keynote speaker the affair will undoubtedly be a financial success.

Although no information has been received as to the contents of King's speech, it is reasonable to assume that he will comment on the matter with which he is primarily concerned at the present time, namely, his campaign of civil disobedience planned for the Spring of 1968 in Washington, D.C.
Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan

RE: COMMUNIST PARTY, USA
100-3-104-31

It is believed that the publicity given to King's appearance at Carnegie Hall on 2/23/68 in behalf of the communist publication, "Freedomways," could serve to show King's affinity for the communist movement and, thereby, place his planned civil disobedience campaign in the proper context.

The attached proposed article goes directly to the heart of this matter. It is proposed that this article be released to appropriate sources in the mass news media field through the Crime Records Division. The proposed article raises the question as to whether King is courting the communists to bolster his civil disobedience campaign.

In this connection, it is pointed out that former close associate of King's in the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, is one of the editors of "Freedomways." In 1963, King reluctantly released from his post in the Southern Christian Leadership Conference when it became publicly known that was a leading figure in the Communist Party. It is further pointed out in the proposed article that the Communist Party, with its years of experience in agitation and fomenting conflicts, would be a powerful ally for King in his efforts to promote civil disobedience in Washington, D. C.

RECOMMENDATION:

That this memorandum and the attached article be routed to the Crime Records Division for release to appropriate sources in the mass news media field.

[Handwritten notes and signatures]
Is Martin Luther King, Jr., courting fled favor to bolster his civil disobedience campaign in Washington, D.C.? "Freedomways," the communist-backed publication in the civil rights sphere, is holding an affair in New York City to raise money to help finance its operations. This affair is advertised as an observance of the 100th birthday of the late W. E. B. Du Bois, the well-known Negro educator who flirted with left-wing causes for many years before he publicly announced he had joined the Communist Party, USA, at the age of 93. This announcement was greeted with great fanfare by the Communist Party, USA, press, so it is understandable why the 100th anniversary of the birth of W. E. B. Du Bois was chosen as the setting to raise funds that will ultimately benefit the Communist Party, USA.

It is no coincidence that King's old friend from the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, one of the editors of "Freedomways" magazine, it is recalled, was reluctantly released by King from his post in the Southern Christian Leadership Conference in 1962, after it became public knowledge that a leading Communist Party figure, was a member of King's hierarchy in the leadership of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

The Communist Party, USA, has only recently issued a new and more militant line concerning the civil rights struggle in this country. The Party would welcome any opportunity to involve itself in a program such as King has proposed for Washington, D.C. With its years of experience in agitation and fomenting conflicts, the Communist Party would be a powerful ally for King in his efforts to promote civil disobedience in the Spring of 1968. It appears that King has chosen effectively, if not wisely.
Director, FBI (100-3-104-34)  
Mr. W. G. Shaw

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA  
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY - C  
(FREEDOMWAY ASSOCIATES)

Read 2/3/68, a copy of which was furnished.

Your proposed counterintelligence action set forth in resital is excellent and shows that your office is alert to the necessity to suggest effective counterintelligence measures whenever the occasion arises. Your suggested article has been given to cooperative news sources and you should be alert for publication of this information in your area. Promptly furnish the Bureau with copies of any news articles which relate to this matter, along with any tangible results.

1 - Atlanta (100-3888)

New York furnished a suggested article concerning the appearance of Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., at a fund-raising affair sponsored by CP-controlled Freedway Associates. The article raised the question as to whether King was courting the communists to bolster his civil disobedience campaign. It was also pointed out that a leading CP figure, one of the officers of Freedways-ESR Associates, Crime Records Division, New York, has been requested to be alert for the publication of any articles related to this matter.

MLK EXHIBIT F-451G
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448006)
FROM: SAC, BALTIMORE (157-2520)
SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE

The Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) has recently opened an office in Baltimore, Maryland, in connection with the proposed march on Washington by SCLC. A racial source of this office has advised that prominently displayed in the office are photographs of MARTIN LUTHER KING, MUHAMMED ALI and CASIUS CLAY. Copies of the publication "Muhammed Speaks" and other literature of the Nation of Islam (NOI) are available in this office. Additionally, there is indication that a representative of the NOI in Baltimore has been in contact with SCLC representatives here.

It is recalled that in 1966, KING and ELIJAH MUHAMMED were not able to resolve their differences at a widely publized meeting of the two.

At the present time, the SCLC is making very poor progress in either getting organized, finding sufficient people with funds to back the project, and in general finding enough residents in Baltimore to go along with the idea of such a march. Again according to our source, the leaders of the SCLC here are talking of picking a particular area of the City of Baltimore and concentrating on that area to gain support with the thought that thereafter to spread to other parts of the city.
Sources have advised this office that the presence of literature and photographs connected with the NOI, along with KING, have raised the question as to where all the money is going to in connection with this and other projects.

Attached to this airtel is a sketch of a suggested leaflet. It is requested that this be considered by the Bureau and that a refinement of this sketch be made with either a photograph or possibly a caricature and that a sample copy be furnished to this office. It is specifically noted that this office does not desire to use this leaflet at the present time; but, "if the SCLC does make any headway in a particular section in Baltimore City then this office would make a recommendation of anonymous distribution of this leaflet in quantity."
For the information of Atlanta and Chicago referenced airtel pointed out that the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) recently opened an office in Baltimore, Maryland, in connection with Martin Luther King’s Washington Spring Project. Baltimore advised that photographs of Martin Luther King and Muhammad Ali (Cassius Clay) are displayed in this office and literature of the Nation of Islam ( NOI) is available at the SCLC office. The FBI newspaper, “Muhammad Speaks,” is also available at the office. Baltimore suggested that a cartoon concerning the unusual alliance of the SCLC and the NOI be circulated in Baltimore if the campaign for the Washington Spring Project takes hold in Baltimore. The Bureau is holding this suggestion in abeyance at this time.

Because of the past conflict between Martin Luther King and the NOI, Baltimore is requested to consider the possibility of alerting a newspaper source to this situation. If a newspaper publicized the apparent alliance between King and the NOI, a militant, black nationalist group, it might prove embarrassing to King. Of course, the publicity should not be in a Negro newspaper that might only publicize the Washington Spring Project to King’s advantage.
Airto1 to SAC Atlanta

EX: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
(100-443083)

Atlanta is requested to comment on this suggestion and advise the above offices and the Bureau by return airtol. Advise what King's reaction might possibly be to this publicity. Chicago is requested to advise of any possible NOI reaction by return airtol, and thereafter, Baltimore should expeditiously submit recommendations for alerting a completely cooperative and reliable newspaper source who would publicize this situation as outlined above. Since the Washington Spring Project is scheduled to begin April 22, 1953, each office should promptly reply.

No counterintelligence action should be taken without Bureau authority. The Bureau appreciates Baltimore submitting this suggestion and recognizing the counterintelligence potential in this situation.
MLK EXHIBIT F-451J

Re Bureau airtel to Atlanta 3/14/68.

Baltimore's suggestion of utilizing a cartoon to depict the apparent alliance between SCLC and the NOI has, as the Bureau noted, definite merit. However, Atlanta is of the opinion the Bureau's suggestion of a pertinent newspaper article is more appropriate under the circumstances and might lend itself to wider circulation than a cartoon. The impact on KING of printed matter is apt to be greater than material presented in a cartoon no matter how skillfully it may be presented.

It is noted that during an SCLC retreat held in Atlanta in the middle of January 1968 regarding the WSP, KING stressed that obtaining jobs or income for Negroes would represent a mere fraction of that which America owes...
the Negro throughout its history. He declared America owes an incalculable sum to the Negro who throughout his long years of involuntary servitude labored to build this country. This language almost suggests some degree of adherence to teachings of ELIJAH MUHAMMAD.

It is suggested the proposed publicity might be slanted to convey the thought that the apparent alliance between SCLC and the NOI possibly grew out of the former meeting between KING and MUHAMMAD; that in connection with the WSP SCLC is "pushing" the NOI in Baltimore. This, of course, would raise a question as to the sincerity of KING's current statements that the WSP is to be based on nonviolent techniques because the position of the NOI toward the white man is basically one of annihilation.

While KING is currently seeking the cooperation of other organizations to assist with SCLC's WSP he has shown no willingness to use SCLC to assist any other organization.

In effort to finance the WSP, SCLC plans to seek financial contributions from Negro churches. Establishing the thought of an alliance with the NOI which is opposed to Christianity may well discourage a favorable reaction on the part of some Negro churches.

It is felt KING's reaction to the proposed technique would be positive for counterintelligence purposes. KING considers himself a devotee of the nonviolent philosophies of the late MAHATMA GANDHI. To publicly align him and/or SCLC with the NOI should trouble him on this basis. It is further conceivable that MUHAMMAD may see fit to respond to this publicity which should embarrass KING further.

On 3/14/68 the Vice President and Treasurer, SCLC, had recently commented he felt the SCLC staff employees assigned to Baltimore for WSP recruitment were inexperienced and not taking advantage of opportunities available to them (not explained). This might indicate a current weakness in the SCLC organization in Baltimore and that the proposed technique is timely.
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448006)
FROM: SAC, CHICAGO (157-2209)
SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE
(WASHINGTON SPRING PROJECT)

Re: Airtel 3/14/68.

Chicago has carefully reviewed the Nation of Islam (NOI) file concerning the suggestion in referenced airtel concerning publicity circulated to possibly embarrass Washington Spring Project (WSP) efforts in Baltimore through a suggested alliance between forces of MARTIN LUTHER KING and the NOI. Additionally, highly placed NOI sources at Chicago, specifically (inserted redacted), the latter of whom was not available until 3/20/68, were also contacted in this connection and the matter was indirectly pursued with them.

By way of background, as the Bureau is aware, KING and ELLIJAH MUHAMMAD, head of the NOI, met briefly in Chicago during 2/68 under amicable circumstances, primarily as a result of MARTIN LUTHER KING's then recent entry onto the Chicago civil rights scene. The meeting produced no tangible results insofar as cooperation, unity or program was concerned, however, did receive considerable local publicity. The meeting was basically for the purpose of showing unity within the Negro community.

KING suffered no adverse publicity as a result of this meeting although within several days MUHAMMAD, at an annual NOI Convention, made remarks critical of KING for being too close to...

JCS: mem
C. C. Bishop

1 - Bureau (RM)
2 - Atlanta (RM)
3 - Baltimore (157-2220) (RM)

EX-116
MAR 25 1959

Agent in Charge
the white man. In reaction to these remarks publicly, KING glossed over this criticism and to some degree capitalized on it, indicating that in his efforts to build unified support for the cause of the Negro, he was in contact with all segments of Negro opinion. Indeed, as recently as 8/67, MUHAMMAD indicated a desire to again meet with KING to discuss the unity of the Negro.

As the Bureau and Atlanta are aware, KING and CASSIUS CLAY were in personal contact in Louisville, Kentucky, in 5/67, in the course of open housing demonstrations held under SNCC auspices.

In subsequent newspaper publicity concerning this meeting, KING was quoted as having praised CLAY for his refusal to be inducted into the armed forces, coupling this reference to attacks on our policy in Vietnam. The NOI publication "Muhammad Speaks" was one of the papers which contained KING’s favorable remarks, including a comment that CLAY had given up $1,000,000 in order to stand up for what his conscience dictated as right.

In short it would appear generally to be true that contact between KING and the NOI is not a heretofore unknown happening and it would appear that any effort to utilize this situation in Baltimore must indicate more than casual associations or contacts, but in order to embarrass or inhibit WSP efforts should indicate a close working relationship or partnership between the two groups.

It should be kept in mind also, however, that as the above sources note, although CLAY is nationally known for his adherence to the NOI, he is also somewhat universally acclaimed and embraced by most groups within the Black Nationalist Movement, CORE and SNCC as examples, as well as the black community generally and has achieved somewhat the status of a martyred black folk hero.
Referenced airtel requested specific comments concerning NOI reaction to exposure of joint type efforts with KING's WSP.

As the Bureau is aware, ELIJAH MUHAMMAD has publicly stated that the white man has given him a million dollars worth of free publicity. This comment was specifically prompted by a television series about MUHAMMAD and the NOI which had nationwide exposure, as well as being generally a reflection of constant expose type articles concerning the organization. MUHAMMAD stated that MUHAMMAD has been openly upset over a period of such lack of publicity given him and his organization by the white press. It would appear, therefore, that any disruption program as envisioned would in all probability, have no real effect on the NOI and the most that would be forthcoming from ELIJAH MUHAMMAD or one of his spokesmen would be a simple denial of such support for the WSP. "Muhammad Speaks" is one of the principal sources of finance for the NOI and its presence in WSP offices in Baltimore is believed a reflection of NOI diligence in assuring wide-spread circulation of this paper and would put in any way embarrass or compromise the NOI.

The above is furnished for the information and consideration of the Bureau and other offices interested in this matter.
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448006)
FROM: SAC, DETROIT (100-34655)
SUBJECT: COUNTER INTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALISTS - HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE
(WASHINGTON SPRING PROJECT)

As a counter intelligence action relating to the Washington Spring Project (WSP), 4/22/68, Washington, D.C., Detroit proposes the utilization of the following technique, which in part, has already been instituted. Background data regarding this matter is hereby set forth:

MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., on 3/14/68, spoke at Grosse Pointe, Michigan, sponsored by the Grosse Pointe Human Relations Council, at which time he was warmly received and afforded a standing ovation from the over 2,500 spectators who attended his speech. Previous investigation regarding WSP had determined that KING and local leader and Detroit organizer for the WSP would possibly confer for purpose of determining a course of action in connection with Detroit's role in the WSP. In an effort to determine if any plan of action was devised at this time, the following pretext was utilized:

Bureau (RM)
2 - Detroit
JFK/4/68

EX 106
CLASSIFIED

3/23/68

FBI

Transmission follows.

[Teletype message content]

[Document is classified and marked as such]

Approved: Special Agent in Charge
DE 100-34653.

A stenographer of the Detroit Office, at the request of SA JOHN E. KING, placed a telephone call on March 20, 1968, to his place of employment "for her employer," G. L. WHITE, requesting to speak to him. When answered, the stenographer went through the business routine of advising "Mr. WHITE" was on the line.

From this point, SA KING advised that he was a local white businessman with the fictitious name of "G. L. WHITE" who was in complete sympathy with MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., and his Washington "camp-in." He was further advised that the caller had heard Reverend KING's speech at Grosse-Points and was deeply moved by KING's speech. G. L. WHITE further advised DITTO that he wanted to assist in the Washington "camp-in" in any way possible, especially from the financial end.

It was advised that the caller, under no circumstances, wanted his identity disclosed and any financial assistance offered this project was to be on a strictly confidential basis. He was told that the caller had colored employees in his company and would make these people available to participate for a brief period in the WSP at the caller's expense.

Further, that it was conceivable the caller would be in a position to help out with the financial end of travel to individuals from Detroit in connection with the WSP. He sounded favorably impressed and stated that he fully understood and appreciated the efforts of the caller to assist in this matter. He reassured that no mention would be made of any donations from this source. He expressed a deep feeling of gratitude and described the caller as one "deeply concerned with the under alleged group of humanity." It was mentioned to the caller did not want to be publicly identified as it could possibly render harm to his business and bring about retaliatory action from the white extremists involving possible physical harm to his wife and family.

It was at this point that the caller volunteered the information set out in re KING. He offered to furnish the caller with further information regarding WSP after his meeting with KING.
Prior to terminating the interview, it was established that would be telephonically contacted by the caller following his scheduled conference with KING in Detroit. It is the opinion of the contacting Agent that if KING actually comes to Detroit on 4/4/68, that this return telephonic recontact with would be productive and pertinent data regarding WSP could be obtained from him.

In addition to the above, it is suggested that the following action be taken prior to 4/4/68:

1. A plain unmarked envelope with $100.00 in cash, carefully wrapped, in commercial type stationery be mailed to care of East Side Voice of Independent Detroit (EVSVD), 10833 Mack Avenue, Detroit, Michigan, place of employment, registered, special delivery, marked personal on envelope. The stationery covering the money would have typewritten on it "To help the cause of humanity in my own humble manner. G. L. WHTZ."

2. After the scheduled 4/4/68 meeting between KING and another personal telephone call to will be placed in the same manner as the initial call. Further detailed information regarding WSP will be solicited from he will be apprised of the interest the caller has in Dr. KING's Washington "camp-in." Inquiry will be made at this time regarding "the good will gesture, set up by the caller."

3. In the event it appears to what has thus far transpired, another $100.00 in cash will be mailed to the same manner as described above. The enclosed notation on this letter would read: "To be put to the best use in your good endeavors. G. L. WHTZ."

Through G. L. WHTZ's show of good faith by giving $200.00 in cash "with no strings attached," he would be receptive to "G. L. WHTZ's" offer of making available to two chartered buses to...
transport Detroit area people to Washington for the WSP. The availability of these buses will be handled upon further
is to advise any inquiry regarding these buses that they
are being sponsored by ESVID or through Reverend KING.
will be contacted by "G.L. WHYTE" prior to the date
of departure for those traveling to Washington, at which
time will advise "G.L. WHYTE" of the time and
location where he wanted these two buses to be sent.

It is believed that this technique has the potential to achieve the following results:
1. It would create a deep resentment on the part of the people to be transported to Washington against Reverend KING, and the WSP when they are all set to go and no buses show up at the designated location, especially since and MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., are supposedly solely responsible for their transportation.
2. The resentment and confusion derived would undoubtedly strike at the heart of recruiting since it is unreasonable to assume he will have his closest followers and friends traveling to Washington at no expense to them personally.
3. Doubt and suspicion would cast and future efforts of recruiting other individuals not personally involved in this incident, thereby resulting in elimination of some of these individuals planning to participate in the WSP.

All possible precautions will be taken to preclude any embarrassment to the Bureau in the handling of this matter. No further action will be taken without prior Bureau authority and the Bureau will be immediately advised of any tangible results.

DE 100-34655
Memorandum

Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE March 26, 1968

G. C. Moore

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE
(WASHINGTON SPRING PROJECT)

PURPOSE:

To recommend item be furnished cooperative national news media source by Crime Records, designed to curtail success of Martin Luther King's fund raising for the Washington Spring Project.

BACKGROUND:

Martin Luther King has now scheduled the Washington Spring Project, his "poor people's march on Washington, D. C.," for the latter part of April, 1968. King's organization, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) has sent out a mailing to 70,000 potential financial contributors. King asked these 70,000 to contribute to the Washington Spring Project for the feeding and housing of the marchers.

At the same time, churches in the Washington, D. C., area have said they will feed and house King's marchers.

SUGGESTION:

That the above facts be given a cooperative news source by the Crime Records Division so that a story could be

I - Mr. DeLoach
I - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
I - Mr. Bishop
I - Mr. G. C. Moore
I - Mr. D. M. Wells
I - Mr. T. J. Deakin

Enclosure

TJD:df/dsm (7)
Memorandum to Mr. Sullivan

RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

given nation-wide circulation that King does not need contributions from the 70,000 people he solicited. Since the churches have offered support, no more money is needed and any contributed would only be used by King for other purposes. This item would need nation-wide circulation in order to reach all the potential contributors and curtail their donations. A sample item is attached.

ACTION:

That the facts about King's solicitation of funds unnecessarily be given a cooperative news source by the Crime Records Division.

[Handwritten notes:]

Verified 4/10/68
Martin Luther King, Jr., President of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), today finds himself in the embarrassing position of having too much money, or at least the probability of too much money. The SCLC sent out a huge mailing to its contributors pleading for funds for the Washington Spring Project, the "poor people's march on Washington." Thousands of contributors were urged to support the march financially in order to feed and house the demonstrators. But the churches in the Washington, D.C., area have offered to house and feed the demonstrators.

Now the contributions are beginning to roll in from the mailing and King doesn't need the money. An embarrassment of riches has befallen King, who will only use the money for other purposes. The churches had better come through with all the housing and support the demonstrators need, because there will be little money left for the "poor people" by the time the march rolls around.
To: SAC, Mobile

From: Director, FBI

Subject: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST - RATS GROUPS
WASHINGTON SPRING PROJECT

You are authorized to send the two anonymous letters not put in ritual. Prepare the letters on commercially purchased stationary and take all necessary precautions to ensure they cannot be traced to the Bureau.

Then the letters and envelopes are prepared, send them to the Baltimore office for mailing. For the information of Baltimore these two letters are designed to bring the true nature of the Washington Spring Project to the attention of Negro leaders in Selma, Alabama. Mail the letters the same day they are received from Mobile.

You are authorized to send the two anonymous letters not put in ritual. Prepare the letters on commercially purchased stationary and take all necessary precautions to ensure they cannot be traced to the Bureau.

The Bureau appreciates Mobile's suggestion. Advise the Bureau, under the above caption, of results.

Advising the Bureau, under the above caption, of results.

NOTE: ELC, ES, recommends that an anonymous letter showing the true nature of Martin Luther King's Washington Spring Project he in Selma, Ala., has made Cen-cen-tary wr

Instead, this letter would be sent from another city (CA) with a copy to the editor of the local newspaper, the "Selma Times-Journal" to give the newspaper an opportunity to interview about the letter and possibly publicize its contents. This newspaper has wide Negro leadership. The letter will urge the March to be King and personal aggrandizement, he is interested mainly in donations, that in no provision to house or feed marchers, and there might be vio-

MLK EXHIBIT F-451N
To: SAC, Mobile.

From: Director, FBI

Subject: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM

RACIAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON SPRING PROJECT

You are authorized to send the two anonymous letters not out in reality. Prepare the letters on commercially purchased stationery and take all necessary precautions to ensure they cannot be traced to the Bureau.

When these letters and envelopes are prepared, send them to the Baltimore Office for mailing. For the information of Baltimore these two letters are designed to bring the true nature of the Washington Spring Project to the attention of Negro leaders in Selma, Alabama. Mail the letters the same day they are received from Mobile.

The Bureau appreciates Mobile’s suggestion. Advise the Bureau, under the above caption, of results.

SAC, Mobile, recommends that an anonymous letter should be sent out in the nature of Martin Luther King’s Washington Spring Project he has made in Selma, Ala. This would be a letter to King. Instead of this letter being sent from Baltimore, it is recommended that another city write this letter to give the newspaper an opportunity to interview King about the letter and possibly publicize its contents. This newspaper has wide Negro leadership. The letter will note the march has been taken over by Negro radicals.

NOTE: SAC, Mobile, recommends that an anonymous letter should be sent out in the nature of Martin Luther King’s Washington Spring Project he has made in Selma, Ala. This would be a letter to King. Instead of this letter being sent from Baltimore, it is recommended that another city write this letter to give the newspaper an opportunity to interview King about the letter and possibly publicize its contents. This newspaper has wide Negro leadership. The letter will note the march has been taken over by Negro radicals.

MLK Exhibit F-4510
FROM: FR (100-448006)
DATE: 4/2/68

SAC, LOS ANGELES (157-2252) (P)

RE: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE

Re Bureau ariel dated 3/4/68.

1. SA FRANCIS G. KAHL has been designated coordinator of the counterintelligence program against Black Nationalist - Hate Groups for the Los Angeles Division.

2. The following Black Nationalist Hate type groups are active in the Los Angeles area at this time. They are given a priority listing based upon an evaluation of their size, aims, and propensity for violence. It is believed that counterintelligence action should be instituted first against those organizations heading the list. This target evaluation is based upon the opinions of the agents handling these organizations as well as information from informants in contact with these groups.

US

This organization is probably the fastest growing group in the Los Angeles area. It has about 200 members, of which approximately 20 are considered "hard core." The group claims to be culturally oriented, however, its leaders make rabble rousing speeches designed to appeal to the emotions of their listeners with suggestions of revolution and violence. It is rated as having a potential for violence.

STUDENT NON-VIOLENT COORDINATING COMMITTEE (SNCC)

This is a newly reorganized and reactivated group with an estimated 30 members. It is rated as having a potential for violence based on the composition of its leadership and membership rather than its size.
and otherwise exploit minor frictions and differences. For example, a rank and file member of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), might be asked during an interview if there was anything to the rumor that STOKELY CARMICHAEL plans force MARTIN LUTHER KING out of the SCLC and take it over, or even some more plausible type of rumor. It is felt that such activity might be useful in preventing the formation of a coalition.\(^\text{1}\)

Agents assigned to work racial matters have been fully advised of the importance of the counterintelligence program. Any suggestions or ideas will be submitted to the Bureau for approval, in accordance with Bureau instructions.\(^\text{1}\)
Detroit is authorized to continue pretense calls to the Detroit organizer of the Washington Spring Project. The Bureau appreciates the ingenuity and initiative shown in this matter.

However, it is not possible to authorize the expenditure of $200 "earnest money" to convince Ditto that a fictitious businessman will pay for transportation for the Project, transportation that would not materialize. Detroit should consider other methods of using this established pretense to disrupt plans.

NOTE:

Detroit has established the pretense contact with Ditto of a fictitious businessman, G. L. Whyte, who is purportedly sympathetic to Martin Luther King's March on Washington. Ditto has been so taken in as to furnish G. L. Whyte with considerable information about the march. Detroit now suggests offering to pay for two buses to bring the marchers to Washington. Whyte would make arrangements and, of course, no buses would show up. Detroit suggested sending $200 from Whyte to show Whyte's good faith. This would leave with $200 of our money, and he could always arrange for two more buses on his own.
MLK Exhibit F-451R

Memorandum

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448006)
FROM: SAC, WFO (157-1292) (P*)
SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE

DATE: 4/4/68

ReBulet 3/4/68, setting forth goals and targets of the Counterintelligence Program.

In accordance with the instructions set forth in reBulet, the following data is submitted:

1) SA ARLAND A. MOSEL has been designated as the coordinator of this program. This letter sets forth the combined specific thoughts, views and efforts of Special Agents assigned those organizations and individuals coming within the category of primary targets of the program, as well as the general views of all Special Agents handling racial matters in Washington Field.

2) Succinct Summary

SNCC in WDC has a staff of six people located at 1234 U Street, N. W. as Director. STOKELY CARMICHAEL announced new policy of SNCC to attain unity among Negroes and then Black Power. Muhammad's Mosque #6 of the NOI has about two hundred members, and preaches "white devils" will be destroyed; however, officials also advocate policy of no participation in demonstrations or public gatherings. The New School of Afro-American Thought has about ten dues paying members; DONALD T. FREEMAN now Director of the New School and Gaston T. Neal is the...
In regard to SNCC, WFO is probing for weaknesses which may be uncovered through sources in endeavoring to ascertain the identity of individuals who may be dissatisfied because of personality clashes and/or those who may be disenchanted with volunteer services for SNCC and have sought a salary; and those who may be suspect of "working for the man", i.e., suspect of being an informer.

In regard to [redacted] WFO has carefully considered him from a counterintelligence standpoint since his arrival in WDC to take up residence in January, 1968. However, no positive program has been developed due to the fact that the sedition investigation has been under active consideration from a prosecutive standpoint, and it was felt that a simultaneous counterintelligence program if operational against CARMICHAEL might tend to aggravate possible future prosecution and possibly lead to embarrassment. WFO feels that a positive counterintelligence program would be warranted against him especially in the absence of any prosecutive action against him. In assessing for potential counterintelligence, WFO has concluded that to be effective, such a program must discredit him in the Negro community where he enjoys considerable popularity, and would seemingly have to be stronger than alleged immoral or un-American political inclinations.

Concerning the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC) and the Washington Spring Project (WSP) office in WDC, sources who are familiar with SCLC operations have been instructed to look for opportunities to plant seeds of discontent and dissension between the SCLC and the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) workers there, particularly in the realm of funds; and to give rise to rumors that KING seems to be getting the lion's share of the funds, whereas the AFSC and the poor people who are to participate are getting little or nothing in the way of financial aid. It has been developed that WSP recruiter [redacted], since transferred, was at the center of a controversy concerning dissension in the office. WFO is in the process of developing further plans exploiting this dissension.
With regard to MARTIN LUTHER KING, WFO will continue to be alert for all possibilities to secure information of value in counterintelligence and for use in the program. It is felt, however, that the office of origin in this matter is in a better position to fully evaluate and be aware of possibilities to exploit in this program.

There is no organized Revolutionary Action Movement (RAM) activity in the WDC area which has risen to the surface; however, in the event any situation should arise which would lend itself to a counterintelligence move, steps will be taken to fully pursue that matter.

A source has advised that the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) is not currently active in WDC; that it has no organizational structure or planned program of activity. CORE has held no meetings in the past year.

WFO is also looking for opportunities to develop positive information concerning in this area in order to possibly effect a workable counterintelligence operation.

5) As noted above, WFO will continue to exploit all possibilities and opportunities to institute a successful counterintelligence program on the mentioned targets and upon the formulation of a specific plan on any particular organization or individual, will submit same by separate letter for the Bureau's approval.

With reference to Bullet of 3/18/68 and 4/2/68, in the above caption outlining counterintelligence situations with reference to SNCC and the Black United Front, these matters will be taken up by separate letters to the Bureau.

In accordance with instructions from Item #5 of Page 5 in the first reference above, the following suggestions are forwarded as possible counterintelligence actions against previously determined fieldwide targets:

I. SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE (SCLC)

MARTIN LUTHER KING

A. KING has changed the date of his Washington Spring Project (WSP) on several occasions; he has, on occasion, announced his anticipated presence at various locations, and then send a top aide instead of appearing himself; he has periodically changed the dates of his appearances in certain geographic areas. Many times, announcements were made when KING was to be at a specific WSP meeting in order to draw a crowd, when actually it was known in advance by KING that he would not attend.
It is felt the above considerations can be exploited to cause confusion in the efforts of KING and his group, and to cause Negro dissatisfaction with his operating procedures. This could be accomplished by the following:

1) When KING is actually to be at a gathering, have informants circulate false information as to time, date and location of KING's appearance, or variations of each, i.e., correct time and place, but different location; correct location, but different date, etcetera.

2) Have informants circulate information that KING is to be at announced local meetings of SCLC groups when, in fact, he will not be present.

3) Announce, through informant, when KING is to be at specific place, that this is only a guise to draw a crowd, and only local leaders will be present, excluding KING.

B. KING and his top aides dress expensively, generally travel via first class means, and stay at first class accommodations usually in predominate white areas of cities he visits. Recently, in Memphis, KING ran from his followers when violence erupted during a march he was leading there. It is felt the above two considerations could be linked to discredit KING and his aides with poor Negroes who he is seeking support from. This could be accomplished by the preparation of a flyer showing photographs of KING and aides dressed well, next to photographs of Negroes poorly clothed; under the photograph would be data concerning his expensive taxes, accommodations, use of private airplane, and related data; with this information would be information concerning
KING's deserting his followers during the Memphis riots. The key note message would be that KING and his aids are out for their own financial and physical welfare primarily. Flyers could be prepared from newspaper photographs of KING and his aids, or from some photographs available at various field offices. Distribution could be by anonymous mailings to poor Negro leaders, or by placement of copies at Negro meeting places by informants.

II. STUDENT NON-VIOLENT COORDINATING COMMITTEE (SNCC)

This group has discouraged its members from associating with whites. Information has been developed that some leaders and top functionaries, since the establishment of this policy, have periodically maintained close associations, to include residing with white girl friends. Information concerning these associations could be capitalized on by counterintelligence measures to show the hypocrisy of these leaders and to discredit the individuals involved with their new "Black only" oriented associates in the same organization, and to discredit them with leaders of other Black Nationalist organizations with whom they may be seeking support or rapport.

Specifically, efforts could be undertaken to obtain photographs of the principals involved with their white girl friends. The flyer could then be prepared containing this photograph or photographs. Under the photograph could be information regarding the principals' position with SNCC, followed by quotations of top SNCC leaders regarding associations with whites or Black Separatists statements. The flyers could be mailed anonymously to pertinent National and local leaders of SNCC and/or to leaders of other Black Nationalist organizations advocating Black separatism, rather than simply
Mr. McHARGH. Mr. Brennan, the first item under that tab, MLK exhibit No. F–451A, is the exhibit referred to this morning which targeted the SCLC for disruption under the counterintelligence program. Do you have that exhibit before you?

Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, I have it.

Mr. McHARGH. Can you explain to the committee why the SCLC was included in the group or within the groups that were to be targeted at that time?

Mr. BRENNAN. You have Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, SCLC, Revolutionary Action Movement, Deacons for Defense and Justice, Congress for Racial Equality, and the Nation of Islam. Some of those were at that time noted for their advocacy of violence.

As I indicated to you, the basis of the FBI investigation of SCLC was based on the degree of Communist influence and the determination of the extent of it, and I believe that is why it was included in that.

Mr. McHARGH. That was again based on what?

Mr. BRENNAN. Based on the degree of Communist penetration and influence within the SCLC.

Mr. McHARGH. Would you say that that so-called Communist influence was the influence being exerted on Dr. King by the advisers you mentioned earlier?

Mr. BRENNAN. Yes. There were that I know of, there were five or six individuals either in or connected with the SCLC at that time.

Mr. McHARGH. Mr. Brennan, is it your position that Dr. King and the SCLC were in fact being controlled by these advisers?

Mr. BRENNAN. I cannot make an assumption of that nature, because I don’t know the extent to which they did influence him. I can only tell you from the recipient end of the information that we were getting that they apparently did exercise some degree of influence over him. And I think the classic Bureau position is to consider whether or not the Communists can work themselves into a position where they can exploit somebody to exacerbate class struggle in our society.

And Martin Luther King was in a position where he had the power to move millions of people at his behest. And I think many of us in the FBI felt that all he had to do was say the word to foment civil strife, and it could have been brought about. And our feeling was that if Communist associates around him were able to convince him that nonviolence was not the way to achieve his end, and able to convince him that he ought to be going in the direction of violence, that it could be a threat to the stability of our society.

Mr. McHARGH. So you were talking about a potential at that time?

Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, the potential for long-range violence engineered by the individuals that we knew surrounded King, who had a background, either who were then current members of the Communist Party or had a background as previous Communist sympathizers.

Mr. McHARGH. Without agreeing that there was in fact that influence being exerted, you were in fact talking about a potential, that this might happen?
Did you have any information that Dr. King at that time was in fact following the course that you were worried might occur?

Mr. Brennan. There was a point in time, and I cannot tell you the exact time, because of the passage of time that has gone by now, but I recall one particular set of circumstances where apparently something had happened to tremendously upset and to excite Dr. King, and this was information developed over a wiretap, and he was discussing his concern with somebody else, and at one point he said, "Don't they realize that" in effect "if they don't get off my back I have the capacity to" in effect "start a mass wave of violence in the United States."

Mr. McHargh. Mr. Brennan, are you referring to the fact that the wiretap on Dr. King or a wiretap on Dr. King in 1964 and 1965 had picked up the fact that Dr. King had received, in the mail, a tape which was very derogatory, which had been sent to his home?

Mr. Brennan. Yes. It was obviously—I was not aware at the time as to what exactly had upset him, and I did not learn about it until years later, but at that time when I read what he had to say I immediately went to my boss, who was then Assistant Director Sullivan, and I told him that something had so upset King that it appeared to me that the man was on the verge of a potential breakdown, through my interpretation of what he was telling somebody else, and that whatever it was it appeared to me that he was not far from the breaking edge of departing from his consistent stance of advocacy of nonviolence.

Mr. McHargh. That was in fact in 1965, was it not, Mr. Brennan?

Mr. Brennan. I will have to take your word for it. The particular date escapes me but I believe that sounds about right, yes.

Mr. McHargh. And that was referring to the fact that Dr. King had received the tape which had been mailed from the Bureau, is that not correct?

Mr. Brennan. I later learned that was what caused his concern, yes.

Mr. McHargh. Between 1965 and 1967, when the SCLC was targeted, did you ever gather any information that would indicate that Dr. King was advocating violence, or that the SCLC was advocating violence, or any of the other concerns that you had expressed relative to the targeting of the SCLC?

Mr. Brennan. Not that I recall, no.

Mr. McHargh. So at the time that this memo was prepared, you had no information that the SCLC or Dr. King was in fact advocating any violent overthrow of this Government or any other subversive kind of activity?

Mr. Brennan. At no time during the investigation of Dr. King or the SCLC did I ever see anything which indicated that Dr. King advocated violence.

Mr. McHargh. So once again with respect to their being targeted—and we are not talking about opening investigation, we are talking about an official policy whereby the bureau would intend to disrupt, misdirect, discredit, neutralize, expose, et cetera, et cetera—that those tactics were to be employed against the SCLC based on nothing more than a potential, that at some point in time in the future?
Mr. BRENNAN. Based on the potential arising from the fact that there were a number of individuals in SCLC or working with Dr. King with current or previous Communist backgrounds.

Mr. McHARGH. Mr. Brennan, do you think today in retrospect that an organization such as the SCLC could justifiably be targeted for disruption, based on notions of a potential or an unascertained potential influence by subversive elements?

Mr. BRENNAN. No, I don't think so, because of what has transpired in recent years. It seems to me that it is readily apparent that the FBI engaged in overextending itself to a degree through this policy of neutralization or harassment, and in retrospect it appears to me that it should not at any time in the future be the function of the FBI to engage in such activity. So I would say that in the light of different circumstances, no, it should not be done.

Mr. McHARGH. Mr. Brennan, during testimony this morning, the allegation was made that on occasions the FBI files would be purged or altered in some way to avoid embarrassment to the Bureau. During your handling of the King security investigation, are you aware of any instance where such a practice was employed?

Mr. BRENNAN. No, and I am glad you brought that up, because I personally was in the Bureau 26½ years. I spent 16 of those years, from 1956 to 1972, working at FBI headquarters. In the Martin Luther King case I know of absolutely no instance in which there was any stripping or changing records in files.

In all the 16 years that I was at FBI headquarters, I know of only three or four instances in which field offices called Bureau headquarters, referred to a communication which they had sent in, and said that "We have made an error on page 2" or "page 5 of a communication. We would like to correct our copy, and would you correct the same file copy back in Bureau headquarters?"

I have never seen any instance in all those years at FBI headquarters where there was any manipulation, any stripping of files, any altering of files for purposes of covering up in any capacity whatsoever.

Mr. McHARGH. You have, however, in your testimony today outlined the set of practices employed by the Bureau designed to disrupt and discredit an American citizen that continued from 1963 to the time of Dr. King's assassination. Can you in retrospect explain to the committee, No. 1, whether or not you think the tactics that were employed were appropriate and, if not, why they occurred?

Mr. BRENNAN. I don't think that they were appropriate because I think that, in retrospect, it goes beyond the bounds of what the function of the FBI should be but, on the other hand, I think that you have to look at the precedent and at the basis which seems to have served as a motivation for such techniques. And in that regard, I think that you have to go back all the way through the 1940's, when the country was faced with wartime problems, with espionage problems, with a major serious Communist infiltration problem in the American labor movement.

I think you have to come up into the period in which you are talking about, and look at the burden of responsibility which was placed upon the FBI to investigate also groups like the Ku Klux
Klan, the American Nazi Party, the extremist groups of both the left and the right, and to look at, over the years, the practices that evolved, not only to investigate and to cover the activities of those groups, but to develop intelligence about them, but going a step beyond to the extension in procedures which ultimately delved into this concept of neutralization and disruption through the dissemination of public source information, in order to try to let the public know the truth about what certain groups or individuals or leaders of those groups are doing.

Mr. McHARGH. Relative to the King investigation, one final question. By the time Dr. King was assassinated, had the Bureau gathered any hard evidence, obtained any information which would indicate that Dr. King was in fact following the dictates of the Communist Party or was implementing any programs or policies which were at the behest or at the direction of the Communist Party?

Mr. BRENNAN. With one exception I would have to say that there was no hard evidence, and again you have to bear in mind that the FBI is a recipient of information as developed through sources and informants upon whom it has to measure a degree of reliability. In that regard we were told at one time, through this relationship with an individual who had previously operated in a clandestine Communist capacity, we developed information that King had once asserted that he was a Marxist and would have liked to have professed it publicly had it not been for the realization that it would have destroyed his capacity to serve as a leader in the civil rights movement.

Mr. McHARGH. Did you ever uncover any activities of Dr. King that would support that particular conclusion?

Mr. BRENNAN. No, no, we did not, although again in that regard I think I have to bear out, bring out that along the line it is my recollection that at one period of time the Justice Department sent two or more attorneys to meet with King at a motel, I believe in Atlanta someplace or perhaps in that area, I believe down in Georgia somewhere, where it was known that he was to have a meeting with these individuals, which had given rise to such concern within the FBI because of their either current or previous Communist affiliation.

Again, this is hearsay, but it is my understanding that after the departamental attorneys did confront King and did advise him of the Communist backgrounds of these individuals that he just dismissed it.

We had another situation involving an individual also, a member of the Communist Party, who turned up working in Martin Luther King's headquarters in Atlanta, and when it appeared in the press that this individual was a member of the Communist Party, King took a stand that he didn't know what the man's background had been, that he could only judge a man on what he was then today, but in view of the revelations, he was going to take the position of removing him from his position in the SCLC.

We subsequently learned that he did not remove him, but resorted to the alternative of transferring him to the fund-raising office of SCLC in New York City.
Mr. McHargh. Isn't it also true, Mr. Brennan, that Dr. King asked the Bureau to provide him with written documentation or information that would back up its claim concerning these advisers, that the Bureau in fact did not do so?

Mr. Brennan. I am not sure that Dr. King did ask but, if he did ask, I don't think the Bureau, under the provisions for the Bureau's responsibility for information, would have been able to accede to Dr. King's request to make available information in the files to him.

Mr. McHargh. But they did in fact disseminate information concerning Dr. King.

I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you, Counsel.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Fithian, for such time as he may consume.

Mr. Fithian. May we suspend for just 30 seconds, Mr. Chairman?

Mr. Fithian. Mr. Brennan, I am interested in some very specific answers. You testified earlier that you thought that some of the surveillance and some of the activities directed against Dr. King was because by 1963 or thereabouts you felt that the national security risk was increasing because of possible Communist influence upon him, is that correct?

Mr. Brennan. Yes.

Mr. Fithian. Does this refer to the adviser Stanley Levinson?

Mr. Brennan. Yes.

Mr. Fithian. Mr. Brennan, I am at a loss to know why you would target Dr. King in 1963 but not get around to looking into the Levinson matter or put any surveillance on him until 1966.

Mr. Brennan. Levinson had previously, and it is my understanding had been the subject of an FBI investigation all through that particular period. Why he was not a target for any type of counterintelligence program I cannot answer you.

Mr. Fithian. But it is correct, is it not, that the surveillance of Levinson started 3 years later?

Mr. Brennan. I don't know that the surveillance of Levinson started 3 years later, sir.

Mr. Fithian. As to when he was targeted for disruption.

Mr. Brennan. I don't know that he ever was.

Mr. Fithian. Let me turn to something else.

You have indicated that the tapes were the item that perhaps pushed Dr. King close to breaking away from his nonviolent stance, and perhaps bordering on turning to violence, is that correct?

Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir.

Mr. Fithian. Now at the time that the FBI decided upon sending the tapes to Dr. King, did it ever occur to you that when you invite a man who is a leader of a movement, as many interpret it at least, to commit suicide, that he might in fact, it might be reasonable to expect that he might in fact depart his nonviolent stance? Did that ever occur to anybody over there in the hen shed?

Mr. Brennan. I don't know whether it ever occurred to anybody. I was not aware of the sending of the tapes at that time, and I don't think—very few people in the Bureau were aware of it. I did
not become aware of it, as a matter of fact, until long after I had retired and I was personally told by Mr. Sullivan that he had discussed it with Mr. Hoover, and Mr. Hoover had approved for Sullivan to arrange to have those tapes delivered to King.

Mr. Fithian. On a broader scale, did it ever occur to you that the actions of the Bureau might so poison the atmosphere that someone might be encouraged to consider the possibility of assassinating Dr. King?

Mr. Brennan. That as a potential for the assassination of King never did occur to me, no.

Mr. Fithian. We are now in retrospect. I know something of the period you are talking about.

Mr. Brennan. Yes; if you recall that period, we were living in a period of extremes, of great social upheaval. It was a period in which our society was marked by increasing violence. I think if you check the statistics, for example, you will see that there were increasing assaults, and in fact ambushes and murders of public servants such as firemen and policemen.

Mr. Fithian. Let me ask you this. Let me just cut in here and ask you this. We all understand something of the period. Is it your present view then that because of the nature or the tenor of the times that a powerful agency like the FBI was entitled to or justified in taking what now as we look into it once all the information is out, is clearly violations of the law?

Mr. Brennan. In what respect, sir?

Mr. Fithian. Well, all sorts of respects, whether it is breaking or entering or whether it is using the Federal Government to invite somebody to commit suicide or whether, you know, just on and on and on. The documentation here just goes on and on and on, and I do not think that we are willing now to go in and try to refute all of that.

You have basically agreed on the interpretation of most of those documents. I am asking you for an interpretation.

Mr. Brennan. Yes, but I haven’t agreed to specific illegalities, and I would rather have those spelled out for me prior to agreeing to them.

I will agree that the bureau overextended itself, and exceeded itself, and to a degree abused its particular powers at that period of time, and I think in retrospect, from my own standpoint, I would like to see measures taken to insure that any agency such as the FBI would not engage in that type of behavior in the future.

I don’t know, for example, that there is let’s say a major threat that that can happen again today. I think that there has been a major change at all levels affecting the FBI, including a change in the director, including a change in the top echelon of the leadership of the FBI, including the Department of Justice taking a firm hold of the reins to control the FBI, including additional legislation which has been enacted in regard to the responsibilities of the FBI. And I think that if there is any danger today, it is not the danger of an abuse of power by the FBI; I think that it is limiting the potential effectiveness of the FBI in our society. I think extremes generate extremes, and I think that we have gone from one extreme to the other.
Mr. Fithian. It is my interpretation—I am going to ask Professor Blakey just now—it is my interpretation that the Justice Department concluded that the illegal entry, breaking and entering into apartments, et cetera, to plant an electronic surveillance was a violation of the law.

Professor Blakey, could you assist me on that just for one minute?

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Fithian, the Supreme Court held in Ervine v. California in a State case that a breaking and entering to place a microphone did in fact violate the fourth amendment. Following that, the Federal Bureau of Investigation requested of the Department of Justice an opinion whether that restricted their ability to place microphones, and the then Attorney General Brownell wrote them back in what has to be the unique opinion in the history of attorney generals' opinions that, despite the fourth amendment, the Bureau could continue to use microphones, but for any constitutional scholar after 1954 a trespassory entry to place a microphone violated the fourth amendment.

Mr. Brennan has previously alluded to some confusion in the law, and indeed he is probably correct, in the area of wiretapping. But certainly by the time the Supreme Court had decided a series of cases, one in the District of Columbia, the Silverman decision, it was fairly clear that the kind of electronic surveillance, either wiretapping or bugging, being conducted by the Bureau raised serious constitutional questions, and if the Department of Justice had taken a vigorous attitude toward the prosecution of it, the existing civil rights statutes made it criminal to deprive a person of their civil rights, and I take it that the fourth amendment is one of the American civil rights.

I have always been fascinated as a lawyer dealing with constitutional law to have heard the arguments presented by people in the Department of Justice that this did not violate the law.

Mr. Fithian. I was just reminded, Mr. Brennan, that the Church committee, going into this particular area at an earlier date, in intelligence activities, book 2, on page 219, the finding there, after going through all of this, simply says "The sustained use of such tactics by the FBI in an attempt to destroy Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., violated the law and fundamental human decency."

I did not really expect, you know, that we would now be debating this again. I presume that we all concluded that I was really trying to get at an interpretative question.

I am really though, I guess my final point, Mr. Chairman, is that I am really concerned that someone, a high official in the FBI, would tell me here today that, in consultation with Sullivan and everybody else down there, that you would not perceive, and even now do not perceive, that the activities of the Bureau in fomenting disruptive tactics and all kinds of activities to attempt to destroy the movement in the SCLC and Dr. King, that all of those activities and the kinds of leakage out to a friendly press, and we just have hundreds and hundreds of documents, which are not debatable, they are your documents. What is really puzzling me is that you would not even now see that that could be a contributing factor in the poisoning of the atmosphere, which would result in somebody out there in the 200 million people saying that the
United States would be better off if we totally violated this man's civil rights and assassinated him.

Do you not see even now any connection between that kind of clouding and bestirring and emotionalizing the atmosphere, mixing in with the national security risks and questions, just the whole poisoning of the atmosphere? I am just really flabbergasted that you would not see even now any association.

Mr. Brennan. I think when you talk about any public figure, anything that is said or written about him can generate feelings intensely one way or the other.

Mr. Fithian. I understand that, but I am talking about taking the entire weight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and directing it against one American citizen, and so poisoning the atmosphere with all kinds of statements to the press and all the kinds of activities that you engaged in that nobody would have even thought of down there that you might, by the tapes, push him into nonviolence, and he did have influence.

Mr. Brennan. Yes.

Mr. Fithian. Where he may say, OK, we are setting nonviolence aside, burn it down.

Mr. Brennan. But again I remind you that the only two people who knew about that situation involving the tapes, to my knowledge, are Hoover and Sullivan. How can I, based on something I know nothing about, perceive what are going to be potential——

Mr. Fithian. Let's not try to hide behind the incident. I am talking about the whole ball game. The tapes are one example, but we have gone over this with you in executive session. The staff has gone over it with you. I have questioned you before on this very matter, so let's not try to diffuse the issue by going to using you know that you did not happen to know about the tapes. That is not the issue at stake here.

My fundamental question is, did you not ever think at the time, by doing all of these things, that you could stir up an atmosphere of animosity which would result in somebody, not FBI but somebody, pulling the trigger? That is my question.

Mr. Brennan. That never occurred to me.

Mr. Fithian. Do you know whether it occurred to anybody in the FBI?

Mr. Brennan. I don't know.

Mr. Fithian. Mr. Chairman, I do not have any other questions.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Brennan, being familiar with the COINTEL program, you had to be familiar with Dr. King and his philosophy, were you not?

Mr. Brennan. Yes, relatively.

Chairman Stokes. And you knew his philosophy was in the discipline of Gandhi, that he believed in nonviolence and in love, did you not?

Mr. Brennan. Yes.

Chairman Stokes. And you knew as he went about the Nation what he was advocating for Black citizens in this country was equal protection of the laws, their constitutional rights, all kinds of guarantees that every American is entitled to? Did you not know that?

Mr. Brennan. Yes.
Chairman Stokes. And in his advocation of nonviolence you knew that he told little Black children not to burn, baby, burn, but learn, baby, learn? You have heard that over and over again, have you not?

Mr. Brennan. Yes, I heard that.

Chairman Stokes. Would you tell me what he was doing then in this country that in any way constituted a threat to the national security, or how he in any way was violating the laws of the United States to justify the COINTEL program?

Mr. Brennan. Well, as I indicated to you during my testimony, my particular concern was focused on the degree of Communists who might have been seeking to exploit him.

Chairman Stokes. That is not what I am asking you. Here is a man who obviously was not engaged in any type of criminal activity, was he?

Mr. Brennan. I never knew him to be engaged in any.

Chairman Stokes. What is your answer?

Mr. Brennan. I never knew him to be engaged in any.

Chairman Stokes. Well, if he was not engaged in any type of criminal activity, and he was exercising his rights as an American under the first amendment to the Constitution, what justification is there for the COINTELPRO program?

Mr. Brennan. Well, again it goes hand-in-hand with the basis for the investigation of King, which dealt with the subversive influence.

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if I could ask a question?

Chairman Stokes. I yield.

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Brennan, I have asked only one other question in these hearings and they were in the context of the hearings on the Kennedy side, but there has been one question that I have been meaning to ask of a responsible FBI official, and I guess maybe you are as good a one as any to ask it.

As I have understood the rationale for the COINTELPRO program, and I have had it explained to me by a number of FBI agents from time to time, it was that Dr. King was under the influence of the Communist Party, with one or more advisers, and therefore somehow he was a legitimate target for the Bureau to neutralize him.

If indeed he was under the influence of the Communist Party, would you not consider him a victim of their nefarious activity?

Mr. Brennan. I would, yes.

Mr. Blakey. Would you tell me why your COINTELPRO activity was directed at the victim and not the perpetrator?

Mr. Brennan. Because of Mr. Hoover's intense dislike.

For example, I would have gone along with the recommendation to advise Dr. King of the degree of Communist influence around him.

Mr. Blakey. I think I understand the first part of your answer. It was because of Mr. Hoover's position?

Mr. Brennan. I would think so.

Mr. Blakey. And it was Mr. Hoover's position that King was no good, isn't that correct?

Mr. Brennan. Yes.
Mr. BLAKEY. And that really was independent of any Communist influence on him, wasn't it?

Mr. BRENNAN. Yes.

Mr. BLAKEY. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. Mr. Brennan, are you aware that when Mr. Sullivan testified in the Senate on this precise matter, he testified on it being the FBI's war against Dr. King and he said this:

No holds were barred. We have used similar techniques against Soviet agents. The same methods were brought home against any organization against whom we were targeted. We did not differentiate. This is a rough, tough business.

Now that is the same way you would characterize what happened to Dr. King, is it not?

Mr. BRENNAN. Not exactly; no. I don't think that I would agree with Sullivan's estimate of that.

For example, I never would have, at least I like to think that I never would have indulged in sending those tapes anonymously to Dr. King.

Chairman Stokes. But he is saying what was done. He is not talking about what might or might not. He described what was done under the program against King.

Mr. BRENNAN. Yes, but you asked me if I agree with Sullivan's assessment, and I would have to disagree.

Chairman Stokes. But you are disagreeing on the basis of something you would not have done, you said.

Mr. BRENNAN. Yes.

Chairman Stokes. But on the basis of what was done, I want you to characterize it.

Mr. BRENNAN. Oh, I see what you mean. All right, then I will agree with Sullivan's assessment of the situation as he saw it.

Chairman Stokes. OK, and agreeing then, as he described it, can you justify it?

Mr. BRENNAN. In many respects, no.

Chairman Stokes. In any respect?

Mr. BRENNAN. Yes; in some respects. You mean the investigation of Dr. King?

Chairman Stokes. I am talking about the war against Dr. King.

Mr. BRENNAN. Oh, no, no. Where the whole thing got off the track really, I feel that the initial investigation of King was justifiable. I feel that the Bureau, under the mandate which it had, stemming from Presidential directives in 1939 to investigate subversive activity, had the responsibility to continue investigations of Communists attempting to exploit King.

I feel that where the investigation got off track was when it got into King's personal life, and there is where I feel the Bureau exceeded the scope of its responsibility and its authority. I feel it had no right to delve into that aspect.

Chairman Stokes. Would you also characterize it as being immoral, illegal, and unconstitutional?

Mr. BRENNAN. I would say unethical.

Chairman Stokes. You would not say it was illegal, immoral, and unconstitutional?

Mr. BRENNAN. In what specification? I mean you are grouping together things there.
Chairman Stokes. In view of the fact there is no justification for what was done in the COINTEL program. That is what I am basing it on.

Mr. Brennan. My particular characterization of it was that it was unethical and it should not have been done.

Chairman Stokes. Did you think that it was pure unadulterated arrogance for a man, and men serving under him in his organization, to arrogate unto themselves the power of removing a leader for a whole race of people, destroying that man, and then further arrogating it to themselves this kind of power to select for them or propose to select for them their next leader?

Mr. Brennan. I think that was an abuse of power.

Chairman Stokes. That was what?

Mr. Brennan. An abuse of power.

Chairman Stokes. But does it not even go further than abuse of power? Does this not go to the very root, the very fabric of a democracy, of a free society? Is this not governmental lawlessness under the guise of law?

Mr. Brennan. In some respects I would have to agree with that, yes.

Chairman Stokes. How would you characterize Mr. Hoover, the man who conceived of this kind of diabolical plot against this man?

Mr. Brennan. How would I characterize him?

Chairman Stokes. Yes, what kind of human being would you classify him as?

Mr. Brennan. I think Mr. Hoover was an individual with a supreme ego. I think that he was a very unique person in the history of our society. I think that he developed one of the most powerful positions in our society over the years that I have ever had occasion to witness, and I feel that he did so because, over the years, he was allowed to go unchecked in regard to his control and the direction that he furnished in regard to policies of the FBI.

I feel that he served under a variety of Presidents, a variety of Attorneys General, and he was responsible ostensibly to Congress through appropriation testimony each year, and I feel that at one point in time or another, some President or another or some Attorney general or another or Congress should have been taking a closer look at what the record said relative to the policy and direction of the FBI under Mr. Hoover.

Chairman Stokes. Would you further characterize it as megalomania?

Mr. Brennan. If I were to be asked to make a medical assessment I might characterize it in those terms, but I really obviously am not qualified to make a medical characterization of it. And I would have to say, lacking the capacity to give a professional medical judgment, I would have to just say that it appeared to me that he was a man with a supreme ego.

Chairman Stokes. And when we use this term "neutralize" that was being used in this program, that is really a euphemism. What you really were intent upon doing was destroying Dr. King, was it not?

Mr. Brennan. Intent upon removing him from his capacity as the leader of the civil rights movement.
Chairman Stokes. And what was there, given the kind of tone that was set from the top by Mr. Hoover, the realization that he wanted Dr. King destroyed, and with that notion being prevalent throughout the entire Bureau, and trickling all the way down to men like Rose who came in this afternoon and admitted under oath that he was personally prejudiced, with the knowledge existing throughout the entire Bureau that Hoover wanted him destroyed, what would stop some agent from feeling that he could with impunity kill Dr. King?

Mr. Brennan. I think that is an extreme supposition. I think that the people in the FBI, at least on the basis of my personal experience over the years that I worked in the FBI for more than 26 years, were men of great dedication and integrity, and I would say that that would be a far-out extreme case.

Now I am not saying that we never had any bad apples in the FBI, and that somebody would not consider doing a bad thing, but I would be shocked and amazed if any individual in the FBI ever did consider such a step.

Chairman Stokes. Were you shocked and amazed that it was testified to here that when Mr. Rose heard Dr. King had been killed he expressed joy, and used the term "They got the SOB"? Did that shock and amaze you?

Mr. Brennan. That shocked me, yes. I don't see how any man, particularly the men of the caliber of the type that we try to get into the FBI, would be joyful over that type of assassination.

Chairman Stokes. Regrettably, Mr. Rose is still with the FBI.

Mr. Brennan. Well, sir, that is not of my doing.

Chairman Stokes. I do not fault you for that. I fault the system for keeping him.

The gentleman from the District of Columbia, Mr. Fauntroy.

Mr. Fauntroy. Mr. Chairman, I have no questions. I am exhausted.

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Devine.

Mr. Devine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My questions will be more from the administrative standpoint, Mr. Chairman, rather than these other things to which you made reference. In order to clarify the record, when it is finally printed, you will recall—I think you may have been in the room, Mr. Brennan, when Mr. Murtagh was in here this morning. Were you?

Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir, I was.

Mr. Devine. And he made reference specifically to I think jockeying files. I would ask you if it is not a fact that each crime or each offense within the jurisdiction of the Bureau has a specific number classifying that particular offense, is that correct?

Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir, it does.

Mr. Devine. Such as a national motor vehicle theft act is a 26 case, a white slave traffic act is 31, and espionage I think is 65?

Mr. Brennan. Yes.

Mr. Devine. And internal security is 100?

Mr. Brennan. Yes.

Mr. Devine. What classification was the King case, if you recall?

Mr. Brennan. I don't even recall, sir.

Mr. Devine. Well, I refer you to any of these MLK exhibits that you have here.
Mr. Brennan. It is probably in the category of what we call inter—-

Mr. Devine. It has a 100 classification, does it not?

Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir.

Mr. Devine. That would indicate that the investigation of Dr. King was under the classification of internal security rather than a criminal offense?

Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir.

Mr. Devine. All right, now the second number after a classification is usually the chronological number of that case in the bureau or in the field office, is that right?

Mr. Brennan. In sequence, yes, sir.

Mr. Devine. And then the third number is the serial number?

Mr. Brennan. Right.

Mr. Devine. With the first serial the opening memorandum of the file is No. 1, so theoretically it would be 100-404-1, and each serial thereafter building up the file from the bottom up comes to a higher number.

My point in this is for the record that, if any serial is removed from a file, is it not a rule of the Bureau that a charge-out slip is placed in that file to replace that serial?

Mr. Brennan. Yes. In addition there is what they call an abstract and an index card maintained for every communication which refers to it by the same sequence of numbers, and which are all filed separately.

Mr. Devine. So it would be very easy to see whether anything was jockeyed or changed or moved around?

Mr. Brennan. If you were going to jockey or change anything or move anything around, it would be a rather complicated operation.

Mr. Devine. Now in another vein, and I will conclude with this.

You have been in the Bureau a number of years, been retired for a while. Did you not see a change in—I was going to say the mentality or the posture of the Bureau 10 years ago from 20 years ago from 30 years ago to possibly 40 years ago?

Mr. Brennan. Tremendous, tremendous change has taken place in the FBI. The change I think particularly has been reflected by the change of leadership. I think that it is true, for example, that every organization reflects the nature and character of its leader, and if it has a very strong, dominant, aggressive leader it will be a very strong, dominant organization. And if it has a more timid, soft-key type individual as its leader then I think that will be reflected in the activities of the individuals in it.

As you well know, Mr. Hoover was a very strong, dominant, aggressive forceful figure, and I think that the FBI under his particular aegis reflected the nature of his personality. He was a very driving individual, and I think that to me Mr. Hoover, while he and I had our major differences, he was a very unique, charismatic individual, and I don't think you will ever see the likes of Mr. Hoover in the FBI again.

I think that the changes that have taken place within the FBI have been much for the better, and I think that the younger men who have come to the fore in the FBI have replaced what this agent testified to here today as the clique. I don't think there is a clique in the FBI any more, and I think that there is a whole new
FBI today which is reflective of a more understanding type of personality which our colleges have been turning out in recent years.

Mr. Devine. You are aware, of course, of current criminal charges pending against present and former agents for their activities within the Bureau that violated—if they didn’t twist—the law? You are aware of those?

Mr. Brennan. Yes, sir.

Mr. Devine. And do you recall back, again, 10, 15, 20, 30, 40 years ago, the Bureau had what might be considered an “the end justifies the means” attitude in acquiring information and perhaps an overzealousness in agency supervisors? Is that correct?

Mr. Brennan. That’s correct, sir.

Mr. Devine. Have you seen a manifest change in that particular attitude?

Mr. Brennan. I think so. Of course, I remind you I have been retired for years now, but even prior to my retirement, after I left the Bureau headquarters, I served as agent in charge of the Alexandria Division, and I subsequently served as agent in charge of the Salt Lake City Division, just prior to my retirement, and there was a striking contrast to me between the types of individuals who had come into the FBI in my day and the types of individuals who I found working for me as relatively new agents.

In my day, you saluted and said, “Yes, sir.” When your supervisor and your chiefs gave you an order, you saluted and carried them out. In my last few years within the FBI, when I was in a position of giving orders to younger agents, they always wanted to know why, and if you recall, sir, we never asked why; and I think that that is very reflective of the nature of the change that has taken place in the personnel of the FBI today.

Mr. Devine. That same changed attitude is reflected in the dress code and personal appearance of agents?

Mr. Brennan. That I can’t quite agree with. You will notice I still wear white shirts and the like, and I do not affect a moustache or wavy hair or whatever; but when my agents would walk in in sports coats and flashy blazers and bright ties and moustaches, I had to agree that this was the changing nature of our times.

Mr. Devine. Are there a great many of those left that were referred to this morning as “clones”?

Mr. Brennan. I don’t think so. I feel that the changing times are being reflected in regard to the clones. I think that there were a lot of things that were problems and troublesome within the FBI, within the upper echelons of the FBI. I will agree that in many respects there was a clique, and I will agree that that clique did and was very selective in trying to keep its own men, its own hand-picked men, in positions of influence in the FBI; but I think that so many of them have retired. Today, when I look at the men in positions of leadership in the FBI, I hardly recognize any names anymore, and I must say that I hope that they have been replaced by younger men who hopefully don’t represent clones anymore.

Mr. Devine. Since the Director there have been the Ruckelshauses, and the Grays, and the Kellys, and now the Websters. You recognize change at a top level and on down the line; is that correct?
Mr. BRENNAN. Yes. Yes, I see a very drastic change that has taken place in the organization.

Mr. DEVINE. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ford.

Mr. FORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Brennan, the Chairman raised a question a minute ago about Mr. Rose, who appeared before the committee earlier today, and talked about rejoicing after he heard about the assassination of Dr. King. You indicated that you couldn’t see or understand why any member of the FBI would rejoice after hearing something like that.

Would you not expect Mr. Hoover to rejoice over the death of Dr. King, in light of his feelings toward Dr. King?

Mr. BRENNAN. I don’t think it would be fair for me to speculate on what the potential impact would be on Hoover. I can only tell you in my own terms how it affected me.

Mr. Sullivan called me immediately after, or shortly thereafter—the assassination. I can only tell you he appeared to me to be shocked by the situation. I was shocked by it, but we were both thinking in terms of what the impact would be on the country; and I suggested that we immediately send teletypes to every one of our major field offices, to warn and alert them that we could expect an outbreak of riots and violence throughout the United States. I had no time to think in terms of the aspect of Mr. King’s death other than the potential impact that it was going to have on this country, and I think my feelings in that regard were borne out by what did happen.

Mr. FORD. Did Mr. Sullivan ever express to you the feelings of Mr. Hoover?

Mr. BRENNAN. No; he did not. Mr. Hoover was a very private individual and, as I say, even as an Assistant Director, the only time that I got to see Mr. Hoover was when he would call me to his office, and then there was very little interchange that took place. It was simply that he wanted to give directions as to what to do; and even though I was at FBI headquarters for 16 years, I don’t think that I had occasion to see Mr. Hoover any more than maybe 10 times, and most of that came within the year or so that I was an Assistant Director, where he would call me or have me in conference, or whatever, and there were not too many men within the FBI who really knew Mr. Hoover closely.

Mr. FORD. Did you ever wonder why the FBI did not investigate the conspiracy element of Dr. King’s assassination?

Mr. BRENNAN. I assumed—and I cannot put this within the framework of the reference that I heard here this morning and the contrast to the investigation of the murder of the three civil rights workers as compared to the investigation that was conducted in regard to the death of Dr. King.

There are a couple of things that perhaps I can clarify for you in this regard.

My section handled, for example, the KKK. We handled the Black Panthers; we handled all the types of security and extremist groups, and whatever. Now, if, let’s say, a klansman engaged in a
bombing, that case, even though we had it from the aspect of conducting an intelligence-type investigation into the KKK, once there was a specific bombing, that went across to another division, to a bombing desk, even though they had no background whatsoever on this particular set of circumstances.

So that when King, for example, was assassinated, to me the logical thing to do would have been to keep the investigation of the assassination within the Intelligence Division, because we had all the background, all the intelligence, all the sources; but by the nature of the Bureau's organizational setup, it immediately flipped over, out of our division, into the civil rights section of the Criminal Division.

I believe it was a civil rights matter, was treated as a civil rights matter, and went over into the Investigative Division, and in this regard I never gave it any thought as to possible conspiracy. I look upon the FBI investigations as such, that when you investigate a set of circumstances, as we did in the murder of the three civil rights workers, it was not known for months who the killers were; so it was necessary to spend months and to bring in teams of agents and to locate and develop new sources, informants, whatever; and at the end of the line they finally solved the case.

And sitting across the street, as I was, looking at the nature of the investigation being conducted out of another division, it appeared to me that what had happened was, they immediately solved the case, and there was no basis for any further investigation. I never heard of any allegations of conspiracy.

It would have seemed to me that James Earl Ray would have been the first one to have brought up the situation, rather than just sit there and keep quiet about the situation. It really never even raised a question in my mind.

Mr. Ford. Is it possible that the Bureau could have opened the door for someone to come in to assassinate Dr. King, considering the feelings of Mr. Hoover and other agents within the Bureau?

Mr. Brennan. Would you repeat that?

Mr. Ford. Considering the attitude of Mr. Hoover and other FBI agents, do you feel that someone within the FBI could very well have opened the door for someone to assassinate Dr. King?

Mr. Brennan. That's a very difficult question to know how to answer, how any particular individual in our society may react to any given set of circumstances. I really don't feel that I could give you an answer to that question.

Mr. Ford. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman yields back the balance of his time.

Mr. Brennan, part of your answer there to the gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ford, was with reference to James Earl Ray and the nonpursuance of conspiracy.

If I understand you correctly, you are saying that it was up to James Earl Ray to raise the question of conspiracy with you?

Mr. Brennan. No; what I am saying was that I don't recall that anybody ever raised the question at that time, of a potential conspiracy, and the gentleman asked me whether the thought had occurred to me at that time, and I had to say no; it had not; and I
don't recall anybody else ever raising the question of a possible conspiracy at that time.

Chairman Stokes. Well, but wouldn't it be a natural and logical part of law enforcement procedure, once it has become known that this man was killed, to look into whether or not others were involved?

Mr. Brennan. I would assume——

Chairman Stokes. Let's just assume that the one individual was involved.

Mr. Brennan. I would assume that is what our Criminal Division did when it supervised the investigation of the case, and I would assume when they came up with Ray that there were no indications that there was any other involvement. I don't know.

The investigation was not focused out of our division and I had no knowledge of how the investigation was conducted or what it turned up, or anything.

Chairman Stokes. Well, my understanding is that the Attorney General raised the means by which the FBI got into the investigation. That would be the purpose for the FBI coming in, wouldn't it?

Mr. Brennan. The Attorney General what?

Chairman Stokes. Had raised the question of the possibility of conspiracy.

Mr. Brennan. If so, I wasn't aware of it. And, again, I will reiterate, the investigation was not conducted in the Intelligence Division; it was conducted and supervised by the Criminal Investigative Division. I had no knowledge of the investigation. I had no knowledge of what was done, what was not done, why it was done.

The divisions operate totally apart, and once that division had taken over that scope of the investigation then there was nothing that I was aware of as to the nature and scope of the investigation.

Chairman Stokes. I see.

Mr. Devine. Will you yield, Mr. Chairman?

Chairman Stokes. Certainly, I yield to the gentleman from Ohio.

Mr. Devine. Mr. Brennan, was there not a jurisdictional problem here? I ask this for this reason: The offense of murder is not necessarily a Federal offense, and I think it was against the peace and dignity of the State of Tennessee, the actual assassination. Did not the Bureau get into the matter at either the specific direction of the President or the Attorney General?

Mr. Brennan. I really don't recall, sir. As a matter of fact, that very question arose in my mind, because essentially what you have here is a murder, and again I'll say now, once this assassination occurred, the investigation was conducted out of another division.

I never did quite understand the basis for the FBI being called in to conduct the investigation. I would assume that it was conducted as a result of what was termed a civil rights violation, and you would have to direct your questions, really, to the men who supervised the investigation in the Criminal Investigative Division at that time, to really know what motivated the Bureau to be in there, what prompted the Bureau. I really don't know the answer.

Mr. Devine. It was my impression that it was at the specific request of the President of the United States. Perhaps Mr. Blakey can shed light on the jurisdictional issue that has been raised.
Chairman Stokes. But in doing so, I would cite the testimony of Mr. Murtagh this morning. He participated in the King investigation and characterized it as being essentially a fugitive investigation, and he said, further, that they never looked into the conspiracy aspect.

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Chairman and Mr. Devine, this will be the direct focus of the day's hearings, several days hearings, and we will go into exactly how the Bureau got into it and trace each of the investigative steps from testimony with people who are intimately familiar with the findings.

But the short answer to you is that the initial investigation probably was a fugitive case, although the predicate for it was a conspiracy to deprive Dr. King of his civil rights and the possible involvement of one of James Earl Ray's brothers—I stand corrected by the record if I am wrong—which served as the predicate for the initial investigation.

Mr. Devine. Thank you.

Chairman Stokes. The Chair yields to counsel, Ken McHargh for any further questions.

Mr. McHargh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Brennan, with respect to the discussion relative to the files stripped in question, you outlined the listing of the numbers on the documents. Those are referred to as serial numbers; is that correct?

Mr. Brennan. Yes.

Mr. McHargh. Isn't it also true that there is a policy whereby there might be found in various files unrecorded serials? Those would be serials that would have the file number but would not necessarily have individual document numbers, so that they could not necessarily be placed in sequence?

Mr. Brennan. I believe so; but now you are getting into an area where you would do well to interview somebody at the FBI who is familiar with the handling of the filing system.

I believe there are some nonrecorded serials; yes.

Mr. McHargh. The basis of the question was because that was our information after having interviewed individuals in the FBI, and I wondered whether or not you were familiar with it.

I have nothing further, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. Any further members?

Any other members of the committee seeking recognition?

Mr. Brennan, at the conclusion of a witness' testimony before this committee, the witness is entitled to 5 minutes to amplify or explain or in any way comment upon his testimony before the committee. I extend to you at this time 5 minutes for that purpose.

Mr. Brennan. I have nothing further to add, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you very much, Mr. Brennan. You are excused.

The Chair recognizes Professor Blakey.

Mr. Blakey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

George C. Moore was the Chief of the Racial Intelligence Section of the Domestic Intelligence Division from 1967 until after Dr. King's assassination. The Racial Intelligence Section was created in 1967 to replace the Subversive Control Section. Its primary responsibility was to deal with racial disturbances. Nevertheless, follow-
ing the memos that targeted certain so-called Black hate groups and Black leaders for counterintelligence-type programs, the Racial Intelligence Section was given the responsibility for handling these matters.

As Chief of the Racial Intelligence Section during that particular time, Mr. Moore was privy to all of the COINTELPRO proposals that circulated throughout the Bureau.

It would be appropriate at this time, Mr. Chairman, to call Mr. Moore.

Chairman Stokes. The committee calls Mr. Moore.

Mr. Moore, will you please stand and be sworn?

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you will give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Moore. I do.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you. You may be seated.

Would counsel for the witness please identify himself for the record?

Mr. Gettings. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I am Brian Gettings of the law firm of Leonard, Cohen, Gettings, & Sher of Washington, D.C.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you, sir.

The Chair now recognizes counsel for the committee, Ron Adrine.

TESTIMONY OF GEORGE C. MOORE; RETIRED FBI AGENT AND SECTION CHIEF, RACIAL INTELLIGENCE SECTION, ACCOMPANIED BY BRIAN GETTINGS, COUNSEL

Mr. Adrine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Moore, would you state your full name for the record and spell your last name, please?

Mr. Moore. My name is George C. Moore, M-o-o-r-e.

Mr. Adrine. And where do you presently reside?

Mr. Moore. I reside at 6715 North 27th Street, Arlington, Va.

Mr. Adrine. You are currently retired, are you not?

Mr. Moore. I am retired.

Mr. Adrine. And how long have you been retired?

Mr. Moore. I have been retired since July 31, 1974.

Mr. Adrine. Previous to your retirement, you were employed with the Federal Bureau of Investigation; is that correct?

Mr. Moore. That is correct.

Mr. Adrine. And how long were you employed with the Bureau?

Mr. Moore. I started working with the Bureau in September—pardon me—November 1941, and I worked until I retired at the end of July 1974.

Mr. Adrine. Can you briefly review the positions that you held within the Bureau during your tenure?

Mr. Moore. All right. I started with the Bureau as a fingerprint clerk in the Identification Division back in 1941. I became an agent in the fall of 1943, served as an agent until the summer of 1944 when I went into the Army, and shortly thereafter into the Navy. I was discharged in 1946.

In the fall of 1946 I went to the Philadelphia office, spent about 4 months in Philadelphia, transferred to the Washington Field Office in the early part of 1947, stayed in the Washington Field Office
from that time until I was transferred to the Bureau in approximately 1956, stayed in the Bureau until I retired.

Mr. ADRINE. Sir, your last assignment in the Bureau dealt with the Racial Intelligence Section, did it not?

Mr. MOORE. That is correct.

Mr. ADRINE. And it extended from what date until what date?

Mr. MOORE. It extended from the fall—I believe it was in September; could have been the latter part of August, somewhere approximately September 1967, until my retirement, July 1974.

Mr. ADRINE. Now during that timeframe the Racial Intelligence Section was known by a couple of different names, was it not?

Mr. MOORE. Yes. There was a change of names several times, mainly due perhaps to reorganization or other reasons, but at first, when I first became section chief, I became section chief of a section called the Subversive Control Section, which was primarily a section which deals with Communist Party members; and shortly thereafter there was a reorganization which Mr. Sullivan brought about, in which he put most of the racial matters in one section, in fact, all the racial matters in one section—

Mr. ADRINE. May I interrupt you for just a second?

Mr. MOORE. Yes.

Mr. ADRINE. Mr. Sullivan held what position at that time?

Mr. MOORE. Yes, Mr. Sullivan, who has been referred to previously in testimony, was the Assistant Director of this Division, the Domestic Intelligence Division.

Mr. ADRINE. Thank you.

Would you continue, please?

Mr. MOORE. After I became Section Chief of the Subversive Control Section, it was reorganized into a section called the Racial Intelligence Section, and then later as the militancy of the cases or the individuals who were the subject of cases increased, the name became the Extremist Intelligence Section; and then later on when Mr. L. Patrick Gray became the Acting Director, the name was changed to IS-1, and the “IS-1” stood for “Internal Security-1.”

Mr. ADRINE. In 1967 when this section was originally formed, what types, specifically, of cases were sent into that section?

Mr. MOORE. In 1967 when the Racial Intelligence Section was formed, we retained in that section as sort of a nucleus of a section one unit which was a unit that dealt with riots and disturbances. That unit, I believe, was called the Racial Intelligence Unit, and it was from that unit we obtained the name for the section.

Then in addition to that, primarily from the section headed by Mr. Brennan, who testified earlier, we were given the cases or the cases were transferred to this section which deal with the various white hate groups.

There was KKK, the Minutemen, American Nazi Party, cases of that nature. We also inherited the cases dealing with the Black nationalist hate—groups, those types, Black Panther Party, Revolutionary Action Movement, cases of that nature, and along with it we received cases which were the Communist infiltration cases involving Blacks.

Mr. ADRINE. Now—so it would be fair to characterize that section as containing all cases that dealt with individuals or groups who had evinced some form of racial hatred; is that correct?
Mr. Moore. Racial hatred and violence and things of that nature or ethnic—I apply the word “ethnic” in it also.

Mr. Atrine. Would it be fair to say, sir, that you held the office of Section Chief in the Racial Intelligence Section for the 7 months immediately preceding Dr. King’s assassination?

Mr. Moore. That is correct.

Mr. Atrine. Could you explain to the committee exactly where the Racial Intelligence Section fit into the Bureau structure, that is, the organizational structure of the Bureau?

Mr. Moore. The Racial Intelligence Section was one—my recollection is a little hazy here because we reorganized so many times, but I believe we had three sections in one branch which was called the Internal Security Branch.

Mr. Atrine. If I might interrupt you once again, it might help—I don’t know if you can see that far across the room—-

Mr. Moore. I can’t really see that far. I can see that far but I can’t read everything on the chart.

Mr. Atrine. OK. The clerk is handing you a smaller copy of that exhibit, which has been previously marked as Martin Luther King exhibit No. F-435.

Mr. Moore. Pointing to the Functional Organizational Chart under Division 5, you will note down at the bottom it shows “Racial Intelligence Section” and above that the “Internal Security Section,” and then the “Liaison Section,” all three of those sections under one Branch called the “Internal Security and Liaison Branch,” and that made up approximately one-half of the work of the Domestic Intelligence Division.

Mr. Atrine. Did your section direct any investigations at Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., or at the SCLC, while you were the section chief?

Mr. Moore. Yes. Those were two of the cases that we inherited from the Internal Security Section when our section was formed.

Mr. Atrine. So it would be fair to say that those were ongoing investigations that were vested with you at the time that you ascended to that position?

Mr. Moore. Yes, sir. Yes; sir; that’s correct.

Mr. Atrine. Can you recall how those investigations were designated by the Bureau?

Mr. Moore. These were, I believe, “Internal Security-Communist investigations, meaning that they were Communist-infiltrate investigations. That was the reason I believe, for the predication of the investigations.

Mr. Atrine. Was your section at any time vested with the responsibility for counterintelligence programs, or COINTELPRO, as I think the Bureau nomenclature is?

Mr. Moore. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. Atrine. And to your knowledge were there COINTELPRO programs prior to the time that you assumed the position of Section Chief of Racial Intelligence?

Mr. Moore. Yes, sir; that is so.

Mr. Atrine. And do you recall who those prior COINTELPRO programs were directed at?

Mr. Moore. Well, there was a prior counterintelligence program directed against the Communist Party and also one directed
against the white hate groups, primarily the Ku Klux Klan. I'm not sure, but possibly there were counterintelligence programs directed against the Russians in the foreign intelligence field.

Mr. ADRINE. Sir, were you aware of any particular attitude that Director J. Edgar Hoover had toward Dr. Martin Luther King and/or SCLC at the time that you became section chief of the Racial Intelligence Unit?

Mr. MOORE. Well, I might point out here that when I became Section Chief of the Racial Intelligence Section this was the first time—and I had been in the Bureau since 1956, and we are in 1967 at this point—all of my prior experience in the Bureau had been in the foreign area and I was made Section Chief of the Subversive Control Section, and then when we took over the reorganization we had the Racial Intelligence Section. I was well aware that one of the cases that came down to us was the one on Dr. Martin Luther King. I knew nothing at all about that case prior to its coming to us, except mostly what I had read in the media and what I had also heard by nature of scuttlebutt around the division.

Mr. ADRINE. Now can you relate to the committee what that "scuttlebutt around the division" was?

Mr. MOORE. Well, not only from the media but also the scuttlebutt around, I knew that the case of Dr. Martin Luther King was one in which the Director was very personally interested.

Mr. ADRINE. Did the fact that you knew that the Director had a special interest in Dr. King in any way affect the manner in which your investigations concerning Dr. King and his organization were carried out?

Mr. MOORE. Many times if you had a case or had a case in which the boss, the Director in this instance, was primarily or personally interested, you were certainly going to handle that case in a way that he was apprised of all matters which came about during the investigation, came to our attention; and you were going to keep him advised, and we did keep him advised.

Mr. ADRINE. Sir, would it be fair to say that at the time you became Section Chief of Racial Intelligence in 1967 that Dr. King and the SCLC had already been targeted by the Bureau as subjects for counterintelligence program proposals?

Mr. MOORE. I think that is a fair assessment.

Mr. ADRINE. Mr. Chairman, I would appreciate it if the witness could be afforded a copy of what has previously been marked as Martin Luther King exhibit No. F-451A.

This exhibit has also been entered into the record, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman STOKES. It has been entered into the record previously?

Mr. ADRINE. Yes, that's correct. The document has also been placed on one of the easels in a blown-up form.

Now, sir, the document that you have been provided is an internal FBI memorandum which relates to the establishment of a counterintelligence program aimed at so-called Black Nationalist—Hate groups. In that memo you will find the names of specific groups which were targeted.

Would you read those groups into the record for us, please?
Mr. Moore. If I am looking at the same thing you are referring to, it is on page 2, the second complete paragraph. It starts out:

Intensified attention under this program should be afforded to the activities of such groups as the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, Revolutionary Action Movement, the Deacons for Defense and Justice, Congress of Racial Equality, and the Nation of Islam.

Mr. Adrine. Sir, to your knowledge, did the SCLC exhibit any conduct that would cause you to conclude that it was a violence-prone organization?

Mr. Moore. It is not my recollection that it did.

Mr. Adrine. Were you aware of the existence of this memo when you became Section Chief?

Mr. Moore. Yes. As you pointed out, this memorandum was prepared before I became Section Chief, and I am not aware—whether I was I'm not aware today whether I was aware then of its existence at that particular time. However, I became aware of it later, definitely.

Mr. Adrine. Can you justify the inclusion of the SCLC on this list of groups which had, in fact, shown some propensity for violence prior to the date that appears on the memo?

Mr. Moore. No; I couldn't.

Mr. Adrine. Were you aware of any efforts undertaken by the Bureau to discredit King or disrupt his efforts prior to the date that appears on this memo, that is, August of 1967?

Mr. Moore. I really didn't know too much about it, although in the Division—and the Division being a rather small Division in a way and closely confined—I had heard either by rumor or perhaps on some shift of duty—we all took turns working on Saturdays and holidays—but I had heard about some of the things that had taken place to discredit Dr. King. Not very many of them had I heard about, but I had heard some.

Mr. Adrine. Let me back up a little bit. Now counterintelligence programs, as they are outlined in the memo dated August 25, 1967, have the purpose of exposing, disrupting, misdirecting, discrediting, or otherwise neutralizing the activities of the groups that they were directed at; is that a correct statement of the purpose of counterintelligence?

Mr. Moore. I think so.

Mr. Adrine. Were these activities that we have spoken of that predate this memo in the strict sense of the word “counterintelligence,” that you recall?

Mr. Moore. You mean the ones that I had heard of, the few that I had heard of?

Mr. Adrine. That's correct.

Mr. Moore. Well, I would say so. To discredit it would fall within the verb “discredit.”

Mr. Adrine. So, even though they weren't under this formal counterintelligence program, there was a program that would meet these goals in evidence at the Bureau prior to the time that this formal memorandum was issued?

Mr. Moore. I would say the activities would meet the definition of “counterintelligence.”

Mr. Adrine. Sir, in late 1967 Dr. King announced plans to launch what came to be called the Washington spring project,
which was alternately termed the “Poor People’s Campaign.” This event was to take place during the spring of 1968, and it was expected that it would bring thousands of people to the Nation’s Capital in protest of poverty that existed throughout the United States.

Can you recall what the Bureau’s attitude was toward this projected project?

Mr. Moore. I just have an overall, general knowledge or recollection of that, and it is my recollection that at that time the Bureau’s attitude toward that proposed march on Washington or poor people’s campaign, Washington spring project, whatever it might have been called at the time, was that there would be thousands of people who were coming into Washington and that the situation in the country was becoming quite volatile as far as disturbances and riots were concerned, and the fact that there could be such a mammoth, large march would be a matter of concern from a violence standpoint, and I believe—and it is also my recollection—at the time it was not only the Bureau’s feeling but it was also a feeling of other people, including the Department of Justice as well as—in the back of my mind, I think—the President of the United States was concerned about this sort of thing.

Mr. Adrine. Now, prior to this date—that is, 1967, late 1967—Dr. King had been involved in many marches which he had led; is that correct?

Mr. Moore. That’s correct.

Mr. Adrine [continuing]. Is that your understanding?

Mr. Moore. That is my understanding.

Mr. Adrine. And during the course of those many undertakings, did you ever have any knowledge of any of the followers of Dr. King involving themselves in violent acts during the course of his demonstrations?

Mr. Moore. I did not.

Mr. Adrine. Can you relate to the committee why it is that the Bureau would on this occasion assume that the Washington spring project would end in violence?

Mr. Moore. I don’t know whether the Bureau assumed that the Washington spring project would end in violence or not, but I think that the conditions might exist.

This was probably or possibly the thinking at the time, that there was the potential. Again, we were talking about the potential, and one of the units in our section was set up entirely for the reason of dealing in the potential of violence, and that was that Racial Intelligence Section, which was in the Subversive Control Section before we had the Racial Intelligence Section. And the purpose—one of the purposes—of the Racial Intelligence Unit was not only to follow the riots and the disturbances as they took place, but they also had the responsibility of notifying the Department and other agencies of the Government as far as the potential for violence was concerned.

Mr. Adrine. Now can you explain to the committee typically how a counterintelligence proposal would originate?

Mr. Moore. Counterintelligence programs, for the most part, would originate by a field office sending in a communication which would be captioned, “Counterintelligence.” Then there would be a
character, and that’s for routing purposes, of the nature of the counterintelligence, whether it had to do with the Communist Party, or racial intelligence, or internal security, the New Left, whatever.

When the communication reached the Bureau, it would be channelized, if it was racial intelligence, to our section. There it would go to the desk supervisor. The desk supervisor would analyze the communication; he would prepare a response approving or disapproving, and from that point it went up through the chain of command.

Mr. ADRINE. Now referring you once again to the August 25 memo that we have spoken of earlier, on the third page of that exhibit, and at the bottom, the second to the last paragraph, underlined are these words: "No counterintelligence action under this program may be initiated by the field without specific prior Bureau authorization."

Is that your understanding of the way counterintelligence was to be handled?

Mr. MOORE. That’s my understanding, yes.

Mr. ADRINE. And the next paragraph, the last paragraph on that document, reads: "You are urged to take an enthusiastic and imaginative approach to this new counterintelligence endeavor and the Bureau will be pleased to entertain any suggestions or techniques you may recommend."

Was that memo met with a great deal of response from the field, can you recall? I mean, when you came into the section—I know that this predates you—were there a number of counterintelligence-type proposals that had already been submitted for action in your office?

Mr. MOORE. I don’t recall the number. I don’t even recall one individual one at this particular point; but I’m sure that there was a response to this, and this last paragraph, the writer put that paragraph in there in order to get the field to contribute suggestions, and I’m sure that the field—as it usually did when the Bureau suggested something—did contribute.

Mr. ADRINE. Did the majority of such proposals originate with headquarters, or with the field offices?

Mr. MOORE. Oh, I would say the vast majority with the field.

Mr. ADRINE. And can you explain how a counterintelligence proposal that originated at headquarters would travel through the hierarchy?

Mr. MOORE. The procedure in headquarters to get anything through the chain of command as far as the written word is concerned would be through a memorandum. A memorandum would be prepared and the way it was prepared—it was for routing purposes—it would be prepared with the name of a section chief to the name of the division head.

In my instance, since I was Section Chief, the memorandums would be prepared, “G. C. Moore to W. C. Sullivan” or “C. D. Brennan” when he was Assistant Director; and then they would have the caption on it, the facts would be laid out, the memo would set forth the analysis and the recommendation for approval, and then it would go up the chain of command.
Mr. Adrine. Now this type of proposal could originate at the
desk of the supervisor who was in charge of that case; is that
correct?

Mr. Moore. That's correct.

Mr. Adrine. And it would follow the outline that you just laid
out; is that correct?

Mr. Moore. That's correct.

Mr. Adrine. As a matter of course, Mr. Moore, would all coun-
terintelligence proposals that came into the Bureau at one time or
another cross your desk?

Mr. Moore. They may not cross my desk, but they would either
cross my personal desk or the desk of my No. 1 man, who would be
acting in my stead, or if I were busy, if I were on something else at
the time, in order to keep the mail moving, he would initial it for
me and send it on up; so technically speaking, or theoretically—as
a matter of practice, it came through the front office of which I
was the head.

Mr. Adrine. So that means that all counterintelligence proposals
would come to the racial intelligence desk—section, to be dealt
with in that area?

Mr. Moore. That's true.

Mr. Adrine. And anything that came in as a result of that
August 25 memorandum would come to your section?

Mr. Moore. That's true.

Mr. Adrine. Did some of these proposals originate in your sec-
tion?

Mr. Moore. Yes, some of them did.

Mr. Adrine. And did you author any of these proposals?

Mr. Moore. Did I author any?

Mr. Adrine. Yes.

Mr. Moore. I don't recall whether I personally authored any or
not, but I think the ones that I can recollect originated in the unit
where we had a supervisor by the name of Mr. Deakin, who was in
charge, who was the coordinator of counterintelligence.

I personally don't recall authoring any myself, but it is possible.

Mr. Adrine. So it would be your testimony at this time that you
cannot recall authoring any of the proposals of a counterintelli-
gence nature that were aimed at Dr. King or the SCLC; is that
correct?

Mr. Moore. Offhand, I don't recall any.

Mr. Adrine. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have the witness
provided with a copy of Martin Luther King exhibit F-452A.

I would ask that that document be entered into the record.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the
record.

[The information follows:]
At 5 PM, 3/11/68, GEORGE C. MOORE, Section Chief, Racial Intelligence, Division 5, SOG, advised ASAC ELMER F. INGRAM and Supervisor JAMES D. INGRAM AS follows:

He advised that the following proposal was sent to the Director:

The racial conference at the SOG discussed the Washington Spring Project headed by MARTIN LUTHER KING and recommended that the facts about the Project be brought to the attention of possible participants through a rumor campaign. We would use our informants, without their knowledge, to spread the story about lack of funds and organization. Fears of economic reprisal and personal safety should dissuade potential participants. We would point out also that the Project is strictly for MARTIN LUTHER KING's benefit which is actually the case. He thinks he can regain lost prestige by this demonstration. Some suggested rumors would consist of:

- The participants would be told that their names would be taken in Washington and welfare checks from the Government discontinued.

- Possible threats of violence and bodily harm to the participants would be spread. Also information showing that the Washington Negro Community is incensed and furious with respect to this march on Washington by outside Negroes.

The above are a few of the type of rumors that can be used and you should tie in any rumor of this nature to your local problem. Also think of other counterintelligence methods and secure telephonic approval from the Bureau prior to utilization.

MLK EXHIBIT F-452A

Mr. ADRINE. Mr. Moore, have you had an opportunity to review that document?

Mr. MOORE. Yes. We discussed this in the previous session, in the executive session.

Mr. ADRINE. And it's a fact that that document is an internal FBI memorandum to the special agent in charge of the Jackson, Miss., field office, and is dated March 11, 1968, and concerns the Washington spring project, does it not?

Mr. MOORE. Yes.

Mr. ADRINE. Now if you will follow along with me, the fourth paragraph of that document states that: "The participants"—and
they are speaking about participants in the Washington spring project—"would be told that their names would be taken in Washington and welfare checks from the Government discontinued" and this is a form of rumor that this document suggested be disseminated in order to keep the numbers of people participating in the Washington spring project down; is that correct?

Mr. Moore. That's correct, yes.

Mr. Adrine. And another possible rumor that might be disseminated appears in the following paragraph which states: "Possible threats of violence and bodily harm to the participants would be spread. Also, information showing that the Washington Negro community is incensed and furious with respect to this march on Washington by outside Negroes."

Finally, the last paragraph appearing on this page reads that, "The above are a few of the type of rumors that can be used and you should tie in any rumor of this nature to your local problem. Also think of other counterintelligence methods and secure telephonic approval from the Bureau prior to utilization."

At the top of this memorandum appears the designation for the special agent in charge, "SAC, Jackson" and underneath that, "Section Chief George C. Moore, Racial Intelligence, Seat of Government"—that's "SOG"—that's what that stands for, is it not?

Mr. Moore. That's true.

Mr. Adrine. Do you have any specific recollection of this particular memo?

Mr. Moore. As I testified previously, I have no recollection of the memorandum at all. In fact, the copy that I have here—I don't even know if I dictated it or not, because I don't see my initials on it. However, I will accept it. You know, this could very well be exactly right; and I would—as I pointed out previously—the third paragraph here—you asked me the question of whether I originated the counterintelligence thing—I don't know whether I originated this or not, but it says that I telephoned ASAC Elmer F. Linberg and supervisor James O. Ingram as follows: "He advised that the following proposal was sent to the Director:"

Then the next paragraph says, "The racial conference at the seat of government discussed the Washington spring project headed by Martin Luther King and recommended that facts about the project be brought to the attention of possible participants through a rumor campaign."

As I pointed out previously, it looks to me like this memorandum was based upon another memorandum which put out the results of a racial conference at the seat of government, and perhaps after the memorandum had got up to the Director, someone said, "Call Jackson" or that's the reason that Jackson was called. And, again, I don't know whether that is the way it happened or not.

Mr. Adrine. Now in this type of a memorandum that speaks about the dissemination of rumors of violence or possible violence, was any consideration ever given to the possibility that such a memo or such a rumor would cause those people who did, in fact, participate to be so nervous as to anticipate violence and therefore possibly bring it on?

Mr. Moore. I don't recall of any such consideration either way.

Mr. Adrine. Is it possible that this type of a rumor campaign was also intended to discredit Dr. King?
Mr. MOORE. There is that possibility, but I do not recall it.
Mr. ADRINE. Sir, I would like to have you presented with Martin Luther King exhibit F-451B. This memorandum is also being placed in a blown-up form on the easel, as well as being presented to you personally, and it can be found under tab P in the exhibit book.

Mr. Moore, have you had an opportunity to review that document?
Mr. MOORE. Yes, I have.
Mr. ADRINE. Now, did your section originate this memorandum?
Mr. MOORE. This memorandum was originated from our section, yes, and there should be a cover memorandum to this. This is not a memorandum I have, incidentally; this is a personal attention AIRTEL, but there would be a cover memorandum on it.

Mr. ADRINE. Appearing in that document are certain characterizations of Dr. King and the SCLC. I think they are found on page 4. I am talking about the section that deals with targets, and if you will follow along with me, it reads that:

Primary targets of the Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist-Hate Groups, should be the most violent and radical groups and their leaders. We should emphasize those leaders and organizations that are nationwide in scope and are most capable of disrupting this country. These targets should include the radical and violence-prone leaders, members, and followers of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the Revolutionary Action Movement, and the Nation of Islam.

Sir, do these characterizations comport with what your understanding was of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference in 1967 and 1968?

Mr. MOORE. The answer is “No.”
Mr. ADRINE. Can you justify the inclusion of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, which was basically a group composed of southern ministers, primarily, in this characterization?
Mr. MOORE. I can’t justify it.
Mr. ADRINE. Would you say that this memo, which is dated March 4, 1968, signaled the intensification of the counterintelligence program in the Bureau?

Mr. MOORE. It signaled the intensification of the counterintelligence program of the Black nationalist-hate group, which intensified the previous memorandum which you referred to, the August 25, 1957, memorandum. In fact, I think the document so indicates that it intensifies.

Mr. ADRINE. And that was its specific purpose; is that correct?
Mr. MOORE. The specific purpose was to get more counterintelligence going; yes.
Mr. ADRINE. Sir, I think that this document, for the first time, specifically names Dr. King as a target for counterintelligence, and that appears on page 3 of the document—

Mr. MOORE. That’s true.
Mr. ADRINE [continuing]. Is that correct?
Mr. MOORE. Yes.
Mr. ADRINE. Are you aware of any event that occurred between the August 25, 1967, memorandum and this memorandum that would justify the Bureau’s inclusion of Dr. King’s name on the list of individuals specifically targeted for counterintelligence?
Mr. Moore. The answer is, I can not.

Mr. ADRINE. Can you give the committee any explanation as to why Dr. King's name would be included upon this list?

Mr. Moore. What I can do is merely speculate on this, and I don't know how good the speculation is, but I did have trouble with this particular memorandum when I was reviewing it, and I was asked about this memorandum before, when I appeared before the Senate select committee a couple of years ago and was asked the same question.

I think at the time that I was asked then—and it was an answer on the spur of the moment—to which I said, I said perhaps we couldn't have gotten a memorandum out without including Dr. King, in view of the Director's interest in him. And I don't know whether that's the correct speculation or not, but where I have difficulty with including Dr. King in here is the caption of the memorandum and the AIRTÉL is "Black Nationalist-Hate Groups," and Dr. King was not a Black nationalist; he didn't fit the definition of a Black nationalist-hate group, and the whole thrust of the memorandum deals with the Black nationalist-hate groups until you reach page 3, and then suddenly in the middle of the page there is inserted a paragraph, and it's like a patchwork quilt in effect, where it is brought out about Dr. King, and also on the last page, for emphasis, I believe, or somewhere under "Targets"—it's on page 4—"Southern Christian Leadership Conference" is put in there.

Now, having some knowledge of how memorandums are prepared in the Bureau, what you see here is the final product of a memorandum; you don't see the raw material and everything that went into the preparation of this memorandum; and I don't know what went into the preparation of this memorandum. I don't know how many days or weeks this memorandum was written, or rewritten, and went up the line and came back down the line at the time that it reached me in my position as Section Chief, from the agent who prepared it.

I sent it on up, approved it, but it could be very well that instructions had been passed down originally to include it, or maybe the memorandum was changed and someone said change it to include Dr. King.

I would speculate that perhaps after the first memorandum went up, someone said include Dr. King in it, but I cannot recollect that at all. Mere speculation.

Mr. ADRINE. This particular AIRTÉL carrying this information was directed to all of the FBI field offices; is that correct?

Mr. Moore. No; I don't think so. I think it added offices. At that time there were 50-some offices and I think if you count them—2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 18, 20, 40, 41—41—if it had gone to all offices, it would have saved a lot of time here, if they would have said to all offices, instead of listing every one of them.

Mr. ADRINE. And by the time it was disseminated to these 41 offices, this was Bureau policy; is that correct?

Mr. Moore. At the time Mr. Hoover put "OK, H" on it, it became Bureau policy, and this was approved by Mr. Hoover.
Mr. ADRINE. Would it be your feeling that the inclusion of Dr. King's name on a document such as this was probably, or most likely, at the insistence of the Director?

Mr. MOORE. It could very well have been.

Mr. ADRINE. Was your understanding of the Director's attitude such that you would feel that if he saw a particular document such as this that did not have Dr. King's name on it, that he would inquire why not?

Mr. MOORE. I think that is also a possibility.

Mr. ADRINE. In your position as Section Chief, if either on the way up or on the way down the chain of command you disagreed with the inclusion of a particular name or particular organization in a document such as this, would you have been able to delete that name?

Mr. MOORE. You have the right to disagree in the Bureau just like everywhere else, and you can write your thoughts out if you disagreed. But if you got word that this is something the Director wanted in the memorandum, I don't think it would be a good practice to disagree vehemently, it would be the better part of judgment to go ahead and put it in there, because that is the way it was going to be.

Mr. ADRINE. Mr. Moore, I would like to cover some specific counterintelligence program proposals that were put forward during your term as Section Chief in the Intelligence Section. In early 1968 your section was requested to update a profile on Dr. King which the Bureau had compiled some years earlier. The Bureau designated this document as a monograph, and it included the predicates for the original security investigation, that is, Dr. King's alleged advisers who supposedly had Communist backgrounds, and also contained some information that was of a highly personal nature.

This information was developed during the security investigation that was carried out on Dr. King. While you were Section Chief, did you ever produce a monograph or a document of similar magnitude or import on any other case that was carried in your section?

Mr. MOORE. I don't recall having done so.

Mr. ADRINE. What was the average caseload in your section during the time that you were Section Chief?

Mr. MOORE. I would say the caseload in this particular section varied between 5,000 and 10,000 cases.

Mr. ADRINE. To your knowledge, was the monograph ever disseminated outside the Bureau?

Mr. MOORE. I believe it was. In fact, I think the document shows the dissemination.

Mr. ADRINE. Mr. Chairman, I would like the witness to be provided with Martin Luther King exhibit F-441E, and I would like to ask that that document be entered into the record.

Chairman STOKES. Without objection.

[The exhibit follows:]
Mr. Adrine. Mr. Moore, have you had an occasion to review that document?

Mr. Moore. Yes.

Mr. Adrine. It is entitled “Memorandum” and it says that it is directed to Mr. W. C. Sullivan and that it is from G. C. Moore, that is, from yourself. The subject matter is Martin Luther King, Jr., and under a caption “Security Matter-Communist.” If you will follow along with me, please, the document reads:

Through liaison it has been determined that the recent monograph entitled “Martin Luther King, a Current Analysis” dated March 12, 1968, has been received very favorably by the intelligence community. Because of this, liaison has received requests from various agencies for copies of this monograph. We feel that the monograph would be helpful to other Government agencies with intelligence responsibilities.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that copies of the monograph on Martin Luther King, Jr., be furnished the following agencies by liaison: Central Intelligence Agency; Secretary of State Dean Rusk; Joint Chiefs of Staff; Major General Carl C. Turner, Provost Marshal, U. S. Army; General Leonard E. Chapman, Commandant, U. S. Marine Corps.

Mr. Adrine. Mr. Moore have you had an occasion to review that document?
Sir, was this document disseminated to any individuals that you are aware of outside the Bureau—I mean, not outside the Bureau but outside the government?

Mr. Moore. I don't know. The file would speak for itself. I just have no recollection. I don't know of anybody outside the government that it was disseminated to. But if it were, it would be in the file.

Mr. Adrime. Are you aware of any individuals, private individuals, who were briefed on the contents of that monograph who were outside of the government?

Mr. Moore. I don't know whether they were briefed on the contents of this particular monograph or not, but I am aware of one occasion prior to the assassination of Dr. King that Mr. Sullivan—and I am sure this was with the approval of the Director because I had heard him say this—was briefing two outstanding religious leaders on Dr. Martin Luther King, and perhaps he was using the material not only in this monograph but also the old monograph that was referred to earlier.

Mr. Adrime. To your knowledge, sir, did the Bureau have a policy of not disseminating information of a personal nature which it came across during the course of its investigations to sources outside the Bureau?

Mr. Moore. Yes. That is the general policy.

Mr. Adrime. What you are speaking of now indicates to me that in the case of Dr. Martin Luther King this policy was not strictly adhered to?

Mr. Moore. Not only in the case of Dr. Martin Luther King, but if there was any other individual that the Director wanted something disseminated to outside government circles, he would so indicate and it would be disseminated. He would be the authority for that dissemination to take place. I can recall other instances where things were sent to other people with the Director's OK.

Mr. Adrime. During the time that you were Section Chief, did the counterintelligence programs that were engaged in by the Bureau include any leaks to so-called friendly news sources?

Mr. Moore. Yes.

Mr. Adrime. Were these leaks inclusive of material that was produced internally in the Bureau which was then tried to be placed with the news media?

Mr. Moore. Yes.

Mr. Adrime. Did they also include information, which the Bureau came across which was of a derogatory nature toward an individual who was the subject of an investigation, that the Bureau wanted wider dissemination for?

Mr. Moore. That is true.

Mr. Adrime. Are you aware of any counterintelligence program proposals that were made concerning Dr. King subsequent to his death?

Mr. Moore. Yes. We talked previously about this matter. I have just mentioned one briefing and I consider that counterintelligence to discredit Dr. King, the briefing of the two religious leaders. It is my understanding or recollection that Mr. Sullivan was not able to brief those two religious leaders prior to the assassination, and
after the assassination he did so brief them. And then I think you will also find some documents which show that—I don’t know how many, one or two or a few—whereby some lobbying efforts were done to try to prevent a day being set aside in honor of Dr. King, or something of that nature.

Mr. Adrine. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you, counsel.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from the District of Columbia, Mr. Fauntroy.

Mr. Fauntroy. Thank you.

Mr. Moore, I have simply two questions. You mentioned a Mr. Deakin whom you characterized as probably responsible for some of the suggested projects to discredit Dr. King.

Mr. Moore. I don’t know whether he was responsible for the suggested ones, but he was our coordinator for counterintelligence.

Mr. Fauntroy. Is he still with the Bureau?

Mr. Moore. He is still with the Bureau.

Mr. Fauntroy. Thank you.

The second question, you were in the central office, the Washington office, for how many years?

Mr. Moore. I was in Bureau headquarters from 1956 to 1974.

Mr. Fauntroy. You had an opportunity, therefore, to observe Mr. Hoover?

Mr. Moore. Not really. I observed a lot his memoranda.

Mr. Fauntroy. Yes.

Mr. Moore. But not to observe Mr. Hoover.

Mr. Fauntroy. How would you characterize Mr. Hoover? What kind of man was he?

Mr. Moore. Well, Mr. Hoover I would say is a father figure, in a large sense. I would say he was a man that—he would be in a room—and I have seen this happen—and in that particular room—as it happened with many people, when Mr. Hoover walked in the room, you knew it when he walked in the room even though you didn’t see him. I think you have been in the presence of people like that.

He was probably the best administrator. I think President Lyndon Johnson characterized him as the best administrator he had ever seen. He was an outstanding administrator. He worked 24 hours for the Bureau. I think he considered that he worked 24 hours a day all of his life for his country. I think that he felt, and I felt also, that what Mr. Hoover did he did sincerely in what he thought was the best interest of his country.

But I also think that he is like all of us, that he was human, and I think he made mistakes and I don’t think I am really qualified to judge Mr. Hoover and his mistakes, but we do all seem to fall into that trap, judging others sometimes. But I am sure that he made his mistakes along with everybody else. But I had the greatest respect for Mr. Hoover. I think that he did a great service to the Nation from an overall—and I think you have to look at life on balance. I think when you put it on the scale, he will come out in history as a great American, a strong disciplinarian who did a great deal for this country.
I also feel perhaps one of the things he should have done earlier, maybe he should have gotten out of the Bureau sooner than he did.

Mr. FAUNTROY. Are you still with the Bureau?

Mr. MOORE. I am not. I am retired.

Mr. FAUNTROY. One more question. Do you recall what the aim of the COINTEL program was, if it had any program in Memphis in April 1968?

Mr. MOORE. I am not aware of any counterintelligence activity that took place in Memphis in April of 1968. There was a memorandum which has been shown to me which was news media consumption. Perhaps much has been said in the press about it to try to get Dr. King to stay at a different motel than he did. But outside of that, I have no recollection of any counterintelligence at that time.

Mr. FAUNTROY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you.

Mr. Moore, I just have one question. You recognize that an American citizen under the U.S. Constitution has what is known as the right to peaceably assemble and petition for one’s grievances, do you not?

Mr. MOORE. Absolutely.

Chairman Stokes. Would you not say that anyone who circulates rumors, untrue and unfounded rumors relating to violence in order to prevent one from the exercise of his constitutional rights, is thereby interfering with that constitutional right?

Mr. MOORE. I agree.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you.

The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Devine.

Mr. DEVINE. No questions, Mr. Chairman. I thank Mr. Moore for his testimony.

Chairman Stokes. Mr. Moore, at the conclusion of a witness' testimony before this committee either he or his counsel may address the committee for a period of 5 minutes. During that time you may amplify, explain or make any comment upon your testimony before this committee. I would extend to you or your counsel at this time 5 minutes for that purpose.

Mr. GETTINGS. May we have one moment?

Chairman Stokes. Certainly. Take your time.

Mr. MOORE. Thank you for the opportunity for appearing here this afternoon, because I think this committee, incidentally, is doing a job which is needed to be done. I think we have read too much about hearsay and rumor about the assassination not only of Dr. Martin Luther King but also the other big case that you have before you, and I just hope by you giving me the opportunity and other people like me the opportunity to appear before the committee as thoroughly and professionally as you have pursued it—and this is the fourth time I have been before either you or your staff and I come away with nothing but respect with the way your people are handling this investigation. It is very professional in every sense of the word, and I think the American people owe you a debt of gratitude when everything is published. Because at that time I think we should have the last word on both of these assassinations. I hope it is the last word and puts a lot of things to rest.

I would like to have one more final word. The counterintelligence program in my estimation today, looking at it from the
perspective of 1978 and 1977, a perspective which I didn’t have in 1967 and 1968, things are different, things do change, but I am convinced like nobody else is convinced that counterintelligence program as instituted here, not only in this particular case but perhaps in some other cases, has no place in the Bureau’s litany of investigation.

By the same token, I am sorry that even today, 4 years after I have retired and all the talk that has been said about what the Bureau has done and what it hasn’t done, that nobody has seen fit to give guidelines to the Bureau yet. I think the people in the Bureau are entitled to guidelines. If I had had guidelines in 1967, 1974, I would not have been able to operate by the seat of my pants, and other people also would not have operated that way. I think the Bureau badly needs guidelines, and I hope anything this committee can do to further that is going to be greatly appreciated.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you, Mr. Moore. You certainly have been very straightforward and a very candid witness before this committee. I think, in terms of the manner in which you have testified here today, you have aided the purpose for which this committee has been constituted, and we appreciate your testimony.

Mr. Moore. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you, sir. You are excused.

Mr. Gettings. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you, counsel.

Is there anything further, Mr. Blakey?

Mr. Blakey. There is one additional item dealing with one other witness. The man’s name is Theron Rushing, who was one of several FBI agents who supervised and coordinated the counterintelligence efforts of the Bureau’s Racial Intelligence Section. As the headquarters’ point of contact, case supervisors reviewed all COIN TELPRO proposals from the field before they were sent to higher levels of command.

From his vantage point, the case supervisor both observed and participated in the dynamics of the Bureau’s counterintelligence program as it was implemented against Dr. King and the SCLC, as well as other Black leaders and groups.

Mr. Rushing was a career agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation from January 19, 1948, until he retired on June 14, 1972. During his career, he served in several field offices; eventually he came to headquarters, where he was promoted to supervisor.

Although he carried the title “supervisor,” Rushing was in fact a “supervisor’s supervisor.” As such, he had five or six other case supervisors who reported to him.

Mr. Rushing has given the committee a full deposition concerning his participation in the King case.

In the interest of time, it seemed to me appropriate to enter into the record at this time, as Martin Luther King exhibit F-434, his deposition.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the record at this point.

[The exhibit follows:]
Stenographic Transcript Of

HEARINGS

Before The

Subcommittee on the Assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr.

of the

SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

DEPOSITION OF THERON D. RUSHING

Washington, D.C.
November 16, 1978

Alderson Reporting Company, Inc.
Official Reporters

300 Seventh St., S. W. Washington, D. C.
House of Representatives
Select Committee on Assassinations
Subcommittee on the Assassination of
Martin Luther King, Jr.

Deposition of Theron D. Rushing

Washington, D. C.
November 16, 1978

Page 2
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

November 15, 1978

House of Representatives
Select Committee on Assassinations
Subc. on the Assassination of
Martin Luther King, Jr.
Washington, D. C.

Deposition of

HERON D. RUSHING

called for examination by counsel for the Subcommittee on the
Assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr., pursuant to notice, in
the offices of the Select Committee on Assassinations, House
Annex No. 2, Second and D Streets, S. W., Washington, D. C.,
beginning at 2:55 o'clock p.m., before Annabelle Short, a Notary
Public in and for the District of Columbia, when were present on
behalf of the representative parties:

For the Subcommittee:

Ron Adriene, Attorney

ALDERSON REPORTING COMPANY, INC.
Mr. Adrine: Would you swear the witness, please.

Whereupon,

THERON D. RUSHING

was called for examination by counsel for the Subcommittee and, having been first duly sworn by the Notary Public, was examined and testified as follows:

EXAMINATION

By Mr. Adrine:

Q Mr. Rushing, would you by way of background please provide what your experience is, what your dates of service were with the Federal Bureau of Investigation?

A I entered duty on January 19, 1948. My last day of duty was June 14, 1972, when I retired.

Q During that time, undoubtedly you held various positions with the Bureau. Could you review those for the record?

A My initial office of assignment following training school was at Detroit, Michigan, where I was primarily engaged in the applicable type work. I was reassigned to the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, office in late 1948 where I was primarily engaged in internal security investigations. I was transferred to FBI headquarters as a supervisor in June of 1951 where I remained until my retirement.

Q Now, sir, generally speaking what are the duties of an FBI supervisor?
A It is to supervise the handling of field investigations.

Q In your position did you have any subordinates; that is, people who reported to you?

A Not initially. Not for some time.

Q Once you had assumed the position of FBI supervisor at headquarters, how long was it before you had subordinates?

A It was sometime in the early to mid 1960s. I don't remember the date.

Q At some point there was created a section within the Bureau that came to be called the Racial Intelligence Section.

A Yes.

Q And that section was created as a result of an internal reorganization in the Bureau, is that correct?

A That is correct.

Q Now you were transferred from your previous assignment to that assignment sometime in 1967 when that section was formed, is that correct?

A Yes.

Q Did you have reportees -- that is, subordinates -- at that time?

A Yes, five or six. I don't recall the exact number. It could have varied.

Q Now what title did your subordinates carry?

A Supervisor.

Q Was there a difference in the delegation of job
responsibilities? Did you advise them?

A  Yes, I would say so. I was responsible for overseeing or supervising their activities.

Q  So in essence you would be like a supervisor's supervisor?

A  That is correct.

Q  As a result was there a difference in the actual physical work load that you carried as opposed to theirs; that is, case load?

A  That is correct. As I recall, my case load was approximately half of their case load but I had other duties as well. For example, I was responsible for the correlation and preparation of budget material as well as information for the Director's annual report based upon information provided by various supervisors.

Q  So as a result you had not only responsibility for cases in the field but also administrative responsibilities, is that correct?

A  Yes.

Q  To your recollection can you at this point remember having responsibility or your particular unit having responsibility for the Martin Luther King or SCLC cases?

A  The case was assigned by unit.

Q  Was that an ongoing case within that unit at the time that it was started?

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A  Yes. It was transferred from another section. It was an ongoing case at that time.

Q  Was it transferred to that section at the time the section was formed?
A  I believe so.

Q  Were you immediately assigned responsibility for that case, if you recall?
A  Not directly. I was assigned to one of the supervisors within the unit.

Q  When you say one of the supervisors, you are speaking of one of the five or six individuals who reported to you?
A  Yes. I never had direct immediate supervision of the Martin Luther King or SCLC case.

Q  Can you recount in what instances and under what circumstances you would become directly involved in matters having to do with the Martin Luther King or SCLC cases?
A  I would see outgoing correspondence emanating from the section prepared by the supervisors handling the case. I would have seen incoming teletypes. Ordinarily I would not have seen letters or airtels.

Q  Now as far as outgoing correspondence, you are speaking of mail that was generated within your section and had to go either somewhere else within the Bureau or to a field office or outside of the Bureau, is that correct?
A  That is correct, yes.

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Q Any mail of that nature necessarily would have to cross your desk, is that correct?
A Yes.
Q If, for instance, you were not present when such mail was produced, in what manner would it flow then? Would it wait for you?
A No. Someone acting on my behalf would have initialed it up through the chain of command.
Q So it would be someone designated by you to serve that function in your absence?
A Designated by my immediate superior.
Q Who was in this case Mr. George C. Moore?
A George C. Moore.
Q Now during the time that you had the SCLC and King cases within your section or within your part of the section, do you recall the beginnings of the so-called COINTEL program?
Let me rephrase that.
Do you recall the initiation of COINTELPRO as a Bureau program during the time that the SCLC and King matters were part of your concern?
A I believe that the COINTELPRO was an ongoing program at that time before it became involved with Dr. King and the SCLC.
Q Now at various times during the past the Bureau has mounted counterintelligence or COINTELPRO type programs and they
have targeted various organizations or groups of organizations. I think that at one time there was a COINTEL program that was aimed at the Communist Party in the United States.

A Yes.

Q And one that was aimed at the Ku Klux Klan.

A Yes.

Q The one that I am speaking of specifically is the one that was aimed at black nationalists hate groups or hate type organizations.

A Yes.

Q We have showed you previously today, and I will try to find again, a memo which was dated August 25, 1967, which refers to the initiation of counterintelligence programs against such black nationalists hate organizations. Do you recall having seen this document at the time that it was produced?

A I do not recall ever having seen that.

Q Now this document that we have been referring to is captioned Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalists Hate Groups, Internal Security, and is to the Special Agent in Charge at Albany and is from the Director of the FBI, is that correct?

A That is correct.

Q Now we also have had occasion to speak about another document which in some ways intensified the counterintelligence program effort directed at these groups and it comes by way of a document which is referred to as an airtel dated March 4, 1968,
and once again it is directed to the Special Agent in Charge at Albany and it is from the Director of the FBI. The caption is Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalists Hate Groups, Racial Intelligence.

Would you review that for me, please, and tell me whether or not you have any specific recollection of the document or its contents?

A This does not have a date on it. Oh, yes, I see it; 3/4/68.

I have no specific recollection of having seen it but in all probability I did.

Q In your position as supervisor in the Racial Intelligence Section, would you have been responsible for implementing or following through on the types of proposals that were contained in this memo?

A No. That would have been up to the individual supervisor.

Q Would each of the individual supervisors that have responsibility for one of the groups named in this memo — that is, on page 4, the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the Revolutionary Action Movement or the Nation of Islam — would the individual supervisors for those groups have been responsible or would they have seen this particular airtel?

A I would certainly think so.
Q So that even though this airtel was specifically directed to the field offices since the proposals were supposed to come in to Washington in order to make the individual supervisors aware of the fact that they would be receiving these types of proposals, it would be likely that those supervisors would have gotten a copy of this airtel?

A Certainly.

Q All right. As a supervisor in the Racial Intelligence Section, did you have responsibility for any of the aforenamed groups? Were they on your case load?

A No.

Q Did you have responsibility for any groups that were targeted for counterintelligence?

A To the best of my recollection I had responsibility for no group as such.

Q Did you from September of 1967 to April of 1968 have occasion to see any counterintelligence programs, or program proposals that is, that were directed against Dr. King or SCLC?

A I am sure that I did but I have no specific recollection of any particular one.

Q How would you become aware of such a program or such a proposal?

A By the outgoing correspondence crossing my desk.

Q Do you recall whether or not the individual -- Let's back up a little bit. First of all, who was the specific

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individual who was responsible for the King, SCLC cases?

A We had changes in the personnel quite frequently. The only supervisor that I specifically recall was Dwight Wells.

Q Do you recall whether or not an individual by the name of T. J. Deakin ever had responsibility in that area?

A Only insofar as COINTEL was concerned. To my knowledge he was never an immediate supervisor of the King case.

Q So that incoming counterintelligence program proposals even if they were directed towards a specific group -- that is, like the SCLC or Nation of Islam -- would go to Mr. Deakin first? Is that the way it was set up?

A To the best of my recollection that is the way it was set up.

Q Would the individual supervisor who had primary responsibility for investigations of any particular group be informed of a specific counterintelligence program proposal?

A Yes, and he probably would have been asked to provide some background information.

Q If that supervisor disagreed with the proposed action, did he have any ability to challenge that action?

A Yes.

Q If you as supervisor or supervisor's supervisor had a disagreement with a particular counterintelligence program proposal, would you have any way of preventing its implementation?

A I would discuss it with the supervisor involved and we
would try to resolve our differences and if we could not, we would take it to a higher authority for final decision.

Q So that if you disagreed with the decision that had been made by another supervisor, then your immediate supervisor would serve as referee and make the final decision, is that correct?

A My immediate supervisor?

Q Yes.

A Yes, that is correct, and there might have been cases when he would have taken it even higher.

Q Under what type of situation would the matter be carried higher than your immediate supervisor? What is the type of circumstance that would cause that to happen?

A Well, I would say in a delicate situation where he didn't want to make the final decision as to whether to go ahead. Of course, he didn't have the authority to approve it on his own. The matter would have had to have gone up through channels.

Q Now from your recollection where did most counterintelligence program proposals originate; that is, in the field or in headquarters?

A I would say the field.

Q From the two memos that I have shown you previously it would seem that these memos were suggesting that such proposals were solicited. Is that an accurate portrayal from your recollection?
A Solicited? Yes.

Q Did you ever have occasion yourself personally to make a counterintelligence program proposal?

A No, not to my recollection.

Q Sir, were you aware of any particular attitude on the part of the then Director J. Edgar Hoover concerning Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and/or the SCLC?

A My feeling is that there was animosity. I don't know the extent and I don't know when the animosity began.

Q Would you say that the animosity that existed in any way was reflected in the type of investigation programs that were carried out as they concerned Dr. King and/or the SCLC?

A That would be pure conjecture on my part.

Q Would you say that the Director's attitude was known to the people who worked in your section?

A I would think so, yes.

Q Would you say that specific instances occurred where the types of proposals that the Director would have an interest in were made known to people in your section as they related to Dr. King or SCLC?

A Let's go back over that just a second.

Q All right. Let me try to rephrase and maybe cut it down a little bit.

Would you say that there were occasions where the Director's attitude toward Dr. King was evident from the types of proposals.
that he authorized or okayed that were to be placed into operation on Dr. King or SCLC?

A    I don't think so.

Q    Would you say that the SCLC or King investigations were the recipient of any special attention on the part of the Director?

A    I don't believe so.

Q    Would you say that the Director showed any greater interest in the SCLC or King cases than he did in say, for instance, the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee case?

A    Not really. Not to my knowledge.

Q    I have previously shown you a document which I have indicated is referred to as the monograph and which purports to be a document which purports to be "Communist influence in racial matters -- current analysis." Did your section prepare that document?

A    In reviewing the document it appears that it did.

Q    And by reviewing the document you are speaking of the procedures that were employed within the Bureau to indicate responsibility for the production of paper or production of memos and things of that nature? That is, there is a sign-off procedure that was used in the Bureau on documents as they came through to let people know that certain people had produced them, certain people had seen them, is that correct?

A    That is correct.

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Q And on the particular document that we are talking about, which I think is dated March 11, 1968, your initials appear somewhere on that document?

A They do.

Q Under the procedures that were in effect at that time, what does the appearance of your initials indicate to you?

A They indicate that I dictated the cover memorandum and letters of transmittal to -- was it Mrs. Stegall?

Q Right.

A And someone else at the White House.

Q I think that it states that there were attached proposed letters to Mrs. Stegall and the Attorney General with copies going to the Deputy Attorney General and Assistant Attorney Generals and the Internal Securities Civil Rights and Criminal Division.

Now this document was originally prepared for Mr. George C. Moore's signature, is that correct?

A cc Moore to Sullivan. Yes, he initialed this. I see Sullivan's initials on this. Mr. Sizoo signed it for Mr. Sullivan.

Q And the document was directed to Mr. Sullivan's attention initially?

A That is right.

Q So if your initials do in fact appear on the cover letter for the monograph, then it would indicate to you that you prepared the cover memorandum, is that right?

A That is correct.

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Q Would it also appear to you that you have read the document that underlay that memorandum?

A Oh, yes.

Q Now once such a memorandum was prepared, would you then keep a copy within your part of the section?

A The agent handling the individual case would have, yes.

Q And if someone within the hierarchy wanted a copy of that document, would they come to your section or to the specific agent for a copy of it?

A You mean outside the Bureau now?

Q Let's back it up and try to make it intelligible again.

If someone within the Bureau hierarchy wanted a copy of the monograph that was produced by your section, would they come to the specific agent within your section that had that responsibility?

A Normally they would call the section chief and it would be his responsibility to refer it to the supervising agent.

Q All right. Now if a proposal had been made from above that that monograph was to be disseminated outside of the Bureau, would the actual dissemination be carried out by the supervisor in charge of that case or would it be directed up to the Bureau official who had requested the dissemination for him to send it out?

A It would be directed to higher levels. The supervising agent would not do it on his own.

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Q Now, sir, do you know why the Southern Christian Leadership Conference was included with the groups who we have referred to previously as black nationalists hate type organizations?

A I have no specific recollection of why they were included.

Q Do you know why Dr. King was included as a target for counterintelligence program proposals?

A I presume because he was head of the SCLC.

Q Now was there anything within your realm of understanding, if you can recall at this time, that would have led you to believe that the SCLC in 1968 was a violence prone organization?

A Not to my recollection. There may have been elements within the organization.

Q Were there any such elements that you were aware of?

A Not specifically, no.

Q Even by inference had anyone inferred that there were elements within the SCLC that were violence prone to your recollection?

A No.

Q Could you relate what the procedure would be if the Bureau were to receive at one of its field offices a threat directed at an individual such as Dr. King, a death threat?

A It is my recollection that the standard procedure was to immediately notify the police authorities in the locale where
the threat occurred and for the field office to advise the Bureau by telephone or by teletype, depending upon the urgency of the matter, of the time element involved.

Q I want you to turn your attention, if you would, to the days and weeks immediately preceding Dr. King's death. Do you recall whether there were any counterintelligence programs that were instituted against Dr. King while he was in Memphis either on March 18, March 28, or on April 2 through 4?

A At this time I have no specific recollection of any particular counterintelligence action.

Q Now just prior to Dr. King's death and immediately following the march which ended in violence on March the 28th, 1968, in Memphis, a proposal was made to contact a news source and provide that news source with a document or with a blind memorandum which would suggest a possible news story and in that news story it would be suggested that Dr. King had sought the comfort of a white owned establishment outside of the black area of Memphis when he could in fact have stayed with his own people at a place called the Lorraine Hotel. This document was put forward as a possible counterintelligence program proposal. Do you have any specific recollection of a document of that nature?

A I have no recollection and I do not believe that I ever saw it.

Q I think that somewhere around here we have it. Let me see if I can find it for you.
The document that I have been speaking of is an internal memo of the FBI dated March 29, 1968. It is from George C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan and apparently, according to the initials that appear at the bottom left hand section of the document, it was authored by Mr. Deakin.

A I have no recollection of the thing. I have not seen that at all.

Q Your signature or initials don't appear on this document, do they?

A Not that I can make out.

Q All right. To your recollection and to your knowledge at present there were no active counterintelligence program proposals aimed at Dr. King or SCLC active in Memphis during the month of March or the first part of April of 1968, is that correct?

A I have no specific recollection of any. There probably were.

Q Are you saying that there may have been?

A There may have been.

Q And it would not necessarily have been brought to your attention as supervisor of the unit that you were supervisor of at that time?

A If I were at my desk, they would have come across my desk, yes.

Q In light of the events that occurred subsequent to Dr. King's assassination, would you have recalled if you had any
active proposals going at the time that he was killed?

A I think I would.

Q Now, Mr. Rushing, there is a document that purports to be an internal memorandum of the Federal Bureau of Investigation dated March 28, 1968, from George C. Moore to Mr. Sullivan and the subject matter is the sanitation workers' strike, Memphis, Tennessee -- racial matters. I am going to read it to you real quickly and see whether or not you have any recollection of this ever crossing your desk at that time. It starts:

"A sanitation workers' strike has been going on in Memphis for some time. Martin Luther King, Jr., today led a march composed of 5,000 to 6,000 people through the streets of Memphis. King was in an automobile preceding the marchers. As the march developed, acts of violence and vandalism broke out, including the breaking of windows in stores and some looting. This clearly demonstrates that acts of so-called non-violence advocated by King cannot be controlled. The same thing could happen in his planned massive civil disobedience for Washington in April."

Under Action Suggested it states that: "The attached is a blind memoranda pointing out the above which if you approve should be made available by the Crime Records Division to cooperative news media sources."

The blind memorandum reads as follows:

"Martin Luther King, Jr., president of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, injected himself into the sanitation

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workers' strike in Memphis, Tennessee, and the result of King's famous espousal of non-violence was vandalism, looting and rioting. Previously King involved himself in the strike, called for a general strike and called for a mass march. Today he led the mass march in an automobile at the head of the line. Negroes began shouting 'Black Power' and trouble began. King, apparently unable or unwilling to control the marchers, absented himself from the scene. Window breaking and looting broke out. Police officers were forced to use gas to break up the march and to control the crowd. It was necessary to activate the National Guard. Martin Luther King claims his much heralded march on Washington, scheduled for April 22, 1968, will also be 'non-violent.' He says he has persuaded militants and black nationalists to abandon violent extremism in Washington, D. C., during the march. Memphis may only be the prelude to civil strife in our nation's capital."

Had you seen this?

A Not to my knowledge.

Let me check that.

Yes, I dictated it.

Q Did you dictate it?

A Yes.

Q All right.

A I don't know whether I did the blind memo or not.

Q But you did dictate the cover memo?

A I did dictate the cover memo.
All right. Now wouldn't that fall under the category of a COINTEL type project?

Yes.

So in that particular instance was that a project that was initiated by you?

I would not say that this was initiated by me. I dictated a couple of memos. I don't recall this, to tell you the truth, but this would have been prepared by the supervising agent. That frequently happened. I would dictate the cover memo in many cases for stuff like that without having prepared the attachment.

Now on this particular document do you recognize the initials of the individual whose initials appear behind yours?

What do you mean? Up here is a --

There is a TDR and then there is -- what is that?

FHD. That was my secretary.

That was your secretary?

Yes.

In this particular instance those initials carried no particular significance?

Only as my secretary.

Only as your secretary?

Yes.

All right. Now do you know or would you have any specific knowledge as to whether or not that proposal was ever

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carried through?

A No, I have no way of knowing that.

Q Was there any procedure within the Bureau to determine if proposed articles such as that that were proposed to be placed with the press or to be given to friendly news sources or otherwise ever saw print?

A Yes, newspapers were regularly reviewed.

Q Would they be reviewed to determine if something like this had made the paper?

Let me back that up, too. Was everything concerning not only Martin Luther King, for instance, but any figure who there was an open fire on, collected by the Bureau? That is, as far as news media coverage is concerned, did the Bureau keep or collect all of the articles that were in print about any given individual that they had an interest in?

A All that came to its attention.

Q Was there a unit within the Bureau that was designated as the media unit?

A To the best of my recollection there was.

Q Do you know what the function of that unit was?

A Mass media, and it was known as the mass media.

Q I am sorry.

A That was not in my section and I am not too familiar with the functions of that desk.

Q So it is not necessary for you to have any contact with
that desk?

A I might have on matters of interest to my section or my unit, yes, but he covered a much wider spectrum.

Q Do you know whether he would be responsible for getting favorable material about the Bureau placed? Would that have fallen under mass media?

A He would not have been responsible for the dissemination of such information, no. He had no authority to do that on his own. The preparation of it but it would have had to be approved by a higher authority.

Q Now is the individual who held the responsibility for the mass media's section at the same level that you --

A It was not a section.

Q It was not a section.

A No.

Q Was it a unit similar to yours?

A No. It was, as I recall, a supervisor within a unit.

Q All right. So would it have been the next rung down on the hierarchy from what the position was that you occupied? Is that correct?

A Yes.

Mr. Adrine: All right. That is it. Thank you very much.

(Whereupon, at 3:57 p.m., the deposition was concluded.)

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CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Annabelle Short, the officer before whom the foregoing deposition was taken, do hereby certify that the witness whose testimony appears in the foregoing deposition was duly sworn by me; that the testimony of said witness was taken by me in shorthand to the best of my ability and thereafter reduced to typewriting by me; that said deposition is a true record of the testimony given by said witness; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which this deposition was taken; and further that I am not a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties thereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of the action.

[Signature]
Notary Public in and for the District of Columbia

My Commission expires
November 14, 1980
Mr. Blakey. With that, Mr. Chairman, the staff has nothing additional to present to the committee this afternoon.

Chairman Stokes. There being nothing further to come before the committee at this time, the committee adjourns until 9 a.m. Monday.

[Whereupon, at 5:15 p.m., Friday, November 17, 1978, the select committee adjourned, to reconvene at 9 a.m., Monday, November 20, 1978.]
INVESTIGATION OF THE ASSASSINATION OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.

MONDAY, NOVEMBER 20, 1978

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The select committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 9:20 a.m., in room 345, Cannon House Office Building, the Hon. Louis Stokes (chairman of the select committee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Stokes, Preyer, Sawyer, Ford, and Edgar.

Also present: I. Charles Mathews, special counsel; Edward M. Evans, chief investigator; Elizabeth Berning, chief clerk; G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel and staff director; and William A. Webb, staff counsel.

Chairman Stokes. The committee will come to order.

The Chair recognizes Professor Blakey.

NARRATION BY PROF. G. ROBERT BLAKEY, CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR

Mr. Blakey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

In February 1968, the Memphis sanitation workers, most of whom were Black, went on strike to gain recognition for their union. Members of the Black community in Memphis formed an association of religious, civil rights, and civil organizations in support of the strike. It was called COME, C-O-M-E, Community on the Move for Equality. Among its leaders were the Reverends H. Ralph Jackson, Samuel Kyles, and James M. Lawson.

Reverend Lawson and Reverend Kyles were veterans of the civil rights movement and associates of Dr. King.

Shortly after COME was formed, its leadership decided to invite national civil rights leaders to Memphis. Roy Wilkins and Bayard Rustin were invited to address mass rallies. Reverend Lawson extended the invitation to Dr. King.

By this time the effort to organize the Washington spring project had bogged down and Dr. King and the SCLC were tying to recover from their first major defeat, which had occurred during efforts to organize in Chicago. Dr. King apparently accepted the invitation to go to Memphis with little hesitation. He viewed the Memphis struggle as a logical parallel to the Poor People's Campaign and as a means to gain much needed momentum.

Dr. King delivered a major address in Memphis on March 18. Special Agents of the FBI, Howell Lowe and William Lawrence covered the speech but neither was able to recall it. They did say...
their coverage was consistent with their contention that at no time was Dr. King under electronic surveillance while in Memphis.

Toward the end of the address, King announced his intention to return to Memphis to lead a march on behalf of the sanitation workers. Originally scheduled for March 22, it was rescheduled for March 28 due to a severe snowstorm. The march was to begin at 10 a.m., at the Clayborn Temple.

On March 28, strike organizers and marchers began arriving as early as 8:30 a.m. The early morning hours were marked by considerable unrest, as reports of violence at neighborhood schools began to circulate through the growing crowd.

It would be appropriate at this time, Mr. Chairman, to enter in the record and display Martin Luther King exhibit F-460.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the record.

[The information follows:]
Mr. Blakey. It depicts the head of that march. A few moments later, to the rear of the march, a store window was broken. This ignited a reaction of violence that involved not only the marchers but the police themselves.

It would be appropriate at this time, Mr. Chairman, to insert in the record and display Martin Luther King exhibit F-462.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the record.

[The information follows:]
Mr. Blakey. It gives a vivid statement of the nature of that violence.

When it became clear the march was out of control, efforts were made to get Dr. King out of the area. Bernard Lee commandeered the last car to pass through a police barricade. A motorcycle patrolman, asked to lead them to the Peabody Hotel, replied that travel in that direction was impossible because of the violence and suggested instead the Rivermont Holiday Inn. Dr. King and Reverend Abernathy stayed there that night.

The FBI's activities during Dr. King's visit to Memphis were of considerable interest to the committee. The Memphis field office had been routinely monitoring the sanitation strike since it began, relying heavily on intelligence gathered by other sources, particularly an undercover Memphis police officer, Marrell McCollough. McCollough had infiltrated a group of Black activists called the "Invaders." He kept abreast of strike developments and frequently attended key meetings of COME and the strike leadership, as well as those of the Invaders.

According to Special Agent Lowe, who shared responsibility for related security cases in the Memphis area, much of the field office's concern with the strike was the result of demands for intelligence by the military, the White House, and Congress. The FBI considered the strike to be a relatively insignificant event, not one which warranted extensive monitoring. In addition, the Bureau had a policy of avoiding labor disputes.

With respect to Dr. King, despite the documented concern about him at the FBI headquarters in 1968, the Memphis office has told
the committee its interest in Dr. King was incidental to its cover-
age of the sanitation strike. Agent Lowe has testified, "Our main
concern was to get Dr. King in and out of Memphis without inci-
dent."

The committee has reviewed a memo that indicates that the
Bureau had received information prior to the March 28 march that
violence was likely to occur. Special Agents Lowe and Lawrence
confirmed this in their testimony.

It appears that about 1 or 2 hours before the march an inform-
ant notified Agent Lawrence that the march participants had pur-
chased several hundred 2 by 2 sticks, to which they attached card-
board placards, and that there was a possibility that they would be
used in a violent manner.

Mr. Chairman, you can notice in Martin Luther King exhibit F-
462 those sticks lying on the ground.

This information was corroborated by Memphis police sources
who were also in touch with Agent Lawrence. They provided an
additional report: Members of the Invaders were distributing the
sticks to "impressionable youngsters between the ages of 10 to 13."

Lawrence notified FBI Headquarters about the potential for vio-
ence and he apparently was in close contact with the Memphis
Police Department. Nevertheless, neither the FBI nor the police
department informed the leaders of the march of the threat, al-
though, as the agents testified, they had good relations with the
leaders of COME, exchanged information with them, and shared
their interest in preventing violence.

The committee has noted that during the period of March 28 to
April 3, the day of Dr. King's return to Memphis, there was a
dearth of communication between the Memphis field office and FBI
headquarters concerning Dr. King. Reports about Dr. King on the
28th, following his arrival at the Rivermont, came from a conversa-
tion between him and an associate intercepted by the FBI in the
city where the associate lived.

A memo written on FBI letterhead dated April 2 recounted
events during a meeting between Dr. King and members of the
Invaders at the Rivermont on the morning of March 29. While
preparing to attend a press conference scheduled for 11 a.m., Dr.
King had received a visit from Charles Cabbage, Charles Harrin-
ton, and Calvin Taylor, who identified themselves as members of
the Invaders.

Mr. Cabbage, along with several other members of the Invaders,
had occupied two rooms at the Lorraine Motel from April 2 until
about 5:45 p.m. on April 4. Witnesses have described their depar-
ture from the motel some 10 minutes prior to the assassination as
"hurried."

Agents Lowe and Lawrence have both insisted that no special
arrangements were made in anticipation of Dr. King's expected
return to Memphis. Moreover, despite the intense concern about
Dr. King and the Poor People's Campaign at FBI Headquarters,
there is little evidence to reflect that concern in Memphis field
office files.

On April 1, 1968, a reservations clerk at American Airlines in
Memphis informed the field office the airline had received a threat
that the plane Dr. King was to take back to Memphis would be
bombed. None of the agents interviewed by the committee recalled the threat but a memo in the Atlanta field office files—with the city of origin given as Memphis and a copy mailed to headquarters—indicates Memphis alerted both Atlanta and Washington. Dr. King, however, was never told of this threat. He learned of it when his plane back to Memphis was delayed 1 hour while it was searched.

Although the Bureau continued to receive information on the strike and preparation for Dr. King’s return—principally through the Memphis Police Department undercover agent Marrell McCollough—it has been adamantly maintained there were no additional efforts to monitor Dr. King physically or electronically following his arrival on April 3.

The FBI did, however, direct counterintelligence activity toward King with regard to his visit in Memphis. The committee discovered proposals from headquarters for news leaks ridiculing Dr. King.

Mr. Moore had sent Mr. Sullivan a memo recommending a news release characterizing Dr. King as a hypocrite. Titled, “Do As I Say, Not As I Do,” it recounted Dr. King’s urging of Blacks to boycott downtown white merchants in support of the sanitation strike.

The release continued:

On March 29, 1968, King led a march for the sanitation workers like Judas leading lambs to slaughter. King led the marchers to violence and when the violence broke out King disappeared.

The fine Hotel Lorraine in Memphis is owned and patronized exclusively by Negroes but King didn’t go there from his hasty exit. Instead, King decided the plush Holiday Inn Motel, white owned, operated, and almost exclusively white patronized, was the place to “cool it.” There will be no boycott of white merchants for King only for his followers.

This memo was initialed by Director Hoover, indicating his approval. It was also marked, “Handled 4-3-68.”

Whether this particular release itself was used is unclear, although the committee is aware of a newspaper article that was remarkably similar in tone and content.

Intelligence activities of the Memphis Police Department Intelligence Division in a conspiracy against Dr. King was considered by the committee. Among the members of the division interviewed was Marrell McCollough.

Mr. McCollough moved to Memphis in early 1967 after over 3 years of Army service as a military policeman. In September, he entered the police department academy and was made a patrolman on December 6. He remained a uniformed patrolman until February 1968.

On February 16, 1968, Mr. McCollough received his first undercover assignment—to attend a sanitation strike meeting and report on what transpired. After successfully completing that assignment he was reassigned to the internal affairs division, which had handled intelligence operations for the department.

A series of newspaper articles brought the Invaders to the division’s attention. McCollough infiltrated the Invaders and his reports on the group, as well as the strike, and Dr. King’s activities, were passed along to local FBI offices.
Mr. McCollough, on April 4, 1968, witnessed Dr. King being shot at the Lorraine Motel. He directed police to the area where he believed the shot had originated—the rooming house at 4221/2 Main Street.

McCollough claims to have been the first person to reach the fallen Dr. King. While he has been disputed on this point, he can be seen kneeling beside the body in a now-famous photograph taken minutes after the assassination.

Mr. McCollough's presence at the scene of the assassination has been used by some to support a contention that government agencies, including the Memphis Police Department, were directly involved in the assassination.

In an article in Newsday in February 1976, a former leader of the Invaders claimed that McCollough was very active and vocal: "He had a 7.62 Russian automatic rifle and he was armed every time we were armed. He was always suggesting the action we should take; I never saw him physically attack anyone. But he was one of the most provocative members of the Invaders."

Mr. Chairman, it would be appropriate at this time to call Marrell McCollough.

Chairman Stokes. The committee calls Mr. McCollough.

Mr. McCollough, will you stand and raise your right hand and be sworn?

Do you solmenly swear the testimony you will give this committee will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. McCollough. Yes; I do.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you. You may be seated.

The Chair recognizes staff counsel, William Webb.

TESTIMONY OF MARRELL MCCOLLOUGH, POLICE OFFICER, MEMPHIS, TENN., POLICE DEPARTMENT

Mr. Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. McCollough, will you state your full name, please?

Mr. McCollough. Marrell McCollough.

Mr. Webb. Will you spell both your first and your last name?

Mr. McCollough. Yes, sir; my first name, M-a-r-r-e-l-l; last name, M-c capital C-o-1-l-o-u-g-h.

Chairman Stokes. Would you ask him to please pull the mike over a little closer to speak?

Mr. Webb. Mr. McCollough, you were in the Army from 1964 through 1967; is that correct?

Mr. McCollough. Yes, sir; that's correct.

Mr. Webb. And what were your duties while you were in the Army?

Mr. McCollough. I was a military policeman.

Mr. Webb. And upon your discharge—will you tell the committee when you arrived in Memphis?

Mr. McCollough. Yes, sir; I was discharged in February, 1967, and I returned to Memphis.

Mr. Webb. And did there come a time after you returned to Memphis when you joined the Memphis Police Department?

Mr. McCollough. Yes, sir; I was appointed to the police department in September 1967.
Mr. Webb. And was that appointment to the police academy?
Mr. McCollough. Yes, sir; I attended the academy from September 4, 1967, until December 6, 1967.

Mr. Webb. Would you briefly describe your duties upon graduating from the academy through the beginning of February of 1968?
Mr. McCollough. Yes, sir; I was assigned to the uniformed patrol and did patrol duty from December until mid-February 1968.

Mr. Webb. And as part of your duties in the uniformed patrol did there come a time when you were responsible for providing security to the sanitation workers' trucks?
Mr. McCollough. Yes, sir; myself, along with another officer, was assigned to a TAC unit from the police department.

Mr. Webb. What were your duties from February 1968 through the period of the assassination?
Mr. McCollough. From February to the period of the assassination I worked with the internal affairs division.

Mr. Webb. And how did that relationship first come about?
Mr. McCollough. I had been on patrol with the TAC unit protecting the truck, and I had gotten a call from the chief of the internal affairs division to report to his office; and I did so, and at that point I was given an undercover assignment.

Mr. Webb. And what was the initial undercover assignment?
Mr. McCollough. It was merely to attend one of the sanitation strikes and to report upon that meeting.

Mr. Webb. And did you do so?
Mr. McCollough. Yes, sir; I did.

Mr. Webb. And upon completion of that assignment, were you then reassigned to the Internal Affairs Division?
Mr. McCollough. Yes, sir. I completed that assignment and next I was directed and targeted against the local militant organization at that time.

Mr. Webb. And what was the name of that organization, sir?
Mr. McCollough. It was the "Invaders."

Mr. Webb. Also during the same period of time was there a Black student union which was formed at Owen College?
Mr. McCollough. Yes, sir. I became aware of the Black student union in late February of 1968.

Mr. Webb. And at the same time did a person by the name of Kay Pittman Black write a series of articles for the Memphis Press Scimitar about that group you identified as the Invaders?
Mr. McCollough. Yes, sir. That is the way the police department became interested in the group, is through the article that Miss Black had written.

Mr. Webb. And will you tell us something about the organization known as the Invaders?
Mr. McCollough. Yes, sir. Starting with the Black student union at Owen College, which was made up of college students—John Smith, Charles Cabbage, and a few others. They were typical of some of the militant-type students at the time, a lot of rhetoric—that's mostly it—but a spinoff from that organization in the community was the Invaders, which was an extension of the Black student union, but with more grassroots support.

Mr. Webb. Were you familiar with an organization known as the Black Organizing Project?
Mr. McCOLLOUGH. These organizations, although different, had a lot in common, because the leadership were one and the same, namely, Charles Cabbage, John Smith, Oree McKenzie, to name just a few of them.

On campus it was the Black student union at Owen College. In the community, consisting of several colleges, was the BOP, that was referred to the “Black Organizing Project,” and on the lower echelon was the Invaders. So they were similar because of the leadership, but different, I guess, in a sense, in some sense.

Mr. WEBB. Were the terms used fairly interchangeably by people outside of the group who were viewing their activities?

Mr. McCOLLOUGH. Yes, sir. Let me explain about the Invaders: It was a small group at the time, but anyone, any young person with long hair would claim to be an Invader, and he would be identified as an Invader.

But with BOP, the Black Organizing Project, it was strictly limited to students at college at the time.

Mr. WEBB. So it would be fair to say that a person who was a member of any of the groups you have just identified might be called an Invader by people outside the group?

Mr. McCOLLOUGH. That’s exactly true.

Mr. WEBB. What specifically was your assignment with respect to the Invaders?

Mr. McCOLLOUGH. My specific duties was to infiltrate the group and to report upon its activities.

Mr. WEBB. And what was the purpose of that assignment, sir?

Mr. McCOLLOUGH. The purpose of the assignment was to gather intelligence information about the group.

Mr. WEBB. Can you tell us what your age was in relation to the other members of the group?

Mr. McCOLLOUGH. We were fairly the same age, I would say.

Mr. WEBB. Did you take any particular steps to establish an undercover identity?

Mr. McCOLLOUGH. Yes, sir. When I was directed and targeted against the Invaders, I moved to a new location and accepted an employment, a fictitious employment, and in that way established a total, separate identity from the one I had with the police department.

Mr. WEBB. And were you attending college at the time, sir?

Mr. McCOLLOUGH. Yes, sir; I did. I started attending school at Memphis State at the time.

Mr. WEBB. Prior to the assassination, how would you characterize the group’s activities?

Mr. McCOLLOUGH. Mostly rhetoric. On campus there was a lot of talk. As you well know, during that time, in the sixties, there was a lot of talk of violence, and this group was no different—a lot of young people getting together, making violent statements and doing a lot of violent talk but actually committing no acts of violence.

Mr. WEBB. Were you present at the march site, Clayborn Temple, on March 28, 1968?

Mr. McCOLLOUGH. Yes, sir; I was.

Mr. WEBB. And do you recall approximately what time you arrived there that morning?
Mr. McCollough. Approximately, I would say, between 8:30 and 9 o’clock.

Mr. Webb. Would you describe the scene at the temple when you arrived?

Mr. McCollough. Yes, sir. There was a fairly large group of people milling around, waiting—waiting to start the march, and particularly at that time there was a tense atmosphere, I would say, because there were rumors going around to the effect that a girl had been beaten.

There were members of the Invaders. All the identities I don’t really recall at this point, but I do remember John Smith was talking against the nonviolent-type approach, making statements to the effect that such a tactic, nonviolence, that is, was not the way, in that it was going to end up with the police beating up on a group of people.

Mr. Webb. Directing your attention to Martin Luther King exhibit F-460, which is the one on the far right, would you say that fairly and accurately reflects the state of the crowd during the premarch hours?

Mr. McCollough. From here it’s pretty hard to tell, because it fades into grayness, but as far as the dark portion there, I would say so.

Mr. Webb. Would you tell the committee what role the Invaders played during the premarch hours?

Mr. McCollough. During the premarch hours, as I said earlier, they were walking around making statements to the effect that the nonviolent aspect of the march wouldn’t work and that it was senseless, in other words.

Mr. Webb. And had this been a fairly consistent position that they had taken all along?

Mr. McCollough. Yes, sir; it was.

Mr. Webb. Mr. McCollough, can you describe for the committee how the march itself came to be disrupted?

Mr. McCollough. The only word I can think of, is “spontaneously.” The march was going along fairly peaceful and then once we reached the area of Beale Street and Third, I believe, near Handy’s Park, all of a sudden you could hear windows being broken and people started running; so the way I described it at the time was that it happened spontaneously.

Mr. Webb. Do you know how the windows came to be broken, that is, what was used to break windows?

Mr. McCollough. Yes. As you can see in the picture, the placards were on sticks, and many of those sticks were used to break windows.

Mr. Webb. After the march was disrupted and the police came in to handle the crowd, do you recall where you went or what you did?

Mr. McCollough. Yes, sir. The crowd turned around—well, was turned around—and headed back east on Beale Street, down to Hernando and over to the Minimum Salary; and along with the group I returned to Clayborn Temple.

Mr. Webb. Do you recall seeing principal members of the Invaders or the Black Organizing Project there at the temple?

Mr. McCollough. No, sir; I didn’t.
Mr. Webb. Mr. McCollough, were you aware that members of the Invaders, of the Black Organizing Project, met with Dr. King on March 29, 1968, the day after the march, at Rivermont Holiday Inn?

Mr. McCollough. No, sir; I am not aware of any meeting.

Mr. Webb. Since you weren’t aware of it, I take it you did not in fact attend it?

Mr. McCollough. No, I didn’t attend any meeting at the Rivermont.

Mr. Webb. So that information obtained by the Memphis Police Department with respect to that meeting would have come from someone other than yourself?

Mr. McCollough. Yes, sir; that’s true.

Mr. Webb. Some newspaper accounts were critical of Dr. King’s staying at the Rivermont. They were couched in terms that Professor Blakey had read, criticizing him for patronizing an exclusively white-owned motel, while there was a Black hotel in Memphis. Do you know if the Invaders felt any bitterness toward Dr. King for staying at the Rivermont?

Mr. McCollough. No, sir; there was no bitterness in the usual sense of the word felt toward Dr. King by the Invaders at all.

Mr. Webb. Would that include areas besides the Rivermont? Is it fair to say that they were not bitter or hostile toward Dr. King at all during the period?

Mr. McCollough. Yes, sir; that’s fair to say.

Mr. Webb. Did you attend the meeting between the Invaders or the Black Organizing Project, and Dr. King, at the Lorraine Hotel on April 3, 1968?

Mr. McCollough. Yes, sir; I did.

Mr. Webb. And can you tell the committee what occurred at that meeting?

Mr. McCollough. Yes, in general terms I can. The Invaders group made it known to Dr. King and his people there that when they had come to Memphis and had met with the local ministers, the COME group, that this group was not really the ones that they should have been meeting with; instead, they should have been meeting with the Invader group, because the Invaders had the grass roots support. And they further went on to say that had Dr. King and his group met with the Invaders early on, then the march wouldn’t have ended in disruption on the 28th of March.

Mr. Webb. At that time, during the meeting, did the Invaders seek anything from Dr. King or the SCLC?

Mr. McCollough. Yes, sir. In general terms there was a request made for automobiles, for transportation, and there was a request made for an unspecified sum of money that SCLC should provide to the Invader group.

Mr. Webb. Mr. McCollough, do you have any knowledge of the type of coverage employed by the FBI which was directed against Dr. King while he was in Memphis?

Mr. McCollough. No, sir; I had no direct—I had no association with the FBI. I was totally responsible to the police department.
Mr. Webb. Were you aware of any other government agencies whose primary purpose was intelligence gathering that were operating in Memphis prior to the assassination?
Mr. McCollough. No, sir; I was not.
Mr. Webb. Were you aware of any electronic surveillance directed against Dr. King while he was in Memphis?
Mr. McCollough. No, sir; I was not.
I can say that the Memphis Police Department didn't use any electronic surveillances.
Mr. Webb. Do you recall your activities during the morning of Thursday, April 4, 1968? That was the day Dr. King was killed.
Mr. McCollough. During the morning I attended classes.
Mr. Webb. And that would have been at Memphis State?
Mr. McCollough. Memphis State University, yes, sir.
Mr. Webb. Do you recall what time you left school on that day, sir?
Mr. McCollough. I left school during the midafternoon when classes had finished.
Mr. Webb. And after you left school, do you recall where you went?
Mr. McCollough. Yes. I headed downtown and stopped at Clayborn Temple.
Mr. Webb. And what occurred at Clayborn Temple?
Mr. McCollough. When I got to the temple, I was approached by Rev. James Orange, who wanted to go shopping at the time, and so I took him shopping.
Mr. Webb. And approximately what time did you finish shopping?
Mr. McCollough. We spent the whole afternoon shopping. We got back to the Clayborn Temple area around 5:30, I would say.
Mr. Webb. And from Clayborn Temple where did you proceed?
Mr. McCollough. We went over to the Lorraine Motel.
Mr. Webb. Do you recall what time you arrived at the Lorraine?
Mr. McCollough. Yes, sir; it was around 6 o'clock, just before or just after 6.
Mr. Webb. And when you arrived at the Lorraine Motel, do you recall seeing any of the members of the Invaders there?
Mr. McCollough. No, sir; I didn't see any one of them.
Mr. Webb. Will you tell us what you did when you arrived at the Lorraine?
Mr. McCollough. When I arrived, I parked my car and got out and went back to a car which had been following us—Reverend Orange and myself—and started speaking to the occupants of that car, and at that point I was aware that Dr. King was at the motel, as a matter of fact, on the balcony, so I was just standing around at the motel.
Mr. Webb. And did anything occur at that time?
Mr. McCollough. Yes, sir. Almost immediately as we arrived I heard this loud explosion and looked up, and Dr. King was falling; he had obviously been shot at that time.
Mr. Webb. What did you do at that point?
Mr. McCollough. Spontaneously, I ran to him, to offer assistance, to try to save his life.
Mr. Webb. And when you, I take it, at some point arrived at Dr. King's body, who else was there?

Mr. McCollough. There was no one there at the time when I arrived at his body.

Mr. Webb. On your way to where Dr. King had fallen, did you take any steps or do anything to try to assist him? On your way up the steps and to Dr. King did you stop and do anything to render assistance to him?

Mr. McCollough. Yes, sir. Let me try to describe to you what occurred there. I was on the ground. I ran up to the——

Mr. Webb. Excuse me, Mr. McCollough.

Mr. Chairman, at this time I think it might be helpful to enter a photograph which has been premarked as Martin Luther King Exhibit F-454, and that might aid Mr. McCollough in describing the events that took place.

Mr. McCollough, will you use the photograph as you can?

Mr. McCollough. Yes, sir. As you can see, that is on the second floor there, and I was standing down in the parking lot; so what I did, I ran to the nearest stairwell and went up to the second floor, and I ran and crawled along that rail there, hoping that no more shots would be fired; and you see that basket there? That was a linen basket. I pulled a towel from that basket and went over to Dr. King and tried to stop the bleeding. He had a wound in his face and neck.

Mr. Webb. Mr. McCollough, can you identify some of the people who appear in that picture?

Mr. McCollough. Yes, sir. That's me, trying to stop the bleeding in Dr. King's neck; and the girl is Esther Hunt; and Ambassador Young is on the far corner there.

Mr. Webb. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like the photograph entered as Martin Luther King exhibit F-454.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the record.

[The information follows:]
Mr. Webb. After you were with Dr. King for a while, what happened then?
Mr. McCollough. I was there for a while, and I believe Reverend Abernathy came over and he relieved me, and he began trying to stop the bleeding; and at that point I left and went back downstairs and went over to a uniformed lieutenant and told him where I thought the shot had come from that hit Dr. King.
Mr. Webb. Were you able to tell where the shot came from by the noise?
Mr. McCollough. No, not by the noise; it is kind of intricate, the way I determined where the shot had come from.
If you notice the way that rail goes there, it goes north and south, and the way Dr. King was facing, was to the east, and from where I stood downstairs, and the way he had fallen, and from the way the position that his body was, and the wound, too, how it came down, in my mind I was sure that the shot had been fired from an elevated position from the west; and facing where I am there, directly in front of me to the west, is that boardinghouse on Main Street there.
Mr. Webb. Mr. McCollough, you will notice the people in the picture are pointing. Do you know what they are pointing at?
Mr. McCollough. Yes, sir. The elevated boardinghouse is in the direction they are pointing.
Mr. Webb. And did you convey that information to the Memphis police lieutenant you had talked about before?
Mr. McCollough. Yes, sir. I told him where I thought the shot had come from.
Mr. Webb. Mr. McCollough, were you subsequently interviewed by agents of the FBI in connection with your observations?
Mr. McCollough. Yes, sir; I was.

Mr. Webb. And do you recall when in fact that interview took place?

Mr. McCollough. It was sometime later; maybe a week later, about a week later or more.

Mr. Webb. Mr. Chairman, I would like the next document, which has been premarked as Martin Luther King Exhibit F-455, entered as an exhibit and shown to Mr. McCollough.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the record.

[The information follows:]
MARRELL MC CULLOUGH, residing 270 Gaston, Apartment 6, Memphis, Tennessee, telephone 947-4265, who is employed as a warehouseman by the Summerrall Electric Company, 345 S. Parkway, Memphis, telephone WH8-4435, advised as follows:

MC CULLOUGH is a native of the state of Mississippi and has lived in Memphis, Tennessee, since approximately February 1967. He had been present at the Lorraine Hotel and Motel, 406 S. Mulberry Street, Memphis, from approximately 5:55 p.m. until approximately 8:00 p.m. on Thursday, April 4, 1968, and was present when DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING JR., President of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), was shot.

He explained his presence as follows:

MC CULLOUGH, who is a Negro, had been a sympathetic supporter of the Memphis sanitation workers who had been on strike in Memphis beginning February 12, 1968.

Beginning around the early part of March 1968, MC-CULLOUGH, in his spare time, has engaged in various strike support activities sponsored by a group of Memphis Negro ministers who have adopted the name Community on the Move for Equality (COME). He has worked with this group and other supporters in the Memphis community engaging in sympathy marches and other strike support activity which is primarily centered in the headquarters of the Minimum Salary Division of the AME Church, 276 Hernando, Memphis, and at the Clayborn Temple AME Church at 280 Hernando.

Around March 18, 1968, the SCLC sent various of its staff to Memphis to assist the COME group in strike support activity, and in fact, DR. MARTIN LUTHER KING JR. made a public speech in behalf of the sanitation workers at Mason Temple on the night of March 18, 1968. DR. KING returned to Memphis on the morning of March 23, 1968, to lead a mass downtown Memphis strike support march, and after a major disturbance occurred in the Beale Street area of Memphis resulting in considerable
property damage by some of the marchers, the SCLC staff left various of its members in Memphis to further organize the strike support activity. Shortly after March 28, 1968, Mr. MC CULLOUGH became acquainted with two members of Dr. KING’s staff; namely, Rev. JAMES ORANGE, of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and Rev. JAMES BEVEL, of Birmingham, Alabama, and Chicago, Illinois, and he has worked with them on various projects since that time.

On the afternoon of April 4, 1968, MC CULLOUGH, who has a blue 1967 Volkswagen, 1600 series, fastback, drove to the Lorraine Motel accompanied in his car by Rev. JAMES ORANGE and Rev. JAMES BEVEL, and he fixed their arrival at the motel in the car at about 5:55 p.m. He parked his Volkswagen in the motel parking lot which would be on the east side of Mulberry and just south of the old hotel portion of the Lorraine Hotel and Motel. His car had been followed by a white Pontiac Tempest, exact model number not recalled, driven by CLARA ESTER, a student at LeMoyne College and who he understands resides at 396 LaClede, Memphis, and another young lady, MARY HUNT, who lives on Baltimore Street in the Orange Mound area of Memphis and who he believes attends Memphis State University. These young ladies had also been working in some of the strike support activity sponsored by COME, and they had been with BEVEL, ORANGE and MC CULLOUGH at the Clayborn Temple prior to coming to the Lorraine Motel.

They parked their car behind the Volkswagen, and at that point, BEVEL, ORANGE and MC CULLOUGH and HUNT and ESTER got out of their cars and stood around the parking lot area. MC CULLOUGH recalled seeing numerous other people on the north end of the parking lot area which is directly in front of the new motel portion of the Lorraine and recalled seeing a Negro singing group managed by JAMES BEVEL known as the "Bread Basket Group." He did not know any of their specific identities.

MC CULLOUGH was first aware of the presence in the vicinity of Dr. MARTIN LUTHER KING JR. when he got out of his car and observed Dr. KING standing on the second floor balcony of the motel almost directly in front of Room 306, which had been Dr. KING’s room during his recent visit to Memphis. Dr. KING was leaning over the rail which runs in front of an outside walkway running the length of the second floor motel portion, and MC CULLOUGH noticed no one else on the balcony with him at the time.
At this point, which would probably have been close to 6:00 p.m., either shortly before or shortly thereafter, Mr. MC CULLOUGH walked back toward the car driven by CLARA ESTER and Rev. BEVEL and Rev. ORANGE walked north on the parking lot toward the group of people who were standing there.

Suddenly, MC CULLOUGH heard an explosive sound and recalled that he was standing and facing north when he first heard it. He was standing south of the position occupied by Dr. KING and noted that the rail on which Dr. KING had been leaning runs north and south, and that KING would have been facing Mulberry Street, or to the west with his back facing the doorway of the motel and to the east. MC CULLOUGH was unable to adequately describe the sound other than it was rather loud and had a seeming echo to it. He has served in the U. S. Army and would offer an opinion based on his Army experience and limited knowledge of firearms that the noise which he heard was a gunshot sound.

Immediately thereafter, someone in the crowd, identity not recalled, by MC CULLOUGH stated in essence, "Dr. KING has been shot." MC CULLOUGH pointed out that he had been facing north when he heard the sound, and upon hearing the person say something to the effect that Dr. KING had been shot, he looked easterly and upward toward the rail where Dr. KING had been standing and observed Dr. KING falling backward in a southeasterly direction. It appeared as though Dr. KING may have been grasping with one of his hands for his throat area, although MC CULLOUGH could not be positive as to the physical movement, if any, of Dr. KING's hands. Almost immediately, MC CULLOUGH turned his head in a westerly direction looking across Mulberry Street, which runs north and south, and saw no one either on the ground or in any of the buildings which face east toward the Lorraine Hotel and Motel. He saw no one in the area in the vicinity of the motel with a gun or a weapon of any sort.

He saw no one running from the area in any direction.

A few seconds later, he recalled seeing a group of what he felt were Memphis Fire Department employees running from the rear entrance of the fire station which faces Main Street and whose rear entrance faces Mulberry Street and which is located just south of the motel, noting that these firemen seemed to be running toward the vicinity of the motel.
When MC CULLOUGH looked upward again at the point where Dr. KING had fallen, he was first conscious of seeing Rev. JESSE JACKSON, an SCLC staff member from Chicago, looking out a doorway of a motel room just south of the room previously occupied by Dr. KING. JACKSON would have been looking in a westerly or actually a northwesterly direction, because he was looking toward KING’s prone body.

Almost instinctively, MC CULLOUGH ran up the outdoor iron and cement stairway which leads to the balcony from the ground level and which is located about two or three motel doors south of where KING’s body rested. He turned north on the balcony upon reaching the second floor level, running toward Dr. KING’s body, and noticed that Dr. KING was lying prone in a crosswise position with his head pointing in a southeasterly direction and his feet pointing in a northwesterly direction, his feet being located adjacent to the protective railing.

MC CULLOUGH attempted to apply pressure to the wound in an effort to stop the bleeding, as the bleeding was quite profuse at this time, and as he knelt down and observed Dr. KING’s body in its prone position with his back facing the concrete floor and the front side of his body facing upward, the wound would have had to have been caused by a bullet or projectile coming toward Dr. KING from a northwesterly direction since it entered the right side of his face and since KING...
was last recalled being seen by him looking directly west as he stood against the hand rail. It was his definite impression at the time, and he still holds to this impression, that the shot would have come from one of the buildings to the northwest. There is a series of old buildings located just west of the motel whose fronts would face on S. Main Street, which is the next north-south street west of Mulberry.

From the second story position of Dr. KING when he was shot, coupled with the position of the wound beginning around his cheekbone area and dropping down toward his neck area, he believes the shot in all probability would have come from one of these buildings at an elevated level rather than from the ground area surrounding the buildings.

MC CULLOUGH also recalled that as he applied the pressure around Dr. KING's cheekbone and upper neck area with the towel, he was aware of an unusual odor which was similar to the odor which one smells when a firecracker is exploded.

Shortly thereafter, he was conscious of the fact that CLARA ESTER and MARY HUNT had come up onto the balcony and were standing near him. By this time, there was no doubt in MC CULLOUGH's mind that Dr. KING was dead. There was no movement in his body, and his eyes were immobile and he believes they were open, although he could not be certain of this. He estimated he applied the pressure for one to two minutes, and by this time, a number of Negroes had gathered around the body, and he recalled seeing Rev. RALPH B. ABERNATHY, Dr. KING's chief aide. ABERNATHY knelt down and began applying pressure with the towel which had originally been held by MC CULLOUGH.

At this point, Rev. ABERNATHY relieved MC CULLOUGH, as MC CULLOUGH noted that CLARA ESTER and MARY HUNT were crying and appeared to be shaken considerably at the sight of Dr. KING's body. He was afraid they would become hysterical and he there- after walked with them away from the area. They walked down the outside motel stairs to the south of Dr. KING's body onto the parking lot area and stood around.
By this time, it would probably have been a few minutes after 6:00 p.m., and he observed a large number of members of the Memphis Police Department and possibly the Shelby County Sheriff's Office in the immediate area. One of the officers, identity not recalled, asked all of the people in the immediate area to remain and not leave.

He estimated that he stood around the parking lot area in the immediate hotel and motel area until close to 8:00 p.m. and when no one had asked him specifically not to leave he left and returned to the Clayborn Temple.

He had been to the motel on Wednesday, April 3, 1968, with some of the SCLC people and representatives of the COQUE group, and at no time while around the Lorraine Motel did he recall seeing any individuals he could consider to be suspicious or who may have given the impression they were observing the area other than the fact that he had from time to time seen law enforcement officers in the area. He was unable to pinpoint the exact times when he had seen this.

McCULLOUGH concluded that he knew of no suspects and had not recalled having heard any of his associates mention any suspects or any suspicious persons who may have been frequenting the area of the motel during the day or two prior to Dr. King's death.

Mr. WEBB. Mr. McCollough, you have had a chance to review that document, prior to testifying today, in our interview; is that correct?

Mr. McCollough. Yes, sir.

Mr. Webb. And is that in fact a copy of your interview with the FBI concerning the assassination?

Mr. McCollough. Yes, sir; it is.

Mr. Webb. And does that fairly and accurately reflect your recollections at the time of the assassination?

Mr. McCollough. Yes, sir; it does.

Mr. Webb. Mr. Chairman, at this point I have no further questions of the witness.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you, counsel.

At this time the Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Edgar, for such time as he may consume.

Mr. Edgar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. McCollough, I would like to begin the questioning and go through some of the same questions that were asked of you previously, but perhaps in a little bit more detail.

Let me begin by asking you, while you were in the Army did your duties include any intelligence activities?

Mr. McCollough. No, sir; it didn't.

Mr. Edgar. Were you ever assigned to a CID unit while you were in the service?

Mr. McCollough. No, sir. I was assigned to the 709th MP Battalion and the 558th MP Company.

Mr. Edgar. While you were at the police academy, did you receive any special training for undercover work?

Mr. McCollough. No, sir; I did not.

Mr. Edgar. Did you think of it as being a little bit unusual to be asked just a few months after assuming your duties as a Memphis police officer to be an undercover agent?

Mr. McCollough. No, sir; I didn't think it was unusual at all.
Mr. EDGAR. What actually took place in the conversation that you had that led to your accepting the duties of an undercover agent?

Mr. McCOLLOUGH. If you are talking relative to Inspector Tines, at the time he called me to his office and he said that he would like for me, along with another officer, to go down to the meeting where the strike situation was being outlined. He explained the purpose of going down there was to report on strike activities you know, we had had that strike for a while, members of the sanitation workers had been using several tactics, one, stopping a truck, blocking the entrance to the dump sites, et cetera. So he was primarily interested in really where the next move would be made by the workers, when would they actually try stopping the truck, et cetera.

Mr. EDGAR. Were you told to wear your uniform?

Mr. McCOLLOUGH. No, sir. He simply told me to go undercover, not to wear a uniform, to wear street clothes, to go down there.

Mr. EDGAR. Wouldn't the sanitation workers have recognized you as being the police officer that was part of the TAC unit?

Mr. McCOLLOUGH. No, sir. I have to explain Memphis is quite large and we had several TAC units going at the time. As a matter of fact, probably I ought to explain a TAC unit to you, the TAC unit consisted of three police units that would follow a particular convoy of trucks, and we had, I can't even guess how many, 20 maybe or more, that was going on.

Mr. EDGAR. How old were you at the time?

Mr. McCOLLOUGH. In 1967 I was around 23 years old.

Mr. EDGAR. Who gave you your day-to-day instructions of what to do, who supervised your undercover work?

Mr. McCOLLOUGH. Lt. Eli Arkins.

Mr. EDGAR. Did you meet with him on a day-to-day basis?

Mr. McCOLLOUGH. Not every day but we tried to keep it every other day at least.

Mr. EDGAR. What kind of instructions would he give you on an every-other-day basis?

Mr. McCOLLOUGH. Well, what would happen, I would make my reports daily on the telephone to him, and then when we would meet together he would just want to know how things were going, how I was doing out there, and certain areas to look out for, et cetera.

Mr. EDGAR. Who gave you the instructions to be an undercover agent with the Invaders?

Mr. McCOLLOUGH. Inspector Tines.

Mr. EDGAR. When did that occur?

Mr. McCOLLOUGH. That occurred in late February of 1968.

Mr. EDGAR. How were those instructions given to you?

Mr. McCOLLOUGH. As I recall, he said we have this militant group that is starting up and we don't know anything about it, and I would like you to go down and see what we can find out.

Mr. EDGAR. What did you do?

Mr. McCOLLOUGH. I went down there and I started making friends with members of the group and eventually became accepted by them.
Mr. Edgar. I apologize for going into so much detail, but it is a little confusing to me how someone could walk in off the street and get an assignment to get to be an undercover agent with the Invaders and just go down to a building someplace and walk in and say: Hi, my name is Marrell McCollough, I am a student. I would like to get involved in your organization.

Is that how you went about it?

Mr. McCollough. Not quite that simple, sir. You got to remember that there were meetings going on, sanitation meetings, and I met members of this group through that. I had contact with them. Eventually I became accepted, not overnight mind you, not by a long shot. I got to know a couple of the members, and eventually through that member I became accepted by the group. It was difficult.

Mr. Edgar. Were they members of the sanitation union?

Mr. McCollough. No, sir; they weren't. They were an independent group.

Mr. Edgar. Who was the first Invader that you befriended?

Mr. McCollough. I believe it was Oree McKinsey, but the circumstances, I can recall meeting him at one of the sanitation mass meetings and from there on striking up a friendship.

Mr. Edgar. How large was the Invader group?

Mr. McCollough. As I was saying, the coterie, it was very small, 10, 12, 15 people, but again, anyone with long hair, young at the time, would consider himself as an Invader and would be called an Invader. So the real group was small but people claiming to be Invaders were very large.

Mr. Edgar. Did you have any resistance in getting into the Invaders?

Mr. McCollough. No, not any real resistance. Once I start making friends with the guys.

Mr. Edgar. Did you have to demonstrate any violent rhetoric in order to get accepted?

Mr. McCollough. No, sir; I didn't.

Mr. Edgar. Did you have to condone any violent rhetoric on the part of any of the leaders of the Invaders?

Mr. McCollough. Well, you say condone violent rhetoric. I didn't tell anyone not to say any particular thing, but I never committed any acts of violence. I never suggested any acts of violence. I merely went, and as a matter of fact my position was minister of transportation and I provided transportation for the group.

Mr. Edgar. Were you ever present when an act of violence took place?

Mr. McCollough. Yes, sir. I was present at some points when violence was committed.

Mr. Edgar. Will you describe those for us.

Mr. McCollough. Yes, sir. Following the assassination there were firebombings and I was present during some of these instances.

Mr. Edgar. Did you participate with that?

Mr. McCollough. No, sir. That is strictly against the rules as a police officer. I could not participate in any acts of violence.
Mr. EDGAR. And you are indicating that the only acts of violence that you saw with the Invaders was after the assassination?

Mr. MCCOLLOUGH. Yes, sir, that is true.

Mr. EDGAR. Not prior to?

Mr. MCCOLLOUGH. Nothing prior to.

Mr. EDGAR. You describe yourself as the minister of transportation.

Mr. MCCOLLOUGH. Yes, sir.

Mr. EDGAR. I am a little bit confused as to the organizational structure. If your orders from the Memphis Police Department were to be the undercover agent responsible for infiltrating the Invaders, how does that put you in relationship with the Clayborn Temple?

Mr. MCCOLLOUGH. Early on I testified that my initial assignment was to go down to the Clayborn Temple and to report on the striking sanitation workers. That is the way I became associated with the temple.

Mr. EDGAR. I am still confused. I understand that as being one of your orders. But you are given the responsibility for being an undercover agent with the Invaders, and you claim to be called the minister of transportation. Were you in fact transporting Invaders around or were you in fact transporting members of the leadership group at the Clayborn Temple?

Mr. MCCOLLOUGH. Congressman, I transported Invaders around and I also transported people at the temple. But what you have to realize, that my undercover work extended over a period of over a year and a half and not merely the month you and I have been talking about here.

Mr. EDGAR. Except that what I am trying to focus in on is how much a part of the Invaders you were in that month period prior to the death of Dr. Martin Luther King. Were you a transportation minister for the Invaders during that period?

Mr. MCCOLLOUGH. Yes, I was part of the group during that period.

Mr. EDGAR. What position did you hold in the group?

Mr. MCCOLLOUGH. Again it was minister of transportation.

Mr. EDGAR. Was there any talk within the Invaders about discrediting Dr. King or the SCLC or any of the local ministers?

Mr. MCCOLLOUGH. No, sir; there were none.

Mr. EDGAR. Was there any friction from the leadership of the Invaders for you playing both roles?

Mr. MCCOLLOUGH. Working with the strikers and with them, no, sir; there wasn’t any friction whatsoever.

Mr. EDGAR. You indicated that the only acts of violence you saw were after the death of Dr. Martin Luther King; is that correct?

Mr. MCCOLLOUGH. That is true.

Mr. EDGAR. Did you hear prior to the death any discussions of planning acts of violence?

Mr. MCCOLLOUGH. No, there were no discussions of planning any acts of violence prior to Dr. King’s death.

Mr. EDGAR. I wonder if we could take a look at the exhibit that has the march photograph, the larger one that is underneath the Lorraine Hotel picture at this point.
Mr. McCollough, I wonder if you could tell us where you are standing in that picture?

Mr. McCollough. I would have been standing somewhere near the Clayborn Temple midmarch, if I am interpreting that picture correctly.

Mr. Edgar. Would you walk to the picture and show us where that would be.

Mr. McCollough [complying]. Yes.

Mr. Edgar. So you were behind the march?

Mr. McCollough. This is not behind the march, sir. It is right near the temple here. It's about midmarch, I would say, a little back of being midmarch.

Mr. Edgar. Let me ask you some questions concerning that. There you are standing midmarch during that day. The march has started to move up the street. Are you in the march?

Mr. McCollough. At this point I am not in the march because, as I said, I was with the Invader group and they never joined the march. They were just walking around the temple here talking, as I testified earlier.

Mr. Edgar. Where was John Smith at that point?

Mr. McCollough. John spent most of his time right around the door of the temple.

Mr. Edgar. Did you see John Smith removing the placards from the sticks and passing the sticks out to the youngsters?

Mr. McCollough. No, sir. I never saw him do that and I never saw anyone passing sticks out to the youngsters, other than the sticks with the placards on them.

Mr. Edgar. You were standing with the Invaders. You were where they were coming into the march. Did you see any acts of violence there?

Mr. McCollough. No, sir; only rhetoric, as I said earlier.

Mr. Edgar. You indicated earlier that the sticks that are laying on the ground were used to break windows. I wonder * * * did you actually see any of the windows broken by those sticks?

Mr. McCollough. Yes, sir. The march progressed up Beale Street past Handy Park. I got up there near a clothing store—it was a tailor shop. I actually saw windows in the tailor shop being broken.

Mr. Edgar. Were they broken with the sticks or with other things thrown into the windows?

Mr. McCollough. Everything was being thrown. And the reason I am certain the sticks were used, Reverend Middlebrook and I began collecting the sticks from the marchers and trying to take the weapons because we realized they were using the sticks as weapons—we tried to take them away.

Mr. Edgar. What was the reaction of the other Invaders to your picking up the sticks?

Mr. McCollough. As I told you earlier, the Invaders did not, per se, take part in the march. As the march moved out, they stayed behind and eventually left the area.

Mr. Edgar. Did you hear John Smith tell anyone not to be afraid to use the sticks’’?

Mr. McCollough. Not in quotes like that. I can only testify that in general John and other members were telling them that the
nonviolent aspect wouldn’t work and it would just lead to them being taken downtown and beaten by the police. So I would characterize it as rhetoric of violence but nothing specific as to take this stick and break a window.

Mr. Edgar. But did that rhetoric lead to some of the younger members of the crowd picking up the sticks and using them, in your opinion?

Mr. McCollough. You are asking for my opinion now, and in my opinion, I am certain that the atmosphere, the rhetoric that was being talked at that time, the rumors that were going around about the young girl being beaten, all added to the tension and all added as I said to the spontaneous eruption downtown that day.

Mr. Edgar. There were reports earlier in the narration that the sticks were purchased specifically to be used for acts of violence. In the early narration prior to your coming into the room there were some reports allegedly that the information was given to the Memphis police and FBI that sticks were being purchased and they were being possibly put together for acts of violence ahead of time. Wasn’t it usual to have sticks of this type for mass demonstrations for the use of putting the placards on the sticks?

Mr. McCollough. I don’t know where that report came from. It did not come from me, but I can explain to you here that earlier when the marchers had the placards, they would drape them around their necks as this man has done here. There was no semblance of order about them, and it was my conclusion that the sticks were brought in, not for violence, but in order to put some semblance of order to the marchers’ uniformity, if you will, with the placards.

Mr. Edgar. So you would not agree with the earlier informants that might have indicated to the Memphis police or to the FBI that the sticks were purchased specifically by either the Invaders or someone to create violence in the march?

Mr. McCollough. Only if he had better information than I had, and I had no information such as that.

Mr. Edgar. I think you can return to the table at this point.

Mr. McCollough, do you know if the Invaders were responsible in any way for the strike being held at all?

Mr. McCollough. No, sir; they were not responsible for the strike at all.

Mr. Edgar. At any time through the period of the assassination did you have any relationship with the FBI?

Mr. McCollough. No, sir. As I testified earlier, I was solely responsible for the Memphis Police Department. I worked solely for them.

Mr. Edgar. Were you aware of FBI agents who were related to the Memphis Police Department?

Mr. McCollough. At what point in time are you referring to, sir?

Mr. Edgar. Prior to the assassination.

Mr. McCollough. No, I have no recollection of FBI participation with the police department.

Mr. Edgar. Did you have any relationship with the Central Intelligence Agency during this period of time?
Mr. McCOLLOUGH. No, sir; I had no relationship with the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. EDGAR. Did you have any relationship with any other intelligence agency?

Mr. McCOLLOUGH. No, sir. Again, I will testify that I was solely responsible to the police department as a commissioned officer there.

Mr. EDGAR. Prior to the assassination, at any time were you employed by any of these groups?

Mr. McCOLLOUGH. No, sir; I was not.

Mr. EDGAR. You were aware, were you not, that your reports were routinely passed on to the FBI?

Mr. McCOLLOUGH. At what time was I aware now? You are saying I was aware?

Mr. EDGAR. Were you aware?

Mr. McCOLLOUGH. At the time, if you are dealing with the time of the assassination, I was not aware that my reports were going to the FBI.

Mr. EDGAR. Did you ever propose that the Invader group take any specific action?

Mr. McCOLLOUGH. No, sir. Again, I was working under specific instructions not to commit any acts of violence, not to provoke any acts of violence, merely to report upon the activities that occurred as they occurred.

Mr. EDGAR. Let me take you back to the Lorraine Hotel for a moment. You had indicated that Reverend Orange had asked you to take him shopping?

Mr. McCOLLOUGH. Yes, sir.

Mr. EDGAR. What did you understand your role as the person to provide transportation on the night of the assassination? Where did you think you were going to be transporting people?

Mr. McCOLLOUGH. I was headed down to the Lorraine Motel because the Invaders had a room at the motel, but I had stopped by the Clayborn Temple and Reverend Orange had asked me to take him shopping and I obliged him just out of courtesy to him.

Mr. EDGAR. So your purpose in being in the courtyard below was not to in fact transport Dr. King but in fact was to visit the Invaders' room that was at the Lorraine Hotel?

Mr. McCOLLOUGH. Yes, sir.

Mr. EDGAR. What was the purpose of the Invaders having a room at the Lorraine Hotel?

Mr. McCOLLOUGH. As you know, earlier they had the meeting with Dr. King and his group, and so was the SCLC staying at the motel, it was just out of mere logistics that they would have a room there in the Lorraine Motel.

Mr. EDGAR. I am not sure I understand why that would be necessary. If an organization wanted to meet with SCLC or with Dr. King, they could come to his room or they could meet in the lobby or they could visit some other place?

Mr. McCOLLOUGH. Well, the room was provided. It was provided free, I don't know by whom specifically, but it was almost like a fringe benefit of the movement. If you go back to what I said earlier about the cars, about the money, it was a freebie and it was taken.
Mr. Edgar. Who was in your car when you arrived at the Lorraine Hotel? Did you bring anyone with you?

Mr. McColough. Yes, sir. Reverend Orange had been with me all afternoon. He was there, and so was Jim Bevel. We had picked him up at the temple and he came with me.

Mr. Edgar. Were they going to meet with the Invaders or with Dr. King?

Mr. McColough. They were to meet with Dr. King. They had no dealings with the other members of the Invaders.

Mr. Edgar. When the shots rang out, you ran and were the first to arrive at the body. What did you do as you arrived at the body?

Mr. McColough. As I arrived at Dr. King's body, I tried to stop the bleeding. He had a severe wound in his face and neck. And, as you know, going through the police academy, I had been taught first aid, and the first thing came to my mind was to try to give him first aid.

Mr. Edgar. Could any of the actions have contributed to the death of Dr. King?

Mr. McColough. On the contrary, it was designed to help save his life, and unfortunately it didn't. And to answer your question, no, sir; it couldn't have.

Mr. Edgar. Did you own a rifle at the time of the death of Dr. King?

Mr. McColough. No, sir, I have never owned a rifle.

Mr. Edgar. In your undercover work were you armed?

Mr. McColough. On some occasions I was and that would have been with a .25 automatic pistol.

Mr. Edgar. Were you armed on this occasion?

Mr. McColough. I don't specifically recall. Possibly not because I had been to school and I didn't carry my weapon to school with me.

Mr. Edgar. What did you do during the march on March 28 after you gathered up the sticks? Where did you physically go?

Mr. McColough. Physically, we turned back to the Clayborn Temple area to the Minimum Salary Building, and from there I went home.

Mr. Edgar. You went home?

Mr. McColough. Later on—you have to realize that following the violence the police department placed a curfew in the city. So once I left the temple area I went home, yes, sir.

Mr. Edgar. Did your presence in the activities surrounding the death of Dr. King harm or hold up your ability to work with the Invaders for some time after the death, or did they continue to accept you?

Mr. McColough. It never came up with me in the group, the fact that I was present when Dr. King was killed.

Mr. Edgar. Did you have any extensive debriefing by the Memphis Police Department after the death?

Mr. McColough. Not extensive. I provided my regular report, which I did every day on what I thought had occurred.

Mr. Edgar. Were you ever interrogated by the FBI?

Mr. McColough. Not interrogated. I was interviewed. I gave them an interview.

Mr. Edgar. How extensive was that interview?
Mr. McCollough. It was full. It covered everything that I recalled about the assassination.

Mr. Edgar. When did that take place?

Mr. McCollough. Looking at the date here, April 12, 1968.

Mr. Edgar. Thank you.

No further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Preyer.

Mr. Preyer. Thank you.

You have given us a somewhat different picture than I, at least, had of the Invaders from general reading in the press. You were telling this committee the Invaders was a bona fide student movement that arose among students; it was not something set up by any governmental agency as a front for anything?

Mr. McCollough. The Invader group was not a front for anything. It was just, as I said, grassroots young people in the community.

Mr. Preyer. Concerning the question about the room at the Lorraine Hotel, was there anything secret about the fact of the room being there? Was it general knowledge?

Mr. McCollough. There was nothing secretive about it. I knew that the group was there, and they didn’t try to keep it a secret.

Mr. Preyer. Was it on the same floor or another floor as Dr. King’s room?

Mr. McCollough. Again, as I recall, the room would have been farther to the north, the corner from where Dr. King’s was, so it would have been down the corridor from where Dr. King was.

Mr. Preyer. Did anyone spend the night in that room?

Mr. McCollough. I never spent the night there and I am not aware of anyone spending the night, but it is possible that some of the members, particularly Charles Cabbage, Edwina Harris, and maybe even John would have spent the night there.

Mr. Preyer. Did the Invaders use that room on other occasion or was this the first time they had such a room?

Mr. McCollough. This was the first time they had that room in the motel.

Mr. Preyer. Thank you.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Sawyer.

Mr. Sawyer. I have no questions.

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from the District of Columbia, Mr. Fauntroy.

Mr. Fauntroy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. McCollough, first of all I wonder if you would review for me why you felt the shot came from the roominghouse, and begin by telling me where you were when Dr. King was shot.

Mr. McCollough. OK, sir. I was standing to the southeast of where Dr. King’s room was, that was room 306. I was down below him. As I told you earlier, the shot came as an explosion, not directional but as an explosion, and from the way Dr. King fell when the shot rang out he fell at an angle. If you would look at the rail and consider that the rail runs north and south and consider the way Dr. King’s body is laying in conjunction with that rail, that plus the fact that the angle of where I saw where he had been
hit, suggested that it was from an elevated area. The angle at which he fell suggested that it came from the northwest, so in my mind at that time spontaneously I thought—and still do believe—that the shot came from an elevated area from the northwest which would have been that roominghouse.

Mr. Fauntroy. Is it correct to say that you suggested to people by pointing that is the way from whence the shot came?

Mr. McCollough. Whether I suggested to them, I don’t know. But I know that I felt at the time that the shot came from that way. It is very possible that the suggestion was made, because I went down and told the police officer what I felt and where I thought the shot had come from.

Mr. Fauntroy. Second, I am interested in how you infiltrated the Invaders. I guess my first question is, I take it you had never lived in Memphis prior to this time?

Mr. McCollough. That is true.

Mr. Fauntroy. Where did you live at the time of the formation of the Invaders?

Mr. McCollough. I was overseas with the military services when it would have initially begun.

Mr. Fauntroy. You were still in service?

Mr. McCollough. I was in the service from 1964 until 1967.

Mr. Fauntroy. The Invaders were formed in early 1967?

Mr. McCollough. Yes, sir.

Mr. Fauntroy. You were a student at college at the time?

Mr. McCollough. At Memphis State University, yes, sir.

Mr. Fauntroy. How did you allocate your time between your assignments as a police officer and as a student?

Mr. McCollough. Let me explain to you. When I first started to work with the police department I was in the uniform patrol, straight 8-hour-a-day. Once I had been assigned to the Internal Affairs Division undercover, my duties were to associate and infiltrate the Invader group during hours after school, so——

Mr. Fauntroy. Just a minute. I want to know how you got in school.

Mr. McCollough. I took the entrance exam and passed it.

Mr. Fauntroy. No. You are a police officer?

Mr. McCollough. Yes, sir.

Mr. Fauntroy. You are working 8 hours a day?

Mr. McCollough. No, sir. I don’t think you understand me. What happened, I would go to school during the day Monday, Wednesday and Friday and Tuesday and Thursday, and once I got out of school at that point I would go and get with the members of the Invaders.

Mr. Fauntroy. I understand that.

When did you start school?

Mr. McCollough. At what point did I start school?

Mr. Fauntroy. Yes.

Mr. McCollough. I started school later on during the summer of 1968.

Mr. Fauntroy. What I am trying to understand is how you represented yourself to the Invaders.
Mr. McCOLLOUGH. I represented myself to them as working at a warehouse twice a week and afterwards as being a student. But during this period that you are interested in—

Mr. FAUNTROY. I see. That helps me to understand. So as far as they were concerned, they were for the most part students and you were from the area and you didn't have to tell them much more than you were working at the warehouse?

Mr. McCOLLOUGH. That is all.

Mr. FAUNTROY. They didn't inquire if you knew any of the other fellows, how long you had been in Memphis or anything like that?

Mr. McCOLLOUGH. I made that a fact. See, my background was that I grew up in Mississippi, went in the service and came out. That was good enough because I had just come to Memphis.

Mr. FAUNTROY. Were you aware of any informants that the FBI had with the Invaders?

Mr. McCOLLOUGH. No, sir, not that the FBI had.

Mr. FAUNTROY. You were not aware at that time.

Have you since become aware of the presence of any FBI informants among the Invaders with whom you worked?

Mr. McCOLLOUGH. As a member of the Invader group, there were no FBI informants.

Mr. FAUNTROY. So the impression and the statement that the FBI had an informant working with the Invaders was not then true and to the best of your knowledge is not now true?

Mr. McCOLLOUGH. That is correct.

Mr. FAUNTROY. You indicated that the room was made available to you, it didn't cost the Invaders anything?

Mr. McCOLLOUGH. To my knowledge, it didn't cost them anything at all.

Mr. FAUNTROY. You indicated or we had the impression the Invaders were formed to challenge the existing leadership. Did you get that impression?

Mr. McCOLLOUGH. Not specifically to challenge the established leadership. Let me just go over this and maybe clear it up a little bit. On campus, this group of students started the Black Students Union. OK? Now, once they left school and went back into the community, they started this organization called the Invaders. And interestingly enough, I really don't believe that organization would have come to anybody's attention had it not been for the articles by Kay Pittman Black. The guys on campus made very volatile statements, and she printed them and she asked John: Who are you? And John said Invaders.

During that time there was a popular TV story known as the Invaders, and she started writing stories and apparently it worked for her and it worked for the group because there was a lot of publicity.

The group wasn't necessarily started to challenge the established leadership but it was an outgrowth of the publicity and an outgrowth of the Black Student Union and the general unrest among the student population.

Mr. FAUNTROY. Were you aware the FBI was approached by them for funds?

Mr. McCOLLOUGH. The Invaders? I am not even aware of that to this day, sir.
Mr. Fauntroy. So at no time did you hear discussion of them approaching the FBI for funds?

Mr. McCollough. No, sir.

Mr. Fauntroy. So you could not tell us what may have been the rationale for that approach?

Mr. McCollough. I have never heard it before. This is the first time I have heard it.

Mr. Fauntroy. Is it, against the background of your experience with them, understandable that an antiestablishment group would approach the establishment for some money?

Mr. McCollough. It just doesn't seem to go along with the Invaders. I would just have to deny it. And even if it did occur—this is a speculation—it would have been a ripoff scheme by somebody, and again I want to point out that I have no knowledge of the Invaders ever going to the FBI and ever asking for funds from that bureau.

Mr. Fauntroy. I take it also your answer would be in the negative to the claim that you were a provocateur and that you were running around encouraging them to engage in acts of violence?

Mr. McCollough. That was totally against the police department's charter. It was totally against anything I would have done, so you are right, I definitely deny that.

Mr. Fauntroy. And you didn't have a .762 Russian automatic rifle?

Mr. McCollough. I have never even seen one, sir.

Mr. Fauntroy. Were they armed at any time?

Mr. McCollough. There was the Saturday night special, it was in keeping with the concept of the Saturday night special. Almost anybody on the street would have had one of those, but to be considered as an armed group, no, we weren't.

Mr. Fauntroy. Mr. Chairman, I should like to reserve a little of my time. I yield back that portion which I have used.

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman yields back the balance of his time. The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ford?

Mr. Ford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. McCollough, you mentioned to Congressman Fauntroy a minute ago that you were admitted into Memphis State in the summer of 1968. Is that correct?

Mr. McCollough. To the best of my recollection, yes, sir; that is correct.

Mr. Ford. You also indicate that on April 4 of 1968 you attended class prior to the assassination of Dr. King. Is that correct?

Mr. McCollough. Either one is not correct. One can't be correct, so I would have to think on that, but I am trying to remember what had occurred. So I must have entered school early rather than during the summer. But I agree with you, one is not correct.

Mr. Ford. You were born where, Mr. McCollough?

Mr. McCollough. In Tunica County, Miss.

Mr. Ford. Which is about 35 miles outside Memphis; is that correct?

Mr. McCollough. Yes, sir, it is.

Mr. Ford. You were discharged from the Army in 1967?

Mr. McCollough. Yes, sir, that is correct.
Mr. Ford. Did you move back to Tunica or did you move to Memphis immediately after service?
Mr. McCollough. I went straight back to Memphis.
Mr. Ford. What month in 1968 did Inspector Tines assign you as an undercover agent to the Invaders?
Mr. McCollough. It was in February of 1968.
Mr. Ford. Did you participate in any of the other community activities with the Invaders prior to the April 4 assassination?
Mr. McCollough. Yes, sir. I went to meetings with them, I went to their meetings down in south Memphis prior to the assassination.
Mr. Ford. Where in south Memphis?
Mr. McCollough. On Hanover Street.
Mr. Ford. What was on Hanover Street?
Mr. McCollough. John Smith maintained an apartment on Hanover Street where the group met.
Mr. Ford. That was when?
Mr. McCollough. Excuse me?
Mr. Ford. February, March?
Mr. McCollough. When the group met or when he maintained the apartment?
Mr. Ford. Are you talking about the month of February, March or April?
Mr. McCollough. I am talking about in February when I initially started attending the meetings.
Mr. Ford. Were you a part of the activities at Carver School and some of the other schools in the city that turned out early in the afternoons because of the Invaders?
Mr. McCollough. Yes, sir. I attended—I was at Carver I believe the day that the schools were turned out, I was there.
Mr. Ford. Did you report that to Inspector Tines?
Mr. McCollough. Yes, sir. All of my reporting was that I reported raw data on activities, yes, sir.
Mr. Ford. Did you participate in those activities?
Mr. McCollough. Only in the fact that I was there. That is the extent of my participation.
Mr. Ford. You are telling the committee that you were there but you did not participate?
Mr. McCollough. As far as participation to the point of having the students leave the school, no, sir, I did not, and I believe later—if you recall, John Smith was arrested for his participation during that incident.
Mr. Ford. After that incident you went back to other meetings held by the Invaders, even though you did not participate in the activities at Carver School and other activities of the group?
Mr. McCollough. I think you and I are are talking differently of participation. If you are talking about participation to the extent that I am suggesting or provoking students to leave school, then I didn’t participate. But as you know, there were other Invaders present when John was there, and other people, and it has been found that their presence there did not constitute participation in the sense that John had participated and asked the students to leave.
Mr. Fauntroy. Would the gentleman yield?
Mr. Ford. Yes.

Mr. Fauntroy. Mr. McCollough, you were about this time considered a part of the group?

Mr. McCollough. Yes, sir.

Mr. Fauntroy. How did they know you were part of the group?

Mr. McCollough. Because I was always present, and I guess you will hear testimony from some of the group that I was the passive one, because I had to be passive to fit into my role as a police officer because I couldn’t suggest any acts of violence, I couldn’t participate in any acts of violence, and so I would take them to different places and I would accept a lesser role.

Mr. Fauntroy. Did they ever question you about the fact that you were standing around when you were supposed to be active in the movement?

Mr. McCollough. Well, I was active, sir, but I knew where to break it off. I could just go so far and no farther.

Mr. Fauntroy. How far did you go in participating in the activities?

Mr. McCollough. I took the group over there and I was talking to students, but I was not ranting and raving and using words to make them leave school. So as far as participating, talking to students, certainly I did.

Mr. Fauntroy. What were you talking to them about?

Mr. McCollough. Well, sir, you use your ingenuity in a situation like that. You talk about the group, what are the Invaders? I told them what the group was all about, but as far as saying this is what you are going to do, no, sir, I never did anything like that.

Mr. Fauntroy. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Ford. Mr. McCollough, were you ever arrested with any of the Invaders?

Mr. McCollough. Yes, sir, I was.

Mr. Ford. For what?

Mr. McCollough. This is later on outside the scope of what we are doing here. But for your information, one night the police department raided John’s apartment and everybody was taken to jail.

Mr. Ford. Did you ever provide any of the Invaders with any drugs or marihuana?

Mr. McCollough. No, sir, I was not into dealing with drugs.

Mr. Ford. What about finances?

Mr. McCollough. No, sir. I never provided money. It was not a paying organization. You didn’t have to pay, as such.

Mr. Ford. When we talk about the Invaders, I think in terms of a close, united group of young men in south Memphis. I am a little concerned how you were able to fit into that group, since you were from Tunica, Miss., and right out of the armed services. I say that because I am from south Memphis and most of the Invaders were known for a period of time. You are saying that you did not use money or drugs or anything else to offer to members of the Invaders, yet you mentioned earlier that during the March 28 march in Memphis that the Invaders wanted a couple of automobiles, and finances from the SCLC.

You infiltrate the Invaders as an undercover agent for the Memphis Police Department, yet assured us that you did not participate
in their activities. And I am curious at this point to know, how did you get so involved with the Invaders? A young country boy from Tunica, Miss., walks into the big city and the Invaders, a community-oriented group—and I don’t think they were that radical, I think they were just concerned about the welfare and interest of the total Black community in Memphis—join with and participate with them, and they never questioned you. And they go to Carver School and other schools and turn the schools out, and you stand over by the tree and let it happen and go back to the meeting the next night and say, right on, brothers.

I just want to know, how did that happen?

Mr. McCOLLOUGH. Congressman, I have to admit that your characterization in all fairness is not one which I hope to have presented to this committee, so I will go back over what I have testified, hopefully to alleviate some of your fears.

No. 1, the close, unitededness of that group, it was not that closely united.

No. 2, what I did, I offered to be minister of transportation. One uses all resources, and I had a car, none of the guys had a car, and I used that to get into the group and to gain their confidence.

The other part, the innocence, being right out of the country, thank you for that, but again, I think I was resourceful and I used what I had to the best of my ability and I was able to get into the group and protect my own integrity and the integrity of the police department and report fairly and report objectively about the group. Again, I was with them for over a year and a half, so if that disturbed you, all I can say is I had a job to do, I was assigned to it and I did it well, as far as I am concerned.

Mr. Ford. Thank you very much, Mr. McCollough, and thank you for appearing here today.

I yield back the balance of my time, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman yields back the balance of his time.

Mr. McCollough, do you know Ed Redditt?

Mr. McCOLLOUGH. Yes, sir, I do.

Chairman Stokes. In your position as an undercover agent for the Memphis Police Department, did you have a special relationship with Ed Redditt?

Mr. McCOLLOUGH. Yes, sir. When I was brought into the internal affairs unit Ed Redditt along with Willy B. Richmond, Inspector Tines—they were all part of the unit at that time.

Chairman Stokes. In your role as an undercover agent, did you report or in any way share information with Ed Redditt?

Mr. McCOLLOUGH. Yes, sir. When I initially started, Ed gave me advice on how to conduct myself, how to go about my assignment, and I got to know him pretty well initially.

Chairman Stokes. Once you became a part of the Invaders group, what was your relationship with Ed Redditt?

Mr. McCOLLOUGH. It all ceased because somewhere, I am not exactly sure at what point in time, the internal affairs division split up, one group went to monitor police activities and the other became known as the domestic intelligence unit and Ed was no longer part of the domestic intelligence unit, so I lost all direct contact with him.
Chairman Stokes. How long had you been in the courtyard at the time Dr. King was shot?

Mr. McCOLLOUGH. I arrived at the courtyard around 5 minutes till 6, or something like that, and Dr. King was killed around 6, so I had just barely got there.

Chairman Stokes. At the time you heard the shot, what was Dr. King doing?

Mr. McCOLLOUGH. Dr. King was leaning over the balcony and he was talking to someone down below.

Chairman Stokes. Do you know to whom he was talking?

Mr. McCOLLOUGH. Specifically I don't know because there was a group of people, some of the ones I recognize as being from the Bread Basket singing group, so to whom he was specifically speaking I have no knowledge.

Chairman Stokes. Do you know how far you were from whomever he was talking with?

Mr. McCOLLOUGH. I was approaching that group, going over toward them so I could not hear specifically what Dr. King was saying and I just don't recall how far I was away from him but it was close. I was close to that group.

Chairman Stokes. You are aware of the speculation that has grown up around Dr. King's having been in some way maneuvered out on the balcony. In light of the fact that it was known that James Earl Ray checked into the rooming house at around 3 p.m. that afternoon, there was speculation as to how he would know that Dr. King would be out on the balcony and he would thereby be able to shoot him from the bathroom window.

You have heard that, have you not?

Mr. McCOLLOUGH. Not that specifically, no sir, I have not.

Chairman Stokes. In what way did you hear it?

Mr. McCOLLOUGH. This is the first time I have heard that he was maneuvered outside so that he could be assassinated.

Chairman Stokes. You have never heard it rumored or discussed in terms of people wondering how Dr. King happened to be out on the balcony at that precise time?

Mr. McCOLLOUGH. No, sir. All accounts I have heard is that he was out talking to the singing group and was making a special request for a song.

Chairman Stokes. At any rate, you are unable to tell us what you heard him say on that occasion or what you heard anyone else say to him?

Mr. McCOLLOUGH. That is correct. I didn't hear Dr. King say anything. I knew he was talking because the people were paying attention to him and he was talking. Specifically what he said I don't know.

Chairman Stokes. As you arrived there, as you described, about 5 minutes to 6, what was your purpose?

Mr. McCOLLOUGH. My purpose was to bring Reverend Orange and Jim Bevel over. As I told you earlier, I had taken Orange out to east Memphis to do some shopping—he was looking for a pair of overalls—and the continuity of events led me to bring him back to the Lorraine Motel.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you. I have no further questions.

The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Devine.
Mr. Devine. No, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from the District of Columbia, Mr. Fauntroy.
Mr. Fauntroy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. McCollough, did you know that Ed Redditt and Mr. Richmond were assigned to surveillance of Dr. King at the time that you were working as an Invader?
Mr. McCollough. To know that they were assigned to surveillance, I wouldn’t have any direct knowledge of that, but I can tell you of an incident at the Mason Temple. I ran into Officer Richmond and passed pleasantries and said, “What are you doing here?”

And he said, “I am on the King detail.” So whatever that meant, he was either on the surveillance team or on the protection team. I didn’t even question him.
Mr. Fauntroy. So that while you said you knew Mr. Tines and Mr. Richmond and Mr. Redditt and that you were in the same position, you never met together to discuss your various roles?
Mr. McCollough. No, sir. Because by the time Dr. King was assassinated, Ed Redditt was into another division.
Mr. Fauntroy. To your knowledge, did they know that you were working as an informant with the Invaders?
Mr. McCollough. Sir, I was not an informant; I was a commissioned police officer with the police department.
Mr. Fauntroy. You were gathering intelligence?
Mr. McCollough. Yes, sir.
Mr. Fauntroy. Excuse me. I did not perceive the difference and I now know the difference.

At one point you were questioned about the march on the 28th, and I wonder if you recall any Invaders coming up to Dr. King and Dr. Abernathy and commenting to them about how fine it was they were leading the march and then going out to the fringe of the march and precipitating violent acts.
Mr. McCollough. No, sir. My recollection is, as I testified earlier, that there were members at the temple who were making highly volatile statements that this wasn’t the right way and that it would be met by violence from the police.
Mr. Fauntroy. Were you aware that your department had any other undercover agents involved in the Invaders or any other group?
Mr. McCollough. While I was undercover, sir, as far as my knowledge, I was on my own, I didn’t know of any counterparts.
Mr. Fauntroy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. McCollough, at the conclusion of a witness’ testimony before this committee, the witness is entitled to 5 minutes. During that 5-minute period the witness may explain and amplify or in any way make further comment upon his testimony. I would extend to you 5 minutes for that purpose at this time, if you so desire.
Mr. McCollough. Thank you very much. I hope that I have been helpful to the committee. I have been honest with you and that is all I have to say.
Chairman Stokes. Thank you very much, Mr. McCollough.
There being nothing further, you are excused.
The Chair recognizes Professor Blakey.

NARRATION BY PROF. G. ROBERT BLAKEY, CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR

Mr. Blakey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I understand that the witness will not invoke the rules, so it would be appropriate to rescind your previous ruling dealing with media coverage.

Mr. Chairman, in addition to Marrell McCollough, the committee reviewed the FBI informant files for the Invader informants. Apparently, contrary to Mr. McCollough's knowledge, the FBI had several informants who were either members of the Invaders or so associated with them that they were able to provide information to the Bureau about the Invaders' activities.

It has also interviewed the FBI informant within the Invaders who was the most likely person through whom the Bureau would have attempted to influence or employ members of the Invaders to carry out activities directed toward Dr. King.

The Invaders became the subject of much public attention after the assassination. Many people, including former members of the group, blamed it for the disruption of the March 28 march. It has also been alleged that members of the group were actually agent-provocateurs in the employ of the FBI who were furthering the Bureau's Conintelpro activities. Another accusation has been that the disruption by some members of the Invaders was part of an FBI plot to lure Dr. King back to Memphis.

Much of this speculation was generated by a docu-drama called "King," telecast in the fall of 1977. This production was supposed to be a dramatic rendition of history. In one scene of the movie, Andy Young interrogates two men portraying members of the Invaders. One informs Young that they were paid to disrupt the march. The other, like Charles Cabbage, a Morehouse graduate, when asked who had paid them to do so, responded, "The FBI."

The Invaders came into being in late 1967 when a number of Black youths, conditioned politically by the Vietnam War, the civil rights movement and economic conditions in Memphis, created what they envisioned would be a coalition of groups to challenge the established Black leadership of Memphis. The organization came to be known as the Black Organizing Project. It was actually the brainchild of a small group of young Black activists, some of whom were college students. Among them were Charles Cabbage, John Smith, Ronald Ivy, Calvin Taylor, and Coby Smith. The central group was known as the Invaders.

The Invaders patterned its organization after the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee. Members were drawn from the ranks of the Black student unions at Lemoyne and Owen Colleges, as well as Memphis State. Also, an effort was made to try to organize the younger, more disillusioned and disaffected groups in the community into a cohesive force for social and economic change.

The group was largely ineffective and given to rhetorical excess. Its militant posture, however, captured the attention of a local newspaperwoman, Kay Pittman Black. It was her series of articles that brought the group public exposure and a degree of prominence among local high-school-age youths.
While the Invaders were attempting to get organized, Mr. Cabbage and Mr. Smith asked to meet with local agents of the FBI, part of an effort to establish themselves in the community and to obtain funding. The Invaders had become aware of alleged FBI funding provided to a group in Chicago, the Blackstone Rangers. Special Agents Lawrence and Lowe of the Memphis field office did meet with a number of members at Mr. Smith's apartment on February 16, 1968. This marked the beginning of the FBI's interest in the group.

The sanitation strike presented the Invaders and the Black Organizing Project (BOP) with an issue over which to vie for community leadership.

In addressing the role of the Invaders, the committee has interviewed several key former members. Some provided written releases authorizing the FBI to turn over to the committee their Bureau files, including those which would help in determining whether they were informants. A great deal of information about the group and individuals was also taken from interviews with people associated with COME. Former members of the Memphis Police Department provided what details they remembered. In addition, the committee examined the written reports on Invader activities in various files of the FBI and the Memphis Police Department. These latter were drawn principally from reports by Mr. McCollough.

Finally, the committee interviewed and took testimony from the FBI agents who had responsibility for controlling these informants and monitoring the activities of groups and individuals connected with the sanitation strike.

One member of the Invaders, Calvin Taylor, was in a unique position to comment on the events of March 28. Although described by some as a peripheral member of the Invaders' leadership, his position was clearly evidenced by his presence at critical junctures in meetings between the Invaders and Dr. King.

As a copy boy for the Memphis Commercial Appeal, Mr. Taylor attended various strike-related activities, in particular the march on March 28. He also attended the Invader meeting with Dr. King at the Holiday Inn on March 29.

It would be appropriate at this time, Mr. Chairman, to call Mr. Taylor.

Chairman Stokes. The committee calls Mr. Taylor.

Will you raise your hand, please, and be sworn. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you give before this committee is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Taylor. I do.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you. You may be seated.

The Chair recognizes staff counsel, Mr. McHargh.

Mr. McHargh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. McHargh. Mr. Taylor, would you please state your full name for the record.

Mr. Taylor. Calvin L. Taylor, Jr.

Mr. McHargh. Mr. Taylor, where did you reside during 1967 and 1968?
Mr. Taylor. Street address?
Mr. Mchargh. Where? In what city?
Mr. Taylor. Memphis, Tenn.
Mr. Mchargh. Were you employed during that period of time?
Mr. Taylor. Yes; I was.
Mr. Mchargh. How were your employed?
Mr. Taylor. I was a copy clerk for the Memphis Commercial Appeal newspaper.
Mr. Mchargh. Did there come a time during that time period when you became associated with the group which has been described as the Invaders?
Mr. Taylor. Yes.
Mr. Mchargh. About what time was that?
Mr. Taylor. I don't know a specific time. I have known members of the group all my life. We grew up together, we lived in the same neighborhood.
Mr. Mchargh. Were you associated with that group during the time of the sanitation strike in 1968?
Mr. Taylor. Yes.
Mr. Mchargh. What was your understanding of the goals and objectives of the Invader group at that time?
Mr. Taylor. From my understanding of the group at that time, our goals and objectives were merely to improve conditions for minority persons living in Memphis, Tenn.
Mr. Mchargh. How did the group advocate improving those conditions?
Mr. Taylor. How did we advocate it?
Mr. Mchargh. How did the group intend to go about improving the conditions of Blacks in Memphis at that time?
Mr. Taylor. I think our initial approach was to make it known to whatever leadership, or whoever had the power, that there were problems existing. We attempted to do this largely—it would depend upon the circumstance of the issue at hand.
Mr. Mchargh. Would you describe the group as being a militant group at that time?
Mr. Taylor. I would not describe our group as being militant, no.
Mr. Mchargh. In contrast to the leadership of the strike, the group called COME, are you familiar with the group?
Mr. Taylor. Yes, I am.
Mr. Mchargh. Did the Invaders attempt to work with COME relative to the sanitation strike that was going on?
Mr. Taylor. We did.
Mr. Mchargh. Would you describe how you attempted to work that organization.
Mr. Taylor. We never got around to how we would work, and if you mean in an operational manner, because we had some difficulty getting recognized by the COME group as a force in the community that were concerned about some of the same problems they were concerned about.
Mr. Mchargh. Who were some of the other members of the group at the time of the sanitation strike? And would you refer to individuals that would have been considered leaders or spokespersons for the group.
Mr. Taylor. First of all, I think if I may answer the question the way I want as opposed to the way you posed it to me, leadership in the Invaders was not necessarily a rank-and-file situation as you would have in any other organization. Leadership in the Invaders really meant an active role in trying to improve what we felt were some injustices that Black people in Memphis were having to go through. We had several people who were spokesmen. The press, I think, would identify whomever was speaking at the time as a spokesman or leader, but among the group itself we never had what we considered to be a leader.

Now if you would like me to name members of the group—

Mr. McHargh. For example, was John B. Smith considered to be an Invader at that time?

Mr. Taylor. He was identified by the press as a member of the Invaders, yes.

Mr. McHargh. Did you know him to be a member of the Invaders?

Mr. Taylor. Yes.

Mr. McHargh. Charles Cabbage?

Mr. Taylor. Yes.

Mr. McHargh. Charles Harrington?

Mr. Taylor. Yes.

Mr. McHargh. You indicated earlier that the group met with little success attempting to work with the COME leadership in addressing the sanitation strike. Could you describe to the committee what you feel were the reasons that you were unable to achieve such success with the COME leadership?

Mr. Taylor. I think perhaps the identification, or the labeling would be a better word for it, that we were a militant group, was unacceptable to both the Black and white leadership in Memphis during this time, and it probably prevented us from actually ever really being able to get along, I guess, or discuss with the leadership what the issues were. I think it was a question most of the time of, for example, the way we dressed. Unfortunately, I don't think any of us could afford very many suits at times so we could look like what the establishment looked like. But I think that, for the most part, presented itself as a problem.

Mr. McHargh. You indicated that the label the Invaders was something that turned people off. Isn't it also true that you were considered by the COME leadership to be a militant group?

Mr. Taylor. By them; yes.

Mr. McHargh. Did your rhetoric at the time, that is, the rhetoric of the group, was that consistent with the consideration of the group as being a militant group?

Mr. Taylor. Would you repeat that again, please?

Mr. McHargh. In other words, you indicated that because you were called the Invaders, people looked at you askance. Isn't it also true that the rhetoric that the group utilized in describing itself and stating its positions—isn't it true that that was also considered to be militant rhetoric?

Mr. Taylor. I think the rhetoric was necessary for identification of the group. We were seeking to spearhead some issues of which some other people were also working on. I think that whenever two
or three groups get together over the same issue, you have to have some kind of education.

So I think we sort of ended up with the militant identification.

Mr. McHARGH. Were you present during the testimony of Marrell McCullough this morning?

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes; I was.

Mr. McHARGH. Did you know Marrell McCullough while you were in Memphis?

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes; I did. I knew who he was.

Mr. McHARGH. Did you know him to be a member of the Invaders?

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes; I did.

Mr. McHARGH. Was this prior to the time that Dr. King was assassinated?

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes; it was. I am trying to remember just when I did meet Merrell McCullough, or when we began to see his face.

Mr. McHARGH. You don’t recall when you first met him, but you do recall he was considered to be a member of the Invaders prior to Dr. King’s assassination?

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes.

Mr. McHARGH. Can you describe to the committee what your recollections of Mr. McCullough’s activities with the group were at the time?

Mr. TAYLOR. As it relates to his activities, I could not describe. As to the kind of person he was, he seemed to be very eager to assist in whatever needed to be done. I never knew him to be one of the people who had something else to do or somewhere else to go or something.

Mr. McHARGH. Did Mr. McCullough attend meetings held by the group?

Mr. TAYLOR. As far as I know, he did.

Mr. McHARGH. Did you ever see him at any of the meetings held by the group?

Mr. TAYLOR. I would say yes. I don’t remember, but I would say yes, I am sure he was there.

Mr. McHARGH. Do you recall Mr. McCullough advocating any particular posture at these meetings?

Mr. TAYLOR. No, I don’t, not really.

Mr. McHARGH. Do you ever recall Mr. McCullough giving any direction to group activities?

Mr. TAYLOR. No.

Mr. McHARGH. Did you consider him to be one of the spokespersons or leaders of the group?

Mr. TAYLOR. Did I? No.

Mr. McHARGH. Do you recall Dr. King’s arriving at Memphis on March 28 to lead a march? That was the march that ended in violence.

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes.

Mr. McHARGH. What were you doing on the day of that march?

Mr. TAYLOR. On the day of the march I was assigned to cover the march for the newspapers.

Mr. McHARGH. Prior to that march, do you recall having any meetings among the Invaders during which time you discussed strategy relative to the march itself?
Mr. TAYLOR. No.
Mr. MCCHARGH. You don’t recall any such meetings to discuss what should take place at the march?

Mr. TAYLOR. No.
Mr. MCCHARGH. What time did you arrive at the march on the 28th?

Mr. TAYLOR. Ten o’clock in the morning, probably. I would say between 9 and 10.

Mr. MCCHARGH. Would you describe to the committee what you saw upon arriving at the march?

Mr. TAYLOR. I would describe it as a great deal of confusion. There were a lot of people; people were milling around. There were a lot of different kinds of people or kinds of groups of people. I think I came to the march from behind the publishing company which was located behind the Clayborn Temple. I think it is probably northeast of the temple.

There were several young people, several people dressed in all kinds of clothing, some drinking wine, some talking. It was kind of a festive occasion, with a great deal of anxiety about it. There was an air that something was going to happen that day. No one knew exactly what. It was a lot of people.

Mr. MCCHARGH. Did you see other members of the group known as the Invaders at the march scene?

Mr. TAYLOR. When you say “other members of the group known as the Invaders,” I saw a great deal of people who identified themselves with the group; yes. We had no membership roll as such, no dues, no bylaws or that kind of thing. Anyone who wanted to could be a member of the Invaders simply by saying, “I’m a member of the Invaders.”

Mr. MCCHARGH. But you were not aware of any official group decision to attend the march and be involved in any specific action at the march scene?

Mr. TAYLOR. No.

Mr. MCCHARGH. Did you hear any of these members that you recall seeing say anything prior to the march beginning?

Mr. TAYLOR. I heard a lot of things. Things like what?

Mr. MCCHARGH. Well, did you hear anyone advocating violence prior to the march beginning?

Mr. TAYLOR. A number of persons; yes.

Mr. MCCHARGH. What were they saying?

Mr. TAYLOR. Mostly it was the idea that this was the minority members’—or Black people in Memphis—day to really demonstrate to the white power structure what we were all about, you know, as far as the sanitation workers were concerned. This was their day to do whatever they were doing and anyone else who showed up.

Mr. MCCHARGH. You have testified earlier that you saw people there drinking wine. Did you also indicate that you saw them distributing wine to younger members that happened to be in the crowd?

Mr. TAYLOR. When you say, “distributing”—I don’t know where you grew up, but where I grew up somebody buys wine and passes it around.

Mr. MCCHARGH. Will you describe how you saw wine being handled at the march scene?
Mr. Taylor. You say being handled at the march scene? I am saying as I walked from the publishing company to Clayborn Temple and passed the rear of the temple, there were people in the back consuming wine. That wine was being passed in the normal manner in which we pass it, I guess; that is, you take a sip and I take a sip.

Mr. McHargh. Would you consider, or do you now consider, that perhaps the fact that individuals there were drinking might have contributed to the atmosphere and helped to have contributed to the fact that violence subsequently occurred?

Mr. Taylor. I would think everything that occurred this day contributed to the violence, and I would have to say; yes.

Mr. McHargh. Did you see any specific activity relative to the signs which were previously described, which had been mounted upon the sticks?

Mr. Taylor. Other than members perhaps of the sanitation workers who were nailing placards to them, I didn’t see any. The signs and the sticks were, I think, furnished by the sanitation workers or by the coalition that was working with them.

Mr. McHargh. So, to your recollection, the Invaders as an organization had nothing to do with the fact that signs mounted on sticks were present at the march on the 28th?

Mr. Taylor. To my recollection, we had nothing to do with that at all.

Mr. McHargh. Could you describe to the committee what happened once the march began and what you actually saw?

Mr. Taylor. Well, to begin with, the march was very late in getting started. I would imagine in retrospect that the holdup was due to the arrival of Dr. King.

The people, of course, were very restless; they were anxious to get started. So I guess whoever was in charge of the march decided that we should begin the march.

The march progressed from the temple down Ornando to Beale, made a left turn on Beale and went west; it got to Main Street and made a right turn which, of course, meant north, and I think my first knowledge that there was something wrong in the march came as we approached the department store named “Goldsmith.”

Mr. McHargh. Would you describe what happened at that point?

Mr. Taylor. There was a rush on the part of the people in front to go to the back, because there were—windows were being broken out of the department store.

Mr. McHargh. You were there covering the march for the newspapers, as you previously testified. Did you have a camera with you?

Mr. Taylor. No; I have never been very good with a camera.

Mr. McHargh. Did you participate along the course of the march?

Mr. Taylor. You mean, did I walk in the march?

Mr. McHargh. Yes; did you see any individuals begin breaking windows or otherwise conduct any violent activity?

Mr. Taylor. I did. I did see people break windows; yes.

Mr. McHargh. Do you know the names of the individuals that you saw?

Mr. Taylor. Not specifically.
Mr. McHARGH. Did you consider the individuals that you saw engaging in violence to be members of the Invaders?

Mr. TAYLOR. I did not consider them; no.

Mr. McHARGH. What did you do once the violence began?

Mr. TAYLOR. I really don't know. I guess I just ran back to the temple, like everybody else. I don't know what I did.

Mr. McHARGH. Did you participate in any violent acts yourself?

Mr. TAYLOR. Did I throw rocks or stones or something of that nature?

Mr. McHARGH. Did you participate in any violent acts?

Mr. TAYLOR. I would imagine I did; yes.

Mr. McHARGH. What did you do?

Mr. TAYLOR. I probably picked up a stone and threw it, or stick.

Mr. McHARGH. Did you consider yourself to be doing that based on any plan or strategy or objectives that you felt you and the other members of the Invaders wanted to accomplish on that day?

Mr. TAYLOR. No.

Mr. McHARGH. So you would then describe your acts as spontaneous and not preplanned?

Mr. TAYLOR. I would; yes. I think everyone was caught up in the emotion of what was going on.

Mr. McHARGH. Following the march, Dr. King was taken to the Rivermont Motel and the next morning, March 29, you and two other members of the Invaders visited Dr. King's room; is that correct?

Mr. TAYLOR. That's correct.

Mr. McHARGH. Would you describe to the committee what your purpose for going to see Dr. King was?

Mr. TAYLOR. As I recall Dr. King sent for us. He wanted to see the members of the Invaders who, of course, were being blamed for the violence that occurred during the march.

Mr. McHARGH. Do you have anything specific to base that recollection on?

Mr. TAYLOR. Once we got in the meeting, he asked us—everyone there asked us, why did we disrupt the march.

Mr. McHARGH. Well, with respect to the purpose for going to see Dr. King, do you recall anyone giving you or any other members of the Invaders a specific request that Dr. King wanted to see you?

Mr. TAYLOR. I can't remember who did it or how we got the message; but I remember that the message was that Dr. King wanted to talk with the Invaders regarding the disruption of the march.

Mr. McHARGH. Would you describe to the committee everything that happened once you arrived at the Rivermont Motel and once you were admitted to the room in which Dr. King was staying?

Mr. TAYLOR. Upon arrival at the meeting, let's see, it was Cab and Charles, and myself.

Mr. McHARGH. Excuse me. Would you give the full names of the individuals?

Mr. TAYLOR. Charles Cabbage and Charles Harrington.

Mr. McHARGH. Were they also members of the Invaders?

Mr. TAYLOR. They had to be at this point, whether they wanted to be or not. When we entered the room, I think I took a seat over by the balcony. Cab and Charles sat on the couch which was facing
west in the room. Dr. King was at the time, I think, taking a bath and did not greet us immediately.

I think we were greeted by someone—Reverend Abernathy. Reverend Abernathy began to ask us why did we disrupt the march. We attempted to explain to him that we did not disrupt the march. He insisted that we did, and we insisted that we did not. This went on until Dr. King came out.

Mr. McHARGH. So by that time, by the time that Dr. King came out, that you have indicated, you had met only with Dr. Abernathy?

Mr. TAYLOR. And someone else. I don't know who the other person was in the room. There was someone else.

Mr. McHARGH. Do you recall whether or not that other person might have been Bernard Lee?

Mr. TAYLOR. It may have been; I don't know.

Mr. McHARGH. You have no specific recollection?

Mr. TAYLOR. I have no specific recollection as to who it was. I mean, there were persons coming in and out. The room was, you know—I just assumed they were all Dr. King's aides. Reverend Abernathy is the only one I knew because he started talking to us.

Mr. McHARGH. Describe what happened when Dr. King entered the room.

Mr. TAYLOR. Well, to begin with, there was a complete change in the atmosphere. There was a great deal of static, I would say, between our side and Reverend Abernathy's side. When Dr. King came in, it was a very tranquil situation; everybody calmed down. I don't recall that anybody spoke above a whisper.

Mr. McHARGH. Do you recall what Dr. King said to you?

Mr. TAYLOR. He was very cordial. He said hello, invited us to have breakfast with him, and said he wanted to talk about the march, in a very conversational tone.

Mr. McHARGH. Did you or any other member of your group—Mr. Cabbage or Mr. Harrington—ever acknowledge having taken responsibility, or did you ever take responsibility, for the violence which had occurred in the march the day before?

Mr. TAYLOR. We evaded the question; we never took responsibility for the march, for the disruption anyway.

Mr. McHARGH. Did you ever imply that you might have been able to control the events?

Mr. TAYLOR. We explained to Dr. King the circumstances in which—which existed when he arrived, and our efforts to meet with the Black leadership and our efforts in the community, the things that we were trying to do, had been instrumental in doing, and sort of explained to him that these might have been reasons for the violence.

Mr. McHARGH. Mr. Taylor, is it accurate to state that you essentially told Dr. King that one of the reasons the march had ended in violence was because the leadership of the strike movement had not sought to include representatives of the—your group and other representatives of the youth in Memphis?

Mr. TAYLOR. As a reason, possibly, yes.

Mr. McHARGH. What did Dr. King say in response to those comments?
Mr. Taylor. I don't know what he said, but as I recall he expressed some disappointment that we had not been included, and he felt that we should have been, and that we certainly would be in the future, or from that point on.

Mr. McHargh. Your testimony is that at no point during that meeting did you specifically take direct responsibility for the violence which had occurred?

Mr. Taylor. No; we did not.

Mr. McHargh. Following the meeting at the Rivermont, members of the group were reported to have taken up residence at the Lorraine Motel; is that accurate?

Mr. Taylor. Yes.

Mr. McHargh. Were you one of the members of the group that stayed at the Lorraine?

Mr. Taylor. No; I was not.

Mr. McHargh. Did you ever attend any meetings at the Lorraine Motel following the march, which had ended in disruption, up until the time of Dr. King's assassination?

Mr. Taylor. I don't recall that I did.

Mr. McHargh. Mr. Chairman, I should state for the record at this time that in the course of our interviews with Mr. Taylor he has provided us with a release of all of his files with the FBI, and based on a review of those files we have been able to determine that his recollections with respect to the events is consistent with his testimony, and we found no information that he served in the capacity as an informant for the FBI.

Mr. Taylor, do you recall ever meeting with members of the FBI?

Mr. Taylor. No.

Mr. McHargh. Do you recall the organization having held a meeting during which FBI members were present?

Mr. Taylor. I recall that the FBI, at least it was my impression, or my understanding, that the FBI came to see us; but I was not present at that meeting. I don't know what prompted them to come to see us, but it was my understanding that they did.

Mr. McHargh. Did you have any relationship with the FBI relative to the events which you have testified about this morning?

Mr. Taylor. None.

Mr. McHargh. Mr. Chairman, at this time I have no further questions.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you, counsel.

At this time the Chair will recognize the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Edgar, for such time as he may consume, after which the committee will resort to the 5-minute rule.

Mr. Edgar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Taylor, why were you invited to the meeting with Dr. King at the Holiday Inn?

Mr. Taylor. To be perfectly honest with you, I don't even know. He had requested to see some members of the Invaders to discuss the meeting. Somehow or other Charles Cabbage and Charles Harrington and I were together and we went.

Mr. Edgar. Would it have been natural for, at that period of time in the Invaders, for the three of you to be looked at not as leaders but as spokesmen for the group?

Mr. Taylor. Certainly.
Mr. EDGAR. How did that meeting end?
Mr. TAYLOR. On a very friendly note, a lot different from the way it began. Dr. King was very cooperative.
Mr. EDGAR. Did Dr. King make any promises to your group?
Mr. TAYLOR. No promises outside the fact that he felt we should be working with him, that we would continue to work with him very closely on anything that he had to do in Memphis, Tenn.
Mr. EDGAR. Was Dr. King aware of the fact that the group was going to set up a headquarters at the Lorraine Motel?
Mr. TAYLOR. I would imagine so. Dr. King had several aides and several different kinds of people working with him. Since we were to be working with him, I think it is only logical that we would be working at the Lorraine Motel.
Mr. EDGAR. In what ways did you assume you would be working with Dr. King?
Mr. TAYLOR. We were not exactly sure. We never got around to talking about operational procedures. But I would imagine that after the disruption of the march, that perhaps crowd control would be something they would want to consider for us.
Mr. EDGAR. Did you discuss at that meeting the ways in which you might participate with Dr. King in terms of crowd control?
Mr. TAYLOR. Not specifically.
Mr. EDGAR. Did you talk about the philosophical comments of violence versus nonviolence?
Mr. TAYLOR. I think Dr. King and Charles, rather Cab, did engage in that discussion.
Mr. EDGAR. They did engage in that discussion?
Mr. TAYLOR. Well, it was not so much of a discussion as it was, "This is my way" and, you know, Cab, would say, "Well, this is an alternative."
I think one of the things that people need to understand about the Invaders is that we never necessarily advocated violence as the one and only approach to solving the problems. We felt that the leadership in the city of Memphis was leaving out an alternative that was just as good as any of the other alternatives. Our position was that the problems that existed were enough that whatever anybody could do would be helpful. It certainly could not hurt.
Mr. EDGAR. What was the nature of that rhetoric? What kinds of things did you say?
Mr. TAYLOR. What everybody else was saying, you know, you have to burn buildings, destroy property, whatever was being said at that time.
Mr. EDGAR. You were advocating this prior to the march on the 28th of March?
Mr. TAYLOR. The group was advocating violence?
Mr. EDGAR. The Invader group was advocating this militant rhetoric?
Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, certainly.
Mr. EDGAR. You indicated earlier that you were at the march in the capacity of working for a newspaper; is that correct?
Mr. TAYLOR. Yes.
Mr. EDGAR. In what capacity were you working for that newspaper?
Mr. TAYLOR. It was kind of odd. Memphis was not very much unlike the rest of this country. I think they had a shortage of Black reporters. This was a black event and they needed to have someone they felt could cover the situation and give them a fair and accurate report, I guess.

Mr. EDGAR. Who was your boss at that time?

Mr. TAYLOR. Angus McCarren, Veal Sorrells, three or four people.

Mr. EDGAR. Did you have a notebook and pencil with you?

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, always.

Mr. EDGAR. Did you subsequently write an article for the newspaper?

Mr. TAYLOR. I wrote several articles for the newspaper, some of which got published and some of which did not. I fancied myself as somewhat of a writer at that time.

Mr. EDGAR. Once you had learned that Dr. King was going to lead the march on the 28th, didn't you view that as an opportunity to prove that violence was a means to achieve change?

Mr. TAYLOR. Once the group learned that Dr. King was going to lead the march, I don't think we viewed that as anything, but we needed to talk to him.

Mr. EDGAR. Were there any discussions in the group that this would be a good opportunity to act out in a violent way to demonstrate your feelings that the leadership of the Black community was not moving as aggressively as you would like them to move?

Mr. TAYLOR. I am sure that was yes. In all honesty I would have to say yes to that question. We saw that as an opportunity to achieve several things just as the sanitation workers saw it.

In retrospect, now I am told that Dr. King saw that as an opportunity to prove to the Nation that he could lead his poor people's campaign, you know, large numbers of people in a peaceful manner.

I think a lot of people saw it as a lot of opportunity. I am sure that we viewed it from all advantages as possible for our group.

Mr. EDGAR. Did you observe any of the leaders of the Invaders involved in violence during the march?

Mr. TAYLOR. None.

Mr. EDGAR. Did you see John Smith involved in any violent acts?

Mr. TAYLOR. No.

Mr. EDGAR. Did you hear John Smith or anyone else in the leadership role of the Invaders talking with some of the young people on the sidelines prior to the outbreak of violence?

Mr. TAYLOR. No; I did not. As a matter of fact, I just found out this morning—I was under the impression that John was not even at the march because I did not see him. I had seen him earlier that morning, but it was my impression that John and Cab and some others would specifically be nowhere near the streets of downtown Memphis at that time.

Mr. EDGAR. Where did you think they were?

Mr. TAYLOR. I knew where they were, I thought they were at home.

Mr. EDGAR. So it is your testimony that you did not see John Smith or Mr. Cabbage at the march?
Mr. Taylor: I did not see either one of them specifically. However, I understand that John was present.

Mr. Edgar: Were there other members of the Invaders present that you saw?

Mr. Taylor: Yes.

Mr. Edgar: Who were they?

Mr. Taylor: If I could see faces, I could call names. I cannot recall just now who was there.

Mr. Edgar: So you don't recognize anyone or cannot recall recognizing anyone as an active member of the Invaders participating in the march?

Mr. Taylor: I can recall seeing faces that had worked with us or that had been around that were at the march, yes, I can recall faces. I don't know their names is what I am saying.

Mr. Edgar: What actually did you do? You indicated earlier that you probably picked up a rock of some kind and participated at least in some acts of violence. You also indicated in earlier testimony that you returned to the Clayborn Temple; is that correct?

Mr. Taylor: Yes.

Mr. Edgar: Then what did you do?

Mr. Taylor: As I recall, there was nothing specific to do. I just sort of hung around, keeping up with what was going on. I think shortly after they teargassed the temple everybody just disbanded and went away. In all likelihood I went to work and started working on the story.

Mr. Edgar: When did you get back together with some of the people in the Invaders group?

Mr. Taylor: That is difficult to say. Do you mean like on a formal occasion to discuss what happened? I can't recall when we did that.

You must understand that we all lived very close to each other and saw each other at all times. Unlike a corporation or someone like that, we could get together on a street corner and discuss what we had to discuss and go on about our business and the information would be passed on to whomever needed to know it. It was not necessary to call a meeting and that kind of thing.

Mr. Edgar: But your meeting with Dr. King occurred shortly after the violence occurred?

Mr. Taylor: The next morning.

Mr. Edgar: So that you would have had to be in contact with John Smith at least prior to your meeting with Dr. King?

Mr. Taylor: As I recall, when I went to work the next day—what I can suggest to you is this because my memory is not too clear—but immediately upon going to work I wrote a story which never got published regarding that meeting. I am sure that it is a lot fresher than my memory is.

As I understand it, Dr. King wanted to meet with some members of the Invaders. Now how Charles and Cab and myself got together, I really don't know. I personally think I went to pick them up, but why I went to pick them up or what prompted me to go pick them up I have no idea.

Mr. Edgar: I am having a little bit of difficulty understanding the course of events. Let me see if I can recall them.
You go to work for the newspaper and are asked to cover the parade, the march?

Mr. Taylor. Right.

Mr. Edgar. You walked to the Clayborn Temple and the march begins. You observe some sharing of some wine. You are in the middle of the march. You see the rush of people back, and in the enthusiasm of that march you begin to participate in some of the violence that is there. You return to the Clayborn Temple. It is teargassed and then you go home.

Mr. Taylor. No; I probably, I said in all likelihood I went to work probably.

Mr. Edgar. You went back to the newspaper?

Mr. Taylor. Yes.

Mr. Edgar. And then sometime between that time and the breakfast meeting something happened to get the three of you together?

Mr. Taylor. Right.

Mr. Edgar. And your recollection is that you went to pick them up and take them to the motel?

Mr. Taylor. If I remember correctly, that is what happened.

Mr. Edgar. And there were only three of you present?

Mr. Taylor. At the meeting; yes, three.

Mr. Edgar. Now, those three people present at the meeting with Dr. King would be looked upon as spokesmen for the Invaders?

Mr. Taylor. Certainly.

Mr. Edgar. And you would then have to report back to the rest of the Invaders at some point, either informally or formally, about what transpired at the meeting?

Mr. Taylor. Yes. That would be the logical thing.

Mr. Edgar. Some time after that meeting you as a group, not personally but as a group, set up a headquarters at the Lorraine Motel?

Mr. Taylor. That is correct.

Mr. Edgar. To the best of your recollection you never went to the Lorraine Motel during that period of time?

Mr. Taylor. No; I never said I never went to the Lorraine Motel. I think I was asked if I ever attended a meeting there. I never attended a meeting, but I went to the Lorraine Motel on several occasions, probably.

Mr. Edgar. On the day after?

Mr. Taylor. I have no idea. I just know that I went. One of the things, given the events that were taking place and the kinds of things that could happen at any minute, it was sort of like, I think the reporters were like doctors, sort of like on call all day long to keep up with what was going on.

So I would have gone to the Lorraine Motel had I been assigned to do it or had I not been assigned to do it.

Mr. Edgar. Were you at the Lorraine Motel on the night of April 4?

Mr. Taylor. I don’t think I was. As I recall, I was trying to help put a story together.

Mr. Edgar. Why did the Invaders leave the Lorraine Motel?

Mr. Taylor. I have no idea. I was merely told that we had left. I would assume that we couldn’t get along with somebody, however.
Mr. Edgar. Do you have any knowledge of any argument that you had with any member of the party of Dr. King?

Mr. Taylor. At that time, none. I don’t have any firsthand knowledge of any; no.

Mr. Edgar. Can you recall whether or not on April 4 you were at the Lorraine Motel at any time during the day?

Mr. Taylor. At about 6:01 I was; yes.

Mr. Edgar. Will you describe your comment, “6:01”?

Mr. Taylor. I happen to remember I was standing at work looking at the teletype machine and the squawk box monitoring police calls called out one of those codes they have to let you know there is an emergency. The teletype machines went completely quite for 2 or 3 minutes and when that happens something is really going on in the newspaper business.

The first thing I tore off was that Dr. King had been shot at the Lorraine Motel. Whoever happened to be the managing editor, I went over to him and I didn’t think it was necessary to say this was a story and you have to go.

So I left and went to the Lorraine Motel. I didn’t get very close to it because the police were trying to drive everybody away.

Mr. Edgar. Did you get to see Dr. King’s body?

Mr. Taylor. No; I did not.

Mr. Edgar. You had press credentials but you could not get in?

Mr. Taylor. That is not unusual. I am still Black, whether I am a reporter or not, in Memphis, Tenn.

Mr. Edgar. So then what did you do?

Mr. Taylor. I think I went to Mason Temple because I understand that they had called some kind of a mass meeting or a quick meeting for Dr. King or for some of his aides or something. I think that is where I went.

Mr. Edgar. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions at this time.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Preyer.

Mr. Preyer. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Devine.

Mr. Devine. Mr. Chairman, I have no questions of this particular witness, but in the narrative preceding his testimony by Dr. Blakey, he mentioned the fact on page 33 that much of the speculation on a plot to lure Dr. King back to Memphis was in a docudrama telecast last fall and the production was supposed to be a rendition of history.

I was wondering who produced that docudrama, if that information is available?

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Devine, it is my understanding that an individual by the name of Abby Mann was involved in the production of it. I also understand that James Earl Ray’s attorney, Mr. Lane, had a consulting role to play.

Mr. Devine. Do you know anything about the background of Abby Mann?

Mr. Blakey. Mr. Mann has been associated with Mark Lane at various points of time in investigating this case and publicizing its results. He has also been associated with Mr. Lane over a longer period of time on other issues. I think he has also had things to say
at one time or another on the Kennedy assassination and I believe the Army-McCarthy hearings.

Mr. Devine. That clarifies the record. Thank you.

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from the District of Columbia, Mr. Fauntroy.

Mr. Fauntroy. Thank you.

Mr. Taylor, on your meeting with Dr. King after the march on the 28th, do you recall any member of the Invaders raising with Dr. King the advisability of his staying at the Holiday Inn there or questioning his staying there?

Mr. Taylor. I don't recall that; no.

Mr. Fauntroy. Congressman Devine has referenced what has been called a docudrama that played the television in late 1977. Did you see that docudrama, "King"?

Mr. Taylor. I saw portions of it; yes.

Mr. Fauntroy. Did you see any portions of it that had reference to the role of the Invaders?

Mr. Taylor. I didn't see that portion, but I was well informed of it the next day after it aired.

Mr. Fauntroy. What were you informed?

Mr. Taylor. It portrayed two members of the Invaders as having been paid, or suggested that we had been paid by the FBI to disrupt the march or something like that which is, of course, totally in error.

If this committee establishes nothing else as far as the Invaders are concerned, we have never been in the employ or worked with or even know of FBI people. That is just, that is the movie business, I guess.

Mr. Fauntroy. And your testimony is that at no time were you a part of a group which sought from the FBI funds?

Mr. Taylor. No.

Mr. Fauntroy. Were you aware of any approach by the FBI to any member or members of the Invaders?

Mr. Taylor. I was not aware of any approach. No; I am not.

Mr. Fauntroy. You are also aware, I take it, of the suggestion that members of the Invaders were provocateurs, that is, they were engaged in actually carrying out or initiating the violence on the march on the 28th?

Mr. Taylor. As I explained, I know Ken's first name, but in all honesty, Mr. Fauntroy, whether we would have initiated it or not, the atmosphere, the comments, the timing, everything was right for there to be violence.

I think if the Invaders had taken a trip to Colorado, that march would have disrupted in violence because I think the wheels had been set in motion weeks before that time.

For example, with the students leaving high school and that kind of thing, I think all of that added to the fact that there would have been violence and there was nothing that the Invaders could do to stop it or make it even worse than what it was. It was like predestined. It was going to happen. That is all there was to it.

Mr. Fauntroy. When you say the wheels that were set in motion, you mean just in terms of climate?

Mr. Taylor. Just in terms of climate; yes.
Mr. FAUNTROY. Do you suspect that anyone orchestrated that climate in any way?

Mr. TAYLOR. I don't suggest that anyone orchestrated it; no. That would mean that you would sit down and you would say you do this and you do this and you do that. I don't think so, but I think that words of a nature to bring those things about were said by numerous kinds of people.

One of the things I think that even the Invaders did not understand is that once we talk with people, the amount of influence that we have over those people, you know, you get people to a certain point and, you know, there is just no controlling them anymore.

I don't think we realized just how much influence we really did have.

Mr. FAUNTROY. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ford.

Mr. Ford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Taylor, could you tell us about Mr. McCollough who testified before this committee earlier about his involvement with the Invaders?

Mr. TAYLOR. Congressman Ford, given the manner in which people worked with the Invaders, once again I must reiterate that the Invaders was not or were not an incorporated group, you know, of the State of Tennessee. We did not have bylaws or membership. Anyone who believed in the philosophy that we aspired to in terms of trying to correct injustices within the State of Tennessee could work with us.

I don't think our nature was that of a law enforcement agency who questioned anyone who came to work with us. When Mr. McCollough arrived, I am sure he came with blessings of somebody within the group prior to his coming there or someone who knew him.

When I joined the group someone vouched for me, but there was nothing like, where is your mother's burial plot or will you cut your finger and take an oath. There was nothing like that.

When Mr. McCollough came to the group, no one questioned him. He was very eager to do whatever needed to be done, so let him do it.

Mr. Ford. At any time were you or any other member of the Invaders suspicious of Mr. McCollough's involvement as an undercover agent for the Memphis police department?

Mr. TAYLOR. No; we were not. To my knowledge no one was suspicious of his involvement with the Memphis police department. If anyone would have been suspicious, it would have been myself because I worked with the Commercial Appeal and that meant having to deal with numerous white people daily and giving information from both sides.

So I would not think that anyone would have suspected him of anything.

Mr. Ford. How long after the death of Dr. King were you employed by the Memphis Commercial Appeal?
Mr. Taylor. Maybe 2½ years. I can't remember correctly. I think it was 1970 or 1971. The first part of 1971 I think I left.
Mr. Ford. Are you presently employed?
Mr. Taylor. Yes; I am.
Mr. Ford. Where?
Mr. Taylor. The city of Memphis as a center manager for the youth services division.
Mr. Ford. Are you a part owner of a business in Memphis?
Mr. Taylor. Yes, I am.
Mr. Ford. What is the name of that business?
Mr. Taylor. The Mohammud Ali Towne Center Cinema.
Mr. Ford. I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Sawyer.
Mr. Sawyer. I have no questions.
Chairman Stokes. Anyone else?
Mr. Fauntroy. I have just one other question and comment.
Mr. Taylor, you know of our interest in the fact that the Invaders were reported to have left the room which they had at the Lorraine shortly before the actual assassination of Dr. King. It is your testimony that you have no knowledge of why they left?
Mr. Taylor. I have no firsthand knowledge of why; no, sir.
Mr. Fauntroy. Do you have any secondhand knowledge?
Mr. Taylor. We had a disagreement with the other side.
Mr. Fauntroy. With whom, do you recall? It was reported a disagreement had been had.
Mr. Taylor. I don't know who was negotiating for Dr. King at that point, but whomever was negotiating for him, that was the people we had had a disagreement with.
Mr. Fauntroy. Mr. Chairman, for the information of the committee, our subcommittee did conduct several interviews of the members of the SCLC staff, including Dr. Abernathy. It is reported that at one time after the meeting of which Mr. Taylor was a part, members of the Invaders were placed on the staff of SCLC, and that when Dr. King learned of it he informed the staff generally, and Mr. Josea Williams in particular, who had arrived for their employment for SCLC that under no circumstances did he want ever to have anyone on his staff who advocated violence as a means of effecting change, and that that was the substance of the disagreement, and at Dr. King's behest they had been told that they could not work for SCLC.
Chairman Stokes. Is there anything further?
Mr. Taylor, at the conclusion of a witness' testimony before this committee the witness is entitled to 5 minutes during which time the witness may make any further comment he so desires regarding his testimony. He may amplify it or explain it or make any other comment.
I would extend to you 5 minutes for that purpose if you so desire.
Mr. Taylor. Other than to say thank you to the committee for an opportunity to clarify the position of the group as it relates to the disruption of the march and Dr. King's death, I really have nothing to say.
Regardless of what TV says or rumor or the FBI memos or whatever, the Invaders at no time had any dealings with them whatsoever.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you very much, Mr. Taylor.
There being nothing further at this time, you are excused.
There being no further witnesses to appear this morning, the committee will recess until 2 p.m. this afternoon.
[Whereupon, at 11:52 a.m. the committee recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m. the same day.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

Chairman Stokes. The committee will come to order.
The Chair recognizes Professor Blakey.
Mr. Blakey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
John B. Smith was one of the original organizers of the Black Organizing Project. This effort was begun in the fall of 1967, shortly after Smith returned from military duty.
Mr. Smith's home was the location of a meeting in February between the leadership of the Black Organizing Project and two special agents of the FBI.
Subsequent characterizations of Mr. Smith and the Black Organizing Project in FBI documents are less than favorable. Specifically, an FBI memo states that prior to the march Mr. Smith was seen, along with other Invaders, exhorting the youths to violence.
It would be appropriate at this time, Mr. Chairman, to call Mr. Smith.

Chairman Stokes. The committee calls Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith, will you stand and be sworn?
Do you solemnly swear the testimony you will give before this committee will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. Smith. I do.
Chairman Stokes. Thank you. You may be seated.
Will counsel for the witness identify himself for the record?
Mr. Trombl. Kenneth Trombl.
Chairman Stokes. Thank you.
The Chair recognizes staff counsel, William Webb.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN B. SMITH, FORMER CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD, BLACK ORGANIZING PROJECT, MEMPHIS, TENN., ACCOMPANIED BY KENNETH TROMBL, COUNSEL

Mr. Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Smith, will you state your full name, please?
Mr. Smith. My name is John Burrell Smith.
Mr. Webb. Would you move the microphone a little closer to you, please?
And will you tell us how old you are today, sir?
Mr. Smith. I'm 35.
Mr. Webb. And were you part of an organization known variously as the Black Organizing Project or the Invaders?
Mr. Smith. I was chairman of the board of the Black Organizing Project.
Mr. Webb. Mr. Smith, were you present this morning when Calvin Taylor testified?

Mr. Smith. I was.

Mr. Webb. Did you hear his description of the organizations—both the Invaders and the Black Organizing Project?

Mr. Smith. I heard his explanation, but I can’t remember it well enough to—

Mr. Webb. Briefly, he described the fact that the group started off as an offshoot of campus activities of yourself, Mr. Cabbage and some other individuals, that the Black Organizing Project was an umbrella group which included the Invaders, that many people in the Memphis community oftentimes interchanged both names, “Invaders” and “Black Organizing Project” and identified members of the group primarily as Invaders because that was their best frame of reference.

Would you agree with that characterization?

Mr. Smith. If we are trying to establish for the record what actually was the situation with the Black Organizing Project and with the Invaders, I would prefer to give my own characterization of what the organization was, because there were inconsistencies in his explanation.

Mr. Webb. Fine, sir. Would you explain to us what the Black Organizing Project was?

Mr. Smith. The Black Organizing Project was an umbrella group that we organized in late 1967, but the Invaders we did not organize. The Invaders were organized by the young people who made up the group. It started off as a social group, about 15, 20 young people in the Riverside area, formed a group that gave houseparties and dances and things like that.

When we organized the Black Organizing Project, they became a part of the Black Organizing Project.

Mr. Webb. So aside from that explanation would you agree with what Mr. Taylor testified about this morning?

Mr. Smith. Yes.

Mr. Webb. And in fact at times you wore a jacket with the name, “Invaders” on the back; is that correct?

Mr. Smith. Yes.

Mr. Webb. In 1967 and 1968 were you living at 1644 Hanauer Street in Memphis, Tenn.?

Mr. Smith. Yes, I was.

Mr. Webb. And did other members of the Black Organizing Project and/or the Invaders frequent that apartment?

Mr. Smith. Yes.

Mr. Webb. Mr. Smith, were you present at a meeting on February 16, 1968, between members of your organization and representatives of the FBI?

Mr. Smith. Yes.

Mr. Webb. And in fact that occurred at your apartment?

Mr. Smith. Yes, it did.

Mr. Webb. Will you tell us briefly what transpired at that meeting?

Mr. Smith. It was in the afternoon. I come home from school. Several other individuals had come home with me. The FBI knocked on the door. They presented their credentials; they told
me who they were and why they were there; and I let them in. They came in. They questioned us about our organization, what our intentions were. They said that Mr. Cabbage and Mr. Clifford Taylor had come by their office and Mr. Cabbage had registered some concern about the harassment that we were receiving from the Memphis police department dating back to July of 1967 and that he had come down to explain to the FBI who we were in order to establish some official record what type of organization we were, what our intentions were, so that if the harassment continued we would be able to—like launch some type of complaint, official complaint, against the Memphis police department.

In response to Mr. Cabbage’s request, the FBI said that they had come by to see for themselves what type of organization we were, and that’s essentially what happened at that meeting.

Mr. Webb. So you provided them with information—when I say “you” I mean members of your group—about your organization, activities, goals, purposes, and had originally brought to their attention the existence of your group in order to have a record somewhere that you were being harassed, and that, in fact, you were what you considered to be a legitimate organization? Would that be fair to say?

Mr. Smith. Yes.

Mr. Webb. At a point in time did you become aware of the fact that Dr. King would be in Memphis to lead a march on March 28, 1968?

Mr. Smith. Yes.

Mr. Webb. Did your organization discuss what posture it would take in response to that march?

Mr. Smith. Again, we must keep in mind the distinction between the Invaders and the Black Organizing Project. The Invaders had a president, secretary, and they had a representative on the board of the Black Organizing Project. The board of the Black Organizing Project did discuss involvement in the sanitation strike. It was determined that we would take an individual type of posture. If an individual wanted to participate in the strike, they could but as an organization we would not support the strike.

Most of the people in the organization—this is not just the Black Organizing Project board but the separate organizations which made up the Black Organizing Project—did decide to participate as individuals.

Mr. Webb. During the discussion about what posture the organization should take, was there any consideration given to creating an incident at the march, either violence or disruption, or anything of that sort?

Mr. Smith. We have advanced on your questioning. It seems like you were asking me when we first discussed——

Mr. Webb. That’s correct, sir.

Mr. Smith [continuing]. About participating in the strike, or in the march.

Mr. Webb. In the march. I’m sorry; in the march.

Mr. Smith. Oh. In reference to the march, we decided that, as I said, individuals could if they wanted to. We did not decide to do anything as a group. We just decided that if anyone wanted to
participate in the march they could, but as far as the organization taking any kind of position, we decided not to.

Mr. Webb. And obviously from your answer you did not discuss the organization or conclude that the organization should disrupt the march, create an incident or anything of that sort?

Mr. Smith. No.

Mr. Webb. Did you yourself go to the site of the march on the 28th?

Mr. Smith. Yes, I did.

Mr. Webb. And would you consider yourself as having participated in that march?

Mr. Smith. No; I don’t consider myself as having participated in that march.

Mr. Webb. Now, Mr. Smith, did the Invaders ever undertake to provide any type of security for Dr. King while he was in Memphis?

Mr. Smith. No, no security; they wouldn’t have allowed it if we wanted to.

Mr. Webb. After the march was disrupted, Dr. King was taken to the Rivermont Holiday Inn. Many of the press agents and in fact the FBI press releases suggested that he should be criticized on a number of accounts: No. 1, for living in the luxurious motel while people in Memphis, Tenn.—some people—were in poverty; and, No. 2, for patronizing a white-owned establishment when there was a Black hotel in Memphis.

Did the members of your group feel any hostile feelings toward Dr. King because of that, because of his staying at the Rivermont?

Mr. Smith. No, we didn’t.

Mr. Webb. At any time in March and April, during the period Dr. King was in Memphis, was your group hostile or bitter toward Dr. King or the SCLC’s presence in the city?

Mr. Smith. We were not bitter or hostile toward SCLC for participating in the strike. We didn’t have any animosity toward Dr. King. We did feel that the people who were in charge of the strike, which was basically COME, were not utilizing all of the possible tactics that could be utilized.

We did discuss with COME and with other people some tactics that we felt could be employed to improve or to get more force into the strike, but we did not have any animosity or hostility, because no one took our ideas.

Mr. Webb. Now, you have heard testimony today that members of the organization had two rooms at the Lorraine Motel. Were you aware of that at the time?

Mr. Smith. This is another inconsistency that has arrived, you know, has arisen, in the record. Those rooms were taken the day after the march, the riot. As I stated, we were already receiving harassment from the Memphis police department prior to the sanitation strike as a group. Myself, personally, I had been arrested. I had been beaten up several times. Mr. Cabbage had been arrested; he had been beaten several times. We had complained to the different local civil rights groups, the NAACP, the Internal Security, so when the riots jumped off, we were afraid.

I spent the night at my sister’s house and they suggested that I not go home, because the police had been through my apartment
several times, had ransacked the place, had carried off records and things; so we took rooms at the Lorraine for our own personal safety. It had nothing to do with the organization having a room.

Mr. WEBB. When you say "we took rooms," do you mean yourself and someone else?

Mr. SMITH. Mr. Cabbage took a room and I took a room. We had separate rooms.

Mr. WEBB. Did there come a time when SCLC eventually paid for the rooms or promised they would pay for the rooms?

Mr. SMITH. We stayed about 3 days on our own expenses. When, as Mr. Taylor has indicated, Dr. King became interested in talking to the group, it was suggested by SCLC that we keep those rooms so we would be down close to what was happening rather than going back to south Memphis to the apartment. So we kept the rooms until the evening that Dr. King was assassinated.

Mr. WEBB. Were you present for any of the meetings between members of your organization and Dr. King that were held at the Lorraine?

Mr. SMITH. One.

Mr. WEBB. And would you tell me what date that occurred on?

Mr. SMITH. I seem to recollect it was on the 4th, but I have since been informed that the record shows it was on the 3d; and if that's what the records show, I would have to accept that it was on the 3d; but my recollection is that it was on the 4th.

Mr. WEBB. My next question would be, What happened at the meeting?

Mr. SMITH. I think the meeting came about as a result of the first meeting at the Rivermont. I'm not positive about that; but I was informed by members of the group that we were supposed to meet with Dr. King, to discuss our possible involvement in a march that Dr. King had planned, and how we could possibly help the march go smoothly, I suppose. We met.

Dr. King asked what could we do, or what did we want done; and we asked of him, you know, what they wanted us to do. We discussed our program, which we had been trying to get funded. We called it the community unification program; it was a cultural program. And he listened to us about the program; he said that he could give us some help with the funding of it if we would help them with the strike, and what they wanted us to do was to go around to the high schools and talk to the young high school students and make sure that they understand that the marches were to be nonviolent, that those who wished to could serve as marshals and help monitor the march, to keep it peaceful. Those who wanted to participate in the march had to understand that it was going to be a nonviolent march.

We told him that we could do this as far as going around and talking to the people, but we could not guarantee anything; all we could do was talk to them. If they wanted us to do this, we needed some transportation because we did not have any, and in that case cars would be necessary for us to have transportation.

Mr. WEBB. At that time, did you discuss with Dr. King or members of the SCLC obtaining their help in securing funding for your organization?
Mr. Smith. That was our consideration in the agreement, that if we did do this, they would help us by looking at our program, helping us to get the program into funding order, because it was not put together in such a way that we could submit it for funding at that particular time.

All we had was the concepts, and Dr. King said that he would use his resources to help us get it funded.

Mr. Webb. Mr. Smith, how long did you keep the rooms at the Lorraine Motel?

Mr. Smith. Up until about 5:30, April 4, I think, somewhere around that time. I can't be sure now, but I know it was about 5:30, April 4.

Mr. Webb. What made you decide at that point in time to leave the Lorraine?

Mr. Smith. We decided to leave the Lorraine after discussing the attitudes of SCLC toward us. You can see in the record that we were not on the best of terms. I think they firmly believed that we had consciously set out to disrupt and destroy the march, and they could not move beyond that point.

Dr. King felt that he could work with us and that we had a positive contribution to make. Most of the members of the SCLC did not feel that way; they felt that we were trying to rip them off and that they wanted no part of us as a group.

So in discussing among ourselves just what would be the best thing for us to do, we decided that it would be best for us to go back to our apartment that we were using as the headquarters, which was my home, and operate out of there; that way we would not have a constant conflict with Dr. King's staff.

Mr. Webb. Now, Mr. Smith, in Prof. Blakey's narration he described some witnesses as having said that when members of your organization left those rooms, they left in a hurried fashion. Will you tell the committee how you left the rooms, what you did?

Mr. Smith. Mr. Cabbage was driving a friend—his car—so we had only one means of transportation. There were about 14 to 15 of us. I had some clothes and baggage. Mr. Cabbage had some clothes and baggage. We picked them all up.

We all went downstairs. We put the baggage in his car. The space that was left—a few people got into the car. The rest of us took the bus. That was it.

Mr. Webb. Would you say there was anything unusual or hurried in the manner in which you left?

Mr. Smith. No.

Mr. Webb. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like to point out for the record that in a staff interview with Willie Richmond, who was a Memphis police officer manning the surveillance post at the firehouse and who was watching the events at the Lorraine Motel, when a similar question was put to him about the manner in which the Invaders or Black Organizing Project left the Lorraine, he described it as being in a completely normal and usual manner, and that they did not appear, in fact, to hurry or anything of the sort.

Mr. Smith, can you tell us when it was you learned that Dr. King had been killed?
Mr. SMITH. It took us about 20 minutes, maybe 30, to ride the bus to get to the apartment. We went in, turned the television on, and as it came on the newscast, a special bulletin was being telecast at that precise time, and the only part we caught was that Dr. Martin Luther King has been shot at the Lorraine Motel, and that is when I learned.

Mr. WEBB. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you, counsel.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Edgar, for such time as he may consume, after which the committee will operate under the 5-minute rule.

Mr. EDGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Smith, after you heard the word that Dr. Martin Luther King had been shot, what did you do?

Mr. SMITH. We closed the door—turned the television off, then closed the door and locked it, walked around the corner to Charles Cabbage’s house, and talked about it for a few minutes.

A few other friends arrived. A couple had cars. Then we drove back down to the Lorraine. Police had the area all cordoned off; they wouldn’t let us into the area; so we drove over to the Clayborn Temple where a mass meeting had been called for that night.

When we got there, Rev. Orange and Rev. James Bevel and several other staff workers for SCLC were there, and they were telling people that the mass meeting had been called off and that they didn’t want any trouble, and the best thing we could do would be to return to our homes.

Mr. WEBB. Did you have any fear that you or Mr. Cabbage would be considered a suspect in this particular event?

Mr. SMITH. Yes; I did.

Mr. WEBB. And yet you still returned to the scene, the Lorraine Motel?

Mr. SMITH. Naturally, I returned to the scene because that’s where Dr. King was. As I said, I had no animosity for Dr. King. I had great respect for him. He was a great man, and when he was killed it hurt me as it hurt every American; and I don’t see anything else I could have done other than try to return, and I maybe could have done something.

Mr. WEBB. Did you make any attempt to hold down any of the violence that occurred after the death?

Mr. SMITH. The city was immediately put under curfew and, as I say, we were already receiving a great amount of harassment from the Memphis police department. We spent the night at the Lorraine Motel that night, because that was about as safe a place as any.

When we carried the other people home, we came back up to the Lorraine. I was there when Mrs. Bailey died. As a matter of fact, I ran to get down there. So I thought that was the safest place in the world for me to be.

Mr. WEBB. Let me take you back to March 28, the day of the march itself. You indicated you did not participate in the march; is that correct?

Mr. SMITH. No, I didn’t participate in the march.

Mr. WEBB. Where were you at the time the march took place?
Mr. Smith. I was at different places. Are you talking about when it formed, when it started off, or when it got disrupted? Which one are you talking about?

Mr. Webb. Let's start at all three of those places. Where were you when it started and Dr. King was delayed, the parade, the march, was delayed?

Mr. Smith. I intentionally waited because I wanted the march to have already started when I got there. As a matter of fact, we had come down to hear Dr. King speak and that was about all. There was myself and three other individuals.

Mr. Webb. You came down to the temple?

Mr. Smith. Yes. When we got down to Main Street, we could see that the march had not taken place, so we wanted to see what was holding it up; so we walked back down to the temple. When we got down there, the march was about like you see it now; everyone was still posed, people were milling around, waving.

Mr. Webb. Where were you when that picture was taken?

Mr. Smith. I have no idea when that picture was taken, but looking at it, I would imagine that I was somewhere up around the steps of the Clayborn Temple.

Mr. Webb. So you were in the vicinity of the march while you did not take part in the march itself?

Mr. Smith. Yes.

Mr. Webb. Were you addressing or talking to young people around you on the steps of the Clayborn Temple?

Mr. Smith. No.

Mr. Webb. Did you advocate the use of violence at the march on March 28?

Mr. Smith. No.

Mr. Webb. Did you ever speak to anyone around you about using violence as a tool to disrupt the march?

Mr. Smith. When you say "violence," what are you referring to?

Mr. Webb. Disruptive activity, breaking windows, using the sticks.

Mr. Smith. As I said, I didn't address anyone during the whole time. I was down there. I came down to hear Dr. King speak. I came intentionally late so that by the time we got down there the march would have already proceeded to city hall and Dr. King would already be in a position to speak.

So, as I said, I didn't address anyone; I didn't have no intention of participating in the march.

Mr. Webb. Did you remove any of the placards from the poles or the sticks that were used to hold up the placards?

Mr. Smith. No, I didn't.

Mr. Webb. Mr. Chairman, I would like an FBI document dated March 29, 1968, which has been premarked as MLK exhibit F-456, entered as an exhibit and shown to the witness at this time.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the record at this point.

[The information follows:]
TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
FROM: SAC, MEMPHIS (157-1032) (P)

23 FEB 68

MEMPHIS, MEMPHIS
RM
(03: Memphis)

Be Memphis airmail and ILM, 3/28/68.

Enclosed for Bureau are 11 copies and for Atlanta 2 copies of ILM captioned and dated as above.

Copies are being furnished U.S. Attorney, Memphis; U.S. Secret Service, Memphis; and Regional Offices of Military Intelligence.

Bureau (Encls. 1)
Atlanta (Encls. 2)
Memphis
(1 - 157-1092)
(1 - 157-556) Possible Racial Violence, Major (Urban 9 & D. Area)
(1 - 100-105, MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.
(1 - 157-1066, SLC)
(1 - 100-4538, CHARLES L. CARRAGE) APR 2 1963
(1 - 157-1038)
C. Bishop
(1 - 157-957, JOHN B. SMITH)
(1 - 157-1018)
(1 - 157-103, SNCC)
WHL: 157-1018 Sub A, Dissemination File

D-D-LE 660
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Memphis, Tennessee
March 29, 1968

Title: SANITATION WORKERS STRIKE, MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE

Character: RACIAL MATTERS

Reference: Memorandum prepared at Memphis, Tennessee, dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
On March 28, 1968, a first source advised that the sanitation strike, Memphis, Tennessee, has been in progress since February 12, 1968, and that it has gradually deteriorated into a racial conflict. The source stated that the vast majority of the 1300 strikers were members of the Negro race. Source one also stated that the strike support had been primarily taken over by Negro groups in Memphis, Tennessee, primarily consisting of approximately 125 Negro ministers, members of the Memphis Interdenominational Ministerial Alliance which has adopted the name Community on the Move for Equality (COME), and source recalled that daily marches in support of the strike have been held originating at Clayborn Temple, a church of the African Methodist Episcopal Church located at 230 Hernando, Memphis, Tennessee, this being the strike support headquarters. Nightly rallies have been held at various Negro churches and such nationally known leaders as Roy Wilkins of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), Bayard Rustin of the A. Philip Randolph Institute, and Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., President of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), have come to Memphis to address large rallies of strike supporters.

Source one recalled that Reverend King spoke at a mass rally in Mason Temple on the night of March 18, 1968, at which time he called for the Memphis Negro community to have a massive downtown rally during which all Negro employees would stay away from work and all school children would stay away from school and scheduled this march for March 22, 1968. This march was cancelled at the last minute due to a 16-inch snowfall in Memphis on that date and was later re-scheduled for Thursday, March 28, 1968.
Lieutenant E. H. Arkin, Inspectional Bureau, Memphis Police Department, both advised on March 28, 1968, that preceding the march high school age students from several Negro high schools in a rather boisterous manner left school to head downtown to participate in the mass march scheduled for March 28, 1968, to begin at 10 a.m. At Hamilton High School, a predominantly Negro high school, some two hundred to three hundred youngsters took to the streets, began throwing rocks, and resulted in police being called. They threw rocks and bricks at the police, injuring several police and as a result the police had to use considerable force, according to Lieutenant Arkin, to quell this disturbance. First reports were that tear gas was used on the students, although Lieutenant Arkin stated that this definitely was not true.

Lieutenant Arkin pointed out that the start of the march was delayed until approximately 11 a.m., due to the late arrival in Memphis of Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., who was to head the march. He did not arrive until approximately 10:22 a.m. at the Airport, and in fact did not join the march until it had proceeded one block north on Hernando from Clayborn Temple.

Source one, source two and source three, all of whom were in the vicinity of Clayborn Temple immediately prior to the start of the march, pointed out that approximately five thousand to six thousand people congregated near the Temple for the start of the march and they estimated that at least half of these people were teenagers and of school age. Among the marchers were individuals who sources, who are familiar with many people in the Negro community, would describe as common criminals and both sources one and two recognized several as being people who have been in and out of penal institutions for various law infractions in the past.
The march was ostensibly under the control, according to these three sources, of the COME group. The COME group handed out literally hundreds of prepared placards made of cardboard and carried on long 4-foot pine poles. It was apparent to these three sources prior to the march that many of the youngsters were planning to use the placards as sticks and clubs because they were indiscriminately ripping the cardboard away, leaving a 4-foot pole in their hands which many of them waved in a threatening manner.

In fairness to the march marshals and ministers leading the march, all three sources heard several of them caution the people in the crowd against violence and some of the youths would utter obscenities at those who were cautioning them. Sources one, two and three observed in the vicinity of the Temple several individuals in Memphis who have identified themselves with the black power movement.

For example, source three observed who has already been arrested three times in connection with incidents in connection with the strike, a young male Negro and John Burrell Smith, an Owen College student, and self-acclaimed leader of the Black Power movement, at the Mosque, made fun of the marchers, saying that he had more important things to do, inferring that he was going to engage in violence. Source one, who is particularly close to the black power movement, which he said refers to itself as Black Organizing Power (BOP), an affiliate of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and headed by Charles Laverne Cabbage and John Burrell Smith, commented that in fairness to the BOP group these individuals did not organize any violence as such. However, these individuals have repeatedly made inflammatory statements during recent weeks and he recalled that on the night of March 5, 1968, Charles Laverne Cabbage, before approximately 1500 people at a strike support rally in Clayborn Temple, passed out to the audience a leaflet containing an inflammatory letter from H. Rap Brown, Chairman of the SNCC.
and also containing a professional type drawing showing in detail how one could make a Molotov cocktail.

In recent weeks, John B. Smith has been bragging that he and his followers have been urging high school students to remain away from school when the mass march to be led by Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., was to be held.

Pointed out that prior to the start of the March 28, 1968, march that John Smith and some of his associates were in his opinion inviting to violence in that they were indiscriminately giving out the 4-foot pine poles to various teenage youngsters in the area and John Smith was heard to tell these youngsters, identities not known, not to be afraid to use these sticks.

On March 28 and again on March 29, 1968, source two advised that prior to the start of the march, the parade marshals agreed to put the sanitation workers strikers in the front of the march with the remainder of the people to follow behind. He stated that several of the marshals kept cautioning the youngsters to be peaceful and that he personally saw two self-admitted BOP people, both students at LeMoyne College, male Negroes, and other unknown associates; and that they were making remarks sometime between 8:30 and 9:30 a.m. near the Clayborn Temple that they were going to "tear this S.O.B. town up today." made some general statements about some high school students being "chicken" and staying in school rather than marching and he stated that the white people who were participating in the march were fools for marching because if any trouble started that the Negro marchers would turn on them first.

Source two stated that the march started at approximately 11 o'clock a.m., and that and some of their unknown associates remained behind. As
the march progressed north of Linden on Hernando, and another associate from LeMoyne College, understood to be in the BOP group, went back into an alley and obtained some sticks and tricks. At this point, they moved on up ahead of source two. He did not see them thereafter. Source two added that the march progressed peacefully, although it was definitely not well organized in that the marchers were walking all over the street and sidewalks and that there was no order whatsoever to the line of march.

He stated that the march headed north on Hernando to Beale, went on Beale toward Main Street, and that by the time he reached Third and Beale many of the teenagers had ripped the signs off their poles and were waving them wildly as clubs.

In February 16, 1968, in connection with another FBI investigation James Elmore Phillips, Charles L. Cabbage, Clinton Roy Jamerson, and John Burrell Smith all admitted to representatives of the FBI that they were members of the Governing Body of BOP which they admitted was affiliated with the SNCC, with national headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia.

Source two continued that on reaching Third and Beale Street, the head of the march had already progressed as far west as Main Street and he observed unknown young Negroes using the long sticks to break windows in Paul's Clothing Store at Third and Beale and that he could hear windows breaking further west on Beale Street, a 2-block area consisting of pawn shops, clothing stores, and dry goods stores. Almost as if spontaneously Negroes who had been in the march began looting these stores and breaking windows and running in all directions. Some of the parade marshals were urging them to reverse their direction and return to Clayborn Temple in an effort to break up the crowd. Police officers were also urging them to cease and desist and return to the Temple. By this time, which would have
been approximately 11:15 a.m., according to source two, main confusion reigned, people were running in all directions, and the police were doing the best they could to stop the looters and move them back toward Clayborn Temple. Various reports started rumors that the police had shot a teen-age girl but source later determined that this was not true.

Source two returned to the Temple, along with several hundred of the marchers.

On March 28, 1968, Lieutenant Arkin stated that when the front of the march had proceeded to Beale and Main Street, there was complete disorder on the part of the marchers; they were all over the sidewalks and all over the streets; and that at this point Martin Luther King, Jr., who had joined the march at Hernando and Beale with the Vice President of the SCLC, Reverend Ralph D. Abernathy, and others unknown at that point to Lieutenant Arkin, were still marching at the head of the march. As the windows of store fronts were broken out and sporadic looting began, King remarked that he had to get out of there. He and some of his associates ran on ahead and jumped into an old Pontiac automobile and were escorted away from the march by a Police Lieutenant to the Rivermont Hotel, an exclusive new hotel on the Mississippi River front operated by Holiday Inns of America. Lieutenant Arkin stated that King left the march at about 11:15 a.m. and had checked into the Rivermont by 11:24 a.m.

Lieutenant Arkin added that by approximately noon the Police Department had broken up the crowd, being forced to use tear gas particularly in the vicinity of Clayborn Temple, after some of the marchers who had run into the Temple began throwing rocks and bricks at police from the roof top of the Temple and also began throwing from the streets, and when the police would start after them they would run into the Temple.
Source two recalled that prior to the start of the march, some of the associates of and were making remarks near Clayborn Temple to the effect that some of the marchers should break windows and loot.

Source three stated that after the marchers returned to Clayborn Temple, after the looting started, the so-called black power group, including many apparent unorganized teenagers, virtually took over the Temple and Reverend James Morris Lawson, Jr., one of the leaders of the CORE group, was unable to control them. One of these individuals made the statement, "We're going to take over this town."

The "Press-Scimitar" newspaper, Memphis, Tennessee, issue of March 29, 1968, in a story by Clark Porteous, "Press-Scimitar" staff writer, who observed portions of the disturbance on Beale Street where the major portion of the early looting occurred, stated that he saw the Memphis police take an awful lot of the looters in the way of bricks and bottles and that he heard some reports of police being rough on citizens, but he did not see any police brutality. He stated that many of the officers were taking a lot and doing it bravely.

Another story in the "Press-Scimitar" issue of March 29, 1968, by Staff Reporter James R. Reid, described the rampant window breaking and looting which occurred from the South Main Street area around Beale Street, east on Beale to Hernando, and pointed out that Memphis police officers formed a line in an effort to move the crowd back and that they gave ample warning. The story reported that many of the crowd instead gloated at the officers who tried to move them from the area, and that when the officers pushed against the crowd, many of the crowd pushed back. Reid reported that he saw one officer there felled in the melee, and that the crowd was then out of control with many of the crowd having long wooden sticks. He stated that police officers with megaphones asked the crowd to move and stated, "For your safety, move back."
Some of the officers pleaded, according to Reid, that many of the officers had earlier been pelted with rocks and bricks and had restrained themselves from using clubs or gas. He stated that considerable force was needed by the police in order to control the crowd which had virtually turned into a mob and that it was necessary for the police to strike several of the Negroes with night sticks in order to control them. He stated that he saw Lieutenant D. W. Williams of the Police Department turn from a small group of Negroes with his face covered with blood and saw other officers falling along the way. He stated that the officers observed by him reverted to force only after everything else had failed, yet he heard some of the Negroes in the crowd yell, "Police brutality." He stated that some of the owners of businesses, who had their windows smashed and their merchandise stolen as they took refuge from the violent mob that surged through the streets, were heard to remark that no one was complaining about "police brutality." He stated that many officers were struck by bottles, sticks and large rocks thrown by the crowd and that those in the crowd who responded quickly to the officers' command to move on met with little or no physical persuasion from the officers. He stated that, in fairness, most of the crowd did move quickly.

Source three added that this source remained near Clayborn Temple throughout the march and observed numerous teen-age Negroes with sticks and also observed some of them literally tear some old iron beds apart, making iron pipes from the parts thereof, and making statements, "We're going to get some white bastards today," whereupon they ran down and caught up with the march and joined it. Source three pointed out that the march was extremely poorly organized; that the march leaders had no control over the marchers, even before they started; and that it was obvious that there would probably be trouble.
Lieutenant Arkin on March 28, 1968, advised that a reliable source of the Police Department had between 8 and 9 a.m., March 28, 1968, observed John B. Leith and some of his black power associates near the Clayborn Temple with sticks and brickbats.

Source two added that he heard Charles L. Cabbage tell some of the crowd as they left the Temple, after the marchers returned to the Temple, that they should not run from the police and that they should "not start a job that they did not plan to finish." Cabbage did not elaborate but source two construed this as a call for trouble.

A fourth source advised that Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., Ralph D. Abernathy, and Bernard Lee, administrative aide to King, were scheduled to leave Memphis at 9:05 p.m., Central Standard Time, via Eastern Airlines, en route to Atlanta, Georgia, and were scheduled to leave Atlanta, Georgia, on the early morning of March 29, 1968, to fly to Friendship Airport in Baltimore, Maryland.

Source one advised that after the trouble on Beale Street, the mass rally scheduled for Mason Temple on the night of March 28, 1968, which was to have featured Martin Luther King, Jr., as the main speaker, was cancelled.

On the late night of March 28, 1968, source four advised that King, Abernathy and Lee had failed to catch the above-described flight and that no one had cancelled his reservations, and that to his knowledge King was still staying at the Rivermont Hotel.

During the afternoon and evening of March 28, 1968, Lieutenant Arkin advised that sporadic looting continued in the south-central area of Memphis, which is predominantly a Negro area, and that the main targets of the sporadic vandals were liquor stores and small grocery stores and sundry stores.
On the late night of March 28, 1968, Lieutenant Arkin advised that there had been numerous small fires set but none of them were serious. He stated that the Memphis Fire Department was able to extinguish the fires without trouble. He pointed out that during the afternoon of March 28, 1968, the Tennessee State Legislature in a special session passed a statute which would give Memphis Mayor Henry Loeb authority to apply a curfew and that such a curfew was ordered to begin at 7 p.m., March 28, 1968.

Lieutenant Arkin further advised that by 6 p.m., March 28, 1968, approximately 3500 members of the Tennessee National Guard consisting of the Memphis unit and West Tennessee units had arrived and were on duty in Memphis, Tennessee, and that Guardsmen were preparing to patrol Memphis in tactical units, each unit to be accompanied by one or more officers of the Memphis Police Department.

On the morning of March 29, 1968, Inspector G. P. Tines, Inspectional Bureau, Memphis Police Department, advised from records, as yet incomplete at the Memphis Police Department regarding the following statistics relative to the racial disturbance in Memphis from approximately 9 a.m., March 23, 1968, to 12 noon, March 29, 1968, as follows:

A total of 150 fires were set; most were small in nature, primarily trash fires. Approximately 30 of these were estimated by the Memphis Fire Department to have been caused by Molotov cocktails or some similar incendiary device. There have been over 300 arrests; exact count not as yet completed, primarily consisting of charges of looting, violation of curfew, arson, disorderly conduct, and related offenses. An approximate total of 60 individuals, many of whom were arrestees, have received medical attention for various injuries received in connection with the looting.
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and over-all disturbance, In addition, over 300 reported cases of looting and rather major vandalism have been reported to the Memphis Police Department by merchants throughout Memphis, again most of these being confined to the south-central area of Memphis, which is a predominantly Negro area. Inspector Tines emphasized again that the incomplete count shows that most of these were liquor stores, small grocery stores, sundry stores, and related establishments, plus numerous clothing stores and related stores in the Beale Street and South Main Street area, described hereinafore.

Inspector Tines advised that five officers of the Memphis Police Department were injured sufficiently to require hospitalization and that there were scores of minor injuries to officers requiring only on-the-spot field first aid.

Inspector Tines continued that there was a total of four individuals who were shot while in the process of looting, or as a result thereof. They are as follows:

1. Male Negro, age 16, 3023 Parker Road, an 11th grade student at Mitchell Road School, which is actually operated by the Shelby County Board of Education, just south of the Memphis City Limits. He was pronounced dead on arrival at John Gaston City Hospital, 1:30 p.m., March 28, 1968. He was shot by an officer of the Memphis Police Department as he attacked this police officer with a butcher knife after he had looted a Sears Roebuck store on South Third Street. He had run from this store into the vicinity of the Fowler Homes on South Fourth Street. Another shot but not killed was...

2. Male Negro, age 17, residing 938 Springdale Street, Memphis. He was shot by a citizen while looting a store at 1239 Thomas about 4 p.m., March 28, 1968, by the store manager. He was charged by the police with assault to murder. He was shot after a beer bottle was thrown through the store window. Tines stated that is in serious condition with a shotgun slug in his back.
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Another shot but not killed, according to Tines, was a 21-year-old male Negro of 1835 Castalia, was shot by a policeman while looting a grocery store near Greenwood, and Walker and is in fair condition.

Tines added that a preliminary count of available arrest tickets, which is definitely not a complete list, indicates that at least ten Negroes arrested had pistols or revolvers on their persons and that numerous others had other lethal weapons such as knives.

Lieutenant Arkin advised that at approximately 1:20 p.m., March 28, 1968, the Memphis Transit Authority which operates the Memphis City Bus System, after receiving numerous complaints from its bus drivers that they feared for their personal well being due to the disorder, coupled with the fact that many of them had been individually robbed in the past, decided as a safety measure to stop the movement of City Buses for the remainder of March 28, 1968.

The Memphis "Commercial Appeal" Newspaper, issue of March 29, 1968, in a front-page story, by an unidentified writer, reported that many of the looters and window breakers were black power advocates, and that several wore jackets of the "Invaders," a local black power group. This story did not give any basis for its statement to this effect.

On March 28 and 29, 1968, sources one and two, along with Lieutenant E. H. Arkin, all of whom are familiar with many phases of the black power movement in Memphis, Tennessee, advised that a small group of the BOP followers have put the word 'Invaders' on their jackets but that many high school age students have done this for effect and are not necessarily affiliated with the BOP movement.

Sources one and two, along with Arkin, added that thus far there is no evidence that any of the BOP group participated in the looting and in fact sources one who is particularly close to this group advised that he saw many of them immediately after the initial rioting and looting.

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started and that they definitely had not personally been involved in the looting. Source one pointed out that as mentioned hereinbefore these individuals had done much by their previous statements and actions outlined above to incite some of the more ignorant and greedy youths who were in the march.

portions of the disturbance and who are familiar with their actions, that the looting was not organized as such. He observed that in his opinion approximately 1 per cent of the marchers engaged in looting and violence and that many of these were people who were criminally inclined and had been in previous trouble. He stated that he would say that probably the first breaking of the first window was enough to set off the crowd which had been emotionally worked up by its long wait for the start of the march and by the general festive air surrounding the march which was on a balmy spring day and was participated in by several hundred youths who obviously had cut school in order to participate.

The information set out hereinbefore has been orally furnished to representatives of Military Intelligence, Memphis, Tennessee, and the information not received from the Memphis Police Department has been orally furnished to Inspector G. Tines and Lieutenant E. H. Arkin of the Inspectional Bureau, Memphis Police Department.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.
Mr. EDGAR. Mr. Smith, directing your attention to page 4 of this exhibit, I would like to read aloud the first paragraph and have your comments:

In recent weeks, John B. Smith has been bragging that he and his followers have been urging high school students to remain away from school when the mass march to be led * * * pointed out that prior to the start of the March 28, 1968, march that John Smith and some of his associates were in his opinion inciting to violence in that they were indiscriminately giving out the four-foot pine poles to various teenage youngsters in the area—and John Smith was heard to tell these youngsters, identities not known, not to be afraid to use these sticks.

Are those statements about your passing out the sticks true?

Mr. SMITH. The statement about me passing out the sticks is not true. Did you want me to comment on the rest of it?

Mr. EDGAR. No; I just wanted your comment on that allegation that was made.

Mr. SMITH. But I would like to comment on the first part of the statement.

Mr. EDGAR. Please do.

Mr. SMITH. The fact that high school students were urged to stay out of school and attend the march is not uncommon in civil rights demonstrations. I think this is a common practice; it was a strategy of COME; it was not something developed by the Invaders; it was not something initiated by the Invaders.

There are press accounts on the morning of the march that Reverend Martin was out in front of Booker Washington High School encouraging students not to attend school but to come to the march. No one has asked about why was he asking students not, you know, to go to school. This was a policy of the strategy committee, to get high school students involved in the strike.

The first part of the strike, most of the marching that occurred, students were the ones who did the marching. There were over—I don’t know—100 marchers. They were going with two marches a day. We recruited those people and trained them the proper way to march without violence, but no one has even referred to the things that we did as an organization that were productive in reference to the strike, and I would like to get that in the record, that we did help plan several other marches that didn’t end in violence, that had no violence involved in it at all.

Mr. EDGAR. So you are suggesting that this was a tool that was used in the civil rights demonstrations, of going to the schools and recruiting students to participate in nonviolent marches, and it was not uncommon in 1968 to do that?

Mr. SMITH. Yes.

Mr. EDGAR. How did you feel about participating in marches and demonstrations?

Mr. SMITH. Personally, I felt that in Memphis, Tenn.—I can’t speak about how it is any other place in the country—but I felt in Memphis, Tenn., marching was putting yourself in the position to get hurt. We in Memphis have suffered police brutality for years. The police force in Memphis is very, very hostile toward Black people.

How I got involved in organizing the Black Organizing Project was the result of personal police brutality, so I felt that any time you are going to put mass numbers, you know, mass demonstra-
tions, on, and you were going to have people involved, that you were putting yourself in the position of where the police could attack you and do just what they did on March 28.

**Mr. Edgar.** Is that a feeling that you hold today, or is it a feeling that you held in 1968?

**Mr. Smith.** Nothing has changed in Memphis except Dr. King died.

**Mr. Edgar.** But to my specific question about your feeling about marches, you are relating your comments to the march as well as thinking of it as being a place where people could get hurt.

As I understand your answer, you are saying it was essentially a waste of time?

**Mr. Smith.** I wouldn’t say it is essentially a waste of time. Marches have their place. Understand that Memphis, Tenn., and as a result of the kind of police department that Memphis has, marching in Memphis is very dangerous and I would not personally urge anyone to march.

**Mr. Edgar.** At any time did you claim responsibility for the violence that disrupted the march on March 28?

**Mr. Smith.** No, I didn’t.

**Mr. Edgar.** Are you aware of any member of your group who claimed responsibility?

**Mr. Smith.** No; I’m not aware of any member of the Invaders or the Black Organizing Project claiming responsibility for any of the violence that occurred on March 28.

**Mr. Edgar.** When you met Dr. King on the morning after at the Holiday Inn, did you or other members of your group imply that you were responsible for, or could prevent, future violence?

**Mr. Smith.** I was not a part of that meeting. I was not there.

**Mr. Edgar.** You were not present at the Holiday Inn meeting?

**Mr. Smith.** No, I wasn’t.

**Mr. Edgar.** You knew that that meeting took place?

**Mr. Smith.** Not until after it took place I didn’t.

**Mr. Edgar.** Do you know who was present at that meeting?

**Mr. Smith.** Now I do.

**Mr. Edgar.** You were not part of that?

**Mr. Smith.** No, I wasn’t.

**Mr. Edgar.** Did you know Marrell McCollough?

**Mr. Smith.** Yes.

**Mr. Edgar.** And how did you know him?

**Mr. Smith.** I was introduced to him by Oree McKenzie.

**Mr. Edgar.** Did you know that he was an undercover Memphis policeman?

**Mr. Smith.** Not when I was introduced to him I didn’t. I found out later.

**Mr. Edgar.** When did you first begin to suspect that he was an undercover policeman?

**Mr. Smith.** I can’t say that I began to suspect that he was an undercover agent. I was told about June, by a woman—she’s a barber. Her name is Alice Matthews, and she said she knew personally that Marrell was an undercover agent and that he worked for the Memphis Police Department; and we discussed it as a group, and decided that, since we knew, the best thing to do was to
just keep him. If we ran him off they would only send someone else.

Mr. Edgar. When was that, again, that you began to discover that?

Mr. Smith. About June, somewhere around in there.

Mr. Edgar. So you were unaware of his involvement with the Memphis police during February, March, and April of 1968?

Mr. Smith. I was unaware then.

Mr. Edgar. What was he like as a member of the Invaders group?

Mr. Smith. See, I was chairman of the Black Organizing Project, which was a board. That board had representatives on it from all of the organizations that comprised it.

For the record, I would like to read to you the groups that comprised the Black Organizing Project, so we'll know whom we are talking about: There was the Afro-American Brotherhood, located at Owen College. There was the Black Student Union at Lemoyne College. There was the Black Student Association at Memphis State University. There was the Downtown Association, which operated on Beale Street. There was the Neighborhood Organizing Project, which we implemented. This was the name given to our community unification project, once we got it funded by War on Poverty in the late summer of 1968. And then there was the Invaders.

Mr. Edgar. Would it have been easy for people outside the group to mistake you for a member of the Invaders?

Mr. Smith. Yes. As I was saying in answer to your other question, I worked with the Invaders because I worked with young people and that was the youth group. You could be a member of one of the other groups but do volunteer work with another group. So I didn't really come in contact with Marrell that often because he was working directly with the Invaders. These were young people, high school students. During the strike he was assigned to work with the strike people down at the temple. This is where he came in contact with Oree McKenzie, I suppose, and the other young members of the Invaders; so he had been involved with them for some time before I ever met him.

When I did meet him, it was only briefly. I was told that he had joined the Invaders and that he was one of the members of the group, and it was only after the strike was over and probably sometime in May that I began to see him quite often. What he did most of the time was provide transportation.

Mr. Edgar. Did he ever suggest to you what actions the group should take, or the Black community should take, in Memphis?

Mr. Smith. If you are talking about doing something like, something violent or maybe burning up something, no, he never suggested anything to me; but I couldn't say what he may have suggested to someone else. But he made suggestions about the kind of programs we could run with the youth, you know, from a juvenile standpoint.

Mr. Edgar. Let me go back to an earlier question I asked you, about a meeting with Dr. King, and I appreciate your correcting me on your not being present at the meeting at the Holiday Inn,
but you were present on either April 3 or April 4, depending on whose records we look at, the meeting with Dr. King.

When you met with Dr. King, did you or other members of your group imply that you were responsible, or that you could prevent future violence?

Mr. SMITH. No, we didn’t.

Mr. EDGAR. So that Dr. King did not assume that——

Mr. SMITH. I don’t know what he assumed. I know we didn’t try to take credit for the violence or imply that we could prevent any future violence.

Mr. EDGAR. Were you an FBI informant?

Mr. SMITH. No, I wasn’t.

Mr. EDGAR. Were you ever employed by the FBI?

Mr. SMITH. No.

Mr. EDGAR. Did you ever provide information to the FBI about the BOP, or the Invaders, or any other organization in Memphis?

Mr. SMITH. The only time I had opportunity to discuss with the FBI what we were about was the meeting of February 16. At that meeting, yes, we discussed our program, what we were about, the concept of our program, what we hoped to do, how we wanted to get funding, things of that nature.

Mr. EDGAR. Who initiated that meeting in February?

Mr. SMITH. As I said previously, Mr. Cabbage went down to the FBI to talk to them about the kind of harassment we were already receiving. I was not present at that meeting. I was told by Mr. Cabbage that he had gone down, that he had talked to them, and that they said they would come out to see the group. They didn’t set a date, or we weren’t supposed to be having a board meeting or anything.

What he said is, they wanted to talk to the members of the group sometime.

Mr. EDGAR. That was your only meeting or contact with the FBI?

Mr. SMITH. As far as discussing with them about our program. Now, they came by my apartment on several occasions to participate in harassment that was going on toward our group. They would come by and knock on the door and come in and ask us, are we Communist inspired, “Do you know that most Black groups have Communists in them?” and those types of things, but——

Mr. EDGAR. You never went to them to volunteer information or were enlisted by them to ask specific questions of others to share that information with the FBI?

Mr. SMITH. No.

Mr. EDGAR. Mr. Chairman, when Mr. Smith was interviewed by staff, he signed a release authorizing the committee to obtain his FBI files, including those which would indicate if he had been an informant. A review of those files has shown that Mr. Smith was not an FBI source or informant.

Did you have any prior knowledge of any assassination or threat on Dr. King?

Mr. SMITH. Almost every time Dr. King had a march, someone threatened his life. There was several rumors floating at the time that Dr. King would be killed, if he even came to Memphis he would be killed; so, yes, I heard rumors of that type, but as far as being able to relate those rumors to what actually happened, I
could not say; but I do know that there were rumors floating around that Dr. King would be killed if he came to Memphis.

Mr. EDGAR. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentlemen has expired. The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ford.

Mr. FORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Smith, when did you first hear the rumor that Dr. King would be killed if he returned to Memphis after the march of March 28?

Mr. SMITH. As far as rumors go, I heard the rumor even before he came the first time, when it was first mentioned that Dr. King was going to come to town for the first march—the one that was snowed out—that if he came to town he would be killed.

Mr. FORD. So we are talking before the March 28 date?

Mr. SMITH. Right. It was nothing specific but just a conversation discussed around the temple, Minimum Salary Building, where the strike strategy sessions were held.

Mr. FORD. Going back to what Mr. Edgar asked earlier about the FBI informants, do you know of any informants at all who might have been a part of the Invaders before the assassination of Dr. King or after the assassination? I think he asked a question whether you were an informant. I am asking now whether or not, to your knowledge, anyone connected with the Invaders might have been placed with the organization by the FBI?

Mr. SMITH. To this date, I have not found anyone who has been identified as an FBI informant. The only informant that I did find out about was Marrell McCollough.

Mr. FORD. You met with Dr. King at the Lorraine Hotel on—what was it—April 3?

Mr. SMITH. Yes, I did.

Mr. FORD. Would you share with us at this time briefly what you discussed with Dr. King once he came out of the shower?

Mr. SMITH. You say the meeting at the Lorraine or the Rivermont?

Mr. FORD. At the Lorraine Motel.

Mr. SMITH. That meeting was not in his room. This was a meeting held at the room above the front office where the registration desk—and they have like a dining room up there, and the meeting was held in that room. There were maybe 16 of us, Dr. King, several of the staff members, Dr. King sat in front of the group, and we sat in chairs. And he asked us, did we feel that we could work with his organization, did we have any problems working with a nonviolent organization?

We told him no. He said that he could not work with people who expound violent philosophies, and things like that, and we told him that we were not a violent organization and that we had been working with the strike previously and we could continue to work with the strike in our same capacity and there would be no problem.

He asked us what did we want SCLC to do for us to cooperate with them. We told him that we had a program called the community unification program, which was a cultural program, and that we had been trying to obtain funding for that program for about a year and we had not succeeded, and that if we could have him and
his organization to help us get the program submitted to the Federal Government or to any source from which he thought we might be able to obtain funding, that would be sufficient for us. And we asked him, what would SCLC want us to do? And he said he needed us to work with the young people. There seemed to have been a problem in the last march basically with organization and with control of the young people. He needed some people to help monitor the march, serve as marshals. He also needed some people who understood how to recruit young people to do that type of volunteer work, that were not going to try to disrupt the march.

We said we could go into the high schools, we could talk to young people, and we could get the kind of young people he wanted. And if he wanted us to do that, we would need transportation because we didn't have cars.

Mr. Ford. Did the SCLC provide cars for you?
Mr. Smith. They never provided cars. The agreement was made and Dr. King was assassinated.

Mr. Ford. But you, the Invaders, had decided to serve as marshals during the march?
Mr. Smith. Yes, and we did. In the Memorial March we served as marshals. We monitored the whole route, front and back.

Mr. Ford. The 16-year-old boy that was killed during the march on the March 28 march, Larry Payne, happened some 3 or 4 miles from the downtown area where the march was taking place. He was a high school student?

Mr. Smith. Yes.

Mr. Ford. You mentioned earlier the Memphis Police Department. I agree we haven't made too much progress in the last 10 years in the city of Memphis, but as a representative from that city, I feel we are beginning to move forward. Mr. Smith, in 1968 when Henry Loeb was the mayor, he projected an image of racism not only of Memphis but of the State of Tennessee. I know in the last 10 years we have been able to make some progress, although I am one of those who says there is still a lot of progress to be made in the future. But I would just like to say for the record that we have made some progress with our law enforcement offices there in the city, and hopefully we will continue to make progress in the future.

Mr. Chairman, at this time I have no further questions.

Mr. Smith. May I respond to that?

Mr. Ford. Sure.

Mr. Smith. I would agree that we have made progress. Our greatest amount of progress has been electing you Congressman from Tennessee, so therefore I would agree with that. Now, if we could just do the same with the Memphis Police Department, then I could agree with the rest of your statement.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Devine.

Mr. Devine. I have no questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Fithian.

Mr. Fithian. No questions.

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. Sawyer. No questions.

Chairman Stokes. Does counsel have something further?
Mr. Webb. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Smith, in your testimony you alluded to certain documents you have. If, in fact, you would like to make those available to the committee, it would help us in completing our record with respect to your organization, its goals and purposes. We can enter them in the record at this point, assign them a number, reproduce them, and give them back to you this afternoon.

Mr. Smith. All right.

Mr. Webb. Mr. Chairman, I would like the committee to receive the documents Mr. Smith is offering as F-464 and have them made part of the record at this time.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, they may be received and entered into the record at this point.

[The information follows:]

MLK Exhibit F-464

- PROPOSAL -

Submitted to:

CULTURAL ENRICHMENT PROGRAM
MANPOWER PLANNING COUNCIL
MEMPHIS - SHELBY COUNTY

Ms. Carolyn Wilson, Supervisor

Presented by:

BIG BROTHERS JR. ACHIEVERS
335 EDITH AVENUE
MEMPHIS, TN 38126

Mr. Richard L. Kirksey, Jr.
Director
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CULTURAL ENRICHMENT PROGRAM
MANPOWER PLANNING COUNCIL
MEMPHIS - SHELBY COUNTY

Rationale

An eventful and useful summer experience is very seldom affordable for most inner-city youth, particularly those youngsters from poverty level families, broken homes, and those who have had difficulty making a successful accommodation to the demands of society. This Summer Youth Program is designed to provide meaningful career exposure, cultural enrichment, and the opportunity to develop a broaden perspective of life. Since very few resources (means, mechanics, or facilities) are available to disadvantaged youth during the summer, these young people are subjected to a summer of boredom and idleness. This type of non-productive activity can often lead to discontent, which manifests itself in various ways, some of which are destructive to the individuals, as well as the community. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the community to do what it can to provide opportunities for it's youth to gain meaningful and enriching experiences.

Big Brothers Jr. Achievers proposes to participate in the Memphis - Shelby County Employment and Training Administration Summer Youth Program for economically disadvantaged youth, as a part of it's Community Service Activity. One of the primary goals of Big Brothers Jr. Achievers is to extend the world of inner-city youth beyond the bricks and concrete, crime and punishment, pain and isolation prevalent in their environment, by broadening their horizons, and upgrading the quality of life within the community.

Big Brothers Jr. Achievers' expertise in the area of Summer Youth Cultural Enrichment Programming extends back to June 6, 1972, when we began with a Community Beautification Program, which involved thirty-five (35) young people. This project was comprised of neighborhood clean-up efforts, and general athletics. In May of 1974, Big Brothers Jr. Achievers implemented it's Summer Excursion Program. The aim of this program was to broaden the knowledge and experiences of youths, and to get them out of the confines of the inner-city. This project was designed to provide a means for young inner-city dwellers to personally participate in outdoor activities most urbanites have gained very little appreciation.

The first such excursion was to Camp Pinecrest, located in Moscow, Tennessee, a "wilderness campsite." This was a one week wilderness encounter, where the project participants were familiarized with a general outdoor existence. Participants were counselled on First-Aid, Personal Hygiene, Physical Health, Boating and Water Safety, Drugs, and Identification of Plants and Animal Species; their characteristics, potential for food, harm or benefit. This program accommodated seventy-five (75) young people and ten (10) staff members without any personnel expense, and at a total cost of $4,500.00.

On January 14, 1975, Big Brothers Jr. Achievers carried a total of one hundred, twenty-eight (128) young people to Nashville, Tennessee, to personally witness the inauguration of the Governor of the State of Tennessee, The Honorable Ray Blanton, and the installation of the 89th General Assembly. This trip also included a tour of the Capital, and an overnight stay on the campus of Tennessee State University. This was a two and one half (2 1/2) day excursion implemented at a cost of $1,000, and again without personnel cost.
Later that same year, August 17-24, 1975, and as a conclusion to other summer activities, we journeyed to Booker T. Washington State Park, located in Chattanooga, Tennessee. The stay in Chattanooga was a one week educational tour oriented to expose seventy-three (73) young Memphians to a different lifestyle, and the historical perspective which produced that lifestyle. The campsite at Booker T. Washington State Park has excellent proximity to Lookout Mountain; The Tennessee Valley Railroad Museum; Ruby Falls; Rock City; and Historic Point Park Civil War Battlefield; which enriched the project's participants interest and knowledge. The cost to underwrite this program was $6,300.00, and, as with other summer efforts, we incurred no personnel expense.

Big Brothers Jr. Achievers, as a community service organization, is uniquely situated and qualified to provide a program of cultural enrichment, as a part of its continuing service to the Latham and McLemore area. Three (3) previous summers of administrating and maintaining a "Summer Excursion Program" which consisted of traveling approximately 1,520 miles, without an accident, or the loss of a participant. We serviced over two hundred, eighty-six (286) young people at a cost in excess of $11,800.00, which should more than demonstrate the ability of Big Brothers Jr. Achievers.

Emphasis:

The problems of most inner-city youth are compounded by the feeling of isolation experienced during the vacation months, or the lack of confidence in their ability to locate and apply successfully for summer employment. The concept of this program is based on plugging into existing agencies, service organizations, educational institutions, and other facilities which offer cultural enrichment, or some type of career opportunity. To this end, emphasis is on placing the participants into direct contact with different types of professions and professionals by traveling to and from the various locations, so each participant can gain further exposure to the city, and what it has to offer.

Target Population:

1. Twenty (20) disadvantaged youth, as identified by the Memphis - Shelby County Employment and Training Administration to be members of this cultural enrichment component.
2. Two(2) youths from Project First Offender, identified as disadvantaged youths.
3. Two (2) youths from Juvenile Court, identified as disadvantaged economically by the Memphis - Shelby County Employment and Training Administration.
4. One (1) youth from the Shelby County Penal Farm or Tennessee Department of Probation and Paroles, identified as within the age limit and economically disadvantaged.
5. This represents a total of twenty-five (25) young people.
6. The general population in the area of Latham and McLemore.

Objectives:

The goals of this cultural enrichment program are to provide experience for economically disadvantaged young people in four (4) areas: 1. Creative Arts; 2. Career Motivation and Opportunity; 3. Ecological Sensivity; and 4. Civic Awareness of the Memphis Community. The use of educational tours will add
new dimensions to the participants' personal development, as well as augment the overall quality of society as a whole. This program will service a total of twenty-five (25) youths basically from the community during the period from June 15, 1976 to August 14, 1976.

The program participants will receive cultural involvement in this manner:

1. Participants will receive maximum exposure of 76 hours and 40 minutes in two (2) broad areas: Creative Arts and Career Motivation & Opportunity. In addition to this, 38 hours and 20 minutes in each category of Ecological Sensitivity and Civic Awareness.

2. Activities in each area will permit participants to gain a basic understanding:
   a. In the proper use of a Library (book reports, research, and creative writing).
   b. Career advancement (tour various job sites).
   c. Personal budget counseling.
   d. Better knowledge of what our city has to offer.
   e. What types of opportunities do the educational institutions offer.
   f. The importance of an ecological balance.
   g. The need for sound community health and safety.

3. Participants will advance their ability to take part in civic, social, and economic life in this community.

4. Participants will become more knowledgeable in:
   a. How to fill out job applications, prepare for interviews (dress and appearance).
   b. The location of vital services, educational institutions, and cultural activities.
   c. The local history, people and places.

5. Participants will demonstrate increasing levels of community involvement by preparing the project information sheet, and community clean-up activities.

6. Participants will increase their appreciation of the aesthetics.

7. Participants will have a broader perspective of the social, civic, and economic lifestyle of Memphis.

8. Participants will develop an understanding of the need to set realistic goals.
   a. Personal management.
   b. Fiscal management.

NARRATIVE

Program will be organized as follows:

Implementation:

Participants will arrive promptly at 9:00 o'clock A.M. for one hour of orientation. They will sign in, and turn in written reports from the previous day's activities. The activities for that day begin promptly at 10:00 o'clock A.M. On the days tours are scheduled, we will leave at 10:30 A.M., and return at 2:30, not later than 3:30 P.M. On those days tours are not scheduled, we will devote our time on workshops, counseling, and oral reports from Library books. Some of these days will be devoted to athletics, games, or art projects. The daily lunch schedule will fluctuate according to the starting time of that day's tour. Participants will be given one (1) hour for lunch, before or after the tour. This will be the case only when the site to be toured will not accommodate a break. Participants will be given two (2) fifteen (15) minutes
V. Graduation.
The Graduation for participants is calculated to give each individual a personal opportunity to express what the Summer Enrichment Program has meant to him or her. We also want to recognize those participants who have cooperated fully, and at times made an extra effort to meet the mission of the project. This program will afford Big Brothers Jr. Achievers an opportunity to thank all the individuals who helped in any way to get the program, or made it a success.

Itinerary:

The week of the 6th - 14th of June will begin orientation to familiarize each participant with the program, its aims and objectives, their responsibility toward the mission of the program, what is expected of each of them as participants, and what the program can do for each participant.

The first days of the program will be utilized as a period for hygiene and physical examinations for each of the participants to ascertain the condition of each participant's health. A workshop by the Memphis and Shelby County Health Department will acquaint the participants with the nature of social diseases and other community health problems.

Two visits will be made to the Public Library where the participants will learn the proper use of, and the types of services provided by the Library. Each participant will check out a book, and give a report on it during the course of the project.

Tours to Audobon Park-Goldsmith Civic Center Garden, and seminars by the Memphis City Beautiful Commission, and the Environmental Action Council of Memphis will provide information which will be translated into individual activity on three (3) neighborhood clean-up days spaced throughout the program.

A trip to the two (2) Memphis daily newspapers will educate each participant to the mechanics of producing a newspaper. This experience will serve as background for the three (3) community information sheets the participants will produce during the program.

The career potential of each participant will be enhanced by three (3) tours to the major educational institutions of Memphis to acquaint participants with: 1. Application Procedure and Processes; 2. Criteria for Attendance; and 3. How to Apply for Financial Assistance.

As a means of increasing the historical and civic perspective of the participants, tours are planned to take in such sites as City Hall, Shelby County Jails, Board of Education, Chucalissa Indian Village, etc.

Related directly to cultural enrichment is an appreciation for the aesthetics. In this regard, the Memphis Little Theatre; Brooks Art Gallery; Memphis Art Academy; Pink Palace Museum; etc., will provide each participant with a basic understanding upon which to cultivate a degree of sensitivity.

With exposure as the key ingredient, tours to industrial sites, such as: Memphis Defense Depot; Firestone Tire and Rubber Company; International Harvester; Kimberly-Clark; and Fruehauf, participants not only receive knowledge of job opportunities and occupational categories, but will receive proper information and practical experience in how to apply, location of major job sites, and how to prepare for a job interview.
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**FILING APPLICATIONS AND PROCESSING APPLICANTS FOR PARTICIPATION IN PROGRAM**

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<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Physical Exams</strong></td>
<td><strong>Memphis &amp; Shelby County Health Department</strong></td>
<td><strong>Memphis Public Library</strong></td>
<td><strong>Memphis Public Library-Vance Branch</strong></td>
<td><strong>Memphis City Beautiful Commission</strong></td>
<td><strong>Memphis City Beautiful Commission</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Physical Exams</strong></td>
<td><strong>Memphis &amp; Shelby County Health Department</strong></td>
<td><strong>Memphis Public Library</strong></td>
<td><strong>Memphis Public Library-Vance Branch</strong></td>
<td><strong>Memphis City Beautiful Commission</strong></td>
<td><strong>Memphis City Beautiful Commission</strong></td>
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<td>23</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Health &amp; Physical Hygiene Orientation YMCA</strong></td>
<td><strong>Audubon Park Goldsmith Civic Center Garden</strong></td>
<td><strong>Memphis International Airport</strong></td>
<td><strong>Memphis Air Force Reserve Training Center</strong></td>
<td><strong>Memphis City Beautiful Commission (session &amp; film presentation)</strong></td>
<td><strong>Chucalissa Indian Village &amp; Museum</strong></td>
<td><strong>TVA - Allen Steam Plant</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUNDAY 27</td>
<td>28 MONDAY</td>
<td>29 TUESDAY</td>
<td>30 WEDNESDAY</td>
<td>1 THURSDAY</td>
<td>2 FRIDAY</td>
<td>3 SATURDAY</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUNE 1976</td>
<td>Neighborhood Clean-up Project</td>
<td>Creative Writing</td>
<td>Submit first report for Community Information Sheet</td>
<td>Tour the Xerox Corporation Office and Facility</td>
<td>1st Community Information Sheet Distribution Day</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JULY 27th - 30th</td>
<td>(Clean trash and debris from designated target area)</td>
<td>A Day At The Press</td>
<td>(compile articles for newsletter)</td>
<td>(career motivation and opportunity)</td>
<td>(distribute community newsletters to impact area residents)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>5 Memphis State University</td>
<td>Creative Writing</td>
<td>Creative Writing</td>
<td>Creative Writing</td>
<td>Creative Writing</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Memphis Little Theater</td>
<td>A Day At The Press</td>
<td>A Day At The Press</td>
<td>A Day At The Press</td>
<td>A Day At The Press</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>WHBQ - Channel 13</td>
<td>Memphis Commercial Appeal</td>
<td>Memphis Commercial Appeal</td>
<td>Memphis Commercial Appeal</td>
<td>Memphis Commercial Appeal</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>8 Visit City Hall (tour)</td>
<td>Shelby County Sheriff's Depart.</td>
<td>CAMP DAY</td>
<td>CAMP DAY</td>
<td>CAMP DAY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Witness City Council in Session</td>
<td>Visit Shelby County Court Div. III</td>
<td>All day camp in Hernando, Miss.</td>
<td>All day camp in Hernando, Miss.</td>
<td>All day camp in Hernando, Miss.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cong. H. Ford's Office</td>
<td>Visit Shelby County Quarterly Court &amp; Election Commission</td>
<td>(back-to-nature sojourn)</td>
<td>(back-to-nature sojourn)</td>
<td>(back-to-nature sojourn)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Visit Shelby County Court Div. III</td>
<td>Visit Shelby County Court Div. III</td>
<td>Visit Shelby County Court Div. III</td>
<td>Visit Shelby County Court Div. III</td>
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<td>Visit Shelby County Court Div. III</td>
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<td>Visit Shelby County Court Div. III</td>
<td>Visit Shelby County Court Div. III</td>
<td>Visit Shelby County Court Div. III</td>
<td>Visit Shelby County Court Div. III</td>
<td>Visit Shelby County Court Div. III</td>
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<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Southwestern University</td>
<td>Pink Palace Museum</td>
<td>Pink Palace Museum</td>
<td>Pink Palace Museum</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pink Palace Museum</td>
<td>2nd Neighborhood Clean-up Project</td>
<td>2nd Neighborhood Clean-up Project</td>
<td>2nd Neighborhood Clean-up Project</td>
<td>2nd Neighborhood Clean-up Project</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(art, music &amp; drama)</td>
<td>Visit Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Park</td>
<td>Visit Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Park</td>
<td>Visit Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Park</td>
<td>Visit Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Park</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>14 Brooks Art Gallery</td>
<td>Memphis Art Academy</td>
<td>Memphis Art Academy</td>
<td>Memphis Art Academy</td>
<td>Memphis Art Academy</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Visit Overton Park &amp; Zoo</td>
<td>Visit Overton Park &amp; Zoo</td>
<td>Visit Overton Park &amp; Zoo</td>
<td>Visit Overton Park &amp; Zoo</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>16 Pink Palace Museum</td>
<td>Shelby State Community College</td>
<td>Shelby State Community College</td>
<td>Shelby State Community College</td>
<td>Shelby State Community College</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(music, art &amp; drama)</td>
<td>(music, art &amp; drama)</td>
<td>(music, art &amp; drama)</td>
<td>(music, art &amp; drama)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>18 Craigmont Planetarium</td>
<td>Modern Jazz Dance</td>
<td>Memphis Queen A Ride on the Riverboat</td>
<td>Playhouse on the Square</td>
<td>Playhouse on the Square</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>&quot;Cosmic Connection or Jupiter Effect&quot; (film presentation)</td>
<td>Athletics - Swimming</td>
<td>A Ride on the Riverboat</td>
<td>(witness rehearsal and production mechanics)</td>
<td>(witness rehearsal and production mechanics)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>YWCA</td>
<td>Visit Beale Street &amp; Tom Lee Park</td>
<td>Visit Beale Street &amp; Tom Lee Park</td>
<td>Visit Beale Street &amp; Tom Lee Park</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Memphis Queen A Ride on the Riverboat</td>
<td>Playhouse on the Square</td>
<td>Beale Street Repertory Company</td>
<td>Beale Street Repertory Company</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(film presentation)</td>
<td>(witness rehearsal and production mechanics)</td>
<td>WREG-TV Channel 3</td>
<td>WREG-TV Channel 3</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(music, drama &amp; medium)</td>
<td>(music, drama &amp; medium)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUNDAY 25</td>
<td>26 MONDAY</td>
<td>27 TUESDAY</td>
<td>28 WEDNESDAY</td>
<td>29 THURSDAY</td>
<td>30 FRIDAY</td>
<td>31 SATURDAY</td>
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<tr>
<td>JULY 25th to 3lst.</td>
<td>Millington Naval Air Station</td>
<td>Art Project Day (concentration on completion of arts and crafts projects for hospital patients)</td>
<td>Creative Writing Workshop</td>
<td>Neighborhood Clean-up Project</td>
<td>A Day At Shelby Forest: Physical Activity (back-to-nature venture, horseback riding, hiking, swimming)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUGUST 1-14</td>
<td>International Harvester</td>
<td>3rd Community Information Sheet (career motivation &amp; opportunity)</td>
<td>Revisit the Library (return books, and research material for graduation)</td>
<td>Workshop (writing and performing speeches)</td>
<td>Final Preparations for hospital visit (complete all art projects)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>3 Community Information Sheet (print and distribute Information Sheet to impact area residents)</td>
<td>Final Preparations for hospital visit (complete all art projects)</td>
<td>Develop ideas for one act skit.</td>
<td>Practice Dances</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Revisit the Library</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Workshop (writing and performing speeches)</td>
<td>Practice Dances</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Art Project Day (concentration on completion of arts and crafts projects for hospital patients)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Final Preparations for hospital visit (complete all art projects)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Creative Writing Workshop</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Final Preparations for hospital visit (complete all art projects)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Prepare Community Information Sheet for printing</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Final Preparations for hospital visit (complete all art projects)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Neighborhood Clean-up Project</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Final Preparations for hospital visit (complete all art projects)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Open House &amp; Graduation Week</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Workshops for Graduation (Practice speaking, dances and songs)</td>
<td>Final Preparations for hospital visit (complete all art projects)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Workshops for Graduation (Practice speaking, dances and songs)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Prepare Stage Setting For One Act Skit</td>
<td>Complete stage decorations for graduation, and continue practice on routines.</td>
<td>DRESS REHEARSALS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Prepare Stage Setting For One Act Skit</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Complete stage decorations for graduation, and continue practice on routines.</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Continue Practice for graduation</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>DRESS REHEARSALS</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Complete stage decorations for graduation, and continue practice on routines.</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>Graduation &amp; Open House</td>
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<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Graduation &amp; Open House</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Graduation &amp; Open House</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Staffing:

1. **Big Brothers Jr. Achievers' staff will administrate** this program, and along with the volunteer consultants will serve as an Advisory Board for the program. The Advisory Board will have the responsibility of recruiting, selecting and employing the project administrator, and aiding in the selection of additional program personnel. The Broad will serve as non-paid consultants in developing the Summer Youth Program:

   Mr. Richard L. Kirksey, Jr.
   Administration Consultant

   Mr. John B. Smith
   Programming Consultant

   Ms. Dorothy M. McNeail
   Scheduling Consultant

2. **Project Administrator** is responsible for oversight of the selection and employment of program personnel, serve as liaison between Memphis - Shelby County Employment and Training Administration and the program. He or she is also responsible for details of planning and implementation, for maintaining schedules, purchasing of supplies and materials. He must maintain financial records, attendance records, and all other records as needed.

3. **Project Coordinator** will coordinate the activities of the program in cooperation with the Program Administrator. He will coordinate and oversee project instruction, counseling and tours. Advises project administrator of equipment, material and space needs. Serve as lead instructor in designated areas.

4. **Career Counselor** will assist the Project Administrator in designated areas. Counselor participants on day-to-day problems, stand available to handle on-the-spot emergencies. Give instructions on career opportunities, how to apply, and how to prepare for job interviews.

5. **Project Secretary** will handle routine secretarial and clerical duties necessary for the efficient operation of the program.

Facilities:

The program will be housed in the home of **Big Brothers Jr. Achievers**, located at 335 Edith Avenue. This facility contains two large instruction areas, (50 occupant capacity), and three (3) other rooms, (30 occupant capacity). The home is located in the heart of the area we have chosen as the target population or impact area, and will be easily accessible to all participants.

Budget:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Staffing</th>
<th>Per Month</th>
<th>Three Months</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Director</td>
<td>$850.00</td>
<td>$2,550.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Program Coordinator</td>
<td>650.00</td>
<td>1,950.00</td>
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<tr>
<td>Project Counselor</td>
<td>450.00</td>
<td>1,350.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secretary</td>
<td>450.00</td>
<td>1,350.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$2400.00</strong></td>
<td><strong>$7,200.00</strong></td>
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Office & Duplicating Supplies & Equipment:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paper, envelopes, folders, duplicator masters</td>
<td>$125.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typewriter (per month $30 rental fee)</td>
<td>$90.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Folding Chairs, Card Tables, Banquet table</td>
<td>178.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Desk, Secretary Chair, 2 draw file ($100.00 per/mo.)</td>
<td>300.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spirit Duplicator (per/month $30.00 rental)</td>
<td>$90.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$783.92</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Transportation

Bus Trips  
35 trips ( $35.00 each) $1,225.00

### Instructional Supplies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item Description</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 Legal Size Clip Boards</td>
<td>$12.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 doz. assorted pens</td>
<td>10.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 doz. Legal Pads 8x14 ($6.20 per doz.)</td>
<td>18.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 doz. #2 Pencils</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short Folders (100) 8/12 x 11</td>
<td>16.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 Long File Folders 8 1/2 x 14</td>
<td>7.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Complete Sets File Dividers</td>
<td>6.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 Index Card 3x5 $.45pg. 1 File Box</td>
<td>3.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 5x8 Large Index Cards</td>
<td>5.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 doz. Scratch pads 4x6</td>
<td>6.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staples - 2 Boxes</td>
<td>7.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staple Machines (3)</td>
<td>15.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paper Clips (2 boxes)</td>
<td>3.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Library Rental Fees (equipment, projector films)</td>
<td>100.00</td>
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</table>

$216.15

### Art Supplies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item Description</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paint Brushes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4607F-Flats size 2 (2 doz.)</td>
<td>$5.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4607F-Flats size 6 (2 doz.)</td>
<td>7.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4607F-Flats size 12 (2 doz.)</td>
<td>13.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4607F-Flats size 3 (2 doz.)</td>
<td>8.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art Chalk (pastel) 2 doz. box</td>
<td>16.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Art Chalk (charcoal) Twelve Sticks</td>
<td>23.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paris Craft</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 cartons -20lbs. ca. 17.25 ea.</td>
<td>86.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Liquitex Basic Color Set @6.85</td>
<td>34.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Doz. Round Mixing Trays @6.20</td>
<td>12.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 Brush &amp; Palett Cups @3.00</td>
<td>15.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100 Poster Boards</td>
<td>24.00</td>
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</table>

$269.70

### Graduation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item Description</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Certificates of Achievement (25)</td>
<td>$3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Certificates of Service Award (25)</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage Decorations Costumes &amp; props</td>
<td>300.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$309.00

### Mailing Costs

$100.00

Total $10,103.77
The Black Organizing Project
1112 Latham Street
Memphis, Tennessee

The Black Organizing Project is a multi-programmatic, non-profit, social welfare corporation chartered by the State of Tennessee on the 28th day of January, 1968. This Project grew out of the thought; a community functions best when there is unity of purpose, consistency and coordination in actions, both maintained by a diligent effort on the part of its members to reduce inefficiency and duplications in regards to community productivity. This initiative was undertaken as a means of reducing unnecessary pressures produced by rivaling factions and competing forces in areas of joint interest. The incorporating body consisted of six autonomous groups, all of them operating separately and with a common grounds of understanding.

The Black Organizing Project was conceived to be an umbrella-type structure which would provide a means of pooling the collective resources, talents and energies of several factions into a unified force. Through this amalgamation, a Board of Directors was elected to represent the incorporated body and to implement the goals and desires of the charter. The officers were chosen in accordance with by-laws written previously and terms of office were set. Each organization was represented equally on the Board of Directors of the Black Organizing Project and enjoyed full protection and benefit of incorporation. There was at least one representative from each autonomous group, (no more than three according to size and number of organization), which would serve the interest of that constituency. One could only hold a seat on this body except by election as a result of participation as an active member in one of the member groups.

To achieve the forestated goals six opposing factions were amalgamated into a diversified conglomerate but at the same time maintaining autonomy by subordinating individualism in behalf of effort. The six groups were as follows:

The Black Organizing Project
Chairman: John B. Smith
Sec.: Edwina Harrell
Treas.: James Phillips

Campus Groups
Afro-American Brotherhood: John B. Smith
Owen College: Falon Jones

Black Student Union: James Phillips
LeMoyne College: Wesley Benn

Black Student Association: Robert Jones
Memphis State Univ.: Edwina Harrell

Community Groups
Downtown Association: Clifford Taylor
Beale Street

Neighborhood Organizing Project: James Phillips
1310 Florida St.: Charles Ballard

The Invaders: Donnie Delaney

1644 Hansner
The composition of the Board of Directors for the Black Organizing Project remained intact until late 1970. At this point most of the organizations which made up the Board of Directors began to succumb to inertia and fail to maintain an active membership. By early 1972, a call for reorganization was adopted by the remaining members of the Board of Directors and the chairman designated July 15, 1972.

Reorganization came about in this fashion, first new members of the Board of Directors were selected. The Old Board was dissolved and the composition was changed to accommodate an expanded membership. The name of the Board of Directors was then changed to be more indicative of its functions to the Tri-State Urban Coalition. Three broad headings were created and four at-large positions were placed on the Coalition Board as non-partisans. The new groups elected to the Coalition Board of the Black Organizing Project then had to select organizational representatives and the at-large members were chosen jointly from the total membership of the Black Organizing Project.

The composition of the Tri-State Urban Coalition, the Board of Directors of the Black Organizing Project is as follows:

Chairman.........................John B. Smith
Vice-Chairman.....................Wesley W. Benn, Jr.
Secretary.........................Dorothy M. McNeal
Treasurer.........................Richard L. Kirksey, Jr.

Cultural
Big Brothers Jr. Achievers..............Richard L. Kirksey, Jr.
Survival - Downtown Association..........Herb Nealland
Committee Beale Street Urban Renewal Co........Dorothy M. McNeal

Economics
BoJax..............................Lou Bond
& Finance - Association of Black Cleaners........Wesley W. Benn, Jr.
Committee Black Economic Development..........LaSaunders Hudson

Political
Veterans Affairs.......................John B. Smith
Education - Drugs & Ex-Inmates Council..........Robert Dismuke
Committee Black Political Contingent........Dedrick Withers
Law Enforcement In-Service
Training.............................Eugene Leake, Sr.

This approach was devised as a means of consolidating each of these separate community efforts so as to maximize unity as a driving force. Through this amalgamation the Black Organizing Project serves as a central command headquarters and allows one staff to accomplish many of the duplications of separate groups. This umbrella-type structure serves as a resource pool, a plug-in agency and a corporate shelter by way of its non-profit social welfare status.
The Black Organizing Project

Tri-State Urban Coalition

- Big Brothers Jr. Achievers
- Downtown Association
- Beale St. Urban Renewal Company
- Cultural Survival Committee

- BoJex Inc.
  - Association of Black Cleaners
  - Black Economic Development

- Economic & Finance Committee

- Veterans Affairs
  - Drugs & Ex-Inmates Council
  - Black Political Contingent
  - Law Enforcement
  - Ex-Service Trainees

- Political Education Committee
Dear Investor:

Last year at this time, Big Brothers Jr. Achievers initiated its Community Investment Program, a prospectus featuring eight specific areas of community-group investment projects. This year again, we are seeking support for our Summer Excursion Program which provides an opportunity for inner-city young people to get out and see the beauty of our state, enjoy nature, learn boating and water safety and in general participate in outdoor activities most urban dwellers have gained very little appreciation.

This year for our summer camp, we will journey to Booker T. Washington State Park, Chattanooga, Tennessee for our campsite. Booker T. Washington State Park under the expert supervision of Mr. William C. Bell was selected because of its strategic location or proximity to Lookout Mountain Museum, Tennessee Valley Railroad Museum, Chickamauga National Park, Sequayah Caverns, Ruby Falls, Rock City and historic Point Park Civil War Battlefield which will provide many hours of educational interest.

This year's camp has been scheduled for the week of August 17-24, 1975. Big Brothers Jr. Achievers have established a projected goal of $10,000.00 to underwrite this year's camp. This sum will enable approximately 100 inner-city youngsters to experience, through this training-vacation, a different perspective and broaden their horizon. The Summer Excursion Program is an attempt on the part of Big Brothers Jr. Achievers to cement a very badly needed social connection that of the individual, organization or business which desires to help build a strong and equitable social structure and the need of this society for intelligent and industrious young people motivated by an unbiased view of the world.

Your contribution will be graciously appreciated and enthusiastically received no matter what the nature.

BIG BROTHERS JR. ACHIEVERS COMMUNITY INVESTMENT PROGRAM

Big Brothers Jr. Achievers, in 1974 initiated its Community Investment Program as a means of acquainting unfamiliar members of our society with our many functions and projects. Organizationally, we started with one summer recreation event in 1971, now, we have matured into a diversified multi-programmatical group serving this community on a full-time basis. To our credit, we proudly confess to being one of the very few organizations in this area which exist solely for the benefit and betterment of the young members of this society. Though we have only been known as Big Brothers Jr. Achievers
since 1971, our roots have their origin in a youth group, The South Memphis Cagers, organized in 1957 by the Honorable Nat D. Williams, noted Beale Street Historian.

It is true our legacy of poverty renders us beneficiaries of very little but benefactors we must be and our energies are geared toward salvaging what is left of our community fortune, the children. So, it is this on-going program of investment in which Big Brothers' Jr. Achievers wishes to interest you as an investor. Acknowledging first and foremost, we all, because of today's technology, live one heart beat away from one another, one should periodically review their portfolio in this vital area. If for some reason you have not yet began to develop an interest in this area, please allow this communique to serve as your impetus.

The Big Brothers Jr. Achievers Community Investment Program is a portfolio featuring eight specific areas of group investment items and they are projected to yield prime dividends on all long term investment notes.

I. The Big Brothers Jr. Achievers Beale Street Historical Calendar

This is a pictorial calendar depicting the lifestyle, people places and humor which was characteristic of that beloved street. The Honorable Nat D. Williams is featured as the 1976-77 honoree.

II. Summer Excursion and Life Involvement Project

Projects in this area are concerned with raising the conscious level of the individual in relationship to our total environment. Last year's Summer Excursion to Camp Pinecrest was the type of experience where we give inner-city children an opportunity to get out and see the rural area of our state and generally learn to relate on a personal level with an aspect of life most of us have forgotten to appreciate.

III. Police Community In-Service Training Council

This initiative is an effort by Big Brothers Jr. Achievers to afford those police officers who exhibit a genuine concern for redefining the function and affect of the police on the community, by providing a channel through which they may act.

IV. Drug, Ex-Inmate and Community Rehabilitation Contingent

With this operation, we merely strive to maintain an active on-going educational program to disseminate information and to point out the debilitating affects certain types of conduct have upon the society as a whole.

V. Friend to Friend "Deed or Need"

This project was originated to render aid and assistance, such as food, clothing and even shelter, in emergencies to those temporarily bankrupt and are without the funds to sustain themselves. We are also available to aid the older members of the community.

VI. Family Encounter Staff

This we think represent a new approach to try and ensure there is female and male participation in all programs. It is the responsibility of this staff to keep alive the thought of fight-
Music: Blues, The Art Form
Our concern here is to keep alive the tradition and artistic significance of the Blues Art Form, in relationship to our development as a people.

Communication
In connection with our ability to express ourselves, this operation is composed primarily of Dis-jockies and others in the audio-visual communications field and its aims are to expedite the entrance of interested young people into these related fields. The job of this program is to develop training exercises, means of gaining experience and career placement.

This investment approach should not be confused or equated to the degree of considering our children as mutual funds, equities, negotiable stocks and bonds or any of the material assets derived from traditional investments. This prospectus is neither an offer to sale or buy security but is merely an investment idea of today in an effort to build an appreciative dividend on the future.

Thank you,

Richard L. Kirksey, Jr.
Director

dmm

Mr. Smith. Mr. Chairman, the program which I have been describing that we were trying to get funded, subsequently we have rewritten it, and I have brought it along to show that there was such a program, but it is called the community culture enrichment program. I would like to submit that so that we would have something in the record.

Chairman Stokes. It has been properly marked as an exhibit and has been ordered into the record in full.

Mr. Smith, at the conclusion of a witness' testimony before this committee, either the witness or his counsel has the privilege of making a 5-minute statement to the committee, at which time you can either amplify or further comment upon or explain your testimony before this committee. If either you or your counsel desire the 5 minutes, I would extend it to you at this time.

Mr. Smith. Yes; I would like to make a statement, if I may. Chairman Stokes. You may proceed.

Mr. Smith. I was born an American in 1943, January 13. Everything that I have done in the last 11 years has been because I am an American. I feel that the Constitution gave me the right to try and help my community by organizing and participating in the political process. It is the political process which we addressed when we organized the Black Organizing Project. It was the considerations that the Constitution gave us when we feel that there is something in government that is wrong or something in government that we can aid or help or change, the Constitution gives us as citizens that right.

We, acting upon those rights, our rhetoric is the only thing that we have been accused of doing that was wrong. No one has established to the date this committee is interested in that we committed any act of violence, that we did anything wrong. But I feel that
we have had to defend ourselves against allegations, against in-
nuendoes that no one can find foundation for in any record whatso-
ever.

But there have been charges made against us before this commit-
tee as to the kind of individuals we were at the time, as to what
our intentions were. These allegations not only exist in the record
but they exit in the minds of many people. I would like today to
state for the record that were I not an American, then I should
have considered my actions a little more carefully. Were I in
Russia, then maybe I should have thought twice about trying to
change the system. If this was a Communist nation, yes, I would be
guilty of a lot of crimes, but this is America. This is the land of the
free and the home of the brave.

Everyone here has the right to try and change what they feel is
not right. I have no sorrow, I have no regrets for exercising my
rights. I feel that black people in America have received unjust
treatment by this Government, and I feel that we are receiving
unjust treatment today. I have in the past sought to try and correct
those injustices. I will try in the future to correct those injustices.
Nothing that has happened to me from being maligned, beaten,
imprisoned and kept without employment for the last 11 years will
change my mind, will change my perspective, nor will it change my
goal.

This committee has helped by allowing us to come before it today
and to present our side to the world. We are nothing more than
men. We have the same desires, the same goals and the same needs
as any other man. We have children, families that we have to feed.
We have neighbors that need help, and if it takes another Black
Organizing Project, we will form another Black Organizing Project.
If there comes a sanitation strike, I will participate in it or any
other kind of strike that might help my people.

I will not be intimidated and I will not be forced to accept that
which I think is wrong. Thank you.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you, Mr. Smith.

Did I understand you to say that after 11 years you are still
unable to get employment?

Mr. Smith. Yes.

Chairman Stokes. Is it based upon those activities as an Invader
at that time that you made reference to?

Mr. Smith. I would assume it is. I could not be sure. I know that
I apply for jobs, I get a favorable interview but nothing ever
happens. I know that in order to get into school I have to use a
fictitious name, though the record is straight today as to what my
real name is. But I would not be able to get in using my own name
because I had applied and been turned down.

Chairman Stokes. You certainly have been a very articulate
witness here today, and many of the things that you stated in your
5-minute statement certainly many of us can share with you in
many respects, and hopefully when our work is finished the testi-
mony you and others have given here today will perhaps straight-
en the record out once and for all.

Thank you very much for appearing.

Mr. Smith. Thank you.

Chairman Stokes. The Chair recognizes Professor Blakey.
Mr. BLAKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Charles Laverne Cabbage grew up in Memphis, Tenn. Like Dr. King, he graduated from Morehouse College in Atlanta, then, in 1967, returned to Memphis.
Mr. Cabbage was a cofounder of the Black Organizing Project and its first chairman. He was a key participant in the activities surrounding the strike and Dr. King's visits to Memphis. He was one of the three Invaders to meet with Dr. King at the Holiday Inn on March 29, 1968. He was also one of the Invaders who was staying at the Lorraine Motel from April 2 to April 4.
It would be appropriate at this time, Mr. Chairman, to call Mr. Cabbage.
Chairman STOKES. The committee calls Mr. Cabbage.
Mr. Cabbage, would you stand and be sworn. Do you solemnly swear the testimony you will give this committee is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?
Mr. Cabbage. I do.
Chairman STOKES. Thank you. You may be seated.
Will counsel for the witness please identify himself.
Mr. KOHN. Richard Kohn.
Chairman STOKES. Thank you very much.
The Chair recognizes Staff Counsel Ken McHargh.
Mr. McHARGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

TESTIMONY OF CHARLES LAVERNE CABBAGE, REPRESENTED BY RICHARD KOHN, ESQ.

Mr. McHARGH. Would you state your full name for the record.
Mr. Cabbage. Charles Laverne Cabbage.
Mr. McHARGH. Were you present in Memphis during 1967 and 1968?
Mr. Cabbage. Yes; I was.
Mr. McHARGH. Mr. Cabbage, have you been present in the room during testimony which has been given this morning?
Mr. Cabbage. Yes; I have.
Mr. McHARGH. You have heard reference to the organization described as the Black Organizing Project. Were you an original organizer of that group?
Mr. Cabbage. Yes; I was.
Mr. McHARGH. Have you also heard testimony that a subgroup of that organization was a group called the Invaders? Is that correct?
Mr. Cabbage. Yes.
Mr. McHARGH. Is it also true, Mr. Cabbage, that the name Invaders began to be applied to members of Black Organizing Project and its other constituents after news articles popularized that particular name?
Mr. Cabbage. Yes, that is true, and we had a very difficult time trying to straighten that situation out. Maybe it was of the stigma attached to organizing along Black areas in that particular time. It seemed whatever we had to say had no validity with the establishment in the Black community nor with the press at that time, and when we tried to explain to these groups the Black Organizing Project existed separately from the Invaders, nobody seemed to
listen. They always seemed to like the Invader name. I think this was a deterrence and made it difficult for us to communicate to the leadership, both Black and white.

Mr. McHargh. Mr. Cabbage, you have heard testimony of Mr. Smith concerning the objectives and goals of your organization. Would you agree with what he testified to?

Mr. Cabbage. Yes; I would.

Mr. McHargh. You also heard his testimony relative to the meetings which took place prior to the sanitation march on March 28, the one led by Dr. King. Would you also agree with his statements relative to the posture of the organization as it related to that particular march?

Mr. Cabbage. Yes; I would.

Mr. McHargh. Mr. Smith also testified that it was his belief that the meeting which took place between the Invaders, the Black Organizing Project and members of the FBI on February 16 might have taken place because of a visit made by you and I believe a Clifford Taylor, to the local FBI office. Is that correct?

Mr. Cabbage. That is a possibility that that may have occurred, but I don’t specifically remember extending just an open invitation for the FBI to visit our headquarters. I didn’t think that would be appropriate at that particular time, but I felt it was necessary for us to meet with the FBI because at that particular time we had no hedge between us and the Memphis Police Department. We were being harassed beyond belief at that particular point, and we had no help out of the community. We were unable to make bond at that time. Members were constantly being arrested, and we felt we had to go to some particular group and explain what our goals and objectives were so they could understand what we were about and maybe have some kind of effect on the kind of pressure that the police department were putting on the organization. I felt the FBI would be that instrument; therefore I did go to them.

Mr. McHargh. As a result of your visit to the FBI office, did any official relationship develop between you or your organization and the FBI office?

Mr. Cabbage. I wouldn’t call it an official relationship. I would say it brought my attention to them, and, as a result of that, I was drafted 1 month after the assassination of Dr. King and was arrested for refusing to be inducted into the military because of that relationship.

Mr. McHargh. If you would talk a little slower, Mr. Cabbage, I think we would have a little better chance to understand what you are saying.

Following the march on February 28, which ended in disruption, you, along with Charles Harrington and Calvin Taylor, visited Dr. King at the Rivermont Hotel; is that correct?

Mr. Cabbage. That is correct.

Mr. McHargh. Do you recall what the purpose of going to the Rivermont was?

Mr. Cabbage. Yes. I am not exactly sure. My recall at this particular point is very vague on some of these particular issues. But I remember Calvin having mentioned earlier today that we had been extended an invitation, that Dr. King had wanted to talk to us. Let me emphasize prior to Dr. King seeking us out we had
sought him out because we recognized the danger that existed in the Memphis community well before the leadership of the community on the Move to Equality, and we articulated those problems to them and indicated that we did not feel that Dr. King should be brought to Memphis because of the unstable conditions and the volatile situation that existed at that time. We were not allowed to see Dr. King.

Mr. McHargh. Excuse me. Are you saying that prior to Dr. King's leading the march on the 28th you attempted to see him to warn him about the volatile situation?

Mr. Cabbage. Yes, I did.

Mr. McHargh. And you were prevented from seeing him?

Mr. Cabbage. Yes, I was.

Mr. McHargh. By whom were you prevented?

Mr. Cabbage. I don't want to necessarily state specific individuals because COME was almost a brotherhood in itself, and it represented Memphis membership at that time, mostly ministers and leaders of local political organizations that had stature in the community. So I would hesitate to single out individuals who stood in our way. I would just say that the organization COME, if you can call it an organization, resorted to various forms of deception to make it difficult for us to make the meetings and difficult for us to find out the kind of information we needed to be able to articulate the kind of problems we sought with the mass demonstration being planned.

Mr. McHargh. In your interview with the staff previously, I believe you indicated that you thought the reason they might have tried to prevent your meeting with Dr. King is because they didn't take your group seriously or they didn't agree with your particular philosophy concerning the events which were taking place at the time?

Mr. Cabbage. Well, I think that the problem was that they were suffering from some kind of prejudice of their own. They could not see, especially around 1967 and 1968 and even several years prior to that, that there were students who were working throughout this country who were working for no pay at all, who were not necessarily concerned with receiving money but were committed to ideals and goals, as far as dealing with the problem of racism and oppression facing Black people in this country.

We came back here in 1966 and 1967, organized over 2,000 people in the city of Memphis, and they were totally unaware of it. When we began to try to make them aware of it, they looked at us in disbelief and said this could not happen.

Mr. McHargh. With respect to the meeting with Dr. King at the Rivermont, did you discuss with Dr. King the fact that you were a Morehouse graduate, and did he converse with you about that point?

Mr. Cabbage. He mentioned it to me. I think I was aware of the fact that he attended Morehouse, but I think he mentioned it to me first. He said something to the effect that, why didn't I come and warn him? Because, after all, we are brothers and we attended the same school, we were both Morehouse graduates. And at that point I was kind of taken aback because I was a bit surprised that he knew anything about me at all.
At that point he began to ask me why had we disrupted the march, and at that point I began to explain to him that we did not disrupt the march, that one of the things we had been trying to do ever since he had some to Memphis was to inform him of the tactical situation that had been established as far as conducting the march was all wrong, it was being conducted in a very volatile atmosphere and I thought his life was in danger, that I thought one of the things he should do is actually prepare himself to deal with the situation in Memphis, could go back, if necessary, and come back, but in the process send in people ahead of him trying to train people in workshops so they would be able to take the police brutality; it takes training to take beatings like that shown in that exhibit up here, and we just hadn't had that kind of orientation in the city of Memphis at that time.

Mr. McHargh. Following that meeting, did you participate in other meetings with Dr. King and members of the SCLC?

Mr. Cabbage. You say following or before?

Mr. McHargh. Following the meeting at the Rivermont.

Mr. Cabbage. Yes, I did. In the room here on the other exhibit, where everyone is pointing, where you see the curtain there, we have negotiated there in that particular room. I think we met there two or three times trying to work out logistics, trying to carry out the SCLC as far as having mass demonstrations.

Mr. McHargh. The record should indicate that Mr. Cabbage is referring to the Lorraine Hotel.

Mr. Cabbage, during any of those meetings, do you recall whether or not Andy Young was present at any of those meetings?

Mr. Cabbage. Yes, he was present. As a matter of fact, Andy was one of the individuals that broke the deadlock that had occurred inside the meetings. The deadlock occurred basically because we were expected to have the kind of control inside the city of Memphis that even the police department did not have, and that is actually controlling the violence. I thought it was ridiculous for us to assume the posture of saying, well, the guarantee that no problems will occur, that the march will be able to occur without a riot, but I was mainly concerned with securing funding for our program.

In order for us to be in a position of putting ourselves between the marchers and the police department, I thought that was going to be difficult for me to sell to the organization from the beginning, so I had a problem there. Second—am I going into too much detail here?

Mr. McHargh. Perhaps we could suspend here. We may get into more detail, if necessary, later.

Mr. Cabbage. Right.

Mr. McHargh. You were present when Professor Blakey read the narration and referred to the docu-drama "King" that was televised nationally; is that correct?

Mr. Cabbage. Yes.

Mr. McHargh. I would like to read passages from that docu-drama to you with reference to the sections that had to do with the alleged statements made by individuals who have been described and generally considered to be members of the Invaders I would like you to comment on them after I read the section. One individual's name from the text I will read from is Harold. He is described
as being a Morehouse graduate. The person identified as Andy speaks first:

**Andy.** Why is it you were never interested in the strike before?

George responds, and George is purportedly a member of the militant youth group present in Memphis during the march on the 28th:

**George.** Well, the guys got me interested in it.
**Andy.** Why did you push Dr. King for? Do you like pushing him?
**George.** No. At home they think of him as Jesus Christ.
**Andy.** Is that how you reward him? You push him?
**George.** Dr. King, you have to understand—
**Andy.** No, he's not going to understand. None of us are going to understand what you and the others were doing there.
**George.** We were paid.
**Andy.** You were paid. By whom?
**George.** I don't know.

An individual named Harold is addressed. Harold says the following:

**Harold.** Those two men were murdered. We've got to do something.
**Andy.** Harold, you're a born loner. Why were you interested in that strike?
**Harold.** We've got to do some fighting. Not march—fighting.
**Andy.** Don't give me that stuff. The only thing you give a damn about is your own precious behind. A Morehouse man, with an honors degree, and you care about garbage workers? Don't make me laugh.
**Harold.** What the hell is this, an inquisition? What right do you have to bring—

An individual characterized as Reverend Williamson speaks next:

**Williamson.** That is right. George talked.
**Harold.** That stupid—
**Andy.** Who paid you? Who paid you to interrupt that march?
**Harold.** Don't tell people around here. They think he's the Lord God almighty.
**Andy.** Who was it?
**Harold.** The FBI.
**Andy.** Get him in the other room.
**Harold.** They have them at a lot of demonstrations. I am not the only one.
**Andy.** Out. Maybe we should get out of Memphis.

Mr. Cabbage, did you see the docu-drama "King" when it was televised?

**Mr. Cabbage.** Yes, I did.
**Mr. McHargh.** Do you recall seeing that particular portion of the drama?
**Mr. Cabbage.** Yes, I saw that.
**Mr. McHargh.** Did you get the impression that the Harold that was being referred to was purportedly yourself?
**Mr. Cabbage.** Well, it was a well-known fact that I was the only organization member who had graduated from Morehouse, so I guess everybody automatically assumes that it was me.
**Mr. McHargh.** Did the events portrayed in that portion of the transcript ever occur?
**Mr. Cabbage.** No, they never occurred.
**Mr. McHargh.** Did you ever admit to anyone that you had caused the violence on the 28th?
**Mr. Cabbage.** No.
**Mr. McHargh.** Did you admit to anyone at any time that you had ever had a relationship with the FBI?
Mr. Cabbage. No.

Mr. McHargh. Did you have a relationship as an informant with the FBI?

Mr. Cabbage. No, not as an informant; as a defendant. They arrested me.

Mr. McHargh. Mr. Chairman, I think at this time it would be appropriate to note for the record that the staff interviewed Andrew Young, who is commonly considered to be the Andy referred to in the transcript, and Ambassador Young also indicated that his recollection of this particular sequence of events as depicted in the docu-drama never did occur.

Chairman Stokes. The record will so show.

Mr. McHargh. Mr. Cabbage, did you hear Mr. Smith testify concerning the acquiring of rooms in the Lorraine Motel?

Mr. Cabbage. Yes, I did.

Mr. McHargh. Do you agree with this particular assessment as to how that happened?

Mr. Cabbage. Yes. Well, let me give you an account of my activities the night of the riot and maybe you can see from that where it all runs together. I was in fear of my life for the entire time while we were organizing in Memphis. And any time any situations were to occur where any violence occurred, I was always the No. 1 suspect. So when the riot broke out, I immediately began to seek refuge. One of the first places was in the mosque there on Florida Street. I went to the mosque for awhile. I stayed there. This was after curfew. After curfew, I made my way by back streets down to the Lorraine Motel, checked into the Lorraine Motel. At this point I think this is where John also checked in down there, and we stayed there until after most of the trouble was over.

Mr. McHargh. Mr. Chairman, at this point I have no further questions.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Edgar, for such time as he may consume.

Mr. Edgar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Cabbage, 10 years after an event, sitting and reflecting upon it, makes it a little difficult for some of us to get a visual picture of what in fact was happening. I wonder if you could describe for the committee the kind of style that you, yourself, exhibited as leader of the Invaders. What was your operating style?

Mr. Cabbage. To be honest about it, basically for the first year I wore sandals and one pair of blue jeans and a sweatshirt—for over a year.

Mr. Edgar. So it was not a suit and tie and "sit down and let's talk rationally about each issue as it comes up"?

Mr. Cabbage. Well, we had problems even feeding ourselves at that particular time. So the style was just one of trying to stay alive and deal with some of the problems the Black people in Memphis were facing at that time.

Mr. Edgar. Would you describe yourself as being angry at that time about the conditions of Black people?

Mr. Cabbage. Definitely. I was bitter.
Mr. Edgar. Would you indicate that your words, your rhetoric, would have been militant?

Mr. Cabbage. At that particular time I would say they probably were.

Mr. Edgar. How would you describe that militant rhetoric that you might have talked to others about or utilized during the period of March and April, 1968?

Mr. Cabbage. Maybe we should get something straight in terms of semantics. To some people militancy can mean just participating in a demonstration to get a union formed and to others militancy may mean actually going in to talk about revolution and overthrowing the U.S. Government. I wouldn’t say that I went that far to the left, but I would say that I was somewhere in between.

Mr. Edgar. I think, it is important for us to get a visual sighting of that kind of attitude and behavior in order to put in perspective some of the things that might have occurred.

Did you know Marrell McCullough?

Mr. Cabbage. Yes.

Mr. Edgar. When did you first meet him?

Mr. Cabbage. I met him at the apartment which we used—John’s apartment—which we used basically as our headquarters. I think I came through one evening and he was just there. I asked who he was and I was told who he was, and from that moment on I suspected him as being a member of the police department.

Mr. Edgar. Why was it that you suspected him as being a member of the Memphis Police Department so early?

Mr. Cabbage. Well, in his manner, his availability, the flexibility of his schedule, popping out of nowhere, with no background. I didn’t know anything about him. It was just all of a very suspicious nature, and at that time, as I say, I was rather close to a state of being paranoid because of the pressure put on us by the police department, so I just immediately interpreted him as being a plant.

Mr. Edgar. Did you make any effort to weed him out of the Invader’s group?

Mr. Cabbage. Oh, no. That would have been a mistake.

Mr. Edgar. Did you make any effort to indicate to John Smith or to any other member of the Invaders that you suspected Marrell McCullough to be—

Mr. Cabbage. Yes; we discussed it.

Mr. Edgar. Did you discuss it as early as February and March of 1968?

Mr. Cabbage. No.

Mr. Edgar. It would have been later on in the year?

Mr. Cabbage. It is difficult for me to place the time but I doubt—I don’t think the discussion occurred any time in February because I think he may have been dropping by. But his presence was not as obvious to me at that time as it was—it just dawned on me one day as I came into the apartment, hey, like this fellow has been here quite a bit, and all of a sudden it just came to me. But up until that time, no, I can’t say I suspected him.

Mr. Edgar. Would you describe his activities as an Invader.

Mr. Cabbage. Well, he says that he had the job of minister of transportation. I will just leave it at that.
Mr. Edgar. Did he ever make contributions as to what you as an organization should be doing?

Mr. Cabbage. After I began to get bad vibes about Marrell, I stayed away from him as much as I possibly could.

Mr. Edgar. Do you know if he was present at the march on March 28?

Mr. Cabbage. No, I do not know whether he was there or not.

Mr. Edgar. Were you present during the march?

Mr. Cabbage. I came down and took a look and saw the confusion an disarray and disorganization and bad tactical planning, and saw that it was going to lead into chaos, and I went home.

Mr. Edgar. You didn’t stay for any of the activities or violence?

Mr. Cabbage. Well, I had been trying for months to get them to listen to some of the ideas we had about trying to conduct a nonviolent demonstration and I wasn’t listened to then. There was no indication that I would have been listened to then. I thought the best thing for me to do was to go back home because I figured that would be a safe place for me because I knew if trouble broke out I knew we were going to be blamed mostly for it, and that is exactly what happened.

Mr. Edgar. Were you present the next day at the Holiday Inn at the meeting with Dr. King?

Mr. Cabbage. Yes, I was.

Mr. Edgar. What characterized that meeting?

Mr. Cabbage. Calvin said he had gotten word that Dr. King wanted to talk to us, and I am not sure that is the case or whether we had decided to try to reach him. But somehow I found out where he was staying, and when Calvin came in with the information that Dr. King wanted to talk, I said, “Finally we will get to talk.” I thought it important for Calvin to go along because whatever was going to be said in that meeting I felt would be important for the historical record because of the importance of the poor peoples campaign. I saw what was happening and I saw that cataclysmic events were in the shape of being formed at that time. Calvin went along. Also Charles Harrington went along, as another witness. So I went to the hotel and there was no security there. I caught the elevator, went upstairs and knocked on his door and walked in.

Mr. Edgar. Was the first part of that meeting dealing with Dr. Abernathy?

Mr. Cabbage. Dr. Abernathy was a bit antagonistic from the beginning. He really didn’t want us to talk to Dr. King at all. Like I say, we had been confronted with that same attitude throughout the strike effort, but I talked with him and we exchanged viewpoints. I don’t remember the exact gist of the conversation that went on, but he had told me Dr. King was in the process of meditating and that he would not have time to talk with me. And just as he had finished lying and getting that out of his mouth, Dr. King walked out of the other room and Dr. King said, “That is okay” and that he did want to talk.

Mr. Edgar. Did you serve as the leader of that meeting or the spokesman?

Mr. Cabbage. Yes; I articulated our position. Yes. But I would like to stay away from the definitions of leader and spokesman
because I never really considered myself as that. I just felt that I had a job and a duty to perform, and I did, and I felt this was in line with that.

Mr. Edgar. What took place at that meeting to lead you to believe you should set up headquarters at the Lorraine Motel?

Mr. Cabbage. As I just mentioned, we did not set up headquarters at the hotel. To be truthful about it, I was there to avoid the Memphis Police. We were there before SCLC came, and as a result of our being there it had been assumed by some I have talked to that that is probably one of the reasons why they came there, because for some reason they needed us to march in their parade and they had to get us involved with the sanitation strike because the exclusion of us may have been the cause of the violence that occurred in the first march and to make the same mistake twice just wouldn’t make sense. So just as a matter of logistics and just good planning, it would be good for all of us to be there and to conduct negotiations to the extent that everybody could feel satisfied about their role in the participation in the upcoming demonstration.

Mr. Edgar. So it is your testimony that you and John Smith just got rooms at the Lorraine to stay clear of the police and that by accident Dr. Martin Luther King found himself in that same motel a few days later?

Mr. Cabbage. I wouldn’t say necessarily by accident, but they did eventually check in there.

Mr. Edgar. Did you make yourself known to the members of SCLC?

Mr. Cabbage. Yes; I did.

Mr. Edgar. Did you anticipate that there would be followup meetings to the meeting you had at the Holiday Inn?

Mr. Cabbage. I was hoping that there would be.

Mr. Edgar. But you were not led to believe that there would be?

Mr. Cabbage. Well, we had received no concrete guarantees. Dr. King had told me in the room that he would take what I had said into consideration, that he was glad that I came to him to talk to him because he wasn’t aware of the volatility of the situation in Memphis at that time, if he had known, he would not have walked into the situation that he did walk into, and that when he comes back to Memphis that I wanted to be one of the first people he wanted to see.

Mr. Edgar. During the meeting at the Holiday Inn or the meetings you held at the Lorraine, did you and your members discuss providing security for Dr. King?

Mr. Cabbage. I recognized a need for Dr. King to have security in Memphis because of the situation that existed between the strike and the police department, but we really weren’t organized or disciplined enough to provide the kind of security he needed. Now, the question may have come up in some discussions we may have had among ourselves. We talked about a lot of things. Generally we would have political discussions just about every night and we would run the gamut and cover both sides of the coin; somebody would play devil’s advocate and we would try to figure out how they would be thinking on the other side in order to come up with the proper solution to the problem we were confronted with.
Within that context it is possible the question of security for Dr. King came up, but I am not saying that was brought into negotiations that we had with SCLC at that time.

Mr. EDGAR. You used the phrase "during your negotitions." What did you think you were negotiating with the SCLC?

Mr. CABBAGE. During that particular phase I felt that the worst thing that could happen in bringing Dr. King here to Memphis and something going wrong with the march, I figured that would be the most detrimental thing that could happen to us as an organization, therefore we were opposed to it.

Would you ask your question again because I want to get it exactly straight. Would you ask that question again.

Mr. EDGAR. My question relates around the question of negotiation with SCLC. What is it you thought you were negotiating?

Mr. CABBAGE. Oh, one of the things was that in order for the march to be successful we had to be involved in it. This was the position that they took. In order for us to be involved in it then, there were only a couple roles we could play. They really didn't need any more people to fill the ranks because they had more people than they needed who were willing to march, so here again we were put in a situation of being placed between the marchers and possible rioters on the outside, along the outer rim of the march, and the police. So, OK, I figured if we were going to jeopardize and put ourselves in the firing line in this way, SCLC should try to make some efforts to help us to get some of the things we were trying to do.

We were very much concerned with our program at this time. We had been trying for years to secure funding through the Federal Government but we had met with little or no success at all. And, OK, when we talked with Dr. King and presented our side to him and told him, OK, we will try to do this even though we can't guarantee that violence will not break out, we will do the best that we can, but in the process of using this, will you help us to secure funding for our program. At this particular point he picked up the telephone and called to New York or—I don't even know whether the phone was hooked up or not, but this is what transpired in the meeting. And he talked on the phone and he said: We have a commitment from the particular group involved—I think it has something to do with the National Council of Churches but I am not specific on this; I would like the record to show that—but he said: OK, we have a tentative commitment to partially fund your program.

At that particular point I had felt we had gotten what we had come to get. I went back to the executive board meeting that we were having in the room at the Lorraine, John and I, and our secretary Edwina Harris at that time, and we began to try to sell the program to the rest of our organization members.

Mr. EDGAR. What were the conditions under which you and John Smith and the others left the Lorraine Motel within the hour prior to the death of Dr. Martin Luther King?

Mr. CABBAGE. We talked about this and I have been trying to recall. It seems to me that as a result of the negotiations and the way they went that there was quite a bit of objection within the ranks of SCLC in terms of reaching an agreement with us in
marshalling the march, because I think some of the younger mem-
ers felt they could do it. And this brought about quite a bit of
animosity, and it hasn’t come out yet but at that particular time I
was on the staff of the SCLC. I think they paid me something like
$70 or something like this, it wasn’t very much, and we are talking
about the cars, et cetera, et cetera, and one of the things they came
and told me—I think we got a call or somebody told us—I am not
exactly sure—but they told us the SCLC would no longer be pick-
ing up the tab on the room. We originally had rented the room
ourselves but in staying over somebody had to pay the bill. SCLC
picked up the tab on that. In the process, they put me on the staff
and issued me a check, but they never made cars available to do
the work they talked about having done. So at that point we felt if
they were not going to finish paying the room, the next thing we
are going to be confronted with is people putting us out of the
hotel. So the best thing was to leave and continue our discussions
at the Howard address. So we packed up and left.

Mr. Edgar. One final comment and then I will pass to the other
members of the committee. Let me make sure that I understand
what you are saying. You were a member of the SCLC staff, you
were paid $70 and you became a member of that staff after the
march on the 28th and before the death of Dr. King?

Mr. Cabbage. Yes. But how I became a member of the staff of
SCLC, I really don’t know how it happened. But as I remember, I
think it was Orange who brought it to me and said: We will be able
to put you on staff.

Mr. Edgar. Reverend Orange?

Mr. Cabbage. Yes; and that would make things a lot easier. So I
agreed, because we needed the funds.

Mr. Edgar. No further questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr.
Preyer.

Mr. Preyer. Just a couple of minor points. When you took the
room at the Lorraine, you took it to avoid harassment and the
question of negotiating with the SCLC came up after you had been
in the room; is that right?

Mr. Cabbage. Partially correct. Remember, I told you that at the
Rivermont meeting Dr. King had said after he came back to Mem-
phis one of the first persons he wanted to talk to was me, and OK,
we were already checked into the Lorraine Hotel, so when he came
back to Memphis it just as a course of natural events began to go
into things that involved the rest of the organization members.

Mr. Preyer. When you checked into the motel rooms, did you
and Mr. Smith pay for your rooms at that time? Were you going to
pay the bill when you checked out?

Mr. Cabbage. I think the policy at the Lorraine was you had to
pay to get into the hotel room. I doubt they would have let us have
a room without paying for it.

Mr. Preyer. So it is your recollection that you paid for the rooms
when you took the room?

Mr. Cabbage. I am not being specific about this. I am assuming
that is what happened. I don’t have a specific recollection of it. All
I know is we were at the hotel and I was there. I am not saying
that I registered in the room myself and used my name, but I am saying that we did rent rooms at the Lorraine. I know that is where I went, and John also came there.

Mr. Preyer. The SCLC did not pay for your rooms?

Mr. Cabbage. No; not at the very beginning.

Mr. Preyer. Did you ask them to pay for it?

Mr. Cabbage. I was trying to recollect whether SCLC had left Memphis or not. They had to still be there because the riot broke out on the 28th. They were still in town, yes, but at that particular point we weren't communicating that well at all.

Mr. Preyer. Thank you.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Devine.

Mr. Devine. There seems to be some question about why your group left so hurriedly just before the assassination. Could you clarify that in any way? Was it just a coincidence that you checked out quickly before the assassination? How would you explain that, sir?

Mr. Cabbage. I have been trying to recall ever since the incident what happened, exactly what the sequence of events was. But to be honest about it, I haven't been able to place them accurately in my mind. I either got a phone call from one of the staffers or one of them came by the room, or sent the message up that they were no longer going to pay for the room, and we were already overdue and that it left no alternative but for us to check out. So we checked out.

Mr. Devine. That is your best recollection?

Mr. Cabbage. That is my best recollection of what happened.

Mr. Devine. You would say categorically that the hurried departure, the so-called hurried departure had nothing to do with the later events?

Mr. Cabbage. Now I am going to say this, and I hope I am taken in all sincerity. I feel that if we had stayed at the hotel a little longer, I believe that Dr. King would still be alive today, and I have carried this around with me for quite some time. I feel that, regardless of what the caller said or what the information was that came to us, that we should have stayed at the hotel out of concern for Dr. King. But, well, we were slack in our duty. By them being so concentrated along the nonviolent tradition, it was obvious that security for the man was just totally nonexistent as far as I could tell. Now, I may be wrong. At that particular time there were members of our organization who, out of necessity, went around. The way I feel that we were the only individuals in the motel who were actually capable of providing any kind of security for Dr. King at all, and that if we had stayed there, there is a possibility that he may be alive today. But by us leaving, it left him no cover at all, and he walked into an assassin's bullet.

Mr. Devine. Thank you, sir.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired. The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ford.

Mr. Ford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Cabbage, what about FBI agents, Mr. Lawrence and Mr. Lowe? Did you know them during that time? Do the names ring a bell with you?
Mr. CABBAGE. Yes. They had been by my house several times. I don't know whether you all know it or not, but even before I left Morehouse I had been getting draft notices every time the grades came out, and I would constantly have to go back and get an S—2 form. After I had gotten back to Memphis they constantly sent me draft notices in the mail, and I sent them back saying I did not live at that address because at that time I was opposed to the war because I didn't think the war was serving my particular purpose, and I felt it was unconstitutional and, well, for all those particular reasons. But Mr. Lowe—and I guess the other man's name—I remember two Black gentlemen who worked for the FBI who constantly just intimidated my family, coming by the house all the time. One time they came back with a waiver for me to sign.

Mr. FORD. A what?

Mr. CABBAGE. A waiver. I wouldn't sign it. After the assassination they had an arrest warrant out for me and I left town, went to Atlanta, got a lawyer, came back and surrendered to the Federal marshal in the Federal building. It hasn't been a relationship of working together.

Mr. FORD. Were you at Mr. Smith's house on Hanover the night the FBI agents came over?

Mr. CABBAGE. No, I was not at that meeting. I don't recall being there. Now, I have seen some documents that say that I was at that meeting but I actually do not recall being there.

Mr. FORD. What about between March 28 and April 4; do you recall any contact with the FBI at all?

Mr. CABBAGE. No, I don't.

Mr. FORD. Mr. Chairman, if I could get the clerk to give MLK exhibit F-459 to Mr. Cabbage, I would like him to turn to page 3. Mr. Chairman, I would also like to have MLK exhibit F-459 entered into the record at this time.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it will be so ordered into the record at this time.

[The information follows:]
Memorandum

DATE: 3/14/68

DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448006)

FROM: SAC, MEMPHIS (100-4542) (P)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST-HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE

Re Bureau airtel to all offices dated 3/4/68.

The following is being submitted pursuant to Bureau instructions set forth in referenced airtel:

I. SA HOWELL S. LOWE has been assigned to coordinate the Black Nationalist-Hate Groups Counterintelligence Program.

II. The Black Nationalist movement in the Memphis Division is found in the following three main areas:

1. Nation of Islam (NOI)
2. Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC)
3. Black Organizing Power (BOP) - Afro-American Brotherhood - Invaders

The Nation of Islam (NOI), established Memphis, Tennessee, in the Summer of 1960, has approximately 15 members. There has been no overt black nationalist activity on the part of the members of the local NOI Mosque and members have been cautioned not to violate laws and to stay away from the militant black power advocates. It is not believed that as presently constituted local NOI members have any propensity for violence.

BUREAU (RU)
7 - Memphis (2 - 100-4542)
(1 - 100-4140, Investigation of Student Groups, etc.)
(1 - 157-556, Possible Racial Violence, Major Urban Areas)
(1 - 157-1022, Black Nationalist Movement)
(1 - 157-1028, SNCC)
(1 - 157-1029, NOI)
The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) has an established chapter at Nashville, Tennessee, which was organized at Fisk University in October, 1966. The exact number of members of this chapter is unknown. At least 25 members have been identified and it is believed that the actual membership of the SNCC chapter at Nashville, Tennessee, is several times this number. This group is believed to have a great propensity for violence, based on the fact that members have been in the forefront of anti-Vietnam protests and anti-draft protests in Nashville, Tennessee. In April, 1967, leaders and members of the SNCC chapter at Nashville, Tennessee, were the ringleaders in the 3-day riot which occurred at Nashville, Tennessee. Various leaders and members of this SNCC chapter have advocated violence in various statements made by them during the past year.

Black Organizing Power (BOP) - Afro-American Brotherhood - Invaders is a Memphis-located subsidiary of SNCC. It is known by any one of the abovementioned names, but it has been described by its acknowledged leader CHARLES LAWRENCE/CASBADE as an unchartered SNCC chapter of Memphis, Tennessee. This organization, commonly referred to as BOP, has a governing body of 9 Negro males and one Negro female, and its membership or following is estimated to be between 50 and 100 Negroes. This organization has a younger group of Negroes going under the name "Invaders" which is composed of high school students and/or high school dropouts or recently graduated students.

This organization known as BOP is believed to have a great propensity for violence based on statements and actions of the known leaders.

The following persons listed on the Rabble Rouser Index of the Memphis Office are considered to be militant black nationalists:
CHARLES LAVENZ CABBAGE, a Negro male graduate of Morehouse College, Atlanta, Georgia, is the present BOP leader and has made statements to the effect that Memphis should burn and that Memphis needs a good race riot.

JOHN BURRELL SMITH, a Negro male, student at LeMoyne College, Memphis, self-admitted second in command of BOP, has also made numerous statements indicating that Negroes must adopt a policy of violence.

COBY VERNON SMITH, a Negro male, student at Southwestern College at Memphis and close associate of both CHARLES LAVENZ CABBAGE and JOHN BURRELL SMITH, has advocated violence and made statements that he "will turn Memphis upside down."

FRED HARRIS BROOKS, a Negro male, former student at Tennessee State A and I University, Nashville, Tennessee, a member of SNCC chapter who is currently free on bond awaiting trial for violations of the Selective Service Act, 50 App., USC. BROOKS has made numerous statements during the past year and a half indicating he believes in the use of violence in order to obtain Negro equality.

III. The following organizations and individuals are believed to be of such potential danger as to be considered for current counterintelligence action:

1. Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) (Nashville, Tennessee, Chapter)
   a) FRED HARRIS BROOKS
   b) KENNETH RICKY JONES, Chairman of SNCC Chapter, Nashville, Tennessee
   c) JAMES MICKEY BOOTH, self-proclaimed member of SNCC
d) FREDERICK N. COLLINS, member of SNCC, Nashville, Tennessee

e) DONALD L. GRAHAM, member of SNCC, Nashville, Tennessee

f) DANIEL FRANK MASSIE, leader of SNCC chapter, Nashville, Tennessee

This SNCC chapter at Nashville, Tennessee, distributed a pamphlet in early part of November, 1966, which announced that the purpose of the SNCC chapter at Nashville, Tennessee, was to stimulate and foster the growth of local protest movements. They have evolved into an anti-draft, anti-Vietnam and anti-white group and state they are followers of former SNCC Chairman STOKELY CARMICHAEL and RAP BROWN, current SNCC Chairman.

The above listed members of the SNCC chapter at Nashville, Tennessee, have all made statements indicating a propensity for violence and all took part in the race riot which occurred in April, 1967, at Nashville, Tennessee.

2. Black Organizing Power (BOP) - Afro-American Brotherhood - Invaders

a) CHARLES LAVERNE CABBAGE

b) JOHN BURRELL SMITH

c) JAMES ELMORE PHILLIPS, student, LeMoyne College, Memphis, Tennessee

d) CLEPTON ROY JAMERSON, student, LeMoyne College, Memphis, Tennessee

e) CHARLES HARRINGTON, student, Owen College, Memphis, Tennessee

f) CHARLES B. BALLARD, student, Owen College, Memphis, Tennessee
The above-listed ten individuals are the self-admitted governing body of the SNCC-affiliated organization at Memphis, Tennessee, known as Black Organizing Power (BOP). They claim to be followers of H. Rap Brown and Stokely Carmichael, and all have made statements that violence is the only answer to the Negroes' problems.

IV. It is believed that one of the most effective counterintelligence actions which can be taken against black power advocates is a continuing interview program of the known leaders and members of any black power group. There is evidence in the Memphis Division that within the past two months interviews of leaders and members of the BOP organization has caused a disruption in the recruiting of new members and has created suspicion against those members who have not been interviewed.

V. Suggestions for counterintelligence action will be submitted by separate letter by the Memphis Division in the near future.
Mr. Ford. This is a report from the Memphis FBI Office. It is a list of Blacks that they considered to be militant. They have on here Charles Cabbage. Do you have the top of page 3? They have described you as a Negro male graduate of Morehouse College, Atlanta, Ga., is at present devoted leader and has made statements to the effect that Memphis should burn and that Memphis needed a good race riot.

Why do you think they would make this statement?

Mr. Cabbage. I think that is typical of FBI activity that particular time. Now, in reference to the statements that I am supposed to have made, they can be verified by an article that appeared in the "Commercial Appeal," where I was discussing the housing conditions in Memphis in either around the latter part of 1966 or early 1967. I was working for about $30 a week for the War on Poverty and I had made a statement that conditions in Memphis were so deplorable and that Black people in the city have been made to suffer under conditions that just really are unbearable, that we can expect riots in the city of Memphis. Now, that is closer to the statement that I made than this, whatever this is here. This is incorrect.

Mr. Ford. Mr. Cabbage, where are you presently employed?

Mr. Cabbage. The last job that I had.

Mr. Kohn. Excuse me. May I address the Chair.

Chairman Stokes. Certainly. The Chair recognizes counsel for the witness.

Mr. Kohn. In spite of the fact that the committee made documents available to us previously, I have not seen this document. I object to the use of this document because it is based on hearsay and the fact that it was not shown to us beforehand.

Chairman Stokes. I believe that this document counsel can advise, has been previously marked as an exhibit and entered into the record.

Mr. McHargh. No, Mr. Chairman. That document was not, but it will be used for a portion of the hearings that will be covered tomorrow.

Chairman Stokes. Does counsel want to restate his objection?

Mr. Kohn. I would just object to this document being used in evidence during these proceedings with respect to Mr. Cabbage. As I understand it now, it is not being introduced into evidence but simply being referred to. I am disturbed that it was not shown to us previously, even though other documents had been shown to us.

To the extent that it will be used in these proceedings, I want to register an objection.

Chairman Stokes. Counsel’s objections will be noted for the record and the committee will take your objections under advisement.

Mr. Cabbage. In answer to Congressman Ford’s question, I have had the same kind of difficulty that John has had in seeking employment in Memphis.

I am very much interested in politics because I understand that politics controls the way this nation moves. The only time I am actually able to get any work is during the political season. The last time I had a job was, I managed 2 campaigns for 2 candidates running for the county court in the city of Memphis and I also
helped in coordinating 11 other campaigns of a slate of candidates that have been endorsed by a political organization that I am now a member of.

As far as continuing with steady employment, except for the political season I am constantly out of work. I have applied to different positions. I have gone on interviews, left the State and gone to different parts of the country to try to get jobs.

At first the prospects appear to be bright and the people appear to be hopeful about my employment. Then all of a sudden the whole attitude changes and I have never understood why.

Mr. Ford. Mr. Chairman, I want counsel to know that this is one of the reasons why I was pointing this out. There are records like this one before this committee today that have caused Mr. Cabbage and Mr. Smith to be unemployed 11 years after the assassination of Dr. King. We look and find reports here coming from the FBI office on two distinguished citizens of the city of Memphis.

I was bringing it out for the record in an attempt to clear this up. You have the opinion here of a couple of agents who would write about Mr. Cabbage and Mr. Smith and John Smith and Cobbly Smith. That is why I was bringing this out and I want counsel to know that.

At this time, Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Fithian.

Mr. Fithian. I defer to Mr. Sawyer.

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Sawyer.

Mr. Sawyer. The only thing I am interested in, not that I am interested in but that I want to ask, you expressed some regret and thought that your having left the room in the Lorraine led to the death of Martin Luther King, or if you had stayed there, it might have prevented it. That maybe would be a fairer way of saying it.

What makes you think that whether you were there or not makes any difference?

Mr. Cabbage. I don't know. When you are involved in situations with such a significant historical value, you begin to wonder where your place in that is. I don't think that anything has happened within the last 100 years that has been more significant to the development of, let's say, Black people in this country than the assassination of Dr. King.

True, there have been assassinations of other Black leaders in the past, but I was not close enough to that to feel any kind of closeness to it in the way that I did toward Dr. King. I had a great amount of respect for the man. I thought that he was perhaps one of the last hopes that we had and that if his nonviolent program did not succeed, then I saw that the country would actually be heading down the road toward a racial war and that would serve the Black person no purpose because we were ill prepared at that particular point to confront the forces of the U.S. Government.

I think it would have been totally absurd for us to think so. If we could have saved him, maybe at this particular point we may be seeing more changes than we have seen up to this point. I don't know. But I just feel if we had stayed, maybe we could have done more.

Mr. Sawyer. From the probable location of the sniper and the position of Dr. King out on that balcony, it impressed me that they
could have had a group of 100 armed commandoes in another room there and it would not really have done any good.

Mr. CABBAGE. Perhaps not, but that still does not exclude me from feeling my personal responsibility for seeing to it that a man of Dr. King's stature should not be gunned down in my hometown. And I am actually in the same hotel building with him and not able to do anything at all. It gives one a sense of just hopelessness.

What can you do? I have searched my mind constantly and I often ask myself what could I have done.

Mr. SAWYER. What I am really getting at is that I interpret your earlier observation as more of a personal frustration that you could not have done anything rather than a realistic view that whether you were there or not it would not have made any difference.

Mr. CABBAGE. Well, maybe it would not have made any difference. Perhaps not. I should agree with you there that it perhaps would not have made any difference if there had been 1,000 men.

Mr. SAWYER. Thank you.

I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman yields back the balance of his time.

The gentleman from Indiana.

Mr. FITTHIAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Cabbage, we are glad to have you here today. I would like to go back to the civil rights movement with you and see if we could not explore it a little historically and let me get a little better picture of where you think you fit into that movement.

Generally speaking, the students in the civil rights movement believed that prior to Dr. King's death, well prior to it, there had been an increasing impatience of many in the Black communities who believed that nonviolence was not going to get them there.

Now, both groups perceived great wrongs that were done to Black Americans and great denial of their civil rights and their economic opportunities, but there came a rather precise and profound division in the movement, the Black rights movement, represented on the one hand by Dr. King who was the older, the initial prime mover, and others who believed that that would not get them there, H. Rap Brown, Huey Newton, and on and on and on. This division generally followed age lines, but not always.

What I would like for you to describe for me is where you saw yourself fitting in in 1966, 1967 and 1968, into these two basic divisions of the Black rights movement. On which side were you?

Mr. CABBAGE. I saw myself as threatening. I will not say threatening but walking a very thin line.

Now as a history student I don't want to confine myself in dealing with the civil rights struggle just to what happened in 1967 or in the sixties. Let's go back 100 years and talk about what Booker T. Washington talked about and the problems between him and W. E. B. DuBois and talk about their solutions to the problem and talk about the riots that occurred in the country from 1909, 1919, 1924 and on up until even in some places today.

Now as far as Black people being able to form an armed rebellion in this country, I think it is ridiculous for us to even talk about that at this point. Therefore, the revolution or mass suicide
as some people were discussing at that point, I cannot adhere to that particular theory.

But I did not feel that nonviolence alone was going to be enough to move the powers that be, that there had to be some fusion of all of the factions that were involved, and out of that some kind of cohesive approach to dealing with the problem, not with just one tactic.

Mr. Fithian. If I may interrupt, generally speaking, some very tough choices had to be made between those who would involve themselves in Watts-type activities and those who believed it was enough to peacefully demonstrate and march, and through Christian love and brotherhood and all of Dr. King’s teachings, believed that that was the way to go.

Now these are in and of themselves, I believe you would agree, almost mutually exclusive. I don’t think you can walk that line you are talking about. I don’t think you thought so then.

Mr. Cabbage. Are you making an accusation or are you asking me a question?

Mr. Fithian. I am just trying to get you to tell me where you fit into the Black rights movement, that is all.

Mr. Cabbage. As I said, I saw myself as walking a very thin line because I saw the relevancy of nonviolent discipline on the one side, but when nonviolent discipline is met by rifle fire, then I see the necessity for self protection.

Now if nonviolent disciplines can be allowed to carry out their functions without windows broken and without no one hurt, that is legitimate, you know. I can see where it has, it has a place in working toward the solution of the problem.

But when we have situations that exist in this country like what happened in the picture describing King in the Montgomery to Memphis situation where Black people are actually fired on and dogs are turned loose on them and things of this nature, this is not nonviolent.

At what point should Black people constantly throw themselves before the cannon and say we will continue to be killed and wiped out in an attempt to gain what we are supposedly born with, the right for human rights to be granted to all and civil liberties to be administered across this land equally? How much blood do we have to shed before we realize that nonviolence, if it is met by gun fire, is not the total and only solution?

Mr. Fithian. So, then, basically you are saying that you had along with many others given up on the nonviolence?

Mr. Cabbage. No, I had not given up on the nonviolent solution. I realized that the powers that be had to be faced with another alternative.

Mr. Fithian. And that was?

Mr. Cabbage. I would not necessarily say violence in itself, but I will say it was not adherence to the nonviolent principle.

Mr. Fithian. I didn’t understand that.

Mr. Cabbage. It was not totally adhering to the nonviolent principle in dealing with the social problems faced by the Black people in the country in gaining their human and civil rights.

Mr. Fithian. There was some violence, pretty modest really, in the march by comparison to some of the great events of the move-
ment. The march in and of itself other than it tells us a little bit about Dr. King, that kind of violence is pretty modest by comparison to lots of other things as we both know.

I am not obviously going to argue totally in sympathy with what you said. They did use police dogs and there were Bull Connors and all kinds of provocations that stood in the way of the nonviolent movement.

So while I can understand, you know, people giving up on the nonviolent approach, and while I don't really view the breaking out the windows and the disturbance of this particular march as a tremendous act of violence historically speaking, comparatively, still something happened in that march, somebody decided to use the sticks for other than holding up signs of protest.

Now I gather that from what you said and others that you take no responsibility for that?

Mr. Cabbage. No, I don't.

Mr. Fithian. Who do you perceive as having promoted the violence at that time?

Mr. Cabbage. I would not go so far as to say the violence was promoted. I would like to say that the violence was provoked by the Memphis Police Department, that if they had been—well, let me rephrase that. If they had executed a bit more judgment in dealing with the march in the terms of the way it was set up, worked a little more closely with the community leaders, shown more interest in it, actually even attending some of the COME meetings, I think that would have served the purpose.

But their position was one of hold the line. I think that the day the march broke up I went home and I received a phone call that said the police had lined up, they had drawn a line on Main Street, and that the march was to proceed no further than that point, and that if it did proceed to that point, then they would open fire on the front ranks of the march.

The first report that I got on the telephone was that the first ranks of the march had been fired on. I was not even there. I received this over the telephone. I don't remember who the caller was, but this is the information that I received.

Mr. Fithian. I think generally from the information that we have it was kind of the rear ranks that decided to start. I am not saying who provoked whom. I guess what I am saying is this: Let's strip away with all the rest of it, we could engage in philosophical discussions of the Black rights movement for a long time.

But this committee is trying to get at the truth of the death of a great American, Martin Luther King, and all the evidence that we have at our disposal, Mr. Chairman, seems to me, and I could be wrong and I rather hope that I am, to be at wide variance of what I am hearing here this afternoon.

It seems that generally throughout these long proceedings and in questioning many, many witnesses, the Invaders were looked upon as part of the militant wing of the Black rights movement and testimony from a variety of sources points in this direction.

Mr. Cabbage. Has any testimony been given and evidence to indicate or back up the statement that you have just made?
Mr. Fithian. Yes. We have gone over some of the documents and you reject those because they were FBI. Then we talked to Dr. Abernathy and you reject that for some other reasons.

Mr. Cabbage. That we actually engaged in acts of violence and you pinpoint individuals?

Mr. Fithian. As I understood Dr. Abernathy, the reason he initially proposed that Dr. King not talk with you was that you were representative of that other approach to the Black rights movement.

Mr. Cabbage. That was misinformation on Ralph Abernathy's part.

Mr. Fithian. All I am saying is that all the information that I have had, and it may be superficial, certainly, is at very sharp variance with what you are telling us. I have listened very carefully to the tone of your testimony here today and that of your predecessor.

I would judge maybe that I was in a sociology classroom somewhere where somebody was talking about a movement that occurred way off there in some other civilization. And we are looking at this in a very detached and unemotional and objective way. And that is so very different from a person who was there, who felt deeply the abuse of Black Americans.

I believe you have already indicated or inferred that you believed there had to be other kinds of responses. I am just having a lot of difficulty believing, Mr. Chairman, that we are going to get at the bottom of what happened in Memphis if we get going on this road.

I have no further questions.

Chairman Stokes. Mr. Cabbage, how old are you presently?

Mr. Cabbage. Thirty-four years old.

Chairman Stokes. And you, too, have been unemployed now for 11 years other than the occasions when you get——

Mr. Cabbage. I worked for the War on Poverty for about a month-and-a-half and they heard that we were in the process of organizing Black power. I was fired from that job. I think that was the last time I drew a check.

Chairman Stokes. Give us some idea of the kinds of jobs you have applied for over this 11-year period.

Mr. Cabbage. I have applied for jobs with the CETA program. I have applied for jobs with the county government and the State in Memphis. I have applied for a job with the Urban League in Georgia, the NAACP in Georgia, for nuclear industries in Tennessee. There have been quite a few.

Chairman Stokes. Now you have a degree from Morehouse College?

Mr. Cabbage. Yes, I have, and I have done some graduate work also.

Chairman Stokes. Was that at Morehouse, also?

Mr. Cabbage. Atlanta University.

Chairman Stokes. What is your degree in?

Mr. Cabbage. History and political science.

Chairman Stokes. Are you ever given a reason why you are rejected for employment?
Mr. Cabbage. I never have up to this point, but I assume that—I really don't pursue it. It is almost like I expect it. I have gotten used to it. It happens so often. There seems to be no remedy for it.

Chairman Stokes. I was interested in one of your comments in reply to Mr. Fithian's questions. Maybe another question or two from me along that line may help to clarify what may be in Mr. Fithian's mind.

Would you agree with me that the time of Dr. King's assassination, that Dr. King was encountering around the country, not only in Memphis but in other cities, many young Black youth who were unable to accept the philosophy of nonviolence, who spoke of a society that they believed in no way would accept a nonviolent approach, and many of the young Black youth who were adhering more to the Black power philosophy were unable to accept the nonviolent philosophy being advocated by Dr. King. Would you agree with that?

Mr. Cabbage. Yes.

Chairman Stokes. Many people tend 10 years later to act as though there was no objection to Dr. King. I think maybe they tend to forget that many Black leaders were at that time even attacking Dr. King and that appears to have been forgotten in the context of history.

Mr. Cabbage. I think that we need to make a distinction here that Dr. King, the man, and what he stood for, I think were a symbol that we call could rally around and that he actually had his place, but the tactic of nonviolence itself was what was under attack, not the man.

I had a tremendous amount of respect for Dr. King, but there were situations, you know—it is ridiculous to think about taking 1,000 people and marching them just straight into guns. I mean, this is absolutely suicide. You know, I can see why the nonviolent principle was being questioned.

In 1968, we had Orangeburg where students were fired on and killed; Kent State in 1970; Newark in 1967; Detroit; Watts. I mean, I think that some of these people had a legitimate argument saying how do we deal with these kind of situations in which we see our brothers and sisters dying in the streets, you know. Is nonviolence the only solution that we have? If it is, it is about time we begin exploring new possibilities.

I am not saying what they were or I necessarily advocated those, but I would say I knew at that point something definitely had to be done. I knew Dr. King coming to Memphis at that time was a terrible mistake. I did all that I could to stop it, but I did not succeed.

Chairman Stokes. Another witness earlier today indicated that the time and the conditions in Memphis at that time were ripe for the kind of outbreak of violence that took place in that first march and there was nothing that would have stopped it and not necessarily anything that provoked it. It is just that the times and conditions were ripe for that kind of situation.

Would you agree to that?

Mr. Cabbage. That is right. That is why I tried to get to him. You know, I mean to recognize this and to have him come to the community without knowing what those threats were, for another
individual to feel that and here is another individual in a leadership position almost totally out of contact with the community and making decisions.

I would think a person who had his hand on the leadership of the community would have a better way to see what the conditions are. I think the failure of the leadership at that time to listen to groups of people in the society at Memphis who were actually prepared to deal with the violence issue should have been listened to and they were not.

I am not saying that to say I, myself, was involved in fomenting violence or we were training along that line, but it was like a phobia. Well, I don’t want to call it a phobia because that indicates there was something wrong with it, but it was sweeping the country—I will put it like that—and Memphis was not excluded.

Chairman Stokes. Just one other question: Putting into perspective the feeling that you and many other young Black men had 10 years ago and the anger that is understandable that you would have had at that time which perhaps resulted in a great degree of rhetoric against the kinds of conditions under which Black people were being made to live, I note with interest that notwithstanding the fact that you have been unable to acquire employment anywhere for 11 years, that you have been involved in the political process, and the only employment that you have indicated over this period of 11 years has been your own personal involvement in the political process.

I would assume that perhaps that operates to the advantage of one of the gentlemen who sits on this committee from your city, but put in perspective for me how you feel today in terms of the system and working within the system to change the system.

Mr. Cabbage. I feel that we still have some problems that have to be worked out, but I think that we have the mechanism now to deal with them. I don’t want to comment on how these mechanisms came into being because then, again, we would have to get into a lot of philosophical discussions.

I am a member of the Democratic Party and third vice chairman of the Shepard County Democratic Party. I feel that working within the system at this particular time, I feel that the system can accommodate people that have dissenting views. Like John stated, like our Government is built on that particular statute that we have the right to petition for the relief and that we should try as best we can to bring to the attention of people in power the ills, the wrongs, and other misuses that occur in Government.

I don’t have many negative feelings toward the Government at this particular point. I don’t blame them for what has happened to me because I made my own choices. I knew that I was going to be harassed. I knew I would eventually end up in jail. I knew that I was going to be faced with innumerable problems.

One of the things that hurt me most of all was that my family suffered a lot, but I was prepared to deal with the suffering myself, but somehow I did not include the planning of my family’s suffering in the way that they did. But it took that.

I am just saying that I just hope now that a new attitude exists within the Government that makes the kinds of things that happened back in 1968 unnecessary.
Chairman Stokes. Thank you.
Before I recognize counsel, the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Sawyer.

Mr. Sawyer. While this might not be a very good choice, have you given any thought of going somewhere else other than Memphis because Memphis sounds kind of bad from what I hear about it.

Up in Michigan I am sure nobody would have ever heard your name or Black power. Have you given any thought to that?

Mr. Cabbage. Memphis is my home. My mother, father, sisters, brothers, aunts, and uncles and relatives are there.

Mr. Sawyer. Maybe it is a bad choice, but it is a big world out there.

Mr. Cabbage. It is my home. I have to take it like it is. I can't very well leave it.

Mr. Sawyer. That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ford. Will the chairman yield to me?

Chairman Stokes. I yield to the gentleman from Tennessee on a point of personal privilege.

Mr. Ford. I want Mr. Sawyer to know that even though Mr. Cabbage and Mr. Smith have had a problem in the past trying to find employment, beyond that, Memphis is a good city. I know that we have had leaders in the past who have presented and painted a picture of Memphis that made it appear as not the best city in the South, but it is a good city. I would like to say that I have known Charles Cabbage and his mother and father for the last 20 or 25 years in Memphis; we grew up in the same community. His parents work there with the school, title XX, at the church, in the community and with other community activities.

Hopefully this record here before this committee, and you and Mr. Smith and others testifying as witnesses today before these public hearings, will get back to Memphis and hopefully we will be able to correct this problem in the very near future.

If Mr. Sawyer would send one of those automakers down into the Memphis area, General Motors or Ford Motors, to open up a plant, we would not only create jobs here for Mr. Cabbage and Mr. Smith but we would create jobs for 10,000 or 15,000 Black unemployed people in the city of Memphis.

Mr. Cabbage. Excuse me, Mr. Ford. I would like to indicate for the record that if you were able to do that, I would be glad to work for it.

Mr. Ford. Thank you.

Chairman Stokes. At this time the Chair recognizes Ken McHargh.

Mr. McHargh. Mr. Cabbage, in responding to questions by Congressman Edgar, did you refer to being contacted or having been involved with two Black FBI agents in 1968?

Mr. Cabbage. I didn’t understand the question.

Mr. McHargh. Did you make reference to having contact with two Black FBI agents in Memphis in 1968?

Mr. Cabbage. Yes; these were the two that first appeared at my parent’s home to inform them that I was being sought by the FBI for violating the Selective Service Act.
Mr. MCHARGH. This was subsequent to the assassination of Dr. King?

Mr. CABBAGE. Yes; I think so. I am not exactly sure of my dates because I don't have the information that I need. I have not been able to get it from the committee. I am sure that it is in the files somewhere, the exact dates that they actually came by my house. I am sure the FBI could get the reference.

But they did come by my house looking for me several times. They came to serve a waiver, came by and talked to my parents several times. It is just an ongoing form of subtle intimidation that created a lot of problems. My father had five heart attacks and as a result he has had a coronary bypass in the last 2 years. My mother also is very ill as a result of this. It has not helped very much.

Mr. MCHARGH. Did you in fact sign a waiver so that the committee could obtain copies of your FBI files?

Mr. CABBAGE. Yes, I did sign the waiver.

Mr. MCHARGH. All right. I have nothing further, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman STOKES. Is there anything further from any members of the committee?

Mr. Cabbage, at the conclusion of a witness testimony before this committee either the witness or his counsel may take 5 minutes in order to address the committee, at which time the witness may amplify or explain or comment further upon his testimony.

Under the rules of this committee I would at this time extend to you or your counsel 5 minutes for that purpose.

Mr. KOHN. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Cabbage would like to make a statement to the committee, but first, as a preliminary matter, we feel that Mr. Cabbage has been defamed in a very irresponsible manner by the portion of the film script that has been read into the record.

Under rule 53(C) of the committee rules, we have the right to request the committee to call additional witnesses if we believe that evidence that has been adduced would tend to defame a witness who is testifying.

We would like to request of this committee that it call Abby Mann or the people responsible for writing that film script to determine what their source of information was and whether it was a total fabrication. It is our position that that is exactly what it was.

We feel that by doing so, it might tend to clear Mr. Cabbage for good of the most irresponsible charge that he headed an organization that was paid by the FBI to disrupt the March 28 march.

I have prepared a request in writing to that effect and I would like to present it to the chief counsel.

Chairman STOKES. Let me ask counsel this: Of course, it is true that under section 3.3 of the rules it does say that: "If the committee determines that evidence or testimony at an investigative hearing may tend to defame, degrade, or incriminate persons, it shall," and one of the remedies it says "afford such person an opportunity voluntarily to appear as a witness and (c) dispose or request from such person to secure additional witnesses."
The record referred to, however, was, of course, a documentary that did not take place here in this hearing room but which took place outside of our investigative hearings.

Is it your contention that by referring to just a portion of the documentary that this would necessitate compliance under the rule here?

Mr. Kohn. Mr. Chairman, yes; it is. I believe that whether the evidence introduced before this committee takes the form of counsel reading a statement into the record and before the television cameras or whether it is adduced by live testimony makes no difference in the impact that it has on the person who stands defamed or accused. That is the unfortunate position that Mr. Cabbage finds himself in.

He has been accused through hearsay and through innuendo of a charge by persons whom he has never met and never had any contact with. He has never and will never have an opportunity to respond to these charges. We think it is very important for Mr. Cabbage's sake that this matter be cleared up.

Chairman Stokes. If counsel will follow through, then, with the written request, the Chair and the committee will react to your request. At the present time we will take it under advisement.

Mr. Kohn. Thank you very much.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you.

The Chair now recognizes you, Mr. Cabbage.

Mr. Cabbage. The statement that I have to make is short and it is basically philosophical in nature, just some thoughts that I wanted to relate to the committee.

When the Federal Government does not live up to its responsibility to protect the rights of all its citizens, it opens up a Pandora's box of subterfuge, innuendo, and outright distortion of the real truth. It is in this void that speculators are able to actually formulate and promote lies that tend to muddy the waters and create history based on nonexistent facts and honest, unsubstantiated theories all stated to make the roads of truth more winding.

A very cold trail now exists after 10 years of inaction within these years. It is highly likely that the guilty will remain hidden and obscure while innocent victims are free game to mislead seekers of truth who in their zeal care not who they defame or libel.

It is in such an environment that this investigation has finally gained approval to conduct the business. It is truly unfortunate that in a country such as ours which prides itself on its efficiency and civil liberties that our constant watch words "freedom and justice for all" has been denied the best of us, yes, Presidents and leaders of truly just causes, and these are the best of them, have been denied what all of you take for granted.

How could it have happened and why it happened—I do not know who killed Dr. King, but I do know that each of us as Americans are guilty of not acting at the proper moment to make the life of all men better. After all, that is what Dr. King's ultimate purpose was. Why should he have suffered the supreme sacrifice for trying to help us all.

The sickening aspect of the entire tragedy is the fact that the disease that made it possible that this man lost his right to live is still running rampant in this land. We are getting farther and
farther away from the truth. The individual or individuals, I cannot speak of more simply because I do not know, but on the causes I have very much to say: Hunger, ignorance, poverty, suffering, joblessness, and last but not least, racism and oppression. It is these cases for which I have gone on record as being opposed to.

Thank you, gentlemen, very much.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you, Mr. Cabbage. We appreciate your appearance here and the testimony that you have given to this committee.

Ultimately, we hope that this committee will make the kind of findings that will set the record straight and clear in an unqualified way.

Thank you very much.

There being no further witnesses to come before the committee today, the committee will adjourn until 9 a.m. tomorrow morning.

[Whereupon, at 4:38 p.m. the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 9 a.m., Tuesday, November 21, 1978.]
The select committee met, pursuant to adjournment, at 9:15 a.m. in room 345, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Louis Stokes (chairman of the select committee) presiding.


Also present: G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel and staff director; Kenneth McHargh, staff counsel; and Elizabeth L. Berning, chief clerk.

Chairman STOKES The committee will come to order.

The Chair recognizes Professor Blakey.

Mr. BLAKEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, one of the FBI agents extensively involved with King-related matters in Memphis in 1968 is William Lawrence. Mr. Lawrence was assigned to the Memphis field office as a case agent from 1945 until his retirement in 1970.

During the 1967-68 period Mr. Lawrence was assigned to the security investigation of Dr. King. He also worked closely with Special Agent Howell Lowe in monitoring the activities of the sanitation strike and the Invaders.

Mr. Lawrence provided advice and assistance in the Memphis Police Department on the formation of its intelligence unit. In return, the FBI routinely received the reports of the police departments undercover and informant sources on racial matters.

It would be appropriate at this time, Mr. Chairman, to call Mr. Lawrence.

Chairman STOKES The committee calls Mr. Lawrence.

Sir, would you please stand and raise your right hand and be sworn.

You solemnly swear the testimony you will give before this committee is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. LAWRENCE. I do.

Chairman STOKES Thank you. You may be seated.

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM H. LAWRENCE, FORMER AGENT, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Chairman STOKES The Chair recognizes staff counsel, Mr. William Webb.
Mr. Webb. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Lawrence, will you state your full name, please.

Mr. Lawrence. William H. Lawrence.

Mr. Webb. And you are a retired agent of the FBI, is that correct?

Mr. Lawrence. I am.

Mr. Webb. Will you state your dates of service with the FBI?

Mr. Lawrence. From June of 1941 until December of 1941, and then again from around the fall of 1943 until my retirement in January of 1970.

Mr. Webb. Mr. Lawrence, during your service with the FBI you were assigned to the Memphis office, is that correct?

Mr. Lawrence. That is correct.

Mr. Webb. And will you tell us what dates you served in Memphis?

Mr. Lawrence. I believe I originally went there in December 1945 and remained there until my retirement.

Mr. Webb. Mr. Lawrence, could you pull the microphone a little bit closer to you, please.

Mr. Lawrence. OK.

Mr. Webb. Thank you.

What were the nature of your duties while you were assigned to Memphis?

Mr. Lawrence. They were varied. I investigated criminal matters, applicant matters, civil rights matters, and gradually I assumed more and more duties in the field of internal security, investigating activities such as communism, the Ku Klux Klan.

And then with the advent of the Black nationalist groups, I spent considerable time on what we would call the racial aspects of internal security.

Mr. Webb. So that in 1967 and 1968 were the nature of your duties primarily the security-type matters that you have described?

Mr. Lawrence. That is correct.

Mr. Webb. As part of your duties, were you responsible for the FBI's coverage of the sanitation strike, Invaders, Black Organizing Project and the activities of Dr. King while he was in Memphis?

Mr. Lawrence. Yes, sir, those matters were assigned to me.

Mr. Webb. And is it true that during 1968 you were assisted in security matters by an agent by the name of Howell Lowe?

Mr. Lawrence. That is correct.

Mr. Webb. Sir, will you tell the committee what was the FBI's primary means of covering Dr. King's activities while he was in Memphis?

Mr. Lawrence. Through live sources of information or informants; through information received from the Memphis Police Department and any other law enforcement agencies which might have had information; and through what we would refer to as public source information—citizens who might furnish information or call in, newspaper coverage, things of that nature.

Mr. Webb. Sir, can you tell us what type of information you received from the Memphis Police Department?

Mr. Lawrence. We received information from them concerning the times or the dates, the sizes of proposed marches, the results of the actual march, whether or not there was any violence, or wheth-
er there was any trouble, any information which they may have
developed concerning potential violence in the community which
could be either directly related to or peripherally related to the
strike activity; information that various officers in the department
had developed while on their normal routine patrol duty, and from
the intelligence which they had set up.

Mr. Webb. Sir, did you personally handle the racial informants
who covered both the Invaders and the sanitation strike?

Mr. Lawrence. I did.

Mr. Webb. Can you tell us how many informants you had report-
ing on the activities of the Invaders of the Black Organizing Proj-
et?

Mr. Lawrence. I cannot recall exactly. I would have to guess. It
would probably have been in the neighborhood of four or five. Then
we had other people who we considered confidential sources,
sources of information, who from time to time would furnish infor-
mation. But the primary ones would be in that neighborhood.

Mr. Webb. And did these informants keep you abreast of the
activity, not only of the Invaders and the Black Organizing Project,
but also the sanitation strike?

Mr. Lawrence. That was my understanding.

Mr. Webb. Can you tell us in a general way the type of instruc-
tions you would provide the informants as to the information you
wanted them to acquire?

Mr. Lawrence. That is right. I think I can best explain this by
the analogy of a moving bus, the bus being the organization in
which you are interested. It picks up people at every stop. Some-
times people get off at various stops. Others stay on for the entire
ride.

Our primary purpose was to determine whether or not any group
had or initiated any potential or actual violence. We were interest-
ed in why people became involved, why they left, what motivated
them; furthermore, primarily those who remained in the organiza-
tion and carried out its function, those who took the full ride.

We instructed our informants that we wanted a very objective
view as to what they could determine was happening. We wanted
to know the good as well as the bad.

We had a duty to protect the country as best we could through
finding out those who were potentially or actually dangerous. We
had a concomitant duty to detect and so report those who were
innocently involved as being dupes or through other unconscious
connections which they may have had.

Mr. Webb. And, sir, will you tell us what you would do with the
information you obtained from these informants?

Mr. Lawrence. I recorded it in files almost daily, based on
contemporary notes that I had taken, either in interviewing an
informant in person or receiving telephonic reports.

Mr. Webb. Mr. Lawrence, are you familiar with an FBI acronym,
COINTELPRO?

Mr. Lawrence. Generally. I don’t recall the specific details.

Mr. Webb. And, sir, do you understand it to stand for Counterin-
telligence Program?

Mr. Lawrence. I do.
Mr. Webb. Were you aware of a letter from the Director of the FBI to 22 field offices, including Memphis, dated August 25, 1967, which had targeted the SCLC as part of that counterintelligence program?

Mr. Lawrence. I did not independently recall it, but when you showed it to me previously, I did recall it, yes.

Mr. Webb. Were you also aware of a second COINTELPRO letter that was sent to 44 field offices, including Memphis, which targeted Dr. King in addition to the SCLC?

Mr. Lawrence. Yes, sir.

Mr. Webb. The latter letter required that each field office respond with specific proposals against those individuals and organizations which had been targeted.

Do you recall the Memphis response with respect to Dr. King or the SCLC?

Mr. Lawrence. To the best of my recollection, any response we would have made would have not targeted Dr. King, nor his organization, SCLC, because at that time I do not believe there was a chapter of SCLC in Memphis.

Dr. King, of course, resided and operated out of Atlanta, Ga.

Mr. Webb. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like the document that has been premarked as Martin Luther King exhibit F-459 shown to the witness.

Mr. Chairman, for the record, this is a memorandum from the special agent in charge of the Memphis office to the Director of the FBI dated March 14, 1968. The subject is "The Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist Hate Groups, Racial Intelligence."

Mr. Lawrence, will you take a moment and review the first page of that document, and in particular item Roman numeral II.

Mr. Lawrence. It says——

Mr. Webb. Without reading it, if you would just familiarize yourself with it.

Mr. Lawrence. Yes.

Mr. Webb. Is there any mention of Dr. King or the SCLC in that document?

Mr. Lawrence. There is not.

Mr. Webb. Do you recall whether or not by March 14, 1968, the Memphis office of the FBI was aware that Dr. King would be coming to Memphis on March 18, 1968, for a speaking engagement?

Mr. Lawrence. I don't believe that we knew that at the time.

Mr. Webb. Do you recall today whether or not Dr. King regularly or routinely visited Memphis, Tenn.?

Mr. Lawrence. I have tried to think about that. He may have been there in the early sixties in connection with some of his Baptist church work. I don't recall him ever being there in connection with SCLC work.

I believe that he and some other prominent national civil rights leaders came to Memphis when James Meredith was shot with a shotgun on his march in Mississippi. That would probably have preceded maybe 1965 or 1966, in that area.

Then I don't recall him being there again until his March 1968 appearance.
Mr. Webb. Sir, do you find it unusual with no SCLC chapter in Memphis, and Dr. King not visiting your city regularly, that you would not have responded with programs or proposals directed against his activities?

Mr. Lawrence. There would have been no reason for us to have done so.

Mr. Webb. Mr. Lawrence, are you aware of any FBI counterintelligence activities directed against Dr. King while he was in Memphis during March or April 1968?

Mr. Lawrence. I think I can say with some complete certitude that there were none.

Mr. Webb. You are speaking about activities directed out of the local office?

Mr. Lawrence. That is correct.

Mr. Webb. Sir, prior to Dr. King’s arrival in Memphis, were agents of the FBI physically surveilling the sanitation strike?

Mr. Lawrence. Periodically, but not consistently.

Mr. Webb. When you say periodically——

Mr. Lawrence. There were almost daily marches. We might check a march once or twice a week depending on our workload, or if we had received any information that there might be trouble. There were a few sporadic trouble incidents which preceded the march activity, but it was not a daily consistent coverage.

Mr. Webb. Do you recall whether or not agents of the FBI continued to surveil the strike activities after Dr. King came to Memphis?

Mr. Lawrence. Periodically. For example, I did not personally surveil. I personally have never seen, or never saw, Dr. King. Mr. Lowe may have covered some of the marches.

Mr. Webb. Do you recall why the FBI’s local office ceased for all practical purposes its surveillance of the strike activities?

Mr. Lawrence. Repeat that, please.

Mr. Webb. Do you recall why the FBI’s local office discontinued surveilling sanitation strike activities?

Mr. Lawrence. I would surmise that it was because of the delicate nature of—we did not want to be in a position of showing an undue interest in labor-management relationships. That had always been the policy of the FBI.

We still had a concomitant duty, though, to develop any information which might precipitate violence regardless of where it occurred, whether it be in a union activity, a campus disorder, or whether it involved any activity.

But we did not want to be in a position of showing an undue interest which could be construed as making it appear that we were trying to find out what the union was demanding or what the town was counteroffering, that sort of thing.

Mr. Webb. Mr. Chairman, I would like an FBI document, which has been premarked as Martin Luther King exhibit F–453–A, entered as an exhibit and shown to the witness?

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the record.

[The information follows:]
Reuraitels and letterhead memoranda concerning this matter.

It is noted at the Bureau that in several of the letterhead memoranda submitted in connection with this matter Special Agents of the FBI have observed marches and demonstrations. It is assumed at the Bureau that Agents were at the scene of these demonstrations in connection with other business inasmuch as there has been no authority from the Bureau for Agents to be present observing such activities. It is, of course, necessary that your office maintain sufficient close liaison with law enforcement agencies to be made currently aware of all developments; however, without specific Bureau authority, Agents should not observe demonstrations as a part of intelligence-gathering activity.

NOTE:
In Memphis, Tennessee, Negro sanitation workers have been on strike since early February, 1968. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People is supporting the strikers. There have been a number of marches and demonstrations in connection with this labor dispute. There is no outstanding instructions for Special Agents to observe.
Mr. Webb. Mr. Chairman, for the record it is an airtel from the Director, FBI to the special agent in charge of the Memphis office, dated March 15, 1968, and captioned "Sanitation Workers Strike, Memphis, Tenn., Racial Matters."

Mr. Lawrence, I would like to read you two passages from the document. I am quoting.

Inasmuch as there has been no authority from the bureau for agents to be present observing such activities.

Then the last sentence in the document, without specific bureau authority, agents should not observe demonstrations as part of intelligence-gathering activities.

Mr. Lawrence. Um-hum.

Mr. Webb. Does that refresh your recollection as to why your office stopped its surveillance?

Mr. Lawrence. It does. That would evidently have been the basis for our action. I did not specifically recall that until you showed me this.

Mr. Webb. Mr. Lawrence, can you tell us whether or not the Memphis office of the FBI ever conducted any electronic surveillance of Dr. King during the period of March and April 1968?

Mr. Lawrence. They did not.

Mr. Webb. Did the FBI ever conduct any physical surveillance of Dr. King during that same period?

Mr. Lawrence. I did not, and to the best of my knowledge Mr. Lowe did not.

Mr. Webb. Once again, you and Mr. Lowe worked in fairly close coordination?

Mr. Lawrence. Right.

Mr. Webb. How would you assess the FBI’s intelligence on both the Invaders’ organization and the sanitation strike?

Mr. Lawrence. In retrospect and at the time we felt that we had reasonably good intelligence.

Mr. Webb. And once again, that would have been from your sources, from the police department sources, and from the undercover agent who had infiltrated the Invaders’ organization, as well as public source information.

Mr. Lawrence. That is right. It would be a composite.

Mr. Webb. Mr. Lawrence, do you recall receiving from an FBI source and confirmed by a Memphis Police Department source prior to the beginning of the March 28 march information that there was a potential for violence at that march, and that that potential came from the fact that for the first time in Memphis sticks were going to be used in connection with the placards that the marchers carried?

Mr. Lawrence. Yes, sir, I have a vague recollection of that. They were attaching the placards to I believe it was 2-by-2’s.

Mr. Webb. Sir, you are familiar with an organization that existed in Memphis, that went by the name of COME—Community On the Movement for Equality.

Mr. Lawrence. I am.

Mr. Webb. Were you on speaking terms with a number of the leaders of COME?

Mr. Lawrence. I was.
Mr. Webb. And in fact, you exchanged information with those leaders about your mutual concern for the prevention of violence in connection with their activities, is that not correct?

Mr. Lawrence. That was the purpose of our relationship, yes, sir.

Mr. Webb. Were any steps taken to notify the leaders of this march that you had information from a source you considered reliable and that that information had in fact been confirmed by the Memphis Police Department, that there existed a potential for violence at that march?

Mr. Lawrence. I would have assumed—I do not independently recall—that I probably tried to call Dr. Ralph Jackson at the Clayborn Temple. I believe his offices were there or adjacent there-to.

Whether I reached him or not, I do not know. I told the police department. Of course, the police department told me.

I would have also assumed that the police who were on the scene would probably have discussed this with some of the march leaders. Of course, in retrospect the march leaders, including members of COME, were well aware that they had the sticks.

I had to assume that they had furnished the sticks originally and were well aware that they were being distributed and the placards being attached.

Mr. Webb. But, sir, do you recall that the nature of your information was not simply that sticks would be used, which was fairly common to everyone—

Mr. Lawrence. That is right.

Mr. Webb [continuing]. But that there was a possibility specific groups or individuals would use these sticks in a violent manner?

Mr. Lawrence. That is right. We had no specific information that there would be violence. If someone had given out several hundred bottles of Coca-Cola, for example, the Coca-Cola bottles could have been a potential for violence because they could be used as a weapon or for a purpose for which they were not originally intended.

Mr. Webb. Mr. Lawrence, did you assist the Memphis Police Department in setting up their intelligence activities?

Mr. Lawrence. I did.

Mr. Webb. And can you tell us why they would have sought your assistance in that function?

Mr. Lawrence. I presume it was because I probably knew more about intelligence activities than anyone else in the office at that time, due to my long tenure in Memphis, knowledge of the community, things of that nature.

Mr. Webb. Would this be an indication of the kind of working relationship you had with the Memphis Police Department; that is, helping them establish a new division and exchanging information?

Mr. Lawrence. That is correct.

Mr. Webb. Did you know a Memphis police officer named Marrell McCollough, who had infiltrated the Invader organization?

Mr. Lawrence. I did.

Mr. Webb. And is it true that his reports under either the code name Max or Agent 500 were routinely provided to the Memphis office of the FBI by the Memphis Police Department?
Mr. LAWRENCE. They were.
Mr. WEBB. Do you recall when you learned that Mr. McCullough was in fact Max or Agent 500?
Mr. LAWRENCE. When I first learned of it?
Mr. WEBB. That is correct.
Mr. LAWRENCE. It would have been sometime during this period. I cannot recall the exact date. It was sometime after the sanitation strike started.
Mr. WEBB. Do you recall whether you knew that pre- or post-assassination?
Mr. LAWRENCE. I cannot honestly answer that. It would have been in that time frame, either before or immediately after.
Mr. WEBB. Mr. Lawrence, were you aware at the time of a death threat against Dr. King that was in the nature of a bomb threat called into the airline that had brought him to Memphis, indicating that if he returned his plane would be bombed?
Mr. LAWRENCE. I did not independently recall that. I believe one of the—you folks showed me that. I still don't specifically recall it. I believe it said American Airlines, and I don't believe American Airlines flew from Atlanta to Memphis, but I do not independently recall it.
Mr. WEBB. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like the document premarked as Martin Luther King exhibit F-463 entered into the record and shown to the witness.
Chairman STOKES. Without objection, it may be entered into the record.

[The information follows:]

Radio
Aerial 80-18
Vol. 100-5536

Urgent 4-2-68
To Director, Information Atlanta, From Memphis

Unsub: Threat to American Airlines and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Memphis, Tennessee April 1, 1968; DANV

At approximately 12:55 p.m. April 1, 1968 Mrs. Helen Perkins reservationist, American Airlines, Memphis, Tennessee, received a call from a male individual who spoke in a clear precise emphatic voice. Mrs. Perkins judged him to be middle aged and a white man and heard no background noises. The man asked "is this the American Airlines office?" Mrs. Perkins replied yes. The man said "your airlines brought Martin Luther King, Jr. into Memphis and when he comes in again a bomb will go off and he will be assassinated." Mrs. Perkins said the individual hung up immediately and she was under the impression the call was a local one.

Memphis Police Department Shelby County, South Hundred Eleventh MI. Secret Service, and FAA advised.

TOR 1:00 PM JH

MLK EXHIBIT F-463

Mr. WEBB. Mr. Chairman, this is a verbatim copy of an FBI radiogram sent urgent, April 2, 1968 to the Director, "Information
Atlanta, From Memphis,” and it concerns the bomb threat against the plane that was to carry Dr. King back.

Mr. Lawrence, does this refresh your recollection with respect to the nature of the threat and the time at which it was received?

Mr. LAWRENCE. It states at approximately 12:55 p.m. April 1, 1968—do you want me to read the rest of it?

Mr. Webb. Does this refresh your recollection about the threat?

Mr. LAWRENCE. Right.

Mr. Webb. Do you know or recall whether or not you were aware of it at the time?

Mr. LAWRENCE. I do not recall receiving the call. I do not recall seeing this communication. I could have, but I do not recall it.

Mr. Webb. Were your duties such that this would be the type of thing that would have been brought to your attention at the time?

Mr. LAWRENCE. Normally it should have been routed to me if someone in the chief clerk’s office, or the desk that handled it, would have recognized or realized my interest in the subject matter.

Mr. Webb. Sir, after that information had been received in your office—

Mr. LAWRENCE. Right.

Mr. Webb [continuing]. Who would have been responsible for preparing the radio message that went out to Atlanta and the Director?

Mr. LAWRENCE. The agent who received the information or who received the complaint from the airline office.

Mr. Webb. Would it have been a normal practice to notify Dr. King about a death threat against his life?

Mr. LAWRENCE. We would not in Memphis because he resided in—I believe he was residing in Atlanta at that time. We, according to the communication—we sent this information to the FBI headquarters here in Washington, and to Atlanta. What they did with it I have no way of knowing.

Mr. Webb. For the record, the information as appears on the bottom of the document, was also sent to the Memphis Police Department, Military Intelligence, the Secret Service, and the FAA, is that correct?

Mr. LAWRENCE. That is right. It says that they were all advised.

Mr. Webb. In retrospect, do you think it might not have been wise to have alerted the person against whom the threat was made, whether or not you had responsibility for doing that or not?

Mr. LAWRENCE. Normally if we received information from another office that some individual, a possible threat had been made against them, if we knew the person we would probably as a matter of interest in his welfare, as well as common courtesy, would have told him.

If we did not know the person, we would convey that to the police department or sheriff’s office who had jurisdiction over the territory in which he resided, and they would advise him because they would be primarily responsible for his security and welfare.

We did not have that authority under the guidelines under which the FBI operated.
Mr. Webb. Aside from the threat we have just been discussing, were you aware of any other threats against Dr. King's life, either during his first trip or second trip to Memphis?

Mr. Lawrence. I do not recall any.

Mr. Webb. Mr. Chairman, I would like an FBI document which has been premarked as Martin Luther King exhibit F-452I entered into the record and shown to the witness.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the record.

[The information follows:]

FBI
Date: 4/10/63

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are 11 copies of a letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above. One copy of this LEM is being furnished Atlanta.

Copies are being furnished to the United States Attorney and U. S. Secret Service, Memphis, and to Regional Offices of Military Intelligence.

Special Agents of the FBI who observed activities of this march were as follows: Vincent H. Lawless, Richard H. Brandt, Joe W. Phillips, Keranill H. Mc Cloudman, James J. Stanto, Francis B. Cole, Howard D. Trayn, Charles L. Lloy, William N. Philong, Thomas L. Eakly, Faird W. Shatt, Melvin B. Le Gray, Eugene G. Douglass, Franklun L. Johnson, O. James Holbrook, Edward M. Quinn, Kenneth A. Williams, and Eugene A. Reddick, Jr., and O. James W. Brambly.

MLK Exhibit F-452I
Mr. Webb. Mr. Chairman, for the record it is an airtel from the special agent in charge of the Memphis office to the Director, dated April 10, 1968.

Mr. Lawrence, I would like to direct your attention to the bottom portion and the section that reads "Special agents of the FBI who observed activities of this march were as follows:" In the second line of names there is an individual M-e-r-r-i-1-1 M-c-C-l-o-u-g-a-n. Were you familiar with a special agent of the FBI by that name?

Mr. Lawrence. Yes, sir. He was assigned to the Memphis office during the last few years of my service there.

Mr. Webb. And was that individual Black or white?

Mr. Lawrence. He was white.

Mr. Webb. You also indicated earlier you knew a Marrell McCol­lough.

Mr. Lawrence. Right.

Mr. Webb. Do you recall whether he was Black or white?

Mr. Lawrence. He was Black.

Mr. Webb. So that these two individuals would not in fact be the same person, is that correct?

Mr. Lawrence. That would be correct.

Mr. Webb. Mr. Lawrence, do you recall whether or not you had informant information or coverage of a meeting which took place between Dr. King and three members of the Invaders at the River­mont Hotel on March 29, 1968? That would have been the day after the march was disrupted.

Mr. Lawrence. Yes, I received information about that meeting.

Mr. Webb. And would that have been live informant or source information you received?

Mr. Lawrence. Yes, sir.

Mr. Webb. Mr. Chairman, as Professor Blakey had noted earlier in his narration, one issue the committee is examining in connec­tion with the question of FBI complicity in the assassination is the possible use of FBI informants who were associated with the Invader organization to provoke the violence which occurred on March 28, 1968.

The next series of questions to Mr. Lawrence are designed to explore the relationship between Mr. Lawrence, the FBI, and a Memphis security informant who provided information on racial matters generally and the Invaders in particular.

Pursuant to an agreement between the committee and the Attor­ney General, the committee was allowed to review the headquarters and field office files for this individual. These files were duly excised in the first instance to protect the identify of the inform­ant.

After reviewing the files, the committee requested that the FBI make this individual available for an interview with the staff. The informant was faced with that question.

He agreed to submit to an interview and to permit the disclosure of his name to the chairman of the full committee, the chairman of the King subcommittee, Mr. Fauntroy, and the ranking minority member of the full committee, Mr. Devine.

Prior to testifying this morning, Mr. Lawrence was apprised of this matter. I indicated to him the name of the person we were going to be talking about.
At the same time Mr. Lawrence was given two documents which purport to represent information supplied to him by that informant.

Mr. Lawrence, have you had a chance to review those documents?

Mr. Lawrence. Yes, sir.

Mr. Webb. And is it correct that you and I have discussed the name of a person known to you as having been a security informant that you were responsible for instructing and receiving information from?

Mr. Lawrence. That is correct.

Mr. Webb. Further, did I indicate to you with respect to those documents the number of the source that we were going to be talking about this morning?

Mr. Lawrence. That is correct.

Mr. Webb. Have you had a chance to thoroughly review the pages I identified to you as containing information from that source?

Mr. Lawrence. Well, not thoroughly. I read them through once, and I believe I generally am familiar with the information contained therein, yes, sir.

Mr. Webb. Mr. Lawrence, is there any doubt in your mind today that that information which you attributed to that source in 1968 did in fact come from that source?

Mr. Lawrence. There is no doubt in my mind. It would have been information which I contemporaneously recorded and dictated, in this case, probably within the day or day after I received the information.

Mr. Webb. Aside from your normal practice of doing that, sir, do you recall today, do you have an independent recollection today that that information was in fact provided by that source?

Mr. Lawrence. If I attributed it to that source, it would have been provided by that source.

Mr. Webb. Do I understand your answer to mean that today, aside from the fact that you indicated on the document that it came from that source, you have no independent recollection that he in fact provided you that information?

Mr. Lawrence. I recall that he provided me information of this nature. Now, the exact words—I cannot recall the exact words, but of subject matter.

Mr. Webb. Do you recall him providing you information on that subject matter?

Mr. Lawrence. The subject matter.

Mr. Webb. You have described or began to describe a process by which you would have contemporaneously recorded that information.

Is there any likelihood that in your working with a variety of sources you could have attributed information to that source that came from a different person?

Mr. Lawrence. We are all, of course, subject to human frailties. It is humanly possible, but it is not likely.

Mr. Webb. Mr. Lawrence, did you ever give any instructions to that source—that is, on the type of information you wanted collected, where you would want him to be—any instructions whatsoever?
Mr. Lawrence. Yes; I did.

Mr. Webb. And can you tell us the type of instructions you would have provided to that source?

Mr. Lawrence. Once I learned that the source had the ability and the opportunity to be with the group or the target group under investigation, I naturally encouraged the source to spend as much time as the source could logically spend.

I would have instructed him as to the type information that we were seeking, those who actually might be speaking or urging violence or stimulating violence.

Also, I would have instructed him to furnish good information as well as what we would call bad—any exonerating information which may have developed; to learn the identities, the background of these people and be particularly aware for any interlocking connections which they might have with other groups; and to keep us currently apprised as to the information which this source had been able to develop as the source knew it.

We also emphasized that we wanted facts which the source had either seen or heard personally. If the source were to furnish conjecture, opinion, or speculation, then naturally we would take that.

But, we wanted the source to differentiate and explicitly point out that this is conjecture, this is supposition, or this is opinion, as contrasted from the actual facts.

Mr. Webb. Sir, would you have asked any of your sources to attend the meeting or the march on March 28, 1968?

Mr. Lawrence. I in all probability did ask them if they possibly could do so, if their work or living conditions permitted, to be present at the march.

Mr. Webb. Do you recall today whether or not you had asked the source we have been discussing to see if he could attend that march?

Mr. Lawrence. I don’t independently recall it, but I probably did.

Mr. Webb. How often in the course of a month during which there was a high level of activity in the sanitation strike would you have given instructions to your source either identifying people to him you wanted information about, or activities you wanted him to find out about?

Mr. Lawrence. Oh, during this period, the source about whom we are discussing, I probably would have been in almost daily contact with this source, or maybe sometimes two or three times a week at least.

Mr. Webb. How would that contact occur? Would you call him to give him your requirements and then call him later to find out what information he had obtained? Would that source have called you and said, ‘I have just learned this’? How would that relationship have worked?

Mr. Lawrence. I would call him if I had occasion to alert him to something. Otherwise, I would hope that he would call me, which he frequently did.

Then periodically we would meet in person under what we hoped were safe conditions, to personally exchange information, go over descriptions, any photographs, things of that nature.
Mr. Webb. Do you recall whether or not after the assassination you asked this source to be alert for any information concerning Dr. King's death?

Mr. Lawrence. I did.

Mr. Webb. And can you tell us why you would have done that?

Mr. Lawrence. At the time that Dr. King was assassinated, we had no idea as to the identity of the assassin. The FBI, of course, instituted a massive investigation in conjunction with the Memphis Police Department. I did some work on the assassination itself.

My primary work was to contact as many people in Memphis, whether they were informants, sources of information, citizens who may have known Dr. King or his movement, to ask them and seek their cooperation in furnishing any information which might furnish leads which would lead to the identity and apprehension of the person responsible for Dr. King's death.

Mr. Webb. Do you recall that as part of that murder investigation, FBI headquarters had directed the field to contact all their security informants and ask them to provide this type of information?

Mr. Lawrence. Right. That would be a normal investigative procedure.

Mr. Webb. Thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions at this time.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you, counsel.

The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Sawyer, for such time as he may consume.

Mr. Sawyer. I wonder, Mr. Witness, did you or any member of your office to your knowledge ask the Memphis Police Department to conduct surveillance on the Invader group?

Mr. Lawrence. I didn't understand the first part of your question, sir.

Mr. Sawyer. Did you or any member of your office ask the Memphis Police Department to conduct surveillance on the Invader group?

Mr. Lawrence. I don't recall that we specifically asked them to. I am sure the suggestion came up. They probably did it independently. They were as interested in the Invaders as we were.

So in this sense it would probably have been a joint interest—and a joint investigation. We were sharing information as we developed it on almost a daily basis.

Mr. Sawyer. Did you, at the Memphis office, normally use or routinely use electronic surveillance of any kind?

Mr. Lawrence. In my 25 years in Memphis we never used an electronic surveillance, unless—I believe I heard that there was one used in the Hoffa investigation.

But if I recall right, that would have been a tape recorder that one of the witnesses wore. I am not conversant with the details of that. In Memphis proper I can say that no electronic surveillances were utilized.

No; I take that back. When the late E. H. Crump received an extortion threat, right after I went to Memphis, they put a telephone tap, with his knowledge, with his family's knowledge—as a matter of fact at his request—to receive any information that might have been received to him concerning any possible payoff.
I wouldn’t consider that a technical surveillance in a covert nature. This was done with his knowledge and at his request.

Mr. Sawyer. I understand that the Memphis office did not have Reverend Dr. King under surveillance, under physical surveillance. Would that be unusual for you not to have him under physical surveillance?

Mr. Lawrence. No, it wouldn’t.

Mr. Sawyer. On this COINTEL program, or the so-called countereintelligence program that was conducted in some instances rather vigorously against King, did the Memphis office engage in any of this COINTEL program?

Mr. Lawrence. I did not. I don’t recall whether anyone else did or not. We may have had some programs directed at the Ku Klux Klan, but I was not investigating the Ku Klux Klan at that time.

Mr. Sawyer. Had you received no instructions about implementing a COINTEL program with respect to King?

Mr. Lawrence. We received the instructions, which I have since read, which included him. We did not institute any action, nor did we recommend any action. We had no SCLC group in our area.

He had not been in our area, I guess, for at least 2 years, and that was only for a day or two, when he came to see James Meredith at John Gaston Hospital. I am not aware he was there at any other time, so there would have been no reason to.

Mr. Sawyer. Now, I understand you used informants occasionally out of the Memphis office.

Mr. Lawrence. Yes, sir. The informants were the lifeblood of any investigative agency, particularly in intelligence or organized crime field, yes, sir.

Mr. Sawyer. How do you instruct them with respect to this kind of nice distinction between observing and informing and participating in whatever is going on? Did you give them any specific instructions or guidelines on that?

Mr. Lawrence. You very definitely do, sir. It is a very delicate balance that one has to constantly strive for. Naturally you want any inculpatory information concerning the target area, but also you have a concomitant duty to develop exculpatory information concerning the same people, so that the record can speak and will be there forever.

You always have the danger of the informant participating too extensively to where he or she might be asked to participate in some activity which might prove to be illegal.

You tell them there that you cannot condone any illegal activity on their part. If they are under coercion or duress, which the criminal law recognizes under our substantive criminal law system, naturally they would have to, just as any citizen would if he or she were coerced or duressed.

Naturally you tell them if they can, without exposing their informant status, to, through their persuasion, through their ability to converse, to attempt to dissuade their associates from violence, if they can possibly do so. Otherwise be as passive as they can.

It is a very delicate problem. It is a very difficult problem.

Mr. Sawyer. How do you handle it if a very valuable source of information ends up as a participant in something that amounts to criminality? What do you do in that case?
Mr. Lawrence. Well, of course, that is an abstract question. All I can do is give an abstract answer. You tell the informant in advance that if he or she engages in criminal activity, that they are probably going to have to answer for it.

You have no control over them. They are not a paid employee. There is not an agency relationship as we look at it under the law. They are volunteers, they are citizens who live their own lives, but who through various motivations—in this case were mostly patriotic motivations—were willing to be the eyes and ears of the Federal Government.

It is a difficult proposition.

Mr. Sawyer. Don’t you pay them at all, these informants?

Mr. Lawrence. Some you do, some you don’t, depending on the amount of time they spend, the position that they hold, the expenses that they incur in order to carry out the function that they are performing.

Mr. Sawyer. Do you ever abstain from invoking prosecution on any of these informants, as a kind of an inducement to become an informer, on something that you could charge them with?

Mr. Lawrence. I have never done that in my life. That may be done in some of the criminal investigations through the country. I am not personally aware of it.

Mr. Sawyer. Did you make any effort to have your informants following the assassination see if they could develop any information on it?

Mr. Lawrence. I definitely did. I probably spent the next month, day in, day out, contacting everyone that I had ever known who might be in a position to develop any information or furnish us any lead information.

Mr. Sawyer. Now, as I am sure you are aware, there has been speculation by various writers and “assassinologists,” as we have come to call some of them, that the FBI had some involvement in the killing of Dr. Martin Luther King.

Have you any knowledge of any FBI involvement whatsoever in the King situation?

Mr. Lawrence. I can only answer that by personally reading or hearing information like that with a sense of moral outrage. Why people will make such statements, I cannot understand.

There are many weird individuals in this world. I realize that you have conspiracy buffs, people who have conspiracy theories. People still conjecture over whether John Wilkes Booth actually killed Abraham Lincoln.

There are people who do not believe that Jesus Christ was actually crucified, or have different conceptions than we have learned through our Christian teachings. You will always have that.

Naturally, one resents it. But this is a free country and people have the right to think and say what they want. I wish they wouldn’t be so irresponsible, but I cannot control that.

Mr. Sawyer. Are you acquainted with a gentleman named Merrill McCloughan in the Memphis office?

Mr. Lawrence. Yes, sir; I believe that is the gentleman Mr. Webb asked me about. I knew him for several years. He came in during the latter period of my career.

Mr. Sawyer. Was he Black or white?
Mr. LAWRENCE. He was white.

Mr. SAWYER. Now, are you satisfied from your vantage point in the Memphis office that the FBI did everything reasonably within its power in that area to identify any and all people that might have been connected with the assassination of Dr. King?

Mr. LAWRENCE. I certainly am. I think that is probably one of the seven or eight most intensive investigations to my knowledge ever conducted by the FBI. We pursued every conceivable theory as well as including the conspiracy theory, and I am satisfied—although I did not run the investigation, I did some work on it and generally, naturally was very much interested in it—and I am satisfied that under the time and the circumstances of what was known to people in this United States at that time, not now in 1978 but what was known in 1968 and in 1969, that it was conducted as thoroughly and fairly and intensively as any investigation could be conducted as desired by the American people. Mr. SAWYER. I assume you are aware of the fact that we have received or heard some testimony to the effect that once Ray was identified that the entire investigation shut down and in effect came to a halt. Is that true?

Mr. LAWRENCE. I would have retired about that time, sir. I cannot answer that question. No; normally, no investigation of that type has or is ever completely closed. You are always willing to receive or seeking to receive any information that might throw any additional light on it, but I am not privy as to what policy was followed after his conviction.

Mr. SAWYER. You are also aware, I presume, that we have heard testimony to the effect that the FBI was so structurally racially biased that—

Mr. LAWRENCE. Right.

Mr. SAWYER [continuing]. That it was unable to, in effect, function effectively, at least in the investigation of the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King.

Do you have any comment on that?

Mr. LAWRENCE. That's right. I categorically deny that and it would have to, at the risk of being pious, quote the words of Peter when he was being stoned, "Forgive them, Lord, for they know not what they are doing."

I heard testimony last Friday morning. I was shocked to hear that testimony from a former agent whose career from a time span paralleled my own. We both retired about the same time. I did not know the gentleman. He was assigned to a southern office, I believe he said, for 10 years. I was assigned to the southern office for 25 years and had worked in Charlotte, N.C., prior to that. So I spent the bulk of my career working in the South.

I have never known of any pattern of racial bias. I sought Black employees. I went to all of the Negro leaders in Memphis seeking qualified Black employees. Many were hired. I heard what the gentleman said. I believe he mentioned a Mr. Ponder, a Roy Moore, and a James Adams, who I believe is Associate Director of the FBI. I know those men. I did not know them well.

It was in complete disbelief that any individual could make the statements that he made about those men, though those were not that type men, and I would hope in fairness—and I am not trying
to get on a soap box but I am sincere about this—I would hope in fairness that this committee would have the time—I know you are under a time limit—to call these men and let them defend themselves and to answer the scurrilous charges that were made against them.

I certainly did not see the FBI as this gentleman did. When I heard his testimony it was as though I were reading George Orwell's 1984, where history is being completely rewritten. As a matter of fact, I am not here to defend any person; I am not here to attack any person. But there are or have been a lot of illusions made as to the certain statements or actions by Mr. Hoover.

Before coming up here I happened to get hold of a copy of the Senate Intelligence Committee report in 1976, where they investigated intelligence activities in the United States. They were quite critical of the FBI, which they had a right to do. I didn't agree with all of their findings, but they had the right to do that. But it is most significant, I think, and I would like to read this into the record, as to the position that Mr. Hoover took.

He has been accused—he's dead and cannot defend himself—of having a personal vendetta against the late Dr. Martin Luther King. Unfortunately, Dr. King is dead, and I would say let both of them rest in peace. But I would like to say this to show Mr. Hoover did have a concern about the Black people and about the civil rights movement, and I allude specifically to a memorandum that he wrote.

This is reported in the Senate committee on June 17, 1963; this was at the time that the Attorney General Robert Kennedy and President Kennedy were concerned about two advisers of Dr. King who allegedly had Communist connections:

The Attorney General called and advised that he would like to have Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall talk to Martin Luther King and tell Dr. King he has to get rid of advisors A and B, that he should not have any contact with them directly or indirectly.

I [referring to Mr. Hoover] pointed out that if Dr. King continues this association he is going to hurt his own cause as there are more and more Communists trying to take advantage of the movement [referring to the civil rights movement] and bigots down South who are against integration are beginning to charge Dr. King is tied in with the Communists.

I stated I thought Marshall could very definitely say this association is rather widely known and with things crystalizing for them now, nothing could be worse than for Dr. King to be associated with them.

I realize that any letter or memorandum or utterance can be given different interpretations by different people, but I would interpret that as showing that Mr. Hoover was concerned not only for Dr. King's future in that regard but also for the civil rights movement.

And the other groups—the NAACP for years, going back into the 1940's and the early 1950's—were very much concerned about efforts of the Communists to infiltrate or exploit their movements. So we were all concerned about this. So I would just like to make that point, and I appreciate your giving me the opportunity, sir.

Mr. Sawyer. Thank you.

I have nothing further, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. Lawrence, I would take it then that your testimony here is that you dispute the statement that the King investigation by the FBI was essentially a fugitive investigation; do you dispute that statement?

Mr. Lawrence. I am not an expert on criminal investigations, Mr. Stokes, but in a broad sense it was a fugitive investigation, but in any fugitive investigation you naturally have to bear those in mind of a conspiracy or one having aides and abettors, aiders and abettors or accessories either before or after the fact. You always consider those possibilities.

Chairman Stokes. Are you aware of any conspiracy leads that were followed out by the FBI in the investigation of the King assassination?

Mr. Lawrence. I remember I was probably overly security conscious. We at the outset, when the registration card was found where the name Eric Starvo Galt was found, that Lowe and I and Mr. Jensen, the agent in charge, considered very strongly the possibility that this assassination had been the operation of an illegal agent from either Russia or one of the satellite nations.

It followed the exact pattern. Then as it began to unwind, here's a man who was living more or less as a loner. We still did not know his true identity at that time, buying a secondhand car, living in cheap rooming houses, following the classic pattern of an illegal agent who had been sent to this country. We considered the possibility at that time as to who would have capitalized or gained the most from the death of a national leader of the stature of Martin Luther King, namely the Communists.

At that time this country was divided over its opposition and support of the Vietnam War. We had had racial violence, unheard of since the Civil War, in Detroit and Newark the year before. So we considered all those possibilities. Then it turned out later that it was, of course, James Earl Ray. That shot that theory full of holes. I am sure there were other conspiracy theories conceived.

I think your committee has already developed information on that, but I am not privy of all of it. Yes, sir, we did. And, as a matter of fact, I was reading just the other day that the Justice Department, which did an extensive investigation and came up with, I believe, a 149-page report, alluded to the fact that the FBI had looked into many conspiracy theories.

I am sorry I cannot answer your question more specifically. Chairman Stokes. Well, I want us to try and clear the record in terms of your reply to Mr. Sawyer about the thoroughness of this investigation. We have on the record the statement by Mr. Murtaugh of the Atlanta field office, who stated to this committee that the investigation of the King assassination by the FBI was essentially a fugitive investigation. And within 24 hours the Bureau had concluded that the assassination was conducted by one man and that no conspiracy was pursued.

You appear to be trying to say something differently. If you are saying something differently, I want you for the record to tell us what conspiracy leads were followed by the FBI.

Mr. Lawrence. There is one other that I can think of, and I cannot answer this question. I would respectfully request that you interview the agents who not only supervised the King investiga-
tion but played such a prominent part in it. We investigated, for example, I remember I covered leads on this, on the Raoul—if that is the correct pronunciation—conspiracy theory. Many, many leads were followed on that, and they were vanished into thin air.

That would be another example, but bear in mind I did not have the assassination case assigned to me. I covered leads on it, so I cannot answer conclusively, but I can point out those two illustrations as examples.

Chairman Stokes. Well, on what then do you base your statement about the thoroughness of the investigation?

Mr. Lawrence. My general knowledge—I was working right there in Memphis. I saw the amount of time, the thousands of man hours put in it, the tremendous, voluminousness of the file, the fact that probably as many leads and hours were put into it as were put into probably any other 8 or 10 major investigations that the FBI had ever conducted. That would be my basis.

Chairman Stokes. Let me ask you another question:

You have mentioned your concern about having Black employees in the office.

Mr. Lawrence. Right.

Chairman Stokes. Your own instrumentality in that. Were there any Black FBI agents in that office?

Mr. Lawrence. Not at that time.

Chairman Stokes. Did you ever request any to be assigned to that office?

Mr. Lawrence. We made quite a few efforts. Odell Horton, formerly the Assistant U.S. Attorney in Memphis, and later president of Le Moyne College, a Black man, he and I and Special Agent Hugh Kearney, with whom I used to work, spent many hours trying to find young qualified Black men.

I remember I had Otis Higgs, who had become a judge in Memphis, I have lost track of Mr. Higgs now, was all prepared to go and finally decided he didn’t want to leave Memphis.

There was another man I believe by the name of Robinson who was a ROTC instructor at one of the high schools. We had many lined up to go. He finally decided that he didn’t want to leave Memphis. So we were making a very concerted effort. These were just personal recollections. The files would be replete with hundreds and hundreds of other instances, so that is the reason I have to take respectful exception with the statement made last Friday, yes, sir.

Chairman Stokes. Well, in terms of your requesting that any Black agents already in the FBI be assigned to the Memphis office, did you ever request that?

Mr. Lawrence. I was merely an underling. I was a street agent. I never held a supervisory position, so I cannot answer that question. Such a request would have been made by the special agent in charge. And we had many during my career in Memphis.

Chairman Stokes. How about other personnel for the office? Did you get other administrative personnel, Black personnel for that office?

Mr. Lawrence. Yes, sir. One of the finest stenographers we had was a young Black lady who was recruited right there in Memphis,
Shelby County. As far as I know she is still there, but I have lost track. I have not been back there in 7 years.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you.

The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Preyer.

Mr. Preyer. No questions, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Devine.

Mr. Devine. Just one question, Mr. Lawrence.

What was your origin when you went into the Bureau; what was your residence at that time? Were you a southern person?

Mr. Lawrence. No, sir; I was born and raised in Marietta, Ohio, in southern Ohio, on the Ohio River, and spent my young life in Ohio and also across the river in West Virginia, but most of my life was in Marietta.

Mr. Devine. Then Mr. Murtaugh's suggestion that only southern agents were sent to the South was not correct, is that right?

Mr. Lawrence. No, sir. I would say the bulk of the agents in the southern offices, and I visited several during my career, would have been northern-born agents. Many of the southern-born agents were working in New York and Washington and Los Angeles, and there was a policy that over a period of time, conditions permitting, resignations and retirements, that they would gradually try to move a person back closer to his home, if that is where he wanted to go.

Mr. Devine. My question is, was it the policy of the Bureau to send only southern agents to southern offices?

Mr. Lawrence. Very definitely not.

Mr. Devine. Thank you, Mr. Lawrence.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from the District of Columbia, Mr. Fauntroy.

Mr. Fauntroy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Lawrence, I would like to have you expand upon several questions that you have already answered but which are not satisfactory to me.

In the first instance you state that you know that the FBI conducted a thorough investigation into conspiracy and followed many leads. But in the first instance, were you requested to follow any specific conspiracy lead?

Mr. Lawrence. That would have been part of my overall investigation. Whether someone specifically said conspiracy I do not recall. But any experienced investigator has to consider that a possibility where he has an unsolved case on his hands.

Mr. Fauntroy. All right.

You suggested that the FBI pursued possible involvement of the Communists in the assassination of Dr. King.

Mr. Lawrence. Any group that could have.

Mr. Fauntroy. Did you specifically follow any such lead?

Mr. Lawrence. Well, we did up until the point when we finally identified James Earl Ray, and the other things began to fall into place.

Mr. Fauntroy. How do you look for Communist involvement in an assassination like this? What kinds of leads were there that you followed or that you heard other agents in the office followed?

Mr. Lawrence. Could you please either repeat that question or rephrase it? I am sorry, I don't fully understand it.
Mr. FAUNTRY. Give me an example of pursuing a conspiracy that would involve Communists——

Mr. LAWRENCE. Well——

Mr. FAUNTRY [continuing]. In the death of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. When you say they pursued, your recollection is that we pursued what line of thinking?

Mr. LAWRENCE. Right.

Mr. FAUNTRY. How did you do that?

Mr. LAWRENCE. I don't recall what other officers did. I remember that we sat down and came up with about 17 or 18 points which would indicate that this was a possibility based on what we originally knew.

Mr. FAUNTRY. Give me a couple of those points.

Mr. LAWRENCE. A couple of points: Well, that he was using a northern European name; he was a white male; he was living in roominghouses as a loner; he was living very frugally and parsimoniously, being nondescript, things of that nature, which your illegal agents have normally followed in this country, the few that have been unearthed.

Mr. FAUNTRY. You mentioned the Raoul question.

Mr. LAWRENCE. Right.

Mr. FAUNTRY. Do you recall when that first came to your attention?

Mr. LAWRENCE. Oh, it would have been shortly after Ray's arrest and return to Memphis. I think I recalled, I received one or two leads in that connection, sent out communications to other offices, possibly Los Angeles or New Orleans, I do not recall the specifics. But that aspect was gone into; I remember that.

Mr. FAUNTRY. I recall also that you indicated you weren't too familiar with the COINTEL program.

Mr. LAWRENCE. That's correct.

Mr. FAUNTRY. And you were not aware of the extensive surveillance, electronic and otherwise, that was applied to Dr. King across the Nation as well as in the Atlanta office where Mr. Murtaugh worked?

Mr. LAWRENCE. Right.

I had no knowledge of that and, as a matter of fact, most of the knowledge I received was when I read this report put out by the Senate. That is where the bulk of my information emanated.

Mr. FAUNTRY. As you know, one of the things that puzzles this Congressman and the American people, I think, is the fact that we know that extensive surveillance was applied to Dr. King in this period by the FBI wherever he went. We find it difficult to understand why that surveillance, if it happened in Memphis, was not known to you, and difficult to understand why such surveillance was not, by your testimony, not in fact applied.

Mr. LAWRENCE. Right.

Mr. FAUNTRY. You understand that problem that we have?

Mr. LAWRENCE. I can well understand that and I can appreciate your concern, yes, sir.

Mr. FAUNTRY. You, in response to the question why the surveillance of the demonstrations, for example, was not allowed, were refreshed by memo, which memo does not explain to me satisfactorily why it was not allowed.
I wonder if you would care to try to expand on that.

Mr. Lawrence. I think the original memo that counsel showed to me was where they didn't want agents such as myself physically monitoring the marches, and it was not directed at overall intelligence activities per se. That is the way I interpreted it.

Mr. Fauntroy. We are referencing here Martin Luther King exhibit F-453A, which is the memo from the Director to the SAC office.

Mr. Lawrence. Yes.

Mr. Fauntroy. And again, your recollection of a reason that the surveillance would not be allowed seems to be better than what is written here. You said in response to the question that the FBI did not want to be involved in any labor-management.

Mr. Lawrence. Right.

Mr. Fauntroy [continuing]. Controversy. That doesn't appear in this memo from the Director as the reason.

Mr. Lawrence. That's right.

Mr. Fauntroy. You should not—

Mr. Lawrence. That's only a conjecture on my part. I have no way of knowing who in Washington wrote it, I have no way of knowing what motivated them to write it or what their mental process was at the time they wrote it. That was an assumption on my part, the way I interpreted it, yes, sir.

Mr. Fauntroy. Inasmuch as you were not aware of COINTEL operations and were not aware apparently of the memo from the Director to SAC offices throughout the country, including your own SAC office, is it your opinion that COINTEL operations could have been at work in Memphis and you as a security officer not know about it?

Mr. Lawrence. It would have been virtually impossible, the office was too small, the other people were not aware of the work that I was doing, and I would have to say, like Ivory Soap, it would be 99⅔ percent, but I would say even 100 percent certainty that it did not take place.

Mr. Fauntroy. You mention SCLC was not located in Memphis.

Mr. Lawrence. That's right.

Mr. Fauntroy. SNCC was?

Mr. Lawrence. Right.

Mr. Fauntroy. Were you given any COINTELPRO instructions with respect to SNCC?

Mr. Lawrence. They were one of the target groups mentioned in the letter, I believe it was written early in March. We did not institute any actions, to my recollection, under the counterintelligence program against any of these organizations.

Why we did not do so I think I can answer. The purpose was to deter as well as confuse organizations. We felt that we had sufficient intelligence coverage, informant coverage, cooperation of the police, concern of many leading citizens in the community, among both the Black and white race, because you have to bear in mind that a great majority of the Black people in Memphis were just as concerned about the potential violence as were the great majority of the white people.

We were all mutually concerned about this. We felt that we had sufficient coverage that we did not need to use counterintelligence
purposes. I would categorize one counterintelligence purpose a very legitimate and a very wholesome and a very worthwhile one is to, if you had good informant coverage, then if the agent or the investigator will interview a lot of these people, let them know what the Government's interest is, what the laws are, and philosophize with them, that in many instances you are able to deter them from committing extraneous or extreme acts which might otherwise occur.

To me that is the best counterintelligence that any agency can ever have, a hard, firm, but fair investigation.

Mr. FAUNTROY. I have two final questions:

One, how much did you pay your informants generally and specifically the informant to which we had reference earlier?

Mr. LAWRENCE. It would vary. None of them were ever paid any great amount of money. I would say that none of them were ever paid more than the minimum wage. You know, I have argued about that, that many of them were underpaid when you considered the time and the expense that they put in. So that the payments would be minimal when one considers not only the time frame but also the time that they put in.

Mr. FAUNTROY. And who signed off on the payments or who authorized the payments?

Mr. LAWRENCE. I would recommend the payment, the agent in charge would have to go along and proceed on my recommendation and then an official in the seat of government in Washington would either approve or disapprove. I would have no way of knowing who he was.

Mr. FAUNTROY. And you paid them in cash?

Mr. LAWRENCE. In cash, and received a receipt.

Mr. FAUNTROY. All right. How much did you pay them?

Mr. LAWRENCE. How much?

Mr. FAUNTROY. You have in mind a specific informant.

Mr. LAWRENCE. Right.

Mr. FAUNTROY. Obviously you remember paying him something.

Mr. LAWRENCE. Right.

Mr. FAUNTROY. What do you recall was roughly the amount that you paid them? You see, I can't deal with minimum wage, because I don't know how many hours they worked.

Mr. LAWRENCE. I am going on memory now, sir.

Mr. FAUNTROY. That is all I ask.

Mr. LAWRENCE. I would say that $150 or $200 a month would be the maximum, and that would only be during a period where we had a lot of activity such as we did during that period where things were going on almost daily.

Mr. FAUNTROY. Finally, Mr. Lawrence, how would you have us explain the absence of surveillance of Dr. King in Memphis in this period of intense attention given him by the FBI elsewhere?

Mr. LAWRENCE. Right.

Mr. FAUNTROY. Can you help us out in understanding that?

Mr. LAWRENCE. Yes; I could only say this, sir, no one told us to surveil him. We had no reason to. Our best information was that he had come as a public figure to lead an open march on the streets of Memphis in support of the sanitation strike, so there
would have been no justification or no reason to institute any surveillance.

We had no information to believe that he had other purposes in being there. I do believe that the press reported that he, while either there or prior to coming there, indicated he was going to try to recruit people for his Washington project that following spring, but that would have been an incidental reason. So we had no reason to, sir.

Mr. FAUNSTROY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman STOKES. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentleman from Tennessee, Mr. Ford.
Mr. FORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, I am going to yield my time back to the Chair.
Chairman STOKES. Thank you.
The gentleman yields back the balance of his time.
The gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. McKinney.
Mr. McKinney. No questions.
Chairman STOKES. The gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Fithian.
Mr. FITHIAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lawrence, let me just ask counsel whether the witness has had a copy of that document under tab 457. Mine is not marked with a MLK exhibit number, but it is a report from the special agent in charge in Memphis to the Director.

Mr. WEBB. Yes, he has a copy of F-456 and F-457.

If I may take a minute before you get into the questions, Mr. Chairman, since we have been referring to documents, that are marked MLK F-456 and MLK F-457, at this time I would like MLK F-457 to be entered into the record, Mr. Chairman. Also, I would like to note that MLK F-456 has been entered previously, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, they may be entered into the record.

[MLK exhibit F-457 follows:]
MLK Exhibit F-457

FBI

Date:

(from leave, two copies)

No Memphis miracle and LJI dated 3/29/63.

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau and 11 copies, for FBI 3 copies, and for Atlanta 8 copies of LJI captured above and dated 3/30/63. Copies are being furnished to regional offices of military intelligence.

"Information in LJI was furnished to WILLIAM BAY, 11th INTT, 3rd Army, Memphis, and Mr. GEORGE FEATHERS, Inspectional Bureau, Memphis, Tenn."

Enclosed with herewith for the Bureau, 9 copies, and for Atlanta, 5 copies of LJI captioned above and dated 3/30/63. Copies are to be furnished to regional offices of military intelligence.

Information in LJI was furnished to LILLIAN BAY, 11th INTT, 3rd Army, Memphis, and Mr. GEORGE FEATHERS, Inspectional Bureau, Memphis, Tenn.

Bureau (Envs 11) (RT)

Atlanta (Envs 3) (RT) (Info)

(I-SCLC) (I-MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.) (1-Washington Spring Project)

(F) (I-SCLC) (I-MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR.) (1-Washington Spring Project)

Memphis (1 - 187-109)

(1 - 187-109) (Southern Christian Leadership Conference)

(1 - 187-109) (Washington Spring Project)

(WHL:mnfr)

(1 - 157-109) (SNCC)

(1 - 66-1687 Sub) (Dissemination File)
Reference communication captioned as above made at Memphis, Tennessee, March 29, 1968.

On the morning of March 29, 1968, Henry Lux, Assistant Chief, Memphis, Tennessee, Police Department, advised that Rev. James Horace Lawson, Jr., male Negro, TENN., pastor of Centenary Methodist Church, Memphis, and one of the main leaders of the Community on the Move for Equality (COME), the Memphis Negro Ministerial Group leading the support of the sanitation workers, Memphis, Tennessee, who have been on strike since February 12, 1968, informed Lux that a downtown sympathy march for the strikers was planned for the afternoon of March 29, 1968.

Lawson stated that the march would be restricted to sanitation workers and adult sympathizers and that every effort would be made to eliminate the young element which created problems leading to window breaking, looting, and general vandalism which disrupted the massive march on March 28, 1968, led by Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., President, Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC).

Later on the afternoon of March 29, 1968, Henry Lux advised that the march did take place running from Clayborn Temple, 280 Hernando, to the vicinity of the Memphis City Hall on Main Street with approximately 200 individuals participating. There were no incidents. The Memphis Police Department and representatives of the Tennessee National Guard who are still on duty in Memphis as a precautionary measure, guarded the entire parade area, the marchers remaining on the sidewalks and observing all
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Traffic restrictions. There were no arrests and no incidents. Lux pointed out that no permit is required for marches of any kind within the city of Memphis and that the Memphis municipal authorities are considering the possibility of passing an ordinance of this type.

Also, on March 29, 1968, Chief of Police James C. MacDonald of Memphis advised that there have been no serious troubles during March 29, 1968. He had instructed all of his officers to disperse small groups of youngsters in various sections of the city and that there were still sporadic outbursts of window breaking, minor looting, general vandalism, and the setting of trash fires. One squad car was fired on by unknown Negroes in the vicinity of Dixon and Rile in south Memphis early on the morning of March 28, 1968, according to MacDonald, but the individuals firing the shots were not identified. He stated that throughout the day the Memphis Police Department received numerous calls of reported looting, vandalism, and fire settings and fire bombings, although investigation by representatives of the Memphis Police Department and the Memphis Fire Department indicated that most of these incidents were minor. He pointed out that the major damage in connection with the March 28, 1968, disturbance was confined to a three to four block area on Beale Street in downtown Memphis with store fronts being damaged and practically all of a three block area. He stated that liquor stores are still closed, that National Guardsmen are guarding the stores which have been looted and where windows have been broken, that the merchants are boarding up the fronts of most of these establishments to preclude further vandalism and looting and he feels that with the presence of the Tennessee National Guard, along with the assistance of the Shelby County Sheriff's Office and his department, that the situation is well in hand and that, with the exception of sporadic outbursts of vandalism, he does not anticipate any immediate trouble in Memphis.

On the night of March 29, 1968, Assistant Chief Henry Lux advised that there were approximately 33 additional arrests on March 29, 1968, by the Memphis Police Department on charges including miscellaneous looting, disorderly conduct, resisting arrest, and threatened breach of peace. He
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reported that in City Court, Division II, more than 200 persons charged in the past two days appeared before City Judge BERNIE Weinman on charges ranging from drunkenness to assault on police officers. Judge Weinman bound 40 defendants over to the state, dismissed 46 others, and continued the cases against 118 until later in the month of April, 1968. The largest bond was $5,000 set for Gordon L. Odom, Jr., of 336 South Parkway East on a charge of third degree burglary, this being set by City Judge Ray Churchill. Other bonds he set ranged from $250 to $2,000.

During the evening of March 29, 1968, the police received numerous calls of reported fire bombings, vandalism, and looting over a wide area primarily in the Negro neighborhoods but many of these proved to be unfounded on investigation. Lux advised that the curfew imposed by Mayor Henry Loeb on the night of March 28, 1968, continued on the night of March 29, 1968, but that it was a loose curfew in that any individual on the streets who had identifications would have nothing to worry about provided he could give a plausible explanation as to his purpose in being there. This meant that theatres, places of amusement, and restaurants and other functions normally operating at night would be uninterrupted. He stated that riot damage resulting from the March 28, 1968, window breaking and looting was estimated by insurance officials at approximately $400,000 not including the miscellaneous fires. He pointed out fortunately none of the fires were serious. This would not, of course, include losses due to interrupted business days because many office managers, store owners, government agencies, including Federal, state and county, dismissed their employees early both on March 28 and 29, 1968, in order to avoid trouble. He stated that the Memphis city buses were operating throughout March 29, 1968, but would stop around 7:00 P.M. and that in the near future it was anticipated that they would be operating of a full-time basis.

Lux advised that Tennessee National Guardsmen are bivouacked at the National Guard Armory on Central near the Mid-South Fairgrounds and on the military side of the Memphis Metropolitan Airport. He stated that there are approximately 4,000 troops from the west and middle Tennessee National Guard units on duty in Memphis. He had no knowledge as to when they would be pulled out, but predicted that they
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would at least remain in Memphis over the week end of March 30-31, 1968.

He pointed out that school absenteeism in the city school system in Memphis on March 29, 1968, was nearly 40,000 and that the largest number of truants were at the predominantly Negro high schools.

Lax stated that the only injury reported during the day was to Memphis Police Patrolman E. W. MAXWELL, whose finger was severely cut while he was arresting a drunk young Negro who was fighting with other officers on Park Street north of Chelsea, which is in a predominantly Negro neighborhood. He stated that at about 11:15 P.M., officers arrested two white youths, namely: age 20 of 2581 Kallien, age 20 of 1663 Combs. He stated that he had been informed that officers seized a .22 caliber rifle in living room. He did not have the details of the arrest. He stated many of those arrested for looting were youngsters ranging from 8 to 12 years of age. These were being turned over to Memphis Juvenile Court.

The Memphis Commercial Appeal newspaper, Saturday morning issue, March 30, 1968, reported in detail concerning activities of Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., on March 29, 1968, and stated in a story on page 1 by Reporter Thomas BeVier that King came to Memphis to star in what was billed as a "dress rehearsal" for his April 22, 1968, "Poor People's Crusade" on Washington, D. C. The story continued, "by his own non-violent standards, the rehearsal was a flop. The story stated that King in a press interview March 29, 1968, reported that he would be back in Memphis as early as April 3 and not later than April 5, 1968, for another mass march and was quoted as saying, "We are going to have a massive non-violent demonstration in Memphis." The story stated that the question being asked in Memphis, the nation, and the world is whether - with the increasing militancy of black youth - anyone can say with certainty that a non-violent demonstration will stay that way.

King stated in the interview, "I am convinced we can have a non-violent demonstration" but was reported as adding that it would be impossible to "guarantee" that
there would not be any violence. The story stated that it was significant that King was more than a half hour late for his 11:30 A.M. press conference because he was meeting with three members of a Black Power group, which the paper referred to as "The Invaders." BeVier stated that these three young men refused to give their names and stated that they would give their own press conference at a later time.

The story continued that King was staying in a $29 a day room at the Holiday Inn Rivermont, also known as the Rivermont Hotel. King claimed to the newspaper that he did not realize when he came to Memphis that there were those in the Negro community who were "talking about violence." He stated, "We (SCLC) had no part in the planning of the march. Our intelligence was nil." He said that if he had known there were persons likely to start violence, he would have had them made parade marshals, a move which he said had been successful in other marches.

He was reported as being critical of the press for reporting that he left the march in haste after the trouble started on March 28, 1968. He claimed that he left calmly because he said, "I will not lead a violent march." He said that while he "walked" with aides to a car, he was "agonizing over what had happened." The story reported that Assistant Police Chief Henry Lux had earlier said over the police radio at approximately 11:27 A.M., Thursday, March 28, 1968, that the march was apparently without leadership as Dr. King had asked for a police escort away from the march a few minutes after the first report of violence during the march. King was reported in the story as saying he did not think the riot "will in any way affect" his Washington plans for his Poor People's Crusade to commence April 22, 1968. He said he is undecided as to how much of his SCLC staff he can spare to organize the next massive march in Memphis early in April 1968.

The story said that later in Washington, D. C., Rev. Andrew Young, Dr. King's top lieutenant, said that the main thrust of the Washington demonstration would be delayed for about two weeks and that steps would be taken to avoid violence and that a "symbolic delegation," including King, would reach Washington on April 22, 1968. The story continued
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that King claimed that Thursday, March 28, 1968, march was "poorly planned" which the paper said amounts to criticism of Rev. James M. Lawson, Jr., whom Dr. King himself had called "the leading non-violence theoretician in the country." The paper reported that Lawson is in charge of the strategy for the Memphis Negro ministers, also known as COME, and is pastor of the Centenary Methodist Church and continued that Lawson did not entirely agree with King's assessments.

The story stated for instance that King had said that the Black Power advocates with whom he met earlier had said that there had been a lack of communication between them and the ministers and that they felt "rejected." Rev. Lawson was quoted by the paper as saying, "There has been communication. I don't accept that," referring to King's statement. The paper said that it was Rev. Lawson who had originally asked King to come to Memphis and that for about 10 years Lawson has served in an advisory capacity with SCLC. It stated that Lawson agreed with King that a non-violent demonstration is possible and pointed out that this was one of the reasons King was asked to come to Memphis. Lawson stated, "We didn't bring in Rap Brown (national chairman of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee), we brought in King." He was reported to have further said that there were other reasons for bringing in King, one being to give the movement in Memphis a "national image" and another was to strengthen the leadership of the Memphis ministers.

The same March 30, 1968, issue of The Commercial Appeal newspaper had a lead editorial on page 9 entitled, "King's Credibility Gap," which stated that "Martin Luther King on the night of March 18, 1968, told an overflow crowd at Mason Temple: 'You know what? We may have to escalate this struggle a bit.' Dr. King then urged a total work stoppage in Memphis by Negroes 'in a few days' and called for all Negro public school students to cut classes at the same time. 'Try it and they will hear you,' said Dr. King. The escalation came Thursday when Dr. King led a supposedly non-violent protest march from Clayborn Temple to Beale Street, west on Beale to Main, and a block north on Main. He got what he asked — to an embarrassing extent. Negro students did play truant by the thousands and were joined by hundreds of other young Negroes in their 20's who turned the march into a riot and left Beale Street and a short section of Main in utter ruin. Photographs and eyewitness accounts identify those who did the destruction and the looting — the children and young people whom Dr. King had told to stay out of school. Having fled the melee, King later issued statements attempting to disassociate himself from the violence that he
had instigated. The claim will not hold water. Dr. King's pose as leader of a non-violent movement has been shattered. He now has the entire nation doubting his word when he insists that his April project - a shanty-town sit-in in the nation's capital - can be peaceful. In short, Dr. King is suffering from one of those awesome credibility gaps. Furthermore, he wrecked his reputation as a leader as he took off at high speed when violence occurred, instead of trying to use his persuasive prestige to stop it.

"There are many other second thoughts about the Beale Street incident of Thursday. More and more it is evident that Memphis police were well prepared, alert and firm when firmness was vital. What might have spread into far reaches of the city was blocked within minutes.

"The city administration with the help of the legislature and Gov. Buford Ellington got a curfew law which effectively restored general calm and peace.

"As always, there is another side to the coin. Memphis Negroes do need broader participation in Memphis government, and better job opportunities in our city. The sanitation strike, which has been the takeoff point for trouble-making, must be settled soon.

"Mediation and conciliation in the strike have been attempted without significant results. Obstinate and stubborn position-taking will not lead to a settlement. There must be give-and-take.

"It would help if the Negro church ministers who have more or less taken over the cause of the sanitation employees would get them back to work. Then mediation might be attempted in a more reasonable atmosphere.

"The city should shut no doors. It, too, must mediate, if the issue is to be settled without further damage to Memphis.

In connection with the above mentioned Commercial Appeal story with reference to "The Invaders."

advised that this group technically
is known as the Black Organizing Project (BOP) and is affiliated with Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), which has national headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia. It is led by John Burrell Smith and Charles Cabbage.

In connection with another investigation conducted February 16, 1968, Charles L. Cabbage and John Burrell Smith introduced themselves to representatives of the FBI and introduced the governing body of the BOP organization as Charles Laverne Cabbage, 1924 Riley; John Burrell Smith, 1644 Hanauer, Apartment 2; Owen College student; Curtis Carter, LeMoyne College student, residence 377 E. McLemore; Charles Steven Ballard, 1830 Kansas Street, a student at Owen Junior College; Edwina Jeanette Harrell, residence 2413 Gentry, Memphis State University student; Verdell Ronald Brooks, Owen College student, residence 1912 Ball Street; James Rimo, Phillips, 1332 Short, student at LeMoyne College; Clinton Joseph Harrison, 1397 Davis Street; Charles Harrington, 2075 Riley, a student at Owen College; and they mentioned an additional person who was not present, namely Clifford Louis Taylor, 2507 Fontaine, Memphis.

Cabbage and John Smith advised that some of their followers wear the words "Invaders" on their jackets, and John Smith stated that he personally wears these words on his jacket but that this is merely a name which some of them have adopted and that it is all part of the BOP organization.

As recently as March 30, 1968, that many teenagers in Memphis have put the word "Invaders" on backs of their jackets, although they are not necessarily connected with the BOP organization. They do this more or less as a symbol of their self-professed affinity with Black Power. He pointed out therefore that the mere fact that one wears the word "Invaders" does not mean that he is a part of any organized movement, that the only known organized Black Power movement in Memphis is that of BOP headed by Cabbage and John B. Smith and the above mentioned governing body. He pointed that, for example,
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After the ruckus started on March 23, 1968, Cabbage, John B. Smith, and their associates came back to the temple after the ministers had attempted to get the marchers to return and virtually took over the temple, took over the microphone, and would not cease and dismiss when some of the ministers asked them to do so. Therefore, Jackson's assistant Rev. Johnson, who lives at 5183 Horn Lake Road, refused to take them to see Dr. Jackson.

Since around March 1, 1968, the BOP group headed by Cabbage and Smith has been in close contact with the sanitation strike. A mass strike support meeting was held at Clayborn Temple, 230 Hernando on the night of March 5, 1968, attended by some 500 to 600 individuals and that one of the main speakers and masters of ceremony was Rev. James Morris Lawson, Jr., and at this mass meeting Charles Laverne Cabbage and some 30 to 40 of his purported followers were openly and with the consent of the ministers
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In charge of the meeting, passing out a 5 page mimeographed pamphlet entitled, "Afro-American Brotherhood Speaks, Black Thesis, Black Power!" which eulogized H. Rap Brown, national chairman of SNCC. A portion of this document stated that the civil rights tactics of 1963 are not sufficient in the form of pressure on political structures and in dealing with what it referred to as extreme violent reaction of city powers in this community. It claimed that the so-called self-appointed part-time civil rights and part-time preachers inevitably "quit the struggle too soon." It said that "civil disobedience implies an entirely new set of priorities and responsibilities of which the current Negro leadership could no longer accept." It claimed that the current strike support movement in Memphis had turned into a big revival with the preachers having the followers so busy singing, praying, and marching that they do not do anything about the real issues. It asked the question, "Why has the community let the preachers take over and try to lead in a fight which? There must be some real fighting. We all know the preachers can't fight or won't fight." It then printed a letter dated March 21, 1968, from Parish Prison, New Orleans, Louisiana, from H. Rap Brown in which he said, "We must move from resistance to aggression, from revolt to revolution. For every Orangeburg there must be 10 Detros. For every Max Stanford and Huey Newton, there must be 10 dead racist cops. And for every black death there must be a Dien Bien Phu." It continued, "Aggression is the order of the day" and concluded "America: if it takes my death to organize my people against you, and to organize your jails to revolt against you and God, your poor, your country, and to organize mankind to rejoice in your destruction and ruin, then here is my life."

Following this was a detailed drawing captioned "Molotov cocktail," showing in detail how a Molotov cocktail can be made by inserting a plain rag into the neck of a bottle which contains gasoline with a base of dirt or washing powder. None of the ministers present at this meeting made any effort whatsoever to restrain Cabbage and his followers from distributing this material nor did any of them make any statements to the audience that they should ignore such material.

On March 30, 1968, a second source advised that he had reliably learned that the 3 so-called "Invaders" who were reported in the Commercial Appeal as having...
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had an audience with Martin Luther King, Jr., on the morning of March 29, 1968, were the hereinbefore identified Charles Laverne Cabbage, the hereinbefore identified Charles Harrington, and Calvin Leroy Taylor, a male Negro who resides at 347 West Waldorf and who is a senior at Memphis State University. Taylor works part-time as a copy boy at the Commercial Appeal newspaper. Taylor has recently told source 2 that he is a part of the EOP group, which is affiliated with SNCC and that he has been serving as a liaison representative of EOP with the CONE group, with the Negro ministerial group, which is coordinating the strike support. Taylor further stated that when Harrington, Cabbage, and Taylor had an audience with King that their purpose in seeing King was to tell King that they wanted more of the "action" in Memphis feeling that they were not getting enough of the action. Taylor refused to elaborate but source 2 conjectured that by this Taylor meant that the Black Power group wanted more of a position of leadership and more policy making position in the over-all Negro movement in Memphis.

Source 2 also advised that the newsmen in Memphis and other officials will interchangeably use the word "Invaders" when they are actually referring to EOP and pointed out that it had been ascertained that actually the Black Power movement in Memphis uses several names, such as Afro-American Brotherhood, Black Student Association, EOP, and Invaders and that Taylor has told him confidentially that actually there are only about 12 to 15 hard-core EOP people in Memphis and that the others are merely followers or people who tend to imitate them. Source 2 also stated that he had reliably learned from several individuals who in the March 28, 1968, march when the trouble began, that the actual EOP people did not participate in any of the vandalism or looting although prior to the meeting several of them, exact identities not known to source 2, had been agitating the young high school age Negroes who were preparing to participate in the march by indicating that there should be trouble and that Memphis was not worth saving and that it should burn, and other inflammatory utterances to this effect.

On the afternoon of March 29, 1968, a third source advised that Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., President, SCLC, Bernard Lee, Special Aide to King, and Rev. Ralph D. Abernathy, Vice President at Large, SCLC, all departed Memphis, Tennessee, aboard an Eastern Airlines flight 398.
at 3:20 P.M. CST, March 29, 1968, their destination being Atlanta, Georgia. This source stated that to the best of his knowledge they went directly from the Rivermont Hotel to the Memphis Metropolitan Airport.

Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., obviously would have been aware of the presence of a militant Black Power group in Memphis and based this opinion on the following information:

King in his March 18, 1968, speech before the strike supporters at Mason Temple had urged all high school students to remain away from school to participate in the massive march which he planned to lead in the future and urged all workers in Memphis to stay away from their jobs and march and at no time did he call for a completely non-violent march.

On March 20, 1968, meeting with approximately 75 to 100 students, Bevel was the main speaker and gave what informant described as a virulent Black Power talk claiming that the white power structure through economic pressure will eventually attempt to exterminate the Negro in the United States in some form of genocide and pointed out that the United States in its foreign aid program has proven that it is a white supremacist country in that it gives more to white nations in the form of foreign than it does to black countries such as those making up the continent of Africa. Bevel further claimed that while Negroes or black men as he referred to them welcome the support given by the white clergy and white "do-gooders" that these whites are not really sincere as they have no "real soul feeling" toward the Negro and he suggested that his listeners read several Black Revolutionary books, and particularly urged them to read the book entitled, "The Wretched of the Earth" by Frantz Fanon, which
Bevel urged all of these listeners to actively participate in the future scheduled march to be led by Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. Furthermore, at this meeting John B. Smith and his followers stated that they were canvassing all of the Negro high schools with leaflets urging a mass walkout at the schools and urging that these walking students participate in the sanitation workers' sympathy march to be led by King.

Bevel at the LeMoyne meeting urged the students to read "Muhammad Speaks," official newspaper of the Nation of Islam (NOI), headed in Chicago, Illinois, by Elijah Muhammad, pointing out that much of Muhammad's program fits his concept of Black Power philosophy with the exception of the religious aspect whereby Muhammad claimed Allah as his god. He told students to ignore the religious aspects and merely follow the economic and political aspects propounded in Muhammad's program. Bevel also bragged that within the next year he hopes to form a new nationwide Black Power organization in the United States which would supersede SNCC and would take in the remnants of the varied uncoordinated Black Power groups now existing in the United States and wanted to build a united black front effort having tentacles in all major communities in the United States.

Bevel, an ordained minister, was extremely vulgar and obscene in his talk and shocked some of the women who were present resulting in some of the women leaving the meeting.
Mr. Fithian. Mr. Lawrence, I am now referring to document 456. Could you get that?

Mr. Lawrence. All right; I have that.

Mr. Fithian. On page 3 of that document, page 3 in the first paragraph the report here referred to has to do with your testimony and the testimony of two people who were in the BOP at the time, and who were in this committee hearing room yesterday. In about the second sentence of that paragraph it says:

It was apparent to these three sources prior to the march that many of the youngsters were planning to use the placards as sticks and clubs because they were indiscriminately ripping the cardboard away, leaving a four-foot pole in their hands which many of them waved in a threatening manner.

Do you follow that?

Mr. Lawrence. Yes, sir.

Mr. Fithian. Now what I am trying to get at is a balance between what you are telling me and what I was told yesterday afternoon. Was it apparent to you and the people on the scene at the time that there was apt to be violence in this march?

Mr. Lawrence. I would, I was not on the scene at that time. These people that I am referring to here apparently had an apprehension based on what they saw and heard that there would be. But they had no specific information at that point. It was what you would call an educated guess.

Mr. Fithian. Then over on page 4, the first full paragraph where you are referring to John Smith who was with us before this committee, it says:

John Smith has gone bragging he and his followers have been urging high school students remain away from the schools, et cetera, and John Smith, and some of his associates were, in his opinion, inciting to violence in that they were indiscriminately giving out four-foot pine poles to various teenage youngsters in the area, and Smith was heard to tell these youngsters, identity not known, not to be afraid to use these sticks.

What does that mean?

Mr. Lawrence. It would mean exactly what it says, that the source observed Smith giving out some of the sticks, and heard him tell some of the unidentified youngsters to whom he furnished the sticks to not be afraid to use them. We don’t know what he meant. Whether he meant that he wanted to use them as weapons or as clubs is a matter of conjecture. It was a very good possibility.

Mr. Fithian. In your relations with this informant, has she generally been reliable?

Mr. Lawrence. I have always found her to be reliable; yes, sir. Much of the information furnished by this informant was corroborated independently either contemporaneously or after the fact by other sources.

Mr. Fithian. Over on page 9 there is another paragraph I want to call your attention to:

Source 2 added that he heard, that is paragraph 2 on page 9 of that document, Source 2 added that he heard Charles Cabbage tell some of the crowd as they left the temple after the marchers returned to the temple that they should not run from the police and they should not start a job that they did not plan to finish. Cabbage did not elaborate, but source 2 construed this as a call for trouble.

Mr. Lawrence. Right.
Mr. Fithian. And in your judgment, is that a call for trouble? Did you construe it to be that at that time when you read this report or had that information?

Mr. Lawrence. I would have. We seldom voiced opinions ourselves, particularly in our reports. If it was an opinion from a source, you attributed that as an opinion to the source. What we had here I think is a fact, what the informant saw and heard, and then the last sentence would be a conclusion of the source where he says that: "Cabbage did not elaborate, but the source construed this as a call for trouble."

In reading it, if I were in your position or any other person reading it I would say that this was an indication that Cabbage possibly wanted trouble.

Mr. Fithian. Now, with your long history of experience with informers, do informers tend to exaggerate in order to give you what they think you want?

Mr. Lawrence. It's always a possibility, it's a thing you have to guard against. It's a matter which one in dealing with an informant has to constantly warn them against. It's human to want to satisfy a person with whom you have a relationship. But it's also human to be factual if you constantly keep that in mind. This was an effort that we had, because you can get in all sorts of trouble if you start encouraging people to embellish or to exaggerate.

Mr. Fithian. Could you turn your mind back to that time and tell me what your personal reaction was when you learned that Dr. King was coming to Memphis?

Mr. Lawrence. When he was coming to Memphis?

Mr. Fithian. Yes.

Mr. Lawrence. I don't mind telling you, we had been working day and night, I was tired, and I thought my goodness sakes, this is going to create more problems. If I had had my druthers, from that standpoint I would have rather that he had not come.

On the other hand, he had a perfect right to come. He came and we respected that right.

Mr. Fithian. And what did you see as your responsibility?

Mr. Lawrence. Would you repeat that, sir, I didn't hear you.

Mr. Fithian. What did you see as your responsibility with regard to Dr. King's visit to Memphis?

Mr. Lawrence. To develop as much information as would be available through the police and through my sources of information and other cooperative citizens as to the purpose of his being there, to report facts surrounding activities in which he engaged as far as the strike was concerned, that being the purpose we understood he would be there for.

Mr. Fithian. How aware were you of the Director's attitude toward Dr. King?

Mr. Lawrence. I was not personally aware of it. I may have read in the press or magazines about it.

Mr. Fithian. What was the general mood in the Memphis office of the FBI, the general tenor of things with regard to the Director and the whole civil rights movement and particularly Dr. King?

There must have been some talk around the office, wasn't there?

Mr. Lawrence. Oh, I am sure there probably was small talk from time to time. If we talked about it we would have considered
that as a clash between two very dominant personalities. We had no control over it.

Mr. Fithian. Mr. Lawrence, my problem is this: We talked to Cabbage and Mr. Smith yesterday and the young Black militants of the time and they come off sounding only like they are observers of the scene and only a detached casualness. We talked to the FBI, despite the fact that we have records replete up and down the boards with the attitudes of the Bureau toward Dr. King, and we get the impression from you and others that your primary concern was Dr. King's safety.

We don’t find much evidence of that in the FBI records that Dr. King’s safety ranked very high.

Mr. Chairman, I guess my note of discouragement this morning is that in my own plea for candor and on behalf of history I don’t think we are getting there very fast.

I have no further questions.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from the District of Columbia has additional questions.

Mr. Fauntroy. Mr. Lawrence, you are probably also aware of the controversy that has surrounded the concept of agent provocateurs or informant provocateurs in connection with the FBI and the civil rights movement.

Mr. Lawrence. Right.

Mr. Fauntroy. You know that that has been a concern around the march on the 28th, on the 18th in Memphis. I wonder if you would restate for me how the FBI instructed informants and agents whose responsibility was to gather information and intelligence from within the Black community and the civil rights organizations?

Mr. Lawrence. At that point it would have been merely to watch or listen and develop any information that they could as concerning, as to how extensive it might be, the number of participants, the type of participants, and quite specifically as to whether or not any of these young militants about whom we were justifiably concerned at that time were or were not going to participate.

Of course, bearing in mind we wanted information which would indicate any potential for violence.

Mr. Fauntroy. What did you tell them about provocative activities, illegal activities in which they might engage themselves?

Mr. Lawrence. I have always discouraged, explicitly every informant that I have ever dealt with not to engage in any agent provocateur activities. I have no knowledge that any of them ever did, and other than that I don’t know. That was always my policy.

Mr. Fauntroy. If one were to discover that an informant was, in fact, engaging in illegal activities as a function of his role as an informant, what would be the response of the FBI?

Mr. Lawrence. The duty, as I would see it, would be that he would terminate the relationship with the informant immediately.

Mr. Fauntroy. Did you so inform your informants?

Mr. Lawrence. That’s right. They were strictly on their own if they ever went beyond the call of duty, so to speak, and I think that they all knew that and had that understanding.
Mr. FAUNTYROY. Therefore, in Memphis, as far as you are concerned, if any activities of an informant did break the law—

Mr. LAWRENCE. Right.

Mr. FAUNTYROY [continuing]. You were not aware of it.

Mr. LAWRENCE. I was not aware of it.

Mr. FAUNTYROY. And if it had been, if you had discovered it, you would have informed the informant—

Mr. LAWRENCE. That's right.

Mr. FAUNTYROY [continuing]. That he was no longer working for you. But would you have done anything else if you knew that one of your informants had broken the law?

Mr. LAWRENCE. That he had broken the law?

Mr. FAUNTYROY. Yes; in pursuit of—

Mr. LAWRENCE. I can't answer that specifically because it never happened. In the abstract I can't honestly tell you what I would do. I can tell you what I should do. The circumstance, the nature would have to be involved. If it was some minor penny ante crime such as making a few bets on the side or something of that nature, chances are I would just terminate him and say, you are on your own, and not report it to the police, in all probability.

If it were a serious crime, I very definitely would feel constrained not only as a citizen but as an investigator to report it.

Mr. FAUNTYROY. Did you have any policy guidelines from the FBI in this regard?

Mr. LAWRENCE. We did have. I don't recall them in specific detail. They were very conscious of this possibility, and—

Mr. FAUNTYROY. The reason I pursue this is, of course, that we are explicitly and specifically aware of one informant paid on the SCLC staff who confessed to his agency contact, the fact that he was breaking the law and embezzling money, and yet his relationship continued beyond that with the FBI. That raises the question—

Mr. LAWRENCE. Right.

Mr. FAUNTYROY [continuing]. Of the informant provocateur and whether such activity may have taken place in Memphis. I just wondered whether it would be a surprise to you that an informant was allowed to break the law and not terminate in another instance.

Mr. LAWRENCE. Right.

Mr. FAUNTYROY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Does counsel, Mr. Webb, have any additional questions?

Mr. WEBB. Mr. Chairman, I don't have additional questions, but prior to the start of the hearings last Friday staff prepared a glossary of some commonly used FBI acronyms.

At this time I would like that document entered as Martin Luther King F-467.

Chairman Stokes. OK.

Without objection it may be entered into the record.

[MLK exhibit F-467 follows:]
ACRONYM GLOSSARY

The following acronyms are used throughout the FBI materials:

AIRTEL: Air teletype.
BOP: Black Organizing Project. The Memphis-based umbrella group of young blacks which included Charles Cabbage, John Smith, Charles Harrington, and others among its members. Because of the overlap of membership with the Invaders, the two names are used synonymously.
BULET: Bureau letter.
BURAD: Bureau radio message.
BUTEL: Bureau telephone call.
CIRM: Communist Influence in Racial Matters. One of the case captions under which the King and SCLC security investigations was carried out. This term was most frequently used in the early 1960's.
COINTELPRO: Counterintelligence Program. This was the caption under which the program to discredit and neutralize Dr. King took place. It was, generally speaking, the "dirty tricks" program.
COMINFIL: Communist Infiltration. This caption was generally applied to the King and SCLC security investigations after 1964. It replaced, in most instances, the CIRM designation.
CPUSA: Communist Party, USA.
COME: Community On the Move for Equality. The Memphis-based community organization which supported the sanitation strike workers. It was at this group's request that Dr. King came to Memphis.
CRD: Crime Records Division, FBI.
DID: Domestic Intelligence Division, FBI.
GID: General Investigative Division, FBI.
IS-C: Internal Security - Communist. A case caption under which the King and SCLC security investigations were often reported.
LHM: Letterhead memorandum. A memorandum sent on FBI letterhead. This was the principal means of transmitting information from the field to the Bureau in a form ready for dissemination.
MISUR: Microphone surveillance.
NOI: Nation of Islam. Commonly referred to as the "Black Muslims," the organization was based in Chicago. It was the subject of the same type of security investigation as was the SCLC and SNCC.
POCAM: Poor Peoples Campaign. The campaign led by Dr. King to bring poor people to Washington in April 1968. Also referred to as the Washington Spring Project.
PPC: Poor Peoples Campaign. See POCAM.
Chairman Stokes. Anything further?

Mr. Webb. Nothing further from counsel.

Chairman Stokes. Mr. Lawrence, at the conclusion of a witness' testimony before our committee the witness is entitled to 5 minutes during which time the witness may amplify or expand upon his remarks or make any further comment he so desires.

I would extend to you the 5 minutes at this time.

Mr. Lawrence. Thank you, sir, for this opportunity.

I hadn't made any prepared speech. I had hoped to make a few remarks, which I did to Mr. Sawyer, and I appreciate your indulgence, sir. Those were meant as sincere remarks.

I didn't come up here to get into a personality clash with any other former agent, but I did feel that I had a duty to my country and to my former associates to set the record straight as I know it, and I did that as sincerely as I can.

I recognize a tremendous problem that you gentlemen have and your hard working staff. This is probably the third or fourth time that the unfortunate death of Dr. King has been gone into. Chances are that the American people will never be completely satisfied one way or the other. I am sure that if we live long enough, the good Lord permitting, that 10 years from now that other people will raise questions as to why didn't this committee do this or do that.

I feel that this is a natural phenomenon, but we have conscientious people in this country, not only on this committee but in the FBI, who have done their duty as best they can. None of us are perfect. We all sin seven times daily, as St. Paul told us, but despite a few infractions that have been brought out, and I am not proud of them and you have brought them out, I think we have to consider the work of the FBI and we have to consider the work of a committee of this nature in balance and on the whole.

I would like to emphasize that the FBI over its history conducted millions, I repeat that, millions of investigations where all due procedural process was explicitly followed, yet we dwell on the few excesses, which is a natural phenomenon in this country.

I do not know what legislation you gentlemen have in mind of recommending, but for goodness sakes, we can do without a lot of
electronic surveillance if we have to. We cannot live in this country, whether locally or nationally, without live intelligent patriotic informants, both in domestic and national and foreign security, as well as in organized crime.

There is a tremendous danger now evolving in this country where Federal judges are forcing local police and FBI to reveal the identities of their informants. It came about even in this hearing this morning. If the identities of these informants, living or dead, are ever revealed to unauthorized sources, their lives will be placed in danger, they are going to be jeopardized, they can be harassed, and the feedback can even affect their families.

We have a tremendous responsibility, and I would only hope that in making your judgments that we would realize that when a citizen talks to a police agent, an FBI officer or whoever, that he, if he does so in confidence that he expects that the information will be correctly reported, that it will be evaluated and that his identity will be retained in confidence.

Once we cease to retain the identities of informants in confidence in this country, where will we ever, and I repeat that, where will we ever find people who will be informants in the future, to our combined peril?

So, to borrow a phrase from one of my favorite newspaper editors, he is retired now, Howard Flieger of U.S. News & World Report, "Let's don't throw out the baby with the bath water."

I thank you.
Chairman Stokes. Thank you, Mr. Lawrence.

There being nothing further at this time, you are excused, sir.

Mr. Lawrence. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Stokes. The Chair recognizes Professor Blakey.

Mr. Blakey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, Robert Jensen served as special agent in charge of the FBI's Memphis field office from June 1967 until he retired in May 1970. As such, he was responsible for directing FBI activities in Memphis during the critical period surrounding the assassination of Dr. King.

Any counterintelligence proposals directed at Dr. King that originated in Memphis had to cross Mr. Jensen's desk. In addition, counterintelligence proposals to be implemented in Memphis, no matter where they originated, had to cross the SAC's desk.

Additionally, since Dr. King was assassinated in Memphis, the field office there was designated as the "office of origin." It shared the responsibility with Washington for coordinating the investigation.

It would be appropriate at this time, Mr. Chairman, to call Mr. Jensen.

Chairman Stokes. The committee calls Mr. Jensen.

Sir, would you please stand and raise your right hand and be sworn?

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you will give before this committee is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Jensen. I do.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you. You may be seated.

The Chair recognizes staff counsel, Ken McHargh.
Mr. McHargh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Jensen, could you state your full name for the record?

TESTIMONY OF ROBERT G. JENSEN

Mr. Jensen. It's Robert G. Jensen.
Mr. McHargh. And are you a retired FBI agent?
Mr. Jensen. Yes; I am.
Mr. McHargh. When did you retire?
Mr. Jensen. In the latter part of May 1970.
Mr. McHargh. Would you briefly outline your assignments while you were a member of the FBI?

Mr. Jensen. Yes.
I spent approximately the first year of my tour of duty in the FBI in Miami, and I went to Philadelphia and spent 4 or 5 years in Philadelphia. After Philadelphia I went to the seat of government, spent about 9 years in the seat of government.

Mr. McHargh. The seat of government is Washington, D.C.?
Mr. Jensen. The seat of government is Washington, D.C., the headquarters. I think they have another name for it now.

After a tour of duty there I was assigned to Birmingham, Ala., as an assistant agent in charge from the summer of 1961 approximately to December of 1965. Then I returned for a tour of duty out of Washington headquarters as an inspector and spent some time there until I reported in Memphis in the summer of 1967 as the agent in charge and retired there as agent in charge in May of 1970.

Mr. McHargh. All right; so prior to being assigned to Memphis as SAC in 1967 you spent some time in headquarters?
Mr. Jensen. Yes; I did.
Mr. McHargh. I believe you indicated that was approximately 2 years in headquarters?
Mr. Jensen. Not quite that long, December 1965 to I think May of 1967, May or June.

Mr. McHargh. So during the course of the security investigation of Dr. Martin Luther King, which began in 1962, you were first in Birmingham, Ala., during that period until 1965?
Mr. Jensen. Yes.
Mr. McHargh. And at headquarters and at Memphis.
Mr. Jensen. Yes, that's correct.

Mr. McHargh. Would you briefly describe your duties as SAC of the Memphis office?

Mr. Jensen. Well, I was the principal administrative officer. I was the man in charge of the office, and as such had responsibilities for personnel, investigation, certain investigations went across my desk, applicant recruiting, in short, whatever went on in that office I was primarily responsible for.

Mr. McHargh. All right. And you were present during the testimony of Mr. Lawrence this morning; is that correct?
Mr. Jensen. Yes; I was.
Mr. McHargh. And you were Mr. Lawrence's supervisor?
Mr. Jensen. Yes; I was.

Mr. McHargh. Mr. Jensen, this morning reference was made to MLK exhibits F-541A and F-541B. Those two documents were the memos which targeted the SCLC and Dr. King within the counter-intelligence program.
You have been shown those documents previously. Do you recall being shown those documents previously?

Mr. JENSEN. Yes, I do.

Mr. McHARGH. And during the course of your assignment in Memphis as SAC, would those documents have come to your attention at the time that they were directed to your office?

Mr. JENSEN. Let me say I have no immediate recollection, but I am sure that they did. I am sure they crossed my desk.

Mr. McHARGH. You also heard testimony regarding MLK exhibit F-459. That memo was the Memphis office's response to the counterintelligence memos which I had previously referred to, the two memos that targeted Dr. King and the SCLC headquarters had requested the field offices to assign an agent as the coordinator of the counterintelligence program, and had asked that proposals be directed to headquarters concerning how your office would respond to those particular memos.

Mr. JENSEN. Correct.

Mr. McHARGH. The response from Memphis was on March 14, 1968, and it included no reference to Dr. Martin Luther King or the SCLC.

Mr. JENSEN. Right.

Mr. McHARGH. Do you recall Mr. Lawrence's testimony relative to that point?

Mr. JENSEN. Yes, I think I do.

Mr. McHARGH. It indicated that the reason for that was because Dr. King had not yet come to Memphis, you did not have any awareness he was coming to Memphis, and that there was no SCLC chapter in Memphis at the time.

Mr. JENSEN. Yes, that's my recollection, there were no SCLC chapters in Memphis at that time, and I don't know whether there is one today in Memphis, and I also know Dr. King was not a resident of Memphis, that he resided in Atlanta. So we didn't feel this was a particular problem or anything for the Memphis office.

Mr. McHARGH. All right, on March 18, 1968, however, Dr. King did come to Memphis?

Mr. JENSEN. Yes.

Mr. McHARGH. He delivered a major speech?

Mr. JENSEN. Yes.

Mr. McHARGH. He announced his intention to return to Memphis—

Mr. JENSEN. Right.

Mr. McHARGH [continuing]. To lead a major civil rights march?

Mr. JENSEN. Right.

Mr. McHARGH. Do you recall that?

Mr. JENSEN. Yes.

Mr. McHARGH. Once Dr. King came to Memphis and announced his intention to return to Memphis, did you then think to take any steps relative to Dr. King in compliance with the counterintelligence—

Mr. JENSEN. I have no recollection that anything like that was done.

Mr. McHARGH. Mr. Jensen, in the course of our investigation we have heard testimony from the agents in headquarters who coordi-
nated the security investigation relative to Dr. King. They indicated that Dr. King's investigation at that time was a major case. We had testimony that because of the plans Dr. King had announced to lead a march on Washington, that there was a great deal of concern at headquarters relative to Dr. King during the time period that we are discussing now.

Mr. JENSEN. Right.

Mr. McHARGH. They indicated that as far as the field offices were concerned, that they expected that the relative field offices were carrying out their responsibilities relative——

Mr. JENSEN. That's right.

Mr. McHARGH [continuing]. To instructions directed from headquarters concerning Dr. King and others.

With that in mind, when Dr. King arrived in Memphis on March 28 to lead the march——

Mr. JENSEN. Right.

Mr. McHARGH [continuing]. And after that march ended in disruption——

Mr. JENSEN. Right.

Mr. McHARGH [continuing]. Did you or any agents in your office view that as an opportunity to comply with the request that counterintelligence proposals should be directed against Dr. Martin Luther King?

Mr. JENSEN. No, I have no recollection of any action being precipitated under that program or anything else because of the incident in connection with that march.

Mr. McHARGH. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have MLK exhibit F-451C which has been previously entered into the record, shown to the witness.

Chairman Stokes. It may be shown to the witness at this time. [The information follows:]
Memorandum

Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: March 29, 1963

FROM: G. C. Moore

SUBJECT: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM
BLACK NATIONALIST - HATE GROUPS
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE
(MARTIN LUTHER KING)

PURPOSE: To publicize hypocrisy on the part of Martin Luther King.

BACKGROUND:
Martin Luther King has urged Negroes in Memphis, Tennessee, to boycott white merchants in order to force compliance with Negro demands in the sanitation workers' strike in Memphis.

When violence broke out during the march King led in Memphis on 3-28-63, King disappeared. There is a first class Negro hotel in Memphis, the Hotel Lorraine, but King chose to hide out at the white owned and operated Holiday Inn Hotel.

RECOMMENDATION:
The above facts have been included in the attached blind memorandum and it is recommended it be furnished a cooperative news media source by the Crime Records Division for an item showing King is a hypocrite. This will be done on a highly confidential basis.

Enclosure

(7) 1 - Mr. C. D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. T. E. Bishop
1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
1 - Mr. D. Ryan (Mass Media)
1 - Mr. T. J. Deakin
March 29, 1968

DO AS I SAY, NOT AS I DO

Martin Luther King, during the sanitation workers' strike in Memphis, Tennessee, has urged Negroes to boycott downtown white merchants to achieve Negro demands. On 3-29-68 King led a march for the sanitation workers. Like Judas leading lambs to slaughter, King led the marchers to violence, and when the violence broke out, King disappeared.

The fine Hotel Lorraine in Memphis is owned and patronized exclusively by Negroes but King didn't go there from his hasty exit. Instead King decided the plush Holiday Inn Motel, white owned, operated and almost exclusively white patronized, was the place to "cool it." There will be no boycott of white merchants for King, only for his followers.

Mr. McHargh. Mr. Jensen, this is a memo from G. C. Moore to Mr. Sullivan, concerning a counterintelligence proposal to be directed against Dr. Martin Luther King as a result of the events which had occurred on March 28. It begins by indicating that the purpose "is to publicize hypocrisy on the part of Martin Luther King."

Perhaps your copy is not too clear. At the bottom there is an indication that—or there is handwriting to the effect that this was handled—and the date of the handling is indicated it is sometime in 1968 but it's kind of hard to read the time.

Mr. Jensen. Right. I will accept your word.

Mr. McHargh. At any rate, do you recall this particular proposal?

Mr. Jensen. No; I do not.

Mr. McHargh. Do you note the fact that it's with reference to the subject characterized as a "Counterintelligence Program, Black Nationalist-Hate Group"?

Mr. Jensen. Yes; I understand that.

Mr. McHargh. And you recall independently having seen this document before?

Mr. Jensen. Only in appearance with either one of the investigators or with one of the attorneys. This is an in-house memorandum that based on my experience is a memorandum that circulated at the headquarters. I had never seen this before it was shown to me by either one of the staff investigators or one of the attorneys here in previous appearances up here, so that was my first experience with it.

In fact, I believe the last time that somebody asked me what I thought the word "handled" meant, and I said I thought it meant just what it said, that it was handled. Now what they did with it, I don't have any idea.

Mr. McHargh. In your experience, Mr. Jensen, if a counterintelligence proposal proposed in headquarters to be implemented in the field was generated, would it be normal that the field office would handle the actual implementation of the proposal?
Mr. Jensen. Not necessarily, based on the way this is worded or the way it's written; it would be my assumption that it was handled at the seat of government or here in Washington.

Mr. McHargh. All right. With respect to the second page, it reads as follows: This is the caption, "Do As I Say, Not As I Do."

Martin Luther King, during the sanitation workers' strike in Memphis, Tennessee, has urged Negroes to boycott downtown white merchants to achieve Negro demands. On March 29, 1968, King led a march for the sanitation workers. Like Judas leading lambs to slaughter, King led the marchers to violence, and when the violence broke out, King disappeared.

The fine Hotel Lorraine in Memphis is owned and patronized exclusively by Negroes but King didn't go there from his hasty exit. Instead King decided the plush Holiday Inn Motel, white owned, operated and almost exclusively white patronized, was the place to "cool it." There will be no boycott of white merchants for King, only for his followers.

Now with regard to that language, was information such as that available to you?

Let me strike that.

Do you recall receiving information to that effect at the time?

Mr. Jensen. I have told you before that I had never seen this before it was shown to me here. This is some 10 years after the incident and I had not seen this. I did not receive any information relative to this 10 years ago at the time this incident occurred.

Mr. McHargh. So in addition to not having seen this document, you don't recall any circumstances that you personally were involved in—

Mr. Jensen. No.

Mr. McHargh [continuing]. That would reflect on this document?

Mr. Jensen. No.

Mr. McHargh. Mr. Chairman, at this time I would like the witness to be given a copy of MLK exhibit F-453G and have that document also entered into the record.

Chairman Stokes. Without objection, it may be entered into the record.

[The information follows:]
SANITATION WORKERS STRIKE, MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE, RM. SOCIAL MATTERS

RE MEMPHIS TEL CALL TO ASSISTANT DIRECTOR W. C. SULLIVAN.

AT TIME INCIDENTS BEGAN IN MARCH HELD IN MEMPHIS, MARCH TWENTY-EIGHT, SIXTY-EIGHT, MARTIN LUTHER KING, AT HEAD OF MARCH, WAS REPORTED TO HAVE SAID, "I'VE GOT TO GET OUT OF HERE." THIS STATEMENT FURNISHED BY LT. ARKIN OF MEMPHIS PD, WHO ALSO ADVISED KING WAS OBVIOUSLY SCARED.

FURTHER DETAILS AS TO INCIDENTS AT START OF MARCH SECURED FROM LT. M. E. NICHOLS OF MEMPHIS PD WHO WAS IN VICINITY AND OBSERVED ACTIVITIES. HE REPORTED DR. KING MADE NO EFFORT TO QUIET MOB AND HIS ONLY CONCERN WAS TO RUN AND PROTECT HIMSELF. LT. NICHOLS HAS ADVISED THAT DR. KING, RALPH ABERNATHY, BERNARD LEE, AND TWO OTHER NEGRO MALES UNKNOWN TO HIM WERE AT HEAD OF MARCH. WHEN TROUBLE BEGAN, THIS GROUP TRIED TO COMMANDER A WHITE PANEL TRUCK TO GET THEM AWAY FROM MARCH. DRIVER OF TRUCK REFUSED TO HELP. A WHITE PONTIAC WHICH WAS OCCUPIED BY TWO NEGRO FEMALES FOLLOWED THE PANEL TRUCK IN THE CROSS TRAFFIC. ONE OF KING'S
NEGROES INCLUDING DR. KING. THE DESK CLERK TOLD LT. NICHOLS THE NEGROES COULD REMAIN IN THE LOBBY AND EFFORT WOULD BE MADE TO OBTAIN ROOM FOR THEM. AFTER THE FIVE NEGROES, INCLUDING DR. AIDES MANAGED TO STOP PONTIAC. AIDE ASKED IF THE WOMEN WOULD ASSIST IN GETTING DR. KING OUT OF DANGER. THE WOMEN AGREED. THEREAFTER, ONE OF KING’S AIDES SLID BEHIND STEERING WHEEL. THE OTHER FOUR NEGRO MALES, INCLUDING DR. KING, GOT IN REAR SEAT OF PONTIAC. CAR WAS DRIVEN TO BEALE AND FRONT STREET, AT WHICH POINT IT WAS SURROUNDED BY ABOUT FIFTY INDIVIDUALS CONSISTING OF NEGROES AND NEWS REPRESENTATIVES. LT. NICHOLS, WHO WAS ON MOTORCYCLE, CLEARED CROWD FROM AROUND PONTIAC AND ASKED DRIVER OF PONTIAC WHERE HE WAS GOING. DRIVER SAID HE HAD DR. KING IN BACK SEAT AND HE HAD TO GET AWAY. THE OFFICER WAS ASKED TO ESCORT THEM TO HOTEL SHERATON PEABODY. LT. NICHOLS EXPLAINED THAT DUE TO RIOTING THEY COULD NOT GET TO SHERATON PEABODY AND ASKED IF THEY WANTED TO GO TO ANOTHER PLACE. THE NEGRO DRIVER ASKED JUST TO GET THEM AWAY FROM TROUBLE. LT. NICHOLS THEN ESCORTED THEM TO RIVERMONT HOTEL. LT. NICHOLS WENT TO DESK CLERK AND ASKED IF SHE HAD SPACE FOR FIVE NEGROES INCLUDING DR. KING. THE DESK CLERK TOLD LT. NICHOLS THE NEGROES COULD REMAIN IN THE LOBBY AND EFFORT WOULD BE MADE TO OBTAIN ROOM FOR THEM.
KING LEFT THE PONTIAC, THE TWO NEGRO FEMALES DROVE ON. LT. NICHOLS DID NOT OBTAIN NAMES OF THESE TWO FEMALES AND FEELS CERTAIN THEY HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH DR. KING AND WERE NOT A PART OF DR. KING'S PARTY. LT. NICHOLS STAYED AT THE RIVERMONT HOTEL AND KNOWS THE TWO FEMALE OCCUPANTS OF THIS CAR DID NOT RETURN TO THE RIVERMONT WHILE HE WAS THERE.

INTERESTING OBSERVATION MADE BY MEMPHIS OFFICE IN THAT DR. KING IN HIS ROLE AS LEADER AT MOMENT OF DISTURBANCE AND TROUBLE WAS PRIMARILY INTERESTED IN PRESERVATION OF HIMSELF AND MADE NO EFFORT TO QUIET GROUP THAT WAS FOLLOWING HIS LEADERSHIP. SOMEWHAT INCONSISTENT WITH STATEMENTS ATTRIBUTED TO HIM DURING TALK THAT IT BLACK MAN SHOULD SUPPORT HIS OWN BUSINESS ESTABLISHMENTS, DR. KING FIRST SOUGHT RESIDENCE AT SHERATON PEBBLY AND ENDED UP STAYING AT RIVERMONT HOTEL, WHICH IS PART OF HOLIDAY INN CHAIN. IN PAST HE HAS STAYED AT THE LORRAINE MOTEL, WHICH IS A QUALITY NEGRO MOTEL, MEMPHIS.

DR. KING, ACCOMPANIED BY RALPH D. ABERNATHY AND BERNARD LEE, DEPARTED MEMPHIS BY EASTERN AIRLINES APPROXIMATELY THREE TWENTY PM THIS DATE. DESTINATION ATLANTA. ATLANTA ADVISED TELEPHONICALLY.

END

FBI WASH, DC
Mr. McHARGH. Mr. Jensen, with respect to the first page of that document, would you describe what it is and who originated it and where it was sent?

Mr. JENSEN. This would have been sent from Memphis.

Mr. McHARGH. To whom was it sent?

Mr. JENSEN. It was sent to the headquarters in the FBI in Washington, D.C.

Mr. McHARGH. All right. With respect to “To Director Attn: Assistant Director W. C. Sullivan”—

Mr. JENSEN. Right.

Mr. McHARGH [continuing]. What does that indicate?

Mr. JENSEN. Well, that it should go to the division that he was the head of. This is the Domestic Intelligence Division. That is what it was called at that time. I don’t know the name of that division now.

Mr. McHARGH. And right under the caption, “Sanitation Workers Strike, Memphis, Tennessee,” the next line reads: “Re Memphis Tel Call to Assistant Director W. C. Sullivan.”

What does that indicate?

Mr. JENSEN. That would have been a telephone call to Assistant Director W. C. Sullivan telling him of the march, what transpired; in other words, it would have been a preliminary of this teletype.

Mr. McHARGH. All right. So this teletype—

Mr. JENSEN. He would have been told in essence what it says in this teletype.

Mr. McHARGH. All right—

Mr. JENSEN. And it was confirmed by this wire.

Mr. McHARGH. So the information was first phoned in, and then subsequently reported in the wire?

Mr. JENSEN. Right.

Mr. McHARGH. Who would typically make the phone calls from—

Mr. JENSEN. Probably me.

Mr. McHARGH. You?

Mr. JENSEN. Probably me, yes.

Mr. McHARGH. And, in fact, it is normal for the SAC to be the contact with headquarters?

Mr. JENSEN. Yes.

Mr. McHARGH. With respect to the third page of that document, I would like to read the first full paragraph:

Interesting observation made by Memphis office in that Dr. King for his tole as leader at moment of disturbance and trouble was primarily interested in preservation of himself and made no effort to quiet group that was following his leadership. Somewhat inconsistent with statements attributed to him during talk that the Black man should support his own business establishments, Dr. King first sought residence at Sheraton Peabody and ended up staying at Rivermont Hotel, which is part of Holiday Inn Chain. In past he has stayed at the Lorraine Motel, which is a quality Negro motel, Memphis.

Do you recall transmitting that information to headquarters?

Mr. JENSEN. I don’t recall it, but if it’s here, obviously I did.

Mr. McHARGH. And would you also agree that it seems to relate very directly to the counterintelligence proposal which subsequently was prepared at headquarters and indicated as “handled”?

Mr. JENSEN. I don’t place that connotation on it, but I can’t disagree with what you are saying.
Mr. McHargh. I am sorry, would you repeat your answer?
Mr. Jensen. I say I don't place that connotation on it, but I can't disagree with your placing that connotation on it.
Mr. McHargh. Well, again we compare the two documents. It does seem that the characterizations of Dr. King as not being concerned about the marchers appears in both places. The references to staying at the white hotel as opposed to Black-owned hotels appears in both places.
After having seen both documents, does it refresh your recollection as to whether or not when you prepared this memorandum you had in mind the possibility of the creation of a counterintelligence proposal relative to Dr. King?
Mr. Jensen. The actual preparation of the teletype was most likely not me. Usually the case agent would prepare the teletype. It would be brought to the agent in charge and say, "I have something that they should know," and then we would make the call based on what was in the teletype.
Mr. McHargh. But you decided to make the phone call to headquarters?
Mr. Jensen. Well, yes, I did, because of the fact of the violence, et cetera.
Mr. McHargh. But the information we just referred to seems to relate little to the violence. It merely relates to information concerning Dr. King, and the paragraph I read begins by saying, "Interesting observation."
Mr. Jensen. That is what it was. It was an observation made on the basis of what was reported to us by the police department and so on.
Mr. McHargh. Is it reasonable to assume, or is it possible that this interesting observation was made because you were aware of the fact that the Bureau was interested in receiving information of possible counterintelligence opportunities to be directed against Dr. King?
Mr. Jensen. It could very well have been. I can't tell you, you know, what the thoughts were 10 years ago.
Mr. McHargh. Mr. Jensen, you heard Mr. Lawrence testify that there was no electronic surveillance directed at Dr. King?
Mr. Jensen. Yes.
Mr. McHargh. Is that also your recollection?
Mr. Jensen. Other than that, I know that there was no electronic surveillance of Dr. King in Memphis, because if such had been in existence, I would have had to know, and there was none.
Mr. McHargh. Are you aware of any steps which were taken by the Memphis office, once the march on the 28th had been disrupted, preparatory to Dr. King's return to Memphis on April 3, 1968?
Mr. Jensen. What do you mean?
Mr. McHargh. Do you recall any specific steps that were taken by your office to prepare for Dr. King's return on April—
Mr. Jensen. Not right offhand, no, I do not.
Mr. McHargh. Is it reasonable, given the awareness you had of headquarters interest in Dr. King, given the fact that Dr. King had been in Memphis and had been involved in a march that ended in disruption, is it reasonable that some steps would have been taken to prepare for his return to Memphis?
Mr. Jensen. I don't know what you mean when you say some steps should have been taken to prepare for Dr. King's return. I don't know. If you are implying that we should think in terms of technical surveillances, no, absolutely not.

Mr. McHargh. But you had been concerned about gathering intelligence on where the march was to be led?

Mr. Jensen. Yes.

Mr. McHargh. How many people would be involved?

Mr. Jensen. Yes.

Mr. McHargh. Et cetera?

Mr. Jensen. Those things, yes, and I think, just as Lawrence said, that various sources and informants would have been alerted as to the probability of his return, and we were again interested in what is going to happen.

Mr. McHargh. But you do not recall any counterintelligence activity?

Mr. Jensen. No.

Mr. McHargh [continuing]. For Dr. King's return. You heard testimony concerning the identity of an agent named Merrill McCloughan?

Mr. Jensen. Yes.

Mr. McHargh. Do you recall Mr. McCloughan?

Mr. Jensen. Yes. I knew McCloughan. He and I worked together in Philadelphia in the late forties and early fifties. When I came to Memphis I was surprised he was there, and I knew him from 20 years ago approximately.

Mr. McHargh. Did you also know a gentleman named Marrell McCullough, who was an informant for——

Mr. Jensen. I didn't know that name.

Mr. McHargh. Mr. Jensen, please let me complete my question.

Mr. Jensen. All right.

Mr. McHargh [continuing]. Who was an undercover police officer who had infiltrated the Invaders?

Mr. Jensen. Yes. I didn't know the name of the Black police officer who had infiltrated until I was told that here by one of the investigators, a representative of the committee. They are two different people.

Mr. McHargh. And Mr. McCullough, the Black police officer, was never an FBI agent, is that correct?

Mr. Jensen. No, he was not.

Mr. McHargh. Mr. Chairman, I would like to have the witness shown a copy of the document previously entered, MLK F-452I.

Mr. Jensen, toward the bottom of that document, the paragraph begins "Special agents of the FBI who observed activities of this march were as follows:" and the name Merrill E. McCloughan appears in the document. With respect to that particular individual, is that in fact the white FBI agent that you identified?

Mr. Jensen. Yes; it is.

Mr. McHargh. And that is in no way——

Mr. Jensen. That is in no way the Black police officer. These are two different people.

Mr. McHargh. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions at this time.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you.
The Chair recognizes the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Sawyer, for such time as he may consume.

Mr. Sawyer. Mr. Jensen, were you aware of the COINTEL program generally that the FBI had?

Mr. Jensen. Yes, sir.

Mr. Sawyer. With respect to Martin Luther King in particular?

Mr. Jensen. I knew that his name was in the program, and SCLC was in the program, yes.

Mr. Sawyer. But you, as I understand your testimony, at least insofar as the Memphis office was concerned, did not activate or do anything—

Mr. Jensen. No, sir.

Mr. Sawyer [continuing]. Along that line?

Mr. Jensen. We did not.

Mr. Sawyer. Following the assassination of Dr. King, were you aware of any investigation conducted by the Memphis office going to the conspiracy or the possible conspiracy aspects of the—

Mr. Jensen. Yes, if I may take a few minutes, in the original days of my work in the FBI, I was involved in a case in the Philadelphia office which involved Soviet espionage. I carried an assignment card on the case involving Klaus Fuchs, Harry Gold, Julius Rosenberg, and several other people, so I was sensitive to the possibility of sleeper agents.

I spoke with the man in Birmingham, Ala., the agent in charge, when they had a little difficulty running down the possibility of a false identity—we had a transient with no fixed roots, no established residence, change in names. We found after a short period of time the usage of the name Willard in Memphis, Lowmeyer for the purchase of a gun in Birmingham, a different name, Galt. These were classic patterns.

We discussed that possibility of a sleeper and so on, and I know that specifically we asked that our headquarters contact the various intelligence agencies for sources they had that might develop some information of some foreign government involvement.

My recollection is that there was no information showing that there was any foreign agents, foreign government involved, or any conspiracy aspects from that standpoint.

In addition, in Memphis there were two or three situations where we specifically explored the possibility of conspiracy. I remember there was—I don’t remember the name of the Black man that was involved, but he was brought down to Memphis by a fellow by the name of Bryant and there was some involvement or alleged involvement of the Mafia in the thing, a potential conspiracy aspect. That was explored, and the end result was there was no evidence to indicate any conspiracy from that standpoint.

In addition, there was also the allegation or the involvement, I don’t remember the man’s name, but this stranger appeared in town and he spoke with an attorney—I believe the attorney’s name was Thompson—and also spoke with a preacher in town. I think that was the same man. There was some allegation of maybe some involvement or conspiracy aspects. There was nothing, no evidence developed to establish a conspiracy.

In addition, there was much made of the CB radio call which people have said was part of a conspiracy. We were not able to find
any evidence that there was a conspiracy. Those are three situations or four situations that I am familiar with that we explored and did everything that we could. I know that in discussions with other officers, I am sure they did the same things.

Mr. Sawyer. What effort did you make to check out this citizen’s band radio call?

Mr. Jensen. Well, first of all I think, if I remember correctly, from all the data that was available, there was a youngster that was interviewed, and all indications suggest very strongly that it was he, but it ended up with some statement to the effect, well, unless there is an admission here, there is no way to prove anything, and there will be no admission given. Yet as I remember the sequence of events, it was much after the incident, and I don’t know that it proved anything or did anything except to create a lot of consternation and apprehension and confusion at that time.

Mr. Sawyer. As you may know, obviously, the most obvious potential of conspiracy would be some of the far right wing groups as you might call them—

Mr. Jensen. It could very well.

Mr. Sawyer. Did you do anything about that?

Mr. Jensen. I know there were efforts in connection with some of the right wing groups. I know that suggestion was made. I don’t remember offhand any right wing groups of any major size in the Memphis area. We had a small Klan operation. I don’t remember the exact number of figures involved in that thing, but I do know that there was some action taken. If I remember correctly, one of the principals in that organization was finally convicted on a bootlegging or alcohol charge. That is the only COINTEL effort that I can remember that there was any activity of in Memphis.

Mr. Sawyer. What specifically was done by the FBI in Memphis to check out any possible Klan involvement?

Mr. Jensen. Well, any sources that we had in Memphis were contacted for any information they had. I know that they did the same thing in the Birmingham territory. I have forgotten the name of the principal in the Klan, but there was a large Klan there. I know that there was inquiry made in Mississippi also.

Mr. Sawyer. But you did not do anything in Memphis vis-a-vis the Klan—

Mr. Jensen. We didn’t have enough people.

Yes. I will have to qualify that. Yes, we contacted what sources we had that had knowledge of Klan activity, and we got no information indicating that there was an involvement on their part in the Memphis area or any other place that I know of.

Mr. Sawyer. Did you do any checking on the so-called States Rights Party there?

Mr. Jensen. I don’t remember that we had a States Rights Party in Memphis.

Mr. Sawyer. It undoubtedly came to your attention that when James Earl Ray bought the rifle and subsequently returned the rifle and exchanged it for another rifle that he mentioned his brother.

Mr. Jensen. Yes.

Mr. Sawyer. Did you do anything about that?
Mr. JENSEN. No. The only thing I know is that is what he reportedly said. Aeromarine—I have forgotten, I think that was the name of the place that he bought the weapon. There was some indication that supposedly the rifle wouldn’t do the job, and he brought it back because his brother said it wasn’t the kind of thing that he wanted. And vaguely I remember that part of the problem was there was some cosmoline or something in the rifle barrel so that you couldn’t insert a cartridge in the thing.

It seems to me as though that was one of the things that the laboratory found, that that was part of the problem with the first weapon.

Mr. SAWYER. Well, the first weapon he bought was a 243.

Mr. JENSEN. Yes.

Mr. SAWYER. Which is a very light high-velocity rifle.

Mr. JENSEN. Yes.

Mr. SAWYER. As you are probably aware.

Mr. JENSEN. Yes.

Mr. SAWYER. Then he apparently was totally satisfied with that gun, and then obviously he got some kind of consultation on the gun, because he brought it back?

Mr. JENSEN. Yes.

Mr. SAWYER. The next day, and got a 30.06.

Mr. JENSEN. Right.

Mr. SAWYER. Which is a much heavier caliber gun. Did you investigate where he got the advice that apparently he was totally satisfied or totally ignorant on the caliber situation with the rifle, and then the next day brought it back and exchanged it for a much heavier high velocity rifle? Didn’t that provoke any kind of a—

Mr. JENSEN. Yes.

Mr. SAWYER [continuing]. Investigation?

Mr. JENSEN. Yes, it did.

Mr. SAWYER. By your office?

Mr. JENSEN. Because the statement made by him, if I remember correctly what the witness said, that he said that his brother told him that that weapon wasn’t suitable, or words to that effect. I don’t remember the exact words. I also know that as a result of that, efforts were made to interview his brother or brothers, and the end result, as I remember it, the brothers were not amenable to interviews, so efforts were made to find out, well, “did you talk to your brother? Did you have any discussion with him?” And I don’t recall at any given time that any of the brothers were particularly cooperative.

Mr. SAWYER. Did the Memphis office interview either Jerry or Johnny Ray?

Mr. JENSEN. No; we did not. John—one of them lived in St. Louis and one of them lived up in Illinois.

Mr. SAWYER. Did the Memphis office arrange to have them interviewed?

Mr. JENSEN. We asked that they be. I am sure that we did.

Mr. SAWYER. Who did you ask?

Mr. JENSEN. The offices that were involved, St. Louis, and I believe it was Springfield, Ill., that covered—or it might have been Chicago. I don’t remember where that one brother lived up there.

Mr. SAWYER. Did you get back reports on that?
Mr. JENSEN. I am sure we did, and my recollection is that they were not very fruitful interviews.

Mr. SAWYER. Did you make any effort to determine whether or not either Jerry or John Ray had been in the vicinity of Memphis at the time the rifle was purchased and later exchanged?

Mr. JENSEN. We never found any information indicating that any of the brothers had been in Memphis until after Ray was incarcerated.

Mr. SAWYER. And you feel that after the assassination that the investigation proceeded along both potential conspiratorial lines as well as fugitive search?

Mr. JENSEN. Well, all I can tell you is that I know that the initial stages, yes, there was an emphasis on it, and as other information came in, anything that had any bearing on it, it wasn’t a matter, well, we have caught the guy, that is it.

Now there is much talk about the fugitive type investigation, but that in itself encompasses a lot of things. You talk to a lot of people. You explore many avenues that are available to you to explore. Unfortunately, neither of the brothers would tell us anything about the rifle situation, and I really don’t know whether he did actually talk to the brothers or not.

Mr. SAWYER. You don’t know whether who talked to the brothers?

Mr. JENSEN. Ray talked to his brothers or not.

Mr. SAWYER. But there was an attempt made to find that out? Mr. JENSEN. Yes.

Mr. SAWYER. I have nothing further, Mr. Chairman. I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Jensen, this committee, through its King subcommittee chaired by Congressman Fauntroy, has investigated some 21 allegations of conspiracies related to Dr. King. Can you tell me how many allegations of conspiracy in total the FBI investigated relative to Dr. King?

Mr. JENSEN. I have no way of knowing. I have no way of knowing. I know of those that we explored in Memphis ourselves, and I have already listed those.

Chairman Stokes. That would be the three or four— Mr. JENSEN. Right.

Chairman Stokes [continuing]. That you made reference to? Mr. JENSEN. Right.

Chairman Stokes. And of those which you are familiar with, do you know of any in which there were offers of money to kill Dr. King?

Mr. JENSEN. I have no recollection right now, no.

Chairman Stokes. I see. Thank you. I have nothing further.

The gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Preyer.

Mr. PREYER. I have only one thing I was not clear on.

Do you know that the FBI talked with the Ray brothers, or were you just saying they probably talked with them?

Mr. JENSEN. I did not physically talk to them, but I feel certain, and my recollection is, yes, sir, they were interviewed.
Mr. Preyer. Were you ever asked about a shrubbery—or bushes being cut down immediately after the assassination, bushes facing the motel?

Mr. Jensen. No, and yet I have a recollection of having read somewheres, and I may be wrong in my recollection, but I think the man that owned the Lorraine Motel or somebody arranged to have that stuff cut. It may have been a newspaper article, but no, I don't have any knowledge as to who did it or why they did it or anything of that sort. No, I don't.

Mr. Preyer. The FBI did not make any investigation of that?

Mr. Jensen. I don't know that they did, no.

Mr. Preyer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Devine.

Mr. Devine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Jensen, where were you physically when you learned that Dr. King had been shot?

Mr. Jensen. Sitting at my desk a few minutes after 6 o'clock on April 4.

Mr. Devine. How did you receive the word?

Mr. Jensen. I got a telephone call from I believe the dispatcher or communications officer of the Memphis Police Department.

Mr. Devine. And what did you then do, notify the bureau?

Mr. Jensen. No. The first thing I did—this is after hours. The first thing I did was see how many men were in the office that hadn't already gone home. I guess there were 8 or 10 men still left in the office, and I asked that they stay, and then I called the Washington headquarters of the FBI and told them of the information that I had received.

Mr. Devine. You as the agent in charge of the Memphis office assumed that the bureau had jurisdiction of the assassination?

Mr. Jensen. No, I did not. I didn't think that we had jurisdiction, and there was no basis at that time for us to take jurisdiction.

Mr. Devine. The jurisdiction at that moment vested in the Memphis Police Department?

Mr. Jensen. Right.

Mr. Devine. The Bureau's interest had to do with seeking a fugitive thereafter?

Mr. Jensen. Well, not immediately, because initially we didn't really know who or what, but I felt that it would only be a question of time that there would be a request to assist in a fugitive investigation from the Memphis Police Department.

Mr. Devine. Do you know when that came?

Mr. Jensen. It actually didn't come in that sense of the word, because a few hours later I got a call from I believe it was DeLoach, saying that the Attorney General had requested that the FBI go into the case at that moment, and then I went over to the Memphis Police Department.

Mr. Devine. That was a couple of hours then after the actual assassination?

Mr. Jensen. Yes, after Dr. King had been formally or legally declared dead.
Mr. Devine. Who was in charge of the investigation as far as the Memphis office was concerned? I believe you were the agent in charge.

Mr. Jensen. I was the agent in charge. The case was assigned to Agent Hester, Joe Hester.

Mr. Devine. Do you still have on your desk there MLK exhibit F-451C?

Mr. Jensen. Yes, I do.

Mr. Devine. And I would invite your attention to the lower left-hand corner where the initials appear of the person we presume dictated the memorandum, although it says "From G. C. Moore to"—

Mr. Jensen. Right.

Mr. Devine [continuing]. Assistant Director Sullivan. The initial is TJD—

Mr. Jensen. Right.

Mr. Devine [continuing]. Colon, TJD.

Now, would TJD be the man indicated on the bottom of the pages as T. J. Deakin?

Mr. Jensen. That would be consistent, yes, and I believe that is based on my recollection, though I think if I, of the way things were done when I was there. My initials would have appeared on a memorandum of this type in much the same way.

Mr. Devine. You presume then from the initials that the memorandum was dictated by Mr. Deakin for the signature of Mr. Moore and directed to Assistant Director Sullivan; is that correct?

Mr. Jensen. Correct, yes.

Mr. Devine. You would then presume that he would be the author of this particular memorandum?

Mr. Jensen. Yes.

Mr. Devine. Do you know of your own knowledge whether Mr. Deakin is still in the bureau, or alive today?

Mr. Jensen. I don't know that he is in the Bureau. I don't remember having met him, but I probably have. I don't know where he is.

Mr. Devine. But you don't know of your own knowledge whether Mr. Deakin is still in the bureau, or alive today?

Mr. Jensen. No, I do not.

Mr. Devine. Did you happen to know Agent Murtaugh that testified here last week?

Mr. Jensen. No, I do not know Murtaugh.

Mr. Devine. You have had no experience with him?

Mr. Jensen. No experience with him.

Mr. Devine. One other question, Mr. Jensen.

Prior to the assassination, what was the Bureau's interest in Dr. King?

Mr. Jensen. I don't have any specifics other than the general statements that Bill Lawrence made, and these are the things that I associate with the interest in him; his association stemming way back with some people of alleged Communist leanings who were presumably giving him advice, and the propensity or—that is not the correct word—the possibilities of violence in connection with these marches. Other than that, I don't have any personal knowledge of the relationship between Dr. King and Director Hoover.
Mr. Devine. You testified earlier that as agent in charge you knew that there was not any electronic or technical surveillance on Dr. King during his visits to Memphis, that you would have known as agent in charge if they had been in place.

Mr. Jensen. Yes; that is correct. There were none.

Mr. Devine. And that the Bureau’s interest prior to the sanitation workers march or strike was basically on a internal security general investigation, is that correct?

Mr. Jensen. That is correct.

Mr. Devine. No further questions, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The gentleman from the District of Columbia, Mr. Fauntroy.

Mr. Fauntroy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Is it your testimony, sir, that in spite of the fact that Mr. Ray returned the gun to Aeromarine to pick up another and indicated his brother had advised him to do so, that neither you nor the agency, to your knowledge, explicitly pursued interviews with John and Jerry Ray?

Mr. Jensen. No; I am not sure that you understood me.

Mr. Fauntroy. That is what I wanted to be sure, that I do.

Mr. Jensen. The two brothers did not live in the Memphis area or division where I had the authority to interview them personally or have agents from the Memphis office interview them, so that I cannot tell you that I have personal knowledge of the interview, but I say I feel absolutely certain, in fact I am positive, that they talked to the two brothers.

As I indicated, I am not sure whether one brother lived in the Chicago area or in the Springfield area of the FBI, so they are two separate offices. But I am, like I say, without partaking of the interview, there is no reason to assume why they were not and I feel certain efforts were made to interview them.

Mr. Fauntroy. I see——

Mr. Jensen. And the one in St. Louis, if I remember correctly, ran a tavern, and I am positive also that——

Mr. Fauntroy. He was interviewed?

Mr. Jensen. Yes.

Mr. Fauntroy. I see. Who would have determined that they be interviewed—say that they had lived in the Memphis area.

Mr. Jensen. Yes; me.

Mr. Fauntroy. Who would have determined that you were to seek an interview with them?

Mr. Jensen. I would have.

Mr. Fauntroy. You would have determined that?

Mr. Jensen. I would have; yes. Not only me, but the case agent, if I am listed as the agent in the case, because they would have been logical interviews.

Mr. Fauntroy. Would it not also be logical to determine whether or not the brothers were in the Memphis area at the time of the assassination?

Mr. Jensen. There was no information available to us from our investigation that Ray was with anybody else or that anybody else had ever seen him with anybody else.

Mr. Fauntroy. Did you seek that information? You said there was no information available to you.
Mr. Jensen. Yes.

Mr. Fauntroy. Did you seek specifically, specific information as to whether either of his brothers was in the Memphis area, as an index of possible conspiracy?

Mr. Jensen. I don't think that we did, because—I don't think that we did. At least I have no recollection.

Mr. Fauntroy. You indicated that you recalled that once you heard of the assassination of Dr. King you contacted several people. Did you contact Domestic Intelligence?

Mr. Jensen. Yes; I did.

Mr. Fauntroy. Do you recall who specifically you contacted within Domestic Intelligence?

Mr. Jensen. I don't remember the name of the person, but I called—I called for the man on duty at night, and if I remember correctly, I asked him to put me through to DeLoach.

Mr. Fauntroy. I see. Was not Mr. Sullivan in charge of Domestic Intelligence at that time?

Mr. Jensen. Yes.

Mr. Fauntroy. Why did you seek Mr. DeLoach?

Mr. Jensen. Because I felt that Mr. DeLoach was in a position to tell the Attorney General, the Director, and so on.

Mr. Fauntroy. And finally, you know that we have been puzzled by the fact that while Dr. King was under extensive surveillance in many areas of the country, electronic and otherwise, apparently there was no such surveillance through your office in Memphis.

Mr. Jensen. That is correct.

Mr. Fauntroy. You were contacted—did you have occasion to talk to Mr. DeLoach on the counterintelligence program?

Mr. Jensen. No; I did not.

Mr. Fauntroy. At any time?

Mr. Jensen. No; I did not.

Mr. Fauntroy. With whom did you talk in the central office about say the SAC memo of August 25, 1967?

Mr. Jensen. I don't remember that I ever talked to anybody in the central office about that memorandum.

Mr. Fauntroy. And your testimony is of course that you did nothing to implement it?

Mr. Jensen. That is correct.

Mr. Fauntroy. The counterintelligence program.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no questions.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. McKinney. It is essentially your testimony that despite the fact that the sanitation strikers march had evolved into violence, and despite the fact that you were vaguely aware of an antipathy between Mr. Hoover and Dr. King, that there were no special communiques from Washington at all about what your stance should be as Bureau Chief of Memphis when Dr. King was returning?

Mr. Jensen. I had no instructions to do—to take any kind of action that I have any recollection of whatsoever, and we took none that I know of.

Mr. McKinney. Does that not seem rather odd to you, considering that his first visit was at that point in the counterintelligence
program being used as a bad publicity item, was being used to discredit Dr. King?

Mr. Jensen. I didn't give any thought to that. I had no such plans. I had no intention of creating or dealing with the newspapers, nor did I get any instructions to deal with newspapers, to plant any kind of a story.

Mr. McKinney. So there was no communications at all then from Washington on that second visit?

Mr. Jensen. Not on that subject; no.

Mr. McKinney. On any subject concerning Dr. King?

Mr. Jensen. Well, that I cannot answer. That I cannot answer right offhand because I don't remember any instructions, but I do know there were none on—you will do thus and so. You will implement this program. You will do this thing or that thing, no instructions of that kind, nor did I seek any.

Mr. McKinney. And it would be logical that if there had been they would have come across your desk?

Mr. Jensen. They would have had to; yes.

Mr. McKinney. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Stokes. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Any other member of the committee seeking recognition?

Mr. Jensen, at the conclusion of a witness' testimony before our committee, the witness is entitled to a period of 5 minutes. During that time he can amplify or expand upon his testimony before the committee or make any further comment he so desires. I would extend to you 5 minutes for that purpose if you so desire.

Mr. Jensen. Well, I will say the same thing. I have not prepared a lengthy speech. I am a little upset at people accusing the FBI of being biased and bigoted and prejudiced.

I am a Yankee who went South and stayed there and enjoyed that part of the country. My personal background is that I came to the country from Denmark in diapers, and enjoy what we have here in this country. I have a tremendous feeling for it. I have great sympathy for equal rights for everybody, and I think the agents that I have been exposed to and have worked with have the same feeling. And when somebody will get up and say that this is a collection of bigots, and et cetera, I think something is missing, and nothing has been said about a current Associate Director Jim Adams, who has been accused of being a bigot. My personal experiences with Jim Adams are completely different, and permit me to illustrate by a concrete example.

I went to Birmingham. A Government job in Birmingham is an excellent job. It is one that offers security, stability, a living wage. The end result is there is very little change within the staff of an office.

An opportunity presented itself to hire for the first time a black employee in the Birmingham office. I was so impressed in an interview with the youngster, who was nervous and excited that I asked, "Why are you so nervous and apprehensive?" This youngster said to me, "I have never been interviewed by a white man before." She was eminently qualified, a first-class person. I recommended that she be hired and placed in the Birmingham office and, as usual, when things go to Washington, they get buried here and there.
I called Jim Adams and said: "Whatever happened to the applicant so-and-so?" Jim told me: "I'll take care of it." Within a very short time that employee was hired, and to the best of my knowledge is still in the Birmingham office. So that I want to say that in my experience with Jim Adams, the allegations that he was a racist and so on, I have no such knowledge, and my experience does not indicate that.

And as other people have said, I can appreciate your problems, and I would ask you that if legislation comes out of this committee, that extreme care be given to the direction that legislation takes. There is a responsibility that this committee has to the preservation of our system of Government, and there is a need for intelligence functions.

Now you can prescribe rules, guidelines. I am sure that any intelligence agency can work with rules and guidelines. They apparently are now, and this is all I ask of you, and I appreciate having another chance to come here and talk with you.

Chairman Stokes. Thank you very much, Mr. Jensen. We appreciate the benefits of your comments here today. Thank you for your appearance.

You are excused.

The Chair recognizes chief counsel, Professor Blakey.

NARRATION BY PROF. G. ROBERT BLAKEY, CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR

Mr. Blakey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, the involvement of the FBI in the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King must be considered from another perspective. Assume that James Earl Ray was the triggerman in the assassination of Dr. King, an offense for which he had plead guilty and has been convicted.

Assume further that the FBI had a hand in the conspiracy to kill Dr. King that came to fruition in Memphis.

Taken together, these two assumptions carry with them a necessary corollary. Ray and FBI agents or Bureau informants had to be in contact at some time in the period leading up to the assassination.

To determine if such contacts did in fact occur, the committee sought to identify all persons who met with Ray during the period of his incarceration at Missouri State Penitentiary, and from the time of his escape on April 23, 1967, to the assassination on April 4, 1968.

The committee compiled a list of 663 names of possible Ray associates, fellow inmates in Missouri State Prison, criminal associates, and other persons known to have had even fleeting contact with Ray after his escape. This list included individuals who had met Ray in bars and other places, even those who were registered at motels and rooming houses where Ray stayed.

The committee also identified the FBI agents in Jefferson City, Mo., where Missouri State Prison is located, and those agents assigned to the unlawful flight case following Ray's escape.

From the list of 633 known, probable or possible Ray associates during his fugitive period, the FBI was asked to identify any Bureau informants. The FBI acknowledged that in fact three per-
sons on the list had at one time or another been Bureau informants. Two of these informants were not active in 1967–68. One did have a confidential relationship with the Bureau in 1968.

The active informant who had been in contact with Ray was then interviewed by the committee. That interview established, (a) that his confidential relationship with the FBI dated back to the 1950's, and (b) that he had known Ray casually while the two men were serving terms together at the Missouri State Prison in the early 1960's.

It was also learned, however, that the informant left the penitentiary in 1965, nearly 3 years before the assassination, and the informant was returned to Missouri State Prison shortly after Ray's escape.

The committee checked the respective whereabouts of the two men during the period of several weeks in 1967 when they were both at liberty, but it could find no evidence that they were in contact either in person or by telephone, letter, or other means of communication.

Seven key FBI agents were also examined with respect to a direct connection between Ray and the Bureau, one of whom was in the Jefferson City office for the entire period of Ray's detention at the Missouri State Prison. From those interviews, no direct contact between Ray and the FBI either at the Missouri State Prison or during the fugitive period could be established.

The interviews also failed to indicate a contact between the Bureau and any individual who was also in contact with Ray from the time of his escape to the assassination.

Mr. Chairman, usually negatives can only be firmly established by showing inconsistent positives. Consequently, the only way to show beyond any doubt that the Bureau did not directly or indirectly conspire with James Earl Ray to kill Dr. King would be to show, if that were possible, who did, and to show that that individual or those individuals were themselves not connected to the Bureau, a process that could go on ad infinitum.

Ultimately, therefore, all that can be said here is that the committee was not able to develop any contact between Ray and an agent or informant of the FBI or any other evidence that would support a theory that the Bureau somehow conspired with Ray himself in the assassination of Dr. King.

What can be reasonably done has been done, and no evidence of that character has been found.

Chairman STOKES. Does counsel have anything further to present this morning?

Mr. BLAKEY. Nothing further at this time, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman STOKES. There being no further witnesses to appear before the committee today, the committee when it adjourns will adjourn until 9 a.m. on Monday morning next.

[Whereupon, at 11:56 a.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 9 a.m., Monday, November 27, 1978.]