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THE

REPUBLIC OF PLATO
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REPUBLIC OF PLATO

EDITED
WITH CRITICAL NOTES, COMMENTARY AND APPENDICES

BY
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VOLUME I
BOOKS I—V

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TO
THE MEMORY OF
ROBERT ALEXANDER NEIL
I GRATEFULLY AND AFFECTIONATELY DEDICATE THIS BOOK

eis ekéíon ton blón, ótan advís genvómevoi toís toioútois
entúxomev logois.
ἐν οὐρανῷ ἓσε Παράδειγμα ἀνάκειται τῳ θεολογεῖ ὤραν καὶ ὁρῶντι ἑαυτὸν κατοικίζειν.
PREFACE.

The Republic of Plato touches on so many problems of human life and thought, and appeals to so many diverse types of mind and character, that an editor cannot pretend to have exhausted its significance by means of a commentary. In one sense of the term, indeed, there can never be a definitive or final interpretation of the Republic: for the Republic is one of those few works of genius which have a perennial interest and value for the human race; and in every successive generation those in whom man's inborn passion for ideals is not quenched, will claim the right to interpret the fountain-head of idealism for themselves, in the light of their own experience and needs. But in another sense of the word, every commentator on the Republic believes in the possibility of a final and assured interpretation, and it is this belief which is at once the justification and the solace of his labours. Without desiring in any way to supersede that personal apprehension of Platonism through which alone it has power to cleanse and reanimate the individual soul, we cannot too strongly insist that certain particular images and conceptions, to the exclusion of others, were present in the mind of Plato as he wrote. These images, and these conceptions, it is the duty and province of an editor to elucidate, in the first instance, by a patient and laborious study of Plato's style and diction, divesting himself, as far as may be, of every personal prejudice and predilection. The sentiment should then be expounded and explained, wherever possible, by reference to other passages in the Republic and the rest of Plato's writings, and afterwards from other Greek authors, particularly those who wrote before or during the lifetime of Plato. The lines of Goethe,

Wer den Dichter will verstehen
Muss in Dichters Lande gehen,

apply with peculiar force to the study of the Republic, a dialogue which more than any other work of Plato abounds in allusions
both implicit and explicit to the history, poetry, art, religion and philosophy of ancient Greece. By such a method of exegesis, provided it is securely based on a careful analysis of the language, we may hope to disentangle in some degree the different threads which are united in Plato's thought, and thus contribute something towards an objective and impersonal interpretation of the Republic, as in itself one of the greatest literary and philosophical monuments of any age, and not merely a treasure-house of arguments in support of any school of thought or dogma.

I have done what in me lies to make an edition of the Republic in accordance with these principles. Although it has sometimes appeared necessary, for the better exposition of Plato's meaning, to compare or contrast the doctrine of the Republic with the views of later writers on philosophy, any systematic attempt to trace the connexion between Platonism and modern political, religious, or philosophical theory is foreign to the scope of this edition. I am far from underestimating the interest and importance of such an enquiry: no intellectual exercise that I know of is more stimulating or suggestive: but it is unfortunately fraught with danger for anyone whose object is merely to interpret Plato's meaning faithfully and without bias. The history of Platonic criticism from Proclus to the present time has shewn that it is difficult for a commentator who is constantly looking for parallels in contemporary thought to maintain the degree of intellectual detachment which the study of Plato's idealism demands; and although it is true that the genius of Plato outsoars the limits of time and place, the best preparation for following its flight is to make ourselves co-heirs with him in his intellectual heritage, and transport ourselves as far as possible into the atmosphere in which he lived. The influence of Plato on succeeding thinkers from Aristotle down to the present day is a subject of extraordinary range and fascination, but it belongs to the history, rather than to the interpretation, of Platonism. If ever that history is fully told, we shall begin to understand the greatness of the debt we owe to Plato, not only in philosophy, but also in religion. In the meantime we can only rejoice that Platonism is still a living force in both: ἔτι ἡλιος ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀρεσί καὶ οὐπω δεδυκεν.

One of the most toilsome duties which an editor of the Republic has to face is that of reading and digesting the
enormous mass of critical and exegetical literature to which the dialogue, particularly during the last century, has given rise. I have endeavoured to discharge this duty, so far as opportunity allowed; and if the labour has sometimes proved tedious and unremunerative, it is none the less true that in some instances the perusal of obscure and half-forgotten pamphlets and articles has furnished the key to what I believe to be the true interpretation. In many other cases, where the thesis which a writer seeks to prove is demonstrably false, the evidence which he accumulates in its support has served to illustrate and enforce a truer and more temperate view. But in spite of all the learning and ingenuity which have been expended on the Republic during recent years, there still remain a large number of passages of which no satisfactory explanation has hitherto been offered, and a still larger number which have been only imperfectly and partially explained. I have submitted all these passages to a fresh examination, partly in the Notes and partly in the Appendices, and although I cannot hope to have placed them all beyond the pale of controversy, I have spared no amount of time and labour to discover the truth, and in many cases I have been able to arrive at views which will, I hope, command the assent of others as well as myself. Wherever I have consciously borrowed anything of importance from previous commentators and writers, I have made acknowledgement in the notes; but a word of special gratitude is due to Schneider, to whom I am more indebted than to any other single commentator on the Republic. Since I began my task, the long-expected edition of the Republic by Jowett and Campbell has made its appearance, and I have found their scholarly and lucid commentary of service even in those places where it has seemed to me inadequate or inconclusive. Professor Burnet's text of the Republic was not available until the larger part of this edition had been printed off, but I have been able to make some use of his work in the later books.

I have to thank a number of friends for assistance rendered in various ways, and above all my former teacher, Dr Henry Jackson, of Trinity College, who has read through all the proofs and contributed many corrections and suggestions. Mr Archer-Hind, of Trinity College, and Mr P. Giles, of Emmanuel College, have also helped me with their criticisms on some portions of the work. To Professor J. Cook Wilson, of New College, Oxford,
I owe a special debt of gratitude for undertaking an exhaustive discussion of the astronomical difficulties in Book X, and unreservedly placing at my disposal the full results of his investigations. It is due to the kindness of Professor Campbell that I have again been able to use Castellani’s collations of the Venetian MSS Ⅱ and Ⅲ, as well as Rostagno’s collation of Cesenas M. The late Mr Neil, of Pembroke College, to whose memory I have dedicated the work, read and criticised the notes on the first four books before his untimely death, and often discussed with me many questions connected with the interpretation of Plato in general and the Republic in particular. Nor can I refrain from mentioning with affectionate gratitude and veneration the name of my beloved friend and teacher, Sir William Geddes, late Principal of the University of Aberdeen, to whose high enthusiasm and encouragement in early days all that I now know of Plato is ultimately due.

The coin which is figured on the title-page is a silver didrachm of Tarentum, dating from the early part of the third century B.C., and now in the British Museum. It represents a naked boy on horseback, galloping and holding a torch behind him: see the description by Mr A. J. Evans in the Numismatic Chronicle, Volume IX (1889), Plate VIII 14. I have to thank Mr Barclay V. Head, of the British Museum, for his kindness in sending me a cast of this appropriate emblem of the scene with which the Republic opens.

My best thanks are due to the Managers and staff of the University Press for their unremitting courtesy and care.

It is my hope to be able in course of time to complete this edition by publishing the introductory volume to which occasional reference is made throughout the notes. The introductory volume will deal inter alia with the MSS and date of composition of the dialogue, and will also include an essay on the style of Plato, together with essays on various subjects connected with the doctrine of the Republic.

Emmanuel College, Cambridge.
September 5, 1902.
### CONTENTS OF VOLUME I.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Note on the Text</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Book I</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendices to Book I</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Book II</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendices to Book II</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Book III</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendices to Book III</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Book IV</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendices to Book IV</td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Book V</td>
<td>274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appendices to Book V</td>
<td>345</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
NOTE ON THE TEXT OF THIS EDITION.

The materials for the text of the Republic will be discussed in the introductory volume to this edition: but it is necessary here to make a brief statement of the rules by which I have been guided in the selection of readings, and in the formation of the apparatus criticus.

The fundamental principle to which I have endeavoured to conform in the constitution of the text is as follows:—

"By reason of its age and excellence, Parisinus A is the primary authority for the text of the Republic, but the other MSS are valuable for correcting its errors and supplying its omissions" (The Republic of Plato, 1897, p. x).

The MS which stands next in authority to Parisinus A is admitted by all to be Venetus II; and in those cases where A is wrong, and the right reading occurs in II, either alone, or, as happens much more frequently, in common with other MSS, I have been content to cite in the apparatus criticus merely the authority of II, adding, of course, the discarded text of A.

In those cases where neither A nor II can be held to represent what Plato wrote, I have considered, in the first instance, the reading of all the other available MSS; secondly, the evidence of ancient writers who quote or paraphrase parts of the Republic; and, thirdly, emendations; but in the critical notes I have as far as possible restricted myself to Venetus Ε and Monacensis q, partly because I have found by experience that they come to the rescue oftenest when A and II break down, and partly because they are among the few MSS of the Republic,
besides A and Π, of which we possess thoroughly trustworthy collations. It is difficult to overestimate the debt which Platonic scholarship owes to Bekker, but the accuracy and completeness of his collations leave much to be desired, and it is safest for the present to cite, as far as may be, only those MSS of Bekker in which his work has been revised and supplemented by subsequent collators.

It sometimes, though comparatively seldom, happens that the reading which appears to be correct occurs only in MSS other than A, Π, Ξ or q. In such instances, if the reading which I approve is found in Angelicus v, I have sought to lighten the apparatus criticus by citing that MS only, even where its testimony is supported by that of other MSS. My experience has been that, next to Π, Ξ and q, Angelicus v is on the whole the most useful of Bekker's MSS for correcting the errors of A.

In the small number of passages where A, Π, Ξ, q and v appear all to be in error, I have named the other MSS which give the reading selected, confining myself in the first instance to the MSS collated by Bekker, and quoting the MSS of de Furia and Schneider only where Bekker's afford no help. Cesenas M has seldom been cited in the critical notes unless it appears to be the sole authority for the text adopted, but occasional reference is made to it in the commentary.

If the reading in the text is due to an early citation of Plato, or to an emendator, I mention the authority on which it rests. Considerably fewer emendations have been admitted than in my earlier edition, and in this as in other respects the text will be found to be conservative; but there are still some passages where all the MS and other authorities are unsatisfactory, and in these I have printed the emendations of others or my own, when they appear to me either highly probable or right.

In all cases where I have deserted both A and Π in favour of a reading found in Ξ (or q), the readings of A, Π and q (or Ξ) have also been recorded in the apparatus criticus; and when it has been necessary to desert not only A and Π, but also Ξ and q, I have given the readings of each of these four MSS for the information of the student.
The upshot of these rules is that unless the *apparatus criticus* states the contrary, the text of this edition follows Parisinum A, and that the value of the other MSS of Bekker, de Furia, and Schneider has been estimated by the assistance which they give whenever A is at fault. I have tried to give a full account\(^1\) of the readings of the great Paris MS, which I collated in 1891, and afterwards examined again in order to settle the few discrepancies between the results of Professor Campbell’s collation and my own. The scale of this edition has permitted me to give a tolerably complete record of the traces of double readings in A, so far at least as they point to variants affecting the sense or interpretation, and in such cases the rules by which the *apparatus criticus* is constructed are analogous to those already explained, as will appear from an inspection of the critical notes on 327 A 3, 328 E 34, 330 E 33, 333 E 28 and elsewhere.

It may be convenient to subjoin a table of the MSS cited in the notes, together with the centuries to which they have been assigned, and the authors of the collations which I have used.

\(^1\) I have however as a rule refrained from chronicling in the notes those cases in which I abandon the punctuation, accentuation, breathings, or spelling of A. Questions of orthography are most conveniently treated in a separate discussion, and something will be said on this subject in the Introduction. In the meantime I may be allowed to borrow from my edition of the text a statement of the rules which I have endeavoured to observe in matters orthographical. “As regards the spelling, A\(^1\) preserves several traces of the true Attic orthography, such as ἀποκτείνειμι (for example in 360 c), ὅς and a few others. These I have sedulously preserved. In general I have silently abandoned the spelling of A wherever the evidence of Inscriptions appeared conclusive against it, and sometimes also (though rarely) on other grounds, as for example in φιλόνικος versus φιλδνικος. Otherwise, in doubtful cases, where no sure guidance comes from Inscriptions, such as the addition or omission of ν ἐφελκυστικῶν, εὐπάθεια versus εὐπάθεια and the like, I have invariably aimed at following the practice of the first hand in A. I have also deferred to Inscriptions so far as to exclude those grammatical forms which have conclusively been shewn to be unattic, such as ἐστοσαν (352 a et al.), ψευδάσωσαν (381 E), εὐρόθαυς (for ἐνρόθαυς), and a few others; but when there seems to be some room for doubt, the reading of A has been retained. In general, the cases where it has seemed necessary to abandon A on these and similar grounds are few and insignificant.” The orthography of this edition will be found to be in practical agreement with that adopted by Schanz in his *Platonis opera*. 
NOTE ON THE TEXT.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MS</th>
<th>Century</th>
<th>Collator</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Parisinus A (Schneider’s Par. A)</td>
<td>IX</td>
<td>Adam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venetus II (Ven. C)</td>
<td>XI</td>
<td>Castellani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monacensis q (Mon. B)</td>
<td>XV</td>
<td>Schneider</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angelicus v (Ang. B)</td>
<td>XVI</td>
<td>Bekker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vaticanus Θ (Vat. B)</td>
<td>XV</td>
<td>Bekker¹</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parisinus D³ (Par. D)</td>
<td>XII or XIII</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vindobonensis Φ (Vind. B)</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Bekker and Schneider de Furia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florentinus A (Stallbaum’s a)</td>
<td>XIV</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parisinus D³ (Par. D)</td>
<td>XII or XIII</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vindobonensis D⁶</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>Schneider</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lobcovicianus</td>
<td>? XIV or earlier</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cesenas M</td>
<td>XII or XIII</td>
<td>Rostagno</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I hope to say something on the relationship between these MSS in my introductory volume.

¹ I have also recollated this MS for Books I—III of the Republic.
² From Book II onwards. I owe my information as to the date of this and the following MS to a communication from Dr Mercati.
³ IV 429 c—442 D is missing.
⁴ Contains only I—II 358 E, followed by the rest of II in a later hand.
⁵ Flor. B is usually assigned to the twelfth, and Flor. C to the thirteenth, century. The dates here given are due to Dr Guido Biagi, who has been good enough to re-examine at my request these and the other Florentine MSS.
⁶ Contains only I—V.
⁷ II 379 B—III 399 B is missing.
⁸ Contains only VII and X (up to 604 c).
ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑ.

TA TOT ΔΙΑΛΟΓΟΤ ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ.
ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ ΓΛΑΥΚΩΝ ΠΟΛΕΜΑΡΧΟΣ
ΘΡΑΣΥΜΑΧΟΣ ΑΔΕΙΜΑΝΤΟΣ
ΚΕΦΑΛΟΣ

Α.

I. Κατέβην χθές εἰς Πειραιαῖ μετὰ Γλαυκώνος τοῦ Ἀρίστωνος, προσευχόμενος τῇ θεώ καὶ ἀμα τὴν ἔορτήν βουλόμενος θεάσασθαι τίνα τρόπον ποιήσουσιν, ἀτε νῦν πρότον ἄγοντες. καλὴ μὲν οὖν

3. ἀτε Α"ΠΙ: ὅστε Α'.

Πλάτωνος Πολιτεία. On the name, characters, and date of action of the dialogue, see Introd. §§ 1, 2, 3.

327 A—328 B Socrates describes how he visited the Piraeus in company with Glauco, and was induced by Polemarchus and others to defer his return to Athens.

327 A ἀκατέβην κτλ. Dionys. Hal. de comp. verb. p. 208 (Reiske) ὁ δὲ Πλάτων, τοὺς ἑαυτὸν διηλόγους κτενίζων καὶ βοστρυχίζων, καὶ πάντα τρόπον ἀκαπλέκων, οὐ διέλευθαν ἀγαθοκροτοῦ γεγονός ἐτη, πᾶσι γὰρ δὴ τοὺς φιλοδόγχους γνώριμα τὰ περὶ τῆς φιλοσοφίας τάνδρος ἱστοροθεμένα, τὰ τ' ἄλλα, καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν δελτον ἡν τελευτήσων αὐτὸν λέγονς εἰρεθῆναι ποικίλως μετακειμένων τὴν ἄρχων τῆς πολιτείας ἔχοντας τήρηδε "κατέβην χθές εἰς Πειραιαῖ μετὰ Γλαυκώνος τοῦ Ἀρίστωνοι." See also Quint. viii 6. 64, and Diog. Laert. iii 37. The latter gives as his authorities Euphorion and Panaetius. As Cicero was tolerably familiar with the writings of Panaetius, it is possible that he too has the same story in view in de Sen. v 13, where he says of Plato "scribens est mortuus." The anecdote may well be true, but does not of course justify any inference as to the date of composition of the Republic. See Introd. § 4.

2 τῇ θεώ. What goddess? Bendis or Athena? The festival is the Bendideia (354 A) and it is perhaps safest to acquiesce in the usual view that Bendis is here meant. "Alii Minervam intelligunt, quae vulgo ἡ θεᾶς appellatur; neque mihi videtur Socrates in ista Panathenaeorum propinquitate de Minerva venerandâ cognoscere non potuisse: sed quod simpliciter τὴν ἐορτήν dicit, numina diversa statuere non sinit" (Schneider). We hear of a temple of Bendis in the Piraeus in 403 B.C. (τὴν ὁδὸν ἡ φέρει πρὸς τε τὸ λεύκῳ τὴν Μουνιχίας Ὀρτέμιδος καὶ τὸ Βενδίδειον Xen. Hell. ii 4. 11). See also Introd. § 3, and App. i.

3 νῦν πρῶτον. Perhaps 410 B.C. Introd. § 3.
moi καὶ ή τῶν ἐπιχωρίων πομηθ ἐδοξέν εἶναι, οὐ μέντοι ἦπτον 5 ἐφαίνετο πρέπειν ἣν οἱ ὂρακες ἐπεμπον. προσευξάμενοι δὲ καὶ θεωρίζαντες ἀπ' ἀπό το τό ἀστυν. κατιδὼν οὖν πόρροθεν ἦμᾶς Β 15 ὁκαδε ὁρμημένους Πολέμαρχος ὁ Κεφάλον ἐκείλευσε δραμύτα τὸν παέδα περιμεναὶ καὶ κελεύσα. καὶ οἱ ὁπισθεὶν ὁ παῖς λαβόμενος τὸν ἱματίου, Κελεύει ὑμᾶς, ἐφή, Πολέμαρχος περιμεῖαι. 10 καὶ ἐγὼ μετεστραφήν τι καὶ ἠρώμην ὅπου αὐτὸς εἶν. Οὔτος, ἐφη, ὁπισθεὶ προσέρχεται ἀλλὰ περιμεῖαι. 'Αλλα περιμενούμεν, ἡ δ' ὡς ὁ Γλαύκων. καὶ ὅλιγο ὑστερον ὁ τε Πολέμαρχος ἑκεῖς καὶ Ἀδείμαντος ὁ τοῦ Γλαύκωνος ἄδελφος καὶ Νικήρατος ὁ Νικιόν καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς, ὡς ἀπὸ τῆς πομῆς. ὁ οὖν Πολέμαρχος ἐφή 15 Ω. Σώκρατες, δοκεῖτε μοί πρὸς ἄστυν ὁρμῆσαι ὡς ὑπότενε. Οὐ γὰρ θακῶς δοξάζεις, ἡν δ' εγὼ. 'Ορᾶς οὖν ἦμᾶς, ἐφη, ὁσοι ἐσμέν; Πῶς γὰρ οὐ; 'Ἡ τοῖν τούτων, ἐφη, κρείττους γένεσθε ἢ μενετ' αὐτοῦ. Ὅνυκον, ἡν δ' εγὼ, ἔτι ἐν λειπταί, τό ἢν πείσωμεν ὑμᾶς, ὃς χρή ἦμᾶς ἀφέωι; 'Ἡ καὶ δύναισθ' ἅν, ἡ δ' 20 οὐ, πείαι μὴ ακούονται; Οὐδαμῶς, ἐφη ὁ Γλαύκων. 'Ὡς τοῖν μὴ ἀκουσαμένων, οὐτοῦ διανοεῖ. καὶ ὃ 'Ἀδείμαντος, Ἀρὰ γε, | ἡ δ' ὡς, οὐδ' ίστε ὅτι λαμπτάς ἔσται πρὸς ἐστέραν ἀφ' ὑππον τῇ 328 θεῷ; Ἀφ' ὑππον; ἡν δ' εγὼ; καινών γε τοῦτο. λαμπάδαια ἔχουντες

4. η τῶν Αθηναίων: ἣ τῶν Α'.

18. εν λειπταί Σξικτάν χρ. Υπ. ΕΠί. Σκ. ΑΠ. III.

5 οἱ Ὄρακες. Probably resident aliens (as opposed to the ἐπιχωρίων or natives), living for commercial purposes in the Piraeus, which at all times contained a large admixture of foreign population. It was part of Athenian policy to encourage commercial settlers by allowing them to exercise their own cults (Foucart des assoc. relig. chez les Grecs p. 131). Foucart holds that the worship of the Thracian goddess Bendis was brought to the Piraeus by Thracian merchants (p. 84). Others have supposed that οἱ Ὄρακες refers to envoys from 'Thrace, or Thracian mercenaries, the survivors of those who came to Athens in 414 B.C. (Thuc. VII 27); but the other view is more probable.

327 B 6 το ἄστυ or ἄστυ 327 C is regular for Athens itself as opposed to the Piraeus. Hartman would omit the article (cf. Lys. 13, 88 τοῦ ἐν ἄστει εἰ ἐν τῷ Περιαίει); but it occurs infra 328 C, Pheidr. 230 C, Arist. Pol. Ath. 38. I. and elsewhere.

10 αὖτος: 'ipse', 'eris', 'the master' as often: cf. e.g. Prot. 314 D οὐ σχολη αὐτῷ and the Pythagorean αὐτὸς ἐφα. With the deictic οὖτος cf. Symp. 175 Α. Σωκράτης οὖτος—ἐστήκει, 'there goes Socrates—standing.'

327 C 18 εν λειπταί. See cr. n. ελλείπεται (which Hermann and others retain) is less pointed, in view of the two alternatives ἤ—κρεῖττους γένεσθε ἢ μὲνετ' αὐτοῦ. For λειπταὶ said of the μεταξύ τι (Συμφ. 202 A) or third alternative, cf. Theaet. 188 A ἄλλο γ᾿ οὐδὲν λειταί περὶ ἐκατον πλὴν εἰδέναι ἢ μὴ εἰδέναι. 20 ὡς—διανοεῖτε: 'well, you may make up your mind that we shall refuse to listen.' Cf. (with Stallbaum) Crat. 439 C διανοθήκετε—ὡς ἄνθων ἀπάντων ἄλι καλ ἰδέων. μὴ is owing to the imperative: cf. Soph. O. C. 1154 and Jebb's note.

328 A 1 λαμπάς κατ. λαμπάς was the official name for a torch-race: see Mommsen Heortologie pp. 170 n., 282.

τῇ θεῷ: see on 327 A and App. I.
2 λαμπάδια: Harpocratio remarks ἕν
νῦν ἡμείς λαμπάδα καλούμεναι, οὕτως ὒπω-
μαζών. But lamπάς was used for 'torch'
even in classical Greek. Plato chooses
λαμπάδων because he has just used λαμ-
πάς in a different sense.
3 διαδώσουντι κτλ. shows that—except
for the novel substitution of mounted
competitors for runners—the torch-race
in question was of the kind alluded to
in Hdt. viii 98 and elsewhere as held
in honour of Hephaestus. The competition
was not between one individual and an-
other, but between different lines of
competitors, the torch being passed on
from man to man. Victory fell to the chain
whose torch, still burning, first reached
the goal. The well-known figure in Lows
776 ἐ καθάρει λαμπάδα τοῦ βίων παραδι-
δότας ἄλλοι ἐξ ἄλλων refers to the same
form of race. Plato nowhere mentions
the simpler form described by Pausanias
(130.2), in which individuals contended
against each other: see Baumeister Denk-
5 ἔγειρεν θεάσασθαι. Songs and dances
were the leading features in a παρνάχις.
Heracl. 781—783, ἀνεμενέτη ζε γὰς ἐπ' ἐνερ-2
(her Acropolis) ὁλόσωμα παρνά-
χιος ὑπὸ παρθένων λαγχέοι τῶν κρότους
(in honour of Athena at the Panathenaeae).
ἐξαναστήρισμα κτλ. The promise is
nowhere fulfilled.
328 ב 7 ἄλλως ποιεῖτε. Schanz
(Novae Comm. Plat. p. 25) shews that this
phrase, which is tolerably frequent in
Plato, always occurs in combination with
a positive command (here μένετε) except
in 11.369 B.
328 ב—328 ב The scene at the house
of Polemarchus. Socrates begins to inter-
rogate Cephalus on the subject of old age.
328 ב 10 εἰς τοῦ Πολεμάρχου. Po-
lemarchus was older than Lysias (infra
331 D), and we are to infer that at this
time Cephalus lived with him. There
is no reason why we should (with Blass
Att. Ber. p. 338) reject Plato's statement
that Polemarchus had a house in the
Piraeus: the words of Lysias (12.16),
which Blass relies upon as shewing that
Polemarchus lived not in the Piraeus,
but in Athens, refer to 404 B.C. and do
not prove it even for that year. Lysias
probably lived at this time in a house of
his own in the Piraeus, as in 404 B.C.
(Lys. 12.8): it is to be noted that he is
mentioned along with the visitors, in
contrast with Cephalus (ἣν ἐν ἄλλῳ κτλ.
—τεθηκὼς γὰρ ἐγγίζακεν ἐν τῇ ἀληθείᾳ
infra c). Cf. Boeckh Kl. Schr. IV p. 475
n. 1 and Sluckburgh Lys. Orat. ed. 2
p. xii.
15 διὰ χρόνου—αὐτόν. καὶ 'indeed'
goes with the whole clause: cf. Soph.
Ant. 1253 ἄλλ' εἰσάμεθα μή τι καὶ κατά-
σχέσεων | κρυφῇ καλύπτει καρδίᾳ δυσμοιρένην
with Jebb’s note. Tucker translates 'for
it was some time since I had so much as
seen him'—throwing, I think, too much
emphasis on καὶ.
I—2
328 c 16 προσκεφαλαίον τε καὶ δίφρον: virtually a hendiadys, as Hartman remarks, comparing Homer II. ix 200 εἶτεν δ' ἐν κλωομαία τάπτησε πορφυρόως. It is somewhat fanciful to suppose (with Hartman) that Plato throughout this picture was thinking of the aged Nestor seated among his sons (Od. iii 32 ff.). τίνος adds a touch of vagueness: ‘a sort of combination of cushion and chair’ (Tucker).

teuthikos γάρ explains ἐστεφανωμένος: “coronati sacrificandab, ut satis constat” Stallbaum. The God to whom Cephalus had been sacrificing was doubtless Ζέας ἔρειχος, whose altar stood in the αὐλή.

19 οὐδέ—Πειραια. A negative must be supplied, “ut amice expostulabundus cum Socrates senex hoc dicere videatur: tu neque alia facis, quae debebas, neque nostram domum frequentas. Simili ellipsis nostrates: Du kommest auch nicht oft zu uns” (Schneider). οὐδέ is ‘also not’: for exx. see Riddell Digest of Platonic Idioms § 141 and Jebb on Soph. O. C. 590. οὐδέ in οὐδέ πάνω βάδων IX 587 c is another instance, in which, as here, the latter has a kind of colloquial effect. Stallbaum takes οὐδέ with θαμίζεις “ne ventias quidem ad nos, h. e. raro sane domum nostram frequentas”; but his explanation hardly holds good, and is not justified by Xen. Symp. 4. 23, where οὐδέ coheres closely with the emphatic σοί. Others have suspected corruption, proposing οὐ τι (Aet, cf. Od. v 88 πάρος γε μέν οὐ τι θαμίζεις), οὐ δέ (Nitzsch), or οὐ δι’ (Hartman). οὐ τι is very unlikely; for θαμίζω is not exclusively a poetic word (cf. Laxus 843 b), and we need not suppose that Plato is thinking of Homer. I agree with Hartman that οὐ δέ is improbable: δέ is not sufficiently explained by saying that it is “adversative to the idea contained in ἕσπαζετο” (J. and C., with Schneider Additamenta p. 2). None of the cases quoted by Sauppe Ep. Crit. ad G. Hermannum p. 77 (Ar. Knights 1302, Hdt. ix 108, Theogn. 659, 887, 1707 and Callinus I 2) seem to me to justify the change of οὐδέ to οὐ δέ. Hartman’s correction is better; but I believe the text is sound.

328 d 25 μή οὐν κτλ. To this sentence Lach. 181 b c furnishes a near parallel. νεανίας refers to Socrates’ companions who had come from Athens, as opposed to Cephalus, Polemarchus and the others; the emphasis, as often, being on the καὶ clause: ‘associate with these young men, but come and visit us also.’ So also Boeckh Kl. Schr. IV p. 475. There is no sufficient reason for reading νεανίκας (with II and other MSS): see Introd. § 3.

27 καὶ μην κτλ.: ‘Indeed, Cephalus,’ etc. γε need not be added (with II and other MSS) after χαίρω: cf. Phaed. 84 d καὶ μή: cf. Σώκρατες, τάλαγα σοι ἔφω, Euthyd. 275 b 304 c al., with Jebb on Soph. O. T. 749, 1005.
Ε διαλεγόμενος τοίς σφόδρα πρεσβύταις. δοκεί γὰρ μοι χρῆναι παρ’ αυτῶν πυθαγεῖσθαι, ὦστερ τινὰ ὄνομα προεδηλουθώτων, ἦν καὶ ἡμᾶς ἵσως δείχσει πορεύεσθαι, ποία τίς ἔστιν, τραχεία καὶ 30 χαλεπτη, ἦ ῥαδία καὶ εὐποροσ· καὶ δὴ καὶ σοῦ ἴδεως ἂν προάγην, ὁ τί σοι φαίνεσθαι τούτο, ἐπειδῆ ἐνταῦθα ἤδη εἰ τῆς ἡλικίας, δὴ δὴ ἐπὶ γήρας οὐδ’ φασίν εἶναι οἱ ποιηταί, πότερον χαλεπτον του βίου ἢ τῶς σὺν αὐτῷ ἔξαγγέλλεις.

329 III. Ἐγὼ σοι, ἐφη, νῦ τὸν Δία ἑρώ, ὁ Σάκρατες, | οὗν γέ μοι φαίνεται. τολλάκις γὰρ συνερχομεθά τινες εἰς ταύτῳ παραπληραῖαν ἡλικίαν ἔχοντες, διασωφόντες τὴν παλαίαν παρομιάν. οἱ οὖν πλείστοι ἡμῶν ἀλοφύρουνται ξυνιόντες, τὰς ἐν τῇ νεότητι ἡδῶς παθοῦντες καὶ ἀναμμηνηκόρειοι περὶ τε τὰ φρονοσία καὶ περὶ 5 πότους καὶ εὐνύχιας καὶ ἀλλ’ ἀττα ἄ τῶν τοιούτων ἔχεται, καὶ ἀγανικτοῦν ὅσον μέγαλον τινόν ἄπειστεροίπνοι καὶ τότε μὲν εὗ 329 Β ξόντες, νῦν δὲ οὐδὲ ξόντες. ἐνοι δὲ καὶ τὰς τῶν 1 οἰκείων προπη-

34. αὐτὸ Α’Π: αὐτὸς Α².

328 ε 30 τραχεία καὶ χαλεπτή κτλ. The language (as Ast observes) is perhaps suggested by Hesiod Od. 290 ff. Μακρὸς δὲ καὶ δρᾶσις οἰμοὶ εἰς αὐτὴν | καὶ τράχης τὸ πρωτὸν· ἐπὶ δ’ εἰς ἀκρόν λειταί, | ῥήσις δή ἐπί θάλει, χαλέπτη ἢ περὶ ἐνόσια. Cf. Ι 364 D n.

33 ἐπὶ γήρας οὐδὲ. The phrase occurs first in the Iliad (XXII 60, XXIV 487) to denote the natural limit of the life of man. Cephalus is μᾶλλα πρεσβύτερα 328 B. The same meaning suits also in Od. Xv 246 (οὐδ’ ἱκετο γῆρας οὐδῶν 348 and XXIII 212, Ἑυμ. Ἀφρ. 106, Hes. Od. 331, Hdt. ΙΙΙ 14 and elsewhere. Leaf can hardly (I think) be right in explaining οὐδ’ as ὁδ’ in II. ΙΧΧII 60. γήρας is a descriptive genitive (like τέλος γῆρας ἀγαλλόν Μιμ. Fr. 2, 6, τοῦ λόγου ἐν δόλιχω—not δόλιχω—τοῦ λόγου Προτ. 329 A), old age being itself the threshold by which we leave the House of Life. We enter as it were by one door and pass out by another. The idea underlying the phrase may be compared with Democritus’ ἀ κόσμος σκε-νή, ὁ βίος παρόδος: ἑλές, ἐδές, ἀπήλες (Mullach Fr. Phil. Gr. 1 p. 356).

χαλεπτόν κτλ. χαλεπτός is neuter on account of τούτῳ in δ’ τοι σελεύσθη τούτο, and τοῦ βίου is a simple participial genitive; cf. Xen. Mem. 1 6. 4 ἐπακεφαλεῖθα τί χαλεπτὸν ἰδῆσθαι τοῦμον βίου. I cannot agree with Tucker in rendering ‘disagreeable in respect of the sort of life.’ Ast takes χαλεπτόν as masc. (comparing cases like III 416 B τὴν μεγάστην τῆς ἐγκλεσίας), but Αὐτό shews that he is wrong. Translate simply ‘whether it is a painful period of life.’ It is needless to insert (with Hartman) τι after χαλεπτόν; still worse is Liebhold’s addition of τέλος.

34 ξαγγέλλεις: like the ἔξαγγελος in tragedy, Cephalus is the bearer of news from behind the scenes.

329 A—329 D Cephalus delivers his views on old age. It is, or should be, a haven of peace; old men have themselves to blame if they are miserable.

329 Α 3 παρομιλαν. ἠλίξ ἠλίκα τέρπει (Phaedr. 240 c).

4 ἰπινύντες: ι.δ. ὅταν ἰπινύσιν ἡν ἠκούσαν ὁ ἦν ὅτι τούτῳ, ἀλλ’ ἰπινύσιν ἠκούσαν μεκράν. Cf. also Mimn. Fr. 1 1 ff.; Sim. Fr. 71 τίς γὰρ ἄδομα ἄτερ] θνατών βίοις πολεσθεῖσι; Eur. Fr. 1605. Similar sentiments are very common throughout Greek literature, especially in poetry.
λακίσεις τοῦ γήρας οὖν, καὶ ἕτε τοῦτο δὴ τὸ γήρας ὑμνοῦσιν
10 ὅσων κακῶν σφίσιν αἴτιον. ἔμοι δὲ δοκοῦσιν, ὡς Σῶκρατες, οὕτως
οὐ τὸ αἴτιον αἰτίᾳ. εἰ γὰρ ἦν τοῦτο αἴτιον, κἀν ἔγω τὰ αὐτὰ
ταῦτα ἐπεπόνθη ἑνεκά γε γήρας καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ὡς ἐνταῦθα
ἀδικίας. νῦν δὲ ἐγγυτῇ ἣδη ἐντετύχκα οὐχ οὕτως ἔχουσιν καὶ ἄλλοι, καὶ δὴ
καὶ Σοφοκλέας ποτὲ τῷ ποιητῇ παρεγενόμενη
15 ἐρωτωμένῳ ὑπὸ τίνος Πῶς, ἔφη, ὡς Ἄρων, ἑχει πρὸς τάφρον
δίσια; ἐτί οίας τε ἐι γυναικὶ συγγίνεσθαι; καὶ ὡς, Εὐφήμει, ἔφη,
ὡς ἄνθρωποι· ἀσμενέστατα μενοί αὐτὸ ἀπέφυγον, ἀσπερ λυττώντα
τινα καὶ ἄγριον δεσπότην ἄποφυγόν. εὖ οὖν μοι καὶ τότε ἔδοξεν
ἐκεῖνος εἰπεῖν καὶ νῦν οὐχ ἦττον. παντάπασι γὰρ τὸν τε τοιούτω
20 εἰν τῷ γήρας πολλῇ εἰρήνῃ γίγνεται καὶ ἐλευθερία. ἐπειδὰν αἱ
ἐπιθυμίαι παύσωμαι κατατίνουσι καὶ χαλάσωσι, παντάπασι
τὸ τοῦ Σοφοκλέους γίγνεται. 1 δεσποτῶν πάνυ πολλῶν ἑστὶ καὶ D
μανομενῶν ἀπηλλάχθαι. ἄλλα καὶ τούτων πέρι καὶ τῶν γε
πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους μία τις αἴτια ἑστῖν, οὐ τὸ γήρας, ὡς Σῶκρατες,
25 ἄλλα τοῖς τρόποις τῶν ἀνθρώπων. ἄν μὲν γὰρ κόσμιοι καὶ εὐκολοὶ
ὡσίν, καὶ τὸ γήρας μετρίως ἑστὶν ἐπίτοιον; εἰ δὲ μη, καὶ γήρας,
ὡς Σῶκρατες, καὶ νέστῃς χαλεπῇ τῷ τοιούτῳ ἐμβαίνει.

329 c 16 ἔτι—συγγίνεσθαι. Τhese
words are rejected by Hirschig, Cobet, and
Hartman, but their genuineness is sup-
ported by the singular αὐτὸ in αὐτὸ ἀπέ-
φυγον and by Plut. περὶ φιλοσοφιῶν 5.
525 A ὁ Σοφοκλῆς ἐρωτηθεὶς εἰ δύναται
γυναῖκι ηὔρισκεν, Εὐφήμει, ἄνθρωποι,
ἐπεὶ κτλ. In such matters Greek realism
called a spade a spade. In spite of the
anecdote here told, few writers have made
painted sadder pictures of old age than
Sophocles: see for example O. C. 1235—
1238 and Fr. 684. More in keeping with
the present passage is Fr. 688 οὐκ
ἔστι γῆρας τῶν σοφῶν, ἐν οἷς ὁ νοῦς | 
θεῖον ἀνέστην ἡμέρα τεθραμμένον.
17 ἀπέφυγον—ἀποφυγόν. The repeat-
tition adds a certain impressiveness to
the sentence. Herwerden is in error when he
jects αποφυγόν, which seems to have been
read also by Plutarch (referred to in last
ote).
21 κατατείνουσα is intransitive. If
the meaning were (as Ast holds) transitive
—man being conceived as the puppet of
the desires cf. ἔλεγος 6.44 E—we would
expect ἔτι- or αὐτ- rather than κατα-
teίνουσα: see Phaed. 94 c and 98 d.

παντάπασιν κτλ. The impressive
iteration is in keeping with the age and
earnestness of the speaker: cf. 331 A, B.

22 ἔτι. Stallbaum and others eject
this word, but it is not easy to see why
a scribe should have inserted it, particu-
larly in such an idiomatic position. The
asyndeton before δεσποτῶν is regular in
explanatory clauses. I read ἔτι (with A)
in preference to ἔστι: the meaning 'is pos-
sible' does not suit, and would require
ἀπαλλαγήναι rather than ἀπηλλάχθαι.
Translate 'it is the deliverance once and
for all from tyrants full many and furious.'
The grammatical subject, as in English,
remains vague; it is involved in ἐπείδα-
—χαλάσωσι. For the use of ἐστι cf.
Ἠμβρυχίτης. 2 D φαίνεται μοι—ἀρχέσθαι
ὁρός: ὁρός γὰρ ἐστὶ τῶν νεῶν πρὸτερον
ἐπιμεληθῆναι. The sentence-accent falls
on πολλῶν and μανομενῶν and not on
ἔστι. The view of old age presented
here recalls the μελέτη θανάτου τῆς
Phaedo.

329 D 25 εὐκολοι. Like Sophocles
himself: ὡς δ’ εὐκόλον μὲν εὐθαδ’, εὐκόλος
δ’ ἐκεῖ (A. Frogs 82).
IV. "Kai ἐγὼ ᾠγασθείς αυτοῦ εἰπόντος ταῦτα, Βουλόμενος ἔτι Ε λέγειν αυτοῦ ἐκίνουν καὶ εἶπον. 'Ο Κέφαλε, οὐμαί σου τοὺς πολλοὺς, ὅταν ταῦτα λέγης, οὐκ ἀποδέχεσθαι, ἀλλ' ἡγεῖσαι σε ῥαδίως τὸ γῆρας φέρειν οὐ διὰ τὸν τρόπον, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ πολλὴν οὐσίαν κεκτῆσαι: τοὺς γὰρ πλουσίους πολλὰ παραμύθια φασι εἶναι. Ἀληθῆ, ἐφὶ, λέγεις; οὐ γὰρ ἀποδέχονται. καὶ λέγουσι μὲν τι, οὐ μέντοι ὡς σοι οὖνται, ἀλλὰ τοῦ Θεομυστικόλευσ

330 εὐχείς, διὸ τὸ Σερηφίου λοιπονυμένῳ καὶ λέγοντι, ὅτι οὐ δὲ αὐτοῖς ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν πόλιν εὐδοκιμοῦ, ἀπεκρίνατο, ὅτι οὖτ' ἄν αὐτὸς Σερήφιος ὃν ὀνομαστὸς ἐγένετο οὔτ' ἐκεῖνος Ἄθροιος. καὶ τοῖς δὴ πλουσίοις, χαλεπῶς δὲ τὸ γῆρας φέροισιν, εὐ χείς ἄν αὐτὸς λόγος, ὅτι οὐτ' ἄν ὁ ἐπιείκης πάνυ τι ῥαδίως γῆρας μετὰ πενίας 5 ἐνέγκοι, οὔθ' ὁ μὴ ἐπιείκης πλουτῆσαι εὐκόλος ποτ' ἄν ἐαυτῷ.

29. σου Α.Π.: σε corr. Α.2.
330 A, B 8 ποι' ἐπεκτήσάμην κτλ.: 'do you want to know what I acquired, Socrates?' ποι' is simply 'what' as in Μεν. 87 ε τε σκεφώμεθα δὴ καθ' ἐκαστὸν ἀναλαμβάνοντες, ποία ἦσστιν ἡ ἑμάς ὠφελεί. ὠφελεὶ δὲν μην ἐκεῖ καί κάλλος καὶ πλούτω δὴ: ταῦτα λέγομεν καὶ τα τυπάτα ὑφέλιμα, and in the usual τὰ ποία ταῦτα; There is no derision implied, as in ποι' Κτήσιππος (Enyth. 291 Α) and the like: had Cephalus desired to pour scorn on the suggestion, he would have said πόθεν ἐπεκτήσαμην; (cf. Crat. 398 Ε): and it would be absurd to deride a charge to which you at once plead guilty (γένονα χρηματιστῆς κτλ.). If Socrates' question had been not πότερον—τὰ πλεῖον παρέλαβες ἢ ἐπεκτήσω, but ποία ἐπεκτήσω, Cephalus would have said ὡτια ἐπεκτήσαμην: but this idiom is inadmissible, except where the same interrogative occurs in its direct form in the original question. In view of the answer (μένος τις κτλ.) which Cephalus gives, πόσο for ποία would be too precise. Of the various emendations which have been suggested, the only plausible one (in point of sense) is Richards' πότερον for ποι' or ποί: this would assimilate the original and the repeated question, but is less well adapted to Cephalus' reply. Cephalus in point of fact uses an old man's privilege and accommodates his interrogator's question to his own reply. See also v 465 Ε μ.

330 B II Δυσανίας δι'. Groen van Prinsterer's suggestion (Plat. Prosopogr. p. 111) Δυσαιας for Δυσανιας is at first sight plausible, since it is in harmony with the well-known Greek custom of calling grandsons after their grandfathers: but the fashion was by no means invariable: see Blümmer, Gr. Privatallterth. p. 284. [Plut.] vit. Lys. 835 c also calls Cephalus son of Lysianias.

330 B 13 τοῦτοιν. Bekker and others read τοὐσοι, but there is no reason for deserting the MSS. The archaic dative in -οι is tolerably often used by Plato. In the Republic alone it recurs in 345 Β, 388 Ε, 389 Β, 468 Β (Homer), 560 Ε, 564 Ε, 607 Β (-αι) (poetic): see also Schneider on ΠΕΙ. 389 Β, and for the usage of inscriptions Meisterhaus p. 126. In this particular passage the archaic ending suits the age of the speaker; but it should be remembered that Plato's style (at least in his more mature dialogues) is not a mere reproduction of the vernacular Attic, but also in no small measure a literary language or 'Kunstsprache,' in which Ionisms and poetic and archaic forms are occasionally employed: see especially Hirzel Der Dialog 1 pp. 246—250 mm. Hirzel (ib. p. 34 n. 1) gives reasons for holding that a sort of κουρη διάλεκτος, resembling the dialect of Herodotus, was actually spoken in certain cultivated circles at Athens in the Periclean age, e.g. by Anaxagoras and his group, by the Ionian sophists and their followers etc., and some of Plato's Ionisms may be inherited from this source. Cf. vii 533 Β μ.

14 οὐ τοι ενεκα—οτι. The reading τούτοιν for οὐ, though supported by Stobaeus (Flor. 94. 22), is a correction made by some one unacquainted with the idiom, which is common enough in conversational style: cf. infra 491 Β δ μεν τάντων ἀθυμιστήσαν δικαίας, διτι κτλ. and Ar. Frogs 108. Hartman's τού τοι (interrogative) is ingenious, but unnecessary.
C εδοξάς οὐ σφόδρα ἀγαπᾶν τὰ χρήματα. τούτο δὲ ποιοῦσιν ὡς ἢ τὸ πολὺ οὐ ἂν ἦν μὴ αὐτοὶ κτήσωνται· οἱ δὲ κτησάμενοι διπλὴ ἢ ἢ άλλοι ἀσπάζονται αὐτά. ὡσπέρ γάρ οἱ ποιηταὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ποιήματα καὶ οἱ πατέρες τοὺς παίδας, ἀγαπῶσιν, ταύτη τε δὴ καὶ οἱ χρηματισάμενοι περὶ τὰ χρήματα σπουδάζουσιν ὡς ἔργον ἑαυτῶν, καὶ κατὰ τὴν χρεῖαν, ἦσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι. χάλεπτοι οὖν καὶ οἱ 20 ξυγγενέσθαι εἰσίν, οὔδεν ἐθέλοντες ἐπαινεῖν ἄλλ’ ἢ τὸν πλοῦτον. Ἀληθῆ, ἐφι, λέγεις.

D Ψ. Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἢ δ’ ἐγώ. ἀλλὰ μοι ἔτι τοσοῦτοι εἰπέ· τί μεγίστον οἴει ἀγαθὸν ἀπολελαυκέναι τοῦ πολλῆς οὐσίαν κεκτήσαται; "Ο, ἢ δ’ ὦ, ἦσως οὐκ ἄν πολλοὺς πείσαμι λέγον. εὐ γάρ ἵσθι, 25 ἐφ’ οἱ Σώκρατες, ὦτι, ἐπειδὰν τὶς ἐγγὺς ἢ τοῦ οἴσθαι τελευτήσειν, εἰσέρχεται αὐτῷ δέος καὶ φροντὶς περὶ ὅν ἔμπροσθεν οὐκ ἔσηκε. οἱ τε γὰρ λεγόμενοι μῦθοι περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἀιδοῦ, ὡς τὸν ἐνθάδε ἀδικήσαντα δεῖ ἐκεῖ διδόναι δίκην, καταγελώμενοι τῶς, τότε δὴ
Ε στρέφουσιν ἃ αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν μὴ ἀληθείς ὀσίως καὶ αὐτὸς ἦτοι 30

330 ε 16 διπλὴ ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι. The meaning is simply 'twice as much as the others': cf. e.g. Laws 658 a διπλὴ τὸ βλάβος ἐκτεινάω and 938 b ἐγνώσω— διπλὴ. The ἢ is like ἢ after διπλάσιος, πολλαπλάσιος etc. If διπλὴ meant simply 'on two grounds', it could not be followed by ἢ, and we should have to regard ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι as an interpolation. Cephalus expresses himself somewhat loosely, as if loving a thing on two grounds, or in two ways, were equivalent to loving it twice as much. ταύτῃ below is defined by the ὡσπέρ clause, and is preferred to ὡσπέρ, partly in order to correspond to διπλῇ but still more to suit κατὰ τὴν χρεῖαν. The present passage is through Aristotle (Eth. Nic. iv 2. 1120b 14, cf. ib. ix 7. 116b 1—3) the source of the proverb about 'parents and poets.'

21 ξυγγενεσθαι: ‘to meet’ in social intercourse, as in Ap. 41 A. ξυγγενεσθαι (suggested by Richards) would express habitual intercourse, which is not what Plato means to say. With the sentiment cf. Symposium 173 c ὡστὶ μὲν τινὰς περὶ φιλοσοφίας λόγους ἢ αὐτὸς ποιῶμαι ἢ ἄλλων ἄκοιμο—ὑπερφῷος ὡς χαίρω· ὅταν δὲ ἄλλως τινὰς, ἄλλως τε καὶ τοὺς ὑπερφόρους τοὺς τῶν πλούσιων καὶ χρηματιστικῶν, αὐτὸς τε ἄχθομαι ὡς τοὺς ἑταίρους ἑλω, ὦτι οἴσθω τε ποιῶν οὔδεν ποιητῆς.

330 D 26 ἐπειδὰν—τελευτήσειν: ‘when a man faces the thought that he must die,’ not (with Jowett) ‘when a man thinks himself to be near death,’ which would be ἐπειδὰν τις ἐγγὺς εἶναι ὡς τοῦ τελευτῆσαι, as Herwerden proposes to read cf. Laws 932 c ὡς ἐκεῖ μέλλειν ἡγομένη τελευτῶν. “Senum, non iunuenum τὸ οἴσθαι τελευτήσεις est” (Hartman): the weakness of old age convinces us at last that we too must die. Cf. Simon. 85. 7—10 θητῶν δ’ δήφα τις ἄθος ἐξ ἐνοχον ἡμέραν ἢ βύσιν | κούφον ἐκοινον, πολλ’ ἄτελεστα νοεί | οὔτε γὰρ ἐπίθ’ ἐχει γνασαίον οὔτε βανεστάθαι, | οὐδ’ ὑγίης ὡταν ἢ, φρονιτὶ’ ἐχει κακαίων.

29 ἀδικήσαντα—διδόναι δίκην. Plato is fond of this verbal play: cf. Eth. 8 b and 8 E τῷ γε ἀδικώντων δοσῖν δίκην. He who does not render justice in deeds must render justice in punishment: for the tale of justice must be made up. Note that we have here in ἀδίκως and δίκη the first casual allusion to the subject of the Republic.

330 E 30 αὐτὸς κτλ. αὐτὸς ἐπ’ οἷστε s. ultro as opposed to οἱ λεγόμενοι μήδει. The verb is to be supplied by a kind of
zeugma from μᾶλλον τι καθορὰ αὐτὰ (i.e. τα ἄκει); or rather the predicate is accommodated to the second alternative. Cf. 344 B infra and viii 553 c. To regard the bodily weakness of old age as in itself the cause of clearer vision of the world beyond may be in harmony with the doctrine of the Phaedo, but Cephalus is not represented as a Platonist. Tucker needlessly doubts the text.

34 καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑπνῶν κτλ. καὶ is 'both,' not 'and,' and balances καὶ εἰς: 'many a time, like children, awakes out of sleep in terror and lives in the expectation of ill.' For ὄσπερ οἱ παίδες compare Phaed. 77 D, E, and for the general sentiment Arist. Eth. Nic. i 13. 110b 8—11 ἀρίθμη γὰρ ἐστὶν ο ὑπνός τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ λέγεται στουδανα καὶ φαλὴ, πλὴν εἰ τῇ κατὰ μικρὰ δισκούντα τινὲς τῶν κυνήγων, καὶ ταῦτῃ βελτίω γίνεται τὰ φαντασμάτα τῶν ἐπεικῶν ἢ τῶν τυχόντων.

333 ηδίκησεν Α' ζ: ἡδίκησεν Πη et corr. λ².

added by Plato in contrast to μετὰ κακῆς ἐλπίδος.

γηροτρόφος κτλ.: 'to nurse him in old age, as Pindar also says.' γηροτρόφος is best taken by itself and not with ἀγάθη.

5 ἀτάλλωσια κτλ. ἀτάλλω is used of rearing children, and helps out the idea of γηροτρόφος: δις παίδες οἱ γέρωντες. It is not clear how the fragment is to be arranged, nor to what class of Pindar's poems it belongs. See Bergk Poet. Lyr. Gr. 4 p. 452.

6 εἰ οὖν—σφόδρα. The emphasis is quite in keeping with Cephalus' age and character; and Hartman is certainly wrong in condemning the clause: cf. 339 C, 331 B.

333 Β 10 ὁφείλοντα—θεῷ θυσίαν τινας. Phaed. 118 λ ἐπεν, δι ζητευταῖον ἐφέχειατο, ὡς Κριτῶν ἐφιν, τῷ 'ἁσπερίῳ ὀφείλομεν ἀλεξτρών' ἄλλα ἀπόδοτε καὶ μὴ ἀμελήσωτε. Wealth is in Cephalus' view the indispensable χορηγία ἄρετης.

12 ἄλλα γε ἐν ἀνθ' ἐνόσ. ἄλλα γε is extremely rare in Attic prose: in the
Platonic corpus it occurs—according to the best manuscript authority—here and in Rep. viii 543 C, Phaed. 86 e, Hipp. Maior 287 B, Phaedir. 362 A (古典 ἕδη), Phaed. 116 D (id.). In some of these passages ἀλλὰ ἦγε has been conjectured—wrongly, as I think (with Schneider), at all events in the passage in the Republic—but ἀλλὰ ἦγε cannot be read in the Phaedrus and Hippias Maior. There is no a priori objection to the collocation, which is also implied in ἀλλὰ γὰρ (γ' ἀρα); and in later Greek ἀλλὰ ἦγε aroused no objection. The meaning is 'but still,' originally 'yes, but,' as Schneider says, 'γ' ἐν δικαιοσύνης, ἀλλὰ ἦγε ἰδιος φύσις.' There is perhaps also a dramatic motive for putting ἀλλὰ ἦγε into the mouth of Cephalus: see on οὖν μὲν οὖν ἦγε in 329 E. Against the reading of Stobaeus (Flor. 94. 22) ἀλλὰ ἦγε ἰδίος ἐν ἀνθ' ἐνδικος, we may urge the further objection that the idiomatic phrase ἐν ἀνθ' ἐνδικος ('setting one thing against another,' as Jowett correctly translates it) seems to depend for its peculiar force (like μὸνος μόρφος and the like) on the juxtaposition of its two parts: cf. Phil. 63 β (ἐν ἀνθ' ἐνδικος) and Laws 705 B (ἀνθ' ἐνδικος ἐν). The passage quoted by Stallbaum from Euripides Orest. 561 εἰς μὲν τῶς ἦμι ἀνθ' ἐνδικος δοῦναί σε χρῆ ἐν μὲν ἐνδικος is quite different and does not mean 'hoc praeclare,' but 'one thing in return for one thing,' as is clear from lines 656 f.

οὐκ ἐλάχιστον is not adverbial (as Hartman and others suppose), but belongs to τοῦτο: 'setting one thing against another, I should regard this as not the least important object for which wealth is most useful to a man of sense.' The emphasis is characteristic: cf. 339 C, 331 A.

331 C, D The question 'What is Justice?' is for the first time raised. Is it simply to speak the truth and pay what you owe? Polemarchus succeeds to Cephalus' part in the conversation.

331 C 16 τὴν ἄλθειαν κτλ. This theory of justice or righteousness is deduced from the words of Cephalus: στὶς νᾶς μὴ δοκῇ τινα ἐξαπατήσαι ἡ φύσις. This phrase is a generalisation of ἄλθεια (truthfulness, cf. τάλαθος λέγεν below), and μὴ ἀφ' ἀφελλών ἡ ὑπερθανάτικα ἡ ἀνθρώπινῃ χρήστα ἢ ὑπερθανάτικα ἢ ἀποδίδοντα ἤ τις τι παρὰ τοῦ λαβῇ. Cf. (with Wohlrab) Minn. Fr. 8 ἡ ληθεύ̄ση δε παρεστω ὧν καὶ ἐμό, πάντων ἱλικιάδατον. It is simply Truth and Honesty, the two chief ingredients in the popular conception of morality.

ἀπλώς οὖν ἐνομος: 'quite without qualification.' For this idiomatic οὖν cf. ἀπδος οὖν II 377 B.

18 οὖν τοιοῦτο ἐλέγω. Similar points of casuistry are raised in Socrates' conversation with Euthydemus ap. Xen. Mem. IV 2. 12 ff.

21 οὖν ἀν κτλ. I have removed the comma before οὖν, because the ὁ in ὁ ἀποδιδωμεν covers both participles, the person in both cases being the same.
331 D 27 ἔφη. There is not sufficient reason for changing the best supported reading ἔφη, ἐγὼ τῷ Πολέμαρχῳ τῶν γε σῶν κληρονόμοις; Πάνω γε, ἦ δ’ ὃς γελάσας· καὶ ἁμα ἦ πρὸς τὰ ἱερά.

331 E ff. By δικαιοσύνη, it should be noted, is here meant man’s whole duty to his fellows, as δικαίωσις is right conduct in relation to the gods. In this wide sense the word was commonly understood by the Greeks (cf. Theog. 147 ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνην οὐκ ἔσται πᾶσι ἀρετὴν ἑαυτῷ); and even in the scientific study of ethics, the word still retained the same wider connotation, side by side with its more specific meanings (Arist. Eth. Nic. v. 3. 1179 b 13 ff.). The view that Justice consists in doing good to friends and harm to enemies, is a faithful reflection of prevalent Greek morality (Luthardt "Die Antike Ethik" p. 19). It is put into the mouth of Simondes as a representative of the poets, on whose writings the young were brought up: cf. Prot. 316 D, 325 E, 338 E ff. As typical illustrations we may cite: Hes. OD. 707 ff.; Solon 13. 5; Theog. 337 f.; Archilochus Fr. 65; Pindar Pyth. 2. 83—85; Aesch. P. V. 1041 f.; Soph. Ant. 634 f.; Eurip. Med. 807—810; Meno in Plat. Men. 71 E αὐτὴ ἄστω ἀφρός ἀρετή, ἵκανεν εἶναι τὰ τῆς πόλεως πράττεν, καὶ πράττοντα τοὺς μὲν φίλους εἰς ποιεῖν, τοὺς δὲ ἐχθρὸς κακῶς: cf. also Crito 49 B, Xen. Cyr. 1 6. 31 ff. and Hiero II 2. Socrates himself in Mem. II 3. 14 represents the same principle as generally accepted in Greece: καὶ μὲν πλείστον γε δοκεῖ αὐτῷ ἀφαίρετον ἄξονα εἶναι, ὅ ἀν φθάνη τοῖς μὲν πολεμίους κακῶς ποιών, τοῖς δὲ φίλους εὐφρενίτων: cf. also ibid. II 6. 35. These references, which might easily be multiplied, shew that Plato is not, as Teichmüller supposes (Lit. Fohd. i. p. 22 n.), specifically refuting Xenophon, but rather criticising an all but universal view. See Nagelsbach Nachhom. Theol. pp. 246 ff. It is seldom that a voice is raised in protest, as by Pittacus (according to D. L. 1 4. 78) in the memorable words φίλοι μὴ λέγετε κακός, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ ἐχθρόν. Plato was the first Greek who systematically protested against the doctrine, and supported his protest with arguments drawn from a loftier view of man’s nature and work.
VI. Λέγε δή, εἰπὼν ἐγώ, σὺ ὁ τοῦ λόγου κληρονόμος, τί φῆς τοῦ Σιμωνίδην λέγοντα ὅρθως λέγειν περὶ δικαιοσύνης; "Ὅτι, ἦ δ᾽ ὅς, τὸ τὰ ὀφειλόμενα ἐκάστῳ ἀποδίδοναι δίκαιον ἐστί· τὸ τοῦ λέγοντος δοκεῖ ἐνοιχητί καλῶς λέγειν. 'Αλλὰ μέντοι, ἢν δ᾽ ἐγώ, Σιμωνίδης γε οὐ ῥάδιον ἀπιστεῖν· σοφὸς γὰρ καὶ θείος ἀνήρ· τοῦτο μέντοι ὁ τί ποτε λέγειν, σὺ μὲν, ὁ Πολέμαρχε, ἵσως γιγνώσκεις, ἐγώ δὲ ἄγνωσι· δήλου γὰρ ὅτι οὐ τούτῳ λέγειν, ὅτερ ἄρτι ἔλεγομεν, τὸ τῶν 332 παρακαταθεμένων τι ὑποθνοῦν μὴ σοφῷν ἀπαίτομων ἀποδίδοναι·

332 καίτοι γε ὀφειλόμενον ποῦ ἐστὶν τούτῳ, ὁ παρακατέθετο· ἥ γάρ·
332 Α 2 ἀποδοτόν—ἀπαιτόν: ‘well, but we were not on any account to make restoration at the time when the claimant is’—according to the Greek idiom ‘was’—‘mad.’ Socrates, as in ἐπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, is appealing to the admissions made by the πατρὶ τοῦ λόγου (in 331 C), as he is justified in doing when addressing his heir. ὡστε is not—as ὡστε shews—the particle of ‘indefinite frequency,’ but stands for ὡς of the direct: the whole clause τότε ὡστε τις μὴ σωφρόνος ἀπαιτοὶ is thus in the octo olíghma of self-quotation and exactly corresponds to ei μανθανέ ἀπαιτοὶ in 331 C. Madvig’s ἀπαιτεῖ for ἀπαιτοὶ is therefore unnecessary. Goodwin MT. p. 213 explains the optative otherwise, but not (I think) rightly.

6 ἀγαθὸν μὲν τι δρᾶν sc. αὐτόν, for τός φίλος depends on ὀφείλει, to which τός φίλος is the subject.

μανθανὼ—ὅτι. ἧτο is ‘because,’ not ‘that,’ as always (I believe) in Plato’s use of this phrase: cf. Euthyph. 3 B, 9 B and infra 337 D, 344 A. For the sentiment cf. (with J. and C.) Xen. Mem. IV 2 17 ff.

333 B 12 ὀφείλεται δὲ. See cr. n. In explanatory clauses of this kind δὲ and not δὲ γε is the correct usage: cf. infra 337 D, 344 A. I therefore follow Bekker in reading δὲ.

13 προστικέλ. ὀφείλομεν has thus been equated with προστικόν by means of the special cases τὸ τοῖς φίλοις ὀφείλομεν and τὸ τοῖς εὐχηροῖς ὀφείλομεν. τὸ προστικόν is a more general term and is the regular word in classical Greek for ‘proper conduct’ or ‘duty’ (as the Greeks conceived it), the Stoic καθήκων being very rarely used in this sense by good authors.

333 — 336 A The definition is further elucidated down to 333 B: and thereafter Socrates begins to criticise it.

In the first place, the definition is made more precise by representing justice as an art, whose business it is to benefit friends and injure foes (332 C, D). The question is then raised—how does the art of justice do good to friends and harm to foes? By the analogy of other arts Polemarthus is induced to say that justice benefits friends and harms enemies (1) by fighting with them and against them in time of war, and (2) in connexion with partnerships concerned with money in time of peace (332 D—333 B). The explanation of Simonides’ saying is now complete.

Socrates first directs his attack against (2). In cases where money has to be used, it is not justice, but some other art, that is useful for the required purpose: in other words justice, is (in time of peace) useful only in dealing with useless or unused money and other unused objects: which is an unworthy view of the art (333 B—333 E). Further, the analogy of the other arts shows that the art of justice, if it is the art of keeping money safe, is also the art of stealing money—always provided that it does so for the benefit of friends and the injury of foes (333 E—334 B). Polemarthus, in bewildernent, reiterates his
VII. 'Hiniçato ára, ἥν δ' ἐγώ, ὡς ἐωκεν, ὁ Σιμωνίδης ποιητής κῶς τὸ δίκαιον δ' εἶη. διενοεῖτο μὲν γὰρ, ὡς | φαίνεται, ὃτι τοῦτοι 15 εἰη δίκαιον, τὸ προσήκον ἐκάστῳ ἀποδοιδόναι, τούτο δὲ ἄνωμαιεν ὀφειλόμενον. Ἀλλα τί οἶει; ἐφη. 'Ω πρὸς Δίως, ἥν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ οὖν τις αὐτὸν ἤρετο, ὁ Σιμωνίδης, ἥ τίσιν οὖν τι ἀποδοιδόσα ὀφειλόμενον καὶ προσήκον τέχνη ἱατρικὴ καλεῖται; τί ἂν οἶει ἡμῖν αὐτὸν ἀποκρίνασθαι; Δήλον ὅτι, ἐφη, ἡ σώμασιν φάρμακα 20

definition in the old form, and Socrates thereupon starts a fresh line of argument. By 'friends' and 'foes' Polemarchus means those who seem to us good and bad, not those who are so. But as bad men often seem to us good and good men bad, justice will often consist in benefiting bad men, and harming good, i.e. in wronging those who do no wrong; or conversely, if we refuse to accept this conclusion, and hold that it is just to benefit the just and hurt the unjust, it will often be just to hurt friends and benefit enemies, viz. when our friends are bad, and our enemies good (334 C—334 E).

Polemarchus hereupon amends his explanation of 'friend' and 'enemy,' into 'him who both seems and is good,' and 'him who both seems and is bad'; and the definition now becomes, 'It is just to benefit a friend if he is good, and injure an enemy if he is bad (335 A).'

To this amended definition Socrates now addresses himself. He first proves by the analogy of the other arts that to hurt a human being is to make him worse in respect of human excellence, i.e., justice, in other words to make him more unjust, and afterwards by means of similar analogical reasoning, that no one can be made more unjust by one who is just. Simonides’ saying, if Polemarchus has explained it aright, was more worthy of a tyrant than of him (335 A—336 A).

332 C ff. The seventh chapter is a good example of Plato’s extreme care in composition. A careful study will show that the structural basis consists of two illustrations followed by an application: this occurs seven times before the conclusion of the argument is reached. Similar, but less elaborate, examples of symmetrical structure are pointed out in my notes on Crisò 49 B, Prot. 325 D.

332 C 14 ἰμίζηκα—ποιητικῶς. Theaet. 194 C τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κέαρ, δ' ἐφη 'Ομηρός αἰνετόμενος τὴν τοῦ κατὰ ὁμοιότητα. The present passage is no more serious than that in the Theaetetus: Plato knew that Simonides merely meant to say ‘it is just to render what you owe.’

332 C 17 Ἀλλὰ τί οἶει; is a rhetorical question, which needs and receives no answer, like τί μη; and τί μη δοκεῖ; (Theaet. 162 B). It is equivalent to ‘of course.’ For the use of τε Stallbaum compares Gorg. 480 B τε γὰρ δὴ φῶμεν; to which there is also no reply. This explanation is preferable to that of Madvig, who gives Ἀλλὰ τί οἶει to Socrates, and takes ἐφη as equivalent to ἀνεφέ— a harsh usage in a narrated dialogue, and not likely to have been intended by Plato, because sure to be misunderstood. Liebhold’s Ἀλλὰ τί οἶει; <ὁδὲ> ἐφη has everything against it.

ὡ πρὸς Δίως κτλ. ‘In the name of heaven, said I, if any one then had asked him’ etc. ‘what reply do you think he would have made to us?’ ὣ before πρὸς Δίως is (as Schanz holds) an interjection, and does not require a vocative to follow it; cf. Euthyd. 287 A, 290 E. It is tempting (with Tucker) to take ὥ πρὸς Δίως as part of the address to Simonides (cf. Euthyd. 294 B ὥ πρὸς τῶν θεῶν, ἥν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ Δομυσσωρε—αὐτ' τῷ οὗτο πάντα ἐπιστασθοῦν). But on this view the presence of eu oíd— ἤρετο forms a difficulty, and ὥ πρὸς Δίως may very well go with τί ἂν οἶει— ἀποκρίνασθαι.

19 ὀφειλόμενον καὶ προσήκον. It is characteristic of Plato to combine the thing explained and the explanation itself in this way: see my note on Prot. 314 A. Here ὀφειλόμενον is necessary to enable Simonides to recognise his own saying.

ἵατρικὴ—μαγειρικὴ. In Gorg. 463 A ff. Plato refuses the name of ‘art’ to φιλοσοφία; it is but an ἐμπειρία or τρίχη, a sort of bastard adjunct to λατρεία, as κουραστική is to γυμναστική. Here, where less precision is required, both are regarded as ἔχρια.
παλαιότεροι πολέμων καὶ προσήκον τέχνη μαγειρικῆς καλεῖται; Ἡ τοῖς οὕτω σὰς δόμυσμα τοις τῆς ὀρθοτοις τεχνοτοις μεταδόθηκε. Εἰ μὲν τι, ἔφη, δεῖ ἀκολουθεῖν, ὡς Σώκρατες, τοῖς ἐπιστρατεύσεις ἑρμηνεύειν, ἡ τοῖς φίλοις τε καὶ ἐχθροῖς ὕφελίας τε καὶ βλάβες ἀποδιδόσα. Τοῦ τοις φίλοις ἄρα εὐ ποιεῖ καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροῖς κακῶς δικαιοσύνην λέγει; Δοκεῖ μοι. Τίς οὖν δυνατότατος κάμνονται φίλοις εὐ ποιεῖ καὶ ἐχθροῖς κακῶς πρὸς νόσων καὶ ὑγιείων; Ἰατρὸς. Τίς δὲ πλέονται 1 πρὸς τὸν τῆς θαλάττης. Εἴδη κόμινων; Κυβερνήτης. Τί δέ; ὁ δίκαιος εἰς τίνι πράξει καὶ πρὸς τί ἔργον δυνατότατος φίλοις ὑφελεῖν καὶ ἐχθροῖς βλάπτειν; 'Εν τῷ προσπολεμεῖν καὶ ἐν τῷ ἕμμαχεῖν, ἐμοῦγε δοκεῖ. Εἰλαμµυ κάμνοι τῇ μήν καὶ σφιολέμενον ἐναντίον τῶν κράτων, οὖ πάνω μοι δοκεῖ τοῦτο. Χρήσιμον ἄρα καὶ ἐν ἐφεύρεσι δικαστικὴν; Χρήσιμον. Καὶ γὰρ γεωργίαν ἢ οὐ; Ναὶ. Πρὸς γε καρποῦ κτῆσιν. Ναὶ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ σκυπτομείκη; Ναὶ. Πρὸς γε ὑποδημάτων ἄν, ὀίμαι, φαίης κτῆσιν. Πάνω γε. Τί δὲ δή; τὴν δικαιοσύνην πρὸς τίνος χρέων καὶ κτῆσιν ἐν ἐφεύρεσι φαίης ἀν χρήσιμον εἶναι; Πρὸς τὰ ξυμβόλαια, ὁ Σώκρατες. Ξυμβόλαια δὲ λέγεις κοινωνῆματα, ἢ τί ἄλλο; Κοι-
333 E] ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ Α

Β νωνήματα δήτα. "Αρ' οὖν ὁ δίκαιος ἀγαθὸς καὶ χρήσιμος κοινωνῶς εἰς πεπτών θέσιν, ἢ ὁ πεπτευτικός; 'Ο πεπτευτικός. 'ΑΛΛ' εἰς πλινθῶν καὶ λίθων θέσιν ὁ δίκαιος χρησιμότερος τε καὶ ἀμείνων κοινωνῶς τοῦ οἰκοδομικοῦ; Οὐδαμῶς. 'ΑΛΛ' εἰς τίνα δὴ κοινωνίαν ὁ δίκαιος ἀμείνων κοινωνῶς τοῦ κιθαριστικοῦ, ὥσπερ ὁ κιθαριστικὸς τοῦ δίκαιου εἰς κρουμάτων; Εἰς ἀργυρίον, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. Πλὴν γ' ἵσος, ὁ Πολέμαρχε, πρὸς τὸ χρήσαν αὐργυρίον, ὅταν δὲν ἀργυρίον

ποιῆσαι ἢ ἀποδόσαι ἢ ἵππον τότε δὲ, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, ὁ ἵππικὸς ἢ γάρ; Φαίνεται. Καὶ μὴν ὅταν γε πλαοῦν, ὁ ναυ-15 τηροὶ ἢ ὁ κυβερνήτης. "Εσικεν. "Ὅταν οὖν τι δὴ αὐργυρίῳ ἡ χρυσῖν κοινῆ χρῆσαι, ὁ δίκαιος χρησιμότερος τῶν ἀλλῶν; Ὅταν παρακαταθέσαι καὶ σῶν εἶναι, ὁ Σώκρατες. Οὐκοῦν λέγεις, ὅταν μηδὲν δὲν αὐτῷ χρῆσαι ἀλλὰ κείσθαι; Πάντα γε. "Ὅταν ἢρα ἄρχηστον ἢ ἀργυρίῳν, τότε χρήσιμος ἐπ' αὐτῷ ἢ 20

δικαιοσύνη; Κυνιδεύει. Καὶ ὅταν δὴ δρέπανον δὴ φυλάττειν, ὁ δικαίωσις χρήσιμος καὶ κοινῆ καὶ ἱδία; ὅταν δὲ χρῆσαι, ἢ ἀμπελουργική; Φαίνεται. Φήσεις δὲ καὶ ἀσπίδα καὶ λύραν ὅταν δὴν φυλάττειν καὶ μηδὲν χρῆσαι, χρήσιμον εἶναι τὴν δικαιο-15 σύνην, ὅταν δὲ χρῆσαι, τὴν ὁπλιτικὴν καὶ τὴν μουσικὴν; 'Ανάγκη. 25 Καὶ περὶ τάλλα δὴ πάντα ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἐκάστου ἐν μὲν χρῆσαι ἄρχηστον, ἐν δὲ ἄρχηστια χρήσιμος; Κυνιδεύει.

E VIII. 1 Οὐκ ἂν οὖν, ὁ φίλε, πάνυ γε τι σπουδαῖον ἐιή ἢ

21. δὴ γ': δεῖς ΑΙΙ. 28. οὐκ ἂν οὖν Σ ετ corr. in mg. Α²: σοῦς Α¹: οὐκοῦν ΠII.

333 B 10 εἰς τίνα δὴ κοινωνίαν is idiomatic for εἰς τίνος δὴ κοινωνίαν. Compare VIII 556 C ὥς ἐν δῶν πορείας ἐν ἔν ἀλλαῖς ταῖς κοινωνίαις καὶ τὴν τιμὴν ταῖτηρ (where the English idiom would expect τὴν τιμὴν ταῖτηρ) in 11 371 E. In spite of εἰς κρουμάτων and εἰς ἀργυρίον, it is not necessary to read (with Richards) τίνος.

333 C 18 παρακαταθέσαι καὶ σῶν εἶναι. The double expression is necessary to explain κοινῆ χρῆσαι: the κοινωνία arises because one deposits the money and by the other it is kept safe.

30. ἄρχηστον—χρήσιμος. ἄρχηστος fluctuates between ‘useless’ and ‘useless’: the latter sense is predominant here and gives an epigrammatic tone to the sentence (cf. ἐν μὲν χρῆσαι ἄρχηστος, ἐν δὲ ἄρχηστια χρήσιμος in D). It is noticeable that Plato does not take into account the possibility of money being deposited at interest: in this case the money could not be said to be useless.

333 D 22 καὶ κοινῆ καὶ ἱδία; not ‘to the individual and to the state,’ but ‘both in dealings with others, and in personal concerns.’ The words καὶ ἱδία are, strictly speaking, irrelevant, for it is with κοινωνίατα (in the widest sense) that we are concerned. They are to be regarded merely as a rhetorical amplification for the sake of emphasis: cf. infra 350 Α, 351 Αιι.

333 E 28 οὐκ ἂν οὖν κτλ. See cfr. n. Some may think that we should read οὐκοῦν (with the majority of mss) and cancel εἶνῃ after σπουδαῖον (so also Vind.)

A. P.
D), understanding ἕστ. The accidental omission of ὅων is however not uncommon in Plato's MSS: see on IV 437 B.

31 οὕτως καὶ φιλάξασθαί. Because knowledge of anything implies knowledge also of its opposite, according to the usual Socratic view. See Phaed. 97 D ὅπερ ἄλλοι σκέπτονται προφυλακτικά ἀκάθαρτον—ἀλλ' ἂν τὸ ἀκρωτικὸ τὸ βελτίστατον ἀγαθόν ἐστί τὸν αὐτόν τὸν τόν τὸν ἀκρωτικόν τὸν δὲ τὸ μὲν ἀκρωτικόν εἰδέναι, στόμον. 334 A 1 ὁ στρατηγὸς γε κτλ. The στρατηγὸς must be both φιλάκτικος καὶ κλέπτης according to Socrates in Xen. Men. III 6. 6. 2 κλέπτειν καὶ κλέμα used (especially by Spartans) with reference to military operations involving surprise and stealth (Clasee on Thuc. v 9). 334 B 8 ἀγατὰ, 'estcem,' is said with reference to ἐσθλὸν in Hom. Od. xix 395 οἷς μῆτρος ἐστι πατέρα ἐσθλὸν δ' ἀνάρω τοὺς ἔκεισαν καὶ κλέπτουσιν θ' ἀρέσκει τοῖς 'ἄγατα' τοὺς ἐσθλοὺς. The suggested άγατα for ἀγάπα τε would be too strong; see ἰγαμ. 180 B μᾶλλον—θαυμάζουσιν καὶ ἀγαναί—ὅταν ὁ ἐρωμένος τῶν ἑρασθηκότων ἀγαπά, where the meaning of ἀγαπά is shown by ὅνων περὶ πολλῶν ἐποτιτίοις ἐσθλοῦ.
13 tòtoo—ετη. So Euthyphro (14 b) halks back to his first definition of piety (6 e) after he has been refuted by Socrates. Cf. also VII 515 E n.

14 δικαίον does double duty, first with τούτο and then with δικαίωσιν: cf. VI 493 A, VII 517 B, 525 b, 530 b and (with Stallbaum) A 25. b. Hartman needlessly doubts the text.

15 φίλους δε λέγει κτλ. The same mode of argument recurs in 339 b ff. Cf. also Hippias Maior 284 D.

334 C 21 φίλου κτλ. Schneider rightly observes that κατὰ δὴ τὸν σὸν λόγον below tends to show that ἀλλ’ ὤμος—βλάπτειν is interrogative. The argument is in the form of a dilemma: either (a) it is just to injure those who do us no injustice (and benefit those who do), or (b) it is just to injure friends and benefit foes. The first alternative is immoral (πονηρός), and the second directly opposed to Simonides’ view. Socrates suppresses the words which I have put in brackets, because they lessen rather than increase the immorality of the conclusion; the second alternative is expressed in full as the αὐτὸ τούναντίον ἢ τὸν Σιμωνίδην ἐφαμεν λέγειν.

334 D 28 ὃσοι κτλ.: not ‘those of mankind who are in error’ (J. and C,) but ‘those who have mistaken their men’. Cf. Phaedr. 257 D τοῦ ἐταίρου συγχων διαμαρτάνει. So also Schneider, and Davies and Vaughan.

334 E 30 πονηρός γὰρ κτλ. Stallbaum (followed by D. and V.) wrongly takes αὕτως as ‘in their eyes.’ The reasoning is difficult only from its brevity. If it is δικαίον βλάπτειν ἄδικος, and men sometimes suppose that a man is good when he is bad (πονηρός γὰρ αὐτοῖς εἰσίν ‘for they have bad friends’), then since friend has been defined as one whom we suppose to be good (334 C), it is sometimes δικαίον βλάπτειν φίλος. Stallbaum’s view is quite inconsistent with the definition of friends in 334 C as ὃς ἀν ὑπάρχῃ χρήσεως. 33 τῶν φίλων καλέχρων. Hartman (with some inferior MSS) wishes to insert τῶν before ἐξήρων; but cf. infra III 406 D and
many other examples cited by himself. To pronounce them all corrupt is to destroy the basis on which our knowledge of Platonic idiom rests.

35  τὸν  δοκοῦντα  τε  —  καὶ  τὸν  ὄντα.
The meaning required—'he who both seems and is good'—would be more correctly expressed by τὸν  δοκοῦντα  τε  —  καὶ  ὄντα (so Ast and others), but "aliquid tribuendum interpositis η ὄσις, quae negligentiam repentendi, si est negligentia, saltem excusant" (Schneider, who compares also infra 341 B ποτέρως λέγεις τον ἄρχοντα τε καὶ τὸν κρατοῦνα). In τὸν  δοκοῦντα  μὲν, ὄντα  δὲ  μὴ, Polemarchus expresses himself more accurately.

335 A 3  ὁ  ἁγαθός  —  ὁ  πονηρός.
Socrates unfairly neglects the δοκοῦντα, although according to Polemarchus' amended definition the ἁγαθὸς who seemed πονηρός would not be a friend, nor the πονηρός who seemed ἁγαθὸς an enemy. Polemarchus' theory indeed points to a division of men into three classes: friends, enemies, and those who are neither (viz. those who seem good and bad, and those who seem bad and are good). The somewhat ideal view that the ἁγαθὸς is φιλός and the πονηρός ἔχθρος is genuinely Socratic (cf. Men. II 6. 14 ff.): it is part of the wider view that all men desire the good (Symp. 206 A, Gorg. 467 c ff.).

4  προσθείναι—βλάπτειν. Ἡ  ἀκολουθία  μιστή  ἐστι  ἄλλοτε  κατὰ  ἄλλη  ὑμιᾶς.  Ὅτι  δὲ  ἄρα,  Ἵστορις  ἡ ἀκολουθία  ἐχεῖν  καὶ  Ἐκάττος  ἐχεῖν  καὶ  Ἡμεῖς  ἐχεῖν  καὶ  Ὁμιλός  ἐχεῖν  καὶ  Ἑϕαί.  85 ν ἐν ἐν διπλήσιον ἄχμαστις, ἦ λόγου τείχος τινός (so the Diodorean, but ἦ is cancelled by many editors). The late expression Φαίδων ἦ περὶ ἑρμής involves essentially the same use of ἦ. The clause ὦς—κακῶς is summed up in τοῦτο, and the whole sentence means: 'do you wish us to make an addition to our account of justice, or in other words to say now—in addition to our original definition where we said it was just to do good to friends and harm to enemies—that it is just to do good to friends if they are good etc.' This explanation is (I think) the least vulnerable one, if the text is to be retained. With προσθείναι used absolutely cf. 339 B. For other views see App. III.

335 B 10  ἔστιν ἄρα κτλ. Cf. Crito 49 Α ff., Gorg. 469 B, [περὶ ἀρετῆς] 376 E. This chapter contains the only element of permanent ethical interest and value in the discussion with Polemarchus—the only element, moreover, which reappears in a later book of the Republic (II 379 B). The underlying principle—that κακῶς ποιεῖν = κακῶς ποιεῖν—is in accordance with the traditional Greek view of life. For illustrations we may cite Od. XVIII 136 fr. τὸ ὡς ἡμεῖς ἔστω ἐπιχειροῦν ἀνθρώπων | οὖν ἐν ἑκατέρῳ πάντων ἀνθρώπων οὖν ἐν τῇ ἁμορίᾳ, παθήναι κακῶς, τε θεοὶ, ἡμῶν τε ἐφεύρετο. The same point of view is manifest in the transition of meaning in μοχθρός and πονηρός from 'laborious,' 'afflicted' (e.g. Hesiod Fr. 95. 1 Götting) to 'depraved.' Conversely, prosperity makes one morally better, as in Solon 13. 69 ff. τῷ δὲ κακῶς ἐργαζόμενος θεοὶ περὶ πάντα πάσησαν | συντετελέσαν ἁγάθον, ἐκλύσασαν ἀφοφυσίν, and in the frequent identification of ὑποταγή ἡ θυσία αἰολίων
with εδ πράττειν e.g. Char. 172 A, 173 D, Alk. 1 116 B, Arist. Eth. Nic. 1 8. 109 B 20. It is by the analogy of the arts that Socrates in this chapter seeks to prove, first the identification κατος ποιεῖν = καλός τοις, and second that the good man cannot harm others; the Socratic conception of right conduct as an art is still predominant. It is important to observe that it was by means of this Socratic weapon that Plato achieved this noble anticipation of Christian ethical theory (St Mattth. 5. 44 a1). Cf. also Gorg. 475 D ff.

16 ἀνθρώπους δὲ κτλ. Cf. 352 E—353 E

335 E 33 οὐκ ἦν σοφὸς—εἰπών. Telechmüler (Lit. Phehd. I p. 23 n.) finds in this an allusion to Xenophon, who puts into the mouth of Socrates (addressing Crito in Men. II 55. 35) the words ἔγωγκας ἀνδρός ἀρετὴν εἶναι, νικῶν τοὺς μὲν φίλους εἰ ποιῶντα, τοὺς δὲ ἔχοροις κακῶς: but the reference is only to 331 E σοφὸς γάρ καὶ θεός ἀνή. The presents φηναι and νοεῖ are used in a general way, because such a theory and such an interpretation of it might be held by any one at any time: in οὐκ ἦν σοφὸς ὁ ταῦτα εἰπὼν the time is changed to the past to suggest οὐκ ἦν Σιμωνίδης ὁ ταῦτα εἰπὼν (Simonides being σοφὸς 331 E). But for ὁ ταῦτα εἰπὼν, ἦν would be ἐστί. It is a mistake to take ὦν as "is after all"; ὦν is hardly so used in Plato without ἄρα, nor is Phae. 230 A (cited by Goodwin MT. p. 13) an example of that idiom.
36 ἔστιν τις αὐτῷ φη—Σιμωνίδης: as Xenophon virtually does in Hier. II 2: see 331 E n. 27 τῶν σοφῶν τε καὶ μακαρίων ἀνδρῶν. μακάριος is somewhat stronger than θεῖος, which it suggests, μάκαρ being a usual epithet of gods. The whole phrase is intended to carry us back to 331 E σοφός γὰρ καὶ θεῖος ἄνήρ. Ast's view that μακαρίων means "qui ante nostram aestatem florerunt," as if 'sainted,' misses the allusion to 331 E, and is a little far-fetched: it is enough that μακάριος conveys the same ironical commendation as θεῖο: cf. (with Stallbaum) Men. 71 A. ἐγώ γοῦν. See εἰς n. With Hartman, I adopt Bekker's restoration: cf. VII 527 D. For γοῦν A everywhere writes γοῦν.

336 A 4 Περιανδροὺ κτλ. Periander, Xerxes and Perdiccas are taken as types of tyrants, and no tyrant is σοφός (Rep. IX 587 D). It is noticeable that Periander does not appear in the list of the seven wise men in Prot. 343 A. The expedition of Xerxes against Greece is cited by Callicles in Gorg. 483 D in connexion with the doctrine that might be right. In Περδικκοῦ the allusion is to Perdiccas II, father of Archelaus (Gorg. 471 B): he died late in 414 or early in 413, three years before the probable date of action of the Republic (Introd. § 3), after proving himself a fickle friend and foe to the Athenians during the Peloponnesian war. Ismenias is mentioned again in Men. 90 A as having become rich δόμος τινός—οἵνε περαιτίς εἰδρύον τὰ Πολυκράτους χρήματα. There can be no doubt that he is to be identified with the Ismenias who (see Xen. Hell. III 5. 1) in 395 took money from Timocrates the Rhodian, envoy of the Persian King, in order to stir up war against Sparta, and who in 382, when the Spartans had seized the Cadmea, was condemned on this charge among others (Xen. Hell. V 2. 35; Plut. Pelop. 5. 2). Plato implies that Ismenias kept enough Persian gold to enrich himself: he was no true Greek if he did not. But what is meant by saying that he had received the money of Polycrates? This question has been much discussed. Possibly 'the money of Polycrates' (with allusion, of course, to the riches of the Samian tyrant) was a sarcastic expression current in Athens for 'the money of Timocrates': this is perhaps the more likely as we are informed that the Athenians got no share of it themselves (Hell. III 5. 2). Plato would naturally avail himself of such a political gibe to express his dislike of a man who took gold from the natural enemy of Greece (Rep. v 470 C) to stir up not war, but sedition (ib. 470 B), and withdraw Agesilaus from fighting with the barbarian: for his political ideal in foreign policy was that of Cimon. See also on v 471 B. It is not however likely, I think, that the present passage was written after Ismenias' death, for Plato is not given to reviling his contemporaries after their death. That the other three persons cited by Plato were already dead would only make his reproach of the living more marked and scathing. The present passage—so far as it goes—is on the whole in favour of Teichmüller's view (Lit. Fehd. i p. 25) that the first book of the Republic was written soon after 395, when the disgraceful affair was still fresh in men's minds. See Introd. § 4.

5 ὁλομένου is to be pressed (as in III 395 D, 409 C: cf. IV 431 C): their power is fancied, not real: they cannot even do the thing they want: cf. Gorg. 467 A ff. πῶς ἂν οὖν οἱ ἄρσεσι μέγα δυνάμει ἢ οἱ τύραννοι ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι, ἐὰν μὴ Σωκράτης

37. ἐγώ γοῦν II: ἐγώ' οὖν Α.
εἰσελεγχθῇ—ὅτι ποιοῦν αἱ βούλωται:—οὐ φυμὶ ποιοῦν αὐτοὺς ἀ βούλωται. Ηε
alone (says Plato) is truly powerful who
wills what is good and has the power to
obtain it.

336 A—337 B Introduction of Thras-
ymachus.

On Plato's representation of Thrasy-
machus in the Republic, see IntroD. § 2.

336 B οὐ δὲ διεπανύμεθα. Cobet's suggestion ὡς δὲ ἐπανύμεθα misses the point. No dou-
bta διεπανύμας is (as he says) "intermittto orationem post aliqun moram denuo dicturus" (cf. 
Tin. 78 E, Symp. 191 C), but this is precisely the sense required, for the discussion with which Socrates concludes (τὰ ἄν 
ἀλλὰ κτλ.) shews that he desires to re-
sume the discussion.

taut' eipon refers to elev—φαίνει εἰσιν.

12 συντρεπᾶς—διαπρασόμενος: 'ga-
thering himself up he sprang at us like a
wild beast as though he would seize and
carry us off.' Thrasymachus comes down
like a wolf on the fold. ἥκεν is not from 
ἡκα, but from ἡκαί: this is also Ast's view 
in his Lex. Plat.). The expression ἦκεν ἐφ' ἡμᾶς would be too weak after συντρεπᾶς
ἐκαίνων ὡσπερ θηρίων. The object to ἦκεν 
ἐστιν, easily supplied from συντρεπᾶς 
ἐστιν: lit. 'he let himself go at us.' Cf. 
Ar. Frgs 133. It should be noted also 
that compounds of ἡκαί occasionally
drop ἐστιν altogether and become intran-
sitive (e.g. VIII 563 A, Prot. 336 A). Hart-
man's ὑπερ for ἦκεν is not likely to find favou. For διαπρασόμενος Cobet would 
read διαπρασόμενος. Plato however does not use διαιστάων of harrying by wild beasts, 
but in the sense of διαίσθησε, δεινώμενος (VI 503 B, Laws 659 D): and even Cobet 
does not propose to change Pol. 274 B 
διαιστάωτον ὑπὲ ἄντων (i.e. θηρίων). J. 
and C.'s citation of II. XVI 355 αἵπα 
διαπρασόμενον (i.e. οἱ λύκοι τὰς ἀράς) seems 
to me (in spite of Hartman's wonder) strictly relevant, if only we take διαιστά-
ζειν as 'harry,' and not (with J. and C.) 
as 'tear in pieces.'

336 C 15 τιενθίσθενοικτλ. εὐθυβλεθθε 
refers to the readiness of the interlocu-
tors to assent to one another's questions: 
 cf. Charm. 175 C othwo ἡμῶν εὐθυκο 
τοὺς ἡ σκέψει καὶ ὅσκληροιν.

ὑποκατακλίνομενοι: a metaphor, not 
from the wrestling schools, but from 
taking a lower or inferior seat at table or the 
like: cf. Symp. 222 E ἐὰν οὖν ἐπὶ σοὶ 
κατακλή Ἀγαθῶν and Plat. quomodo 
adul, ab amico internoscatu 58 D τὰs 
τοιχάτας ὑποκατακλίεις (alluding to men 
who take the front seats at theatres etc., 
in order to flatter the rich by giving up 
their seats to them). Thrasymachus' 
brutal frankness is not intended by Plato to be 
altogether wide of the mark: see App. II 
and 335 A n.

17 μὴ—φιλοτιμοῦ ἔλεγχων. A com-
mon reproach against Socrates: cf. Thaet. 
150 C.
20 τὸ δικαίου· καὶ ὅπως μοι ἡ ἑρείς, ὅτι τὸ δέον ἐστὶν μηδ' ὅτι D τὸ ὄφελιμον μηδ' ὅτι τὸ λυσιτελοῦν μηδ' ὅτι τὸ κερδαλέου μηδ' ὅτι τὸ ἔμφερον, ἀλλὰ σαφῶς μοι καὶ ἀκριβῶς λέγε ὦ τι ἐν λέγεσι· ὁς ἐγὼ οὖκ ἀποδέξομαι, ἐὰν ύπολος τοιούτος λέγῃς. καὶ ἐγὼ ἀκούσας ἑξεπλάγην καὶ προσβλέπων αὐτὸν ἐφοβοῦμην· καὶ μοι 25 δοκῶ, εἰ μὴ πρότερος ἐσώρακη αὐτὸν ἢ ἐκεῖνος ἐμὲ, ἄφωνον ἂν γενέσθαι. νῦν δὲ ἡ ἑρίκα ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου ἥρχετο ἑξαγρίνεσθαι, προσβλέψα τοιούτου ἐστὶν ἡ ἐκεῖνος ὁ πρὸ-Ε κρίνασθαι, καὶ εἶπον ὑποτρέμων θ' Ἐθρασύμαχε, μη γάλατος ἡμῶν ἵπθι· εἰ γὰρ ἑξαμαρτάνομεν ἐν τῇ τῶν λόγων σκέψει ἐγὼ τε καὶ 30 ὀδε, εὖ ἢσθι ὅτι ἀκούτες ἀμαρτάνομεν. μη γὰρ δὴ οἶου, εἰ μὲν χρυσίον ἐγατοῦμεν, οὖν ἀν ποτὲ ἡμᾶς ἐκούτες εἴναι ὑποκατακλι- νέσθαι ἀλλήλους ἐν τῇ ξητήσει καὶ διαφθείρειν τῇ εὐέρειν αὐτοῦ· δικαιοσύνην δὲ ξητοῦντας, πράγμα πολλῶν χρυσίων τιμώτερον, ἐπειθ' οὕτως ἀνοίχτως υπείκειν ἀλλήλους καὶ οὐ σπουδάζειν ὁ τι 35 κάλιστα φανῆναι αὐτῷ. οἶου γε σύ, ὁ φίλε· ἀλλ', οὔμας, οὐ δυνάμεθα· ἑλείσθαι οὖν ἡμᾶς πολὺ μᾶλλον εἰκός ἐστίν θεοθήκη ζύπτω ὑμῶν ἡ καλεταίνεσθαι.

35. γε θ' et (antecedente οἶου) Φ: τε ΑΠ: pro οἶου γε σὺ πραγματικά οἶου γε ἐστίν Ξ, μή οἶου σὺ εὖ.

οικο αισθήσεως τῆς ἀρχής. Εἰς τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν τῆς ἀνθρώπουν κατακλινόμεθα. Εἰς τὸν ἐρώτημα τῆς ἀλήθείας κατακλινόμεθα. Εἰς τὴν ἐκπαίδευσιν τῆς ἀλήθείας κατακλινόμεθα.
XI. Καὶ ὃς ἀκούσαι ἀνεκάργασε τε μίλα σαρδάνιον καὶ εἶπεν ο Ἡράκλεις, ἐφ᾽, αὐτὴ 'κεινὴ ἡ εἰσωθία εἰρωνεία Σωκράτους, καὶ

4. αὐτὴ Π: αὐτὴ Α.
5 taept' égō ὑδη τε καὶ τοῦτοι προϋλεγον, ὅτι σὺ ἀποκρίνασθαι μὲν οὐκ ἑθελήσοις, εἰρωνεύσιο δὲ καὶ πάντα μᾶλλον ποιήσιοι ἢ ἀποκρινούοι, εἰ τίς τί σ' ἐρωτά. Σοφὸς γὰρ εἰ, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ὡς Θρασύμαχε: εἰ οὖν ὑδησθα ὅτι, εἰ τίνα ἐροιο ὁπόσα ἐστὶ τὰ δώδεκα, καὶ ἐρόμενος προείποι κατ' ὅτε μοι, ὃ ἀνδρωτε. Β 10 μὴ ἑρείς, ὅτι ἐστίν τὰ δώδεκα δις εξ μηδ' ὅτι τρίς τέτταρα μηδ' ὅτι ἐξάκις δύο μηδ' ὅτι τετράκις τρια: ὡς οὖν ἀποδεξομαί σοι, εἶν τοιαῦτα φλαρῆς; δῆλον, οἴμαι, σοι ἦν ὅτι οὐδείς ἀποκρινοίτο τῷ ὀφθω πυθανομένῳ. ἀλλ' εἰ σοι εἶπεν ὡς Θρασύμαχε, πῶς λέγεις; μή ἀποκρινόμαχοι ὃν προείπεσς μιθὲν; πότερον, ὃ θαυμάσει, 15 μηδ' εἰ τούτων τι θυγανέναι ὃν, ἀλλ' ἐτερον εἶπα τι τοῦ ἄλλους; ἢ πῶς λέγεις; τ' ἂν αὐτῷ εἶπες πρὸς ταῦτα; Ἐθέν, ἐφε' ὡς δή ὃ ομοιον τούτο ἐκείνον. οὐδὲν γε καλύει, ἦν δ' ἐγώ' εἰ δ' οὖν καὶ μη ἐστίν ὁμοιον, φαίνεται δὲ τῷ ἔρωτηθέντι τοιοῦτον, ἢττόν τι αἰτών οἷε ἀποκρινειτὰ ὣ το φαινόμενον έαυτό, εἶν τε ἡμέις 20 ἀπαγορεύωμεν εάν τε μή; Ἀλλο τι οὖν, ἐφε', καὶ σὺ οὖν οὕτω ποιήσις; ἂν ἐγώ ἀπείπου, τούτων τι ἀποκρινεῖ; οὐκ ἂν θαυμάσαιμι, Ἦν δ' ἐγώ, εἰ μοι σκεψάμενῳ οὕτω δοξείν. Τι οὖν, ἐφε', ἂν ἐγώ δειξῃ ἐτέραν ἀποκρισιν παρά πάσαις ταύτας περὶ δικαιοσύνης βελτίων D.
The metaphor is from a banquet to which each contributes his share; cf. Symp. 177 C ἐγώ οὖν ἐπιθυμώ ἄμα μὲν τοῦτο ἐρανός εὐανεγκείας κτλ.

338 Α τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἀλλως ποιεῖ: 338 Β η'/
XII. Εἰσώντως δὲ μοι ταῦτα δὲ τε Γλαύκων καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι 5 ἐδείκτων αὐτοῦ μὴ ἄλλος ποιεῖν. καὶ ο Θρασύμαχος φανερὸς μὲν ἦν ἐπιθυμῶν εἰπεῖν, ἵνα εὐδοκιμῆσειν, ἡγούμενος ἐχεῖν ἀπόκρισιν παγκάλης· προσεποιεῖτο δὲ φιλονικεῖν πρὸς τὸ ἐμὲ εἶναι τῶν ἀποκρινόμενων. τελευτῶν δὲ ξυνεχώρησεν, κἀπετα | Αὐτὴ δὴ Ἡ Ἐφ. ἡ Ἐκείνων σοφία, αὐτοῦ μὲν μὴ ἔθελεν διδάσκειν, παρὰ 10 δὲ τῶν ἄλλων περιμόντα μανθάνειν καὶ τοῦτων μηδὲ χάριν ἀποδιδόναι. "Ως μὲν, ἦν δὲ ἐγώ, μανθάνω παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀληθῆ εἰπεῖς, ο Θρασύμαχος· ὅτι δὲ οὐ μὲ φῆς χάριν ἐκτίνειν, φεύδει· ἐκτίνῳ γὰρ ὅση δύναμαι· δύναμι δὲ ἐπαίνειν μόνον· χρήματα γὰρ οὐκ ἔχω· ὅς δὲ προθύμως τοῦτο δρῶ, εἰνάς τίς μοι δοκεῖ εὗ 15 λέγειν, εὐ εἶσαι αὐτίκα δὴ μάλα, ἐπειδὴν ἀποκρινή· οἶμαι γὰρ 1 σε εὐ ἐρείν. "Ἄκουε δὴ, ἦ δὲ ὅσι. φησὶ γὰρ ἔγω εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἡ τοῦ κρείττονος ἔξωμφέρων. ἀλλὰ τι οὐκ ἐπαίνεις; ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔθελήσεις. "Εἰλι μᾶθω γε πρῶτον, ἐφην, τὶ λέγεις· νῦν γὰρ οὕτω οἴδα. τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος φῆς ἔξωμφέρων δίκαιον εἶναι. 20 καὶ τοῦτο, ὁ Θρασύμαχε, τὶ ποτε λέγεις; οὐ γὰρ ποι ὅ τε τοιόύτω φῆς· εἰ Πολυνύδαμας ἦμοι κρείττον ὁ παγκρατιάστης καὶ αὐτῷ ἔξωμφέρει τὰ βόεια κρέα πρὸς τὸ σῶμα, τοῦτο τὸ σιτίον εἶναι καὶ ἦμων τοῖς ἡττοσι ἐκείνου ἔξωμφέρων ἀμα καὶ δίκαιον. D Βδελυγρὸς γὰρ εἶ, ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, καὶ ταῦτα ὑπολαμβάνεις, ἦ ἀν 25 κακοφυγήσαις μᾶλιστα τοῦ λόγου. Οὐδαμός, ὁ ἀριστε, ἦν δ' ἔγω·

338 C 16 ἀκοὺε δὴ calls for attention, ostentatiously, like a herald: cf. X 595 C, Aρ. 20 D. Prot. 353 C. 21 Πολυνύδαμας—ὁ παγκρατιάστης. οὔτοι ο Πολυνύδαμας ἀπὸ Σκοτοῦσας ἤν, πόλεως Θεσσαλίας, διασημότατος παγκρατιάστης, ὑπερμεγέθης, says the Scholiast. He was vicer in the ninety-third Olympic games 408 B.C. Stallbaum refers to Pausanias (vi 5) and others for the wonderful stories of his prowess. His statue at Olympia by Lysippus was very famous. Cf. Boeckh Κλ. Σχρ. ιv p. 446. 22 τοῦτο το οὔτων κτλ. Teichmüller (Lit. Fehd. II p. 190) finds in this a confirmation of his belief that Plato was a vegetarian; but it is implied merely that a beef diet was not considered wholesome for persons out of training. Aristotle may have had this passage in view in Eλ. Νεε. 11 s. 1106a 36 ff., though his illustration is there taken from quantity, and not from quality, of food. Cf. also Gorg. 490 C. 338 D 23 ἔξωμφέρων ἀμα καὶ δίκαιον. The sophistry is undisguised. If βόεια κρέα is Polydamas' 'συμφέρον and δίκαιον, and δίκαιον is assumed to be everywhere identical with itself, it follows that βόεια κρέα is our δίκαιον, but not our ἔξωμφέρων, otherwise we are also κρείττονοι. To avoid this, Wohlrab ingeniously takes εἰκείνου not with ἡττοσιν but with ἔξωμφέρων ἀμα καὶ δίκαιον, as if the meaning were 'Polydamas' 'συμφέρων καὶ δίκαιον is also δίκαιον for us.' This explanation is however linguistically harsh and comparatively pointless. On βδελυγρὸς γὰρ εἴ το Tucker aptly reminds us that the prevailing feature in Theophrastus' description of the βδελυγρὸς (Char. c. 11) is παῦδα ἐπι- φανὴς καὶ ἐπενειδώτας (of obstructive and objectionable pleasantry) Jebb. 25 κακουχύγησαις. Cope observes that the word is used 'of the knavish tricks
and fallacies which may be employed in rhetorical and dialectical reasoning.”

26 el't' onk oisda ktl. ‘Do you mean to say you don’t know’ etc. The division of constitutions into Monarchy, Oligarchy (for which Aristocracy is here substituted) and Democracy was familiar to everybody: see Aeschin. Clis. 6. Tim. 4.ambolgyoun tvar treis einai politeia para pasoan aneropois, turannis kai elvcaXia kai demokratia. Cf. Whibley Greek Oligarchies pp. 17, 24. Thrasymuchus proceeds to define krepis as ‘the corrupt in demokratovnai at frisorakratovnta kai tovton poulieioyn brings out his meaning. Cf. Aristotle 714 B nthmos eido tinex fasi einai tosoata Thesis of politeiaw, and C oiste gar pro tov tov oseis stinov blises deis fasi tois nthmos, all hostile, ‘as is the case when the constitution is the polis, taute de to evmiferon oseis areis te ael kai wv kataklitheta, kai ton fusi bron oinov tokaiou legevai kaalavw' oseis. Pavos: ‘Oti tov tov krip- touvox evmiferovn esti.

29 titeita de ge: Lawv 1. c. titeita krepis, fasi, tov nthmos ev tov th krapcovnta kai tov katakraforovvo. ‘Aplethi oseis. ‘Apro on oseis, fasi, potete dverwv nekiasanta tina politeian allhn h kai tvraon thres tado evkata proas all to proton nthmos h to svmpofron eavno tov arkhv tov menwv; Pavos gar an; Aristotle makes it the distinguishing mark of his three perverted forms (parakíades) of constitution (turaninis, elvcaXia, demokratia) that they seek their own and not to tov nthmos evmiferovn: Pol. 17. 1279b 4 ff.

338 E 32 tov tovov evkaiownta ktl. Lawv 714 D oseis kai de an tratto tv tevnta paraibain, kolaion o thevnon wv adikevnta, dikai taip eino elv epeon- mesowv: ‘Eise kai yvov. Taip ‘urer ael kai oseis kai taip in to dikaiov an evxou. Vhndi yvov oseis elv o Meg. nthmos kai dikaiwv are identified by this theory.

339 A 1 tovov eino dikaiow. Her- weron would expunge tovov, but tavvov is not more otiose here than to autov below.

339 B I evmiferovn yin. There
is here a hint of the main purpose of the Republic, which is to prove that δικαίον is εὐμφέρον in the truest sense for the individual and the state.

339 b—341 a Now that the meaning of the definition has been explained, Socrates proceeds to attack it. Even if we assume that rulers seek their own advantage, yet they often err, and enact laws to their own disadvantage: therefore, as it is just for subjects to obey their rulers, Justice will sometimes consist in doing what is not the interest of the stronger. Socrates reiterates this objection and is supported by Polemarchus. It is urged by Clitophon that Thrasymachus meant by 'the interest of the stronger' what was thought—whether rightly or wrongly—by the stronger to be to their interest. Thrasymachus declines to avoid himself of this suggestion, and explains that, strictly speaking, rulers, qua rulers, cannot err. This statement he supports by arguing from the analogy of medical practitioners and others, pleading that his earlier concession was but a popular way of expressing the fact that rulers seem to err. Therefore the original definition was strictly correct. Justice is the interest of the stronger, since rulers make laws in their own interest, and, qua rulers, are infallible.

On the reasoning of Thrasymachus in these two chapters see 341 a n.

339 b 13 ὅδε—μέντω. "In interrogationibus haec particula" (μέντω) "ita cum οἷος negotiatione contingitur, ut gravissima sententiae vox intercedat, quo modo aliquis eis quae ex altero quaerit summam veritatis ingerit speciem" (Hoefner de part. Plat. p. 34). μέντω is simply 'of course', 'surely', 'surely you regard it as just to obey the rulers, do you not?' The idiom is frequent in Plato. The other examples of it (cited by Stallbaum) in the Republic are infra 346 a, vii 521 d, ix 581 a, 584 a, x 596 e.

14 πότερον ἐν ἀναμάρτητοι κτλ. The reasoning echoes that of 334 c above.

339 c 17 τίθέναι—τίθεναι: we should expect τίθέναι in both cases, as the ἀρχοντες according to the theory we are discussing are κριτοὶ and supreme as legislators: but the middle of personal interest is naturally used in combination with τὰ εὐμφέροντα ἑαυτοῖς: cf. infra 341 a.

339 d 23 τί λέγεις σὺ; a favourite eristic formula: see Ar. Clouds 1174 τοῦτο τούτοιχωμον ἄτεχνως ἔπαινει, τὸ τί λέγεις σὺ;
28 toίνυν: not 'therefore,' but 'also,' a frequent use in Plato. In the Republic it occurs 29 times, according to Kugler. 

339 E 30 ὅταν οἱ μὲν — τοῖς δὲ (i.e. τοῖς ἄρχομενοις). These two clauses depend, not on ὠμολογήσατα, but on ποιεῖν: it is just to do τὰ ἄξιμφωρα τοῖς ἄρχονται as often as the rulers unwillingly prescribe what is evil for themselves and so long as Thrasymachus says it is just for subjects to do what the rulers have prescribed. Desire for brevity and balance leads Plato to put both clauses under the government of ὅταν, although 'since' rather than 'whenever' is the more appropriate conjunction for introducing the second: for Thrasymachus does not sometimes but always assert that it is just to obey the rulers. The suggested reading ὧς for ὥς would require us to take τοῖς δὲ κτλ. as an independent sentence, and leave μὲν in οἷς μὲν without a corresponding δὲ.

32 αὐτὸ is 'the matter,' 'the case before us': cf. IV 428 Α (αὐτῷ), VII 518 B (αὐτῶν), 524 E (αὐτῷ), Theae. i. 172 E al. The text has been needlessly suspected by Madvig and other critics.

340 Α 1 ἔαν σὺ γε is of course ironical. The disciples of the rival disputants now enter the fray.

5 τὸ γὰρ τὰ κελεύμανα κτλ. If this, and no more, had been Thrasymachus' definition, it would remain unrefuted; commands would be commands, whether expedient for the rulers or not.

340 Β 12 ὧς γοῦν—ἐξιμφέρειν. This explanation is involved in Clitophon's earlier statement τὸ τὰ κελεύμανα ποιεῖν
τὸ δίκαιον τούτο ἐτίθητο. Ἀλλ' οὐχ οὖτως, ἢ δ' ὃς ὁ Πολέμαρχος, 15 ἐλεγετο. Οὐδὲν, ἵν 1 δ'' ἔγω, ὁ Πολέμαρχε, διαφέρει, ἀλλ' εἰ νῦν 8 οὖτω λέγει Θρασύμαχος, οὖτως αὐτοῦ ἀποδεχώμεθα.

XIV. Καὶ μοι εἰπέ, ὁ Θρασύμαχε· τοῦτο ἦν δ' ἐβούλουν λέγειν τὸ δίκαιον, τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ἐμφέρον δοκοῦν εἶναι τὸ κρείττονι, εὰν τε ἐμφέρῃ εὰν τε μή; οὖτως σε φῶμεν λέγειν; 20· Ἡκιστά γ', ἔφη· ἀλλὰ κρείττων με οὐεῖ καλείν τὸν ἐξαμαρτάνοντα, ὅταν ἐξαμαρτάνη; Ἐννοοὶ, εἰπόν, ὅμιν σε φῶμεν λέγειν, ὅτε τοὺς ἀρχιστας ὁμολογεῖς οὐκ ἀναμαρτήτους 1 εἶναι, ἀλλὰ τι καὶ ἐξαμαρτάνειν. Συνοφάντης γὰρ εἰ, ἔφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, ἐν τοῖς λόγοις· εἰπεί αὐτίκα ἰατρῶν καλεῖς σὺ τὸν ἐξαμαρτάνοντα περὶ τοὺς κάμνουσιν 25 κατ' αὐτὸ τούτο ἐξαμαρτάνει; ἣ λογιστικόν, ὅσ ἄν ἐν λογισμῷ ἀμαρτάνῃ, τότε ὅταν ἀμαρτάνη, κατὰ ταύτην τὴν ἀμαρτίαν; ἀλλ', οἴμαι, λέγομεν τῷ ἰδίματι οὖτως, ὅτι ὁ ἰατρὸς ἐξήματεν καὶ ὁ λογιστής ἐξήματεν καὶ ὁ γραμματιστής· τὸ δ', οἴμαι, ἐκαστὸς τούτων, καθ' ὅσον τοῦτ' ἐστιν ὁ προσαγορευόμεν 1 αὐτῶν, οὐδέποτε Ε 30 ἀμαρτάνει· ὅστε κατὰ τὸν ἀκριβῆ λόγον, ἐπειδὴ καὶ σὺ ἀκριβολογεῖ, οὐδεὶς τῶν δημιουργῶν ἀμαρτάνει. ἐπιλειτουργεῖ γὰρ ἐπίστημα ὁ ἀμαρτάνων ἀμαρτάνει, ἐν δ' οὐκ ἐστὶ δημιουργὸς· ὅστε δημιουργὸς ἢ σοφὸς ἢ ἄρχων οὐδεὶς ἀμαρτάνει τότε ὅταν ἄρχων γ',


οτὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων: that which the rulers κέλευονει is what they believe to be in their interests. Clitophon's defence finds no justification in the terms of Thrasymachus' definition; but it was the most obvious way of attempting to reconcile that definition with the admission that rulers are capable of erring.

340 C 18 τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ἐμφέρον κτλ. Bonitz (Zeitschr. f. öst. Gymn. 1863 p. 648), followed by Wohlrab, proposes to add the words to ἐμφέρον after ἐμφέρον, "parum venustae," as Hartman thinks. Neither is it well (with Hartman) to omit τοῦ κρείττονος. The apparent harshness of the construction ('that which seems to be the stronger's interest to the stronger') is justified by its brevity and precision, and by the desire to introduce the exact words of the original definition into its amended form.


27 λέγομεν τῷ ρήματι οὖτως. Bekker (with whom Shilleto on Dem. F. L. § 91 agrees) would insert μέν after λέγομεν; but (as Schneider remarks) the emphasis on τῷ ρήματι does duty instead of the particle, and even otherwise, μέν is not essential: cf. III 398 A (where Shilleto would also add μέν), infra 343 C, II 363 E, X 605 C al.

28 τὸ δὲ· 'whereas in point of fact' is a favourite Platonic idiom: cf. IV 443 C, VII 527 A, 527 D al.

340 E 31 ἐπιλειτουργεῖς. See cr. n. The present, which Stallbaum and others adopt, may be right, but the older reading is at least as good. The failure in knowledge must precede the actual error. For the mistake see Introd. § 5.
341 A—342 E Socrates now meets Thrasymachus on his own ground, and attacks his definition according to the "strictest form" of argument. He shows by analogy that every ruler qua ruler seeks the good of those whom he rules, since every art aims at the good of its own peculiar charge or object, and not at its own, for qua art there is nothing lacking to it. 341 A ff. It is to be noted that the discussion is now transferred from the region of facts into an atmosphere of idealism. For this, Thrasymachus is primarily responsible. The theory that the ruler qua ruler makes no mistakes, is no doubt true ideally, but practically it is of little moment, since he will suffer qua ruler for the errors which he commits in moments of aberration. The strength of Thrasymachus' theory lay in its correspondence with the facts (real or apparent) of experience; it is the temptation to defend his theory against the criticism of Socrates which leads him to abandon facts for ideas; and as soon as he is refuted on the idealistic plane, he descends to facts again (343 A ff.). The vein of idealism struck by Thrasymachus is worked to some purpose by Socrates. To assert that rulers qua rulers always seek the good of their subjects is in reality to set before us a political ideal, and Plato's Ideal Commonwealth is intended to be its embodiment in a state. Plato was probably the first to develope and elaborate this principle of political science, but the legislations of Solon and other early lawgivers furnish examples of its application to practical politics (see especially Arist. Keph. Ath. ch. 12 and Solon's verses there cited), and it is formulated by the historical Socrates in Xen. Mem. III 2, with which compare Cyrop. VII 2. 14. See also Henkel Studien zur Gesch. d. gr. Lehre vom Staat pp. 44, 145, and Whibley Greek Oligarchies p. 11 n. 29.

5 συκοφαντέων is explained in εις ἑπιβουλής—κακογιόντα σε, where κακογιόντα (as Schneider observes) is not used as in 338 D of putting an evil or sophistical interpretation on a theory, but of damaging a man's personal reputation and credit: "sic licet eximiationes et pecuniae detrimentum facturus sibi videbatur sophista ideoque Socratem se, quamquam frustra, impignare in sequentibus quoque criminarum."
12 τὸν ὡς ἔτος εἰσείν. The only exact parallel to this use of ὡς ἔτος εἰσείν in Plato is Laws 656 E skopōs δ᾽ εὐφέρεις αὐτῷ πίε τὰ μυριστά ἔτος γεγραμμένα δ᾽ ητευπωμένα ὡς ὡς ἔτος εἰσείν μυριστά ἀλλὰ ὅτως. This idiomatic phrase is rare before Plato, who uses it 77 times with the meaning 'to put the matter in a word,' implying that other and possibly more exact means of describing the thing in question might be found. In 52 of these cases the phrase is combined with πᾶς οὐδὲ ond εἰ ῆς and their family of words, in the sense of fere, propemodum; its use in other connexions is in part a return to old poetic usage; cf. Aesch. Pers. 714, Eur. Hipp. 1162, Herac. 167. See Grünwald in Schanz's Beiträge zur hist. Synt. d. gr. Spr. II 3, pp. 21 ff. The other examples in the Republic are ν ὅ 564 D, VIII 551 B, IX 577 C. 

οὐν δὴ ἔλεγεν: viz. in 340 E κατὰ τὸν ἀκριβῆ λόγον. The antecedent is the phrase ἀκριβῆ λόγον. The conjecture of Benedictus, δό, for δή, though adopted by several editors, would (as Schneider remarks) leave it uncertain whether λόγος or τὸν was referred to by the relative. There is no MS authority for δόν.

341 c 17 ἔφειν—ἀλευτα. παραφοία ἐπὶ τῶν καθ’ ἐαυτῶν τι ἡ ἀδύνατα ποιεῖν ἐπι-

341 d 27 ἐκάστῳ τούτων: viz. τοῖς καί-

nuousi, τοῖς ναύταισι, and in general the sub-

[341 B]
jicts upon whom the art is exercised. The expression is a little vague (cf. viii 543 c n.) but it is rash and unnecessary to insert elde or write ekastw < twn eidwv > touwos, as Tucker recommends.

29 AP oyn—telen einai. I have retained this reading, in deference to the MSS, but it is open to grave objection. As the sentence stands, the meaning is that every art (as well as every object of an art—this is implied by kal) has one sympherov, viz. to be as perfect as it can, but no other. In the sequel this is interpreted to mean that no art needs any additional aergeth; since it is (sym art) perfect already: oyste yar poihria oyste 产物a odeo odeo techei parostin ktl. (342 B). But the words of the sentence AP oyn—telen einai have to be taken very loosely in order to admit of this interpretation. We must suppose them equivalent to 'No art has a sympherov of its own, unless you are to call the fact that it is perfect its sympherov.' If Plato had written the passage as it stands in g and in the margin of Flor. U (both MSS probably of the fifteenth century), it would be open to no objection: AR oyn kal ekasth twn teychwv esti tI sympherov allo < ou prospedeiai>, ET <eixarkei ekasth auth autu, yoste > d tI malostn telena einai; This reading was adopted by Bekker, and by Stallbaum in his first edition; and a careful study of the whole passage confirms the judgment of Schneider, "Platonem non solum potuisset, sed etiam debuisse vel haec ipsa vel consimilia scribere." The same sense, expressed more briefly, may be obtained by the insertion of de before einai: 'has every art also a sympherov besides (i.e. besides the sympherov of its object), or must it be as perfect as possible?' ekasthyn does not require to be repeated any more than in 346 A below. The alteration is very slight; for de einai, deinai may have been written by mistake and d afterwards erected.

341 E 33 vyn ktl.: 'has now been invented.' The art of medicine is not coeval with body. I can see no reason for thinking (with Campbell) that vyn is corrupt for hym.

34 syma esti poihrvn ktl. Lys. 217 B anagkastei de y syma dia vnoov iatrikyn aptasevai kai filow.

35 profyri. This is said by Weber (Schanz's Beiträge II n, p. 67) to be the only example in Plato of  GroupLayout with the subjunctive after a preterite tense.

342 A 3 est autois. Hartman proposes ET est autois. autois (sc. orphalmai, othi) may be emphatic (ipsis), and est, 'over and above,' 'besides': 'we require in addition to the organs themselves, an art' etc. But it is perhaps simpler to make esti = to preside over': cf. ef ols estin VI 511 E n.

4 els tauna means eis ofvn kal akoyfr. The art in question considers what is advantageous with respect to (els) seeing and hearing.
5 ἐκποριούσης; ἀρα καὶ ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ τέχνῃ ἐν τις πονηρία, καὶ δει ἐκάστη τέχνη ἀλλης τέχνης, ἢτις αὐτῇ τὸ ἄγαμον σκέφτεται, καὶ τῇ σκοπουμενή ἐτέρας αὐ τοιαύτης, καὶ τούτ᾽ ἐστιν ἀπέραντον; ἢ αὐτῇ αὐτῇ τὸ ἄγαμον σκέφτεται; ἢ οὕτε αὐτῆς οὕτε ἀλλής ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτῆς πονηρίαν τὸ ἄγαμον σκοπεῖν. οὕτε 10 γὰρ πονηρία οὕτε ἀμαρτία οὐδεμία οὐδεμία τέχνη πάρεστιν, οὐδὲ προσήκει τέχνη ἀλλο τὸ ἄγαμον ἄγαμον ἢ ἐκεῖνος οὗ τέχνη ἐστίν, αὐτῇ δὲ ἀβλαβής καὶ ἀκέραιος ἐστὶν ὁρθή οὔσα, ἐσωτερὶ ἢ ἐκάστη ἀκριβῆς ὀλή ἠπερ ἐστί; καὶ σκόπει ἐκεῖνο τῷ ἀκριβεῖ λόγῳ οὕτως ἢ ἀλλὰς ἔχει; οὕτως, ἐφι, φαίνεται. Οὐκ ἀρα, 15 ἢν δ᾽ ἔγω, ἱατρικὴ ἱατρική τὸ ἄγαμον σκοπεῖ ἀλλὰ σώματι. Ναὶ, ἐφι. Οὐδὲ ἱππικὴ ἱππικὴ ἀλλ᾽ ἵππους οὐδὲ ἀλλὴ τέχνη οὐδεμία ἀνατη, οὐδὲ γὰρ προσδείπται, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνο οὗ τέχνη ἐστίν. Φαίνεται, ἐφι, οὕτως. Ἀλλὰ μήν, ὁ Θαρσύμαχε, ἄρχουσι γε αἱ τέχναι καὶ κρατοῦσιν ἐκεῖνον, οὔτε εἰσὶν τέχναι. Συνεχόρισσεν 20 ἐνταῦθα καὶ μάλα μόνις. Οὐκ ἀρα ἐπιστήμην γε οὐδεμία τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ἄγαμον σκοπεῖ οὐδ᾽ ἐπιτάττει, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοῦ ἢττονος τε καὶ ἄρχομενον ὑπὲρ ἀνατη. Ἐνυμολόγησες μὲν καὶ ταύτα δ ἔπειτον, ἐπεχείρει δὲ περὶ αὐτὰ μάχεσθαι. ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὁμολογήσησ. "Ἀλλο τι οὖν, ἢν δ᾽ ἔγω, οὐδὲ ἱατρος οὐδεὶς, καθ᾽ ὅσον ἱατρός, τὸ 25 τῷ ἱατρῷ ἄγαμον σκοπεῖ οὐδ᾽ ἐπιτάττει, ἀλλὰ τῷ τὸν κάμνουτι; ὁμολόγησαι γὰρ ὁ ἀκριβῆς ἱατρὸς σωμάτων εἶναι ἄρχων ἀλλ᾽ οὖν χρηματιστῆς. ἢ οὐχ ὁμολόγησαι; Ἐνυφῇ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὁ κυβερνήτης ὁ ἀκριβῆς ναυτῶν εἶναι ἄρχων ἀλλ᾽ οὐ ναύτης; Ε 5. ἐκποριούσης χο ἐκποριούσης ΛΠΞ. 12. αὐτῆς Σξ; αὐτῆς ΛΠγ.' 

5 ἐκποριούσης. See cr. n. ἐκποριούσης appears in three Florentine mss. The present is difficult, if not impossible, in so close a union with the future; cf. x 604 A and vi 494 D. See Introd. § 5. 8 ἢ αὐτῆς—σκέφτεται: This question (which is of course to be answered in the negative) shows the awkwardness of the reading of A in ἀρ' οὖν—τελέαν εἰναι (341 D), which might almost be construed to mean that each art does seek its own συμφέρον, viz. the perfection of itself. 342 β 12 ἐσωτερ κτλ.: 'that is, so long as an art, taken in its strict sense' ('"stren genommen" Schneider) 'preserves its essence entire and unimpaired.' The predicate is ὅλη ἠπερ ἐστὶ, and ἀκριβῆς =ἀκριβῆς οὖσα in the sense which ἀκριβῆς bears throughout this passage (341 b al.). Hartman's insertion of ἢ before ἀκριβῆς is unsatisfactory; his alternative proposal to change ἀκριβῆς to ἀκριβῶς spoils the emphasis, and gives a wrong sense. 342 c 20 ἐπιστήμη is here a synonym for τέχνη. All arts rule: and ruling is itself an art or science, not a happy inspiration (cf. Mem. 111 6). Like other arts, ruling seeks only the good of that which it rules. 342 δ 26 ὁμολόγησαι γάρ—χρηματιστῆς. Ast compares Arist. Pol. A 9. 125b10 10 fl. ἄνδρας γάρ οὗ χρηματα ποιεῖν ἐστίν ἀλλὰ βάρος, οὐδὲ στρατηγικής καὶ ἱατρικῆς, ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν νίκης, τῆς δ᾽ ἱγιείας.
'Ομολόγηται. Οὐκ ἀρὰ ὁ γε τοιοῦτος κυβερνήτης τε καὶ ἄρχων
tὸ τὸ κυβερνήτης ξυμφέρων σκέψεται τε καὶ προστάζει, ἀλλὰ τὸ 30
τὸ ναύτη τε καὶ ἄρχομένω. Ξυνέφησε μόνης. Οὗκοι, ἢ δὲ ἐγὼ,
ὁ Θρασύμαχε, οὐδὲ ἄλλος ὁδεῖς ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ ἄρχη, καθ' ὅσον ἄρχουν
ἐστίν, τὸ αυτὸ ξυμφέρων σκοπεῖ οὐδ' ἐπιτάττει, ἀλλὰ τὸ τὸ
ἄρχομένω καὶ ὁ ἄντως δημιουργή, καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο βλέπων
καὶ τὸ ἐκεῖνῳ ξυμφέρων καὶ πρέπουν καὶ λέγει ἀ λέγει καὶ ποιεῖ 35
ἀ ποιεῖ ἀπάνται.

343 XVI. Ἐπειδή οὖν ἐνταῦθα ἡμεῖς τοῦ λόγου καὶ πᾶσι κατα-
φανεῖς ἢν, ὅτι τὸ τοῦ δικαίου λόγος εἰς τούναντίων περιειστήκει,
ὁ Θρασύμαχος αὐτῷ τοῦ ἀποκρίνεσθαι, Εἰτέ μοι, ἐφή, ὁ Ἁχαρίας,
τίτηθι σοι ἐστίν; Τι δὲ; ἢν δ' ἐγὼ: οὐκ ἀποκρίνεσθαι χρήν μᾶλλον
ἠ τοιαύτα ἑρωτάν; Ὅτι τούτω σε ἐφή, κορυφόντα περιορᾶ καὶ οὐκ
ἀπομύττει δεμένων, ὅσ γε αὐτῇ οὐδὲ πρόβατα οὐδὲ ποιμένα

343 A ff. It should be noted that Thrasymachus has in no way changed
his theory, but only reverts to his original standpoint, that of experience. In
the panegyric on Injustice in the present chapter, the new and important point is
the appeal to the evidence of tyranny and the emotions which it roused in
the mind of the Greeks. See on 344 B.

2 εἰς τούναντίον. Justice has now
become τὸ τοῦ ἰττόνος (rather than κρέτ-
τονος) συμφέρον.

5 κορυφόντα: 'snivelling,' μωραίωστα,
μυζάρετα κόρυφα γάρ ἡ μῆδα, ἢ οἱ Ἀττικοὶ
cατάρρον φαύν (Schol.). Ruhnken on
Timaeus Lex. s.v. quotes among other
passages Lucian Alex. § 20 ἢν δὲ τὸ
μηχάνημα τοῦτο άνδρὲι μὲν οὐκ σοι, εἰ δὲ
μὴ φορτικὸν εἰπέν, καὶ οὐρ ἐμοὶ πρόδηλον
καὶ γνώσκαι ράδιον, τοῦ δὲ ἰδώσας καὶ
κορύφης μεσοτὸ τὸν βίνα τεράστων καὶ
πάνω ἀπίστω ὁμοῖοι, and Horace Sat. i.
8 (of Lucilius) emunctae naris.

6 ὅσ γε αὐτῇ κτλ. "Ἅπτε αὐτῇ
interpositem; nam ipsi nutrici Socratis
insipientiam opprobrio esse, Thrasym-
machus vult significare." Ast. Richter
(Fl. Jahrb. for 1887 p. 140) ought not
to have suggested ὅσ γε αὐτὸς. The sense
is 'for she cannot teach you to recognise
even sheep or shepherd,' not 'you do
not know either sheep or shepherd'
(J. and C.), which would require oφτε—
οφτε. The phrase is clearly a half-pro-
verbial expression borrowed from the
nursery.
7 ὅτι οἶει τοὺς ποιμένας κτλ. Thrasymachus gives a new turn to the nursery saying. The illustration from the shepherd and his sheep (which is now for the first time introduced) by the historical Socrates to justify the opposite conclusion (Xen. Mem. III. 2. 1) ἐντυχών δὲ ποτὲ στρατηγεὶς ἡμῶν τῷ, Τοῦ ἐνεκεν, ἐφ’ Ὀμηρὸν οἶει τῷ Ἀγαμέμνωνα προσαγορεῖται ποιμένα λαῶν; ἀρά γε ὅτι, ὥσπερ τοῦ ποιμένα ἐπιμελεῖται δεῖ, ὅπως σῶι το ἐσωτάι αἱ δικαία, καὶ τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ξέρων, οὕτω καὶ τὸν στρατηγὸν ἐπιμελεῖται δεῖ, ὅπως σῶι το ὑπ’ οἱ στρατηγῶν ἐσωτάται. Οὐκ ἔνεκα στρατηγοῦν τοῦτο ἐστι.; So also Arist. Eth. Nic. VIII. 13. 115a 12 ff. εὐ γάρ ποιεῖ τοὺς βασιλευούσας, εὐ ποιεῖ ἄγαθόν ἵνα ἐπιμελέται αὐτῶν. εὐ’ εὐ πράττουσιν, ὥσπερ νοῦσι προβάτων· δέδοι καὶ Ὀμηρὸς τῷ Ἀγαμέμνωνα ποιμένα λαῶν εἰπὲν. In Plato Pol. 271 D ff. the deities of the golden age are compared to shepherds, and the comparison of a good ruler to a shepherd is very frequent in Plato: see Ast’s Lex. Plat. s. v. νοῆς. In Socrates’ view ‘the shepherd careth for his sheep.’ With Thrasymachus’ attitude should be compared the picture of the tyrant in Thuc. 174 D as a σφόντη ποιμένα ή τινα βουκόλον—πολο βδαλλοντα (he squeezes as much milk as he can out of his flock): also Solon ap. Arist. Rep. Alth. ch. 12 εὐ γάρ τις ἄλλος ταύτης τὴν τιμῆν έτυχεν, οὐκ ἀλλ’ κατέσχε δήμου οὐδ’ ἐπάπασατο, | πρὸν ἀναμβασία παρ’ ἐξελεῖ γάλα. In the word ἀμοργος or ἀμολγοι used by Cratinus in the sense of ἄλλα ὀλεροὶ (Meineke Fr. Con. Græc. II 1, p. 140) the image is the same. Compare the eloquent words of Ruskin in Sesame and Lilies § 43 and Milton’s Lycidas 113—129.

1.5 πόρρω εἰ περὶ. πόρρω can hardly (I think) mean ‘far from’ (sc. knowing): this would require πόρρω εἰ <τοῦ τι εἴδοσα> περὶ, as Herwerden suggests: cf. Lys. 212 οὕτως πόρρω εἰσί τοῦ κτήματος. See also Blaydes on Ar. Wasps 192. Such biting sarcasm is appropriate in the mouth of Thrasymachus.

3.3 c 16 ἀλλότριον ἀγαθόν. Arist. Eth. Nic. v. 3. 1150ε 3 f. διὰ τὸ τοῦτο καὶ ἀλλότριον ἀγαθὸν δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ δικαιοσύνη μόνη τῶν ἀρετῶν, ὅτι πρὸς ἐπειρά ἐστιν ἀλλ’ ἄλλος γάρ τὰ συμφέροντα πράττει, ἢ ἀρχοντε ἡ κοινωνία (with Stewart’s note) and ib. 10. 1134e 5. τῷ ὄντι is not τῷ ὄντι δικαίῳ, but revera (as Stallbaum observes).

19 ὡς ἀληθῶς as well as ἀληθῶς, τῷ
the intended render, and the like, is used to indicate that a word is to be taken in its strict and full etymological sense (ε-θήκων): cf. Phaed. 80 D εἰς Ἰδίου ὡς ἀληθῶς, and infra II 376 B, v 474 A, VI 511 B, VIII 551 E nn.

343 ε' 30 τά γε οἰκεία—μονοθρησκείας. Wells aptly cites the refusal of Deioces in Herod. i 97 to continue as an arbiter: οὗ γὰρ οἱ λοιποὶ τῶν εὐαγγελιστῶν τοῦ εὐαγγελισμοῦ τοῖς πέλας δε ἡμέρᾳ δικαίως. Cf. also Ap. 23 B, 31 B. In like manner Aristotle mentions it as one of the safeguards of a democracy engaged in agriculture that the necessity of looking after their private interests will prevent the citizens from often attending the assembly (Pol. Z 4. 1318b 11). Plato is fond of the comparative ending in -ως (affected, says Cobet, by those "qui nitidissime scribunt"); see Kühner-Blass Gr. Gramm. i 577.

32 ἀπεχεθάναι. ἀπέθανακα as a present is not well attested in Plato's time; and the aorist "to incur the enmity of" is at least as suitable in point of meaning here.

35 λέγω γὰρ ὁπερ γὸν δὴ ἐλέγων. As points out that nothing in what has been already said corresponds to the words τὸν μεγάλα δικαίωμα πλεονεκτεῖν, and reads ὅπερ on slight MS authority. But no special reference is intended: the words mean simply 'I mean the man I meant just now.' Thrasymachus asserts that he has all along been referring to τὸν μεγάλα κτλ.

344 A 3 ἡ τὸ δίκαιον: i.e. ἡ τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον. The reading αἰτῶ (found in A, but no dependence can be put on this MS in such matters) would require the omission of the article before δίκαιον (so Stallbaum and others). Tucker inclines to render 'how much more he is personally benefited by being unjust than by justice,' but the ordinary view is preferable.

6 ἡ ou κτλ. This laboured sentence is perhaps intended as a parody of some sophistic style: cf. Goig. 448 c.
344 B 8 ὁν depends on μέρε.  
10 ἀνδραποδισταῖ: 'kidnappers.' The word is defined by Pollux III 78 as ὁ τῶν ἐλευθερῶν καταδουλώσαμεν οὐ τῶν ἄλλων ὀκέτων ἀπαγόμενοι. Thessaly had an evil name for this kind of crime (Blaydes on Ar. Plut. 521); but the frequent references to it in Attic literature show that Greece itself was not exempt. See on IX 575 B and the article in Stephanus-Hase Thes. s.v.

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ [344 A]

σμικρὸν ταλλότρια καὶ λάθρᾳ καὶ βίᾳ ἀφαιρεῖται, καὶ ιερά καὶ ὅσια καὶ ὁδια καὶ δημόσια, ἀλλὰ ξυλιλήθην, ἢ ὅπερ ἐκάστῳ β. μέρει ὅταν τις ἀδικήσας μὴ λάθῃ, ξημοῦται τε καὶ ὁνείδη ἔχει τὰ 10 μέγατα: καὶ γὰρ ἱερόσυλοι καὶ ἀνδραποδισταὶ καὶ τοιχωρίων καὶ ἀποστερηταὶ καὶ κλέπται οἱ κατὰ μέρη ἀδικοῦντες τῶν τοιοῦτων κακουργημάτων καλοῦνται: ἔτειδαί δὲ τις πρὸς τοῖς τῶν πολιτῶν χρήμασιν καὶ αὐτοὺς ἀνδραποδιστάμενος δουλώσηται, ἀντὶ τούτων τῶν αἰσχρῶν όνομάτων εὐδαιμονεῖς καὶ μακάριοι. 15 κέκληται, οὐ μόνον ἀπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων. Κ. ὅσοι ἄν πᾶσαν αὐτοῦ τῆς ὅλην ἀδικίαν ἡδικήκοτα: οὐ γὰρ τὸ ποιεῖν τὰ ἄδικα ἀλλὰ τὸ πάσχειν φοβοῦμενοι ὀνεὶδίζουσιν οἱ ὀνειδίζουσιν τὴν ἀδικίαν. οὕτως, ὡς Σώκρατες, καὶ ἰαγνώρισον καὶ ἐλευθεριώτερον καὶ ἔσπυρτικότερον ἄδικα δικαιοσύνης ἐστίν. 20 ἰκανὸς γνημομένη, καὶ ὅπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔθεσιν, τὸ μὲν τοῦ κρείττονος χυμφέρον τὸ δίκαιον τυχχανεὶ ὃν, τὸ δ' ἄδικον ἐαυτῷ λυστελὺν τε καὶ χυμφέρον.

7. βία II: βία Α.


20 ἰκανὸς γνημομένη: 'realised on an adequate scale' (D. and V.). For the construction of γνημοσύναι with an adverb cf. (with Ast) Soph. 230 C and infra VI 504 C. After τὸ δ’ ἄδικον below, Her- werden would insert τὸ ἐκ γὰρ ἄνωτέρωτος τε καὶ χυμφέρου, but only τυχχανεὶ (and not τυχχανεὶ ὃν) is to be understood after ἄδικων; nor is the last clause intended as a strict and formal definition of injustice.
344 D—347 E. The reply of Socrates falls into two parts. In the first (344 D—347 E), after emphatically expressing his dissent from Thrasymachus’ views, and protesting against the Sophist’s retraction (in the example of the shepherd and his sheep) of the doctrine that every ruler seeks the good of his subjects, Socrates reverts to the stricter form of reasoning to which Thrasymachus had formerly challenged him, and points out that no rulers, properly so called, rule willingly: they require wages. When any kind of rule, e.g. an art, is attended with advantage to the ruler, the advantage comes from the concomitant operation of the ‘art of wage-earning,’ and not from the rule itself. Medicine produces health; the art of wages, wages; the doctor takes his fee, not qua doctor, but qua wage-earner. Thus it is not the ruler, qua ruler, but the subjects, as was already said, who reap the advantage. The wages which induce a man to rule, may be money, or honour, or the prospect of a penalty if he should refuse. The most efficacious penalty, in the case of the best lives, is the prospect of being ruled by worse men than themselves. In a city of good men, freedom from office would be as eagerly sought for as office itself is now. Herewith ends for the present the refutation of the theory that Justice is the interest of the stronger. Socrates promises to resume the subject on another occasion.

344 D ff. The ensuing discussion is not a new argument (see 345 C έτι γάρ τα ἐξηρότθην ἐπισκεψάμεθα) in support of Socrates’ view, but a restatement of his theory, with an addition necessitated by Thrasymachus’ example of the shepherd. The shepherd (says Socrates) is no shepherd, when he fattens his sheep for his own gain, nor the ruler a ruler, when he enriches himself at the expense of his subjects. On such occasions both shepherd and ruler are in reality μορφωτικοί—professors of μορφωτική, an art which is distinct from that of ruling, though usually associated with it. This analysis is new and valuable in itself; it also enables Socrates (in 347 D) to make the first explicit allusion in the Republic to an ideal state, and to formulate what afterwards becomes a leading principle of the Platonic commonwealth—the reluctance of the ruling class to accept office.

344 D 24 καταντήσας. For the metataphor cf. infra VII 336 B, Lys. 204 D, Lucian Dem. Enc. 16 (imitated from this passage) and other examples in Blaydes on Ar. Wasps 483.

28 ἐμβαλὼν: cf. Theaet. 165 D, Prot. 342 E. The whole expression recalls the Latin proverb scripulum abeunti (Cic. de Fin. IV 80).

344 E 31 διαγόμενος. The use of this verb in Soph. El. 781 χρῶσις διὶγὴ μὲ, Dem. 18. 89 πόλεμος—διὶγὴν ἴμας, Xen. Rep. Lac. 1 3 and elsewhere is in favour of regarding διαγόμενος (‘living’) as grammatically passive and not middle both here and in Λαοῦ 758 A. Cf. Stephanus-Hase Thes. s.v. διὰγω.

έγο γάρ κτλ. I agree with Stallbaum and others in taking this sentence as interrogative: ‘do you mean that I think otherwise about this matter?’ i.e. think that it is not a question of βλον διαγόμ. J. and C. complain that this interpretation is ‘wanting in point.’ It is surely much to the point to make Thrasymachus repudiate the imputation of trifling. His doctrine appears all the more dangerous when he confesses that it is no
sophistic paradox, but a rule of life. I can see nothing to justify Apelt's conjecture εγὼ' ἄρι for εγῶ γὰρ (Odeserv. Crit. p. 11).

33 ἦτοι ἡμῶν γε. ἦτοι οὐ ἦτοι—γε = 'or else' (not 'or rather' as J. and C.). The regular construction is ἦτοι—γε, and ἦ—ἤτοι was condemned by the grammarians as a solecism, though it occurs in Pind. Nem. 6. 5. With the use of the ἦτοι in this passage cf. III 400 c, IV 433 A toῦτο ἐστιν—ἤτοι τοῦτον το ἐδώ ἢ δικαιοσύνη. Emendations have been suggested on all these passages of Plato: here ἦ τοι (van Prinsterer, Hartman) and in the other two passages ἦ: but we are not justified in altering the text. Cf. Kugler de partic. toî eiusque comp. ap. Pl. isu p. 14.

345 A 5 ἔστω μὲν ἄδικος κτλ. The subject is ὁ ἄδικος, supplied from ἄδικαν. To πειθέι also ὁ ἄδικος is the subject; but ἢ ἄδικα or τὸ ἄδικεν is the subject of ἔστω. The effect is exactly as in the English 'let him be unjust' etc., 'nevertheless he cannot convince me that it is really more profitable than justice.' J. and C. understand τις before ἔστω, needlessly, as I think, and suppose that the "supposed impunity of injustice" is the subject to πειθέι, but πειθέι is much better with a personal subject. Although the sentence is a trifle loose, it is clear enough, and there is no occasion for reading πειθέι (with Vind. D and Ficinus).

345 B 12 ἐνδὸν. ἐνδιδέων (as Wohlrab points out) was used of nurses feeding children: cf. Ar. Knights 716 f., supra 343 A, and (for the general idea) Theognis 435 and Pl. Symp. 175 D. In μὰ Δία, μὴ εὖ γε Socrates shudders at the prospect of having Thrasymachus for his intellectual nurse.

345 C 17 ποιμάνειν. See cr. n. Cobet (Mnem. IX p. 355) calls for πιαίνειν, but the "addita verba καθ' ὅσον ποιμῆν ἔστω
circum universum pastoris negotium errantium a Socrate Thrasymachus notari documentum” (Schneider). Hoc Thrasymachus erram in ovus proto to kyl. παισεων might perhaps be read, if the alal clause is taken closely with what precedes; you did not think it necessary (says Socrates) to adhere rigidly to the genuine shepherd, and think he failest his sheep quia shepherd. In that case, however, we should expect alal ov---βλέπειν in place of ov---βλέποντα, to form the antithesis to παισεων.

345 D 24 oüto de φιμήν. Some inferior mss (with Eusebius Prac. Ev. XII 44. 2) read ὃ for de, and so As. and Stallbaurn. The connecting particle is better the illative here, where Socrates is merely recalling his former train of reasoning: 'and it was thus that I came to think,' etc.


32 αὐτοίσιν; see 330 b n.


3 παρὰ δόξην is simply 'contrary to your opinion' ("gegen deine Ueberzeugung" Schneider) as in Prot. 337 b, cf. 349 A ἡσὶ ἄν σε ὑπολαμβάνω λέγειν ἀπερ διανοεῖ καὶ 350 b. The words could hardly mean an 'unexpected or paradoxical' reply (as Tucker construes). Socrates is appealing—note ὃ μακάρε---to Thrasymachus not to obstruct the discovery of the truth by want of candour and sincerity.

4 ἀλλὰ---ἐτέρα: sc. ἐστὶν. The reading ἐτέρα is in itself equally good, but has inferior ms. authority. Herweden needlessly recommends the omission of ἐτέρα, or (as alternatives) ἀλλὰ τοῦτο, ἐφ᾽, τῷ ἐτέραν, οὐ ἀλλὰ τοῦτο, ἐφ᾽, ἐτέραν, τῷ ἐτέραν.
The participle. Bel more olpca, Be Tlavv pidXXov, objection O 1258™ aKoirelaL, farpuoj laTpucr). ical elt tairy ylyvrjTai KvptepwriTk) accompanied pecvp pecvp Se Ti ^vptpipov e(f>r). rare 'A first ''Ectgt, a a not pur 2 Qap-ev avrr]\ puadapvrjTLKr) 7 more 1/ceLvov 'front avvecf/T) the adopt iraplxi</dai ovB' ^vixplpov o<plpeiv £vp<plpeiv daXaTT-rj, puadapvrjTLKr) Ti some- similar Br)puovpyd<i O Bvvapus. tt;v

11. ξυμφέρων Εη: ξυμφέρων ΑΠΣ1. 21. αὕτη Ξη: αὕτη Α: αὕτη (sic) Π.

οὕτω; Πάνω γε. Οὐκοῦν καὶ μισθωτικὴ μισθὸν; αὐτὴ γὰρ αὐτῆς ἢ δύναμις. ἢ τὴν ἰατρικὴν σὺ καὶ τὴν κυβερνητικὴν Β τὴν αὐτὴν καλεῖς; ἢ ἕαντερ βούλῃ ἀκριβῶς διορίζειν, ὥσπερ 10 ὑπεθοῦ, οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον, ἐάν τις κυβερνοῦν ύγείας γίγνεται διὰ τὸ ξυμφέρειν αὐτῷ πλεῖν ἐν τῇ βαλαττῇ, ἕνεκα τούτῳ καλεῖς μᾶλλον αὐτὴν ἰατρικὴν; Ὁυ δῆτα, ἐφη. Οὐδὲ γ', οἶμαι, τὴν μισθωτικὴν, ἐὰν ύγιαίνῃ τις μισθαρμῶν. Ὁυ δῆτα. Τί δὲ; τὴν ἰατρικὴν μισθαρμῆς, ἐὰν ῥώμενος τις μισθαρμῆς; Ὁ οὐκ ἐφη. C 15 Οὐκοῦν τὴν γε ὁφελίαν ἐκάστης τῆς τέχνης ἰδίαιν ὁμολογήσαμεν εἶναι; 'Εστώ, ἐφη. 'Ἀντωνὰ ἁρὰ ὁφελίαι κοινῇ ὁφελοῦνται πάντες οἱ δημιουργοὶ, δήλου ὅτι κοινῇ τινὶ τῷ αὐτῷ προσχρόμενοι ἀπ' ἐκεῖνον ὁφελοῦνται. Ἐσοκεν, ἐφη. Φαμέν δὲ γε τὸ μισθόν ἄρνυμένους ὁφελείαν τοὺς δημιουργοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ προσχρῆθαι 20 τῇ μισθωτικῇ τέχνῃ γίγνεσθαι αὐτοῖς. Ξυνέφη μόγις. Οὐκ ἁρὰ ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτοῦ τέχνης ἐκάστῳ ἀὐτὴ ἡ ὁφελία ἐστίν, ἢ τοῦ μισθοῦ D λήψις, ἀλλ', εἰ δεὶ ἀκριβῶς σκοπεῖσθαι, ἢ μὲν ἰατρικὴ υγίειας τοιεῖ, ἢ δὲ μισθαρμηνίας μισθοῦ, καὶ ἢ μὲν οἰκοδομικὴ οἰκίαν, ἢ δὲ μισθαρμηνίας αὐτῇ ἐπομένῃ μισθόν, καὶ αἱ αἶλαι πᾶσαι 25 οὕτως: τὸ αὐτῆς ἐκάστη ἐργον ἐργαζέται καὶ ὁφελεὶ ἐκείνῳ, ἐφ' ὃ τέτακται. ἐὰν δὲ μὴ μισθὸς αὐτὴν προσφηγήνεται, ἐσθ' ὦ τι ὁφελείαν ὁ δημιουργὸς ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης; Ὁυ φαίνεται, ἐφη. 'Αρ' οὖν οὐδ' ὁφελεὶ τότε, ὅταν | προϊκα ἐργαζῆται; Οἶμαι ἐγώνε. Ε Oικοῦν, ὁ Ἐρασύμαχε, τούτο ἡδῆ δήλου, ὅτε οὐδεμία τέχνη οὐδὲ
ἀρχὴ τὸ αὐτῷ ωφέλιμον παρασκευάζει, ἀλλ' ὅπερ πάλαι ἐλέγομεν, 30 τὸ τῷ ἀρχιμένῳ καὶ παρασκευάζει καὶ ἐπιτάττει, τὸ ἐκείνου ψυμφέρου ὄντων ὄντος σκοποῦσα, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος. διὰ δὴ ταῦτα ἔγογγε, οὗ φίλε Θερασύμαχε, καὶ ἀρτί ἔλεγον μηδένα ἐθέλειν ἐκόντα ἀρχεῖν καὶ τὰ ἀλλότρια κακὰ μεταχειρίζεσθαι ἀνορθώντα, ἀλλὰ μηθὸν αὐτεῖν, ὅτι ὁ μέλλων καλὸς τῇ τέχνῃ | 35

357 πράξεων οὐδέποτε αὐτῷ τὸ βέλτιστον πράττει οὐδ' ἐπιτάττει κατὰ τὴν τέχνην ἐπιτάττων, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἀρχιμένῳ. οὐ δὲ ἔνεκα, ὡς ἐστί, μηθὸν δεῖν ὑπάρχειν τοῖς μέλλουσιν ἐθέλεισθαι ἀρχεῖν, ἡ ἀργύριον ἡ τιμήν, ἡ ζημίαν, έαν μή ἀρχή.

XIX. Πῶς τούτο λέγεις, ὁ Σώκρατες; ἐφη ὁ Γλαύκων. τοὺς μὲν γὰρ δύο μισθοὺς μεγανόσκον· τὴν δὲ ζημίαν ὑμῖνα λέγεις καὶ ὡς ἐν μισθών μέρει εὑρίκας, οὐ ξυνήκα. Τὸν τῶν βελτίστων ἀρα μισθόν, ἐφη, οὐξ εὖνείς, δι’ οὖν ἀρχουσίν οἱ εἰπεικέστατοι, ὅταν ἑθέλωσιν ἀρχεῖν. ἡ οὐκ οὕσθα, ὅτι τὸ φιλόστομον τὲ καὶ φιλάργυρον εἶναι δύνειον λέγεισθαι τὲ καὶ ἐστὶν; "Ἐγογγεῖ, ἐφη. διὰ ταῦτα τοίνυν, ἢν δ’ ἔγω, οὔτε χρημάτων ἔνεκα ἑθέλουσιν ἀρχεῖν οἱ ἀγαθοὶ οὒτε τιμῆς· οὔτε γὰρ φανερῶς πραττόμενοι τὴς ἀρχῆς ἔνεκα μισθῶν μισθοτοί βούλουσι κεκλησθαί, οὔτε λάβρα αὐτοὶ έκ τῆς ἀρχῆς λαμβάνοντες κλέπται· οὔδ’ αὖ τιμῆς ἔνεκα· οὐ γὰρ εἰσὶ φιλότιμοι. δεῖ δὴ αὐτοῖς ἀνάγκην προσεῖναι καὶ 15

2. ὃν Ε, superscripto θυ: ὃ Α: οὖ Πη. 15. δὴ Ι: δε Α.

346 E 33 ἐλεγον μηδένα θέλειν. μὴ with the infinitive after verbs of saying, thinking and the like “carries with it the emphasis of the witness on oath, so to speak the emphasis of desire” (Gildersleeve in A. J. Ph. 1 50). Cf. Theaet. 155A, Euthyph. 6 B, Phaed. 94 C al., and infr. III 407 E, IV 419 A.

347 A 2 ὡς ἐσκε belongs to ὃν ἔνεκα, and δεῖ is in indirect narration after ἐγογγα above. There would be no object in qualifying the force of δεῖ: it is not disputed that rulers must have their reward. Hence Stallbaum is wrong in regarding δεῖ as under the influence of ὡς, an illocutional idiom which is common in Herodotus (Stein on I 65), and found occasionally in Tragedy (Jebb on Trach. 1238) and in Plato (Phit. 201D, Soph. 263D, Euthyd. 280D). That ὡς ἐσεκε has no influence on δεῖ in this passage may also be seen from the fact that δεῖ (not δεῖ) would still be used if ὡς ἐσκε were removed. δεῖ is not for δεῖ; the late participial form δεῖ is not found in Plato: see my note on Euthyph. 4 D.


7 ὡς ἐν μισθῷ μέρει. ἡ σ is not (with Wohlra) to be taken with ἐν μισθῷ μέρει, but stands for the indirect interrogative ὡς. 347 B 14 αὐτός = 'by themselves,' 'ultro,' should be construed with λαμβάνοντες. The conjecture αὐτῶν for αὐτός is very tame.
These words are intended to indicate parenthetically that Socrates' thesis finds support in the common judgment of men. Good men, he says, require to be compelled to rule. This may be why (ὅθεν) it is accounted a disgrace to enter on office willingly; that is to say, if you do so, you may be inferred to be, not ἄγαθος, but πιλότιμος or πιλάργυρος, which ὅνειδος λέγεται τε καὶ ἑστὶν 347 β. There is no good reason for rejecting the clause, as some have proposed to do.

347 D 23 τόλμη ἄνδρων ἄγαθων is the first express allusion to an Ideal City in the Republic. The principle here laid down—the reluctance of the best men to undertake the task of government—is fully recognised in Plato's commonwealth, where the ἀρχοντες are represented as unwilling to desert the life of contemplation for the cares of office. 'Nolo episcopari' is in fact one of the leading guarantees which Plato gives against the abuse of political power (Nohle Die Staatslehre Plato's in ihr. gesch. Entw. p. 110). See vi 520 ε., 521 λ, where this topic is resumed. Cf. also Sesame and Lilies § 43 "The true kings—rule quietly, if at all, and hate ruling; too many of them make 'il gran rifiuto.'"

25 τὸ ὅντι κτλ. τὸ ὅντι belongs to οὐ πέφυκε, not to ἄληθινός (as Ast supposes). Richter suggests ἄληθινός for ἄληθινός, but what is said of a single ruler applies to all: cf. (with Schneider) Laws 733 ε λέγομεν δὴ σώφρον βίον ἔνα εἴναι καὶ φρόνιμον ἕνα καὶ ἕνα τῶν ἄνδρειν.

26 πᾶς ἂν κτλ. The articular infinitive with αἰρέσθαι is hard to parallel, and on this ground Richards would cancel τὸ. I once thought that τὸ ὀφελείσθαι might be taken as the object after γιγνώσκων ('he who knows what being benefited is,' i.e. virtually 'who knows his own interests'); but this is harsh, and I now acquiesce in the usual interpretation. With γιγνώσκων (intelligens) used absolutely cf. (with Schneider) Laws 733 ε σώφρον μὲν οὖν βίον δ' ὁ γιγνώσκων ὃν ὑπενθέλε γίνεται πράγμα ἐπί τάντα. For the sentiment cf. Soph. O. T. 584—598, Eur. Ion 621—632, Hipp. 1016—1020.

347 E 30 εἰσαάθις σκευόμεθα. The reference has been much discussed. Pfeiderer's idea (Zur Lösung d. Pl. Fr. p. 72) that the words were introduced by Plato "bei der Gesammtredaktion des Werkes" to prepare us for the second half of Book X is most unlikely, because (among other reasons) Book X does not expressly revert to this topic at all. Siebeck (Zur Chron. d. Pl. Dialoge pp. 121 ff.) holds that phrases of this sort always refer either to some future dialogue contemplated by Plato, or to a later part of the same dialogue. It is difficult to establish either alternative in the present case; nor
has Siebeck, I think, succeeded in proving his point even elsewhere. It is simplest to suppose that such formulae (like ἐισαθ- 
θίς ἐπισκεπτόν in Arist. Eth. Nic. 1. 5. 1097 τ. 14) are in general only a convenient way of dropping the subject, although there may occasionally be a specific reference. Here there is none. So also Hir-

347 E — 348 B Introduction to the second part of Socrates’ reply to Thrasym-

cachu. See 344 D, 348 B mm.

347 E τον τοῦ ἄδικου βλον— 

dikaiou. In these words Socrates sums up the remarks of Thrasymachus from 343 B (καὶ ὅστω πόρω κτλ.) to 344 C (διευθετοῦ τέ καὶ εὐφορέων).

32 πότερος — λέγεσθαι. Ast’s sug-

estion πότερον, ἢ δ’ ἐγώ, ὥς Πλακκος, 

αιρεῖ; καὶ πότερος ἀληθετέρως δοκεῖ σοι λέγεσθαι; is now generally adopted, but (apart from its considerable divergence from the MS reading) the juxtaposition of 

πότερος and ἀληθετέρως is unpleasing. The πότερος aieren of A is quite unobjection-

able: cf. ση. 328 A ὅστως—αἰρόμαι; and it is (I think) an objection to πότερον αἰρεῖ that it would represent Socrates as asking Plato not which view he elected to take, but which life—the just or the unjust—he chose for himself. Schneider (after Bek-
er) retains the reading of the best MSS in 

πότερον ὃς ἄληθετέρως, and explains the 

last two words as equivalent to ἄληθετε 

πότερος λέγεται: but ὃς ἄληθετέρως 

could not (if written by Plato) be any-

thing but the comparative of ὃς ἄληθος, 

and that is quite different in sense from ἄλη-

θετέρως. I have omitted ὃς (with Bre-

mius and a few MSS of inferior authority), 

"ut ortum ex varia lectione πότερον et πο-

tέρως in πότεροις conflatā” (Schneider). 

I am glad to find that Tucker adopts the 
same solution.

348 A I δηλαῖ: i. q. δηλαῖ οὐν ἢ οὐ 

διελθὼν ἔλεγεν εἶναι (Schneider). Cf. 

II 363 A ἄφθονοι ἔλεγον ἄγαθα τοὺς 

ὁσίο̑ς with n. ad loc. In view of ἐν 

ἐκατέρω λέγομεν in b below, it is easy to 

suggest δηλαῖον <ἐν>; but the text is 

probably sound.

4 αὐτῷ τοῖς κτλ. The alternatives 

are between continuous speech and dia-

lectic. By λόγον in παρά λόγον Thras-

ymachus’ speech in 343 A ff. is meant: to 

this Socrates would reply, after which Thrasymachus would speak again, and 

finally Socrates. Thus each party would 

have delivered two speeches. In Athenian 

lawsuits there were often two speeches 

delivered by the accuser and two by the 

defendant (Meier und Schömann Attische 

Process p. 924), so that Plato’s imagery 

is borrowed from the law-court, whence 

diakritōn τῶν τῶν διακριτοντῶν just 

below. This point escaped Ast, who 

reads καὶ ἄδικος ὁσύς ἄλλον ἡμῖν (after 

Ficinus and Stephanus).

ἀντικατατείναντες is intransitive: cf. 

II 358 D κατατείλασ ἐρω τῶν ἄδικοι βλον ἐπαρ εῖναι and 367 B: the notion (as in ἐνυ-

τέλω, ἐνυπερτείνοις and the like) is of 

nervous tension. The word cannot mean 

‘replying to one another in one set speeches’ (J. and C.). “Setting out alternative lists of advantages” (remarks Bosanquet) “was the well-known method of fable or poetry. See Book 11” 361 D—362 c and 362 e— 

365 A: “and compare Prodicus’ Choice of 

Heracles (Xen. Mem. II 1) and the dis-

cussion between the Just and Unjust argu-

ments in the Clouds of Aristophanes.”
5 autô h λόγον παρὰ λόγου, ὡσα αὐτὸ ἀγαθὰ ἔχει τὸ δίκαιον εἶναι, καὶ αὐθίς οὗτος, καὶ ἄλλον ἁμαίΔ, ἀριθμεῖς δεσσεί τἀγαθὰ καὶ μετρεῖν ὡσα ἐκατέροι ἐν ἐκατέρῳ λέγομεν, καὶ ἡ ἰδιαστῶν B τινῶν τῶν διακρινοῦντων δεσιμέθα: ἂν δὲ ὠσπέρ ἀρτι ἀνομολογοῦμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους σκοπῶμεν, ἀμα αὐτοὶ τε δικασται καὶ 10 ρήτορες εὔσωμεθα. Πάνιν μὲν οὖν, ἐφη. 'Οποτέρως οὖν σοι, ἥν δ' ἐγὼ, ἀρέσκει. Οὔτος, ἐφη.

XX. 'Ἰδι δή, ἧν δ' ἐγώ, ὅ θανάσιμαχε, ἀπόκριναι ἕμινεν ἔξ ἀρχής: τὴν τελέαν ἀδίκιαν τελέας οὕσης δικαιοσύνης λυσιτελεστέραν φης εἶναι; Πάνιν μὲν οὖν καὶ φημί, ἐφη, καὶ δι' ἓν, εἰρήκεα. Σ 15 θέρε δή τὸ τοιοῦτε περὶ αὐτῶν πῶς λέγεις; τὸ μὲν που ἁρετὴν αὐτῶν καλεῖς, τὸ δὲ κακίαν; Πῶς γὰρ οὗ; Οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν

5. αὐ ΑΠΙ: ἄν Α\\।

348 B 10 ὁποτέρως is virtually indirect: translate 'whichever you please, then.' Hermann reads ποτέρως, but the text ought not to be changed either here or in Ἐυθύδ. 271 A τίς ἤν, ὁ Σώκρατες, ὃς χάριν ἐν Δικείῳ διελέγοι;—τίς ἤν; ὁποτέρως καὶ ἐρωτᾶς, ὁ Κρίτων· οὖ γὰρ εἰς, ἀλλὰ δὴ ἡστηρ, i.e. (it depends on) which of these you are asking about etc. Cf. also ἤτει—αὐτῶν ἡ ἁρετή 353 C. In Rep. IX 578 E ἐν ποιῷ ἄν τινι καὶ ὅποιον φόβον ὅς γενόσια αὐτῶν and Gorg. 522 A, the ὁποτέρως is perhaps due to the proximity of ὅς, which gives the question a certain semblance of indirectness; ὁποτέρως in Alc. I 110 C and ὁποτέρως ἐνθα 400 A may be similarly explained; while in Meno 74 D ἀλλὰ μὴ μοι ὁποτέρως—ἀλλ' ἃ τι εἶστιν τούτο, it is easy to supply a verb of saying. Possibly (as Heindorf thinks) ἐν (Β ὁ τί) in Ἐυθύδ. 287 B is corrupt for τί, as ὁποιοί for πῶς in Charm. 170 C. In Lys. 212 C ὁποτέρως οὖν αὐτῶν ποτέρων φιλον ἐστιν; ὁ φιλίων τοῖς φιλεύμοιν—ἡ ὁ φιλεύμον τοῖς φιλεῦμοι; we ought no doubt to read ὁ ποτέρως (with Hermann).

348 B—350 C Thrasy machus now identifies θυσικειον with Simplicity, θυσικειον with Discretion. Injustice he assigns to Virtue and Wisdom, θυσικειον to their opposites. He further declares that Injustice is strong and beautiful, and is ready to predicate of it all that is usually preceived of θυσικειον (348 B—349 B).

Socrates then commences a very subtle refutation, addressing himself to the assertion that Injustice is Virtue and Wisdom (349 B—350 C). (1) The just man endeavours to overreach the unjust, but not the just: the unjust man to overreach both the just and the unjust. Therefore, generally, the just man endeavours to overreach the unlike; the unjust man to overreach both the like and the unlike. Further, the unjust man, being wise and good, resembles the wise and good, while the just man, being foolish and evil, resembles the foolish and evil; in brief, each is as those whom he resembles. (2) Again, from the analogy of the arts it is seen that the man who knows tries to overreach the unlike, while the ignorant man tries to overreach both the like and the unlike. But the man who knows is wise, and the wise man good; we may therefore in the last sentence substitute 'wise and good man' for 'the man who knows,' and 'foolish and evil' for 'ignorant.' Comparing, then, conclusions (1) and (2), we see that the just are like the wise and good, that is, are wise and good (since they are such as those whom they resemble), while the unjust in like manner are foolish and evil. Thus is refuted the thesis that Injustice is Virtue and Wisdom.

348 B ff. The second division of Socrates' reply begins here. Though professely attacking the section of Thrasmachus' speech contained in 343 C—344 C, and summed up in the theory that the life of the Unjust is better than that of the Just (347 E), it is not till 352 D that Socrates directly grapples with this theory. In the meantime, certain further deliver-
ances of Thrasymachus on the nature of Injustice are refuted by means of arguments which have an indirect bearing on the question at issue (see 352 D φάνονται μην οὖν καὶ νῦν, ως ἐμοί δοκεῖ, ἢ ἡν έιρήκαμεν ομως δ᾿ ἐτι βέλτων σχετέων). This part of Socrates’ reply may therefore be regarded as being subdivided into two parts—the first being an indirect, the second a direct refutation of Thrasymachus. Cf. 352 D οὐ.

348 C 17 εἰκός γε—τοῦναντιόν. Thrasymachus’ view of δικαιοσύνη is like Callicles’ theory of ἀρετή in Gorg. 491 E ff. esp. 492 B τρυφή καί ἀκόλογα καί εὐθυγραμμικά, ἐὰν ἐπίκουριν ἔχῃ, τοῦτ’ εστιν ἀρετή τε καὶ εὐθυμία. The irony is clearly marked by ὃ ἦδοτε, and Hartman should not have revived Hirschig’s proposal to read <οἶκου> = εἰκός γε.

19 ἀλλὰ τί μήν; ‘Well, what else?’ Cf. (with J. and C.) Sympr. 206 E.

348 D 20 πάνω γενναίων ἐνεβήδαιον: ‘sublime simplicity.’ Such contempt for ἐνεβήδαιος recalls Thucydides’ description of contemporary morals; cf. especially III 83. 1 καὶ τὸ ἐνεβήδες, οὗ τὸ γενναίον πλείοντον μετέχει, καταγελασθεὶς ἡμανῆθη.

21 εὐσυλλογία was preeminently a political virtue; cf. Alc. I 125 E πολίτεια καινονοτότων τοια καλείς ἐπιστήμην; Εὐβοιαίαν ἔγονα, Prot. 318 E, and infra IV 428 ιν. It is therefore fittingly used by Thrasymachus to describe his theory, which is a theory of political rather than of private morality: cf. πόλεις τε—ποιεῖσθαι below.

23 ψφ’ εάντοις ποιεῖσθαι. εάντοις is found in some inferior MSS, but the accusative is also admissible. Cf. Thuc. IV 60 (cited by Schneider) εἰκός—αὐτοὺς τάδε πάντα πειράσασθαι ὑπὸ σφάς ποιεῖσθαι. In τελείως Thrasymachus recalls the telείων ἀδικίαν of 348 B.

24 σὺ δὲ οὖν—λέγειν. Baiter (with Paris A) assigns these words to Socrates; but they come much more naturally from Thrasymachus: cf. 344 B. βαλλάντια and not βαλλάντια is the spelling of A here and in VIII 552 D (βαλλάντιοιμοί) in IX 575 B (βαλλάντιοιμοίαι) the second λ is due to an early corrector. The double-λα has also the best ms authority in Gorg. 508 E, Sympr. 190 E. See also Blaydes on Ar. Fros. 772. For ἡ δ᾿ ὃς below after ἐφι cf. Phaed. 78 A and VII 522 A.

348 Ε 30 ἡδὴ στερεωτέρων: ‘still more stubborn.’ στερεός is like σκληρὸς in Theaet. 155 E σκληροῖς—καὶ ἀντίτυποι ἀνθρώπους, but stronger, suggesting cast-iron hardness and inflexibility.

ῥάδιον. See cr. n. Schneider refers to Latus 757 B τὴν δὲ ἀληθεστάτην καὶ ἀριστήν λαστήνα, ὃν κεὶ ῥάδιον παντὶ ἱδεῖν, ῥάδιον is not (I think) possible here: and a scribe might easily omit ΙΔ in PAIDION. Cf. Introd. § 5.
31 εἰ γὰρ κτλ. Gorg. 483 c νῦν μὲν τόντο ἄδικων καὶ ἀδικχῶν λέγεται, τὸ πλέον ἤτειν ἔχειν τῶν πολλῶν, καὶ ἄδικων αὐτὸ καλοῦν. Dümmler (Zur Compil. in Pl. St. p. 13) goes so far as to assert that ὥσπερ ἀλλοι τινὲς is an express reference to Polus in the Gorgias; but nothing is gained by so hazardous a conjecture. 349 ἤ τῶν προσετθημένων: 'used to attribute to,' sc. before you announced your view—with ironical deference, like ἐλέγομεν in Prov. 353 c τί σοι φασίν τὸ τοῦτο εἶναι, ὃ ἤμεις ἢττο εἶναι τῶν ἱδιων ἐλέγομεν; Stallbaum takes the imperfect as referring to 345 c, but neither there nor in 348 c (cited by Schneider) is there anything to justify a particular reference.

5 εἰμι γὰρ—λέγειν. A similar remark is made after Callicles has expounded kindred views in Gorg. 493 D σαφώς γὰρ σοὶ νῦν λέγεις ὅ τι ἄλλοι δια- νοοῦσιν μὲν, λέγει δὲ οὐκ ἐθέλουσι.

6 τὰ δοκοῦσθα κτλ. can only mean 'what you think about the truth,' not 'what you think to be the truth' (D. and V.) or 'your real mind' (Schneider and Jowett). We should expect δικιαῖας for ἄληθειας, as H. Wolf proposed to read, for it is Injustice, not Truth, which is the subject of dispute. But as δικιαῖας has not a vestige of support from the mss, I have not ventured to make the change. The truth in question must be understood as the truth about justice and injustice. Herwerden's ἐπὶ τῆς ἄληθειας (for which he compares Dem. de Cor. 17, 226, and 294) will hardly command assent.

18 τῆς δικαιας πράξεως. Cf. Chlam. 161 c πάντως γὰρ οὐ τούτο σκέπτετο ὅτι τοῦτο εἶναι, ἀλλὰ πότερον ἄληθες λέγεται ἢ ὅδ. 349 ὡς πλέον ἔχειν. The literal and derived significations of this phrase are treated as identical throughout the curious reasoning which follows. Primarily, πλέον ἔχειν refers to quantitative superiority; in its derived sense, it is used (together with πλεονεκτεῖν) more generally of 'overreaching.'

11 τῆς δικαιας πράξεως. 'To have more than the just action' means 'to do more than is just' (cf. πέλειον—ἀπείροθαπαράττετες 350 λ.), outdo, overreach what is just in action. The notion of virtue as a ἔκταση is implied.

οὐδὲ τῆς κτλ. See cr. n. I do not think that οὐδὲ τῆς δικαιας can be right. The whole emphasi- is (as οὐδὲ shews) must be on πράξεως, and the emphatic word should be expressed. οὐδὲ τῆς πράξεως τῆς δικαιας (sc. any more than the ἀνδρὸς δικαίου) gives exactly the emphasis required. In the cases quoted by Schneider.
tías> δικαίας, ἐφη. Τοῦ δὲ ἀδίκου πότερον ἀξίοι ἄν πλεονεκτεῖν καὶ ἥγοιτο δίκαιον εἶναι, ἢ οὐκ ἄν ἥγοιτο δίκαιον; 'Ἡγοῖτ' ἄν, ἢ δ' ὅς, καὶ ἄξιοι, ἂλλ' οὐκ ἄν δύναιτο. 'Αλλ' οὗ τοῦτο, ἢν οὗ εὔγο, ἐρωτῶ, ἂλλ' εἰ τοῦ μὲν δίκαιον ἡμῖν ἀξίοι πλέον ἐχειν 15 μηδὲ βούλεται ὁ δίκαιος, τοῦ δὲ ἀδίκου; 'Αλλ' οὗτος, ἐφη, ἔχει. Τί δὲ δῇ ὁ ἀδίκος; ἀρα ἄξιοι τοῦ δίκαιου πλεονεκτεῖν καὶ τῆς δικαίας πράξεως; Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ; ἐφη, ὡς γε πάντων πλέον ἐχειν ἀξίοι. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀδίκου ἀνθρώπου τε καὶ πράξεως ὁ ἀδίκος πλεονεκτήσει καὶ ἀμιλλήσεται ὡς ἀπάντων πλέοστον αὐτὸς λάβῃ; 20 Ἐστὶ ταῦτα.

XXI. Ὡδὲ δῇ λέγομεν, ἐφην· ὁ δίκαιος τοῦ μὲν ὁμοίου οὐ πλεονεκτεῖ, τοῦ δὲ ἄνουμοίου, ὁ δὲ ἀδίκος τοῦ τε ὁμοίου καὶ τοῦ ἄνουμοίου. "Ἀριστα, ἐφη, εἰρήκας. Ἐστίν δὲ γε, ἐφην, φρονύμος τε καὶ ἀγαθὸς ὁ ἀδίκος, ὁ δὲ δίκαιος οὐδέτερα. Καὶ τοῦτ', ἐφη, εὐ. 25 Οὐκοῦν, ἢν δ' εὔγο, καὶ ἐοικε τῷ φρονύμῳ καὶ τῷ ἀγαθῷ ὁ ἀδίκος, ὁ δὲ δίκαιος οὐκ ἐοικεν; Πῶς γὰρ οὗ μέλλει, ἐφη, ὁ τοιούτος ὁν καὶ ἐοικέναι τοῖς τοιοῦτοις, ὁ δὲ μὴ ἐοικέναι; Καλὸς τοιούτος ἀρα ἑστίν ἐκάτερος αὐτῶν οὐσπερ ἐοικεν. Ἐλλὰ τί μέλλει; ἐφη.

(Laws 754 B, 916 B, infra VII 516 B) the omitted word is unemphatic and easily supplied. For the error cf. Crito 50 B where the first hand of the Bodleian MS reads τὰς δικασθείσας by mistake for τὰς δικασθείσας. See also Introd. § 5.

349 c 19 οὐκοῦν καὶ—λάβῃ. The ἀδίκος πράξεως which the unjoint man overreaches is to be regarded as ἀδίκος because it has itself overreached (not fallen short of) the mean. ὡς with the subjunctive after verbs of striving does not seem to occur elsewhere in Plato: like its use in a pure final clause (of which there is only one example in Plato, viz. Tim. 92 A) it is almost exclusively confined (among Attic writers) to Xenophon and the tragedians. See Weber's tables in Goodwin MT. p. 398, and cf. Gildersleeve in A. J. Ph. IV p. 419.

23 τοῦ μὲν ὁμοίου—τοῦ δὲ ἄνουμοίου. This generalisation of 'like' and 'unlike' into abstract notions, without regard to their relativity, is suggestive of (but does not of course presuppose) the Ideas of τὰ πίσοι τί which we meet with in Phaed. 74 A.

349 d 26 οὐκοῦν κτλ. A proviso which is made use of in 350 C (Ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐκάτερον εἶναι).

28 ὡ δὲ μὴ ἐοικέναι. ὁ δὲ is simply 'the other' (as is marked in A by a pause after δὲ), i.e. ὁ μὴ τοιοῦτος: cf. 339 E (τοῖς δὲ ἐπὶ τοῖς δὲ ἀρχομένοις), 343 D ὁ μὲν δίκαιος ἀπὸ τῶν ἑαυτῶν πλέον εἰσφέρει, ὁ δ' ἐπαττὼν καὶ ἤχαινον 587 B. J. and C., with most of the editors, adopt the reading of Stephanus (ὁ δὲ μὴ μὴ ἐοικέναι), which has the support of some inferior MSS; but the idiom is sufficiently well authenticated, and the collocation of the two negatives would be unpleasing. I am glad to see that Tucker takes the same view.

29 οὐσπερ ἐοικεν. Madvig's οὐσπερ ἐοικεν is refuted by 350 C ὡμολογούμεν ὁ γε (i.e. οὗς ὁ γε) ὁμοίως ἐκάτερον εἰν, τοιοῦτον καὶ ἐκάτερον εἶναι. Cf. also Arist. Pol. II 13. 1332 B 22. The construction was supported by Schneider from Phaed. 92 B, but δ and not γ is now read there on the authority of the best MS.

Ἀλλὰ τί μέλλει (sc. εἶναι); A rare formula, occurring also in Hipp. Min. 377 D: cf. τί δ' οὖν μέλλει; VIII 566 D, X 605 C. With the force of τί ("what else") cf. Ἀλλὰ τί οὖν supra 332 C.

4—2
30. Μοσικόν δὲ τινα κτλ. Here begin the usual Socratic illustrations from the arts, with the concomitant identification of virtue and knowledge (δὲ σοφὸς ἀγαθός; Φημὶ 350 β).

349 E 34. Δοκεῖ ἂν οὖν—ἄξιον πλέον ἔχειν. Socrates ignores the proverb καὶ κεραμεῖς κεραμεῖ κοτέει καὶ αὐτοὶ διδόντα. Strictly speaking, however, it is not μία κεραμεῖς, but μία moneymaker (or the like) that the κεραμεῖς κοτέει. J. C. cite an admirable parallel from Shakespeare (King John IV 2) "When workmen strive to do better than well, They do confound their skill in covetousness." The words ἂξιον πλέον ἔχειν have a suspicious look, and are rejected by Heller (Fl. Jahrb. 1875 p. 171) and others, but such duplicate expressions are common in Plato, and as the illustration from the harp introduces a new and important stage in the argument, Plato may have wished to remind us that after all πλεονεκτέω is only the πλέον ἔχειν with which we started (349 b). It should be noted, too, that ἄξιον is a little more than ἐθέλειν.

350 Α 1. ἐν τῇ ἐδώδῃ ἡ πόσει refers of course to the patient's diet. Plato carefully writes πλεονεκτέων here in preference to πλέον ἔχειν. The 'over-reaching' in such a case might well consist in giving the patient less.

6. ἡ πράττειν ἡ λέγειν. The idea of πλεονεκτέων in speaking has not been introduced before, nor is it made use of in the sequel. We must regard the addition of ἡ λέγειν as merely a rhetorical device to increase the emphasis: see on 333 D and 351 A.

7. τῇ δὲ ὁ ἀνεπιστήμην; κτλ. Proclus' commentary on these words is interesting, though he probably reads more into them than Plato intended here: καὶ ἐλεος τῷ μὲν ἀγαθῷ τὸ κακὸν ἠμαρτίασα μόνον, τῷ δὲ κακῷ καὶ τὸ καλὸν (ἐλεος, κακὸν) καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀναμετρικὴν οὖν ἔστι τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τοῦ πρὸς αὐτὸ ἐναντίον κακοῦ (in Alc. 1 p. 323 ed. Creuzer). The identifications in ὁ δὲ ἀνεπιστήμην σοφὸς and ὁ δὲ σοφὸς ἀγαθὸς below have been allowed before in the special cases of the μουσικόν and the ἰατρικός (349 E).
èναντίον. Φαίνεται. Οὐκοίν, ὃ Ὀρασύμαχε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὅ άδικος ἦμιν τοῦ ἀνομοίου τε καὶ ὀμοίου πλεονεκτεῖ; ἦ νοῦ ὑμᾶς ἔλεγες; C ἴησον, ἔφη. 'Ο δὲ γε δίκαιος τοῦ μὲν ὀμοίου οὗ, πλεονεκτήσει, 15 τοῦ δὲ ἀνομοίου; Ναὶ. 'Εσοικεν ἀρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ μὲν δίκαιος τῷ σοφῷ καὶ ἀγαθῷ, ὁ δὲ ἄδικος τῷ κακῷ καὶ ἀμαθεῖ. Κινδυνεύει. 'Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὀμολογούμεν, ἂ γε ὀμοίος ἐκάτερος εἰς, τοιῶτον καὶ ἐκάτερον εἶναι. Ὑμολογούμεν γὰρ. 'Ο μὲν ἀρά δίκαιος ἦμιν ἀναπέφαντα ὡς ἀγαθός τε καὶ σοφός, ὁ δὲ ἄδικος ἀμαθής τε καὶ 20 κακός.

XXII. 'Ο δὲ Ὀρασύμαχος ὀμολόγησε μὲν πάντα ταῦτα, οὐχ D ὡς ἐγὼ νῦν ῥαδίως λέγω, ἅλλῳ ἑλκύμενος καὶ μόνις, μετὰ ἱδρύτος θαυμαστοῦ ὄσου, ἀτε καὶ θέρους ὄντος. τότε καὶ εἶδον ἐγώ, 350 C 20 ἀναπέφανται. Stallbaum naively reminds us that ἀναπέφανται is often used of a conclusion which "praeter expectationem emergit et elucet." The pervading fallacy in the discussion is akin to the a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter. Thus 'like' and 'unlike' are used absolutely, and each of them is equated with itself. The wise man is held to be good, because one is good in that in which one is wise (this might however be justified on the "stricter mode of reasoning"). Finally, the just man is inferred to be wise and good, on the principle that one is what one resembles: but whether the resemblance be in essence or in accident, we are not told. The argument should be regarded as a dialectical tour de force,—φιλόδικον μάλλον ἢ φιλάδικος. The reasoning in the next section of the argument strikes a deeper note.

350 C—352 D Socrates now attacks the second assertion made by Thrasymachus in 349 §, viz. that Injustice is strong. Justice (he argues) is stronger than Injustice, both because it is (as we have seen) virtuous and, because in its effects it is the antithesis of Injustice, which infuses hatred and sedition, both into aggregates of individuals, and into the individual himself. Injustice weakens by preventing community of action; it makes men collectively and individually hateful to themselves and to the just, among whom are the gods. When Injustice seems to be strong, it is in virtue of some latent justice which it still retains.

350 C ff. The argument in this section has a deeper ethical import than any which has preceded, and foreshadows some of the central doctrines of the Republic. See notes on 351 D, E, and (for the importance of the whole discussion in the general history of philosophy) Bosanquet's Companion, p. 63, where it is justly observed that the argument "marks an era in philosophy. It is a first reading of the central facts of society, morality, and nature. In social analysis it founds the idea of organization and division of labour....In morality it gives the conception of a distinctively human life which is the content or positive end of the distinctively human will. And for natural knowledge it suggests the connection between function and definition, and consequently between purpose and reality, which is profoundly developed in the sixth and seventh books. These conceptions become corner-stones of Aristotle's Philosophy, and still, when seen in their connection, form the very core of the best thought."

22 ὁ δὲ Ὀρασύμαχος κτλ. 'Now Thrasymachus' etc. 'he is not "flat" (Tucker), but at least as good as δῆ, and much better supported by the MSS. οὐχ ὡς ἐγὼ νῦν ῥαδίως λέγω. "Expectabam certe: οὐχ ὡς ἐγὼ νῦν λέγω ῥαδίως," says Herwerden; but the antecedent in Greek is idiomatically attracted into the relative clause (Kühner Gr. Gramm. II p. 922). Translate 'not in the easy way in which I now repeat them.'

350 D 24 ἀτε καὶ θέρους ὄντος. The action is probably laid in Hecatombaeon (roughly our July): see Introd. § 3.
25 πρότερον δε οὕτω, Ὑθασύμαχον ἐρυθριώντα. ἐπειδὴ δε οὗν διω-
μολογησάμεθα τὴν δικαιοσύνην ἄρετήν εἶναι καὶ σοφίαν, τὴν δὲ 
adikían κακίαν τε καὶ ἀμαθίαν, Εἰδεν, ἢ 6 ἐγώ, τούτο μὲν ἦμιν 
οὕτω κείσθω, ἐφαμεν δε δὴ καὶ ἵσχυρον εἶναι τὴν ἄδικιαν· ἢ οὐ 
μέμνησαι, Ὠ Θασύμαχε; Μέμνημαι, ἐφη ἀλλ' ἐμουγε ὀὐδὲ ἢ νῦν 
30 λέγεις ἀρέσκει, καὶ ἔχω περὶ αὐτῶν λέγειν, εἰ οὗν λέγομαι, 1 εὗ Ὡ 
οὐδὲ ὅτι δημηγορεῖν ἂν με ψαφῆς· ἢ οὗν ἐκ με εἰπεῖν ὡσα βούλομαι, 
ἡ, εἰ βοúλει ἐρωταί, ἐρώτα· ἐγώ δε σοι, ὤπερ ταῖς γρασίν ταῖς 
τοὺς μύθους λεγούσαι, εἰεν ἐρώ καὶ κατανεύσομαι καὶ ἀνανέωσομαι. 
Μηδαμώς, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, παρὰ γε τὴν σαυτὸν δόξαν. Ὡμοτε σοι, ἐφη, 
35 ἀρέσκει, ἐπειδήπερ οὐκ ἐξ ἔξεις λέγειν. καίτοι τι ἀλλο βούλει; 
Οὐδὲν μὰ Δία, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ἀλλ' εἰπέρ τοὔτῳ ποιήσεις, ποιεῖ· ἐγώ 
δε ἐρωτήσω. Ἐρώτα δη. 
Τοῦτο τοῖνοι ἐρωτῶ, ὤπερ ἀρτι, ἦν καὶ 
ἐξῆς διασκεψώμεθα | τὸν λόγον, ὁποῖον τι τυχγάνει ὑπὶ 
dikaiosýnē 351 πρὸς ἄδικιαν. ἐλέξκη γάρ που, ὅτι καὶ 
dunatotéperon καὶ ἴσχυρό-
terov epi ἄδικια δικαιοσύνης· νῦν δὲ γ', ἐφην, εἰπέρ σοφία τε καὶ 
ἀρετή ἐστιν δικαιοσύνη, ῥάδιως, οἶμαι, φανήσεται καὶ ἴσχυρότερον 
5 ἄδικιας, ἐπειδήπερ ἐστὶν ἀμαθία ἢ ἄδικια· οὐδεὶς ἀν ἐτὶ τούτο 
ἀγνόησειν. ἀλλ' οὐ τι ὄντως ἀπλῶς, ὦ Θασύμαχε, ἐγώγε 
ἐπιθυμῶ, ἀλλὰ τῇ δὲ τὴ σκέψασθαι· πόλιν φαίνειν ἂν ἄδικον εἶναι 
3. ἐφη γ' et fortasse A1: ἐφη Α2ΠΣ.
B καὶ ἄλλας πόλεις ἐπιχειρεῖν δουλοῦσθαι ἀδίκως καὶ καταδεδουλώσθαι, πολλὰς δὲ καὶ ύπ' ἑαυτῇ ἔχειν δουλωσαμένην; Πώς γὰρ οὐκ; ἐφή· καὶ τούτῳ γε ἡ ἀρίστη μάλιστα ποιήσει καὶ τελεώτατα ὁ οὐσά ἄδικος. Μανβάνω, ἐφη· ὅτι σὺς οὕτως ἦν ὁ λόγος. ἀλλὰ τὸν περὶ αὐτοῦ σκοτάτον πότερον ἢ κρείττων γηγυμνῆν πόλις πόλεως ἀνευ δικαιοσύνης τὴν δύναμιν ταύτην ἔχει, ἡ ἀνάγκη αὐτῇ.

C μετὰ δικαιοσύνης; Εἴ μὲν, ἐφη, ὅσι σὺ ἁρτὶ ἔλεγες ἐχει, ἡ δικαιοσύνη σοφία, μετὰ δικαιοσύνης; εἰ δ' ὡς ἐγώ ἔλεγον, μετὰ ἄδικίας. 15 Πάνω ἄγαμαι, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ὃ Θαρσύμαχε, ὃτι οὐκ ἐπινευέσθαι μόνον καὶ ἀνανεύεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀποκρίνειται πάνω καλῶς. Σοι γὰρ, ἐφη, χαρίζομαι.

XXIII. Ἐν γε σὺ ποιῶν· ἀλλὰ δὴ καὶ τόδε μοι χάρισαι καὶ λέγει· δοκεῖς ἂν ἡ πόλις ἢ στρατόπεδον ἡ ληστάς ἢ κλέπτας ἢ ἄλλο τι ἔθνος, ὅσα κουίη ἐπὶ τι ἔρχεται ἀδίκως, πράξαι ἂν τι πόλις καταδεδουλώσθαι, εἰ ἀδικοίεσθαι ἀλλήλους; εἰ οὖ δῆται, ἢ δ' ὅσ. Τί δ' εἰ μὴ ἄδικοιεν; οὐ μᾶλλον; Πάνω γε. Στάσεις γὰρ ποι, ὃ Θαρσύμαχε, ἢ γε ἄδικα καὶ μίμη καὶ μάχας ἐν ἀλλήλοις παρέχει, ἢ δὲ δικαιοσύνη ὁμόνοιαν καὶ φιλίαν· ἡ γὰρ; "Εστο, ἢ δ' ὅσ, ἵνα σοι μὴ 25

14. ἡ Α''Π: fortasse el ἡ Α¹.

19. Ιτα II et corr. in mg. Α²: σοι γὰρ ἐφὶ χαρίζομαι· εὑ γέ σοι ποιῶν Α¹.

351 b 8 καὶ καταδεδουλώσθαι is rejected by Cobet, but successfully defended by Heller (Fl. Jahrh. 1876 p. 173). There is in reality no pleonasm: we have first an attempt (ἔπιχειρεῖν), then a successful attempt (καταδεδουλώσθαι), then the results of success (πολλὰς δὲ καὶ ύπ' ἑαυτῇ ἔχειν δουλωσαμένην). A powerful city like Athens might, and often did, display her energy in all three directions simultaneously. For the collocation of δουλουσθαι and καταδουλουσθαι (middle) Heller compares infra IX 389 D, E and Menex. 240 a.

10 ἡ ἀρίστη. Thrasymachus refuses to withdraw from the position that ἄδικα is ἀρετή, in spite of Socrates' refutation. This is why Socrates says μανθάνω κτλ. 'I understand: (you say so) because this was your theory.' οὖτι is not 'that'; see above on 332 A. Richter suggested κρείττων for ἄρετην on account of κρείττων just below; but κρείττων is said not by Thrasymachus, but by Socrates.

14 εἰ· ἐξα. After ἐξα, εἰ is inserted by Stallbaum, following a suggestion of Baier's. Cf. also J. B. Mayor in Cl. Rev. x p. 111. It so happens that ἡ is written in A over an erasure large enough to have contained ei, but there is no trace of ei, and mere erasures in A are seldom useful in determining the text. For ἡ Richter suggests ἢ, which would however give a wrong meaning. Tucker also offers a variety of conjectures, but the text is perfectly sound: cf. II 359 εἰ μᾶλλιστ' ἀν αἰσθομένα, εἰ τοῦτον ποιήσαµεν τῇ διανοίᾳ διώκεται (i.e. εἰ διώκεται) ἐξουσίαν —εἰτ' ἐπακολουθήσαµεν κτλ. and IX 359 D εἰτ' τοῦτον τι γίγνεσθαι, λαμβάνων (i.e. εἰ λαμβάνω)—καταδουλώται.

351 c 20 ἡ ἀριστάς κτλ. Cf. (with Ast) Isocrates Panath. 226 οὐδὲς ἂν ἄρτους (τοὺς Σπαρταῖας) διὰ γε τὴν ὁμοποίην δικαίως ἐπαινέσθαι, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ὃ τὸς καταποιοστας καὶ ἀριστάς καὶ τὸς περὶ ἄλλας ἄδικας ὡς ἄρτοις καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνοις σφάλλων ἄρτοις ὡς ἄρτοις ἀπολλυόνων. There must be some honour even among thieves.

351 d 25 ὁμόνοιαν καὶ φιλίαν. The conception of δικαιοσύνη which meets us in Book IV 433 ἀ.—434 ε is dimly outlined here.
diaphéromai. 'Alla' ev ge su povon, o árioste. tóde dé mou légei, ára eî touto érgon adikias, múso ejmptoein ópon aw eîn, ou kai én eleuthéreis te kai doulois égignoroménè miaseîn poihsai allhlois kai stasismátein kai adunátous einai koiv1 met' allhlois prátttein; E 30 Pánw ge. Tí dé; án én douvèn eignèntai, ou douísoúnai kai miès-
osówne kai éhythlo ésoonta allhlois te kai tois dikaios; 'Esoanta, efh. 'Eán dé dé, o thumásie, én énii eignèntai adikia, mòn mè ápòleie tin aúthis dúnavm, ò oudein ëttón ëxei; Mèndèn ëttón èxéto, efh. Oúkoi ou toinà te ina fainetai ëkousa tìn dúnavm, 35 òiav, ò án eignèntai, eité polèi tîn eítè yènei eité stratoptëô eíte allh ótòmôn, práston mèn adúnaton | autò poihein prátttein352 meb' autòu dià tò stasismàtein kai diaphéresai, éti dé éhythron éinai éantw te kai to étantw pànti kai to dikaios; ouvch oustos; Pánw ge. Kai én énii dé, oimai, énousa taúta pànta poihsai, 5 áper pèfunikèn érygáxeisai; práston mèn adúnaton autòn prátttein poihsai stasismánta kai ouvch ómounúnta autòn éantw, ëpeita éhythron kai éantw kai tois dikaios: ò yar; Nai. Dikaioi dé ò yi eisín, ò filè, kai oi theoi; 'Eston, 1 efh. Kai theois ára B 26. diaphéromai II: diaphéromen A. 1. poihein II: poihei A.

27 én eleuthéreis ktl.: 'whether it makes its appearance among freemen or among slaves.' Plato wishes to-empha-
size the universality of the rule, and that is why he specifies the two classes into which society is divided. Cf. Gorg. 514 b, 515 A. It is less natural and easy to con-
trive (with Tucker) 'in a society where there are both freemen and slaves.'

351 é 31 allhlois te kai tois di-
kaiois. So in 349 c above it is said that the unjust try to overreach both one an-
other and the just.

32 én eti ktl. The results of Book IV are foreshadowed more clearly in what follows. The notion that justice just in the individual keeps the individual at peace with himself is more fully developed in 441 D, and implicitly assumes a psycho-
logical theory like that in Book IV, where soul is shewn to have 'parts' (435 c ii.). Further, in Book IV, Plato first describes justice in the State, and afterwards justice in the individual, using the larger aggregate to assist him to find it in the smaller. The same method is observed here in the description of injustice, and afterwards in Books VIII and IX, where the varieties of adikia in states and individuals are described. The present passage (351 A—352 A), in fact, contains the unde-
volved germ of the whole method and doctrine of the Republic (with the except-

mòn mè (a strengthened mèm) occurs only twice in the Republic, here and in VI 505 c. In the later dialogues mòn is especially frequent (Frederking in Fl. Jahrb. 1882 p. 339). A classified list of examples is given by Kugler de part. to einikes comp. ap. Pl. icos. p. 40.

35 diaon—poihein. See cr. n. poihein would involve (as even Schneider admits) "durissimum et haud scio an vitiosum anacoluthon." Cf. òhèi mè adikês in 334 D. Tucker proposes to erect diaon and retain poihein, but the reading of II is preferable in every way. For the error see Introd. § 5.

352 A 3 pànti: i.e. whether just or unjust: cf. 351 E éhythlo ésoonta (viz. òi adikês) allhlois te kai tois dikaios, 8 ëstow. On the form see Introd. § 5.
eschres estai o adikos, o Theasymphaxhe, o de dikaios filos. Ewwoi
tou logou, ephi, tharroun ou gar eywne sou evantiosomai, ina me to
toisde apetosbouai. 'Idi de, 'hn de eyw, kai ta lopita moi tis
estisasia apotplhrwsou apokrmymenos osteper kai vyn. Oti mene
gar kai sofoteroi kai ameinous kai duxatoterou prattien oi
dikaios fainontai, o de adikos oudein prattien mete allhlon oloi
tes, alala de kai ovis efamem erromenos prototon ti meti allhlon
15
coun praxai adikous ontas, touto ou pantaipasin althesis lagoymen-
gar an apeixonti allhlon komidh onties adikoi, allala deilen
oti enyn ths autous dikaiosynh, h autous epoiei mitoi kai allhlon
ge kai evf ovis yasan ama adikein, dii hyn eprazan eispace,
armasan de epi ta adika adikia hymochothori onties, epei oye 20
pamponyroi kai telews adikoi telewos eisw kai prattien adunatoi.
D tauta me on oin oti oytos exei, maubhano, all ovis sos tu to

15. de kai ovis AΣ: dikaious A1: kai ovis II.

352 B II t o loppa kta: vix. the discussion which begins in D below.
12 deini gar kta. The whole
sentence is summed up in taute men ow oti oytos exe (352 D) and placed in this
recapitulated form under the government of

muhammad. The introduction of
the antithesis (allala de kta) to o de adikou
oudein pratties meti allhlon oioi te,
and of the explanations required by
that antithesis, complicates the sentence,
without, however, rendering it obscure.
For similar anacolutha with dei see
v 465 A, VI 493 D nn. and cf. Engelhardt
Anac. Plat. Spec. III pp. 38, 40. The
whole sentence forms a kind of transition
to "the rest of the feast" by summing
up what has been so far proved; viz.
that Justice is wisdom and virtue (kai
sofoteroi kai ameinous), and more capable
of action than Injustice (duxatoterou
pratties); even the difficulty raised in
allala de - adunatos is not new, having
been briefly explained in 351 C. Lieb-
hold's eti for oti is an unhappy suggestion;
nor should oti be rendered 'quomiam,' as
Hartman proposes.

352 C 18 meito - ye: a strong negative
somewhat rarely used by Plato: cf.
Phil. 67 A and infra 111 388 B, C. See
Kugler de part. tou einique comp. ap. Pl.
meno p. 11.

352 D-354 C The argument here

returns to 347 E, and the rest of the book
offers a direct refutation of the view that
Injustice is more advantageous than
Justice, in other words, that the life of
the unjust man is better than that of the
just. An indirect refutation, says Socrates,
is afforded by the recent discussion (from
348 B to 352 D); the direct is as follows.
Everything has its peculiar work or product
(egov) - that, namely, which it alone
produces, or which it produces better than
aught else. Everything moreover has its
own peculiar excellence, without which it
will not do its work well. Now the work
of soul is to deliberate, to rule, to live:
its excellence is Justice. Therefore the just
soul will live well, and to live well is to
be blest and happy. And as this is more
advantageous than to be miserable,
Injustice can never be more advantageous
than Justice. In conclusion, Socrates
sums up regretfully: until we know what
Justice is, we are not likely to discover
whether it is a virtue or a vice, and
whether its possessor is happy or unhap-

352 D ff. The view that everything has
its own peculiar function, which it
can perform better than anything else,
afterwards becomes one of the cardinal
principles of the Ideal State (II 369 E ff.);
and the statement that everything has an
excellence or virtue of its own is reaffirmed
πρῶτον ἐπίθεσο. εἰ δὲ καὶ ἀμεινον ἔσωσιν ὑδείκων καὶ εἰδαμινοστεροί εἰσιν, ὅπερ τὸ ὑστερον προὐδεμέθει σκέψασθαι, 25 σκεπτέον. φαίνονται μὲν οὖν καὶ νῦν, ὡς ἡ μοι δοκεῖ, ἐξ ὧν εἰρήκαμεν· ὅμως δὲ ἔτι βελτίων σκεπτέον. οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐπιτυχόντος ὁ λόγος, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ὑποτυπου πρὸτον χρῆς ἕν. Σκόπει δὴ, ἔφη. Σκόπητι, ἤν δὲ ἐγώ. καὶ μοι λέγει δοκεῖ τί σοι εἶναι ὑππον ἔργον; 'Εμοιγε. Ἀρ' οὖν τοῦτο ἂν θείης καὶ ὑππον Ε 30 καὶ ἄλλου ὑποτού ἔργον, ὃ ἂν ἡ μοῦν ἐκείνη τις ἢ ἄριστα; Οὐ μανθάνω, ἔφη. Ἀλλ' ὅδε· ἐσθ' ὅτι ἂν ἄλλο ἰδοις ἡ ὀφθαλμοὶ; Οὐ δῆτα. Τί δέ; ἀκούσαις ἄλλω ἡ ὀσίων; Οὐδαμῶς. Οὐκοῦν δικαιῶσ ἂν ταῦτα τούτων φαίμεν ἐργα εἶναι; Πάνω γε. Τί δέ; | μαχαίρα ἂν ἀμπέλου κλῆμα ἀποτέμοι καὶ σμίλη καὶ 353 ἄλλοις πολλοῖς; Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; Ἀλλ' οὐδενὶ γ' ἂν, οἶμαι, οὕτω καλῶς, ὡς δρεπάνῳ τῷ ἐπί τοῦτο ἐργάσθηντι. Ἀληθῆ. Ἀρ' οὖν ὡς οὖν τοῦτο τούτων ἔργον θὸςομεν; Θοςομεν μὲν οὖν.

5 XXIV. Νῦν δὴ, οἶμαι, ἀμεινον ἂν μάθοις ὁ ἄρτη ἡρώτων, πυνθανόμενοι εἰ ὡς τοῦτο ἐκατόν ἐργα ἐρών, ὃ ἂν ἡ μοῦν τι ἢ κάλλιστα τῶν ἄλλων ἀπεργάζηται. Ἀλλ', ἔφη, μανθάνω τε καὶ μοι δοκε τοῦτο ἐκατόν 1 πράγματος ἐρών εἶναι. Εἰς, ἤν δ' ἐγώ· Β οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀρετὴ δοκεί σοι εἶναι ἐκατότως, ὅτερ καὶ ἐρών τι 10 προστετακτα; ἦμεν δὲ ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτὰ πάλιν. ὀφθαλμῶν, φαιμέν,


in Book x, where we are also told that everything has its own peculiar virtue, that of soul being δικαια (668 E fl.).

27 ὑπνα τρόπον χρῆς. Α remi-

niscence of the τας βιοτέων of Socrates: cf. 344 E.

352 E 30. δ' ἀριστα. The political

atical applications of this principle are

developed from 11 369 E onwards: cf. IV 433 A fl.

32 ἀκούσαις κτλ. The rapid suc-

cession of questions makes it possible to dispense with ἄν in the second: cf. II 352 E.

33 φαιμεν. See cr. n. If φαιμεν is

retained, ἂν will belong to εἶναι (cf. v1 493 C), but it is inappropriate here to make εἶναι future or hypothetical. Schneider, while retaining φαιμεν, refers ἄν to δικαια, "ut sensus sit: ὀδοικην, εἰ ταῦτα τούτων φαιμεν ἐργα εἶναι, δικαιως ἂν φαιμεν"—a harsh and unnatural view.

We may either drop ἄν and keep φαιμεν, as (with one of Stobaeus' MSS Flor. 9. 63) I formerly did; or change φαιμεν to φαιμεν. The latter solution is easier and better. Similarly in φαιμεν below (353 D) the i is due to Α2. See also Introd. § 5.

353 A I ἀπότειμοι—see cr. n.—can hardly, I think, dispense with the particle ἄν. It should be noted that the illustrations are of two kinds—the first to illustrate ἡ μοῦν εκείνη, the second to illustrate ἀριστα; after each division the conclusion is stated, in the second case more diffidently (ἀρ' ὡς οὕτωςομεν), perhaps because it is less obvious.

6 μοῦν τι. Cornarius unhappily suggested τις for τι and Stephanus μοῦν τις for μοῦν τι (cf. 352 E). μοῦν τι is of course the subject to ἀπεργάζηται.

353 B 9 οὐκοῦν—προστετακτα. Cf.
Men. 72 A οὐκ ἀποκλαίει εἰς τοὺς ἀρετής τέρματα ὑπὸ τό ἔργου, καθ' ἐκάστῳ γὰρ τῶν πράξεως καὶ τῶν ἡλίκιας πρὸς ἐκάστον ἔργον ἐκάστῳ ἡμῶν ἡ ἀρετή ἐστι. δύσαντω δὲ—καὶ ἡ κακία: also infra X 608 E with Arist. Eth. Nic. II 5. 1106a 15 ff.

12 ἢν: 'is, as we saw,' viz. at 352 E: cf. infra IV 441 D, VI 490 A, VII 532 A.

14 ἀπεργάσασθαι. Heindorf (on Crat. 424 E) would read ἀπεργάσασθαι, and Baier adopts his suggestion; but (as Stallbaum observes) the use of ὀφθαλμοῖο just above may affect the construction. In the same way, perhaps, the occurrence of γυναῖκες καὶ τάλλα ὑπήρχα immediately before causes Plato to write δεσφοντο (the reading of A) rather than δέξομαι in Tim. 756 E. Of the other alleged cases of a plural verb after a neuter plural in Plato, some (e.g. Laws 634 E, 683 b) are not supported by the best MSS; one—ἐς ὧν τὰ τὰ ἁμάτα καὶ τὰ ἁμάτα συνήθηναι (so AT) Crat. 424 E—is distributive; some refer to living objects, e.g. Laws 638 b (with which contrast κρίνων just before) and Lach. 180 E; at least one (Phil. 24 E) is perhaps corrupt. See also on Rep. II 361 B.

353 ο' τοῦ τυφλότητα κτλ. τυφλότης is also said to be the disease or vice of the eyes in Alc. I 126 b, a passage probably imitated from this. In the stricter discussion of X 608 E it is not τυφλότης but ὀφθαλμοῖο which is the vice to which the eyes are subject.

17 οὐ γὰρ τῷ ἰριστῷ ἐστι: cf. III 407 A and Arist. Eth. Nic. I 6. 1097b 22—1098a 17, where this discussion is closely imitated. That it is the ἔργον of soul (and in particular of νοῦς) to rule (ἄρχειν, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, and the like), is continually asserted in Plato: see for example Phaedr. 246 b πᾶσα ἡ ψυχῇ παρὰ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῷ ἐργῷ, Crat. 400 A, Phil. 30 c, Laws 869 A. The same doctrine is made the ground of the subjection of body to soul which is inculcated in the Phaedo (80 a, 94 b), and in Alc. I 130 A. Cf. also Isocrates peri ἀντίθεσεως 180 διοικεῖται μὲν γὰρ τὴν φύσιν ἡμῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος συγκεκριμένη καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ· αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν ὅδεις ἔστιν δότις οὐκ ἂν φθοράς ἐγείρων κατέρρευσιν τὴν ψυχήν καὶ πλεονοσίαν αὐταν· τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἔργον εἶναι βουλευομαι καὶ περὶ τῶν ἱδίων καὶ περὶ τῶν κοινῶν, τοῦ δὲ σώματος ὑπερετῆσαι τοῦ ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς γνωσθείσιν.
The reading *ektein*—see cr. n.—can only be defended by supposing that Plato was guilty of a strange confusion, unless we make a pause at ἀλλώ, and take ἦ as 'or,' not 'than;' but ἦ after ἀλλώ would certainly here be understood as 'than,' and an alternative question should be less ambiguously expressed. After ψυχή the corruption to *ektein* was natural enough. Madvig would eject the word.

27 τὸν ἔτη is κατέ ἔσχον ὁ ἔργον τοῦ ψυχῆς in Plato: cf. Crat. 399 D. ἐπεὶ τὸ ἄρα (εἰς, ψυχῆς), ὅταν παρὴ τῷ σώματι, αὕτη ἐστὶν ἦν ἐν δάκτυλῳ τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς, τὴν τὸν ἀναπνευσμα τοῦ παράκοπον καὶ ἀναψυχῶσαν, ἀμα δὲ ἐκλείποντος τοῦ ἀναψυχῶσαν τὸ σώμα ἀπὸλυται τε καὶ τὸ λεπτὰ ἄθεα ἀνδροῦν ἀλλοίρων καὶ ψυχήν καλέσας, and Phaed. 105 D. The influence of this idea makes itself felt in all the proofs of immortality in Plato, and not least in X 608 eff. See mi. ad loc.

358 Ε 32 *συνεκχωρήσαμεν κτλ.* The reference is to 350 C, D; cf. also 348 C. In these passages Justice has been identified with Virtue, but not expressly with virtue of soul. For this reason Hartman would eject ψυχῆς. But as Plato has just been using ἀρετή 'excellence' in connexion with things other than soul (ears), it is important that he should now make it clear that in identifying δικαιοσύνη and ἀρετή, he meant soul's ἀρετή. Otherwise a soul may possess its ἀρετή without being just; and in which case the conclusion which he is aiming at will not follow.

354 Α 2 ὑμν ἐν κτλ. The ambiguity (as it appears to us) of ὑμν ἐν and πράττειν is frequently used by Plato to suggest that the virtuous life is the happy one, e.g. Charm. 172 A, 173 D: see note on 333 B. Aristotle says that Plato was the first to establish this identification: see the third fragment of his elegies τοῦ, 4—5 ed. Bergk ὅδε μῦν ἡ πρῶτος ὑπερβολή καθεδείκτην ἐναργύρως οἰκείο τε βίοι καὶ μεθεύσεις λόγων ἔτι ἀγαθές τε καὶ ἐκλιπόντως αὐτῶ γίνεται ἀνήρ.

6 εἰστι ἀνθρώπος. The metaphor occurs again in 352 B, v 458 A, IX 571 D. It is part of the formal links connecting the *Timaeus* with the *Republic:* see Tim. 17 A. Cf. Shakespeare Macbeth Act I Scene 4 "In his commendations I am fed: It is a banquet to me,"

7 Βενδιδεῖος. See Introd. § 3. In τὸν σοῦ γε κτλ. Plato seems to be making the *amicus* honorable to Thrasymachus: cf. v 498 C, ὃ μὴ διδάσκει—ἐκεῖ καὶ ὦ Ἐρωταμαχώ ὑπὲρ δειον γεγονότα, οὐδὲ πρὸ τοῦ ἐχθροῦς γεγονότα.
354 C 10 paraferoménon. Casaubon's conjecture "paraferoménou" is neat, but inappropriate, the reference being to the successive courses at a feast, which were not usually carried round among the Greeks. In Athen. iv 33 the carrying round of viands is mentioned as an Egyptian custom: τρίτη δ' ἔστιν ἴδια δείπνων ἀγυρτίκη, τραπεζαὶ μὲν οὐ παρατίθενται, πανάκης μὲν ἐπιδιδομένων, τοῖς ἐπιδιδομένων.

II εἶσαι μοι δοκῶ κτλ. Lys. 222 Ε δεῖσαι οὐν ὡσπέρ οἱ σοφοὶ ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις, τὰς ἀρχήνας ἀπαντᾷ ἀναπλήσσεσθαι. The tone of the concluding summary recalls the usual finish of the earlier and professedly negative Socratic dialogues, like the Charmides (175 B—176 A). The only section of the dialogue which Socrates passes over in silence is the refutation of the statement that Injustice is strong (350 D—352 C). The original question—the quid sit of Justice—is abandoned at 347 E; the quale sit occupies the rest of the dialogue, and Socrates enquires first whether Justice is vicious and ignorant, or wise and good (347 E—350 C), next whether it is strong or weak (350 D—352 C), and lastly whether it is more or less advantageous than Injustice (352 D—354 A). To speculate on the quale sit of a thing before determining its quid sit is condemned by Plato in Men. 71 B D ἐδύων οὐδὲ τι ἠκέν, πῶς ἄν ὅπως γε τι εἰσῆλθ; cf. ibid. 86 D and 100 B. The words with which the first book concludes lead us to expect that in the remaining books the problem will be discussed in proper logical order—the essence first, and afterwards the quality, of Justice. The expectation is duly fulfilled; and Book 1 is therefore in the full sense of the term a προϊμον to the whole work.
APPENDICES TO BOOK I.

I.

I 327 A. προσευξόμενός τε τῇ θεῷ καὶ άμα τὴν ἐορτήν βουλόμενος θεάσασθαι τίνα τρόπον ποιήσωσιν, ἀνεν νῦν πρῶτον ἁγοντες.

The question whether τῇ θεῷ here and in 328 A is Ὑδις or Athena is not so simple as it appears.

In favour of Athena it may be urged (1) that θεός regularly means Athena in Attic literature (see for example Ar. Eq. 650, 923 al., and Plato Laws 806 B): (2) that in view of the relation between the Republic and the Timaeus it is difficult to separate τῇ θεῷ here from τὴν θεόν and τὴν θεόν in Tim. 21 A and 26 E, where the goddess is certainly Athena, (3) that it is dramatically appropriate for an Athenian to dedicate his ideal city to the patron goddess of Athens. Plato's perfect city would thus become in a certain sense a βασιλεία τῆς θεόν.

On the other hand, the goddess and the festival are mentioned so closely together that (if we have regard to the Republic by itself) we are scarcely justified in interpreting τῇ θεῷ without reference to τὴν ἐορτήν, and it is quite in harmony with Socrates' principles that he should be among the first to pay his vows at the shrine of the new goddess as soon as the νόμος πόλεως received her. See Xen. Mem. i 3. 1, iv 3. 16. It is therefore safer to accept the usual view that Plato is thinking of Bendis.

II.

I 333 E—334 A. ἀρ' οὖν ὁ πατέρος δεινότατος ἐν μάχῃ εἶτε πυκτικῷ εἶτε τωι καὶ ἄλλη, οὗτος καὶ φυλάξασθαι; Πάνω γε. Ἀρ’ οὖν καὶ νόσου ὅστις δεινός φυλάξασθαι, καὶ λαβεῖν οὗτος δεινότατος ἐμποιήσας; Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. Ἀλλὰ μὴν στρατοπέδου γε ὁ αὐτὸς φύλαξ ἀγαθός, ὀστερ καὶ τὰ τῶν πολεμίων κλέψαι καὶ βουλεύματα καὶ τὰς άλλας πράξεις. Πάνω γε. Ὀστον τις ἄρα δεινὸς φύλαξ, τούτον καὶ φῶρ δεινός. Ὅταν ἕκαστον.

The reading φυλάξασθαι καὶ λαβεῖν, οὗτος δεινότατος καὶ ἐμποιήσα, which has slight ms authority, is defended by Boeckh (KL. Schr. iv pp. 326 ff.), with whom Zahlfleisch (Zeitschr. f. öst. Gymn. Vol. xxviii 1877, pp. 603 ff.) and others agree. Boeckh points out that καὶ λαβεῖν (sc. νόσον, according to his view) suggests (from its notion of clandestine cunning) the idea of stealing. This may be admitted, but the idea of stealing is much more forcibly suggested (as Stallbaum points out), if καὶ λαβεῖν is construed with οὗτος δεινότατος καλ., and this involves the necessity of changing (with Schneider) ἐμποιήσα of the ms to ἐμποιήσα, for the construction λαβεῖν ἐμποιήσα, though retained by Campbell, is destitute of authority.
Even if Schneider’s emendation be adopted, the argument is (as stated in the notes) fantastical and inconclusive. In order that the conclusion ὅτον τις ἄρα δεινὸς φύλαξ, τοῦτον καὶ φωρ δεινὸς should be valid, φυλάξασθαι should be φυλάξαναι, and the objects of the two verbs in proposition (1) should be identical, as well as those in propositions (2) and (3). As it is, if we express φυλάξασθαι in terms of φυλάξαναι, they are not identical: for in (1) it is the enemy whom you smite, but yourself whom you guard: in (2) it is yourself (or your patient) whom you guard, but the disease which you secretly implant: in (3) you guard your own army, but steal the enemy’s plans, etc. Nevertheless Schneider’s emendation is preferable to the traditional reading, which not only contains all the same fallacies as the other, but leaves the three stages of the argument in comparative isolation, attaches the first hint of ‘stealing’ (λαθεῖν) to the wrong member of the clause, and involves the use of the somewhat strained expression λαθεῖν νόσον. It should be added that the change from ἐμποηῆσαι to ἐμποηήσασ is not greater than the insertion of καὶ before ἐμποηῆσαι, and that ἐμποηῆσαι was very likely to be corrupted under the influence of δεινὸς φυλάξασθαι just before. The emphatic position of καὶ λαθεῖν is necessary to call attention to the first suggestion of the idea contained in κλέψαι; nor can I agree with J. and C. that in Schneider’s emendation “the emphasis falls on the wrong word.” In λαθεῖν ἐμποηῆσαι, which is virtually a single expression, λαθεῖν is more important, in view of the conclusion καὶ κλέπτειν δεινὸς, than ἐμποηῆσαι.

Hartman condemns the words καὶ λαθεῖν, and thinks ὦτις and ὦτος have changed places: “cum enim ubique τὸ φυλάξασθαι urgetur (ὁ πατάξει δεινότατος, ὦτος καὶ φυλάξασθαι—ὅσπερ κλέψαι...), ὦ τοῦτος φύλαξ ἄγαθός, requiritur ὦτος δεινὸς φυλάξασθαι, ὦτος δεινότατος κτλ.; quibus tribus exemplis praemissis inversa ratione conclusit ὅτον τις ἄρα δεινὸς φύλαξ, τοῦτον καὶ φωρ δεινὸς.” Tucker revives the old conjecture καὶ ἄλθειν (‘heal’) instead of καὶ λαθεῖν, and suggests (as an alternative) that λαθεῖν should be μαθεῖν (i.e. καὶ μαθεῖν ὦτα δεινότατος ἐμποηῆσαι ‘clever at learning how to implant’). None of these conjectures appears to me so probable as that of Schneider.

III.

I 335 A. Κηλεύεις δή ἦμας προσβείαιν τῷ δικαίῳ, ἤ, ὡς τὸ πρῶτον ἐλέγομεν, λέγοντες δίκαιον εἶναι τὸν μὲν φίλον εὐ ποιεῖν, τὸν δ’ ἐχθρὸν κακῶς, νῦν προς τούτῳ ὡδὲ λέγειν, ὅτι ἐστὶν δίκαιον τὸν μὲν φίλον ἀγαθὸν ὅντα εὐ ποιεῖν, τὸν δ’ ἐχθρὸν κακὸν ὃντα βλάπτειν;

In this difficult passage Schneider takes ἤ as ‘than,’ and προσβείαιν as equivalent to a comparative with a verb; but no exact parallel has hitherto been adduced, and the idiom even if admissible is exceedingly harsh. Neither the suggestion of Stephanus (προσβείαιν τῷ δικαίῳ ἄλλως ἤ) nor that of Richards (to insert πλέον after ἤ) carries conviction. It should also be remarked that the words νῦν πρὸς τοῦτῳ ὡδὲ λέγειν follow somewhat awkwardly as an explanation of προσβείαιν τῷ δικαίῳ if ἤ ὡς is interpreted in Schneider’s way. Stallbaum’s ἤ ὡς—τὸν δ’ ἐχθρὸν κακῶς; νῦν πρὸς τοῦτῳ ὡδὲ λέγειν, is very unpleasing, not so much from the
necessity of understanding λέγειν after ἡ (‘or to say, as we said at first’ etc.) as because it is extremely violent to separate ἡ from νῦν πρὸς τούτῳ ὦδε λέγειν. Faesius’ proposal (in which he is followed by Ast, Madvig, and several editors) to eject ἡ gives the required sense (‘do you bid us add to the view of justice which etc.’ προσθείναι being explained by πρὸς τούτῳ ὦδε λέγειν), but it fails to account for the presence of ἡ in the mss. It may seem an objection to the view which I take that ἡ in a sentence of this kind would naturally introduce an alternative, whereas πρὸς τούτῳ ὦδε λέγειν only explains προσθείναι. This objection, such as it is, applies with still greater force to the view that ἡ is ‘than.’ Some will probably regard the whole clause from ἡ—λέγειν as a marginal commentary on προσθείναι; but this is much too drastic. Possibly ἡ should be replaced by καὶ—the corruption is said to be common (Bast Comment. Palaeogr. p. 815); but I am not convinced that ἡ does not sometimes mean ‘or in other words’ even in classical Greek.

IV.

I 336 E. μὴ γὰρ δὴ οἶου, εἰ μὲν χρυσὸν ἢγετοῦμεν, οὐκ ἂν ποτὲ ἡμᾶς ἐκόντας εἶναι ὑποκατακλίνεσθαι αἰλλόλους εἰ τῇ ξητήσει καὶ διαφθείρειν τὴν εἰρήσειν αὐτοῦ, δικαιοσύνην δὲ ξητούντας, πράγμα πολλῶν χρυσῶν τιμώτερον, έπειθ’ οὕτως ἀνοίγως ὑπείκεν αἰλλόλους καὶ οὐ σπονδαίειν ὦ τι μάλιστα φανήγαι αὐτῷ. οἶου γε σῦ, ὦ φίλε· ἄλλα, ὦμα, οὐ δυνάμεθα.

Schneider’s explanation of the words οἶου γε σῦ (sc. ἡμᾶς σπονδαίειν ὦ τι μάλιστα φανήγαι αὐτῷ) would probably have met with wider acceptance if he had taken more pains to justify his view. The key to the meaning is to be found in the affirmative οἰεσθαι γε χρῆ which sometimes follows a fortiori reasoning of this kind in Plato. Two examples will suffice: Prot. 325 b, C τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἁρα τόσοῦ μείεις διδακόσκοιν, ἐφ’ οἷς οὐκ ἐστὶν θάνατος ἡ ξημία ἐὰν μὴ ἐπιστῶται, ἐφ’ ὃ δὲ ἡ τε ξημία θάνατος αὐτῶν τοῖς παισι—ταῦτα δ’ οὐρί ὑπεδάκτοιν αὐτοῦ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι; οἰεσθαί γε χρῆ, and Phaed. 68 A ἄνθρωπίνων μὲν παιδίκων—ἀποθανόντων πολλοὶ δὴ ἐκόντες ἔθελησαν εἰς ἂν αὐτῶν—φρονήσεως δὲ ἀρι τῷ ὤτι ἔρων—ἀγανακτήσει τε ἀποθητήσει καὶ οὐκ ἄσμενος ἐστιν αὐτόσε; οἰεσθαί γε χρῆ. If in place of the imperative μὴ γὰρ δὴ οἶου, Plato had used an interrogation (as he generally does in sentences of this kind), writing let us say ἡ οἰεί instead of μὴ γὰρ δὴ οἶου, he would have added οἰεσθαί γε χρῆ. The same way of writing, dictated of course by the desire to emphasize the δ’ clause, causes him to say οἶου γε when the sentence is in the imperatival form. σῦ is of course necessary on account of ὦ φίλε. For the affirmative sense of οἶου cf. infra 346 Ε ἀρ’ οἶου οὐδ’ ὄφελεί τὸτε, ὅταν πρῶικα ἔργαζηται; Οἶμαι ἔγογκε, and x 608 Ε. Of the various suggestions made on this passage that of O. Apelt ιοῦ, ιοῦ, ὦ φίλε “aber wehe, o Freund, unsere Kraft, glaube ich, reicht nicht aus dazu” (Fl. Jahrb. 1891, p. 557) deserves mention for its ingenuity; but except for the corruption of γε to τε (see cr. u.), the text is sound. There is certainly no occasion to follow q and Stallbaum in writing μὴ οἶου σῦ for οἶου γε σῦ.
357 A—358 E Socrates had thought the conversation at an end, but Glauco revives the theory of Thrasymachus. A threefold classification of goods is first agreed upon. Goods are desirable either (1) for their own sakes, or (2) both for their own sakes and for their consequences, or (3) for their consequences alone. Justice is placed by Socrates in the second and noblest of these three classes. Glauco on the other hand asserts that the Many place it in the third, and proposes to advocate the belief of the Many, not as holding it itself, but in order to compel Socrates to defend Justice and condemn Injustice solely on their merits. Thrasymachus, he thinks, has cried off too soon.

357 A 1 ἔγω κτλ. λόγου is abstract = τοῦ λέγειν, not 'the discussion' (Jowett), which would be τοῦ λόγου. For τὸ δὲ see on I. 340 D.

2 ἧν ἄρα: 'was after all,' as in IV 443 C τὸ δὲ γε ἧν ἄρα—εἰςδόλων τι τῆς δικαιοσύνης and Soph. Tr. 1172 τὸ δ’ ἦν ἄρ’ οὐδὲν ἀλλ’ πλὴν θανεῖν εἶμε. With προοίμιον cf. infra VII 531 D, Aesch. P. V. 740 f. ὦς γὰρ νῦν ἄκηκος λόγου οἵ δέν δοκεῖ σοι μηδὲν ὅποιον, and Shake-
speare Macbeth I 3 "As happy prologues to the swelling act Of the imperial theme." For the sense see the last note on Book I. There is no good ground for supposing (with von Sybel De Platonis Praemitis Academiciis) that either Book I of the Republic or the rest of Plato's dialogues were intended merely as προοίμια or 'Programs' to attract pupils to his lectures.

5 βούλει κτλ. The antithesis is between δοκεῖν πεπελεκέναι and πείειν, and βούλει is used in its natural sense, not (as Ast thinks) with the force of μᾶλλον βούλει.

357 B 7 λέγε γὰρ μοι. Other classifications of 'goods' in Plato will be found in Laws 631 B ff. and 697 B ff. (with which compare Arist. Eith. Nic. I. 1. 1098b 12 ff.). See also Euthyd. 279 A ff., Gorg. 407 E, Phil. 66 A ff. The nearest parallels to the present classification are furnished by Stoicism, in which goods were classified as (a) τελικά, (b) ποιητικά, (c) both τελικά and ποιητικά, and the προηγμένα as (a) δι’ αὐτά, (b) δι’ ἔτερα, (c) καὶ δι’ αὐτά καὶ δι’ ἔτερα see D. L. VII 96, 107.

A. P.
and

not the idiomatic 'to continue rejoicing' (as Campbell suggests). The essential mark of these pleasures, viz. that they give pleasure only while they last, is brought out by ἔξοντα, which recalls ἐξαιμέθη ἄν ἕξειν just above, and is used without an expressed object as in 366 E.

367 C 14 τὸ φρονέω—γνώιμεν. ἀκόντων is added in 367 C. Cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. I 4. 1006 b 16 καθ' αὐτά δὲ ποιά θέλη τις ἂν; ἢ οἷα καὶ μονόμονα διώκεται, οὖν τὸ φρόνεω καὶ ὀράω καὶ ἰδον ἔριν καὶ τιμᾶι; ταῦτα γὰρ εἰ καὶ δ' ἄλλο τι διώκειται, ὁμοί τῶν καθ' αὐτά ἄγαθων θέλη τις ἂν: also Met. A 1. 980 b 2 ff. Aristotle himself does not suggest that a special class should be made of things desirable both in themselves and for their results; but integer sensus and bona valetudo are included in the Stoic category of προσμένει καὶ δ' αὐτά καὶ δ' ἐπέρα (Cic. De Fin. III 56: cf. D. L. VII 107).

16 γνωμάζεσθαι κτλ. Cf. Prot. 354 A and Gorg. 407 C, D (where χρηματισμὸς is again said to belong to this class), λάτρευως as an example of χρηματισμὸς (in spite of the ἀκριβῆ λόγος of 1.343 b ff.) is suggested by λάτρευον, οὗ ἄλλος is 'the rest of,' and should not be taken (with Stallbaum) as ἀπεξεταστα: cf. Gorg. I.c. οἱ πλεονέτες τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων χρηματισμῶν ἢς χρηματισθομένων and Crít. 53 c.

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10 χαῖρες—ἀβλαβεῖς. These 'innocent pleasures' are defined in Laws 607 E as those which bring no consequences in their train, good, bad, or otherwise (cf. καὶ μηδὲν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον διὰ ταύτας γίγνεται ἄλλο ἡ χαῖρες ἔχουσα. 'Εμοίον, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δοκεῖ τι εἶναι τοιοῦτον. 'Τί δὲ; ὃ αὐτὸ τε αὐτῶν χάριν ἀγαπῶμεν καὶ τῶν ἀπ' αὐτῶν γυγυμομένους; οὖν αὐτό τὸ φρονέω καὶ τὸ ὀράω καὶ τὸ γνώιμεν· τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτα ποὺ δι' ἀμφότερα ἀσπαζόμεθα. Ναὶ, εἶπον. Τρίτων δὲ ὅρας τι, ἐφ', εἴδος ἀγαθοῦ, ἐν τίς τὸ γνωμάζεσθαι καὶ τὸ κάμνοντα ἦπρευσθαι καὶ λάτρευσις τις καὶ ὁ ἄλλος χρηματισμὸς; ταῦτα γὰρ ἐπιτύπω ἐγέμεν ἄν, ὀδελείν δὲ ἡμᾶς, καὶ αὐτὰ μὲν ἑαυτῶν ἑνεκα οὐκ ἄν D δεξαίμεθα ἔχειν, τῶν δὲ μισθῶν τε χάριν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα 20 γίγνεται ἄπ' αὐτῶν. 'Ἐστών γὰρ οὖν, ἐφ', καὶ τοῦτο τρίτων. ἀλλὰ τί δή; Ἐν ποιῷ, ἐφ', τούτουν τὴν δικαίωσύνην τίθης; 'Εγὼ μὲν οἶμαι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, ἐν τῷ καλλίστῳ, δ' καὶ δ' αὐτό καὶ διὰ τὸ 358 γνωμόμενα ἄπ' αὐτῶν ἀγαπητέων τὸ μέλλοντι μακρὰφ ἔσεσθαι. Οὐ τούτων δοκεῖ, ἐφ', τοὺς πολλοὺς, ἀλλὰ τοῦ ἐπιτύπουν εἴδους,
ο μισθὸν θ’ ἐνεκα καὶ εὐδοκιμήσεων διὰ δόξαν ἐπιτηδευτέον, αὐτὸ
de δὲ δι’ αὐτὸ φευκτέον ὡς ὄν χαλετόν.

II. Οἶδα, ἂν δ’ ἐγὼ, ὅτι δοκεῖ οὕτω, καὶ πάλαι ὑπὸ Ὁρασύμα-
χον ὡς τοιοῦτον ὄν φέγγηται, ἀδικία δ’ ἐπανείπται ἄλλ’ ἐγὼ τις, B
ὡς ἐοίκε, δυσμαθής. "Ἰθι 1 δὴ, ἔφη, ἀκοῦσον καὶ ἔμοι, εάν σοι
tαύτα δοκῇ. Ὁρασύμαχος γὰρ μοι φαίνεται προφαίτερον τοῦ
δέοντος ὑπὸ σοῦ ὡσπέρ ὄφις κηληθήναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ οὕτω παρὰ νοῦν ἱ
ἅπαξεῖς γέγονεν περὶ ἐκατέρον: ἐπιθυμῶ γὰρ ἀκούσαί τι τ
ἔστιν ἐκατέρον καὶ τίνα ἔχει δύναμιν αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ ἐνω ἐν τῇ
ψυχῇ, τοὺς δὲ μισθοὺς καὶ τὰ γνώμωνα αὐτ’ αὐτῶν ἔσασι χαίρειν.
οὗτος οὖν ποιήσω, εάν καὶ σοι δοκῇ: ἐπανανεῶσομαι τὸν Ὁρασυ-
C μάχῳ λόγον, καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ἐρῶ δικαιοσύνην ὅλον εἰναὶ φασὶν 15
καὶ οἶδα γεγονέναι: δεύτερον δὲ ὅτι πάντες αὐτὸ οἱ ἐπιτηδεύοντες
ἀκούσεις ἐπιπτείνουσιν ὅς ἀναγκαῖον ἄλλ’ οὕχ ὃς ἀγαθόν τρίτον
δὲ ὅτι εἰκότος αὐτὸ δράσις: πολὺ γὰρ ἀμέλειν ἄρα ὁ τοῦ ἀδίκου
ἡ ὁ τοῦ δικαίου βίος, ὅς λέγουσιν. ἔτει ἐμοιγε, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὗτι
δοκεῖ οὕτως: ἀπορῶ μέντοι διατεθρυλημένος τὰ ὅτα, ἀκοῦν 20
Ὀρασύμαχο καὶ μυρίων ἄλλων, τὸν δὲ ὑπὲρ τῆς δικαιοσύνης
D λόγον, ἃς ἀμεινοὶ ἀδικίας, οὖνενός πο ἀκήκα καὶ βούλομαι
βούλομαι δὲ αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ ἐγκομιαζόμενον ἀκοῦσαι. μάλιστα
δ’ οἴμαι ἀν σοῦ πυθέσαι: διὸ κατατείνας ἐρῶ τὸν ἀδίκου βίον
ἐπαινῶν, εἰπὼν δὲ ἐνδειξομαι σοι, ὅν τρόπον αὐ βούλομαι καὶ 25

7. ἀδικία δ’ ἐπανεῖπται II: om. A.

358 A 4 μισθῶν θ’ ἐνεκα κτλ. Her-
werden would read μισθῶν τε μὲν ἐνεκα, but for ὄν without μὲν preceding see I 340 D n. The words διὰ δόξαν, which are condemned by the same critic, may no doubt be a gloss on εὐδοκιμήσεων ἐνεκα. I incline however to think them genuine. Plato is not averse to duplicate expressions of this kind (see Schanz Νέων. Comm. Plat. pp. 12—13), and the emphatic addition of διὰ δόξαν helps in the absence of μὲν to prepare us for the antithesis αὐτὸ δὲ δι’ αὐτὸ κτλ. Cf. 363 A below.

7 ψέγγηται. See cr. n. The words ἀδικία δ’ ἐπανείπται are probably genuine: for the mention of ἀδικία seems to be necessary to justify the pronoun ἐκατέρου just below: cf. also in D βούλομαι καὶ σοὶ ἀκοῦει δικαίων μὲν φέγγωστο, δικαιοσύνην δὲ ἐπαινοῦντο. For the omission see Introd. § 5.

358 C 17 ὁς ἀναγκαῖον ἄλλ’ οὐχ ὃς ἀγαθόν. Cf. infra 360 c and vi 493 c τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀναγκαίου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ φύσιν ὅσον διαφέρει τῷ ὀντὶ κτλ.


21 Ὁρασύμαχον—ἀλλων. See on I 337 A ff.

358 D 24 κατατείνας κτλ.: 'I will speak vehemently in praise of the unjust life.' The explanation of Phoitus and Suidas (κατατείνας ἐρωτ αὑτὶ τοῦ μακρον λόγον διεξελέσθαμαι) does not suit II 367 B ὡς δύναμι μάλιστα κατατείνας λέγω. For this intransitive use of κατατείνας cf. I 348 A and Boeckh's emendation of Eur. Ἰππ. Ἀν. 336 88τε κατατείνω (κατατείνω MSS) λίαν ἐγώ.
σον ἀκούειν ἀδικίαν μὲν ψέγοντος, δικαιοσύνην δὲ ἐπαινοῦντος. ἀλλ’ ὤρα, εἶ σοι βουλομένων ἂ λέγω. Πάντων μάλλον, ὡς ἐγὼ: περὶ γὰρ τῶν οὐ καὶ μᾶλλον πολλάκις τις νοῦν ἔχων χαῖροι λέγων Ε καὶ ἀκούων; Κάλλιστα, ἐφη, λέγεις· καὶ ὁ πρῶτον ἐφήν ἐρείν, περὶ 30 τούτου ἄκουε, οὖν τέ τι καὶ ὠδεν γέγονε δικαιοσύνη.

30. οὖν τέ τι θοσ: τί δὲν τε ΑΞ: τί οὖν τε Π: τί οὖνται γ.


358 E 30 οὖν τέ τι. The reading of A τί δὲ τε καὶ ὠδεν γέγονε involves the separation of ὠδεν from γέγονε, and is otherwise much too harsh to be right. There is something to be said in favour of Schneider’s περὶ τούτου ἄκουε τί οὖνται, καὶ ὠδεν γέγονε δικαιοσύνη (see cr. n.), especially as the confusion between οὖν τε and οὖνται occurs rather frequently in Platonic MSS (see Schneider on Ι 329 E), but the specific reference in δ ἐφήν πρῶτον ἐρείν to 358 C πρῶτον μὲν ἐρὲ δικαιοσύνην οὖν εἶχαι φασὶ καὶ ὠδεν γεγονέναι points to the presence of οὖν here. The reading οὖν τε, adopted by Stallbaum, as well as by Jowett and Campbell, on the authority of three MSS (Vind. F, Flor. RT), is unexceptionable in point of sense, but fails to account for the presence of τί in the best MSS. I have ventured to read οὖν τέ τι (sc. ἐστι), supposing that the confusion arose from the accidental omission of τι, which was afterwards (as τί) wrongly inserted before οὖν (where it remained in II), οὖν itself being afterwards changed to δὲ in order to provide a kind of construction (*being what, and whence, it arises,* Ι. and Ε. C.). This δὲ was itself fortified by τυγχάνει in Flor. B and the Aldine edition. Campbell’s suggestion that “τι δὲ τε may be a corruption of τί ἐστι” is improbable: still less can Herwerden and Hartman induce us to reject the whole clause. Few will approve of Tucker’s conjecture τι τι δέ τι καὶ ὠδεν κτλ. Dr Jackson suggests ἄκουε τι, οὖν τέ καὶ κτλ., and a reviewer of my Text of the Republic in Litt. Centrallblatt 1898 p. 296 οὖν τ’ ἐστι κτλ.

358 E—359 B Glauco will first describe the origin and nature of Ἰστατικος, according to the theory which he has undertaken to maintain. According to nature, to commit injustice is a good, to suffer injustice an evil. But as there is more evil in suffering than good in committing injustice, experience causes men to enter into a compact neither to commit nor suffer wrong. The collective prescriptions of this compact are called Law and Ἰστατικος. Ἰστατικος accordingly a compromise between the best policy, i.e. doing wrong without incurring any penalty, and the worst, i.e. suffering wrong without being able to exact vengeance. No one will accept the compromise who is strong enough to do wrong successfully.

358 E ff. In thus resuscitating the theory of Thrasymachus, Glauco removes a serious stumbling-block by introducing the distinction between φόνος and νόμος. Civilisation revolts against the anti-social doctrines of Thrasymachus in their application to itself, but receives them more favourably when its own existence is safeguarded by relegating them to an age anterior to society. The view maintained by Glauco is allied to that of Callippos in Gorg. 483 E ff.; and it has already been pointed out (on Ι 337 A, 344 B) that similar views were tolerably widely entertained in Plato’s time. To the evidence previously adduced may be added Laws 690 B, 889 B, Eur. Phoen. 509 and Frag. 912 ἐν φόνοις ἐβοῦλεθ' ἐν νόμον οὖθεν μελεί. But whereas the doctrine of Callippos breaks down in explaining the origin of Law (Gorg. 483 C, cf. 488 D—489 D), Glauco’s theory endeavours to solve this difficulty by postulating a social contract. A kindred solution is ascribed by Aristotle to the Sophist Lycurgus: Pol. Ι. 1280 νόμος συνήθη, καὶ καθαντερ ἐφήν Λυκόφρον ὁ σοφατρής, ἐγγύης ἀλλήλοις κτλ. The theory of a Social Contract was revived by Epicurus; see D. L. Χ 150. The views of the “incomplete Protagorans” in Thuc. 172 B (with which cf. Laws 889 E), though they do not offer an explanation of the origin of
Law, are parallel in so far as they regard it as depending for its binding force solely upon the sanction of society.

31.  *πεφύκεναι γὰρ—κακον.* Cf. *Gorg.* 483 a φύσει μὲν γὰρ πᾶν αὑσχόν ἐστιν ὅτε καὶ κάκιον, τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, νῦν δὲ τὸ ἀδίκειν. That the natural relation between man and man is one of war is a view expressed in *Laws* 626 a ἣν γὰρ καλοῦσιν οἱ πλείστοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐρήμων, τοῦτο εἶναι μένον ἀδίκου, τῷ δ᾿ ἔργῳ πάσας πρὸς πάσης τάς πόλεις δὲ πολὲς μον ἀκροτρικόν κατὰ φύσιν εἶναι. A similar theory is contained in the myth of Protagoras (Προτ. 32 b ff.).

34.  *τοῖς μὴ δυναμένοις κτλ.* i.e. (according to the theory of Callicles) τοῖς ἀδεόνεσι αὐθρώποις καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς (Gorg. 483 b). In place of *δικήν* in 359 A I have adopted Ast's conjecture *δικεῖν*. Throughout this paragraph Glaucus consistently presents his view at second hand. For the collocation of infinitives cf. *ἀδίκειν, ἀδίκειν* 360 d, and for the error itself *Intro. § 5.*

359 A 3.  *ξυνθήκας αὐτῶν:* ‘covenants between one another,’ ‘mutual covenants.’ *Reading αὐτῶν,* Tucker suggests that the meaning is, ‘they established laws and covenants concerning them,’ i.e. concerning matters connected with ἀδίκειν and ἀδίκεισθαι—a very improbable view.

4.  *νομίμοι τε καὶ δίκαιον:* *φιλμ γάρ ἐγὼ τὸ νομίμων δίκαιον εἶναι, said Socrates (Mem. IV 4 12).*

6.  *τοῦ μὲν ἀρίστου κτλ.* Cf. the reasoning of Philus (whose position in Cicero's work corresponds to that of Glaucus here) in *Cic. de Rep. III 23* “nam cun de tribus unum esset optandum, aut facere inuriam nec accipere, aut et facere et accipere, aut neutrum, optimum est facere, impune si possis, secundum nec facere nec pati, miserrimum digildari semper tum faciendis tum accipiendo iniurias.” Cicero is following Carneades (ibid. 8), who may have been thinking of the present passage. *ἀγαπᾶσθαι below* (as J. and C. observe) “implies acquiescence rather than decided preference.”

359 B 9.  *ἐπὶ τὸν δυναμένου κτλ.* is further elaborated with much vigour in *Gorg.* 484 A. With ὃς ἀληθῶς ἀνήρ should be compared the emphatic ἀνήρ in that passage (ἐὰν δὲ γε, οἷον, φύσιν ἵκνην γένηται ἐξον ἀνήρ), and *Eur.* *Phoen.* 509 ἀνανδρία γάρ, τὸ πλέον ὅσις ἀπολέσας | τοῦ ἀδικοῦ ἔλαβε.*

359B—360D.  *Secondly (urges Glaucus), no one is willingly just.* Give the just and the unjust the fullest power to work their will, by ensuring them against all evil consequences—give them the faculty of becoming invisible, such as Gyges possessed through his ring, and the just man will shew himself no better than the unjust. *If, with this power to screen himself, the just man still refused to do wrong, no doubt men would praise him openly,* but in secret they would judge him wholly miserable and foolish.
10 autò ποιεῖν καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἀνδρα οὐδ' ἄν ἐνί ποτε ξυνθέσθαι τὸ μῆτε ἄδικεῖν μῆτε ἄδικεῖσθαι· μαύσεσθαι γὰρ ἄν. ἢ μὲν οὖν δὴ φύσις δικαιοσύνης, ὡς Σωκρατεῖς, αὕτη τε καὶ τοιαύτη, καὶ εἴ ὄν πέφυκε, τοιαύτα, ὡς ὁ λόγος.

ΠΙΙ. Ὁς δὲ καὶ οἱ ἑπτηθεύνουτες ἀδυνάμια τοῦ ἄδικεῖν ἢκοντες
15 autò ἑπτηθεύνουσιν, μάλιστ' ἂν αἰσθοῦμεθα, εἴ τοιούτε ποιήσαμεν τῇ διανοϊᾳ· δόντες ἐξουσίαν ἐκατέρω ποιεῖν τῷ τι ἄν βούληται, τῷ τε δικαίῳ καὶ τῷ ἰδίῳ, εἴτ' ἐπακολουθήσαμεν θέωμεν, τοί ἢ ἐπιθυμία ἐκάτερον ἄξει. εἴτ' ἀυτοφώρῳ οὖν λάβομεν ἂν τὸν δίκαιον εἰς ταύτων ἰόντα διὰ τὴν πλεονεξίαν, ὃ πάσα
20 φύσις διώκειν πέφυκεν ὡς ἁγαθόν, νόμῳ δὲ βία παράγεται ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ἱσον τιμήν. εἴ ὡς ἂν ἡ ἐξουσία ἢν λέγω τοιάδε μάλιστα, εἴ αὐτοῖς γένοιτο οίαν ποτὲ φασίν δύναμιν τῷ Γύγον ἢ τοῦ Λυδοῦ δρογόνῳ γενέσθαι. εἴναι μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ ποιμένα θητεύοντα para τῷ τότε Λυδίας ἄρχοντι, ὃμβρου δὲ πολλοῦ γενομένουν
25 καὶ σεισμοῦ ῥαγῆναι τι τῆς γῆς καὶ γενέσθαι χάσμα κατά τὸν τόπον ἢ ἐνεμὲν· ἠδόντα δὲ καὶ θαυμάσαντα καταβῆναι· καὶ ἰδεῖν ἀλλά τε ἡ μυθολογοῦσιν θαυμαστὰ καὶ ἰππὸν χαλκοῦν κοίλον,

25. τὶ ΑΞΠ: om. ΑΙ.
360 B] ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ B 71

θυρίδας ἔχοντα, καθ' ἂς ἔγκυψαντα ἰδεῖν ἐνόντα νεκρόν, ὡς φαι-
νεσθαι, μείζων ἡ κατ' ἀνθρωπον τοῦτον δὲ ἄλλῳ μὲν ἔχειν οὐδέν,

Ε περὶ δὲ τῇ χειρὶ χρυσοῦν δακτυλίων, ὃν περιελμένου ἐκβηθναι. 30
συλλόγου δὲ γενομένου τοῖς ποιμέσιν εἰσόθοτος, ἵνα ἐξαγγέλλοι
catā μέγιν τοῦ βασιλεία τα περὶ τα ποιμνα, ἀφικέσθαι καὶ ἐκεῖνον
ἑκοντα τὸν δακτυλίων. καθήμενον οὖν μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων τυχεῖν
tὴν σφενδόνῃ τοῦ δακτυλίου περιαγαγόντα πρὸς ἑαυτόν εἰς τὸ

360 ἐσώ τῆς χειρός. τοῦτον δὲ γενομένου ἀφανῆ αὐτὸν γενεῖ·σθαι τοῖς 35
παρακαθημένοις, καὶ διαλέγεσθαι ὅς περὶ οἰχομένου. καὶ τῶν
θαυμάζειν τε καὶ πάλιν ἐπιφηλαφθῶν τὸν δακτυλίον στρέφαι
ἐξω τὴν σφενδόνην, καὶ στρέφαντα φανέρων γενέσθαι. καὶ τοῦτο
ἐνυόσαντα ἀποπειράσθαι τὸν δακτυλίου, εἰ ταῦτην ἔχοι τὴν 5
δύναμιν, καὶ αὐτὸν οὗτο ξυμβαίνειν, στρέφοντι μὲν εἰσώ τὴν
σφενδόνην ἄδηλῳ γίγνεσθαι, ἔξω δὲ δήλῳ. αἰσθάμενον δὲ εὐθὺς
diαπαράσαθαι τῶν ἀγγελῶν γενέσθαι τὸν παρὰ τὸν βασιλέα.

Β ἐλθόντα δὲ καὶ τὴν γυναίκα αὐτοῦ μοιχεύσατα, μετ' ἑκέινης
ἐπιθέμενοι τῷ βασιλεί οὐκ ἀποκείναι καὶ τὴν ἅρχην κατασχεὶν. 10
εἰ οὖν δύο τοιούτῳ δακτυλίῳ γενοεθῆναι, καὶ τὸν μὲν ὁ δίκαιος
περιθεῖτο, τὸν δὲ ὁ ἄδικος, οὐδεὶς ἃν ἂν γένοιτο, ὃς δοξεῖν, οὕτως
ἀδαμάντινος, ὃς ἀν μείνειν ἐν τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ τολμήσειν
ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἀλλοτρίων καὶ μὴ ἀπτεθαί, ἔξω αὐτῷ καὶ ἐκ τῆς

βασίλεα II: τῶν περὶ τῶν βασίλεα Ε.

'have on' 'wear,' i.e. φορεῖν, is tolerably frequent in Homer, though rarer in Attic: see Stephanus-Hase Πhiles. s.v. for the change of subject in ἔχεω—ἐκβηθναι cf. ιη9 414 D n. Other views on the text and interpretation of this passage are discussed in App. II.

359 ἐ 30 χειρ. Herwerden's δακ-
tυλω is unnecessary, and even unpleasant with δακτυλων so near. Cf. χρυσόχειρες in Luc. Tim. 20. "Etiamnunc homines ita loquuntur" (Hartman).

31 ἵνα ξαγγέλλειν κτλ.: 'to report, as was done every month.' The present expresses the habit (I. and C.).

360 A Α 4 σφενδόνην: the 'collet,' or 'bezel' (Lat. funda or pala annulii)—which is as it were the ring in which the stone is set.

360 B Β 12 ὡς δοξεῖν. "Optativus
candem vim habet, quam solet in oratio-
ne obliqua habere, effectique, ut verba

οὐδεὶς ἂν γένοτο ὡτως etc. ex aliorum
ore missa videantur" (Schneider). This
explanation appears to me better than any
other, although I can discover no ex-
act parallel in Greek. Glanio is most
careful throughout the whole of this sec-
tion to disclaim responsibility for the views
he advocates: cf. ὡς ὁ λόγος 359 8. ἐπει—
ἀδικεῖν in C, ὡς φησει κτλ. in D below:
also 361 C al. Tucker would translate 'as
it might seem,' defending the optative by
Ar. Birds 180 ὡς ὑπέρ εἶτον τις and Eur.
Andr. 929 ὡς εἶτο τις. Others erroneously
hold that ὡς may be supplied from ἂν
γένοιτο, while Ast is desirous of inserting
the particle on conjecture. I do not
think that the optative can be explained
as an instance of irregular assimilation
or attraction.

13 ὃν μείνειν. For ἂν cf. Symp.
179 a and other examples in Kühner Gr.
Gr. II p. 934.
15 ἀγορᾶς ἰδεῶς ὃ τί βουλεῖτο λαμβάνειν, καὶ εἰςώντει εἰς τάς οἰκίας συγχημεῖναι ὡς βουλεῖτο, καὶ ἀποκτεῖναι καὶ ἐκ δεσμῶν λύειν οὐσίνας βουλεῖτο, καὶ τάλλα πράττει ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀνθρώπων οὐτα. οὗτο ὁ δὲ δρῶν οὐδὲν ἀν διάφορον τοῦ ἐτέρου ποιεῖ, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ ταύτων ὑπεν ἀμφότερον. καὶ τοῦτο μέγα τοῦτο τεκμήριον 20 ἀν φαίη τις, ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἐκών δίκαιος ἀλλ' ἀναγκαζόμενος, ὅς ὁικὸν ἀγαθοῦ ἰδία  ὑπάλληλος, ἐπεὶ ὅτου γ' ἂν οἴηται ἔκαστος ὁδὸς τε ἔσσεσαί ἄδικεῖν, ἄδικεῖν. λυσιτελεύν γὰρ δή οἴηται | πᾶς ἄνήρ πολὺ μᾶλλον D ἰδία τὴν ἄδικιαν τῆς δικαιοσύνης, ἀλλήθη ὁδίκες, ὅς φησεῖ ὁ περὶ τοῦ τοιούτου λόγου λέγων. ἐπεί ἐὰν τις τιτανῆς ἔξουσίας ἐπιλαβό- 25 μεν ἐσθήν ὅτι έδεικνύει μηδὲ ἄψαι τῶν ἀλλοτρίων, ἀθλιώτατος μὲν ἂν δόξειν εἶναι τοῖς αἰσθανομένοις καὶ ἀνοητο- τατος, ἐπαινοεῖν δ' ἂν αὐτῶν ἀλλήλων ἐναντίον ἐξεπατώντες ἀλλήλους διὰ τῶν τοῦ ἄδικείαθαι φόβου. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν δὴ ὑπό 

IV. Τὴν δὲ κρίσιν αὐτήν τοῦ βίου πέρι ὄν | λέγομεν, ἐὰν E

360 C 18 ἰσόθεον ὑπά. The half- 
conscious irony of ἰσόθεος foreshadows Pla-
to's attack on the popular theology. 
360 C 20 οὐδεὶς ἐκών δίκαιος here and in 
360 C sums up the Thrasymurchian theory 
in a phrase which suggests the Socratic and 
Platonic antithesis οὐδεὶς ἐκών παρηγόρησ. 
360 C 23 περὶ—λέγων, περὶ can hardly be 
for ὑπὲρ, nor dare we write ὑπὲρ for περὶ (as Badham suggests). The words mean 
simply 'qui de hoc argumento verba facit,' 
' the exponent of such a theory.' Cf. 
362 C ἑκάσθιν εἰρήσθαι περὶ τοῦ λόγου. 
Muretus seems to have desiderated πατήρ 
for περὶ: cf. expressions like Πραθ. 
275 E (λόγος) τοῦ πατήρος ἐστὶν δεῖται βοήθ. 
On the strength of this Herwerden would 
read ὁ πατήρ τοῦ τοιούτου λόγου, reject-
ning λέγων ("posteaquam ex πάντων factum 
est περὶ, corrector addidit λέγων"). 
The 'father of the theory,' would mean Thra-
symachus: see on ὁ παῖς in 368 A. It is 
just possible that πατήρ was read 
by Ficinus ("ut sermonis hius perihent 
auctores"), and if so, the variant may 
have some ancient authority now lost; 
but Herwerden's proposal is too drastic, 
and the text is probably sound. 
360 C 26 ἀδικωτάτους. Apelt conjectures 
ἐλαθώτατους, but cf. (with I Hartman) 344 A 
tοῦ δὲ—ἀδικησάι οὐκ ἄν ἐθήλωντας ἀθλιω-
tάτους.
fensible. It should be noticed that κρίνω is at first a kind of pendent accusative, afterwards "resumed as a cognate accusative with κρίναι" (J. and C.). Tucker strangely makes κρίνω = 'choice.' The word means of course (our) 'judgment' concerning etc. Cf. 361 b in 'Amφιότερον —κρίνωνται and eis τήν κρίνων εκκαθαρίσεις. 360 e 33 eis goes with τελέος: cf. δύονται 361 a.

361 a 2 οὗτω—λαυβανέω. ἐπι-χειρῶν ὅρθως means of course attempting possible, and abstaining from impossible, ὄσκημα. But as an ὄσκημα is possible only if the ἀδίκων is able to conceal it (the alternative of open violence is recognised later 361 b), it is necessary that the unjust man should escape detection. Hence λαυβανέω, although λαυβάνεω was not attributed (because not essential) to the pilot and doctor (360 e).

3 φαίνω means a 'bungler' (D. and V.). With the sentiment cf. Prot. 317 α τό οὖν ἀπο-δοράσκοντα μὴ δίνασθαι ἀπο-δράσαται, ἀλλὰ καταφανῆ εἶναι, πολλῆς μαρίας καὶ τοῦ ἐπισχεῖματος: also Laws 845 b, and the Spartan practice of punishing boys not for stealing, but for being caught (Xen. Rep. Lac. 2. 8). With ἐσχάτω τάξιν ἄδικα κτλ. the editors compare Cicero de Off. 1. 41 "totius autem insitiatiae nulla capitalior est, quam eorum, qui, cum maxime fallunt, id agant, ut viri boni esse videantur."

361 b 13 κατ' Ἀισχύλον—ἀγαθόν. Serm. 592—594 (of Amphiarraus) os γάρ δοκεῖν ἁρμόσει, ἀλλ' εἶναι θέλει, ταύτα διὰ φρονοῦ κατορθοῦνει, εἰ ἔστι τὰ κεφαλά βλαστάνει βουλεύματα. Herwerden would expunge ἀγαθόν ("mente repetatur ἁπλοῖον καὶ γενναῖον"), on the ground that if Plato had added any adjective, it would have been δίκαιον. (The Scholiast substitutes δίκαιοι for ἁρμόσει in Aeschylus.) ἀγαθόν gives excellent sense, and is nearer to the poet's words.
361 C 17 ἐὰν is explained by Stallbaum as an optative of wish (though in a subordinate clause): ‘it is not clear therefore whether he is fain to be just,’ etc. This gives a fair sense, but the idiom is obscure, and unsupported by other examples. J. and C. remark that “the optative accords with the conditional nature of the case in an imagined future,” taking ἂν ἄγνωστον ἄν ἐὰν. But an omitted ἄν ἐὰν cannot be responsible for the mood of τοιοῦτος ἐὰν, nor could ἄν ἐὰν easily be omitted (see Schanz Nov. Comm. Pl. p. 33). Still less should we accept Hartman’s ἂν ἄγνωστον ἄν ἐὰν, sc. ἐὰν. Madvig ejects ἐὰν altogether, understanding ἐὰν after τοιοῦτος. This may be right, but its intrusion is not easy to explain. I think the word is genuine, and means ‘was’: ‘it is not clear then, say they, whether he was just,’ etc. Glaucio again disclaims responsibility: cf. 360 B n. ἐὰν would in direct speech be ἐὰν and the idiom is like that in III 406 ε, where see note. For the sequence of moods and tenses cf. VI 490 A n. Failing this interpretation, the word must (I think) be spurious. Herwerden’s proposal—τοιοῦτος ἐὰνα, ἂν ἄγνωστον ἄν (retaining ἐὰν)—does not surmount the difficulty and is also wrong in point of sense.

20 ἀπ’ αὐτῆς. See cr. n. The sense required is not ‘what is produced by’ (ὑπὸ) ‘it,’ but ‘what results from it’: cf. γιγνομένοις ἄπο (in a similar connexion) 357 C and 358 B. The scribe no doubt assimilated the preposition to the preceding ὑπὸ.

21 ἔστω. See cr. n. I formerly read ἵνα with A1 and the majority of editors, but I now agree with Schneider that ἔστω is right. ἵνα cannot be used by itself as a synonym for ‘live,’ or as a copula: we should require ἵνα διὰ βίου, instead of ἵνα μέχρι βαθέως (to transpose the two phrases would of course be too violent a change). The sole authority for ἵνα is the first hand in A: and this is certainly insufficient to outweigh the inherent superiority of ἔστω. Most MSS have ἢνα, a late form for ἔστω.

361 D 26 ἐκκαθαίρεις: not ‘polish up’ (J. and C.) but rather ‘scour clean’ (D. and V.), ‘purge’ from all extraneous matter: see 361 C γυμνωτέος δέ πάντων πλήρ ἐκκαθασίνης.

32 δεδήσται: 'will be kept in chains.' δεδήσται (so v and some other MSS) is required by Herwerden, and may be right. But in Xen. Cyr. IV 3. 18 δεδήσται is similarly combined with several first futures.

έκκαυνθήσται κτλ. Schneider refers to Hdt. VII 18 θερμώς σιδηρίσει έκκαυνθήσεται—τούς ψυχάλμους, and Gorg. 473 οίδον—στρεβλώσεται και έκκαυνθήσεται τούς ψυχάλμους έκκαυνθήσεται. That έκκαυνθήσεται (and not έκκαυνθήσεται, the reading of some inferior MSS, and of the ancient authorities who cite this passage) is right here, is probable also from 613 έν τοις άγρωκοις έφηθαν ού είναι άληθείς άλγοι, είναι στρεβλώσεται και έκκαυνθήσεται, whether the last clause is genuine or not. It is not clear that Cicero (de Rer. 111 27) did not find έκκαυνθήσεται in his text; for though he has eësli tantur occis, he adds afterwards vincit arm, in aut. Herwerden recasts the words of Plato to suit Cicero's translation, but Cicero is a much less trustworthy witness than Paris A.

362 α 3 άρα: see on 358 C. το δυντι in the same line belongs not to φήσουσι, but to τον άδικον—εθέλειν.

6 Βαθείαν κτλ.: "reaping in his thoughts the fruit of the deep furrow, from which good counsel grows" (Ver- rall. Plato takes τα κενά βουλεύματα more concretely, and places in apposition thereto άρχεοι and the other infinitives down to φελείςθαι, doκοῦντι being the dative of interest after βουλεύματα. For the change from the dative doκοῦντι to the accusative κενάδιντα cf. Euthyph. 5 A and infra IV 422 B, C.

362 B II κοινωνείν. Cobet deletes this word, as well as και κοινωνήματα in Laws 738 A πρὸς ἀπάντα τὰ ξυμβολαία και κοινωνῆματα. In view of the same passage Platt (Cl. Rev. III p. 72) would read καί κοινωνείν. No change is necessary, for κοινωνείν is a term of wider connotation than ξυμβολαίεσ (see 1333 A B.), and the asyndeton has a rhetorical effect: cf. III 407 B, V 465 C, VI 488 C, IX 590 A B.

12 πλεονεκτεῖν recalls L 343 δε E, 349 B ff., as τούς τε φίλους εὐ ποιεῖν κτλ. recalls the theory attributed to Simonides in 1 334 B. Here however it is not Justice, but Injustice masquerading as Justice, which is said to benefit friends and injure enemies.
362 c 17 μᾶλλον προσήκειν. The comparative is attached to the verb as well as to the adjective, so as to combine the force of two expressions, viz. (1) ὅστε καὶ θεοφιλεστέρον αὐτὸν ἐναι μᾶλλον προσήκειν and (2) ὅστε καὶ θεοφιλεστέρον αὐτὸν ἐναι προσήκειν. In cases like λαβραίστερον μᾶλλον Λατις 781 Α, μᾶλλον is quite redundant; in Ἱερ. Μαι. 285 Α ἐστι δὲ γε—ὡφελιμώτερον—παιδεύεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ κτλ, it is resumptive. See on the whole subject Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 25.

19 παρεσκευάσθαι—ἀμειν. For ἀμειν. Richards would read ἀμειλοῦν, or ἀμεινον: cf. 358 c πολύ γὰρ ἀμειλον ἄρα δ τοῦ ἀδίκου ἢ δ τοῦ δικαίου βίος. The change is tempting at first sight; but Plato generally uses ἀμειλοῦν and not ἀμεινον, and the adverb expresses what is virtually the same meaning, since a βίος ἀμειλοῦν παρεσκευασμένος (cf. πόλις ἐν παρεσκευασμένοις Λατις 751 Β) is (according to the views here described) a βίος ἀμεινον. Hermann’s χέλον for χέφον in Phaed. 85 Β, though adopted by Schanz, is also unnecessary, for ἐχέω may be intransitive.

362 c—363 e At this point Glauco gives way to Adimantus. Glauco had maintained the superiority of injustice over Justice by directly praising injustice: Adimantus will uphold the same thesis by describing the arguments usually advanced in favour of Justice. In the first place, when parents and friends exhort the young to follow Justice, they do not praise Justice herself, but the rewards which Justice earns from men and gods. Homer and Hesiod describe the benefits derived from Justice in this present life, while Musaeus and his son guarantee to her votaries sensual bliss hereafter, and others promise to the pious a long line of descendants, but relegate the wicked to punishment after death and unpopularity during life.

362 d 23 ἐφ. See cr. n. ἐφ is present in the majority of MSS, and cannot be dispensed with, where the interlocutor is specified, as here. See Introd. § 5.

25 ἀδελφὸς ἄνδρι παρεῖ—frater adsit fratris. Ast proposed to insert ἄνθρωπον before ἄνδρι, making the sentence interrogative. The rhythm would thus approximate to the usual paroemia rhythm of proverbs; but the brevity and force of the proverb would suffer. If change were needed it would be better to adopt Shilleto’s elegant suggestion ἀδελφὸς ἄνδρι παρεῖ (note on Dem. F. L. § 261), but even if this was the original expression, it would be quite in Plato’s manner to substitute the modern for the archaic word, in defiance of rhythm. The source of the proverb (which with compare συγγενῶς ἀδελφῶν βοηθῶν F. L. § 264) is found by the Scholiast in Od. XVI 97 f. ἦ τι κασιγήτου ἐπίμωμεα, οἷα περ ἄνήρ | μαραθήσονα πέτουσε, καὶ οἱ μέγα νεῖκος ὅρθρεια. Cf. also II. XXI 308 f. and Xen. Mem. II 3 19.
362. E 29 ἐναντίους. Adimantus' λόγοι are ἐναντίον, because they praise Justice, and censure Injustice: whereas Glauco had done the reverse: κατατεθα ἐρώ τὸν ἄδικον βίον ἑπανίων (358 D).

363 A I αὐτό δικαιούντην. Not αὐτώδει δικαιούν (with the second hand in A), which would be the (chiefly post-Platonic) expression for the Idea of Justice (cf. αὐτώδως τριστός and the like). αὐτό is ἰσράμ, 'by itself', as in αὐτοῖ γὰρ ἔσμεν: cf. Theod. 146 ἔγρων ἐπιστημήν αὐτό ὅ τι ποτ' ἐστι', and infra β. 472 c, x 612 b (cited by J. and C.). αὐτό may be thus used even when the feminine of the article is present, e.g. Prot. 361 A αὐτή ἡ ἀρετή: cf. also Cral. 411 D.

2 γίγνεται. The nominatives are treated as equivalent to a neuter plural, thence the singular verb. Cf. Symm. 188 b, Λάτος 925 e, Andocides 1 145. γίγνεσθαι is the verb in each of these examples. See also infra γ. 492 e.

4 τῷ δικαίῳ. Schneider is right in refusing to change the δικαίῳ of A, and most MSS to ἄδικῳ, which has the authority of a few inferior MSS. The reference in δικαίῳ ἄριστος in no doubt to 362 b, where the benefits accrue to the man who seems to be just, although in reality he is unjust. But ὅ τι etc. should be taken, not with δικαίον, but as part of the parents' exhortation. This yields a better rhythm, and much better sense. The parents exhort their children to be just, in order that (εἰσάγεσθαι is necessary) they may obtain the rewards ὅτα ὅτα τῶν ἐνδοκιμέων ὅτα τῷ δικαίῳ. They very properly assume that the surest way to be just (and so to obtain the rewards of justice) is to be just: cf. Xen. Mem. 11 6. 39 συντονώτατε ταῦτα καὶ ἀσφαλειστάτε καὶ καλλιστή ὁδὸν—ὅ τι ἣν βοήθησαν ἐνδοκιμέων ἄγαθον, τοῦτο καὶ γενέσαι ἄγαθον πειράζει καὶ ὁ. 1. 7. 1 with Herac. Pr. 137 ed. Bywater συντονώτατ- τὴν ὁδὸν—εἰς ἐνδοκιμαῖον τῷ γενέσαι ἄγαθον. Glauco's picture of the just man as one who seems to be unjust is untrue to the facts of experience, as Socrates points out in x 612 b: nor did even Glauco go so far as to say that the unjust man, γενέσαι ἄγαθον, ἤδη δικαιούτω ἄγαθον (who may, of course, be unjust).

The divorce between appearance and reality is purely argumentative, and out of place in parental exhortations. Further, in order to make ἄτο τῶν εὔδοκιμων ὅτα etc. represent what Glauco said, we should have to read τῷ ἄδικῳ μὲν δοκοῦντι δὲ δικαίῳ: otherwise the words δοξαζόμε- νων ὅτα ἄδικων in the corresponding phrase (363 b) might just as well be omitted. If ὅτα is construed with δικαίῳ, the words τῷ δικαίῳ must (with Ast) be expunged: but that the clause represents what the parents say is further proved by the exact correspondence of ἄτο τῶν εὔδοκιμων ὅτα τῷ δικαίῳ with τὰς ἄτις αὐτής (sc. δικαιούντης) εὐδοκιμήσεις, which is what the parents praise. I have dwelt on this point at some length because recent English editors (except Tucker) have wrongly deserted Paris A.

6 τοῖς ὅσιοις depends on ἄγαθον ('good things for the pious'): cf. ἄγαθον δηλοῦσθαι τῷ τῶν ἄδικου τοίς ὅσιοις ἃ as the other editors do. Such a postponement of the relative is rare, and

2. ἂν' A 2Π: ὅ' A.
here, I think, unduly harsh, in spite of the analogy of III 390 B and IV 425 C. Cobet felt the difficulty when in an unhappy moment he suggested ἁγάδα, ἀ τοῖς ὀόντως κτλ.

7 Ἡσιόδος τε κτλ. Hesiod and Homer are appealed to as recognised theological authorities: see Hdt. II 53.

363 B 9 ἄκρας — καταβεβριθαι. OD. 232 f. τοισ (i.e. ἐνδικηκὸν ἄρδας) φέρει μὲν γαία πολὺν ἰσο, ὀφείσι δὲ ἄρι

καὶ ἄλλα δὴ πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ τούτων ἐχόμεια: παραπλησία δὴ καὶ καὶ ἐτερος ὦστε τευ γάρ φησιν.

προῦο καὶ κριθάς, βρίθησι δὲ δένδρα καρπό, τίκτη δ' ἐμπέδα μῆλα, θάλασσα δὲ παρέχει .restaurant

15 Μουσαίος δὲ τούτων νεανικῶτερα τάγαθα καὶ ὁ ύψος αὐτοῦ παρά θεῶν διδόσιν τοῖς δικαίοις: εἰς Ἀιδῶν γὰρ ἄγαγόντες τῷ λόγῳ καὶ κατακλύναιτε καὶ συμπόσιον τῶν ὀσίων κατασκευάσαντες ἐστε—φανομένοι ποιοῦσιν τὸν ἄπαντα χρόνον ἡδὶ διάγει μεθύοντας. 

D ἡγησάμενοι κάλλιστον ἀρτῆς μισθὸν μέθην αἰώνον; οἱ δ' ἐτὶ

Plato directs his attack against certain forms of the Orphic conception of a future life: see Lobeck Aglaophamus p. 807 with Rohde Psych. II pp. 127, 129 ff., and Dieterich Nekyia pp. 72 ff. 77 ff. Lobeck refers to Plut. Comp. Cim. et Lucill. Πλάτων ἐπισκόπει τοὺς περι τῶν Ὀρφεα τοὺς εὐ βεβιωκότας φάσκοντας ἀποκείμεναι γέρας ἐν ἄνδρον μὴν αἰώνον: ἔνδυς ὑπὸ ταῦτα ὀνομαζον ἐνδυματό ὑπὸ ταῦτα ἐνδυτικ. Λ. N. 1105 B, where the allusion to Plato is less clear: also D. L. vi. 4.

19 συμπόσιον τῶν ὀσίων. ὅσιοι was the regular appellation of the ἁμάτωσ (ὅσιοι μίστα τοις ὁμοίων ὁμοίων ὁμοίων. Orph. S. 2 ed. Abel). For the συμπόσιον cf. [Ἀριστ.] 371 D συμπόσια τε εὐμελή καὶ εὐδαιμονίαν ἀναστήσαντα καὶ ἀκράτατον ἀλωπία καὶ ἡθῶν διαίτης. The stock example in antiquity of earthly virtue rewarded by the delights of a sensuous paradise is Heracles: see e.g. Find. Nem. I 71, Theocr. xvii 28 f. and Horace Od. iii 39 f., iv 8. 91 f. A somewhat higher note is struck in Pind. Ol. ii 61 ff., and Fr. 129 f. Several of these passages shew traces of Orphic influence, but the special instance of Heracles is traceable to Homer (Od. xi 620 f.).

363 D 21 μέθην αἰώνον may be illustrated from the fragment of Pherecrates ap. Athen. vi 268 E.
22. ἀποτίνουν. See cf. n. The reading of A is defended by Stallbaum as an abbreviation for μακροτέρους λόγους ἀποτίνουν ἐπὶ μισθῶν παρὰ θεῶν; but no other example of this harsh condensation has been adduced, and the sense is far from satisfactory. A better meaning is conveyed by Schneider's translation, "Andere aber lassen die Belohnungen der Götter noch weiter reichen als diese": for it is clear from the next clause that μακροτέρους ('more extensive,' not, of course, 'greater,' which would be μείζους) refers to the extension of the rewards of virtue beyond the personality of the individual concerned. But μακροτέρους ἀποτίνουν μισθοὺς is (to say the least) an obscure and difficult expression; and ἀποτίνουν (i.e. λέγοντας ἀποτίνεσθαι) receives strong support from the parallel use of διδάσκας in c above, and κατορρύθυναν, ἀναγκάζουσιν, and ἄγοντες below. The collocation of μακροτέρους with ἀποτίνουν may easily have led to the corruption ἀποτίνουν, owing to the frequency of such expressions as μακροῦς λόγους ἀποτίνουν. For the error see Introd. § 5.

23. παῖδας—κατόπτυσθεν. The Scholiast remarks Ἕρωδοτος (vi 86) ἀπὸ τοῦ διδάσκαλον χρυσοῦν Γαλάκτῳ τῷ Λάκκων ὄν Ἀνδρός δ' εὐφόρῳ γένετο μετάποιεθεν ἀμελῶν. The story of Glaucus admirably illustrates the view herein expressed; but Plato is more probably thinking of Hesiod Od. 285 (a line which is identical with that quoted from the oracle), and perhaps of some such lines as those of Tyrtaeus 12. 29 f. καὶ τύμβος καὶ παῖδες ἐν ἀνθρώπων ἀρίστῃ καὶ παῖδων παῖδες καὶ γένος ἐξεπάγων.


363 e 27 δοξαζομένων δέ. For δέ without μέν see i 340 d n.

29. ἀλλὰ δὲ ὑπὲρ ἔχουσιν: sc. λέγειν τιμωρημάτα. Adimantus means that they dissuade men from injustice merely on account of its results, ignoring tīna ἐχει δόμαμα αὐτῷ καθ' αὐτῷ ἑν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ (358 b). J. and C. aptly cite Theaet. 176 d, ἐὰν ἔχωσιν γὰρ ἡμῖν ἀκολούθησιν ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ ἂν ἐλεητῆς τάξιν ἀπόλοις ἄδικαις ἐκφυγέων, viz. "that by their wicked acts they become like the pattern of evil."
VII. Prose τούτων σκέψαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλο αὖ εἴδος λόγων περὶ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ ἀδικίας ἱδία τε λεγόμενον καὶ ὑπὸ ποιητῶν. | πάντες γὰρ ἐξ ἐνὸς στόρατος ὑμνοῦσιν, ὡς καλὸν μὲν ἐκεῖνον ἑσφροσύνη τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη, χαλεπῶν μέντοι καὶ ἐπίτουμον ἀκολασία δὲ καὶ ἀδικία ἢδον μὲν καὶ εὔπετες κτήσασθαι, δόξῃ δὲ μόνον καὶ νόμῳ αἰσχρὸν. Λυσιτελέστερα δὲ τῶν δικαίων τὰ ἄδικα 5 ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος λέγοντι, καὶ ποιητοὺς πλουσίους καὶ ἄλλας δυνάμεις ἐχοντας εὐδαιμονίζει καὶ τιμᾶν εὐχερῶς ἐθέλουσιν δημοσία τε καὶ ἱδία, τοὺς δὲ ατιμάζειν καὶ ύπερορᾶν, οὐ ἂν τῇ ἅσβενεις τε καὶ πένητες δόσιν, ὁμολογοῦντες αὐτοῖς ἁμένους εἶναι Β τῶν ἐτέρων. τούτων δὲ πάντων οἱ περὶ θεῶν τοις ἐλέγοντι καὶ ἀρέτης 10 θαυμασιώτατοι λέγονται, ὡς ἄρα καὶ θεοὶ πολλοὶ κἀκεῖ οὐκ ἄγαθοί δυνατὰς τε καὶ βίων κακῶν ἑνεμαν, τοῖς δὲ ἐναντίοις ἐναντίαις μοῦραν. ἀγορίζει δὲ καὶ μάντεις ἐπὶ πλουσίων θύρας ἱόντες πεί-

2. τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη II: om. A.

the use of which men are persuaded that their sins may be pardoned both in life and after death.


32 ἡδία has been understood of writing in prose, but the reference is only to the representations of private persons, e.g. parents, etc. (to poets, who were in a sense the professional teachers of Hellenas: cf. x 606 c, Lvsus 890 λ ἰδιώτων τε καὶ ποιητῶν, and 363 e below.

364 A 1 καλὸν μὲν—ἐπίτουμον. See cr. n. For the omission of τε καὶ δικαιο-

371 σύνη see Introd. § 5. The sentiment may be illustrated by Hesiod OD. 289—292 and Simon. ap. Pl. Prot. 339 b ff. ἀνδρὶ ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀληθείας γεννάται χαλεπὸν κτλ.; cf. also Simonides' imitation of Hesiod (Fr. 58 ed. Bergk).

5 ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλῆθος: i.q. ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πόλυ. So also Paeon. 275 b. The sentiment recurs in Isocr. de pace § 31.

ποιητοὺς is the substantive, and ἀλλὰς δυνάμεις ἔχοντας balances πλουσίους. πλουσίους, parallel to ἀλλὰς δυνάμεις, and also dependent on ἔχοντας, might appear nearer. But there is no reason for deserting the ms., although Plato is fond of the plural of πλοῦτος (cf. e.g. vi 495 A, x 618 b, 619 A). The sentiment is best illustrated from Polus' description of the happiness of Archelaus in Gorg. 471 A ff.

364 B 10 ὡς ἄρα—μοιραν. ἄρα hints dissent: cf. 358 c n. The gnomic poets often express themselves in this vein: e.g. Solon 15. 1 πολλοὶ γὰρ ποινεῖται κακοὶ, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ πένονται, Theogn. 373—

380. A kindred sentiment occurs in Sophocles Phil. 447—452. For the part however it is held that Justice asserts herself in the end: see for example Solon 4. 15 f., 13. 7—32. Euripides expresses the general teaching of Greek tragedy on this subject when he writes (Ion 1621 f.) ἐσ τέλος γὰρ οἱ μὲν ἐσθιοὶ τυχάμουσιν ἀξίων, ἐὰν κακοὶ δ', ὥσπερ πεθάνατε, ὡσπο' εἴ τρεξαν ἄν. There is no occasion to write (with Richards) πολλάκις τοῖς for πολλοῖς.

12 ἐπὶ πλουσίων θύρας ἱόντες. This semi-proverbial expression (cf. vi 489 b, c) stigmatises the avarice of seers and mendicant priests (ἀγάθοι from ἀγέοι, cf. infra 381 D). Plato's contempt for maenities in general is expressed in the Euthyphro and sporadically in various dialogues (see e.g. Tim. 71 b, with Archer-Hind's note); but his attack is here particularly directed (cf. infra 364 e) against such 'Orphics-

366 λοσταί or Orphic friars as Theophrastus speaks of in his description of the desir-
δαίμων (Charact. 16) καὶ τελεσθήσαμεν πρὸς τοὺς Ὀρφεοκελατάς κατὰ μήνα προευθεία αὐτοῦ ἡ γυναῖκος, ἐὰν δὲ μὴ σχολαῖς ἡ γυνὴ, μετὰ τῆς τίτης καὶ τῶν παιδιῶν. The kind of ceremonies which they practised may be seen fromDem. de Cor. §§ 258 ff. Plato agreed with the more enlightened section of this countrymen in condemning such degrading cults and superstitions on the ground of their immoral tendency; see especially Foucart des Assoc. religieuses chez les Grecs pp. 153 —157, where the opinions of ancient writers on this subject are collected. On ἀγάπας in general reference may be made to J. H. Wright in Harvard Studies in Cl. Philol. vi p. 66 n.

364 c 15 ἠν τε—βλάψειν is in oratio obliqua: ‘et si quis inimicum laedere velit, nocituros se parvo sumptu iusto pariter et injusto’ (Schnecker Addit. p. 11). This explanation (which Tucker also proposes without knowing that Schneider had forestalled him) is by far the best and simplest. For other views see App. III. 17 ἐπαγωγαῖς—καταδεσμοῖς, ἐπαγωγαὶ are ἀγαγαὶ δαίμων φαίδων εἰτ των γονόνεσιν (Timaeus Let. s.v.). The datives are usually construed with πείθουσι, and καταδεσμοῖς understood as the binding formula, “by which the seer compels the invisible powers to work his will” (Rohde Psyché ii p. 88 n.). But in the καταδεσμοῖς which have been discovered it is the victim and not the god who is bound down; see e.g. CIG 538 (an Athenian inscription of about 380 B.C.—κατάδεστος Κτησίας—καὶ Κλεοφράῦν κατάδε—καὶ τῶν μετὰ Κτησίου ἀπάντας κατάδε). This and other instances from leaden tablets found in graves are given by Wachsmuth Rhein. Mscr. xviii (1863) pp. 560 ff.; cf. also Marquardt Rom. Staatsverwaltung 111 p. 109 n. 6. On this account I think it better to connect ἐπαγωγαῖς τισίν καὶ καταδεσμοῖς with βλάψειν, exactly as in Laws 933 D ἐὰν δὲ καταδέστεσσιν ἢ ἐπαγωγαῖς ἢ τισίν ἐφόδοι εἶπον ἢ τῶν τοιοῦτων φαινομένων ὑπωνόμουν δόξα δυομοι ἐὰν βλάπτοντι—τεθύναι. Plato is still alluding to the debasing forms of oriental superstition which had gained a footing in Greece in his day: see Fouchart l.c. p. 172.

19 ήις—σφαίρων ὑπηρετῶν; Whereas true religion consists in man’s ὑπηρεσία τοῖς θεοῖς Ἐνθυλ. 13 D ff. οἱ μὲν κτλ.: ‘some claiming about the easiness of vice, how that’ etc. οἱ δὲ—δόοντες recalls 364 A, while οἱ δὲ refers to the ἀγάπας καὶ μάρτυρις of 364 B. The reference in the first case is as precise as possible: πάντες γὰρ ἐξ ἐνός στόματος ὡμοίων ἄκοντον, ἡ σωφροσύνη τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη, χαλεπὸν μέντοι καὶ ἐπίπονον—ἀκολούθως δὲ καὶ ἀδικία ἴδε μὲν καὶ ἐπιτετέλεσε κτησάσθαι, δόξη δὲ μόνον καὶ νόμῳ αἰχμηρῷ (364 A). Those who ὁμοίων ἄκοντον—ἀκολούθως—καὶ ἀδικία—ἐπιτετέλεσε κτησάσθαι can be accurately described as κακίων περὶ ἐπιτετελεῖς ἄδεοτα, but scarcely by οἱ κακίας περὶ ἐπιτετελεῖς διάδοται, because ‘to offer faculties for vice’ is not the same thing as to say that vice is easy. Stallbaum attempts to evade this difficulty by taking διάδοται as equivalent to δὶδάσκατε λέγοντες, but neither is ‘saying that facilities are offered for vice’ quite the same as ‘saying that vice is easy.’ It is also difficult to find another instance of the plural of ἑπιτετελεῖς. The verbal echoes seem to me very strongly in favour of περὶ δόοντες. For δόοντες = ‘harping on’ (like the ὑμοίων to which it refers) cf. Lys. 205 C ἃ δὲ ἡ πόλει διῆς ἓκει and 205 D ἀπὸ αἱ γραμμᾶς ἑδονῆς (with reference to the proverbial γραμμῶν ὀθόλος): the use of ἑδονῆ in A. P.
20 ὃς τὴν μὲν κακότητα καὶ ἱλαδὸν ἔστιν ἐλέσθαι
ῥηϊδώς· λείψ μὲν ὄδος, μάλα δʼ ἐγνύθη ναίει·
tῆς δ’ ἀρετῆς ἵδρωτα θεοὶ προπάροιθεν ἔθηκαν
καὶ τινὰ ὄδον μακράν τε καὶ ἀνάντη ὦ ἐν τὸς τῶν θεών ὑπ’
ἀνθρώπων παραγωγῆς τὸν Ὀμηρον μαρτύρονται, ὦτι καὶ ἐκεῖνος
25 εἴπεν

λιστοὶ δὲ τε καὶ θεοὶ αὐτοί,
καὶ τοὺς μὲν θυσίαις καὶ εὐχωλαίς ἀγαναίσιν
λοιμῆ τε κυίσῃ τε παρατρωπῶσος ἀνθρώποι
λισομένοι, ὥτε κέν τις ὑπερβηθ’ ἐκ καὶ ἀμάρτη.

30 βίβλων δὲ ὄμαδον παρέχονται Μουσιαίοι καὶ Ὀρφέως, Σελήνης
tε καὶ Μουσῶν ἐγγόνων, ὡς φασι, καθ’ ὧς θυηπολούσιν, πείδοντες

23. ἀνάντη ΑΠ. καὶ τραπείῳ ἀπαίτεν ἐπιπον τοῦ
μεν τοῦ τατ’ ἀπαίτεν ἐπιπον τοῦ.

Laws 824 c is different, but akin. For the corruption of δῶντες to διδόντες see Introd. § 5. The conjectures of Liebhold (Fr. Jahrb. 1888 p. 107) and Zeller (Arch. f. Gesch. d. Phil. 11 p. 694) can be added.

364 c, d 20 ὃς τὴν—ἐθηκαν. Hesiod
OD. 287—289. ὃς is due to Plato:
Hesiod has τὴν μὲν τοῦ κτλ. For λείψ
the MSS of Hesiod read ὀλίγαν: λείψ (also in
Laws 718 E, Xen. Mem. 11. 20 and elsewhere) proves the existence of a
different recension. Cf. G. E. Howes Harvard
Studies in Cl. Philol. vi p. 165.
The verses are partially quoted or referred
to and their influence in again also seen in
Phaedr. 272 C.

364 d 23 καὶ τίνα ὄδον κτλ.: Hesiod
OD. 290 μακρὸς δὲ καὶ ὀρθοὶ αἴμοι ἐς
ἀνύῃ καὶ τραχύς κτλ. The last two
words account for the marginal addition
called τραχεῖα in A.

364 d, e 26 λιστοὶ—ἀμάρτη. See cr. n.
The words are spoken by Phoenix to Achilles
in Il. 19. 497—501. Plato edits the lines
to suit his own purposes. For λιστοὶ our
text of Homer has στρεπτοὶ. The word
λιστοὶ (though implied in ἄλλαστοι, τραχεῖας) does not occur elsewhere, a
fact which is strongly in favour of its genuine-
ness here. We must suppose that the
recension which Plato used had λιστοὶ.
The theology contained in these lines
meets us continually in ancient literature:
cf. also the words of the king in Hamlet
111. 3 “And what’s in prayer but this
twofold force To be forestalled ere we
come to fall Or pardoned being down?”
Plato expresses his dissent in Laws
716 E ff., 905 D: in Alc. 11. 149 E we read
οὗ γὰρ ὄνει τοιοῦτον ἐστὶ τὸ τῶν θεῶν
ὡστε ὑπὸ δῶρον παράγεσθαι οὐκαὶ Κατὰ.

364 e 30 βιβλων—ἐγγόνων. The allusion is to Orphic
liturgies. Musaeus was the son of Selene, according to Philo-
chorus quoted by the Scholiast on Ar.
Trag. 1033; cf. fαυσφόρου ἐκγονοὶ Μῆρης
Μουσαίας in Abel Orphic. Fr. 4. Or-
pheus’ mother was the Muse Calliope
(Suidas s.v. Ὀρφέου). There is no solid
basis for the old view that ἐκγόνοι means
’son,’ and ἐγγόνοι ‘grandson.’ The ety-
mological form is ἐκγόνως, but ἐκ-
was often assimilated to ἐγ- before γ during
the 4th century B.C., particularly in this
word: cf. also ἐγγεγέντων etc. on Inscrip-
tions. See Meisterhans p. 107. Else-
where in the Republic ἐκγόνως is the
regular spelling.

31 καθ’ ὧς θυηπολούσιν: sacrificial
liturgies. A θυηπολούσιον is mentioned by
Suidas (s.v. Ὀρφέου) as one of the ‘works’
of Orpheus: see also Lobeck Aglaoph. p. 371 and Rohde Psyche 11 pp. 112, 113 nn.
32. **polèis**: as for instance when Epimenides the Cretan purified Athens (see Grote III 85—89). Plato may be thinking of this event, which in defiance of chronology he placed ten years before the Persian wars (Laws 642 D, E). Cf. also infra 366 A and Laws 990 B.

λόγοι — καθαρμόι. λόγοι means "modes of absorption" (Lobbeck Agraorh. p. 810): cf. 366 A αλ λόγοι θεί and Arist. Pol. B 4 1362 ι 32 τάς νομοφυλέας λόγοις. The Scholion on Arist. Frgs 1033 contains the remark: αυτός (i.e. Musaeus) δὲ παραλογίσεις καὶ τελετὰς καὶ καθαρμούς συντέθεικεν. For παραλογίσεις Blaydes proposes λόγιοι, while Rutherford reads περί λογίσεις (apparently with the Ravenna Codex), inserting also on his own conjecture ποιήματα after συντέθεικέν. I have no doubt that the Scholiast wrote παρὰ λόγοις: besides Absolutions, he has composed also τελετίαν καὶ καθαρμὸν. καθαρμός formed a distinct class of religious literature, and were written by Epimenides, Empedocles, and others: see Grote I p. 27 n. 3.

33. **παίδας ἥδων**: 'pleasures of play.' παίδας depends on ἥδων, and is here used abstractly: cf. Thuc. III 38. 7 αἱ ἥδεις μετά γένος (with Schneider) Paus. 1 21. 7 θεᾶς ἥδου. Mavdig would eject ἥδουν, but without ἥδων Plato would probably have written γενέσθαι (cf. Laws 829 B): other suggestions, such as καὶ παίδας καὶ ἡδονα, or καὶ παίδας διὰ ἡδονῆς, or καὶ παιδίων καὶ ἡδονῶν are open to graver objection. For παιδίων and the like in connexion with religious celebrations Stallbaum cites Hdt. IX 11 οἱ Βακχικαὶ ταῦτα ἄρετα καὶ πολεμίσατε and VIII 99 ἐν θυσίας τε καὶ κυκλαδησθεὶς: add Phaedr. 270 B, Laws 666 B. Plato's point is that atonement if it is made a pleasure and not a penance sets a premium on sin.

366 A 2 τελευτάταιν — τελετάς. The Orpheotelestae connected τελετας with τελευτάται, sometimes on the ground assigned by Plato here, sometimes because they alleged that the sensations of dying resembled those of initiation into the great mysteries (Plut. Frag. de An. 725). This and other ancient derivations are given by Lobbeck Agraorh. pp. 124, 126, 172. For περιγένεα Cobet needlessly conjectures περιμένει.

365 A—367 B Finally, what is the effect on the souls of the young? Young men of ability are encouraged to practise Injustice, while outwardly pretending to be just. To escape detection by their fellow-men, they form political clubs, and employ persuasion and force. The gods they can afford to ignore; for either there are no gods, or they regard not man, or—according to those who are the sole authorities for their existence—they can be propitiated out of the proceeds of Injustice. There are special rites and gods who can deliver us from punishment after death: so the gods' own children say. So strong are the arguments in favour of Injustice that even those who can refute them make allowances, recognising that no one is voluntarily just except from innate goodness of disposition or scientific knowledge.

It rests with you, Socrates (says Adi- mantus), now for the first time to praise Justice and censure Injustice in and by themselves, apart from their attributes. Nay more; you must assign to each the reputation which is enjoyed by the other. Do not merely shew us that Justice is better than Injustice; tell us what effect they severally produce on their possessors, in consequence of which the one is good, and the other evil.

365 A 6 τιμής i. q. τοίς τιμάω. Cf. (with J. and C.) 359 c above.

τί—ποιεῖν. The subject to ποιεῖν is ταῦτα πάντα—λεγόμενα: ψυχάς is its secondary object. Cf. infra 367 B τί ποιούσα ἐκαστήρα τον ἑκοτα κτλ. and 367 E. This view, which Schneider also holds, is better than to make ψυχάς subject to ποιεῖν and ταῦτα πάντα κτλ. dependent on ἀκούοντα.
7 epitptomen. The image, as Jouvet remarks, suggests a bee gathering honey: cf. Ion 534 οὐ τάλας ἐπάνω—οὐ μιᾷ ἀπόθεσιν (vz. the poet) οὐ τέλεσθαι. Simon. Fr. 47 διαλέγεσθαι δυσέσθεν τοις μεταλλήξεσθαι εἰς τότε μηδὲν ἓκαστο καὶ ἡμῖν οὐδενεις ἦσαν ὑποπτοῦς. Ism. 531 οὐ μειόν. The fragment (which appears tolerably often in ancient citations) is restored as follows by Bergk (Fr. 213) πάντες δέ τε εἰς τὸν ἀνάβασιν τοῦ ἵματος. It is, I think, unlikely that theoepias bios and κύριον εὐδαιμονίας follow "si non a Findaro, certe ex poetis petita sunt" (Bergk).

12 ἐὰν καὶ μὴ δοκῶ has been commonly altered to ἐὰν μὴ καὶ δοκῶ on the suggestion of Drobay and Boeckh (with a few inferior MSS): but the text is sound. We are dealing with ταῦτα πάντα...λεγόμενα κτλ.; and it has not been said that it is useless to be just, unless one is also believed to be just (ἐὰν μὴ καὶ δοκῶ). This would imply that it is useful to be just, if one is also considered just; but what has been urged is that justice is in itself never advantageous, although its εὐδαιμονίαι (363 A) are: see 358 A, c, 360 C (οὐδεὶς ἐκώ δικαίος, ἀλλὰ ἀναγκαζόμενος, ὡς οὐκ ἀναγκαζόμενος δικαίος). 362 A (οὐκ εἶναι δικαίος, ἀλλὰ δικαιοῖς δικαίος) εἶναι. The words ἐὰν καὶ μὴ δοκῶ mean "if I also seem unjust," for οὐ δοκῶ δικαίως εἶναι, not δοκῶ οὐ δικαίως εἶναι, is the Greek idiom. This meaning suits exactly. What has to be established is that δοκέω prevails over

ἐναι in human life (ὀδόκους—βιώται). The proof is as follows. To be just and seem unjust is misery (see 361 Ε): to be unjust, and seem just is bliss (see 362 A, c): therefore δοκέω is everything, and ἐπὶ τοῦ τρεπτέον ἄλογον μήδεν σχήμα κύκλῳ περὶ εἰμαντὸν σκιαγραφίαν ἀρέτης περιγραπτεόν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ σοφωτάτου Ἀρχιλόχου ἀλόπεκα ἐλκέον

13 φασίν. Is τὰ λεγόμενα the subject or is the sentence an anacoluthon? ("nant quo modo res ipsa comparata sit, nescio: quae quidem vulgo dictuntur, tali sunt, ut justo mihi commodi quicquam fore negetur" Schneider). The latter view is the more likely. Similar anacolutha are cited by Engelhardt Anac. Pl. 4. ι. 11 p. 40.

365 Σ. 15 οἱ σοφοί. Simonides (σοφοὶ γὰρ καὶ θείοι ἄνήρ I 331 Ε) Fr. 76 Bergk. Plato himself sets no small store by a good name (coupled with virtue) in Latois 950 Α.

17 πρόθυρα—σχῆμα: as my porch and trappings. The mixture of metaphors is thoroughly Platonic; cf. vii 527 D n. With σχῆμα (any kind of external or adventitious means of impressing others or hiding one's own deficiencies) cf. Gorg. 511 Ε περιστατεί ἐν μετρίῳ σχηματ.]

σκιαγραφίαν (‘perspective drawing,’ vii 523 B, X 603 D) with its cognate words is continually used by Plato of things unreal, counterfeit, illusory: cf. infra IX 583 B n., 586 B al., and Wohlrab in Thet. 208 E. 18 τοῦ σοφωτάτου κτλ. Archilocho's poem seems to have canonized the fox as the embodiment of cunning in Greek literature: fragments are preserved of at least two fables of his in which the fox appears (86—88 and 89 ed. Bergk). In the second (89, 5, 6) occur the lines τῆς δ' (sc. πιθηκού)
apr' alēptetē kerkēlēan senvētēto | pynhvνν έχουσα νύν. The kerkēlēan και ποικίλην. ἂλλα γὰρ, φησὶ τις, οὐ ῥᾶσιν ἀεὶ λαυθανεῖν κακῶν οὔτα. οὗδὲ γὰρ ἀλλο οὐδὲν εὐπτετές, 20 D φίσομεν, τῶν μεγάλων ἂλλ' ὁμοίων, εἴ μὲλλομεν εὐδαιμονήσειν, ταύτη ἱπτέω, ὡς τὰ ἔχων τῶν λόγων φέρει. ἐπί γὰρ ταῦτα λαυθανεῖν ξινομοσίας τε καὶ ἐταιρίας συνάξομεν, εἰτὲν τε πειθός διδάσκαλοι σοφίαν δημηγορικὴν τε καὶ δικαίον διδόντες, εἴ ὁν τὰ μὲν πείσματος, τὰ δὲ βιασόμεθα, ὡς πλεονεκτοῦτες δίκην μὴ διδόναι. 25 ἄλλα δὴ θεοὺς οὐτε λαυθανεῖν οὐτε βιασασθαι δυνατόν. οὐκον,

may be from Archilochus. For the sentiment cf. III 394 D.

365 D 23 ξινομοσίας—ἐταιρίας. An allusion to the political life of Athens: cf. Ap. 36 B, Theaet. 173 D, Thuc. viii 54 ξινομοσίαι, ἀπέρ ἐγγυμον πρῶτον ἐν τῇ πόλις ὁδοὶ ἐπὶ δικαίος καὶ ἀρχαίος. In the Lato, Plato would suppress all such secret clubs and cabals with a strong hand: see 856 B ff. The πειθός διδάσκαλο mentioned presently are the Sophists.

25 ὡς for ὠστε (except in idiomatic phrases like ὡς ἐποίειν, ὡς γε ἐντείθεν ἰδεῖν) is a curious archaism, tolerably frequent in Xenophon (e.g. Cyrop. i 2, 8, v 2, v, vi 4, 16, vii 5, 1 and 7, 27), but almost unexampled in Plato. The Protagoras (330 E) furnishes an instance with ὡς πρόεχον (except cf. Xen. Cyrop. iv 2, 13). ὡς in Phaed. 108 E is perhaps to be explained in the same way; cf. also Alc. Π 141 B and Cyrop. 213 B παραχωρήσας τῷ τῶν Ψυχατρῆς ὡς ἐκείνων καθίζω. See also on ὡς δὴ in i 337 C. As διαζώμεθα can be followed by the simple infinitive, it might seem preferable to connect ὡς πλεονεκτοῦτες as a participial explanatory clause either with βιασόμεθα or with δίκην μὴ διδόναι (‘not to be punished for aggrandisement’); but the first alternative gives a wrong sense to πλεονεκτοῦτες, and the second involves too harsh an inversion.

366 οὐκοῦν κτλ. Cf. Lato 885 ὥς θεοῖς ἄγοιμοις εἶναι κακὰ σήμεια οὐδεὶς ποιήσει οὔτε ἔργον ἄσεβές εἰργάσατο εἰκὼν οὔτε λόγον ἀφίκειν ἄνωμοι, ἄλλα ἐν δὴ τι τῶν τριῶν πάχων, ἢ τοῦτο ἑπὶ ἑπάν̣ ὡς ἄγοιμοι, ἡ δὲ τεθείρον ὡς τοὐ φρονιτις ἄνθρωπον, ἡ τρίτον εὐπαραμιθῆς εἶναι θυσίας τε καὶ εἰχαί ταῖς παραγόμενοι. These three classes of heretics are severally refuted in 896 A—899 D, 899 905 D, 905 D—907 B. It is clear both from this passage and from the Lato that
the air was full of such heresies in Plato’s day. The first was doubtless fostered by the sceptical attitude of Protagoras—pery menov theon oikè ἐξήθηνον oth’ ἐσιν oth’ ὡς ἐσιν oth’ ὡς oikè ἐσιν (ap. D. L. IX 51): for the second cf. Aesch. Ag. 369—372 oikè ἐξήθηνον τοις theoȋs baprotôdē̑s áξιωσαται μελεῶν | ðò̑s ðè̑s ðè̑s ðè̑s ðè̑s | ðò̑s ðò̑s ðò̑s | πατοῦτοι οδ’ oikè εἰσεβήσθη: the third—the most pernicious of all, according to Plato Laws 9.48c—furnished the raison d’être of a degenerate priesthood.

27. τὶ καὶ ἡμῖν κτλ. “If the gods do not care for us, why should we in our turn (καί) care?” etc. For the text see cr. n. and App. III.

369 E 29 ἀκηκοάμεν—ποιητῶν. The first ἤ is ‘or’ and the second ‘than.’ In λόγων Plato may be thinking inter alia of the works of early logos-génètes like Pherecydes, who wrote genealogies of gods and heroes in prose; but there is no occasion to change λόγων into λόγιον with Muretus. ἀκηκοαίγναντων ποιητῶν refers to Homer and the Hesiodic and Orphic theogonies.

31 θυσίαι—ἀγανήσιον: see 364 D.

33 αὖτο: ‘from the proceedings of.’ Cf. Laws 906 C, D τοῦτον δῆ τῶν λόγων ἀνάγκαιον λόγων τῶν λόγων ὡς εἰσὶν συγγραφέων δὲ θεοὶ τῶν λόγων ἄδικοι καὶ ἄδικοι, ἂν αὐτοὶ τῶν ἀδικημάτων τις ἀπόφευξε, καθαπερ κυτλ λοιποὶ τῶν ἀρσαμώτων ομικρὰ ἀπονέμομεν, οἱ δὲ ἠμερομενοὶ τοῖς δόσους συγχωρείον τὰ πολλὰ διαρράζειν.

366 A 2 ὑπερβαινοντες καὶ ἀμαρτάνοντες are subordinate to λαοῦμεν: “by praying when we transgress and sin, we shall persuade them,” etc. There is a reference to the λαοῦμεν ὅτε κέν τις ὑπερβηθηκαί καὶ ἀμάρτηθη quoted in 364 E. The position of the participles is justified by the allusion to this line.

5 ἢ—ἡ. It was a common Greek belief that the sins of the fathers are visited upon the children: see the passages cited by Nägelsbach Nachkom. Theol. pp. 34 ff. If we take Plato at his word, Adimantus represents this vicarious punishment as extending even to the other world.

ἡ παίδες παιδῶν. Baiter conjectures <ἡ παίδες> ἡ παίδες παιδῶν, and so I formerly printed. But παίδες παιδῶν means little more than ‘descendants’ (cf. Laws 927 B), and the text may stand. Similarly in Ruskin Modern Painters Ch. 1 “all those labours which men have given their lives and their sons’ lives to complete.”

ὁ ἠμερομενὸς—λογιζόμενος. ὁ ἠμερομενὸς is the objector who urges ἄλλα γὰρ—παιδῶν. In ἠμερομενὸς Plato recurs to the singular of 365 B λέγων γὰρ ἐκ κτλ. λογιζόμενος is not ‘reasoning,’ but ‘making his calculation,’ ‘calculos subducens’: such a man’s morality is nothing but a balancing of profit and loss. Hermann’s devotion to Paris A led him to conjecture ἄλλα λογιζόμενοι αἱ τελεθαί rather than admit a simple case of omission.
arising from homoioteleuton: see cr. n. Vermehren proposes ἀλλ’ ὕφελθσσων αἰ νομίζομει τελεσα (Plat. Stud. p. 90), but we should certainly follow Pl. here. See also Introd. § 5.

6 λύσοι: ‘givers of absolution’: cf. 364 E. Certain Chthonian deities of the Orphic theology are meant, such as Hecate, Demeter, Dionysus λόγοι or λοισείς, and above all Zeus μαλακίας. See Lobeck Aglaoph. p. 303.

366 E 7 θεῖαι παίδες: e.g. Musaeus and Orpheus (Σέληνις τε καὶ Μοῦσών ἔγγονοι 364 E). Madvig’s rejection of οὗ (so also Ficinus) before ταῖς in the last clause seriously impairs the rhythm of the sentence.

12 ἄκρως. ἄκρος was a fashionable expression to apply to the élite of any profession or art: cf. Thes. 152 E τῶν ποιητῶν ὁ ἄκρος τῆς ποιήσεως ἐκατέρας, Pol. 292 E, supra 360 E, infra 111 405 A, v 439 E.

366 C 16 ὦς δὲ τοι: see on I 337 C.

19 θεῖα φύσει—ἐπιστήμην, θεῖα φύσει means a disposition which is good by divine grace or nature, not as the result of knowledge or compulsion. The virtue of such men is θεῖα μοῖρα παραγενωμένη ἄνευ νοῦ (Μεν. 99 E): they are ἄνευ ἀνάγκης, ἀντιφόρως, θεὶα μοῖρα ἁγάθολ (Lato 642 C), resembling Wordsworth’s “Glad Hearts! without reproach or blot, Who do thy work and know it not.” Cf. VI 493 A n. ἐπιστήμην is scientific knowledge of the good in the Socratic, not yet in the Platonic, sense.

366 D 20 οὖδεις ἐκών δικαιος gives the lie to the Socratic οὖδεις ἐκών δικαιος: cf. 360 C. For ἀνανδρίας below see on 359 B.


Plato is referring to well-known tales and maxims, which the poets and logographers had put into the mouths of ancient heroes. It is simpler to understand the expression of Orpheus, Musaeus, and other poets, poets and speakers. 

This thesis is developed and elaborated in Gorg. 472 D—481 B. 

It occurs occasionally in the Attic orators, especially with Socrates, and is tolerably common in Polybius and later Greek: see Stephanus-Ilase Thes. s.v. ὑπέρ and Janzus Hist. Gr. Gr. § 1685. I do not think we are justified in translating (with Tucker) 'on behalf of their view of the relations of justice and injustice.'

367 B 9 κατατεινας: 358 D n.
Theaet. Glauco’s frequent exaggeration is due to his recognition of the obvious. As he says, "what seems to be the case is in reality otherwise." His remarks are found also in the margin of A. He is, at least as old as the Scholium, which mentions the two readings ἀποδεχομένη and ἀνασχομένη. The latter is an obvious correction of ἀποδεχομένη, and has survived in Σ and a few inferior MSS besides.

369 B In a short interlude Socrates, after complimenting Glauco and Adimantus, remarks on the magnitude of the task before him—none other than the defence of Justice against her slanderers. As the weak-sighted are better able to recognize small letters at a distance if they have previously studied the same letters on a larger scale and on an ampler ground, so (says Socrates) let us first study Justice in magnico, that is, in a state, and afterwards look for her lineaments in parvo, in other words, in the Individual. The contemplation of a State in process of creation will show us Justice and Injustice coming into existence.
καὶ τοῦ Ἀδειμάντου ἡγάμην, ἀτὰρ ὦν καὶ τὸτε πάνυ γε ὦσθην | καὶ εἴπον· Οὐ κακῶς εἰς ύμᾶς, ὦ παῖδες ἐκεῖνον τοῦ ἄνδρός, τὴν 368 ἀρχὴν τῶν ἔλεγχων ἐποίησεν ὁ Γλαύκωνος ἐραστής, εὐδοκιμη-| σαντας περὶ τὴν Μεγαροὶ μάχην, εἰπὼν·

παῖδες Ἀρίστωνος, κλεινοῦ θείον γένος ἄνδρός.
5 τούτῳ μοι, ὦ φίλοι, εὐ δοκεῖ ἐχεῖν· πάνυ γὰρ θείον πεπόνθατε, | εἰ μὴ πέπεισθε ἀδικίαιν δικαιοσύνης ἁμεῖν εἶναι, οὕτω δυνάμενοι εἰπεῖν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ. δοκεῖτε δὴ μοι ὡς ἄληθὸς οὐ πεπείσθαν' | τεκμαίρομαι δὲ εἰ τοῦ ἄκου τοῦ ἡμέρου τρόπον, ἐπεὶ κατὰ γε Β | αὐτοῦς τοὺς λόγους ἡπίστον ἀν ύμίν’ ὁσφ ἰδὲ μᾶλλον πιστεύω, | τοσοῦτοι μᾶλλον ἀπορῶ ὁ τι χρῆσομαι’ οὔτε γὰρ ὅπως βοηθῶ |

10. χρῆσομαι Α’Π: χρῆσομαι Α’.

368 Α I ὦ παῖδες ἐκεῖνον τοῦ ἄνδρός.
This curious phrase occurs once again in Plato viz. Phil. 36 D, where Protarchus is addressed in the words ὦ παῖ ἐκεῖνου ταῦτας. Philebus has withdrawn from the discussion, his part in which he has beenqueathed to Protarchus, who is therefore playfully called his son. That this is the meaning appearing from Phil. 11 λ, β, | 11 c δέχει δὴ τούτων τὸν νῦν διδόμενον, ὦ Πρώταρχε, λόγον; 'Ἀνάγκη δέχεσθαι' | Φιλῆθος γὰρ ἡμῶν ὁ καλὸς ἀπελθηκε, 12 λ, | 16 b, 19 λ: cf. also 15 c and 28 b. In precisely the same way Glaucos and Adi-| mantus are the 'children of Thrasymachus.' They are διαδόχοι τοῦ λόγου as appears from 357 λ, 358 B (ἐπαναφέρωσι τοῖς Ὀραμαῖοι τὸν λόγον), 367 λ and 367 c, as well as from the substance of their arguments. This image is in fact one of the links by means of which Plato binds the dialogue together: as Polemarchus is heir to Cephalus (331 e), so Glaucos and Adi- | mantus are heirs to Thrasymachus. In explaining ἐκεῖνον τοῦ ἄνδρος of Thrasy- | machus, Stallbaum is therefore not 'ridicu- | lous' (as J. and C. assert) but right. See my article in Cl. Rev. X p. 237.

2 ὁ Γλαύκωνος ἐραστὴς may be | Critias, as Schleiermacher supposed but there is no evidence in support of the | conjecture: see Bergk Por. Lyr. Gr. 4 | 11 p. 283.

3 τὴν Μεγαροὶ μάχην: perhaps in | 499 B.C.: see Diod. Sic. XII 65. If so, | Plato is guilty of a slight anachronism, | supposing that the scene of the dialogue | is laid in 410. See Introd. § 3.

4 παῖδες—ἄνδρός. By 'Ἀρίστωνος, the | author of the line of course meant Aristo, | father of Glaucos and Adimantus; but 'Ἀρίστων suggests ἀριστός (cf. IX 580 b) | and the pun conveys a friendly, if half- | ironical, compliment to 'his excellency' | Thrasymachus, whose παῖδες (so far as the | argument is concerned) Glaucos and | his brother are: see on ὦ παῖδες above. | In Symp. 174 b, when inviting Aristode- | mus to come as an uninvited guest to sup | with Agathon, Socrates indulges in a | similarly playful pun: ἐποῦ τοῖς, ὥσπερ, | ἢν καὶ τὴν παρομοίαν διαφθείρωμεν μετα- | βάλλοντες, ὡς ἄρα καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἐπὶ διάτασ | τας αὐτόματος ἀγαθοῖ. (The διαφθορά | consists in the substitution of ἀγαθῶν for | δειλῶν, the form of the proverb which | Plato had in view being αὐτόματα ἀ ἀγα- | θοί δειλῶν ἐπὶ διάτασ τας, as the Scho- | liast remarks. Arnold Hug is ill-advised | in adopting Lachmann's suggestion to | read ἄγαθον i.e. ἄγαθων for ἀγαθῶν: | see Cl. Rev. X p. 238.) Other plays on | proper names in Plato are collected by | Riddell Digest pp. 250 f. In κλεινοῦ | Stallbaum finds a 'lusus facetus' on | ἐκεῖνον; but this particular lusus (if it | exists) is accidental and unmeaning:

5 θεῖον. The addition of τι (proposed | by Herwerden) is unnecessary: cf. III | 388 D n. θεῖο is here used, like ἔθεος, | of inspiration: if the speaker does not | understand or believe what he says, he | is, like a rhapsodist or poet, nothing but | the mouthpiece of the inspiring deity: | cf. Phaedr. 245 λ, Ion 533 E, 535 E— | 536 D.


368 c 18 τι τί ἔστι—ἐξει recalls the conclusion of Book I (354 B, c).

368 d 12 οὐαντερ ἐν σκ. ἐποιησά-

θέθαι, the verb being omitted as it fre-
quently is with ὅπερ ἐν εἰ.

25 ἔρμαιον—τυγχάνει. I have fol-

lowed Schneider in printing a colon be-

fore ἔρμαιον—τυγχάνει, not the grammatical apodosis to the εἷς clause, but a further result. The

asymdeon with ἔρμαιον is the usual asyn-

deton of ampliative clauses. For the

principle underlying the method of in-

quiry here enunciated, see Soph. 218 c ὡσα δ' αὐτῷ,

καὶ τῶν μεγάλων δει διαποιεῖσθαι

καλῶς, πριν τοῖς τοιούτων δέδοθαι πάσιν καὶ

παλαι τὸ πρότερον ἐν σιμερόις καὶ

μάσιν αὐτὰ δεῖν μελέταν, πρὸς ἐν αὐ-

τοῖς τοῖς μεγάστοις and Pol. 286 A. (Con-

trast Phil. 48 B, which the opposite course is

recommended.) In the special case of the

State versus the Individual, the words

ἐν σιμερόις, ἐν ἐλάττους are not applic-

able, but ἐν μάσιν πρότερον δει μελετῶν is

the essential part of the principle, and

Justice in the State is ἐν μάσιν καταμαθήνει

(368 e) than in the Individual. Cf. also

infra 377 c ἐν τοῖς μείζονοις—μέθοδος ὑφή-

μεθά καὶ τοῖς ἐλάττους. Illustrations from

letters are tolerably frequent in Plato:

cf. e.g. iv 402 A f., Theaet. 205 D—206 A.

Pol. 277 e ff.

368 e 33—369 a 3 πρῶτον—ἐπι-

σκοποῦντες lays down the method to be

pursued in the rest of the treatise, except

in books v—vi, which are professedly a

d'digression,' and x, which is of the

nature of an epilogue. At each suc-


369 A] ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ Β

91
cessive stage in the exposition of his subject, Plato reminds us more or less explicitly of the method which he here proposes to follow:—at the end of the first sketch of a State 371 E; in connexion with the phylemaivosna polis 372 E; before entering on the theory of education 376 C, D and again in III 392 C, when he has finished the treatment of loga; at Adimantus' objection IV 420 B, C; at the end of the picture of the just state IV 427 D ff.; in passing to Justice in the Individual IV 434 D ff.; at v 472 B ff., where the question is raised 'Is this State possible?'; on beginning the account of the degenerate commonwealths and men in VIII 545 B; and finally when the whole argument draws to a head at IX 577 C.

369 A 2 Τήν τοῦ μείζονος ὁμοίωτητα. Justice in the State is in fact to be used as a means of explaining Justice in the Individual, which is after all the real Justice: cf. IV 443 B ff. nn. The relation between the two is that of a παράδειγμα and that which the παράδειγμα is intended to explain: see Pol. 278 C οὗκ οὖν τοῦτο μὲν ἱκανὸν συνελήφαμεν, ὅτι παράδειγματος γάρ ἔστι τοῦ γένεσις, ὡστάν ὃν ταύτων ἐν ἑτέρῳ διεσπασμένω, δοξάζομεν οὐς καὶ συναχθὼν περὶ ἕκαστον ὡς συνάψως μίαν ἀληθῶς δύο φαίνεται; Plato has been severely blamed (as e.g. by Grote Plato i. 123 ff.) for representing the Commonwealth as the Individual "written large." Plato, however, laid stress upon this view, as tending to cement the union between the citizen and the State, which was rapidly dissolving in his day. This is well brought out by Krohn Plat. Frag. p. 5. Cf. also Pöhlmann Gesch. d. antik. Kommunismus etc. pp. 146 ff.

4 εἰ γνωρίμενη—ἀδικίαν. This would lead us to expect that we are to discover Justice and Injustice in the same State. In the sequel we find Justice only in the Ideal City: it is the degenerate Cities of VIII and IX that furnish the picture of Injustice. Plato does not expressly announce his change of plan till IV 420 B, C: φησίνεμεν γὰρ ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ μάλιστα ἄν ἐπερρηκασώσθην καὶ αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ κάκιστῃ οἰκουμένῃ ἀδικίᾳ—νῦν μὲν οὖν—τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν πλατύτωμον—αὐτίκα δέ τῇ ἐναντίαισι σκέφθησα. The discrepancy must, I think, be admitted (see Krohn Pl. St. p. 32, and Kunert die doppelte Recens. d. Pl. St. pp. 10 ff.), but such corrections and developments of plan are characteristic of the dialogue as a form of literature, and do not establish the theory of a double recension of the Republic. Cf. Grimmelt de resp. Pl. comp. et unit. p. 19, and Westerwick de Rep. Pl. pp. 43—45.

369 B—372 D The First Sketch of a City-state.

A city is called into being by the fact that the individual is not self-sufficient. We may regard it as the union of many men mutually helping one another in one place. The individual gives and takes because he thinks it better for himself to do so. Now man's first need is food, his second housing, his third clothing and the like. The smallest possible State will therefore consist of a farmer, a builder, a weaver and a shoemaker etc.—four or five men in all. Each of these must work for all, because Nature has adapted different men for different kinds of work, and because every kind of work has its critical moment when it must be done and cannot be neglected. Our principle is—One man, one work. We shall accordingly require carpenters and smiths to make instruments for the farmer, weaver, and shoemaker, as well as various kinds of herdsmen, to furnish cattle for ploughing and carrying, together with hides and fleeces for the makers of clothing. Since it is almost impossible to
XI. Γίγνεται τούτων, ἵνα δ' ἐγώ, πόλις, ὡς ἐγώμαι, ἐπειδὴ τυγχάνει ἡμῶν ἔκαστος οὐκ αὐτάρκης, ἀλλὰ πολλῶν ἑνδέης: ἢ τῶν οίνη ἄρχην ἄλλην πόλιν οἰκίζειν; Οὔδεμιαν, ἢ δ' ὦς. Οὔτω δὴ ἄρα παραλαμβάνων ἄλλοις ἄλλων ἐπ' ἄλλου, τῶν δ' ἐπ' ἄλλου χρεία, πολλῶν δὲμένοι, πολλοῖς εἰς μίαν οἰκήσων ἀγείραντες 15 κοινωνούσ τε καὶ βοηθοῦσ—ταύτη τῇ ξυνοκίᾳ θέμεθα πόλιν

make the city self-supporting, we shall require middlemen to introduce imports; and as imports necessarily imply exports, the number of farmers and manufacturers in our city will increase, and we shall need travelling merchants to dispose of their produce. Owners of transport-ships will also be necessary, if there is traffic by sea.

Moreover, to facilitate exchange within the city, there must be a market, and coined money, and retail traders to act as middlemen between the producer and the consumer. The retail traders should be those who are physically unfit to engage in any other pursuit. There will also be hired labourers in our city.

Where then in such a commonwealth are Justice and Injustice? Along with which of the component parts of the State do they make their appearance? Adimantus suggests that we should look for them in the reciprocal intercourse of the various classes in the city. Let us see, says Socrates. The citizens will live the simple easy-going life of vegetarians, satisfying only the modest demands of their natural appetites. On a hint from Glauco, a few additional vegetarian luxuries are conceded.

369 B 11 γίγνεται—πόλεις κτλ. The present episode is ostensibly an historical account of the genesis of society, and from this point of view should be compared with Laws III 676 a ff. Some of the features are derived from an analysis of the industrial basis of society as it exists in civilised times: others (see 372 B—D), are semi-mythical and idyllic, recalling pictures of the golden age such as we find in Pol. 269 c ff., and in the caricatures of the comedians (e.g. ap. Athen. vi 267 u ff.). But the prevailing atmosphere is not historical or legendary, but idealistic (note δὲ in 369 B and elsewhere), and Plato's πρώτη πόλις (Arist. Pol. Δ 1, 1291 a 17) should primarily be regarded as—in its essential features—a preliminary and provisional description of the industrial foundation on which the higher parts of his own ideal city are to rest.

Cf. also on 372 B, D, Retzig, Proleg. in Plat. rep., p. 43 and Steinhart Einleitung p. 156.

12 τυγχάνει as a mere copula is very rare in Attic prose, and it would be easy here to insert ὅπως after πολλῶν: see Porson on Eur. Hr. 752. In the Platonic dialogues this usage recurs in Phaedr. 263 C, Gorg. 502 B, Alc. I 129 λ, 133 λ, Hipp. Mat. 500 λ, Laws 918 C, Tim. 61 C, nor is it possible in the last three examples to account for its omission by lipography. The idiom occurs in Sophocles and Euripides, once in Aristophanes (Ecte. 1141), and (though condemned by Phrynichus) must also be admitted (though rarely) in prose: see the instances cited by Blaydes on Ar. (l.e.) and cf. Rutherford's Néo Phrynichus p. 342.

πολλῶν ἑνδέης. In the account of the genesis of society given in the Laws (676 λ—686 Ε), more stress is laid on the social instinct of man: in Prot. 322 B ff. the operating cause is man's defencelessness against wild beasts. Grote (Plato III p. 139 n.) censures Plato for not mentioning the "reciprocal liability of injury," among the generative causes of civic life; but this (as well) as assistance against external aggression is hinted at in βοηθοῦσ.

14 ἄλλος—χρεία. The words are short for ἄλλος ἄλλον, τὸν μὲν ἐπ' ἄλλου, τὸν δ' ἐπ' ἄλλου χρεία (for the omission of τῶν μὲν cf. Prot. 530 λ, Theaet. 181 D al.): 'one taking to himself one man, another another—the one man for one, the other for another purpose.' Essentially the same meaning would no doubt be conveyed without τῶν δ' ἐπ' ἄλλου, which Herwerden following two inferior ms would omit; but the fuller form of expression is chosen in order, I think, to prepare us for the principle of 'One man, one work' to be presently enunciated.

16 ταύτη τῇ ξυνοκίᾳ. Stallbaum rightly regards the sentence as an anaco-
luthion, the antecedent to ταύτη being the words from paraλαμβάνων to βοη-
θούσ. If the subject to ἐθέμετα (a gnomic aorist) were ἄλλος—δέδομεν—ἀγέρατες,
we should probably have had paraλαμ-
βάνης for paraλαμβάνων: and besides,
Plato is not yet describing the particular
city which we are in of λόγοι (infra
line 19), but laying down the law as to
the γενεσις of cities in general. For the
anacoluthon see Engelhardt Anac. Pl.
Spc. 111 p. 40.
369 D 26 τῶν περὶ τὸ ὅμωμα: neuter,
not masculine; otherwise Plato would
have written θεραπευτῶν (as in q and
some other mss).
27 ἀναγκαιότατη τόλις. Referring
to this passage, Aristotle (Pol. Δ 4. 1291a
10—19) attacks Plato for making the end
of his city not to καλός, but τὰ ἀναγκαία.
No doubt, the end of this ‘first city’—
so Aristotle calls it—is primarily τὰ
ἀναγκαία; but Plato would reply that
the cities of the farmers, the auxiliaries,
and the rulers, are in reality one city,
γεμοῖνη μὲν τὸν ἤν ἑνεκεν, ὁδοὶ δὲ τοῦ
Lk. 8:18 D δὲ δὲ αὐτὸν καθάπερ ἐνα
ἀνθρώπων τὴν εἰ).
369 E 28 ἐνα ἔκαστον κτλ. Cf.
Charm. 161 δικαι ἀν σοι πόλις εἰς ἀλ-
καίσθαι ὕπο τοῦ τοῦ νόμον τοῦ κελεύ-
νος ὑπὸ τοῦ ἵματος ἔκαστον υφάνειν καὶ
πλῆνει, καὶ ὑπόδημα κατακοποῦν, καὶ
λεκύθον καὶ στεγεγίδα καὶ τάλλα πάντα
catὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον κτλ.;
370 A 5 ὀὕτω ῥέον η ἑκεῖνος. ῦοὐτο
refers to the alternative which is more
familiar, although mentioned first; cf.
(with Ast) Xen. Mem. 1. 3. 13 τοῦτο τὸ
θηρίον—τοιούτω διενεργεῖ ὅτι τῶν φα-
λαγγόνων διὸ εἰκείναι μὲν Αρίστολον,
toῦτο δὲ οὕτω ἀπεκτείνει—ἐννέα 71. On
the corruption ῥέον for ῥέων (also in Mem.
94 E) see Introd. § 5.
The City of Books II—IV. The first critic to lay sufficient stress on this point was Krohn: see Pl. St. pp. 59—62, where he collects the references to φώς throughout Books I—IV. The City of II—IV is a κατὰ φῶς oikosêia πόλις. What is meant by φῶς? Not inorganic Nature, but the 'nature' of a πόλις or aggregate of πολίται, i.e. (as the unit in a city is the man) human nature, in other words, the nature of the human soul, which, according to Plato and Socrates, constitutes a man's true and proper individuality. It is not however human nature as it is, but as it ought to be, which is the foundation on which the Platonic State is built; so that, although the doctrine of transcendental Ideas is excluded from the first four books (see on 111.402 c), Idealism at all events is present. See also Krohn Plat. Frage pp. 8—11, and (for the connotation of φῶς) Benn's article on 'The Idea of Nature in Plato' in Archiv f. Gesch. d. Phil. IX pp. 24—49 and Pohmann l.c. pp. 110 ff.

The principle—the cardinal principle of the Republic, reiterated also with great emphasis in Laws 846 D—847 B—is deduced by Plato from φῶς, whose rule is specialization: cf. 370 D ὅταν ἐς ἐν κατὰ φῶς—πράξῃ. Plato (as usual in the Republic) is thinking of Man's nature, one man being naturally fitted for one pursuit, another for another: cf. III 395 B, IV 433 A, 434 A, B. The principle of specialization had already been enunciated by Socrates: see e.g. Xen. Mem. III 9. 3, 15, Cyrop. VIII 2. 5, 6. Aristotle widens it into a general law of Nature: οὕτω γὰρ ἡ φῶς ποιεῖ τοιοῦτον οἶον ὁ χάλκοτοῦτον τὴν Δηλωκτήν μάχαραν πεινχότες, ἀλλ' ἐν πρός ἐν (Pol. A 2. 1252 b 1 ff.). In its application to politics, the principle becomes in Plato's hands a weapon for attacking the foundations of Athenian democracy (see Gorg. 455 A—C), to which, in this respect, his own Ideal City was a kind of counterblast.

Did Plato write καλλίον? καλλίον γίνεται may no doubt mean 'are better made,' which is fairly satisfactory in point of sense, but καλλίω forms a better balance to πλείω τέ, and is more suited to καλὸν just below. With ἔρων immediately following, the corruption would be easy. On the other hand the collocation καλλίω καὶ βέλων is unpleasing, and it is probably safer to adhere to the MSS.
370 Ε 27 ἐπὶ τὸ ἀροῦν. See on 372 B.  
30 αὐτὴν τὴν πόλιν: éρασιν ὑπὲρ: the city as opposed to the inhabitants (téktoses, χαλκῆς etc.). Cf. 360 D n. It is not necessary to adopt Hermann's conjecture αὐτὴν, or (with Hartman) to eject τὴν πόλιν.  
34 ἄν ἐκείνοι δεόνται. All exchange with foreign cities is to be in kind: money is used only for transactions within the city: see infra 371 c ff. Here again Plato is constructing his city κατὰ φύσιν: cf. Arist. Pol. Α 9. 1257b 28 ἥ μὲν ἄν ταύτη μεταβλητικὴ ἀδὲ τὰ παρὰ φύσιν ὡστε χρηματιστικῆς ἐστίν εὖδος ὀοδέν.  
371 Α 3 ὅν ἄν δὲονται. ὦ is masculine in spite of ὅν ἐκείνοι δεόνται just above. The reading of ὅν ἐκείνοι δεόνται is a free correction (after 371 b) intended to make ὅν neuter.  
371 Β 9 τῆς—ὕγιεσις is not the work of a seaman (as Jowett seems to suppose), but a special department of ἐμπόρια, viz. ναυλήπερα: see Arist. Pol. Α 11. 1258b 21 ff. The ναυλήπερα owned a ship and conveyed passengers and cargo for payment (cf. Gorg. 511 D, ε: he is frequently mentioned along with the ἐμπόρος, e.g. Pol. 290 Α ἐμπόρους καὶ
XII. Τί δὲ δή; ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ πόλει πῶς ἀλλήλοις μεταδόσωσιν ὡν ἂν ἔκαστοι ἐργάζονται; ὥν δὴ ἔνεκα καὶ κοινώνιαν πουσάμενοι πόλιν ὄκασαμεν. Δήλου δή, ή δ' ὅς, ὅτι πωλοῦντες καὶ ὁνοµένουν. Ἀγορά δὴ ἡμῖν καὶ νόµισµα ἱµβολὸν τῆς ἀληθῆς ἔνεκα γενή
c se tei εκ τούτου. Πάνω μὲν οὖν. "Ἀν οὖν κοµίσας ο̣γ̣ε̣υ̣ρ̣γ̣ο̣ς above 1 εἰς 15 τήν ἁγοράν τι ὁν ποιεῖ, ἦ τις ἄλλος τῶν δηµιουργῶν, μη εἰς τούτων χρόνον ἠκή τοίς δεοµένοις τὰ παρ' αὐτοῦ ἀλλάζοντας, ἀργήσῃ τῆς αὐτοῦ δηµιουργίας καθήµενος εἰς ἁγορά; Ὄνδαµώς, δὴ ὅς, ἀλλὰ εἰσὶν οἱ τούτο ὀρίζοντες ἐάνοι οὔ τι τῆν διακοινωνίαν τάττουσιν ταύτην, ἐν μὲν ταῖς ὀρθοῖς οἰκουµέναις πόλεσι σχεδόν τι 20 οἱ ἀσθενεστάτασι τὰ σώµατα καὶ ἄνθρωποι τά ἦργα πράττειν.

D Αὐτοῦ γὰρ δὲι μένουσι αὐτοῖς περὶ τήν ἁγοράν τα μὲν ἄντρ ἀργυρίου ἀλλάζοισθαι τοῖς τι δεοµένοις ἀποδόσθαι, τοῖς δὲ ἀντί αὖ ἀργυρίου διαλαττεῖν, ὅσοι τι δέονται πρίσθαι. Ἀυτὴ ἀρα, ἶν δ' ἐγὼ, ἥ χρεία κατῆλων ἡμῖν γένεσιν ἐµποιεῖ τῇ πόλει. ἦ οὔ 25 κατῆλων καλοῦσαι τοὺς πρὸς ὅµιλη τε καὶ πράσιν διακοινοῦσαν ἰδρυµένοις εἰς ἁγορά, τοὺς δὲ πλάνητας ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις ἐµπόρουσ; Πάνω μὲν οὖν. "Εὐτε δὴ τίνες, ὅς ἐγὼµαι, εἰσὶ καὶ ἄλλοι διάκονοι, ἐ οἳ ἄν τα μὲν τῆς διανοιας 1 μη πάνω ἄξιοκοινώνυµοι ὅσιν, τίν ἔδω τοῦ σώµατος ἰσχύν ἰκανὴν ἐπὶ τοὺς πόλους ἐχοσν. οἰ δὲ πωλοῦντες 30 τὴν τῆς ἴσχυος χρείαν, τὴν τιµήν ταύτην μισθὸν καλοῦντες, κέκληµαι, ὅς ἐγὼµαι, μισθωτοί· ἦ γάρ· Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Πλήρωµα

ναυκλήρους καὶ κατῆλων, Λαως 831 E, Χεν. Βιτ. 3; 4; 5; 3.
12 οὐ δὴ ἔνεκα. οὐν can hardly (as J. and C. suppose) refer to μεταδόσωσιν: it must denote the same objects as the previous οὐν. The meaning is 'for the sake of which things we established the principle of community and founded a city.' Cf. 369 C κοινωνίας—μεταδίδοισι δὴ ἄλλος ἄλλῳ κτλ.
14 νόµισµα—ἔνεκα. Cf. Λαως 742 Α νόµισµα δ' ἔνεκα ἀλλαγῆς τῆς καθ' ἡ̣µ' ἐραν. See also 370 E η. Plato regards coined money as a necessary evil—the offspring, not of φύσις, but of νόµος (cf. Arist. Εθ. Νυκ. ν. 8. 1133 Α 30 ητ. διὰ τούτου τοῦφορα ἔχει νόµισµα, δὶ οὐ φύσει ἄλλα νόµος ἐστὶ and Pol. A. 9. 1257 Β 10 ητ.), a mere conventional symbol, the private possession of which is denied to the highest classes of the State (111 416 Α ητ.).

371 C 21 οἱ ἀσθενεστάτατοι κτλ. Cf. Λαως 918 Α—920 η, where κατῆλων is confined by Plato to those ὃν διαφθειρο-
méνοι οὐκ ἂν γίγνοµαι μεγάλη λύµα τῆς πόλεως (919 C).

371 D 26 κατῆλων—ἐµπόρους. Σοφ. 223 D τῆς μεταβαθµησίας οὔχ ἢ μὲν κατὰ πόλιν ἀλλαγῆ, σχεδόν αὐτής ἦµισθ ἀπὸ, καὶ παρὰ τὴν προσαγωγήν. Ναί. Τὸ δὲ γιαδὲς ἐπὶ ἄλλην πόλιν διαλατ-
tόµοιοι ὅσιν καὶ πράσιν ἐµπορική; Τί δ' οὖ; Ε 29 ἄξιοκοινώνυµοι: worthy of being admitted into the κοινωνία of our city. This explanation (Schneider's) is better than 'worthy of one's society' (L. and S.).

31 τήν τιµήν ταύτην. ταύτην is idiomatic for ταύτης: see 1 333 B η.
32 μισθωτοῖ. Plato does not admit slave labour in his city, unless perhaps in the persons of barbarians. The exclusion of slaves is also a touch of 'Nature': cf. Arist. Pol. A. 3. 1253 Β 30 τοῦ δ' παρὰ φύσιν (sc. δοκεῖ) τὸ διεστρέφειν with Suse-
mihl and Hicks ad loc. If barbarians may be enslaved, it is because they are φύσις δουλοι; cf. V 469 ff., with 470 C and Arist. Pol. A 2. 1252b 9 ταύτω φύσιν βαβαραν καὶ δουλον.

372a 2 ἐν αὐτῶν—ἐλλήνως. The reply is to the first question, not to the second; see on V 465 E. In so far as δικαιοσύνη can be said to exist in so elementary a state, Plato would have identified it with the performance by each class (farmers, artisans, etc.) of their own work and no more. This is the first view of δικαιοσύνη in the Republic; for the second see IV 432 ff., 441 D ff., and for the third or metaphysical VI 504 B n.

7. ὑποδήματα. I have placed the mark of interrogation after ὑποδήματα, as it is only the first participles which belong to διαίτησονται. 'And when they have built themselves houses' marks a fresh start, no longer interrogative, for which reason I have also departed from the usual punctuation after ἰκανῶς (in B) and πέλεμον (in C).

372b 9 θρέψονται κτλ. The picture which Plato proceeds to draw represents the working of well-regulated ἐπιθυμία or appetite—the psychological groundwork of the third or lowest order in Plato's city. τὰ μὲν is the wheaten meal (ἀλεύρια), τὰ δὲ the barley-meal (ἄλφιτα). Only the wheaten meal was (as a rule) baked (πέσσειν or ὄπταν) into loaves (ἄρτοι); the barley-meal was "kneaded into a simple dough (μάσσειν, whence μάρη), dried in a mould, and afterwards moistened with water and eaten" (Blümner, Gr. Privatalt. p. 218). μάρη made of barley meal was the staple food of the common Greek: the wheaten loaf was a luxury. The double chiasmus ἀλόφατα, μάχαντες, μάζας ἄλευρα, πέψαντες, ἀρτον is noticeable: cf. Crito 47 C.

It will be observed that the inhabitants of this 'First City' subsist upon a vegetable diet. Cattle are used for ploughing and carrying, and supply wool and skins to make clothing and shoes (370 D, E), but animal food is unknown. It is improbable that Plato deliberately borrowed this trait from the current legends about the golden age (cf. Pol. 271 D ff.): for he allows the slaughter of cattle for skins, whereas in the golden age animal life was held sacred (see Empedocles ap. Arist. Rhet. 1 13. 1373b 14 ff. and Robertson Smith Religion of the Semites pp. 282 ff.). But he no doubt regarded vegetarianism as characteristic of the primitive innocence of a pastoral community (Laws 732 Α—D). In Plato's days, as now, the Greek peasant was almost a vegetarian. To argue from this and kindred passages (esp. Tim. 77 Α—C and 80 E) as Teichmüller does (Lit. Pfl. 11 pp. 187—202), that Plato was himself a vegetarian, is somewhat hazardous. Whether Plato wished his farmers to be vegetarians or not, he permits the soldiers to eat flesh: cf. III 404 B ff.
τῶν κριθῶν ἀλφία τοιαύτα μεγάλα, ἐκ δὲ τῶν πυρῶν ἄλευρα· τὰ ἤ μὲν πέψαντες, τὰ δὲ μαξᾶτες μάζας γενναίας καὶ ἄρτους ἐπὶ κάλαμον τινα παραβαλλόμενοι ἢ φύλλα καθαρά, κατακλυνόντες ἐπὶ στιβάδων ἐστρωμένων μύλακι τε καὶ μυρίναις, εὐωχήσονται αὐτοὶ τε καὶ τὰ παιδία, ἐπιτύννυτες τοῦ οἴνου, ἐστεφανωμένου καὶ ἐμύλωντες τοὺς θεούς, ἥδεως ἐξωνύτες ἀλλήλοις, οὐχ ὑπὲρ τὴν 15 οὖσαν 1 ποιούμενοι τοὺς παιδας, εὐλαβούμενοι πενίαιν ἢ πόλεμον.

XIII. Καὶ ὁ Γλαύκης ὑπολαβὼν, Ἄνεω οὖν, ἐφῆ, ὃς ἔοικας, ποιεῖς τοὺς ἀνδρᾶς ἑστιοῦμένους. Ἀληθῆ, ἂν δὲ ἐγὼ, λέγεις. ἐπελαθόμην ὅτι καὶ ὄψῃς ἐξουσίαν. ἄλας τε δήλον ὅτι καὶ ἐλάς καὶ τυρών καὶ βολβοῖς καὶ λάχανα ὧν ἐν ἀγροῖς ἐψήφωνται καὶ τραγήματά ποιον παραθύσομεν αὐτοῖς τῶν τε σύκων καὶ ἔρεβίνθων καὶ κνώμων, καὶ μύρτα καὶ φηγοῦς στο-
372 D 23 ὑποτίνωντες. Wine was sipped during dessert. ῥας- in ὑποτίνωντες emphasizes the moderation already expressed in μετρίωσ: cf. Lys. 223 B ὑποτεπώκετες ἐν τοῖς Ἐρμαιοῖς. Dr Jackson connects πρός τὸ τῦρῳ ὑποτίνωντες, comparing IV 420 E, Ar. Ach. 751 al. This may be right, but the ordinary view seems to me somewhat more natural.

372 D—373 C Glauco protests against the swinish character of such a life: more comfort, he thinks, should be allowed. While expressing his opinion that the healthy State is that which he has already described, Socrates is willing to describe the 'inflamed' (φλεγμαίνουσα) City, in case Justice and Injustice should be discovered in it (372 D—372 E).

The Second Sketch of a City now begins (372 E ff.).

Some will not be satisfied with the provisions of our first city, but will demand a variety of physical comforts and delicacies, and artistic delights. A crowd of hunters and imitative artists of different kinds will accordingly spring up, and the race of middlemen will be largely increased. As a flesh diet will come into fashion, swineherds will be in demand, and cattle will multiply. The new style of living will bring doctors to the front.

372 D ff. The provisions of the πρώτη πόλις are insufficient for the satisfaction of human needs: for there is θυμός as well as ἐπιθυμία in the soul of man. Hence we must advance a stage further. Plato's method is as follows. He begins by enumerating many of the features of ordinary Greek life, as he found it, without distinguishing the good from the bad. The resulting picture he calls a τρυφώσα or φλεγμαίνουσα πόλις. The next step is to purge this τρυφώσα πόλις (cf. III 399 E Ἀλεξάνδρους τὴν ἀρχήν τρυφῶν ἐφαμεν πόλιν) by excluding some of the features, and correcting and regulating others, both by prescriptive enactments and still more by the influence of education. It is this κεκαθαρισμένη πόλις which forms what we may call Plato's δεύτερα πόλις (II 372 E—IV): his third and crowning effort, the City of the Rulers, is contained in Books V—VII. Cf. VIII 543 E n. and Hirzel der Dialog i pp. 235 ff.

372 D 26 νῦν. The city of Pigs is supposed by Zeller I 1 pp. 325, 383, and Dümmler Antisthenica pp. 5 ff., Proleg. zur Pl. Sta. p. 61, to be a contemptuous allusion to Antisthenes' ideal commonwealth (on which see Susemil in Fl. Jahrb. 1887 pp. 207—214). This conjecture requires us to interpret Plato's first sketch of a State as wholly ironical and intended 'to warn us against the false ideal of a Nature-City' (Zeller I. c.).

I agree with Henkel (Stud. zur Gesch. d. Gr. Lehre vom Staat pp. 8 f.) in thinking that there is no solid ground for Zeller's theory. The πρώτη πόλις is not of course Plato's ideal republic, and his description of it is plentifully bestrewn with irony, but it is nevertheless the foundation on which his city is built, and, in point of fact, although some of its features are implicitly corrected or superseded in the sequel, it still remains on the whole, and as far as it goes, a not unpleasing picture of the life of the lowest stratum in Plato's city, and it is nowhere expressly cancelled or abolished. See also on 369 B and 372 E. The εὐχερήσα πόλις (Pol. 266 c) of the πρώτη πόλις is fairly compared to that of pigs, the εὐχερεστατον γένος τῶν ἄνων (ib.); and it is appropriate that Glauco, who is nothing if not θυμοειδῆς (Intro. § 2), should thus express his contempt for a life which hardly if at all rises above the level of ἑπιθυμία.

372 E 30 καὶ οἱ νῦν ἔχουσι: e.g.
373 A]  ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ Β  101

πόλις, ως ἑοίκε, σκοποῦμεν μόνον ὡς γίγνεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τρυ-
φώσαν πόλις. ἵσως οὖν οὐδὲ κακῶς ἐχεῖν σκοποῦντες γὰρ και τοιαύτην τάχι ἂν κατιδοῦμεν τὴν τε δικαιοσύνην καὶ ἀδικίαν ὅτι ποτὲ ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐμφύονται. ἦ μὲν οὖν ἀληθινὴ πόλις δοκεῖ μοι εἶναι ἣν διεληλυθαμεν, ὡσπερ ὑγίης τίς εἰ δ' αὐτὸ βούλεσθε, καὶ 35
φλεγμαίνουσαν πόλιν θεωρῆσομεν οὗδεν ἀποκολύω. ταῦτα γὰρ
73 δὴ τισιν, οὐ δοκεῖ, | οὐκ ἐξαρκέσει, οὐδὲ αὐτὴ ἢ διαίτα, ἀλλὰ κλίναι ἑν τοιοσοῦνται καὶ τράπεζαι καὶ τάλλα σκεῦη, καὶ ὅψα δὴ καὶ μῆρα καὶ θυμάματα καὶ ἑταίραι καὶ πέμματα, ἐκάστα τούτων παντοδαπα. καὶ δὴ καὶ ὁ τὸ πρῶτον ἐλέγομεν οὐκέτι τάναγκαι

35. θεωρῆσομεν Α'Π: θεωρῆσομεν Α¹.

373 A 2 καὶ ὅψα δὴ. For δὴ see 367 C c.

3 ἑταίραι. G. W. Nitzsch (Rhein. Mus. 1857, pp. 471 f.), Richter (Fl. Jahrb. 1867, p. 141), Madvig, and Stallbaum take offence at the juxtaposition of ἑταίραι and πέμματα and suggest respectively ἀδήραι (apparently an error for ἀδήραι, cf. Ar. Plut. 673), ἔραία (ἐφήματα in Schol. on 445 C), σεχαρία 'panes delicati,' and ἑτέρα (with the following καὶ deleted)—conjectures which are altogether needless and refute one another.

The text is successfully defended by Hug (Hermes 1876, p. 254), who cites an exact parallel in Ar. Ach. 1090—1091 κλίναι, τράπεζαι, προσκεφαλαί, στρώματα, | στέφανοι, μύρον, τραγμαθία, τα πόραι πάρα, | ἄμυλον πάλαικοντες, σοφαιόντες, ἑτέρα | (varieties of πέμματα). Cf. also Amphis ap. Ath. XIV 642 a οἶνος ἕός, ὑά, σοφαι, μέτρον, στέφανοι, αὖλη-
τρίς and infra III 404 D, IX 573 D n. From these passages it may fairly be doubted whether Plato's mention of ἑτα-
ραί is in any way even παρὰ προσδοκιάν (as the Oxford editors suggest): for ἀδή-
τρίδες were almost as common a feature at dessert as the cakes (πέμματα) etc. which accompany them here: see e.g. Xen. Mem. I 5. 4, Symp. 21, Pl. Symp. 176 E, Prot. 347 D. Vahlen (Index Lect. per sem. lib. 1875—6 Berol.) quotes also Catullus' cencabis bene—si tueum atu-
leris bonam atque magnam | cenan non sine candida puella | et vino et sal et omnibus cachinnis” (13. 1 ff.).

fish, flesh, fowl: see on 372 C. The words ἅπερ—ἐχοῦσι are to be taken with τραγή-
ματα as well as with δήα. Glauco is thinking of delicacies like the preserved sorb-apples (βαταπαρκημένα) alluded to in Symp. 190 D. See Blümner Gr. Privatall. p. 222 n. 2.

31 τρυφώσαν πόλιν. Krohn (Pl. St. pp. 34, 73) thinks that Plato originally meant to look for ἀδίκια in this τρυφώσα πόλις: but see on 369 L.

34 ἀληθινή—φλεγμαίνουσαν. There is a vein of irony in ἀληθινή: for the πρώτη πόλις is not the final form of Plato's city. The epithets τρυφώσαν, φλεγμαί-
νουσαν are not however ironical (as Dümmler seems to hold Proleg, p. 62): see III 390 E.

35 εἰ δ' ἄδικοφοι. I have adopted Richards's suggestion, and printed a com-
ma after βούλεσθε, a colon before οὐδὲν. The meaning is: 'but if you wish it, let us contemplate also' etc. The scribe in Paris A must have understood καὶ θεωρήσωμεν in the same way, for he assigns the words οὐδὲν ἀποκόλυων to Glauco.

We are hardly justified in making θεωρησομεν the subjunctive after βούλεσθε, in the absence of other examples in which the subjunctive follows a depend-
ent βούλε (βούλεσθε). A possible view would be to take θεωρησομεν as δὲi θεω-
ρηται and construe 'but if you wish it and we are to contemplate' etc., cf. Crat. 425 D εἰ μὴ δρα δή (MSS δεὶ)—καὶ ἦμεις—
ὑπάλλαγων (‘unless we too are to get quiet'), and Postgate in Transactions of the Camb. Philol. Soc. III Pt. I pp. 50—55. But Richards's proposal is a better one.

36 ταύτα—τισιν. γὰρ is introductory

and means not 'for' but 'well.' τισιν contains a sly allusion to Glauco: cf. v 465 E, VI 504 C.
5 θετέον, οίκιών τε καὶ ἱμάτια καὶ υποδήματα, ἀλλὰ τὴν τε χορογραφίαν κωντέον καὶ τὴν ποικιλάν καὶ χρυσὸν καὶ ἑλέφαντα καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαύτα κτητέον. ἢ γάρ; Ναι, ἐφη. Οὐκόνοι μείζονα τε αὐ τὴν Β πόλιν δεῖ ποιεῖν, ἐκείνη γὰρ ἡ ύποειν ὑπέκειται ἱκανή, ἀλλ’ ἧδη ογκοῦ ἐμπληκτέα καὶ πλῆθους, ὃ οὐκέτι τῷ ἀναγκαῖον ἐνεκα ἐστίν εἰς ταῖς πόλεσιν, οὐδ’ οὗ τι θηρευτά πάντες οὐ τε μιμηταί, πολλοὶ μὲν οἱ περὶ τὰ σχήματα καὶ χρώματα, πολλοὶ δὲ οἱ περὶ μουσικῆν, ποιηταὶ καὶ τούτων ὑπηρέται, ραβψωδοί, ὑποκριταὶ, χορευταί, ἑργολάβοι, σκευῶν τε παντοδαπῶν δημιουργοί, τῶν τε ἀλλῶν καὶ τῶν περὶ τὸν γυμνακεῖον κόσμον. καὶ δὴ καὶ διακόνων πλευρῶν 15 δησομεθα. ἢ οὖ δοκεῖ δεχέσθαι παίδαγγόν, τιτθῶν, τριφῶν, κομμωτρῶν, κουρέων, καὶ αὐ υψοποιοῦ τε καὶ μαγείρων; ἔτι δὲ καὶ συβοτῶν προσδεσμομεθα· τούτο γὰρ ἦμιν ἐν τῇ προτέρᾳ πόλει ὑπν. ἐδει γὰρ οὖν ἐν τῇ δαυτῇ καὶ τούτῳ προσδειασθεὶσ.  

6. καὶ τὴν ποικιλάν II: om. A. 7. αὐ τὴν II: αὐ τὴν A.

6 καὶ τὴν ποικιλάν. ποικιλά means variety of colour as e.g. in embroidery: cf. 378 C, 111 401 A, Euthyd. 6 C. On the omission in A see Introd. § 5. χρυσὸν καὶ ἑλέφαντα: with reference to chryselephantine statuary. Note that (according to Plato) the demand for decorative arts does not arise till the physical necessities of man are satisfied. Cf. Netteship Lectures and Remains, II p. 73. 

379 B 7 μᾶλλον ταῦτα τὴν. τε is ἀνακόλουθον (Hoccleve de part. I. p. 14); for other instances in the Republic see ν 463 Β, VII 522 Β, IX 575 Α. In this passage Richter would change τε αὐ τὴν into τοιαύτην, comparing 373 Ε; but the text is sound, and τοιαύτην would be quite wrong. αὐ τὴν τὴν πόλιν (cf. 376 Β), conjectured by Heller instead of αὐ τὴν πόλιν, is neat but needless.  

9 πλῆθους ὁι: i.e. πλῆθους τούτων οἱ, as Ficinus understood the words. Stallbaum’s alternative suggestion (that οἱ refers directly to ὑγκοῦ and πλῆθουσ) gives a poor sense. Cf. infra 373 ε.η. 

10 θηρευτά πάντες. The addition of πάντες shows that θηρευτά is used in a wide sense, including every variety of fishing as well as hunting: Laws 823 B θήρα γὰρ πάμπολο τι πράγμα ἐστὶ, περιε- λημένον ὑμώματι τῶν σχέδον ενι. πολλὴ μὲν γὰρ ἡ τῶν ἐνυδρῶν, πόλλῃ δὲ ἡ τῶν πτημῶν, πάμπολο δὲ καὶ τὸ περὶ τὰ περὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν θηρευματ. In Euthyd. 290 b–d, Soph. 219 ε ff., and Laws (l.c.), Plato makes θηρευτήκη include ‘fishing for men’ e.g. in war, or by Sophists etc. This wider meaning clearly rests upon a Platonic—or rather Socraitic (see Xen. Mem. II 6, 29, quoted by J. and C.)—metaphor, and is not intended here. Cf. Benseler in Fl. Jahrb. 1881, pp. 236 ff. Aristotle on the other hand regards hunting as characteristic of the most primitive society (Pol. A 8. 1256 Β 35 ff.), and so too Plato himself in Laws 679 Α. 

12 ἑργολάβοι—ἑργολάβοι are the poet’s servants. In Athens and elsewhere they formed regular guilds or σύνοδο τῶν περὶ τῶν Δίωνον τεχνών: cf. Arist. Probr. XXX 10. 956 Α 11 οἱ Δυσωτακοὶ τεχνών. The ἑργολάβοι contracted with the poet for the performance of his play, acting as a kind of financial agent or middleman between him and the σύνοδος to which he belonged. See Müller Bühnenaehörther, pp. 392–414. 

373 C 15 παίδαγγόν—κουρέων. We infer that in the ‘healthy’ State fathers were παίδαγγοι, mothers suckled (τιτθῶν) and nursed (τριφῶν) their own children, and the professional hair-dresser was unknown. 

17 συμβωτῶν. See on 372 Β.
373 d 20 χρείας. Cobet's χρεία is not, I think, necessary. The plural (for which cf. 369 d al.) refers to the different occasions when we may require the help of doctors.

373 d—376 c In consequence of the increase of population we shall require more land. We must accordingly appropriate some of our neighbours' territory, just as under similar conditions they will lay hands upon ours. Herein we have the genesis of War. The duties of War—according to our principle of the subdivision of labour—will involve us in a standing army of professional soldiers or 'Guardians.' Now as War demands not only concentration and application, but also a certain natural aptitude, our Guardians must be qualified by Nature for their duties: that is to say, like generous dogs, they must be quick to perceive, swift to pursue, and strong in actual fight. They should also be brave and spirited, but gentle to their fellow-citizens and one another. The union of gentleness with spirit in the same nature is rare, but not unknown among men, any more than it is among dogs. Our Guardians must in fact be 'philosophic' (φιλόσοφος), like the dog, who is a true philosopher when he defines friend and foe respectively by knowledge and by ignorance, hating the unknown, and welcoming the known. In brief, we shall require a guardian to be naturally philosophic, spirited, swift, and strong.

373 d 23 λέγωμεν. λέγωμεν may be right, but the first hand of A was apt to err in these subjunctive forms (Intro. § 5), and the Indicative is somewhat more natural here; cf. (with Schneider) 377 e ἄλλα πῶς δή λέγωμεν καὶ ποτα;

373 e—376 c τολέμοις. Stallbaum adds δή after τολέμοις with some inferior MSS. The effect of its omission is to lay special stress on the first mention of τολέμοι in τολέμοις, which should be pronounced with emphasis. Cf. IV 432 c, IX 583 c.

30 τολέμοιν—γένεσιν. War then arises from the acquisition of territory and wealth: cf. Phaed. 66 c διὰ γὰρ τὴν τῶν χρημάτων κτήσιν πάντες ἵνα τολεμεῖν ἵνα γενοίται, where war is farther traced to the body and its desires, to satisfy which we seek to multiply our possessions. Cf. Arist. Pol. A § 8. 125b 23 ἡ πολεμικὴ φύσει κτητική πᾶς ἐσται.

31 εἰ ὁν—γέγονται defines γένεσιν. War comes εἰ ὁν i.e. ἐκ τοῦτον ὁν κτλ. (ὡν for εἰ ὁν, according to the usual Greek idiom, cf. Euthyph. 10 c, and III 402 λ ἐν ἀπασιν ὁδὲ ἔστι al.), from that which involves both cities and individuals in calamities, viz. from the desire of money. Cf. 373 b n. and (for the sentiment)
w. filé, meióνον τῆς πόλεως δεῖ οὖτι σμικρῷ, ἂλλ` ὦλῳ στρατον ἐπέδω, 374 ὦ ἐξελθόν ὑπὲρ τῆς οὐσίας ἡπάσης καὶ ὑπὲρ ὅνν τῆς ἐλέγομεν διαμαχεῖται τοίς ἐπιοῦσιν. Τί δέ; η` δ` ὅσι` αὐτοὶ οὖチ ἰκανοί; Οὐκ, εἴ τι γε, ἂν δ` ἐγό, καὶ ἕμει ἀπαντεῖ ὡμολογήσαμεν καλός, 5 ἢμικα ἐπιλαττομεν τῷ πόλιν: ὡμολογοῦμεν δέ που, εἰ μέμνησαι, ἀδύνατον ένα πολλάς καλός ἐργάζεσθαι τέχνας. 'Αλληθή λέγει, ἐφη. Τι οὖν; ἂν δ` ἐγό` ἢ περὶ τοῦ πόλεμον ἢ ἀγωνία οὐ τεχνική B δοκεῖ εἶναι; Καὶ μάλα, ἐφη. Ἡ οὖν τι σκυτικής δεῖ μᾶλλον κήδεσθαι ἢ πολεμικής. Ὀδυμώδω. ἅλλα ἄρα τοῦ μὲν σκυτότομον 10 διεκκολούμεν μήτε χειρογόνως ἐπιχειρεῖν εἶναι ἁμα μήτε υφάντην μήτε οἰκοδόμοιν, ἅλλα σκυτότομοι, ἢμικα δ` ἢμικα τὸ τῆς σκυτικῆς ἐργοῦ καλός γῆρνοιτό καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐνικάστω ἄσαυτος ἐν ἀπεδίδομεν,

11. ἅλλα σκυτότομοι II: om. A.

Laus 870 Λ ff. ἢ τῶν χρημάτων τῆς ἀπόλυτον καὶ ἀπέραν τότες ἐρωταὶ μυρίων ἐντικότους δύναμι διὰ φύσιν τε καὶ ἀπαιτεῖναι τὴν κακίν κτλ. The love of money—so Plato held—is the root of all evil. This explanation is due to Schleiermacher; others (Schneider, Stallbaum, J. and C. as an alternative) refer εἴ όν to war and the like—ex cuiusmodi rebus) (Stallbaum). It is an objection to such a view that it makes Plato say that evils come from War (and the like), directly after he has declined to say anything of the sort (μεθέν γέ πω — ἐργάζεσται). Further, if ὦν referred to war, the sentiment would in itself be a platitude and almost deserve to be expunged from the text, as it is by Herverden. On the other hand εἴ όν—γίγνηται is on Schleiermacher’s view quite consistent with μεθέν γέ πω—ἐργάζεσται, for although war arises from that which harms a State, in itself it may (and does) actually do good. Good in other words may come out of evil; which is exactly the principle on which Plato evokes his ideal city out of the τροφῆς πόλις. ἢμικα γίγνηται (σκ. κακί) is equivalent (as J. and C. remark) to ἐκάστοτε; cf. Phaed. 68 D φόβος μεθένων κακῶν ὑπόμενοιν αὐτῶν οἱ ἄνδρειον τὸν βασιλέα ἐπιθυμοῦσιν. 33 ὁλο. Herverden’s conjecture μεγάλο shows to seem that he connected σμικρῷ with στρατοπέδῳ, but the meaning is ‘not by a small amount, but by a whole army.’ For the datives cf. IX 579 Cfr.

374 A 3 αὐτὸι οὖχ ἰκανοί; Glauco speaks as an Athenian citizen-soldier. In making war a profession, and citizens synonymous with soldiers, Plato is lacoinizing. The language which Isocrates (Archid. 81) applies to Sparta might in point of fact be used of Plato’s State: τῶν Ἐλλήνων διενεπθήκαν ὁὐ τῷ μεγέθει τῆς πόλεως, οὔτε τῷ πλῆθει τῶν ἀνδρῶν, ἅλλ᾽ ὧν τῆς τολμητίας ὑμῖν καταστήσαμεν στρατοπέδῳ καλὸς διοικοῦμεν καὶ πεισάρχικον ἠθέλουσι τοῖς ἄρχονσιν. Cf. Grote Plato III pp. 176, 209.

5 ὡμολογοῦμεν: without εἶναι as in x 610 C ἄθανάτου τὰς ψυχὰς ἡμοῦ, and Soph. 246 ε. The analogy of these cases shews that ἄδυνατον here is not neuter but masculine, agreeing with ἐνα. The reference is to 370 B.

374 B 9 ἅλλ᾽ ἄρα. As διεκκολούμεν is certainly interrogative, Ast conjectured ἄρα for ἄρα, but ἄρα (nichimium) is regularly present in a fortiorti arguments of this kind, either in the δέ clause (Ap. 34 C, 37 C, D, Crito 46 D) or in both (Crito 50 E, Prot. 325 B, C). In place of the second ἄρα is here written δή (τα δέ δή περὶ τῶν πέλους κτλ.). For the combination ἅλλ᾽ ἄρα cf. Soph. 243 ε ἅλλ᾽ ἄρα τὰ ἀμφότερον βούλεσθαι καλῶς ἢ; Ιςως.

11 ἅλλα σκυτότομον. See cr. n. and Introd. § 5. The homoioteleuton as well as the presence of the clause ἐνα—γίγνεται is in favour of the genuineness of these words: and the construction itself, which requires ἐκέλευομεν or the like to be supplied out of διεκκολούμεν (see Heindorf on Gorg. 457 c and Kühner Gr. Gr. 11 p. 1972), is too idiomatic to have been readily invented by a scribe.
πρὸς ὁ ἐπεφύκει ἐκατόστος καὶ ἐφ' ὁ ἐμελλε τῶν ἄλλων σχολῆς
καὶ ἄγων ἡ διὰ βίαν αὐτὸ ἑγραζόμενος οὐ παρείς τούς καιροὺς καλῶς ἀπεργάζεσθαι: τὰ δὲ δὴ περὶ τὸν πόλεμον πότερον οὐ περὶ 15 πλείστου ἐστὶν εὖ ἀπεργασθῆναι; ἡ οὖτο ράδιον, ὡστε καὶ γεωργῶν τις ᾧς πολεμικὸς ἦσται καὶ σκυτοτομῶν καὶ ἄλλην τέχνην ἤντινον ἑγραζόμενος, πεπερευτικὸς δὲ ἡ κυβευτικὸς ἰκανὸς οὖν ἀν εἰς γένοιτο μη αὐτό τοῦτο ἐκ παιδὸς ἐπιτηδεύουν, ἄλλα
D παρέργον χρόνεος; καὶ ἀστίδα μὲν λαβὼν ἡ τι ἄλλο τῶν 20 πολεμικῶν ὁπλῶν τε καὶ ὀργάνων αὐθημερὸν ὑποτικῆς ἡ τινός ἄλλης μάχης τῶν κατὰ πόλεμον ἰκανός ἦσται ἀγωνισθῆς, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ὀργάνων οὐδὲν οὐδένα δημιουργόν οὐδὲ ἀθλητὴν ληφθέν πουήσε, οὖν ἦσται χρήσιμον τῷ μίτη τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἐκάστου λαβόντι μίτη τὴν μελέτην ἰκανήν παρασχεμόνως; Πολλοὶ γὰρ ἄν, 25 ἡ δ' οὖς, τὰ ὀργάνα ἐν ἔξω.

Ε 15. Οὐκοῦν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ὅσῳ μεγίστον τὸ τῶν φυλάκων ἐργον, τοσοῦτον σχολῆς τε τῶν ἄλλων πλείστης ἀν εἶν καὶ αὐτή τέχνης τε καὶ ἐπιμελείας μεγίστης δεόμενον. Οἶμαι ἐγώγη, ἡ δ' οὖς. Ἄρ' οὖν οὐ καὶ φύσεως ἐπιτηδείας εἰς αὐτό τὸ ἐπιτηδείμα; Πῶς δ' οὖ; 30 Ἡμέτερον δὴ ἐργόν ἀν εἰν, ὡς ἐνοίκην, εἴπερ οὗτ ʼεσμέν, ἐκλέξασθαι, τίνες τε καὶ ποίαι φύσει ἐπιτηδείας εἰς πόλεως φυλακὴν. Ἡμέτερον μέντοι. Μά Δία, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, οὐκ ἀρα φαίλου πρῶγμα ἱράμεθα. 375 ὦμοι δὲ οὐκ ἀποδειλιατέου, ὅσον γ' ἂν δύναμις παρείκη. | Ὡ γὰρ

17. σκυτοτομῶν Π: σκυτοτομῶν Α.
in Plato, although παρέλκεις is found with a personal subject (ὁ θεὸς, θεός) again in Theat. 150 D, Laws 934 c. Herwerden would eject δύναμις (cf. Συμπ. 187 E καὶ ὅσον παρέλκεις), but such a word is very unlikely to have been interpolated. δύναμις is simply ‘our powers’: the article is omitted as in the idiomatic κατὰ δύναμις, εἰς δύναμις.

375 A 2. σκύλακος. A play on σκύλας and φίλας is intended. Analogies from the animal kingdom were freely employed by the historical Socrates: for the dog in particular cf. Xen. Mem. IV 1.3 καὶ τῶν κυνῶν τῶν εὐφιλετῶν, φιλοσόφων τῶν ωφών καὶ ἐπιθετικῶν τῶν θηρίων, τὰς μὲν καλὰς ἀχθείας ἀρίτας γλυκεθαί, — ἀναγήγγειν δὲ γεγραμμένα ματαίους τέκνα καὶ μαυρίδες καὶ δυσπαιριστάς. Cf. ii. on φῶκα 370 λ.

5 αὐτοθανόμενον: ‘the moment he perceives.’ The present (where one might expect the aorist) emphasizes the rapidity with which pursuit follows upon sight.

7 ἀνδρεῖοι. For ἀνδρεῖος applied to beasts cf. Isocr. 15. 211 εἷς περὶ τῶν ἐπιτυχεὶς καὶ τῶν κύνας καὶ τῶν πλείστα τῶν ἐν σοι καὶ ἀνδρεία σαμαριτών τῶν ἀνδρείων τέχνας ἔχοντας τινὰς, αἱ τὰ μὲν ἀνδρείατερα, τὰ δὲ πρῶτερα, τὰ δὲ θρονικάτερα ποιοῦσιν, περὶ τῶν τῶν ἀνδρείαν ὑπονοοῦν ἐνόμισαν πάνταν καὶ ταῦτα πρὸς τὸν κύναν κτλ. See also Lach. 196 δ—197 b and Arist. Eth. Nic. III 11. 1116b 33 ff.

8 θυμοειδῆς. The technical term θυμοειδῆς is here for the first time used in the Republic. Plato probably inherited the word from Socrates (see Xen. Mem. IV 1.3 τῶν τε ὑπὸ τῶν εὐφιλετῶν, θυμοειδεῖς τε καὶ εὐφιλετῶς ὑπόστας κτλ.), in practice he employs it as the adjective corresponding to θυμός (see e.g. III 411 A, B), as ἐπιθυμητικός corresponds to ἐπιθυμία. The usual translation ‘spirited’ probably expresses the meaning as nearly as can be done by a single word. For a full discussion of the word reference may be made to P. Meyer οἱ θυμοί σφ. Arist. Platounique (1876), whose conclusion (p. 65) is οἱ τῶν θυμῶν esse eam naturalen vim, qua ductus suam quasiquips propiorum naturam explerre student, quaque incentatus, quaecunque hanc naturam ipsi propriam tollere vel laedere conetur, fugiatur, quae contra perfecto rei reddère possint, adipetat.” See also on IV 439 E.

375 B 9 ἀμαχόν—ἀνίκητον. Ast may be right in supposing that Plato has in view the words of Heraclitus, often referred to in antiquity, θυμὸς μᾶχεσθαι καλεῖται, δὲ τὰ γὰρ ἀν χρήσις γίνεσθαι, ψυχῆς σώφρενα (Pr. 105 Bywater).

αὐτοὺς ἔναι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς πολεμίους ἠλπίζοντα· εἰ δὲ μὴ, οὐ περιμένονταν ἄλλους σφῆς διόλεσαι, ἀλλὰ αὐτοῖ φθισονται αὐτὸ δρᾶσαιντε. Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη. Τὶ οὖν, ἂν δ᾽ ἐγὼ, ποιήσωμεν; πόθεν ἀμα πράον καὶ μεγαλόθυμου ἥδος εὑρίσκομεν; ἐναντία γὰρ τῶν θυμοειδεὶ πραεία φύσει. Φαίνεται, ἄλλα μὲντοι τοῦτον ὁποτέρον 20 ἄν ἄτέρηται, φύλαξ ἄγαθος οὐ μὴ γένηται· ταύτα δὲ ἄδυνατοι.

Δ ἔοικεν, καὶ οὗτο δὴ ἐξιμβαίνει ἄγαθον φύλακα ἄδυνατον γενέσθαι. Κινδυνεύει, ἔφη, καὶ ἐγὼ ἀπορήσας τε καὶ ἐπισκεψάμενος τὰ ἐμπρόσθεν, Δικαῖως γε, ἢν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὃ φίλε, ἀποροῦμεν· ἢ γὰρ προεδρεύει εἰκών ἀπελείφθημεν. Πῶς λέγεις; Οὐκ ἐνοίχαμεν, 25 ὃτι εἰσίν ἄρα φύσεις, οίας ἴμεις οὐκ ὕθημεν, ἔχουσαι τάναντι ταύτα. Ποῦ δὴ; "Ἰδοι μὲν ἂν τις καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ζῴους, οὐ μέντ᾽ ἄν ἔκκαθητα ἐν φύσεις παρεβαλλόμεν τῷ φύλακι. οἴσθα γάρ ποιῶν τῶν γεγοναίων κυνὸν, ὃ τούτω φύσει ἀυτῶν τῷ ἥδος, πρὸς μὲν τοὺς συνήθεις τε καὶ γνωρίμους ὡς οἶνον τε προστάτους εἶναι, πρὸς δὲ 30 τοὺς ἀγνώτας τοῦναιντόν. Ὁδὰ μέντοι. Τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα, ἢν δ᾽ ἐγώ, δυνατὸν, καὶ οὐ παρὰ φύσιν ἔγκυουμεν τοιοῦτον εἶναι τὸν φύλακα. Οὐκ ἔοικεν.

XVI. Ἀρ᾽ οὖν σοι δοκεῖς ἔτι τούδε προσδείκνας ὁ φυλακικὸς ἐσόμενος, πρὸς τῷ θυμοειδεὶ ἔτι προσγενέσθαι φιλόσοφος τὴν 35

375 c 19 ἐναντίᾳ γὰρ—φύσεις. Plato regarded this opposition as the fundamental antithesis of human character, and thought it a statesman’s foremost duty to blend the θυμοείδες and πρᾶον harmoniously together: see Pol. 306 c—311 c, infra III. 410 B E F, VI 503 C, Theaet. 144 A, B.

21 ταύτα—ἔοικεν. Van Heusden (Initia Phil. Philat, p. 471 n. 1) somewhat hastily declares these words to be corrupt, and supplies ἄμφοτερα ἔχειν after ταύτα δὲ, ταύτα refers like τούτοις simply to the two qualities πρᾶον and μεγαλόθυμον: ‘theses)—meaning the combination of these as opposed to one of them—‘are apparently unattainable’: cf. VI 499 D οὐ γὰρ ἄδυνατος γενέσθαι, οὐδ᾽ ἴμεις ἄδυνατα λέγομεν.

375 d 25 ἐνοίχαμεν—φύσεις. ἐνοίχαμεν (with γε) is read by most of the editors, quite unnecessarily, as Schneider shews. νοεῖν is not ‘putare,’ nor—I think—‘perpendere,’ but simply ‘animadvertere,’ ‘notice,’ as often. Such a meaning is peculiarly appropriate with ἔοικεν following. Presently ἄρα is not ‘then’ (J. and C.), but ‘after all.’

38 τῷ φύλακι: not τῷ σκύλακι, as Groen van Prinsterer conjectured (Plat. Prose, p. 209). τῷ φύλακι of course depends on παρεβάλλομεν, and ἐν φύσει is for ἐν τῷν ὃ.

375 e 29 αὐτῶν τῷ ἥδος. With αὐτῶν (unnecessary, but welcome, after τῶν γεγοναίων κυνὸν) cf. IV 428 λ. τῷ· πρὸς μὲν—τοῦναίντον. In Od. XVI 4—10 the dogs of Eumaeus do not bark at Telemachus, and Odysseus remarks (8, 9) Ἑλµάϊ, ἢ μάλα τίς τοῖς εἴλεσται ἐνδιὰ ἐταίρος ἢ καὶ γνῶριμος ἄλος, ἐπεῖ κἀκεῖνα οὐχ ὑλάνουσιν ἄλλα περσασαινοῦν. See also Od. XIV 30, where they bark at the stranger Odysseus, and cf. Heracl. 115 (Bywater) κἀκεῖνα καὶ βαίζουσιν ὅ τι ἄν μὴ γνωσκοίμῃ. In Aristotle similar characteristics are attributed to the lion: see Physogn. 5. 809 b 34—36 μεγαλόφυσοι καὶ φιλόνικοι, καὶ πραβί καὶ δικαιοὶ καὶ φιλόστορον πρὸς ἄν ὁμιλήσῃ, and Hist. An. IX 14. 623 b 10—12.

35 πρὸς τῷ θυμοειδεὶ κτλ. There
seems to be no other example in good Greek of προογενεσθαι meaning ‘to become in addition’; but we may compare προογενεσθαι II 373 A, προογενεσθαι VII 521 D, προογενεσθαι X 607 B, and similar instances with other verbs. I formerly wrote φιλοσοφον for φιλοσοφος (‘that to the element of spirit nature should have added’—προογενεσθαι, i.e., accessisse, cf. I 346 D —‘a philosophical temperament’). The accusative with infinitive has however a harsh effect. Herwerden cuts the knot by deleting the προο- of προογενεσθαι.

376 A 3 ὅτι—προπεπονδεσ. Schneider justly observes that ὅτι is not likely to be an interpolation, and might easily have disappeared before δι, as it has in A (see cr. n.). In itself the presence of ὅτι is an improvement. For οὐδεὶς δὲ ν (supported also by Stobaeus Flor. 43. 149) reads οὐδεὶς, which may be right. Cobet's οὐδὲ ν is too emphatic.

5 οὐ πάνυ—τὸν νοῦν: 'I have hardly thought of the matter till now.' μέχρι δὲ τοῦτο is more idiomatic than μέχρι τοῦτο in this sense, but Xen. Cyr. viii 8. 9 and Dem. de Cor. 48 are closely analogous instances. The alternative rendering 'my observation has hardly extended so far,' is (in view of οὐ πάνυ τοῦτο ἐθαύμασα;) less suitable.

376 B 8 ὑδ άληθῶς φιλόσοφον. ὧδ άληθῶς indicates that φιλόσοφον is to be taken in its etymological sense: cf. I 343 c. n. The dog shews 'a love of knowledge' because he loves the known, and hates the unknown. Brandt (Zur Entwick. d. Pl. Lehr. i. a. Seelenth. p. 19) ingeniously takes φιλόσοφον as ἀσοφὸν τοῦ φίλου: but the other interpretation is more natural and relevant. There is perhaps an allusion to the Cynics: see Schol. in Arist. ed. Brandis (Berlin 1836) 23b 16 ff. τετάρτη δὲ (sc. αἰτία τοῦ κληθηματος) ὅτι διακριτωσ δύον οὸ κόσμων γνῶσε καὶ ἀναγκα τῶν φιλῶν καὶ τῶν ἀλλήντων δρίξουν ὅν γὰρ γεγονόκει, μοιῆς φιλὸν εἶναι καὶ εἰ ὡσποδό επιφέροντο, ὅν ὃν ἀγορεί ἐχθρῶν, καὶ εἰ ὑλείας εὐφερέμων εἰ, οὐτῶς οὖν καὶ οὕτως τοὺς μὲν εὑπηδεῖον πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν φίλουν ἔμπνευσεν καὶ εὐμενες ἔθεχοντο, τοὺς δὲ ἀνεπιθυμηθέντος ἄποθαλαμεὶς ἄνακρουν καὶ οὕτως ἀλακτοῦσε, and Philoponus ed. 35a 5—12.

The Cynics were themselves very fond of pointing the moral from the lower animals to man (Dümmler Proleg. p. 52 n. 2), and Plato here paints them not unkindly in colours of their own. It should be noted that throughout II—IV Plato uses φιλοσοφος and φιλοσοφα with less of an intellectual than of a moral connotation. In the earlier books the word is for the most part connected with a gentle considerate disposition or character, whether naturally implanted or the result of culture (cf. III 410 E, 411 C, 411 E): in 407 C the sense is somewhat different. See Nettleship in Hellenica pp. 77—79, and Krohn Pl. St. p. 71. It is not until the latter part of Book V (473 B ff.) where Plato is proposing to enter on the third and final stage of his ideal city, viz. the καταστασις τῶν ἀρχώνων, that the intellectual aspect of the word begins to predominate over the moral. Cf. IV 439 D n.
15. philosophos II et in mg. Α²: om. Α¹. 22, 23. ἵνα—διεξήμεν Π et in mg. Α²: om. Α¹.

376 ε] ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ B 109

καὶ ἄγνοια ὀρειχόμενον τὸ το οἰκεῖον καὶ τὸ ἀλλότριον; Οὕδαμως, ἡ δὲ ὅς, ὅπως οὐ. 'Αλλὰ μὲντοι, εἰπον ἐγὼ, τὸ γε φιλομαθὲς καὶ

философов таυτί; Ταυτόν γὰρ, ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν ταραττοῦντες τιθομεν καὶ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ, εἰ μέλλει πρὸς τοὺς οἰκείους καὶ γνωρίμους.

C πρᾶξις τις ἑσσηθαὶ, φύσει φιλόσοφον καὶ φιλομαθῆ αὐτὸν δεῖν 15
eiav; Τιθομεν, ἐφη. Φιλόσοφος δὴ καὶ θυμοειδῆς καὶ ταχύς καὶ

συχνῶς ἡμῖν τὴν φύσιν ἑσται ὁ μέλλων καλὸς καγάθως ἑσσηθαὶ

φύλαξ πόλεως; Πανταπας µὲν οὖν, ἐφη. Οὔτοις µὲν δὴ ἄν οὕτως

ὑπάρχοι. βρέφονται δὲ δὴ ἡμῖν οὗτοι καὶ παιδευθήσονται τίνα

D τρόπον; καὶ ἄρα τι προὐργον ἡμῖν ἐστὶν αὐτὸ σκοποῦσι 1 πρὸς 20

τὸ κατιδεῖν, οὔτε ἑνεκά πάντα σκοποῦμεν, δικαιούσην τε καὶ

ἀδικιάν τινα τρόπον ἐν πόλει γίγνεται, ίνα µὴ ἐωμεν ἰκανῶν

λόγων ἡ συχνῶν διεξήμων; καὶ το τοῦ Γλαύκωνος ἀδελφός Πάνω

µὲν οὖν, ἐφη, ἐγώῃ προσδόκω προὐργον εἶναι εἰς τοῦτο ταῦτην

τὴν σκέψιν. Μά Δία, ἣν δὴ ἐγὼ, δὴ φίλε 'Αδείμαιτε, οὐκ ἄρα 25

ἀφετέον, οὐδ' εἰ μακροτέρα τυχάναι οὕτα. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. Ἰθ' οὖν,

ὡςπερ ἐν µύθῳ µωθολογούντες τε καὶ σκολῆν ἀγοντες λόγῳ

Ε παιδεύσωμεν 1 τοὺς ἄνδρας. 'Αλλὰ χρη.

376 c 15 φότα is better taken with philosophos than with πρᾶσ. Cf. 375 b. 20 ἄρα τι προὐργον κτλ. See on 368 ε.

376 d 22 ἵνα µή—διεξήμεν. See εἰ. The omission in the text of A may be accidental (see Introd. § 5), but the sentence is certainly a difficult one. If the MSS are right, the meaning must be “For we do not want to be tedious,”—

but συχρός is rather ‘lengthy’—“and we do not want to leave unsaid what is required for completeness” (J. and C., comparing for συχρό Theaet. 185 ε, Phil. 23 b al.). The conjectures of Teuffel (Rhein. Mus. 1850 p. 469) and Herwerden (Minem. N. S. XI p. 339)—

 đèn ἵνα (50 γ) ἐωμεν συχρόν (50 γ) λόγων ἦ

ἰκανῶν (50 γ) διεξήμων καὶ ἵνα μὴ ἐωμεν συχρόν λόγων ἦν

ὄχι ἰκανῶν διεξήμων—improve the antithesis, but are much
too violent. It is safest to retain the MS reading until a thoroughly satisfactory emendation appears. Dr Jackson suggests ἵνα µὴ ἐωμεν ἰκανῶν λόγων ἦν

ὄχι ἰκανῶν διεξήμων.

376 c—376 e Let us next consider how to educate our future Guardians: the enquiry may help us to discover the origin of justice and injustice.

We may accept the traditional view that Education consists in ‘Music,’ or culture of the soul, and Gymnastic, or culture of the body. ‘Music’ must be begun before Gymnastic. Now ‘Music’ includes literature (λόγου), and literature is either true or false (µῦθοι). We shall educate our children by false literature before we teach them true; but we shall eschew all legends that incultate views inconsistent with those which we desire our Guardians to entertain when they are men. Makers of legend or fable must be submitted to a censorship, and most of our present legends rejected. Caricatures of the gods, like the stories about Cronus and Uranus, Zeus and Cronus, are not only false in themselves, but ought not, even if they were true, to be told to children, lest they breed inhumanity and filial impiety; nor should children be persuaded by Poetry or other imitative arts to believe that the gods
quarrel and fight among themselves. No plea of a 'deeper meaning' (συμβολή) can justify the telling of such tales to children; for children cannot distinguish the spirit from the letter, and impressions made thus early are difficult to efface.

376 E ff. τίς οὖν ἡ παιδεία; κτλ. The educational scheme contained in Books II and III contributes to the purgation of the τριφόσα πόλις, and thereby helps to complete Plato’s second picture of an ideal city; see on 372 d ff. For the correct understanding of these regulations it is well to bear in mind (1) that Plato’s object in this preliminary discipline is to train the character rather than the intellect (cf. IV 430 c n.), and (2) that all the guardians have to pass through this curriculum. The higher scheme of education (in Book VII), on the other hand, is confined to those guardians who are to be made Rulers in the State, and its express aim is to educate the intellect rather than the will. See especially VI 502 E, VII 521 D—522 A n. The best discussion on Plato’s theory of education in its broader aspects is still, I think, Nettleship’s Essay in Hellenica pp. 67—180. Plato’s Erziehungstheorie n. s. Schrift, dargestellt von Dr A. Drygas Schneidermühl 1880 is a useful summary. For Plato’s criticism of poetry, we may refer in particular to Heine’s excellent dissertation De rat. quae Platoni c. poet. Gr. intercircit &c. Vratsalvae 1880, and to Reber’s Plato und die Poesie Leipzig, 1864.

376 E 30 ἔστιν δὲ ποιο—μουσική. The usual Greek view (see for example Isocr. 15. 180—185), corrected by Plato in III 410 c ff.

33 εἶτον. Richter (Fl. Jahrb. 1867 p. 141) revives Muretus’s conjecture είδος; but εἶτον is alone satisfactory. The confusion of ο and ο occurs in Inscriptions from the third century B.C. onwards (Meisterhans3 p. 24 n. 128). See also Introd. § 5.

λόγον δὲ—τετερον. The word ‘lies’ is here used by Plato in its popular sense of that which is false in fact: his own definition of the ‘veritable lie’ is different; see 382 B n. ‘Lies’ are necessary—so Plato holds—in education: only they must be moral lies. Under ‘lies’ he includes stories (μισθόν) about the gods, about the daemons and heroes long since dead, about a future life—all of them subjects where the alleged facts cannot be verified. The ἀληθεῖς λόγοι are concerned with men, and are passed over by Plato, because he could not state his view without anticipating the conclusion which the Republic is intended to prove (see III 392 A—C). This point is missed by Krohn (Fl. St. p. 12).

377 A 4 ἀληθής: i.e. truths of fact or history, not yet with reference to moral truth, for nothing has been said to change the connotation of ψευδός or its opposite ἀληθής. In Plato’s view legend contains some elements of historical truth.

6 ἀρχή—μυθώστον: semi-proverbial, with reference to ἀρχή ἡμῶν πατήρ: cf.
Laws 753 E, and (for the application of the sentiment) ib. 765 E.

377 B 8 μάλιστα — τύπον. See cr. n. To τύποι there are two objections: (1) the subject of πλάττεται and ἐνδυέται should be the same; but the subject of πλάττεται is not τύποι, but the νέο καὶ ἀπαλός ὑπόνοι, cf. πλάττειν τὰς ψυχὰς in c below: (2) it is more natural and correct to say that an object which ‘is being moulded’ ‘puts on’ a τύπος, than to say that the τύπος sinks into it. Reading τύπον we obtain the proper contrast between ἐνδυέται and ἐνσμηναθᾶναι: the youth puts on whatever impression or type the educator desires to stamp him with. The metaphor becomes more explicit in Plutarch De lib. el. als. 3 καθάπερ γὰρ σφραγίζει τοῖς ἁπαλοῖς ἐνσποράττονται κηροῖς, οὕτως αἱ μαθήσεις ταῖς τῶν ἐπὶ παιδιῶν ψυχαῖς ἐνσποράττονται. Cf. also Theat. 191 D and Hor. Epist. II 2 8 argilla quidvis imitatibus uda.

10 ῥάδιος οὗτο: ‘carelessly, without more ado’: cf. 378 A and 1 331 C. This idiomatic οὗτο is common with adverbs like ῥάδιος, εἰκῇ, ἀπλῶς, ὡς, ἐξάφηνε: for examples see Blaydes on Ar. Wasps 461.

377 C 15 καλὸν: sc. μῦθον, which some MSS (including II) insert. For μῦθον understood from μῦθοσου cf. 111 399 D, where τοῦτο i.e. αὐτὸς is understood from αὐτοποιεῖν, 410 A, where αὐτὸ (i.e. λατρεία) follows λατρεία, 411 421 E, and (with Schneider) Laws 886 C θεογνίαι διεξέρχονται, γενομένοι τε (sc. αὐτοὶ) ὡς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐμφανές.

17 πλάττειν κτλ. Mothers and nurses practised massage on the bodies of infants: cf. Laws 78 D τιθέντες νόμοι τὴν μὲν κύουσαν περιπατεῖν, τὸ γενόμενον δὲ πλάττειν τὸν κηρὸν ἐγερθῆναι, καὶ μέχρι δύον ἄτοι σπαργανάν, and Alc. 1 121 D. A trace of massage practised for medical purposes appears in Zeno Fr. 180 (ed. Pearson).

377 D 23 ἔλεγέτην. The dual links together Homer and Hesiod as jointly responsible for Greek theology: see on 363 A. Among the first to rebel against their authority were Pythagoras, Xenophanes, and Heraclitus (D. L. viii 21, ix 18, ix 1). Xenophanes’ protest was particularly famous in antiquity: see Sext. Emp. adv. Math. 1 289 and 1 193 ap. Ritter and Preller Hist. Philos. Gr. pp. 76, 77. Plato’s attack on the Olympian
112

PLATONOS

τοι, γάρ του μέγας τους ἀνθρώποις ψευδείς συνετ-25 θέντες ἐλεγόν τε καὶ λέγουσι. Ποίοις δὴ, ἢ δ' ὁς, καὶ τί αὐτῶν μεμφόμενοι λέγεις; "Οπερ, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, χρῆ καὶ πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα μέμφεσθαι, ἅλλως τε καὶ ἐὰν τις μὴ καλὸς ψευδήται. 1 Τι τούτο; Ε' "Οταν εἰκάζῃ τις κακῶς τῷ λόγῳ περὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἥρωων οἰοὶ εἰσών, ὡσπερ γραφεῖς μηδὲν εὐκότα γράφον πῶς ἄν ὁμοία βούλθη στὰ γράψαι. Καὶ γάρ, ἐφη, ὅρθως ἔχει τα γε τοιαύτα μέμφεσθαι. ἅλλα πῶς δὴ λέγομεν καὶ ποια; Πρῶτον μὲν, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, τὸ μέγιστον καὶ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων ψευδός ὁ εἰσόμενῳ οὐ καλὸς ἐξευθέσθη, ὡς Οὐρανος τε εἰργάσατο ἅ φησι δράσαπτα αὐτόν Ησίοδος, ὥ τα αὐ τά Κρόνος ὡς ἐτιμορήσατο αὐτόν τα δὲ δή | τοῦ Κρόνου ἔργα καὶ 378 πάθη ὑπὸ τοῦ ψευστοῦ ὑπὸ τῆς ἁλλοῦ ἀληθῆς, ὅμως δεῖ γῆς ὅτω λέγεσθαι πρὸς ἄφορνας τε καὶ νέους, ἅλλα μάλιστα μὲν σγαθαίναι, ἐδὲ ἅμας τὴν ἁλλοῦ λέγειν, δὲ ἀπορρήτων ἀκούειν ὡς ἀληθικοῦς, 5 θυσιμένους οὐ χοίρον, ἅλλα τί μέγα καὶ ἄραρον θήμα, ὅτως τι τὸ ἐλαχίστος συνεβάλλει ἀκούσας. Καὶ γάρ, ἢ δ' ὁς, οὐτοί γε τοις οὖν χαλεποί. Καὶ οὐ λεκτέοι γ', ἐφη, ὃ Ἀθείμαντε, 1 ἐν τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ Θείᾳ τόλης, οὐδὲ λεκτέοι νέον ἀκούσας, ὡς ἀδικῶν τὰ ἐσχάτα οὐδὲν ἀν

theology in this and the succeeding book was perhaps the severest blow that Paganism received before the Christian era, and pointed the way for those exaggerated diatribes against the heathen gods in which it afterwards became the fashion of early Christian apologists to indulge, beginning with the Apology of Aristides (cc. 8—11). Cf. x 607 b 2. 26 ἀπερ- χεῦξα. ἀπερ is τῆς εἰκα- θεύν κακῶς περὶ βοήθειας. A distinction is drawn between mere lies and the lie which is in itself oὐ καλὸς, unbeautiful and immoral in tendency, e.g. the story of Uranus and Cronus (ὁ εἰσόμενῳ οὐ καλὸς ἐψέβαστο εἰς δικαίωτα). Such legends not merely misrepresent the gods, but also corrupt mankind.

377 Ε 23 εἰκάζῃ. It is taken for granted that Poetry is a species of imitation: cf. Lat. 608 a—ε. 32 τῶν μεγίστων: masculine, not neuter: cf. 378 b. 33 Ἡσίοδος. Theog. 154—181. 34 τῇ δὲ δή κτλ. δή emphasizes the case of Cronus as the most important (cf. Prot. 313 ο, 312 δ): it is so because the delinquent is Zeus, the reigning king of gods and men. The example set by Zeus on this occasion was no doubt sometimes used to justify wrong-doing: see for example Aesch. Eum. 649, 641, Ar. Clouds 904—906 δὴ ἄρας ἄκρας ὅσοις ὁ Ζεὺς ὃς ἀπαλλάξει τῷ πατέρϊ αὐτοῦ δῆμας; ib. 1079 ff., Eur. H. F. 1317—1319, and especially Pl. Euthyph. 5 ε— 6 δ, where Euthyphro urges the analogy in all seriousness to justify his vexatious prosecution of his own father. The pernicious effect of such legends on human conduct is again pointed out in Lat. 886 c, 941 b: cf. also Isocr. Bus. 38—43, Luc. Men. 1, and Grote Plato III p. 194 n. 378 a 2 ραπίσμων οὖτος: 377 b 2. 5 θυσαμένοις — ἀκούσα. ἀπορρήτων suggests the mysteries, whereas the allusion to the 'mythic pig' (Ar. ACh. 764). For ἄραρον, 'unprocurable' (Jowett), ἄραρον has been suggested, absurdly enough. ἄραρον is further explained by ὁρία— ἀκουσαί. It should be noted that ἀρων with a past tense of the indicative in clauses of this kind is rare in Plato: it occurs again only in Lat. 930 b, 959 c (where ἀρ should be expunged). Cf. Weber in Schanz's Beiträge zur hist. Synt. d. Gr. Sprache II 2, p. 64.
378 B 9 οῦδ’ αὖ has been needlessly doubted by Richter (Fl. Jahrb. 1867 p. 142), who suggests οὖνθέ. The words αὖ...ποιοι correspond to the conduct of Uranus and Cronus towards their children: οὖθ’, λέγοντα τοῦ αὖ...ποιοί: τοῦ Ράδιων αὐλῆ- λοις ἀπεχθανέσθαι: πολλοῦ δεὶ γραμμομαχίας τε μυθολογητέον ἄμφος καὶ ποικιλέως, καὶ ἄλλας ἐγγίας πολλάς καὶ παντοδαπὰς θεῶν τε καὶ ἱρῶν πρὸς συγγενεῖς τε καὶ οἰκείους αυτῶν. ἄλλ’ εἰ πως μέλλομεν πείσεσθαι, ὡς οὖνθέ τοποτε πολιτείας ἐτερος ἐτέρῳ ἀπίγραθον οὖθ’ ἐστιν τοῦτο οὐσίν, τοιαύτα λεκτέα μᾶλλον πρὸς τα παιδιά εὔθεις καὶ γέρουσι καὶ γραυσί, καὶ προσβεβόροις γυναιμένοι καὶ τοὺς ποιητὰς ἐγγένει τοῦτω ἀναγκαστέον λογο- 11. δοκεὶ ν: δοκῶ ἈΠΕ. 19. λεκτέα Π: om. A.

378 C 15 πολλοῦ δεὶ—ποικιλέων. πολλοῦ δεὶ is not adverbal (like ἀκόστα), as J. and C. assert: otherwise δεὶ would be πολλοῦ (so Herverden would read Μεμν. N. S. XI p. 339). The asyndeton is justified by emphasis and the ampliative character of the sentence. The verbs are best explained (with Stallbaum) by supposing an ellipse of εἰσα: cf. Schanz Νοε. Connn. Pl. p. 33.

16 ποικιλέων. ποικιλεω is used of depicting in a variety of colours (VIII 557 c), not necessarily by embroidery. Cf. 373 a n. There is probably a special reference here to the πέπλοι. At the greater, if not also at the lesser, Pana- thenaica festival, a robe woven by Athenian maidens and representing the triumph of Athena and the Olympians over the giants, together with other celestial fights, was carried in procession to the Acropolis, and presented to the statue of the goddess in the Erechtheum; cf. Euthyph. 6 b, c and Mommsen Feste d. Stadt Athen pp. 107 ff. The subject was depicted on the Parthenon frieze: see Baumeister Deuk. d. kl. Alterth. II p. 1185. The allusion to the ceremony is the more appropriate in this connexion, if, as appears to be probable, the action of the dialogue takes place just before the great Panathenaea of 410 B.C. See Introd. § 7.

18 ῥᾳδὲς κτλ. Plato desires to obtain a religious sanction for his institutions, as in the myth III 414 b ff. The best δημιογόρος, according to Socrates, is ἐν στάσει τε παιδός καὶ ἡμίονιον ἑπινοι (Xen. Mem. IV 6. 14): and the Platonic State may from this point of view be regarded as "an attempt to determine the ways and means of securing political διονυσία." (Krohn Pl. St. p. 309).

19 λεκτέα—see cr. n.—cannot be dispensed with. Madvig's suggestion, that μᾶλλον is corrupt for φαίνειν or φαίνετο or the like, and Liebhold's μελέτην for μᾶλλον, are much less probable than the accidental omission of λεκτέα in A. See Introd. § 5. Vermehren (Pl. Stud. p. 92), rejecting λεκτέα, would carry on μυθολο- γητέον or the like; but this solution is much too difficult.

378 D 20 καὶ προσβεβόροις γυναι- μένοις. The dative goes with λογοποιεῖν ('to make tales for them as they grow older'), and καὶ before τοῖς ποιηταῖς means...

30 XVIII. "Exei gair, efhi, λόγουν. 'Alλ' ei tais aù kai taúta érototny hìmas, taúta ἀπτα ἐστιν kai tīnes oι μῦθοι, tīnas ἀν fαιμεν; kai ἔγω εἰπον Ω 'Adeimante, ούκ ἐσμέν poihtai ἐγὼ te kai συ ἐν τῷ παρόντι, | 'Alλ' οἰκισταὶ πόλεως. οἰκισταῖς δὲ τοὺς 379 μὲν τύπους προσήκει εἰδέναι, ἐν οἷς δὲ μυθολογεῖν τοὺς ποιητάς, παρ' ὸδος ἐαν ποιῶσιν οὐκ ἐπιτρεπτέον, οὐ μὴν αὐτοῖς γε ποιητῶν μῦθους. 'Oρθῶς, ἐφη' 'Alλ' αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο, οἱ τύποι περὶ θεολογίας,

etiam. This explanation was proposed by Richter (Fl. Jahr. 1867 p. 138) and Vermehren (L. c. p. 91), and is probably right. Cf. Ar. Frogs 1054 f. Others connect the words with καὶ γέρουσι καὶ γρασί: old men, old women, and the boys themselves as they grow older, must tell such stories πρὸς τὰ παιδία εὖθος. But it is difficult to understand τοὺς παιδίους with γγουμένους unless πρεασμέρῳς γγομένους is construed with λογοποιεῖν.

22 υέσει. Hephaestus. Δός is a false reading derived from a mistaken reference to H. XV 18 ff. The story (according to Clement ap. Suid. s. vν. "Hras de desmous upo theas") was in Pindar: parā Pindarō γαρ ὑπὸ 'Hfaisston desmēntai et ὑπ' ὑπ' αὐτοῦ katakevantrēnti ὑράγ—καὶ φασι δειῆ ταυτή ἐπιθυμεῖσαν Ἡρακλέ. Cf. Paus. I 20. 3.

'Ηfaisston myfies. II. 1 586—594.

23 ἱερομαχίας—οὖν παράδεικτων. Homer II. XX I—74, XLI 385—513. Cf. Xenophon Fr. II. i. 19—22 (Bergk) and Pind. Ol. IX 43. 44 μυ νν λαλαν τοιαυτ' ει τύλειον μάχαν τε πᾶσαν χωρίς ἀβαντών.

24 εν υπονοιαις: adverbial, like ἐν φαρμακόν εἶδε 111 380 B (J. and C.). The allegorical interpretation of Homer probably originated in the desire to save his character for piety and morality; πάρρη γαρ ἤκριβην (says Heracles Alleg. Hom. ad init.), ei μοῦν ἥλλη

γόρησεν. Before the time of Plato it was practised by Theagenses of Rhegium, Anaxagoras, Metrodorus of Lampascus, Stesimbrotos of Thasos and others: see Wolf Proleg. ad Homerum pp. 161—166 and Jebb's Homer p. 89. In Plato's day the Cynics were the chief exponents of this school of criticism, especially Anti-sthenes: examples may be found in Winckelmann's Antisth. Frag. pp. 16, 23—28: cf. also Dümmler Antisthenica pp. 16 ff. Dümmler, many of whose combinations are highly speculative, regards the present passage as directed against Antisthenes, whose rivalry with Plato is well known: but there is nothing to suggest any personal reference. The historical Socrates occasionally played with the same weapons, as appears from Xen. Symp. 3. 6, and Mem. I 3. 7: so also does Plato, but seldom, if ever, without irony, e.g. Rep. I 332 B ἡμενατο—ὁ Σμωνίδης ποιητήκως: cf. also Theaet. 194 c, Alc. 11 147 B—Dals. Plato's attacks upon Homer lent a great impetus to this method of exegesis—the only method, as it was thought, by which his animadversions could be met: cf. Schow's Heracles pp. 225—234.

378 E—380 C What then are the bounds in which our legends must be cast? God should always be represented as He really is. Now God is good, and as good cannot be the cause of evil, He
is the cause of little to the human race,
for evil is far more common in the world than good. This is one of the canons
which our poets are to observe: but it is
constantly violated by Homer and others.
Evil must never be attributed to the gods;
or, if it is, it must be represented as a
chastening visitation for the sufferer’s good.

379 A 5 οίοι τυγχάνειν—έν μέλεσιν.
typhxhaini φων —really is it?: cf. I 337 B n.
On the omission of έως te en melosin in A
see Intro’d. § 5.

379 B 8 ἀλλα μην κτλ. It is first
proved that good is not the cause of evil
(αλλα μην—πας γαρ!); and next that
good is the cause of évtragia (τα δε:—
ναι): the conclusions are then stated in
the reverse order. The step by which each
conclusion is reached—the identification
of άγαθων and ὑφέλιμων—is Socratic
(cf. Xen. Mem. iv 6. 8); but it is doubtful
if the historical Socrates ever went so far
as to deny that God is sometimes the
cause of real evil or adversity to man,
in spite of his belief in Providence (Mem.
14 and iv 3; yet I 4. 16 οει δ άν τούτος
θεοί τοίς ἀνθρώποις δόζαν εμφάνιη, άσ
ικανον εἰναι εκ καὶ κακως ποτεινει, ει μη
dvnapoη ήσαι;). The moral goodness
of the Deity himself was proclaimed
before Socrates and Plato by Xenophanes,
Pindar, and the dramatists,
but the inference, that God, because
He is good, is never the cause of evil,
is probably due to Plato. Bacchylides
expresses a kindred sentiment in Fr. 29
(Bergk) ζειν υφεμένον, δε ἀπαντα δέρ-
κεται, οιν αίτιον θανατοι μεγάλων ἄκεων.
Read in the light of Book vi, the theology
of this and the succeeding chapters gains,
no doubt, in significance and depth; yet
it is illegitimate to argue on this account
(as Susemihl does Genet. Entwicke. II
p. 121) that the existence of the Idea of
Good is already presupposed, unless
it is shewn that Plato could not have
purified his theology except by meta-
physics. In point of fact, Plato might
have written the end of Book III even
if he had never thought of the Ideas
at all.

379 C 15 ουδ' ἀρα—πάντων. Con-
trast Aesch. Ag. 1482, 1486 Δίος παναιτον
πανεργετα. | τα γαρ βροτοι άνευ Δίως τε-
λειται; Suppl. 822—824 and many other
examples in Nägelsbach Hom. Theol.
16, 18, 60 ff., 73 ff.

17 παλιν γάρ—ήμιν. An old saying,
as appears from Pind. Pyth. 3. 81 ff.
μανθάων ονθα προτέρων: έν ταρ' ελον
ηματα σινόν δαιονται βροτοι | άλάνατοι,
and Eur. Suppl. 196, 7: cf. also Hom.
II. xxiv 537 ff., Phil. Fr. Inc. 65
(ed. Meineke). Plato and Aristotle
make room for it in their philosophies: see e.g. Pol. 273 D, Laws 906 λ., and Arist. Probl. X 45. 895b 39 ff. ἡ φύσις φαίηται μὲν πάντα ποιεῖ, καὶ πλείους καὶ πλείως, στοιουδαία δὲ ἐλάττω, καὶ οὐ πάντα δύναται. The counterpart in the sphere of morals is Biâa’s τί πόλοι καλοί: with which may be compared Kep. IV 428 e, 431 λ, 442 A, C, IX 588 D. It is a melancholy cry born of the age of iron: in the golden age—so Plato tells us Pol. 273 c—the balance was the other way.

19 ἄλλ' ἄττα—τὰ ἄττα. The dualism should not be taken too seriously, in spite of the good and evil souls in Laws 806 Ε. Plato is not now constructing a philosophy, but casting moulds for theology and poetry.

Plato ad loc. and cf. 379 c n.): in Plato there is one of each. So great a difference is not likely to be due to Plato: it is easier to believe that he used a different recension from the Alexandrian. The use of φυσις unpersonified was apparently not admitted by the Alexandrian critics. Cf. Wolf Proleg. p. 37, and Howes in Harvard Studies in Cl. Phil. VI p. 204.

379 E 31 ἀγαθῶν—τέτυκται is either from a lost line of Homer, or from some other poet (as Schneider inclines to think): note ovt ἄλλων ποιητοῦ just above. There can hardly be any reference to II. IV 84 Ζεῦς, ὄτε τ' ἀνθρώπων ταμίας πολέμου τέτυκται, as Howes imagines (I. c. p. 156). The sentiment is common: cf. e.g. Hes. O. D. 669 and Pind. Isthm. IV 52, 53 Ζεὺς τά τε καὶ τά νέμει, Ζεὺς οἱ πάντων κύριος.

30 σπονδῶν σύγχυσιν. II. IV 69 ff. 34. θεῶν ἔριν τε καὶ κρίσιν. This is usually explained as referring to the Theomachy (I. c. xx 1 —74), which was caused by Zeus and Themis in the sense that Zeus sent Themis to summon the gods—to the council at which it was
sanctioned (ν. 4). But (1) Themis' part in causing the Theomachy is very small, (2) the simplest and most natural meaning of κρίσις is not 'contention,' but 'judgment' or 'decision,' and (3) the Theomachy in Homer is not productive of evil to men, but only to the gods themselves: its citation here would therefore be quite irrelevant. W. R. Hardie (in Cl. Rev. iv p. 182) is, I believe, right in supposing that the strife of the goddesses three and Paris' judgment is meant. εἰρή

and κρίσις are regularly thus used: e.g. Eur. I. A. 1307 κρίσιν — στηριγμάτων εἰρήν τε καλλάναι; cf. ib. 581, Hes. 708, Tr. 924. Hes. 644 f. Κρίσις was the name of Sophocles' play on the judgment of Paris (Fr. 330). The poem referred to by Plato is the Cypria (so also Wilamowitz, Homer. Unters. p. 367 n. 46), which traced the war of Troy to the judgment of Paris, and that to Zeus' deliberations with Themis (Τειχίς βουλεύεται μετὰ τῆς θείως πέρι τοῦ Τροικοῦ πολέμου Kinkel, Epic. Graec. Fr. p. 17. Θείως is Heyne's emendation for θείως: but it is scarcely open to doubt: for the marriage of Peleus and Thetis, at which the three goddesses quarrelled, was an episode of the poem, and Thetis could hardly therefore have been privy to the plot. See Kinkel l. c. pp. 20, 21 and Jebb's Homer p. 153. Themis was Zeus' ἄρχαία ἄλογα (Pind. Fr. 30 Bergk), and still appears as one of the Olympians in I., xv 87. The Cypria is quoted again by Plato in Euthyph. 12 A. We may fairly suppose that ἀπόκρισις καὶ κρίσις was the heading of one of the introductory episodes in the poem: to this also the omission of the article with εἰρήν τε καὶ κρίσις seems to point. Mr Hardie thinks Plato may have attributed the poem to Homer; but Euthyph. i. c. (ὁ ποιήσας ὁ ποιήσας) does not favor this view.


5 ἐν οἷς—ἐνεστιν. I have left these words in the text, although they are certainly open to suspicion, and have been condemned by Platt (Cl. Rev. iii p. 72). The antecedent to οἷς is apparently τῆς Νιόβης πάθη; but the play was not called 'The Sufferings of Niobe' but 'Niobe,' and the relative can hardly precede its antecedent in sentences of this kind. If οἷς is referred to ταῦτα understood after ποιήσῃ, then ἐν is difficult: 'if any one puts into poetry topics in which these iambics occur' gives no good sense. Unless Plato is writing very inaccurately, we must pronounce the clause a marginal gloss on τὰ—πάθη.

An earlier generation looked upon punishment as retributory—δόναντι ποιήσῃ. This view appears in Hes. Fr. 217, ed. Goettling, and especially in Aeschylus, e.g. Ag. 1563 f., Ch. 399—314, 400—404, 886, 927: in Sophocles and Euripides it is rarer (Ant. 1074—1076, El. 1411 f., 1495 f., Andr. 438, Suppl. 614—616), and Euripides expressly argues against it in Or. 508 f. Traces of a milder theory were however contained in the doctrine ταῦτα μάθω: as well as in the use of words like σωφρονίσεων, δικαιον, εὐθανασία, for 'punish.' In Plato punishment is remedial. Ignorance or vice is in the soul what disease is in the body (IV 444 C, cf. IX 591 A, B), and the judge is the soul's physician (II 409 B f., Gorg. 478 D): hence (Gorg. 480 B f.) the sinner should go before the judge as a patient visits his doctor, and we should even prosecute our guilty friends and relations. See also Laws 854 D, 861 B, 934 A, 944 D ἄν τις γὰρ κακὸν ἢ δει κολασθέναι, οὐ ἀμείναις. The punishment, again, which awaits the wicked after death is intended to cure
their souls, unless they are incurable; and such as are themselves incurable, help to cure others by their deterrent example (X 616 A): so that in its deepest relations this doctrine reaches to the very roots of Plato’s philosophy, with all due deference to Mr W. S. Lilly, who with much intertemporality of language denounces those who attribute such a view to Plato (Fortnightly Review N.S. XLVI p. 116).

14 ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ πόλει: ‘in one’s own city,’ with reference to the subject of διαμαχητέων, not to πίνα. Plato implies that the preachers of such theology must be suppressed in his ideal city. In all this Teichmüller (Lit. Pehd. I p. 114) detects an assault upon Isocrates, but his evidence is of the slightest.

380 C 16 μυθολογοῦντα is rejected by Herwerden: Ast suggested μυθολογοῦμενα. The choice of the participle is determined by λέγειν, which is more important than ἀκούειν: for without saying hearing is impossible. μήτε νεώτερον μήτε πρεσβύτερον belongs both to λέγειν and to ἀκούειν.

20 νόμων τέ καὶ τύπων. All laws are in Plato’s view only moulds or outlines, within which our actions should fall. Cf. infra 383 C and especially Pol. 294 A ff.

380 D—383 C In the second place, God is changeless, and incapable of deceiving. He is changeless, since He is the best. That which is the best cannot be changed by others, and will not change itself, for it can only change to what is worse. Homer and the other poets err in attributing changefulness to the gods. Neither can God deceive, for while the true or veritable lie, that is to say, ignorance of truth within the soul, is hateful alike to gods and men, the spoken lie, which is but an image of the other, is admissible only when used against enemies, or on behalf of friends, or to invest the ancient and unknown with a semblance of reality. God has no need of lying for any of these ends: he is therefore wholly true. In this respect also Homer and Aeschylus misrepresent the divine nature.

380 D 23 ἄρα γόητα κτλ. Although the gods are constantly represented as deceivers in Greek poetry and legend, Plato was by no means the first to uphold the opposite view. In Pindar (Ol. 10. 4) Truth is the daughter of Zeus, and the dramatists often teach a similar doctrine: see Nägelsbach Nachhom. Theol. p. 46. There is a close imitation of Plato’s argument throughout this passage in Arist. Fr. 15. 1476b 14 ff. ed. Rose.
381 B]

POIITEIAS B

119

autóν γεγρόμενον καὶ ἀλλάττοντα τὸ αὐτοῦ εἴδος εἰς πολλὰς 25
μορφὰς, τοτὲ δὲ ἡμᾶς ἀπατῶντα καὶ ποιοῦντα περὶ αὐτοῦ τοιαῦτα
dokeῖν, ἥ ἀπλοῦν τε εἶναι καὶ πάντων ἥκιστα τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἰδέας
ἐκβαίνειν; Οὐκ ἔχου, ἐφη, νῦν γε αὕτως εἰπεῖν. Τὶ δὲ τόδε; οὐκ
ἀνάγκη, εὔπερ τι εξίστατο τῆς αὐτοῦ ἰδέας, ἥ αὐτὸ υφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ
ἔμεθίστασθαι ἢ ὑπ᾽ ἄλλου; 'Ἀνάγκη. Οὐκοῦν ὑπὸ μὲν ἄλλου 30
τὰ ἁρίστα ἔχοντα ἥκιστα ἀλλοιοῦτα τε καὶ κινεῖται; οὖν σώμα
ὑπὸ σιτίων τε καὶ ποτῶν καὶ πόνων, καὶ πάν φυτῶν ὑπὸ εἰλήσεων
tε καὶ ἀνέμων καὶ τῶν ποιοῦντων παθημάτων, οὗ τὸ ὑγιέστατον καὶ
381 ἵσχυρότατον ἥκιστα | ἀλλοιοῦτα; Πῶς δ᾽ οὖ; Ψυχὴν δὲ οὖ τὴν
ἀνδρειότατην καὶ φρονιμωτάτην ἥκιστ' ἂν τι εξώθειν πάθος ταρά-
ζειν τε καὶ ἀλλοιοῦσειν; Ναι. Καὶ μὴν που καὶ τὰ γε ἔξνθετα
πάντα σκεύη τε καὶ οἰκοδομήματα καὶ ἄμφισματα κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν
λόγον τα ἐν εἰργασμένα καὶ εὐ ἔχοντα ὑπὸ χρόνου τε καὶ τῶν 
ἀλλων παθημάτων ἥκιστα ἀλλοιοῦτα. "Εστι δὴ ταῦτα. Πᾶν
Β δὴ τὸ καλὸς ἔχον, ἥ φύσει ἧ τέχνη ἡ ἄμφιτέρως, ἐλαχιστὴν

4. καὶ ἄμφισματα ΠΠ: om. Α.

25 αὐτὸν is emphatic: the contrast is between actual and apparent trans-
formations of the Deity. After αὐτὸν, Herder would insert παντοδαπῶν,
comparing 381 ε; before it, Richards adds ἄλλαν, by which Benedictus and Ast
replace αὐτὸν. Hartman proposes <τ> γεγρόμενον. It has apparently escaped
notice that γεγρόμενον, as well as ἀλλάττοντα τὸ αὐτοῦ εἴδος, belongs to εἰς πολλὰς
μορφὰς in the sense of ‘passing into’: cf. Tīm. 57 A εἰς ἄλλο τι γεγρόμενον, infra III
400 B εἰς βραχὺ τε καὶ μακρὸν γεγρέμενον, 1X 588 C, and the frequent idiom γένεσις
eis εἰς e.g. Phaed. 71 B, 71 E, Phil. 26 D, Tīm. 40 C, 54 B.

27 ἀπλοῦν: one of the watchwords of Plato's State (370 B, C, 374 A—D al.): his citizens are to be nothing if not ἄπλος.
In making the gods a reflection of the type of human character which he desired
to foster, Plato is acting strictly in accordance with the method of Greek theology,
whose Olympus is an image of human society. The end of human action is
διόνυσις δὲ ὡς κατὰ τὸ δυνάμων (Theae. 176 B); and Plato's God, changeless and
with 'no shadow of turning,' furnished the citizens of his ideal city with an
abiding standard of human conduct. Cf.

383 C.

28 τι δὲ τόδε; Steinhart (Plato's Werke v. p. 680) justly observes that the
method of reasoning employed here—the disproof of each of the two members
of the opposite alternative—recalls the arguments by which Parmenides estab-
lished the attributes of Being (see RP.7 §§ 95, 98); but the resemblance is not
close enough to suggest that Plato was thinking of Parmenides when he wrote
this chapter. Although the unchangeableness of God was taught by Xenon-
phanes and the Eleatics, there are few if any traces of such a doctrine outside
the philosophers before Plato.

380 Ε 30 ὑπὸ μὲν ἄλλου κτλ. μὲν has its counterpart in ἀλλ' ἀρα αὐτὸς αὐτῶν
cτλ. 381 B.

31 κινείται: a more general word for change than ἄλλωσι: cf. Theae. 181 D
διον δὴ—ἐἰςυ κινήσεως, ἀλλοιοῦσα, τὴν δὲ περιφέραν. The doctrine of the perma-
nence and immutability of good enunciated here foreshadows, but does not presup-
pose, the metaphysical predominance of the Good in Book vi.

381 Α 4 καὶ ἄμφισματα. See cr. n. and Introd. § 5.
metabolēn ὑπ’ ἄλλου ἐνδέχεται. Ἡ ἔοικεν. Ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁ θεὸς γε καὶ τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ πάντῃ ἀριστα ἔχει. Πῶς δ’ οὐ; Ταύτῃ μὲν δὴ ἥκιστα ἄν πολλὰς μορφὰς ἵσχοι ο θεὸς. Ἡ ἥκιστα δὴτα.

XX. Ἀλλ’ ἄρα αὐτῶς αὐτῶν μεταβάλλοι ἄν καὶ ἄλλοιοι; Δῆλον, ἐφή, ὅτι, εἶπερ ἄλλοιούτα. Πότερον οὖν ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον τε καὶ κάλλιον μεταβάλλει ἑαυτὸν, ἢ ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον καὶ τὸ αἴσχυν ἑαυτοῦ; Ἀνάγκη, ἐφη, ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον, εἶπερ ἄλλοιούτα. οὐ γὰρ ζ. 15 που ἐνδέχετα γε φήσομεν τοὺς θεοὺς κάλλιους ἢ ἀρετῆς εἶναι. Ὁρθότατα, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, λέγεις; καὶ οὕτως ἔχοντος δοκεῖ ἂν τίς σοι, ὁ Ἀδείμαντε, ἐκὼν αὐτῶν χείροι ποιεῖν ὁτιοῦ ἢ θεῶν ἢ ἀνθρώπων; Ἀδύνατον, ἐφη. Ἀδύνατον ἄρα, ἐφη, καὶ θεῷ ἐθέλειν αὐτῶν ἄλλοιοι; ἄλλοι, ὡς οἰκεῖ, κάλλιστος καὶ ἀρίστος ὅν εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ἕκαστος αὐτῶν 20 μενεί ἄπλως ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ μορφῇ. Ἀπασα, ἐφη, ἀνάγκη, ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ. Μηδεὶς ἄρα, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, ὁ ἄριστε, λεγέτω ἥμιν τῶν πνευτῶν, δόν ὡς

θεοι ἑξίνοισιν ἕοικότες ἄλλοδαποίσι παντοτεῖν τελέθοντες ἐπιστρωφός πόλησι.

25 μηδὲ Πρωτέως καὶ Θέτιδος καταψευδέσθωσι μηδεὶς, μηδ’ ἐν τραγωδίαις μηδ’ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ποιήσαις εἰσαγέτω Ἡραν ἡλλοιμένην ὡς ἱερεῖαν ἁγείρουσαν

Ἰνάχου Ἀργείου ποταμοῦ παισίν βιοδόροις.

9. γε II: τε Α.

381 c 20 ἀνάγκη: sc. ἑστίν. For ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ without ὡς see on 1 332 E. Hartman needlessly suggests ἔμοιγε δοκεῖν.


25 Πρωτέως καὶ Θέτιδος. For Proteus see Od. iv 456—458. Aeschylus also wrote a satyr-drama called Proteus: Fragg. 208—213. The transformations of Thetis to escape marrying Peleus he had been celebrated by Findar (Nem. iv 62 ff.), Sophocles (Fr. 548), perhaps also (as Stallbaum thinks) by Hesiod in his ἐπιβάλαμον εἰς Πηλέα καὶ Θέτιν (see Goettling's Hesiod pp. xlix and 304).

27 ὡς ἱερεῖαν—βιοδόροις: from Aesch. Ζαυτραί (Schol. on Ar. Fragg. 1344). Dindorf (Aesch. Fr. 170) restores as follows: ἄρσενυνθοι | ὑμῖναι κρατάσαι κυδραίοι θείους ἀγίωρ. Ἰνάχου Ἀργείου ποταμοῦ παισίν βιοδόροις. Herwerden's βιοδόροι is a wanton change: the sons of the river-god are his tributaries, and life-giving like himself. It is not clear why Hera was disguised as a priestess. The incident in Inachus' history most suited to dramatic treatment was the persecution of his daughter Io by Hera in consequence of her intrigue with Zeus. As Io was a priestess of Hera, Hera may have disguised herself as another priestess in order to discover her husband's unfaithfulness; see Apollod. Bibl. ii 13 3 φαραλεῖς δὲ (sc. ὅ Ζεις) ὑπ' Ἡρας, τῆς μὲν κόρης ἄγαμον εἰς βοῶν μετεμόρφωσε λευκήν, αὐτὴν δὲ ἀπωμόσατο μὴ συνέλθειν. The subject seems to have been treated by Sophocles in his satyr-drama Inachus (Fragg. 255—278). With ὡς ἱερεῖαν ἁγείρουσαν cf. ἀγίται in 364 b and note ad loc.
381 e 29 toioanta polla. For examples see Heyne's Virgil II pp. 146—152 (cited by Ast on 381 d). polla pevodoi aëdoi, the proverb.
31 kakos: like ou kalos 377 E.
" — inulalamos. aëra expresses incredulity (338 c n.) and tines contempt. Plato is thinking, inter alia, of the bug-bears of the nursery—Lamia, Mornos, and Empusa, whose power of self-transformation was unlimited: see Blaydes on Ar. Frgs 293. eixous need not here be limited to the masculine gender. Cf. Strab. I 19 pαιαi προφερομεναι—εις άποτρησα—των φοβηροις (μυθων). γη τη γαρ λαμια μυθος εστι και εις Γοργω και εις Εφαϊλτης και τη Μορμολυην.
382 a I φαντασμα is said with reference to φανεραι just above, and should be taken both with λογος and εργος. The ψευδος λογος is the eikon I: an example of the φαντασμα εργος is a phantasia or unreal appearance (382 e). The words εργον φαντασμα προτεινω must not be understood of actual self-transformations of the gods.
2 to ge oue alithos psuedos ktl. Cf. tov alithos psuedous Thlas. 189 c, and for the sentiment) Louv 730 c.
5 oudeis iouw ktl. With Plato, as with Socrates, vice is ignorance, and involuntary. The doctrine reappears below in III 413 a, IX 589 c: it is further implied by the entire scheme of education in Books VI and VII. For other assertions of this view in Plato see Simonsen der Begriff d. Seele bei Pl. p. 125 n. 359. Cf. also Soph. Fr. 1653 πανας μαστοι αδελφη της πονηρας εφο. The identification of ignorance and vice is in harmony with popular Greek psychology, in which the intellect was not clearly distinguished from the will; it can be traced in the moral connotation of words like αμωσα, απαλλευων, αγνωσια. In close connexion with this conception of vice is Plato's view of punishment as remedial: see 380 b n.
382 b 8 τα οιντα κτλ. τα δετα = 'the truth.' The contrast between the act and state in ψευδεσθαι te και ψευδουσι resembles 1 351 b: ψευδεθαι, moreover, suitably bridges the distance between ψευδεσθαι and αμωσα ειναι. εις τον ψευδον corresponds to ψευδεσθαι, κεκτησθαι παν τον ψευδον εις ψευδουσι: the contrast is between ' holding, ready for use, that which is already possessed,' and permanent possession: cf. Soph. Auct. 177b and Jebb ad loc. The words év τη τουτω 'in such a case' (i.e. év την ψευδεσθαι την ψυχη περι τα οιντα), are quite satisfactory (cf. III 393 c), and ought not to have caused Herwerden difficulty.
I3 μήματα τι—ψευδος. τοῦ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθήματος must not be explained (with Bosanquet Companion p. 93) as the state of mind of him who tells a lie: for that is knowledge, and the spoken lie certainly is not an imitation of knowledge. They refer to the 'true lie,' which is a certain πάθημα in the soul of the 'true liar,' viz. ignorance, and of which the spoken lie is an imitation. It is a tolerably accurate definition of a lie to call it an imitation of ignorance in the soul': cf. IV 443 c n. The spoken lie is not a wholly unmixed lie,' because it implies that the speaker knows the truth: in a certain sense therefore it is mixed with truth. It is ὡς τερον γεγονός, because the spoken lie cannot be uttered until the truth is known. Inasmuch as the spoken lie is mixed with truth, it is better than the 'veritable lie.' We have here nothing but a special application of the old Socratic paradox ὃ ἐκών ἀμαρτάνων ἀμέινων (see on I 334 a). I have placed a comma after γεγονός, to mark the antithesis between εἴδωλον and ἀκρατον ψευδος, and because εἴδωλον is not so much to be taken with τοῦ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ παθήματος: rather it stands for εἴδωλον ψευδος, as οὐ πάντα ἀκρατον ψευδος shews. The distinction between veritable and spoken lies savours, no doubt, of idealism: but it enables Plato to call his ideal archons ideally truthful, even when practically they tell lies, and it is with this object in view that the distinction is introduced. See III 389 B.

382C I8 τότε—μῖσον; τό is masculine: it is presently shewn that the spoken lie is useless to God. Plato does not permit a man to lie in his own interest. Ordinary Greek morality, in spite of Achilles' εἰσαγόμενος γάρ μοι κείνον ὁμώς Ἀδάμ πάλπησιν etc., probably did. The saying of Democritus ἀληθευμένων χρεών, ὅταν λόων (Stob. Flor. 12. 13) leaves us to infer that we may also lie ὅταν λόων. Cf. Soph. Fr. 323 καλὸν μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἐστι τὰ ψευδὰ λέγειν; ὡτα δὲ ὀλεθρον δεικνύων ἀληθεῖ, | συγγενών εἰπεν ἐστιν καλόν. The cynical immorality of Hdt. III 72 exceeds what Greek public opinion would have tolerated: cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. iv ch. 13. See also on I 380 B and Nagelsbach Nachh. Thol. pp. 240 ff.

ἀρ’ οὐ—πολεμίου κτλ. Cf. I 331 E—332 B.

19 τῶν καλουμένων φίλων depends on ἀποτροπῆς. Ἰf ὅταν διὰ μιᾶν—τὸτε had been omitted, the construction would be quite clear: as it is, some difficulty has been felt. Schneider understands τινες as subject to ἐπιχείρωσι: by Hermann ὅταν is changed to of ἂν: by Herwerden ὅταν to οὐ ἀν and τότε to τοῦτο: while Stallbaum resorts to an anacoluthon, as if Plato had intended to say τῶν καλουμένων φίλων ἑνεκα. None of these expedients is so simple as to connect ἀποτροπῆς with φίλων. The clause ὅταν—πρᾶτειν cancels out with τότε and does not affect the construction. καλουμένων, 'so-called,' involves a theory of friendship, viz. that no one who is ἀνήντος καὶ μανθήμασι can be a friend to man (any more than to God: cf. 382 E).
383 A] ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ Β 123

μανιάι ἢ τινα ἀνοιαν κακῶν τι ἐπιχειρῶσιν πράττειν, τότε ἀποτρο-

382 D 22 μυθολογίαι κτλ. Plato seems to have supposed that ancient

and mythology could be manufactured to order. Cf. Arist. Pol. B 9,

II 1269b 28 and Susemihl ad loc. He at-

tempts the task himself in III 414 B ff.,

Prot. 320 c—322 D (unless this is really an extract from one of Protagoras' own

works), Pol. 269 a—274 E, Tim. 21 A—

25 D, Critias, and Laws 676 b—682 D.

26 εἰδέναι. The omniscience of the

gods is no new doctrine: see Nägels-


pp. 23 ff.

27 ποιητής—ἐνι. 'There is nothing of

the lying poet in God.' Cf. 365 c n.

I can see no point in Stallbaum's notion

that there is a play on the two senses of

ποιητής—'poet' and 'creator.'

362 E 28 ψευδότοι, δὲ is carried on:

cf. I 352 E n.

30 μανιμοῦναι. Phaedr. 265 A μανίας
de γε εἰδή ὅσα, τὴν μὲν ὑπὸ νοσημάτων

ἀνθρωπίνων, τὴν δὲ ὑπὸ θείας ἀλλαγῆς
tων ἐισόδων νομίμων γεγονωμένης. Plato

refers here only to the first variety: the

second is discussed in Phaedr. 265 B ff.

32 κομβιῇ ἄρα κτλ. The words

ἀπλοὺν, ὡστε αὐτὸς μεθιστάται sum up

380 D—381 E (see on ἀπλούν in 380 D),

the rest 382 A—D.

34 ὡστε κατὰ φαντασίαν. See cr. n.

and Introd. § 5. φαντάσμα and ἐργα

φαντασμα προτεινῶν in 381 E, 382 A

favour the view that these words are
genuine.

35 ὡστε ὡστε ὑπαρ. See cr. n. ὡστε

ὑπαρ ὡστε is not co-ordinate with ὡστε
cataphρασίας etc., but subordinate to

them: for φαντασίας, λόγοι, and especially

σημεῖον ποιμαί might be vouchsafed

either in waking moments or in dreams: see

Stengel and Oehmichen in Iwan Müller's Handbuch v 3 pp. 37—47. For


383 Δ 5 παράγειν. παράγοντας

(Conjectured by Richards) would be easier, but the slip, if such it be, is excusable. ὡς—ὅτις is not the accusative absolute: if it were, ὡς would express the reason, and here it does not. We are defining the τόπος: and the construction is (they must ποιεῖν) ὡς μήτε αὐτοῦ γύρθης ὅτας, 'represent the gods as neither themselves being sorcerers, etc. In παράγειν the construction is changed, but the change is natural, for our rule applies both to λέγειν and ποιήσις (καὶ λέγειν καὶ ποιεῖν), and λέγειν takes the accusative and infinitive. Both λέγειν and ποιεῖν affect the construction, which involves a sort of chiasmus. Cf. ΜΙΙ 390 B n.

6 τοῦ ἐνυπνίου πομπῆς. Η. ΙΙ 1— 34.

8 ἡ Θέτις κτλ. The verses are perhaps, as Schneider conjectures, from Aeschylus 'Ομήρων κρίσις, in which Thetis was one of the characters (Schol. on Λτ. Αθ. 883). Apollo with his harp (ἕχων φόρμισσα) appears as present at the marriage of Thetis also in Homer (U. XXIV 62, 63). Plato accommodates the beginning of the quotation to his own sentence: in Aeschylus perhaps it ran δ' ἐνδατεῖσθαι τάς ἐμὰς εὐπαιδίας (so Butler, quoted by Schneider). ἐνδατεῖσθαί, 'to dwell upon or emphasize,' is elsewhere always used in an ominous sense (see Jebb on Soph. Ο.Τ. 205): and here too, perhaps, it strikes a foreboding note. The words μακραίωνες βίους were doubted by Stephanus, who suggested μακραίωνες βίον (so Euseb. Praep. Εν. ΧΙΙΙ 3. 35) or μακραίωνες βίου: but Apollo's prophecies did not refer to Achilles only, so that the plural is justified. ἀπείρων should be taken not with εὐπαιδίας, but with βίου, which is in apposition to εὐπαιδίας. In the next line θεοφιλεῖς ἐμᾶς τῖχας depends on the compound expression παῖδων ἐπηνυφήμεσθαι—a construction frequent in Aeschylus, especially with verbs which denote singing, celebrating, etc. (cf.IL. 174, 175 al.): after enumerating all the blessings in store for Thetis (ἐξημαντά τ' εἰπὼν) Apollo raised a paean over her θεοφιλεῖς τίχας. This explanation—Schneider's—is much better than to connect ἐξημαντὰ adverbially with θεοφιλεῖς.
νέων, εἰ μέλλουσιν ἡμῖν οἱ φύλακες θεοσεβεῖς τε καὶ θείοι γίγνεσθαι, 20 καθ᾽ ὅσον ἄνθρωπος ἐπὶ πλεῖστον οἶον τε. Παντάπασιν, ἔφη, ἔγωγε τοὺς τύπους τούτους συγχωρῶ καὶ ὡς νόμοις ἂν χρῶμην.

τέλος πολιτείας B'.

383 c 20 θείοι—οἶον τε. The object of all worship and all religion, as of human action in general, is assimilation to God: cf. X 613 A n.
APPENDICES TO BOOK II.

I.

II 359 D. τῷ Γύγου τοῦ Λυδοῦ προγόνῳ.

Most of the emendations (e.g. Γύγη τῷ τοῦ Λυδοῦ προγόνῳ) which have been suggested in order to bring the present passage into harmony with the allusion in Book x 612 b, assume that the Gyges of 'Gyges' ring' is identical with the famous Gyges (who reigned about 687—654 B.C.), founder of the third or Mermnad dynasty of Lydian kings (Hdt. i 8—13). On this assumption τοῦ Λυδοῦ cannot mean 'Lydus' (the eponymous ruler of Lydia: see Hdt. i 7), but must mean 'the Lydian' i.e. (according to the usual interpretation) Croesus, who was the πέμπτος αριστοκράτωρ Γύγεω (Hdt. i 13). There is however no proof to shew that δ ανδρῶς could without further specification denote Croesus; and on this ground alone Wiegand's proposal (adopted by Hermann, Baiter, and Hartman) τῷ [Γύγου] τοῦ Λυδοῦ προγόνῳ breaks down: while Jowett and Campbell's alternative suggestions τῷ Κροίσου τοῦ Λυδοῦ προγόνῳ, and Γύγη τῷ Κροίσου τοῦ Λυδοῦ προγόνῳ, although satisfactory in point of sense, fail to account for the disappearance of Κροίσου. The proposals of Ast—τῷ Γύγη τοῦ Λυδοῦ (or Λυδίου) προγόνῳ, and [τῷ] Γύγου τοῦ Λυδοῦ [προγόνῳ]—will hardly win favour, while Stallbaum's τῷ Γύγη [τοῦ Λυδοῦ προγόνῳ] merely cuts the knot.

There is however no solid reason for connecting the Gyges of the proverb with the historical Gyges. In narrating the adventures of the latter, Herodotus makes no mention of a magic ring; but if such a legend had been told of the founder of the Mermnadae, Herodotus is hardly likely to have ignored it. In Plato's narrative, on the other hand, everything hangs on the ring. Nor is the magic ring known to Nicolaus Damascenus, whose account of Gyges seems to follow a different tradition from that of Herodotus: see Müller's Frag. Hist. Graec. iii pp. 382—386. It is therefore possible that Plato's story refers not to Herodotus' Gyges, but to some homonymous ancestor of his, perhaps (as Stein suggests on Hdt. i 13) the mythical founder of the family, whose name may have survived in the λαμνη Γύγαίη (Hdt. i 93). The Gyges of history was not the first member of his family to bear that name: his great-grandfather at least was also called Gyges (Nic. Dam. l.c.). The resemblance between the two stories—that of Herodotus and that of Plato—is confined to two incidents, viz. the joint murder of the reigning sovereign by the queen...
and her paramour, and their succession to the throne. In these two features the history of the later Gyges may well have been embellished from the legends about his mythical namesake, or he may actually have copied his ancestor's example. It is noticeable that Cicero says nothing to shew that he identified the Gyges of Plato's story with the Gyges of history; and in a poem by Nizamí (as Mr J. G. Frazer has pointed out to me), where Plato tells the story of the ring, the name of Gyges is not even mentioned. (See Prof. Cowell's article in the Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Vol. 30 pp. 151—157. Prof. Cowell thinks Nizamí became acquainted with the legend through Arabic translations of the Republic.) Thinking it probable, therefore, that the proverbial ring of Gyges belonged not to Herodotus' Gyges, but to one of his ancestors bearing the same name, I have retained the ms reading. I do not think that the suppression of the name is a difficulty, though it would be easy to write (as I formerly did) <τῷ Γύγη>, τῷ Γύγου τοῦ Λυδοῦ προνοο. See Introd. § 5. Such a solution would bring the text into strict verbal harmony with x 612 b, with Cicero De off. iii 38 (where the story is related, not of an ancestor of Gyges, but of Gyges himself—hinc ille Gyges inducitur a Platone), with Lucian Nav. 41 and Bis Acc. 21, and with Philostratus Vit. Apoll. 101. In each of these places we hear of 'Gyges' ring,' not of 'Gyges' ancestor's ring.' But it is better to adhere to the almost unanimous testimony of the ms, especially as in this particular passage they are reinforced by Proclus. Schneider can hardly be right in supposing that the older Gyges is an invention of Plato's, although in other respects his note is deserving of attention: "Platoni vero licebat alterum Gygen fingere, ingenio et fortuna similem interfectori Candaulae, quem ideo genus ab illo ducentem facit, prioris nomen, quippe quod commune ei cum posteriori esset, reticens."

II.

II 359 E. τούτον δὲ ἀλλο μὲν ἐχεω οὐδέν, περὶ δὲ τῇ χεπρὶ χρυσοῦν δακτύλιον, ὃν περιελόμενον ἐκβῆναι.

If (with A) we omit ἐχεω, the meaning must still be: 'the corpse (τούτον) <had> nothing else upon it, only on its hand a gold ring, which he (Gyges) took off and went out.' But it is impossible in Greek, as in English, to dispense with 'had.'

Dr Jackson proposes to read τούτον for τούτον, and omit ἐχεω and ὃν, understanding the sentence to mean 'he took nothing from the corpse except a gold ring on its hand, and then went out.' (Proceedings of the Cambridge Philol. Soc. Vol. 11 1882, p. 12). In favour of this view he urges that 'the nudity of the corpse is not mentioned, either in Cicero's paraphrase de Officiis iii 9 § 38, or in that of Nizamí' (see App. I). Philostratus is also silent on the subject (Heroic. 28). If the principle of this solution is correct, I should prefer to retain τούτον: for there seems to be no reason why περιαρέσθαι should not take two accusatives like ἀφαιρέσθαι, περικρύειν, περικόπτειν, and the like; or, as Dr Verrall
remarks (Proceedings, etc. i.c.)—I think with less probability—

from which Dr. Jackson's view of the passage, in which I formerly concurred, gives excellent sense, and may be right. But it is to be noticed (1) that our chief authority for ἡχεὐ is Ven. II, a ms which is quite independent of Paris A and constantly enables us to restore lacunae in that ms, and (2) that there are other examples in Paris A of the omission of a single word without the excuse of homoioteleuton. See Introd. § 5. E and Flor. B omit ἡχεὐ, but add ἑφέαν after δακτύλιον—an obvious attempt to amend the error which survives in A.

Madvig conjectures πλοῦτου δὲ οὐδέν and Liebhold (Fil. Jahrb. 1888, p. 107) κόσμου δὲ ἄλλο μὲν <ἑχοντς> οὐδέν for τοῦτον δὲ ἄλλο μὲν οὐδέν. Neither of these proposals has any plausibility, and it is best to regard this as one of the places where we owe the right reading to II. 

III. 

II 364 C. ἵνα τέ τυα ἑχοντι πημήναι ἐβέλη, μετὰ σμικρῶν δαπανῶν ὄμοιως δίκαιον ἀδίκω βλάψεων κτλ.

Instead of βλάψεως, the best ms read βλάψει. If βλάψει is retained, the subject must be either (1) τις or δ ἐθέλων τημιαίνειν supplied out of τημήναι ἐβέλη, or (2) the prophet consulted. The latter alternative gives the right sense, but the change from the singular to the plural (in πειθοτες) is very harsh. If we adopt the first alternative (to which J. and C. incline), we must regard the clause ἵνα τέ τυα—βλαψει as semi-parenthetical, and connect πειθοτες with ἀγυρται δὲ καὶ μαντείας at the beginning of the sentence. Such a solution is not less harsh than (2). βλαψει must, I think, be pronounced corrupt. Muretus read βλαψαι, depending, like ἀκείσθαι, on ὄνομας; but βλαψαι is not likely to have been corrupted into βλαψει, nor is it clear why the aorist should take the place of the present (as in ἀκείσθαι). Reading βλάψεως, we might perhaps regard the construction as one of the rare cases in which ὄνομας and the like are followed by a future infinitive: see Jebb's Soph. Phil. p. 252, Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 164, and cf. Phaed. 73 α όυκ ἀν οἱ ι τ' ἦσαν τοῦτο ποίσεων (so the Bodleian ms). There is still however a serious difficulty in the collocation of the present ἀκείσθαι with the future βλάψεως. The explanation given by Schneider in his Additamenta is linguistically unassailable and gives an excellent sense. For the common confusion of -ei and -ew see Introd. § 5.

IV. 

II 365 D, E. οὐκοῦν, εἰ μὲν μὴ εἰσών, η μηδὲν αὐτοῦς τῶν ἀθρωπῶν μέλει, τι καὶ ἡμῖν μελητέων τοῦ λαοθάνεων;

The reading of the best ms, καὶ ἡμῖν μελητέων τοῦ λαοθάνεων, is defended by Shorey (A. J. Ph. xvi p. 231), but (as I think) un成功fully, and even the most conservative editors abandon it.
We have to choose between (1) <τί> καὶ ημῶν μελητέων τοῦ λαυθα-
νέων; (found in several inferior mss besides v), (2) οὖν ημῶν μελητέων κτλ.
(qt Flor. U), (3) καὶ ημῶν <οὖ> μελητέων κτλ. (Paris D in margin), (4) καὶ
ημῶν ἀμελητέων (a conjecture of Baiter's). It is possible that each of
these readings is due to conjecture, and we can scarcely hope to restore
the hand of Plato with certainty in this passage.

I formerly (with Bekker and others) printed οὖν ημῶν. The meaning
is satisfactory, but the correction does not seem probable in itself. The
same may be said of (3) and (4). I have now followed Stallbaum in
supposing that τί was accidentally omitted after the -ei of μέλει. Such
a slip is easy enough, and would be most likely to be corrected by the
introduction of a negative, as in (2) and (3). Moreover, as Stallbaum
says, τί καὶ ημῶν "huius sermonis alacritati plane est accommodatum,"
and καί is, I think, sufficiently justified by the obvious contrast between
the gods and ourselves. Tucker objects that "If the gods do not care,
why should we also care?" is as bad in Greek as in English: but καί is
hardly so much as 'also'; it merely points the contrast. Cf. 111 414 E n.
There is no difficulty in οὐκοῦν followed by a question, so long as the
question is merely rhetorical. Hermann proposes οὐκοῦν—καὶ ημῶν
μελητέων, but the negative would require to be reinforced before ημῶν.
I can see no probability in Tucker's conjecture, viz. οὐκοῦν—<οὖδὲν>
kαὶ ημῶν μελητέων.


386 A—389 A So much for the doctrines by means of which we are to foster the sentiments of piety towards gods and parents and mutual friendship among the citizens. In order to encourage Bravery, we shall require our poets to extol and not to decry the life which awaits us after death: otherwise their poetry will be not merely untrue, but detrimental to our future soldiers. Here again Homer deserves censure. Fear-inspiring names like Cocytus must be discarded, as well as laments put into the mouths of famous men: for the good man has no cause to bewail the death of a good comrade, either for his comrade's sake or for his own. Homer offends against this canon when he represents Achilles and Priam as indulging in lamentations over their dead; and still more when he makes the gods, and even the greatest of the gods, give way to grief. Moreover, as excessive mirth is apt to rebound into the opposite extreme, our youths must not be laughter-loving. Homer errs in depicting good men and gods as overcome with laughter.

386 A I ἴδιαν δὲ περὶ θεοὺς, ἢν δ’ ἔγος, τοιαῦτα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀκουστέων τε καὶ ὦκ ἄνευ ἔφοβος ἐκ παίδων τοῖς θεοῖς τε τιμήσοντι καὶ γονέας τὴν τε ἀλλήλοις φιλίᾳ μὴ περὶ σεμικρῶν ποιησάμενοι. Καὶ οἷμαι γ’, ἐφή, ὁρθῶς ἦμιν φαίνεσθαι. Τί δὲ 5 δή; εἰ μέλλουσι εἴναι ἄνδρεῖοι, ἁρα οὐ ταῦτα τε λεκτέων καὶ οἷα αὐτῶν ποιῆσαι ἤκιστα τὸν θάνατον δεδέναι; ἡ ἤγετ’ τινὰ ποτ’ ἄν γενέσθαι ἄνδρεῖον, ἔχοντα ἐν αὐτῷ τούτῳ τὸ δείμα; Μᾶ Δία, ἡ δ’ ὄς, ὦκ ἐγὼγε. Τί δέ; τὰν” Ἀἰδον ἠργούμενον εἴναι τε καὶ δεινὰ εἶναι οἶεν τινὰ θανάτον ἀδεὶ ἔσεσθαι καὶ ἐν ταῖς μάχαις αἰρήσεσθαι 10 πρὸ ἡπτὴς τε καὶ δουλείας θάνατον; Οὐδαμῶς. Δεῖ δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἢμᾶς ἐπιστατεῖν καὶ περὶ τούτων τῶν μυθῶν τοῖς ἐπιχειροῦσιν

I. Τὰ μὲν δὴ περὶ θεοὺς, ἢν δ’ ἔγος, τοιαῦτ’ ἀττα, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἀκουστέων τε καὶ ὦκ ἄνευ ἔφοβος ἐκ παίδων τοῖς θεοῖς τε τιμήσοντι καὶ γονέας τὴν τε ἀλλήλοις φιλίᾳ μὴ περὶ σεμικρῶν ποιησάμενοι. Καὶ οἷμαι γ’, ἐφή, ὁρθῶς ἦμιν φαίνεσθαι. Τί δὲ 5 δή; εἰ μέλλουσι εἴναι ἄνδρεῖοι, ἁρα οὐ ταῦτα τε λεκτέων καὶ οἷα αὐτῶν ποιῆσαι ἤκιστα τὸν θάνατον δεδέναι; ἡ ἤγετ’ τινὰ ποτ’ ἄν γενέσθαι ἄνδρεῖον, ἔχοντα ἐν αὐτῷ τούτῳ τὸ δείμα; Μᾶ Δία, ἡ δ’ ὄς, ὦκ ἐγὼγε. Τί δέ; τὰν” Ἀἰδον ἠργούμενον εἴναι τε καὶ δεινὰ εἶναι οἶεν τινὰ θανάτον ἀδεὶ ἔσεσθαι καὶ ἐν ταῖς μάχαις αἰρήσεσθαι 10 πρὸ ἡπτὴς τε καὶ δουλείας θάνατον; Οὐδαμῶς. Δεῖ δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἢμᾶς ἐπιστατεῖν καὶ περὶ τούτων τῶν μυθῶν τοῖς ἐπιχειροῦσιν
The translation and analysis of the text are as follows:


386 C 13 λέγοντας. For the accusative after the dative ἐπιχειροῦσα cf. Euthyd. 5 A, Crit. 51 D. Before λέγοντας Σι (with a few other MSS) adds ἄν, as if εἰ λοιδορεῖται should be understood (cf. II 380 C); but we should supply not λοιδορεῖται, but εἰ λοιδορεῖται (Schneider).

15 τούδε τού ἐπούς κτλ. The singular ἐπος is sometimes used of more than one verse, e.g. Hdt. vii 143. The lines are addressed by the shade of Achilles to Odysseus: Od. xi 489—491. On the omission of ὁ μὴ βίοτος πολὺς ἐν θεοὶ see Introd. § 5.

386 D 20 οἰκία—θεοὶ περ. II. xx 64, 65. The words in Homer are under the construction of ἐλευσίναι—μη. 23 ὁ πότοι. The exclamation of Achilles when the ghost of Patroclus eludes his embrace: II. xxiii 103, 104. On φρένες as the "physical basis of life" in Homer see Leaf ad loc.

26 οἰχ,—ἀπόσουσι. Tiresias retained in the other world something of the physical reality of his earthly existence: Od. X 493—495 τοῦ τε φρένες ἐμπεδοῖ εἰσιν' τῷ καὶ τενυχθῇ νόσῳ πόρο Περσεφόνεια [οἶχο πεννυσθήτοι τὸ δὲ σκια ἀπόσούσιν. Plato allows the force of attraction to alter τολ to ταῖ: cf. Men. 100 a οἶχο πεπνύεται τῶν ἐν Ἁιδοῦ, αἱ δὲ σκια ἀπόσοον. 28 ψυχή—ἡμὴν. II. xvi 856, 857. ἤμβεν, explained by the ancients as μέλη.
οὐκοῦν ἔτι καὶ τὰ περὶ ταύτα ὁμόματα πάντα τὰ δεινὰ τε καὶ φοβερὰ ἀποθητεῖα, κωκυτοῦς τε καὶ στῦγας καὶ ἐνέργους καὶ ἄλβαντας, καὶ ἄλλα ὅσα τούτῳ τοῦ τύπῳ ὀνομαζόμενα φρίττειν. 13. πεφοβημένους Α用户体验II: πεφοβημένους Α用户体验I.

τοῦ σώματος (Hesych. s.v.), more probably denotes the mouth (as part of the face): cf. Leaf ad loc. and I. ιξ 409. Leaf plausibly suggests that ἂν in ἄνδρατήτα, 'manhood'—found in all but two MSS of the Iliad—was only the written sign of the nasalis sonans, and counted as a short vowel. 387 ι 2 ψυχή δὲ—τετριγυια. II. ιξελλθ 100. "The voice," says Leaf, "is as weak a copy of the living voice as is the εἰδολον of the αὐτός": whence τετριγυια and τετριγυια again just below. 5 ὅς δ᾽ ὅτε—ἡσαν. Said of the souls of the suitors following Hermes down to Hades: Od. ιξεκ 6—9. Possibly we should read ἦσαν for ἡσαν (with Howes, Harvard Studies in Cl. Philol. vi p. 190).

387 ι 16 ἐνέργους καὶ ἄλβαντας. The Scholiast writes: ἐνέργου τοῖς νεκροῖς, ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐν τῇ ἐφα (δ᾽ ἐστι γὰρ) καθόσι. Cf. ἔραξε. Early psychology scarcely separated the dead body from the surviving spirit: the latter still lived where the body lay 'within the ground.' Hence 'those within the ground' (opposed to the ἐπιθήκηνι or living) became an expression for the spirits of the departed, and the denizens of the lower world in general: see II. ιξελ anal 188, ἡνο 61. The Scholiast's derivation is more probable than that of Brugmann, who (Grundrisse II p. 180) derives the word from ἐν and a nominal suffix -ερο. Plato at any rate would have preferred the Scholiast. On ἄλβαντας (not found in Homer or Hesiod) see Plut. Quaest. Symp. VII 736 Α (cited by Ast) ὅ δὲ ἄλβας καὶ ὁ ἀκελετός ἐπὶ τοῖς νεκροῖς γέγονε, λαδορομινήν ὀνόματα ἐξ ὁρτητος. The ancients derived the word from ἄν and the root of λείβω "life" etc., calling the dead 'sapless,' διὰ τὴν τίς λεῖβας ἀμεθέλειαν (Schol.). L. and S. object that the ἄν is long, relying perhaps on the line of Callimachus in Ετ. Μ. 63, 51 ἐβήσαν ὅσον ἄλβαντα πίννετε (where ἄλβαντα = ὅσιος). There, however, the right reading may be ἄλβαντα, i.e. ὁ ἄλβαντα. But in Sophocles Fr. 751 ed. Dindorf the ἄν is certainly long, unless the text is corrupt. Possibly the word is connected with ἄλβας; cf. Hesych. s. v. ἄλβας, where we are told that Στροχερος Τάρταρον ἄλβας τὸν βαθὸν λέγει.

17 τούτῳ τοῦ τύπου. Instead of writing ἄλλα ὄνοματα ὅσα τούτῳ τοῦ
δὴ ποιεῖ πάντας τοὺς ἁκούοντας. καὶ ἵσως εἰ ἢχει πρὸς ἄλλο τι species de ὑπὲρ τῶν φυλάκων φοβοῦμεθα, μη ἐκ τῆς τοιαύτης φρίκης θερμότεροι καὶ μαλακώτεροι τοῦ δέοντος γένοιται ἤμιν. 20 Καὶ ὅρθωσ γ’, ἔφη, φοβοῦμεθα. Ἀφαιρετεῖ ἁρὰ; Ναὶ. Τὸν δὲ ἐναντίον τῶν τούτων λεκτέον καὶ ποιητέον; Δῆλα δὴ. Καὶ τοὺς ὄν ᾿οικτοὺς τοὺς τῶν ἐλλογιμῶν ἄνδρων. Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη, εἶπερ καὶ τὰ πρότερα. Σκότει δὴ, ἂν δ’ ἐγὼ, εἰ ὅρθωσ ἐξαιρήσουμεν ἢ οὐ. φαμὲν δὲ δὴ, ὅτι ὁ ἐπεικὴς ἄνηρ 25 τῷ ἐπιεικεί, οὔτερ καὶ ἐταῖρος ἐστιν, τὸ τεθνάναι οὐ δεινὸν ἥγησεται. Φαμὲν γὰρ. Οὐκ ἄρα ὑπὲρ γ’ ἐκεῖνων ὃς δεινῶν τι πεπονθότος ὀδύροιτ’ ἂν. Οὔ δήτα. Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τόδε λέγομεν, 18 ποιεῖ Hertz: ποιεὶ ὡς οἶεται ΑΗΕ: ποιεὶ ὡς ὄλω τε q. 19. ὑπὲρ II: ὑπὸ Α. 20. ἐταῖρος Ξγ et idem (vel potius ἐταῖρος) Ἀδ: ἐταῖρος ΑΠ.Π.

τὸ τὸν ἐν ταί Πλατον ἔννεπε ἄλλα ὡς τοῦτο τοῦ τοῦτον τόν ὄνομαζομενα, with precisely the same meaning: τοῦ τοῦ τοῦ τοῦ therefore depends on the copula involved in ὄνομαζομενα. Stallbaum takes ὄνομαζομενα as "quum pronuntiantur’; but this is pointless. The words mean simply ἄλλα ὡς τοῦτον τοῦ ὑποτεινωμενον. After poietae gives no sense, and is admittedly corrupt. ὡς oλω τε, found in all inferior MSS besides q, is a rare phrase, occurring, I believe, nowhere else in Plato (except of course in combination with superlatives, e.g. Ill 412 B, VI 484 C), though found in Aristotle (Pol. E 11. 1313 στρεφεται, where Bekker conjectured ὁστατα); but 'to shiver as much as possible' is painfully rigid. No emendation at all satisfactory has yet been proposed—neither Winckelmann's ὄσιτασ, nor Hermann's ὃσα ἐτη (with reference to recitations of the rhapsodists !), nor Madvig's ὃσιθα, nor Campbell's ὃσετα. Hertz (Fl. fad. 1872 p. 842) supposes the words to be a gloss by some Christian reader, meaning 'as he' (i.e. Plato) imagines.' The author of the gloss wished to indicate that he at least could hear such tales without shivering. After ὡς οἶεται found its way into the text, it was probably altered to ὁστατα (to suit the plural ἀκούοντας), from which oλω τε is a corruption: cf. 11 358 E, where q has ὁστατα as against oλω τε of the best MSS. See also on VI 594 E. 18 καὶ ἵσως—ἄλλο τι: "videlicit ad suavitatem et delectationem: v. p. 387 B, 390 A, 397 D, 398 A al." (Stallbaum).

19 μή ἐκ—μημιν. φρίκη is a cold shiver, sometimes followed by sweat, whence ἐκ τῆς τοιαύτης φρίκης θερμότεροι. Cf. (with Hartman) Plato. 251 άλοντα δὲ αὐτῶν, οἷον ἐκ τῆς φρίκης, μεταβολῆ τε καὶ ἱδρών καὶ θερμότητος ἀθάνατοι λαμβάνει, where Thompson remarks that φρίκη is used by Hippocrates of the 'cold fit of a fever.' In θερμότεροι καὶ μαλακώτεροι Plato is thinking of the softening effect of heat upon iron: cf. (with J. and C.) infra 411 B ὑπέρ εἰδών ἐμβάλεξε, Latus 666 C, 671 B καθάρσε των εἰδών τα ψυχά τῶν πιθίνων διαστούρως γιγαντίας μαλακώτερας γίγνεσθαι; see also II. XVIII 468—477 and Whitelaw on Soph. Ajax 651 in Cl. Kev. v pp. 66, 230. In so far as it associates heat with cowardice, the comparison breaks down, for heat meant courage to the Greeks. For this reason Stephanus conjectured ἄθρομότερα καὶ ἅθωμότερα a reading afterwards found in v. Ast's conjecture is thus refuted by Hartman (l.c.): "Astii conjectura inepta est, quum ἀθωμα vitium sint, non vero iusta ac temperata μαλακία (dixit enim μαλακότερον τοῦ δεόντος))." In the next sentence Hartman expunges φοβοῦμεθα without sufficient cause.

387 D 23 τῶν ἐλλογιμῶν ἄνδρων: a subjective, not an objective genitive: see Ξ below, and 388 E, 390 D ἀπὸ τοῦ τεῦχος—καρτερίας καὶ λέγοντας καὶ πράττοντας ὑπὸ ἐλλογιμων ἄνδρων with X 605 D. 25 ὁ ἐπεικὴς ἁμηρ—ἀποδείκται. This
passage is full of Socratic colouring, οὕτε καὶ ἐταῖρος ἐπὶ contains a suggestion that only good men can be comrades; cf. Xen. Mem. II 6. 19, 20 and Pl. Lyc. 214c. That death has no terrors for the good man is laid down in Ap. 41 cff. The self-sufficiency of virtue was illustrated in the person of Socrates himself (Mem. I 2. 14, IV 8. 11), and continually preached by him (Mem. II 6. 2, cf. IV 7. 1). Steinhardt appears to me to exaggerate the force of αὐτάρκης when he characterises the passage of anti-Christian (Einleitung p. 166).

387 Ε 31 νόσ. The fortitude of Pericles on receiving the news of the death of his two sons was a case in point, and may have been known to Plato. It is commemorated in a fine fragment of Protagoras preserved by Plut. Consol. ad Apol. 33. 118 Ε, F.

33 δώρεται, φέρει. See εἰ. n. The infinitives δώρεσθαι and φέρειν are explained by Stallbaum as dependent on λέγομεν, but this is too harsh. The rhetorical repetition of ἴκατον ἄρα proves that like στερηθήσανται they should be under the government either of δεινόν itself, or of some notion supplied out of δεινόν. As the former alternative gives the wrong sense we must, if the text is sound, take refuge in the latter. Hartman by a tour de force resolves ἴκατον δεινόν into ἴκατον εἰκός αὐθέντα, and carries on the eikón. It would be somewhat easier, I think, though still very harsh, to supply δεινόν out of δεινόν, δεινόν being used as in δεινός καταράσσαται τῷ λίθῳ (Theophr. Char. 15, cf. infra 395 c): but it is difficult not to believe that the text is corrupt. In φ, καὶ has been corrected to χρῆ, and the insertion of δεί before καὶ is suggested by Hartman. The question however is not what the good man ought to do, but what he actually does, and for this reason Richards' ἵκατον after δώρεσθαι is better, although otherwise unlikely. Stallbaum's alternative proposal to read δώρεσθαι, φέρειν δέ seems to me far the best both in point of sense, and because it might easily pass into δώρεσθαι, φέρειν δέ under the influence of στερηθήσανται. For these reasons I have printed it in the text. Cf. Introd. § 5.

388 Α 5 ἄλλοτ—ἀτρυγέτωοι. The picture of Achilles sorrowing for Patroclus in Iliad xxiv 10—12. Plato accommodates the Homeric narrative to his own ποιεῖν, and reads πλασθοῦν—ἀτρυγέτωοι instead of διέλθεσκ άλλων παρδ συν, άλάς, which appears in our Homer. Πλασθοῦσι else where is always used of sail-
ing in the literal sense (yet *ēκ τοῦ νοῦ* ἐκπλώειν in Hdt. vi 12), but it cannot bear such a meaning here. If the mss are right, *πλώειν* must be regarded (with Schneider) as a metaphor, the agitated movements of Achilles being compared to the unsteady motion of a ship upon the sea. Achilles is so to speak 'at sea' and shews it in his gait; cf. the metaphorical sense of χωμάζωμαι. The picture savours of the burlesque, and Howes suggests that *πλώειν* may be a deliberate parody on Plato's part (Harvard Studies etc. vi p. 202). As no other example of such a use of *πλώειν* has been adduced, the word is perhaps corrupt. Heyne's *πλέωρν* "matutinum se agentem" (οὗτος μὲν ἡμῖν 1 φανομένη λθέσει κἀπεὶ ἄλα, says Homer) will never command a wide assent: still less *πλαύωρν* (Benedictus), *πρῶ τον* (Ast), whose quantity is not above suspicion, or *πρῶ ὧν* (Liehold Fl. Jahrb. 1888, p. 108). *αἶδωρν* (Herwerden and Naber) is better in point of sense, but the alteration is too great. I have thought of *πολλ' ψόν* (ψεύς 'cry *ω* and not *ω*) is the spelling of the Codex Mediceus in Aesch. *Enn. 124*), or *ἀγλοιντον* (cf. *ἀγλοιρόσ* in II. xv 607). Perhaps, however, *πλώειν* conceals some word meaning 'to rush wildly from his tent,' *ἐπὶ διν* being probably for *ἐπὶ δίνα*, not for *ἐπὶ δινά*. There is apparently a contrast between Achilles' anguish within his tent and without, and some word is needed to mark his exit. Nothing can be made of the variant *πλάδον* (in a few inferior mss). In default of anything better we must (I suppose) provisionally acquiesce in Schneider's interpretation.

388 B 9 μηδὲ—κεφαλής. II. xviii 23, 24.

11 ἐκείνος. Homer.

ἐγγυς θεόν. Zeus was Priam's seventh ancestor (Apollod. III 12). The phrase has a dash of old-world romance about it: cf. 391 ἐ καὶ οὐ ταλαθαὶ, κρείττονες ἡμῶν καὶ ἐγγυήρα ἥθεν  ἰδεώτερε. 12 λιτανεύοντα τε—ἐκαστον. II. xxii 414, 415.

388 C 17 ὦ μοι κτλ. Said by Thetis in II. xviii 54.

19 ὦ τόποι. II. xxii 168, 169. The words are uttered by Zeus with reference to Hector. For ἄναν our Homer has τέχος.

23 οἱ ἀι—δαμήναι. II. xvi 433, 434. The only variant is ὦ μοι for ὦ αἱ.
388 Π 28 εἰ καὶ ἐπίοι αὐτῷ. καὶ is not ‘even’ (J. and C.), otherwise there would be too much emphasis on ἐπίοι, but ‘also’: ‘if it should also occur to himself’ (sc. as Homer says it occurs to gods). The emphatic word is αὐτῷ. For τοιοῦτον Hartman requires either τοιοῦτον τι or τὸ τοιοῦτον; but cf. 416 b, iv 426 b, 429 b, IX 590 e and II 368 a. n.
29 συμκροίων. See on I 330 b. ἐπὶ συμκροιαὶ παθήμασι has a poetical rhythm, and may possibly be from a hexameter.
33 ἐφὶ—τοιοῦτον. See cr. n. The present ἐφὶ is slightly better than ἐφί: for τὸ τοιοῦτον denotes the state or condition rather than the act. ἐφὶ comes rather nearer to the reading of Α and Π, and is preferred by Bafter and Hartman. For ἐφὶ Η. Wolf conjectured τοιῇ, Herwerden τίκτει or ἐντίκτει, in both cases needlessly: cf. with J. and C. ἐθέλει in Π 370 b. The sentiment is generalised in VIII 563 b.
35 οὐδὲ ἄρα. οὐδὲ followed by δὲ is rare (examples in Kühner Gr. Gr. Π p. 832) but δὲ follows τε very often, especially in τοιὸν δὲ, μεγίστον δὲ etc.: see Π 367 c Μ. Cobet’s οὐδὲ ἄρα, though approved by Hartman, is therefore unnecessary.
389 Α 2 οὐκοῦν—ὁ λόγον. The lines are Π 1 599, 600. Hermann wished to read οὐκοῦν and reject ἀποδεξέωμεν περὶ θεῶν, placing τὰ τοιαῦτα under the government of ἀποδεκτέων. οὐκοῦν may be right, but the change is not necessary. τὰ τοιαῦτα does not refer specifically to the verses, but means τὸ κρατεῖποι ὑπὸ γελώσως and the like; while the two verses are themselves the object of ἀποδεκτέων. I have accordingly placed a colon after θεῶν and removed the pause after τοιοῦτον; a remedy which removes, I think, the objections felt by Hermann to ἀποδεξέωμεν περὶ θεῶν, and by Herwerden to περὶ θεῶν. The asyndeton in ἀσβεστος δ’ ἄρ’ etc. is common in ampliative and illustrative sentences.
389 Β—392. Α high value should also be placed upon truth. The malicious lie may indeed be permitted to our rulers, in the interests of the State: but any others
who lie are to be punished. To lie to the rulers is worse than lying to a physician about one’s illness.

Not less necessary is self-control, which will enable our citizens to obey the rulers, and to rule their own appetites. Homer frequently represents heroes and gods as lacking in this virtue—as insubordinate, glutinous, lustful, avaricious, prone to revenge, and mean. The effect is to discourage in the young the virtue which we desiderate, and all such representations must therefore be forbidden: they are both impious and untrue.

389 B 8 ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἀλήθειαν ἐλεν. On the place of this section in the general plan of the Republic see App. I.

9 θεοὶ μὲν—ἐλεει. For the dative theou see 330 B n. ἐλεει (cf. II 382 C, D) implies the usual Socratic analogy between body and soul: see on III 380 B.


389 C 15 τοιοῦτος is omitted by Hartman, and is certainly open to doubt. The balance of MS evidence is in its favour, although a few inferior MSS and one MS of Stobaeus (Flor. 46. 95), agree with A in omitting it. It must either mean rulers who act ἐπ᾽ ὀφελία τῆς πόλεως, or else such rulers as Plato’s. The former alternative is not altogether satisfactory, and it is difficult not to believe that Plato was in reality referring to his own rulers. The serious objection to this view is that we have not yet heard anything of Plato’s rulers: they are not described till 412 B. I think the solution may be that the present section on truth is a later addition made by Plato after he had written his first account of the rulers in Book III. See also App. I.

19 λέγοντι has caused difficulty, and Madvig would expunge the word. The explanation is simple enough. μὴ τάληθη λέγεω should be repeated between ἡ and πρὸς, and μὴ τὰ ὡστά λέγοντι ὡστα taken closely together, ‘or to lie’ (μὴ τάληθη λέγεω understood) ‘to a pilot about the ship and its crew by misrepresenting the facts about one’s own condition etc.’ One MS of Stobaeus (l.c.) has λέγοντα, which is also possible, and could only be explained in this way. I have removed the comma usually printed after λέγοντι.

20 λαμβάνει: sc. δι’ ἀρχῶν. Cf. I 347 A n. λαμβάνεις (Ficinus and Benedictus) gives a wrong sense.

389 D 21 τῶν οὐ—δοῦρων. Od. XVII 383, 384. κακῶς is of course neuter. If Schneider could shew that this quotation refers to a case in which a chieftain in Homer did or did not punish a δήμοιργός for lying, he would make out a
Prima facie case for his view that Plato is here prescribing canons for poetical representations, but there is nothing of this in Homer; and we must suppose that Plato is speaking here of his own citizens. See App. I.

24. Ἐὰν γε—τελήται does not mean 'if our theory is carried out' (J. and C.) or 'if our ideal city is ever realised' (Rettig). Such a remark would be frigid and superfluous. The meaning is merely that the ruler will first use words, but, if these fail, he will afterwards proceed to deeds i.e. κολάσει. The first γε assests: the second enters a caveat. ἔργα τελήται = ἐργαν ἀλέοι γνησίας.

27 σωφροσύνης δὲ—μέγιστα: for the mass of men, are not the cardinal points of temperance such as these?' (Jebb on Soph. O. C. 20 μακρὰν γὰρ ὡς γέροντι προδύσταλης ὀδὸν—a precise parallel). There is no authority for interpreting these words (with Stallbaum, Hartman etc.) as 'plerumque' 'in universum.' Plato is warning us not to regard his account of σωφροσύνη here as scientifically accurate and complete. It is the most obvious and conspicuous aspects of self-control which poets should chiefly impress upon the multitude, and to these Plato confines his attention. On the Greek conception of σωφροσύνη see the passages collected by Nägelsbach, Nach- hom. Theol. pp. 227 ff.

389 e 30 Ὀμήρῳ. For this Σ and a few other MSS read τοιρ Ὀμήρῳ. Schneider successfully defends Ὀμήρῳ by Arist. Pol. Θ 5. 1339b 7 ὁ γὰρ ὖς Ζέες αὐτὸς ὕπειρε καὶ κινοῦσι τοῖς ποιηταῖς. The line is addressed by Diomedes to Sthenelus in II. IV 412.

32 τὰ τούτων ἐχόμενα. The two verses which Plato here quotes do not follow τέτα, σωπῆς κτλ., and do not even occur together in our Homer. ἵσαν—Ἀχαιός is from II. III 8 (οἱ δ' ἐρ' ἱσαν σιγῆ μενα πνεύματες Ἀχαιόν), σιγῇ—ση- μάντερας from IV 431. Some editors bracket the first verse, but (as Hartman points out) it is not likely that a scribe should have interpolated a line from II. III before one from II. IV. Plato may be guilty of 'contamination,' or the lines may really have occurred together in his text of Homer. J. and C. suggest that Plato perhaps did not mean the lines to be connected. The objection to this view is that σιγῇ (as in our text of Homer, though there it is in a different place) goes best with ἵσαν, and that ἵσαν μὲνα πνεύματες Ἀχαιός is not by itself an illustration of obedience to rulers, and therefore would not be relevant here. See on the whole subject of Platonic quotations from Homer, Howes in Harvard Studies etc. VI pp. 153—237, with whose conclusions (p. 210) I heartily agree.

36 οἶνοβαρῆς κτλ. Achilles to Aga-
390 | καὶ τὰ τούτων ἐξής, ἃρα καλῶς, καὶ δότα ἄλλα τις ἐν λόγῳ ἢ ἐν ποιήσει εἶρηκε νεανικέματα ἰδιωτῶν εἰς ἄρχοντας; Οὐ καλῶς. Οὐ γὰρ, οἴμαι, εἰς γε σωφροσύνην νέοις ἐπιτίθειει ἀκούειν. εἰ δὲ τινα ἄλλην ἠδονὴν παρέχεται, θαυμαστῶν οὐδέν. ἢ τῶς σοι φαίνεται; Οὔτος, ἐφή.

IV. Τι δὲ; τοιεῖν ἄνδρα τὸν σοφότατον λέγοντα, ός δοκεῖ αὐτῷ κάλλιστον εἶναι πάντων, ὅταν

παρὰ πλέαι ὁσὶ τράπεζαι

δοκεῖ σοι ἐπιτίθειειν εἶναι πρὸς ἐγκράτειαι ἀετοῦ ἀκούειν νέο; ἢ τὸ

λιμῷ δ’ οἰκτίστον θανέειν καὶ πότμον ἐπισπεῖν;

ἡ Δία, καθευδόντων τῶν ἄλλων θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων, ὡς, μόνος ἑγγαργορῶς ἢ ἐβουλεύσατο, τοῦτον πάντων ράδιος ἐπιλαμβανόμενον 15

C1 διὰ τὴν τῶν ἀφροδισίων ἐπιθυμίαν, καὶ οὔτως ἐκπλαγέντα ἰδόντα τὴν "Ἡραν, ὡστε μηδ’ εἰς τὸ δωμάτιον ἑθέλειν, ἄλλ’ αὐτοῦ


8. παρὰ πλέαι nos: παραπλέαια vel παραπλέαια ΑΠΩΓ.

memnon in II. 1225. The point of this illustration is not in the abusive epithets, but in the insubordination which they and the rest of the speech (τὰ τούτων ἐξής) express.

390 Α 2 νεανικέματα. See cr. n. The spelling seems established by the verb νεανικέωθαι: e.g. Gorg. 482 C. νεανισκέματα has however some authority, for νεανισκέμωμα was used (Photius s.v.). οικτίστον, to say the least, is doubtful, nor is νεανικός (Photius s.v.) enough to justify such a form, in spite of Schneider (Addit., p. 19).

8 παρὰ πλέαι—δεσπάσειν. Odysseus in Od. IX 8—10. Our text of Homer has παρὰ δὲ πλήθος. I have written παρὰ πλέαι for παράπλεαι or παραπλεῖα of nearly all the MSS. Vat. r. and Vind. have παραπλεῖα, Cesenas M παράπλεαι (sic). παράπλεαι (which Howes L.c. p. 205 thinks Plato found in his text of Homer) is in reality a vox nihili; even if it did occur, it could not mean ‘almost full,’ as L. and S. say: and such a meaning would be ludicrously inappropriate here. With παρὰ δὲ πλέαι cf. Anacr. 94. I ed. Bergk κρητήρι παρὰ πλέφω οἰνοποτάζων. See my article in Cl. Rev. XI p. 349.

390 Β 13 λιμῷ δ’—ἐπισπεῖν. Od. XII 342.

14 ἢ Δία—ἐπιλαμβανόμενον. μόνος ἑγγαργορῶς refers to II. II 1—4: the incident itself is narrated in II. XIV 294 ff. For the postponement of the relative α cf. IV 425 c. The effect is to throw emphasis on μόνος ἑγγαργορῶς—that Zeus should forget what he had purposely kept awake to devise makes the scandal all the worse —and brings it into sharper contrast with καθευδόντως—ἀνθρώπως, ὡς must be taken with ἐπιλαμβανόμενον, the construction being ἢ τοιεῖν Δία ὡς ἐπιλαμβανόμενον; cf. II 383 A. Stallbaum explains ὡς μόνος ἑγγαργορῶς as “ut solus vigil” while J. and C. supply ἀκούειν after ἢ. Neither view seems to me at all satisfactory. The text has been often called in question. Instead of ὡς Hermann reads καὶ: Herwerden and Richards suggest δια (dropping α before ἐβουλεύσατο). The best emendation is perhaps Jackson’s εἰς for ὡς (Journal of Phil. IV p. 147), but I see no good reason why ὡς cannot be
construed with ἐπιλαμβανόμενον. The pause which on this view is necessary after ὃς helps still further to increase the stress on μύον ἐγγυηγομός, which Plato certainly intended to emphasize.

390 C 18 Βουλόμενον—τοκῆα. Βουλόμενον is not otiose after ἑθέλειον (as Hartman alleges): ‘to wish’ (βούλεσθαι) and ‘to be willing’ (ἑθελεῖν) are different ideas. The same critical issue also rejects καὶ before λέγοντα “qua ea verba excusationem τοῦ ἑθελείον humi consuercere continent”; but it is more effective to represent so gross an utterance as an additional part of the picture. For φατάν πρὸς cf. Lys. i 15, 19, where the meaning is the same. Herwerden should not have wished to replace the preposition by παρά. In Homer the line εἰς εὐνήν φατάντων φίλον λήθοται τοκῆα (ΠΝ. XII 296) is not said by Zeus, as Plato—doubtless intentionally, to increase the effect—makes it appear to be.

20 "Αρεός—δεσμόν. Od. VIII 266 ff. δεσμόν is still under the government of παῖειν.

390 D 23 καὶ λέγοντα καὶ πράττονται κτλ.: ‘are either described or done by famous men’ etc.: described e.g. in poetry by Homer’s heroes, or done in actual life before our eyes. θετέωn refers to πράττοντα, ἀκούστον το λέγοντα by the usual chiasmus. J. and C. translate “performed by famous men or told concerning them,” understanding περὶ ἄλλων αὐτῶν with λέγοντα, but this cannot be right.

25 στήθος δὲ—ἐκλησι. Odysseus in Od. XX 17, 18.

27 δωρόδοκος κτλ. The excessive love of money is a sign of ἀκρατεία: so that its mention here is relevant enough, although the vice was not specifically named in 389 D.


32 ἑμμοσκουλέων. II. IX 515 ff. The genitive μῆνιος, for which a few MSS read μυρίος, is natural in paraphrasing Homer. Cfr. the form ἕθεσε in X 600 A.

34 οὐδ’ ὀμαλογηθησόμεν. “Dele futile interpretamentum” exclaims Hartman. The words are genuine, and add a new point: cf. 391 Α φάναι καὶ ἄλλων λέγοντων πε.θεσθαι.
391 D | ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ  Γ | 141

χρήματον εἰναι, ὡστε παρὰ τοῦ 'Αγαμέμνονος δόρα λαβεῖν, καὶ 35
141 τιμῆν αὐτοῦ λαβόντα νεκροῦ ἀπολύειν, ἣν ἄλλωσ ἐδεὶ μη 'θέλειν. 391
Οὔκ οίκον δικαίον γε, ἐφη, ἐπαινεῖ τά τοιαῦτα. 'Οκνὼ δὲ γε, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, δι Ἐμιρρόν λέγειν, ὅτι οὐδ' ὀσίον ταῦτα γε κατὰ 'Αχιλλέως
φάναι καὶ ἄλλων λεγόντων πείθεσθαι, καὶ αὐτὸς πρὸς τὸν 'Απόλλων
eἶπεν ἐβλαβφάς μ' ἐκάρειγε, θεῶν ὀλοστάτε πάντων· 5

η σ' ἃν τεισαίμην, εἴ μοι δύναμις γε παρεῖη.

Β' καὶ ὡς πρὸς τὸν ποταμόν, θεῶν ὄντα, ἀπείθος ἐξέχεν καὶ μάχεσθα
ἔτοιμος ἦν, καὶ αὐτὰς τοῦ ἐτέρου ποταμοῦ Ἑπερχεῖσθαι ἱερὰς τρίχας

Πατρόκλων ἡρωϊ, ἐφη, κόμην ὅπασαίμι φέρεσθαι,
νεκρὸν οὖν, καὶ ὡς ἐδρασεν τοῦτο, οὐ πειστέον. τάς τε αὐτοῦ Έκτόρος
ἐξείς περὶ τὸ σήμα τὸ Πατρόκλου καὶ τίς τῶν Ἑκατοχῆνων
σφαγὰς εἰς τὴν πυραν, ξύμπαντα ταῦτα ὡς φήσομεν ἀληθὴ εἰρήσθαι,
Ϲ οὖδ' ἐάσαμεν πείθεσθαι τοὺς ἴμετέρους, ὡς Ἀχιλλεὺς, θεὰς ὡν
παῖς καὶ Πηλέως, σοφρονεσσάτο τε καὶ τρίτου ἀπὸ Διός, καὶ ὑπὸ 15
τὸ σοφωτάτῳ Χείρων τεθραμμένος, τοσαῦτης ἦν ταραχῆς πλέως,
ὡς ἐξέχεν εἰν αὐτῷ νοσήματε δύο ἐναντίον ἀλλήλου, ἀνελεθρεῖαν
μετὰ φιλοχρημάτιας καὶ αὐτὸ ὑπερθαναίαν θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων.

'Ορθῶς, ἐφη, λέγεις.

V. Μὴ τοίνυν, ἦν δ' εἴγο, μὴ δὲ τάδε πειθώμεθα μὴ' ἐδοξεν 20

D λέγειν, ὡς Θησεύς Ποσειδώνος ὅς Πειρίδος υπὸ Διός ὠρμήσαν
οὕτως ἐπὶ δεινᾶς ἄρπαγάς, μὴ δὲ τίν' ἄλλον θεοῦ παῖδα τε καὶ ἥρω

22. ἄλλων Π.: ἄλλων Α., sed υ puncto notavit A.².
ritious assisted Theseus to abduct Helen: and Theseus Pirithous in his attempt to carry off Persephone from the lower world. Others belongs to deeds; the order is regular and idiomatic: cf. Ap. 36A, Symp. 192 c al. Sophocles and Euripides each wrote a play called ‘Theseus’: but Plato is probably alluding to some epic Theseus. Cf. Kinkel Epic. Gr. Frag. p. 217.

24 αὐτά is censured by Heller, who conjectures ταῦτα, while Hartman keeps αὐτά but rejects ἑργα. Stallbaum says we should expect ταῦτα for αὐτά; but ταῦτα would be too precise. αὐτά means simply ‘the actions in question.’ Cf. I 339 E n. The turn of the sentence recalls II 380 A ἦ δὲ θεὸν ἑργα ἐγένετο αὐτά λέγειν ἦ ἔτη. Cf. also infra 408 C.


301 E 27 ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν. II 378 B, 380 C.

31 ἄρα: II 358 C n.

32 oly—διαμόνων. From Aeschylus’ Niobe: see Dindorf Fr. 155. The passage is also quoted in part by Strabo (XII 8. 21), from whom it appears that Niobe is the speaker, and that αἱ θεῖαι ἀγχιστοροι are her father Tantalus and his kindred (οἱ περὶ Τάνταλον). ὃν—αἰθέρι means ‘whose is the altar to ancestral Zeus on Mount Ida high in heaven,’ i.e. their θεὸς πατρός is Zeus (who was Tantalus’ father), and they worship him on the heights of Ida. Tantalus’ territory extended to Ida: see Strabo l.c. ὁ Τάνταλος ἔλεγε σπέροι δ’ ἄρουραν δύδεχ’ ἤμερων δόνα. | Ἐρεχθέων χώρων, ἐνδ’ Ἀδραστέας ἐδοὺς | Τὰ ἔς μελημοῦσα καὶ βρεχώμας | πρέσευοι μήλων. For ὃν κατ’ Ιδαίων πάγων Strabo has οἷς ἐν Ἰδαίῳ πάγῳ, a much inferior reading. καλ before ὅπως may be Plato’s (so Stallbaum and others),—in which case the last line is from a different part of the play,—but is much more likely to come from Aeschylus, the resolution of κοῦσα being due to Plato. The line follows naturally on the others, and is not sufficiently important to have been selected from a different context. The verses are complete in themselves, and present a stately picture of the sons of the gods, which is the only reason why they are cited here.

302 Α—C So much for legends about gods, heroes, daemons, and the unseen world: it remains to determine what shall
be said about men. But on this subject we cannot lay down rules until we have discovered the nature of Justice, and proved that Justice benefits the just, apart from all appearances.

392 A 2 τι οὖν κτλ. This is the ἄλκης eidos λόγων. Plato has prescribed canons for the ὕθελης λόγοι or legends about gods etc.; but rules for ἄλκης λόγοι, i.e. λόγοι relating to men and human affairs, cannot be drawn up without begging the conclusion which the Republic seeks to establish. See also on II 376 E.

ἡμιν. See cr. n. Without ἡμιν we should have τοῖς λόγοις πέρα ὀρθομένοις. I agree with Hartman and the majority of editors in retaining the word. See Introd. § 5.

6 αὖνατον δῆ. For δῆ Stallbaum approves Ast's conjecture δὲ. δὲ would be too mean, if the meaning were adversative, but it is not. δῆ is only 'well': cf. II 308 A (Schneider).

7 καὶ ποιηταί καὶ λογοτέκτοι. On λογοτέκτοι see II 365 E n.; and for the statement itself Latus 606 E ff., 662 B.

392 B 10 ἀλλότριον — ἀγάθων. 1 343 C n.

14 ξυστούμεν. Stallbaum's conjecture —see cr. n.—is now generally accepted.

ξυστούμεν would imply that the discussion had changed, but it has not. Cf. IV 420 C δ τάλαι ξυστούμεν.

392 C 15 τότε διομολογηθόμεθα κτλ. This is not "an ironical or fanciful excuse for varying the order of the subject" (J. and C.), for if Socrates declared at this stage that justice is a good for its possessor he would in point of fact be presupposing the results of the whole investigation. See IX 588 B—592 B. Others (e.g. Hitzel der Dialog p. 237 n.) have taken τότε διομολογηθόμεθα as a hint of the additional discussion on Poetry in Book X: but there is nothing either here or in that book to justify any such interpretation. Cf. X 595 A n. What Plato's regulations about λόγοι πέρι ἄνθρωπων would have been may be easily gathered from the end of Book IX and X 608 C ff., although the subject is nowhere specifically and expressly resumed in the Republic. Cf. I 347 E n.

392 C—394 D We have now finished our treatment of the subject-matter of poetry, and have next to discuss its form. All composition is in a certain sense narrative, narrating things past, present or future. Narration in this sense may be either (1) simple and unmixed, (2) imitative, (3) both simple and imitative. Homer furnishes
an example of the third kind: his poetry is purely narrative, when he is speaking in propria persona, it is imitative, when he puts his words into the mouth of any of his characters. Tragedy and Comedy exemplify the imitative style. The best example of the purely narrative is the Dithyramb, of the third or mixed variety, the Epip. Which of these forms shall we admit, and on what occasions?

392 c. That Poetry and Art are a species of μιμησις, was an accepted canon in Greece even before the time of Plato: see Butcher Aristotle’s Theory of Poetry and Fine Art² p. 121. Starting from this principle, Plato gradually deepens and intensifies the connotation of μιμησις as the dialogue advances. At first, the word denotes a specific variety of style—the dramatic as opposed to the narrative (392 D—394 D). But as according to Plato style is at once the expression of, and also exercises a reflex influence on, the soul (400 D n.), μιμησις begins to assume an ethical import and is used to express imitation or assimilation in matters appertaining to or bearing upon character and conduct (394 E, 395 E nn.: cf. also 401 B—404 C). Finally, in Book x, after the psychological point of view has been superseded by the metaphysical, the word acquires an ontological or metaphysical significance: see on x 595 C. On the subject generally, reference may be made to the dissertation of Abeken de μιμησις apud Platonem et Aristotelem notioni.

19 το δε λέγεως. Hartman approves the variant τα δε λέγεως: but the subject of λέγεω is better treated as a unity until it has been subdivided.

392 D 23 μυθολόγων ἢ ποιητῶν. μυθολόγων is said so to include writers of μύθοι in prose: cf. 394 B and 365 E n. 28 ὠπερ ὄνων κτλ. Plato means that poor speakers cannot grapple with an abstract notion, but use a part of it, i.e. a concrete example. οὗ κατὰ διον κτλ. may be illustrated from Symp. 205 B, C.

393 A 3 καὶ ἐλισσετο—λάων. II. 1 15, 16. Leaf reads λασσετο because
λέγει τε αὐτὸς ὁ ποιητὴς καὶ οὖν ἐπιχειρεῖ ἢμῶν τὴν διάνοιαν 5 ἀλλοσ τρέπειν, ὡς ἄλλος τις ὁ λέγων ἢ αὐτὸς· τὰ δὲ μετὰ ταῦτα

B ὥσπερ αὐτὸς ὁν ὁ Χρύσης λέγει καὶ πεπράται ἢμας ἢ τι μάλιστα ποιησά μή Ὁμηρον δοκεῖν εἶναι τὸν λέγοντα, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἱερά, πρεσβύτηρι ὤντα. καὶ τὴν ἀλλήν δὴ πάσαν σχεδὸν τὸ ὀνόματον καὶ ὄνομα πεποίηται διάφημιν περὶ τε τῶν ἐν Ἰλίῳ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἰθάκῃ 10 καὶ ὄνομα Ὀδυσσεία παθημάτων. Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἔφη. Ὁμήρου διήγησις μὲν ἐστὶν καὶ ὅταν τὰς ἡμέρας ἱκάστοτε λέγῃ καὶ ὅταν τὰ μεταξὺ τῶν ἡμέρων; ἔπος γὰρ οὖ; Ἀλλ' ὅταν γέ τινα λέγῃ

C ρήσις ὡς τις ἄλλος ὁν, ἀρ' οὖ τὸτε ὀμοιοὶ αὐτὸν φήσομεν ὃ τι μάλιστα τὴν αὐτοῦ λέξειν ἐκάστοτε, ὅν ἄν προειπῆ ὡς ἔρουντα; 15 Φήσομεν· τι γὰρ; Ὁμήρου τὸ γέ ὀμοίων ἐαυτὸν ἄλλω ἢ κατὰ φωνὴν ἢ κατὰ σχῆμα μιμεῖσθαι ἐστὶν ἐκείνῳ ὃν ἃν τις ὀμοίοις; ἢ μὴν: Ἐν δὴ τῷ τοιούτῳ, ὡς ἐοικέν, οὖντος τε καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ποιηταὶ διὰ μιμήσεως τὴν διήγησιν ποιοῦνταί. Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Εἰ δὲ γε μηδαμοῦ ἐαυτὸν ἀποκρύπτετο ὁ ποιητὴς, πᾶσα ἄν αὐτὸ 20

D ἄνευ μιμήσεως ἡ ποιήσις τε καὶ διήγησις γεγονόνια εἶν, 1 ὅνα δὲ μὴ εἴπῃς ὡς ὅν οὐκ αὐτοὶ μανθάνεις, ὅτους ἂν τοῦτο γένουσι, ἐγὼ φάσομαι. εἰ γὰρ Ὁμήρος εἰπών, ὅτι ἠλθεν ὁ Χρύσης τῆς τε θυγατρός λύτρα φέρον καὶ ἱκέτης τῶν Ἀχαίων, μάλιστα δὲ τῶν βασιλέων, μετὰ τοῦτο μὴ ὅσον Χρύσης γεγονόμενος ἐλεγεν, ἀλλ' ἐτή ὅσον Ὅμηρος, ὥσθ' 25 ὃς οὐκ ἂν μιμήσεις ἂν ἄλλα ἀπλῆ διήγησις. εἰδέ δ' ἂν οὖδέ πως φράσω δὲ ἄνευ μέτρου· ὃ γὰρ εἰμι ποιητικός· ἐδὺν ἄν οἰρεύσῃ Η ἡμέρας 1 ἐκείνοις μὲν τοὺς θεοὺς δούναι ὀλούντας τὴν Τροίαν αὐτοὺς σωθήναι, τῆς δὲ θυγατέρας οἱ λύσαι δεξαμένους ἀποθανοῦν καὶ τὸν θεόν αἰδεσθέντας. ταῦτα δὲ εἰπόντας αὐτὸς ἢ μὲν ἄλλοι ἐσέβοντο 30

"Ἀλλού οὖν apparently had a second distinct consonant, and is never preceded by a short vowel." The word had probably been Atticised by Plato's time. 393 Β 8 δοκεῖν—ὄντα. δοκεῖν is here 'to fancy' not 'to seem.' Contrast Π 381 Ε ἔμνι σε ποιήσασι δοκεῖν σφάς παντοδαπούς φαινεσθαι. a passage which is cited by Hartmann to justify ποιήσα as against the variant πείσα.

10 περὶ τέ τῶν—παθημάτων. This clause is rejected by Herderwen. This difficulty—which lies in the collocation of Ἰθακή the place and Ὀδυσσεία the poem—is no doubt lessened by reading (with Richards) καὶ ἐν or καὶ before Ἰλίῳ, but does not wholly disappear. Possibly the last twelve books of the Odyssey, in which the scene is Ithaca, were sometimes known collectively as Ἰθάκη. 393 Δ, Ε 23 ἐπὶ ἠλθεν—βασιλέως paraphrases II. I 12—16.

25 ὅσον Χρύσης γεγονόμενος· 'as if he had been transformed into Chryses,' not merely 'in the person of Chryses' (Jowett). In 'simple narrative' he is Homer: when Chryses begins to speak, he becomes Chryses. Cf. 393 Β ὥσπερ αὐτὸς ὁν ὁ Χρύσης ('as if he himself were Chryses').

27 ἐδὺν—αἰδεσθέντας. II. I 17—21. The emphatic αὐτοῦ accurately represents Homer's ὑπὸ μέν. For λύσαι H. Wolf conjectured ἀποθάνατον; but Plato is closely following Homer, who has λύσατε. τὸν θέον is Apollo.

30 ταῦτα δὲ—βέλεσιν. II. I 22—

A. P.
The paraphrase is accurate, and Plato leaves nothing essential out. There is no passage that differs from ours in this passage.

32 μὴ—οὐκ ἐπαρκέσασιν ἐπαρκέσασιν presupposes ἐπαρκέσασιν in the narrative text: Homer has μὴ νῦ τοῦ οὖν χραιμῇ σκῆπτρων καὶ στῆμα θεοῦ. It is usual to regard this sentence as final: if so, it is the solitary instance in Plato where the future after a final μὴ must be admitted. See Weber in Schanz’s Beiträge II 2, p. 60 and Goodwin MT, pp. 43, 91. The nearest parallel is Lysippus, 15 ἐὰν καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἀν ἐδειξασ παρακινδυνεύειν, μὴ οὐκ ὁρθῶς αὐτὸ ποιήσεις, where μὴ depends on a verb of fearing. It is better, both in point of grammar and of sense, to regard this sentence also as expressing apprehension (for ‘fear lest’), although no verb of fearing is present. It is not final in any proper sense of the word. Bekker read ἐπαρκέσασιν, saying that θα ἔστω ἐπαρκέσασιν.

34 μὴ ἔρεβίζειν. Valckenear’s conjecture μὴ ἔ ἔρεβίζειν (μὴ μ’ ἔρεβίζειν in Homer) is attractive in view of τὰ δάκρυα in 394 A for Homer’s ἐμά δάκρυα, and because it provides an object for ἔρεβίζειν. Plato uses the pronoun tolerably often (e.g. in I 327 B, X 617 E, Symp. 175 C, 223 B); other Attic writers seldom, if ever (Kühnler-Blass Gr. d. Gr. Spr. I p. 592). It is not however clear that ἔρεβίζειν could not be used without an object expressed, and I therefore revert to the ms reading.

394 A 4 ἐν ναῦν οἰκοδομήσασιν shows that Plato understood Homer’s ἐρέφα (ἐν ποτε τα χαρίσειεν ἐπὶ νοῦν ἐρέφα) of building. According to Leaf, ἐρέφα seems to denote the most primitive form of temple — “a mere roof to protect the image of a god standing in a grove.”

6 τείχα—βέλεσιν. Ἀχαϊῶν is of course the subject to τείχα (‘pay for,’ ‘expiate’); in Homer it is τίτιμας ἄναντα ἐμά δάκρυα σοι βέλεσιν. The translation ‘that he would avenge his tears upon the Achaeans’ (D. and V.) is wrong, α ἀπαρατ-πολύσεως στοί, he箔τες, B at the beginning of the line. Bch chooses the word because it expresses Homer’s ἐμά briefly and neatly, rather than from any conscious desire to make the paraphrase archaic.

394 B 12 πραγματικά. Adimantus quotes a single concrete instance—‘tragédies’—to show that he now apprehends the meaning of μικρής. Socrates, out of politeness and because he wishes to make progress, interprets this as a recognition of the imitative character of Tragedy and Comedy in general (ὁ πέρ ὁ λέγεις πραγματικά τε καὶ κομμῳδία), as in point of fact it virtually is. ὁ πέρ ὁ λέγεις is not
true in the beggarly literal sense of λέγειν, but it is sufficiently so for polite conversation. To insert—with Herwerden and Hartman—τε καὶ κωμῳδίας after τραγῳδίας seems to me unnecessary and pedantic.

394 C 16 εὐροίς δ’ αὖ—διπυράμβοις. The dithyramb was at first purely narrative or nearly so; it afterwards became mimetic (Arist. Propl. XIX 15. 918b 19). Only one of Findar’s dithyrambic fragments appears to be ‘mimetic’ (frag. 74). On the growth and decline of the Dithyramb see Smyth Greek Metric Poets pp. xlviii—lvi.

17 τε—δὲ καὶ. II 367 C n.

18 ε’ μοι μανθάνεις: ‘if I can make you understand,’ with reference to μανθάνω in 392 C, 394 B, C. Heindorf’s ε’ μοι μανθάνεις (as in Phil. 51 C) is attractive, but the corruption is not easy to explain, and the MS reading is sufficiently defended by Ι 343 A δ’ γε αὐτῇ οὖν πρόβατα—γεγνώσκεις (so also Hartman).

21 τούτο—αὐτὸ refers to ὅτι χρεία—μανθάνατε, and ἔλεγεν is ‘was saying’ i.e. was trying to say, viz. when I digressed.

394 D 24 εἶτε παραδεξόμεθα κτλ. Krohn (Pl. St. p. 13) declares this passage to be inconsistent with Ι 373 B, where ἵπποκράτα, χορευτά, ἐργολάβοι are admitted. He forgets or ignores the fact that in § 373 Plato is describing the τρυφέω σα πόλις, which he is now engaged in ‘purging’ (399 E). See Π 372 D n.

26 ἵσως δὲ—τούτων. In this remark J. and C. find “an anticipation of the condemnation of epic poetry in Book x.” I cannot see that it does more than prepare the way for ἀλλ’ ὅτι ἄν—ἰτέων. See on Χ 595 A.

394 E—397 D Our guardians must not be prone to imitation. We have agreed that one man can do but one thing well, and it is impossible for one man even to imitate two things aright, as we may see from the special instances of poetical composition and acting. The sole duty of our guardians is to make and keep the city free; if they practise imitation at all, their models must be such as are appropriate to the free—that is to say, men of brave and virtuous character, for imitation means assimilation. Dramatic poetry continually offends against this canon. In general, the good man will not make use of imitation except when he is narrating the sayings or deeds of the virtuous, or some lapse of the vicious into virtue, or sometimes in more play. His style of speech will combine plain narrative and imitation, but he will use the latter sparingly; whereas the bad man will imitate more often than narrate, and no kind of imitation will come amiss to him. In respect of mode and time, the language of Virtue will be nearly uniform, that of Vice varied.
394 E 29. πότερον μιμητικοὺς κτλ. The question is not ‘Are our guardians to become dramatic poets?’ but ‘Are they to have the imitative habit of mind?’ The answer is in the negative, and the drama is banished because it fosters this habit in spectators. Cf. 395 D v.

30 ὁτι—πολλὰ δ’ οὗ explain tois ἐμπροσθεν, as Hartman points out, and not toūτo, as D. and V. translate. ἐμπροσθεν refers to II 370 B.

32 πολλὰν κτλ. suggests, perhaps intentionally, πολύν ἡπιστάτω ἐργά, κακῶς δ’ ἡπιστάτω πάντα. The words ωστὶ—ἐλλάγωμεν—equivalent to a neuter accusative—are undeservedly cancelled by Herwerden and Hartman. Translate ‘he will fail in all of them to attain creditable distinction’: cf. the adverb κακῶς in κακῶς δ’ ἡπιστάτω πάντα.

33 οὖκον κτλ. The reasoning is a foriorti: if two or more departments of merely imitative art cannot be represented by the same person, still less can imitation be combined with any serious pursuit (σχολὴ ἀρα κτλ.).

395 A 3 οὔτε τὰ δοκοῦντα—ποιοῦντες. The reverse is affirmed by Socrates in Symp. 223 D τὸν αὐτὸν ἀνθρώπον εἶναι κακῶρα καὶ τραγῳδοῦντας ἐπίστασθαι ποιεῖν, καὶ τὸν τέχνη τραγῳδοῦσαν δίνει καὶ κυμαδοῦσαν εἶναι. The solution is that in the Symposium Socrates is applying to the drama the Socratic principle μία ἑπιστήμης δὲν ἕνωσι τῶν ἑπιστημῶν: theoretically, therefore, and ideally, the tragedian is also capable of writing a comedy. In the Republic, on the other hand, he is describing Greek dramatic art as he found it: for which reason he writes δύναται and not δύνατ' εἰς (a corruption in ν, wrongly adopted by Stallbaum). Cf. Ion 534 C. Aristophanes did not write tragedy, nor the tragedians comedy. The passage in the Symposium is interesting as an unconscious prophecy of the Shakespearian drama. Cf. Reber Plato n. d. Poesie p. II.

5 μιμήματα. See cr. n. Former editors variously read μιμήματα or μιμήματε. Either is admissible, so far as concerns the Greek, but the plural was perhaps—owing to the proximity of τοῦτο—somewhat more likely to be corrupted to the dual in this instance than vice versa. Cf. x 614 c δόλο—χάοματα ἐκχομένων ἀνάληπων with n. ad loc. The reading μιμήματα τε represents the correction μιμήματα. This is, I think, a somewhat simpler view than to suppose that an original μιμήματε became μιμήματε τε by dittography, and τε was afterwards changed to τά. Roepfer, however, pronounces in favour of the dual (de dual. usu Pl. p. 14), and it must be admitted that duals are peculiarly liable to corruption in the MSS of the Republic. See Introd. § 5.

6 ραφφοῦτοι—ὑποκριται. Even ραφφοῦτοι seem to have generally confined themselves to a particular poet: see Ion 531 C, 536 B.
—
TTOAITEI AC

395 d]

B

Sot?

oi avToi’

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149

ovhe toi viro/cpiTal

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/cal

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Mip.rjp.aTa.

a’?

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/ccopicphois

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€tl

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7roWa /caXcos pupieicrOai, rj avrci e/ceiva 7rpciTTeiv, cov hr) /cal ra
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pupa) paTci eaTiv dcfropioicbpiaTa.

Et apa tov

VIII.
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C 7009

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D

pipijaeis, eav

e/c

py

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aXX’ ovSi ot avTou
This was
7
true without exception till comparatively
late times
see Muller Gr. Biihnena.lt.
KiopipSols and rpayu>8ols
188.
pp. 185
(literally
at the tragedians ’ etc.) are
local
almost adverbial datives, regularly used to denote the exhibitions of
comedies and tragedies : see e.g. Arist.
’
36, and cf. the Latin use of ‘gladiatoribus
for ‘at a gladiatorial show.’
395 B, C 11 rj avTa €K€iva Trpa-rmv.
:

‘

—

—

koKw s should be repeated with irparreiv,
and y is simply ‘or,’ not ‘or else.’ The
alternative rendering given by J. and C.

—

or else
if able to imitate
is not able
do the things themselves,’ does violence
to both grammar and sense.
14 Sppioupyovs eXtvQtpias- An artificial and somewhat strained expression,
selected in order at once to compare and
contrast the guardians with other artists.
They too are artists, and their tpyov is
Freedom. To eXevdepia Plato attaches
his own meaning
true freedom lies in
the subordination of the lower to the
higher, both in private conduct and in
‘

to

:

political life

:

cf.

Xen. Mem.

IX 577 D, E,
in this sense that
below.
infra

TOVTOi<i

oaiovs, eA.eu-

dWo

prjhev tcov ala^pcov, iva pi) 20
rj

ov/c

fjadyaai,

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ort at

vecov iroppco hiaTeXeacoaiv, et? e 9 r) Te /cal (pvaiv
70.

—

crcb(})pova<;,

ra

he dve\ev 6epa pipre iroielv pi)Te

pipijaewi tov eivai diroXavacoaiv.

e/c t?}?

eiriTr)- 15

heoi av avTOv<; a\Xo

TTpaTTeiv ovhe pipelcrdai' eav he pipwvTai, pipelcrdai

6 epov<;,

cfiv\a/ca<;

aXXcov 7raawv hppuovpyiwv dcfreipevov 5 heiv eivai hr/puovp-

iXevdeplas

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A\i) Oearara,

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2. 5,

x 617 e nn.
eXevdlpovs

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om. A.

17 toutois : viz. to is Sypiovpyois iXevBepla s ry s 7r6Xec<JS.
airoXavcrtotriv
reveals
20 I'va p.ij
the object of this attack upon the drama:
adcf. 11 383 C and infra 401 B.
mirable illustration of the sentiment is
quoted by Susemihl from Plut. Sol. 29. 6
pera db ryv dbav irpoaayopeiicra s (sc. 6
SoXw v) avrov (viz. rbv Qeawiv) ypuryaev,
ei Tocrolnuv evavriov ovk alax Bverai ryXitpycravros 8b tov 01 kclvto. \f/ev86pevos.
tnriSos py Seivov eivai rd pera iraidias
Xbyeiv roiavra Kal irpdcraeiv, aipoSpa ry
fiaKTypiq. ryv yyv 6 2 6Xuiv irarafaj Taxi)
pb>TOL Tyv iraidiav, t(py, rahryv eircuvovvTes
Kal TipLovres evpr/aopev ev rols crupfioXalois.
To omit py (with
and a few other
MSS), and govern 'iva by pipeiadai above
is grammatically difficult, and gives an
unsatisfactory sense.
The genitive tov
eivai has been called in question by Hartman (following Ast) on the ground that
‘‘qui rod eivai (sc. aiaxpol) cnroXavaoicnv
iam sunt turpitudine infecti.”
This
would be true, if Plato had written the
present aToXahiaaiv, but the aorist is ingressive, and tov eivai airoXavcrwaiv is
virtually equivalent to ylvtovrai rovd 6
pipovvTai.
Few will acquiesce in Ast’s
conjecture rb eivai, or in Stallbaum’s
view that tov eivai is a partitive genitive.

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καθιστανται καὶ κατὰ σώμα καὶ φωνὰς καὶ κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν; Καὶ μίλα, ἡ δ' ὀσ. Οὐ δὴ ἐπιτρέψομεν, ἣν δ' ἐγώ, ὃν φαμέν 25 κύδεσθαι καὶ δεῖν αὐτοὺς ἀνδρας ἀγαθοὺς γενέσθαι, γυναίκα μιμεῖσθαι ἀνδρας ὡντας, ἡ νέαν ἣ πρεσβυτέραν, ἡ ἄνδρι λοιδορομένην ἢ πρὸς θεοὺς ἐρίζουσαν τε καὶ μεγαλαχυμένην, οἰομένην ευδαίμονα εἶναι, ἡ ἐν ξυμφορᾶς τε καὶ πένθους καὶ θρήνοις ἐξομήνην κάμνουσαν δὲ ἢ ἔρωσαν ἢ ὀδύνουσαν πολλοῖ καὶ δείσομεν. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἡ δ' ὀσ. Οὐδὲ γε δοῦλας τε καὶ δούλους πράττουσαν ὅσα δοῦλων. Οὐδὲ τούτῳ. Οὐδὲ γε ἀνδρας κακοὺς, ὡς ἐοικεν, δειλοὺς τε καὶ τὰ ἐναντία πράττουσαν δὲν νῦν δὴ εἴπομεν, κακηγοροῦντας τε καὶ κωμῳδοῦντας ἀλλὰς καὶ αἰσχρολογοῦντας, μεθύοντας ἢ καὶ νήφουντας, ἢ καὶ ἀλλα ὅσα 396 οἱ τοιοῦτοι καὶ ἐν λόγοις καὶ ἐν ἐργοῖς ἀμαρτάνουσιν εἰς αὐτοὺς τε καὶ εἰς ἄλλους. οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ μανωμένοις ἑθιστέοι ἀφροίσι καὶ ἀντίκειμεν ἐν λόγοις οὐδὲ ἐν ἐργοῖς. γνωστέοι μὲν γὰρ καὶ μανωμένους 5 καὶ ποιηροὺς ἀνδρας τε καὶ γυναίκας, ποιητέοι δὲ οῦδὲν τούτων οὐδὲ μιμητέοι. Ἀληθέστατα, ἔφη. Τί δὲ; ἢν δ' ἐγὼ χαλκεύοντας ἢ τι ἀλλο δημιουργοῦντας, ἢ ἑλαύνοντας τριήρεσι κελεύοντας

395 d 23 καὶ κατὰ σώμα—διάνοιαν. For σώμα Stallbaum conjectured σχῆμα, but Plato would surely have said σχῆμα, as in 397 b. Hartman boldly ejects κατὰ φωνὰς and reads κατὰ <τὸ> σώμα καὶ κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν, remarking that κατὰ τὸ σώμα by itself includes "gestus, habitus, vocem, vultum, similia." This is in a sense true, but there is no reason why one particular instance of physical resemblance should not be selected for special remark. Plato differentiates the external from the internal characteristics by combining σώμα and φωνὰς under a single preposition, and repeating κατὰ before τὴν διάνοιαν.

25 αὐτοὺς. For αὐτοὺς following ὅν see on II 357 b. The rule against the repetition of the relative in such cases is sometimes dispensed with for the sake of rhetorical emphasis, e.g. in II 374 b and perhaps Th. 192 b.

26 μιμεῖσθαι. In what sense can the guardians be said to 'imitate' in such a case, or in those specified in 396 a, b? Not as actors, but as spectators. Acting involves three elements—the character, the actor, and the spectator. In good acting the spectator identifies himself with the actor through sympathy; and as the actor 'imitates,' so does he. Such is Plato's theory, though merely glanced at here. Cf. x 605 c fi., Ion 533 D ff., and see the excellent remarks of Nettleship Lectures and Remarks II pp. 100—104.

ἡ ἀνδρὶ κτλ. ἀνδρὶ is of course 'husband,' not simply 'a man' (D. and V.). Contemporary comedy doubtless furnished abundant illustrations. In πρὸς θεοὺς ἐρίζουσαν κτλ. Plato may be thinking of Aeschylus' Nidhe (see on II 580 a). The emphasis on ὀδύνουσα should be noted: cf. I 336 A n.

395 E 29 κάμνουσαν—ὡδίνουσαν glances at Euripides and his school: cf. Ar. Frogs 1043, 1044 and 1080, with the Scholast's remark on 1080 ἐγράψε γάρ ὁ Εὐριπίδης τὴν Αἴγυνν ὀδύνουσαν ἐν λειψ. Plato's strictures throughout this passage tell much more heavily against Euripides than against the other two dramatists.

396 A I ἡ καὶ ἄλλα. ἄλλα must be coordinated with αἰσχρολογοῦντας, not with νήφοντας, so that Hartman's correction (καὶ for ἡ καὶ), though scarcely necessary, is an improvement, and may be right.

3 μανωμένοις. As in the Ennomenides, Ajax, Hercules Furens.

4 γνωστέον κτλ. cf. 409 A.


396 Β 8 μμητέων. See on μμεισθαι 395 D.
9 ἵπποις—βροντάς. The reference is probably to stage machinery and musical effects etc. in dramatic poetry generally, as well as in the later and degenerate form of the dithyramb (see on 394 C). Cf. (with Nettleship Lect. and Rem. II p. 105) Lawt 659 f. and Ar. Plut. 290 ff. The βροντείαν and κεραυνοσκείαν for producing thunder and lightning were familiar enough (Müller Gr. Bühnenaile. p. 157 n. 2). It is clear, as Nettleship remarks, that "Plato felt strongly that Greek literature and music were declining" in his days: see Lawt 659 Λ ff., 700 Λ ff., 797 Λ ff.

396 C 17 ό μέν—ἀνήρ. It seems difficult (as Schneider remarked) either to connect ό μέν with μέτρος ἀνήρ, or to understand ό μέν as the 'one' and suppose that μέτρος ἀνήρ is in apposition to it. If the latter alternative is right, we should expect μέτρος < ό μέν > ἀνήρ, or < ό > μέτρος ἀνήρ, and in view of other cases in which the article is placed at some distance from its noun (e.g. ό δέ γε, οἴμαι, όν δ' ἐγώ, καταληψθεὶς ἑαυτῶς διδοται VIII 566 C), I still prefer the former view. Some may be inclined to regard μέτρος ἀνήρ as a gloss. I have sometimes been tempted to make μοι δοκεῖ parenthetical (exactly = methinks), in which case ό μέν can easily be connected with μέτρος. The idiom occurs in Phaed. 108 D ό βίος μοι δοκεῖ ὁ ἐμός—τῷ μήκει τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἐξερθεὶ καὶ Μενη. 236 B: cf. also Crato 43 D, 50 B, and 1 332 E Μ. This solution would involve the change of ἑθελήσεις to ἑθελῆσθαι—so ὑν—and of αἰσχυνεῖσθαι to αἰσχυνεῖται just below, as well as again in D. Such a corruption, once started, ἐρχεται—as Plato might say—ὡς κύκλος αἰσχυνομένη; but I do not venture to change the text.

396 D 22 καὶ ἤττον is not superfluous with ἐλάττω. ἐλάττω means 'in fewer respects,' and ἤττον 'to a less degree.'

24 σπουδή. Cf. δ τι μὴ παιδίς χάρων in E and σπουδὴ 397 Α.
to vos toioutos, áma de kai diáxeraíνων autón ékmattein te kai èuvastánai eis tous tôn kakíañōn topous, 1 átimáçou tž ðiañoia, E ó ti mi παιδίας χάριν. Ëikós, éph.

IX. Oúk oxin diřhíseie χρήšetai óla ἡμεῖς ὀλγον πρότερων ὑήλθομεν περὶ τὰ τοῦ 'Ομήρου ἔπη, καὶ ἔσται αὐτοῦ ἢ λέξεις μετέχουσα μὲν ἀμφοτέρων, μιμήσεως τε καὶ θῆς ἀπλῆς διηγήσεως, σμικρὸν δὲ τι μέρος ἐν πολλῷ λόγῳ τῆς μιμήσεως: ἢ οὐδὲν λέγω; Καὶ μάλα, ἐφι, οἴον ὑπὲρ ἀνάλγη τῶν τύπων εἶναι τοῦ τοιούτου ῥήτορος. Oúk oxin, ἢν δ ἔγω, ὅ μήν | τοιοῦτος αὐτῷ ὧσον ἂν φαντάστερος 397 ἢ, πάντα τε μᾶλλον μιμήσεται καὶ οὐδέν ἑαυτῷ ἀμώξων οὐδέστερ εἶναι, ὥστε πάντα ἐπιχειρησία μιμεῖται σπουδῆ περὶ καὶ ἑαυτῶν πολλῶν, καὶ δ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, βροντᾶς τε καὶ ψόφους ἀνέμων τε καὶ χαλαξῶν καὶ ἄξων καὶ προχιλίων, καὶ σαλτπηρίων καὶ αὐλῶν καὶ σφυγγῶν καὶ πάντων ὄργανων φωνῶν, καὶ ἔτι κυνῶν καὶ προβάτων καὶ ὄρνεων φθόγγους: καὶ ἔσται δὴ ὑ τούτου λέξεις ἀπάσα διὰ 'μιμήσεως φωνᾶς τε καὶ σχῆμας, ἢ σμικρὸν τι Β διηγήσεως ἔχουσα; Ἀνάγκη, ἐφι, καὶ τούτο. Ταῦτα τούτων, ἢν 10 δ ἔγω, ἐλεγον τὰ δύο εἴδη τῆς λέξεως. Καὶ γὰρ ἐστιν, ἐφι.

32. ἀπλῆς nos: ἀλλὰς codd. 2. μιμήσεται σ: διηγήσεται ΛΠΕ. 4. δὴ ἐλέγομεν ΛΠΙ: διελέγομεν Λ. te Π: γε Α.

396 ε 29 ὁ τι μή παιδίας χάριν. Cf. vii 518 b. 30 οἷα. According to Van Cleef (de Altracit. usw Plat. p. 36), οἷα is not elsewhere attributed in Plato.

32 τῆς ἀπλῆς. See cr. n. The reading of the MSS τῆς ἄλλης ought strictly speaking to mean 'the rest of διηγήσεως,' i.e. besides μιμήσεως. A reference to 392 D will show that the rest of διηγήσεως includes (1) simple διηγήσεως, (2) the mixed style. If the text is sound, Plato therefore says that the good man's λέξεις will resemble Homer's in partaking of all three varieties. This is a cumbrous and unnecessary elaboration: for if style partakes both in μιμήσει and in simple διηγήσεις, it is already ἐπὶ ἐπὶ ἐπὶ 'mixed.' To take ἀλλῆς as 'besides' may be admissible, but in any case it is desirable to define the kind of διηγήσεως meant. I believe that Plato wrote ἀπλῆς. The good man's style will resemble Homer's, which has already been said to partake of μιμήσεως (393 c) and of ἀπλῆς διηγήσεως (394 b). The corruption—common in uncial MSS—is illustrated by Bast Comment. Palæogr. p. 730. Cf. my article in Cl. Rev. x pp. 384 ff.

33 μέρος (as Schneider points out) depends on μετέχουσα: cf. Eὐθύδ. 306 A ἑών ἀμφοτέρων μέρος μετέχουσα. 397 Α 2 μιμήσεται. See cr. n. The choice of reading lies between this and Madvig's emendation <μιμήσεται ἢ> διηγήσεται. In favour of μιμήσεται is μᾶλλον, which correlates with ὧσον ἂν φαντάστερος ἢ. The corruption doubtless arose from a misinterpretation of μᾶλλον. Thinking that an ἢ clause was needed to explain it, a scribe added ἢ διηγήσεται in the margin, and διηγήσεται was afterwards taken as a variant and ousted μιμήσεται. These arguments, which are Hartman's, seem to me conclusive in favour of μιμήσεται, which Schneider first restored.

3 σπουδῆ τε καὶ ἑαυτῶν πολλῶν: like the professional dramatist or actor.

5 προχιλίων κτλ. Cf. supra 396 b n. 397 b 8 σχῆμασι 'gestures.' 10 ἐλεγον. 398 b, c.
Oůκον αὐτοῖν τὸ μὲν σμικρὰς τὰς μεταβολὰς ἔχει, καὶ εἶν τις ἀποδιδῷ πρέπουσαι ἄρμοιαν καὶ ῥυθμὸν τῇ λέξῃ, ὅλγον πρὸς τὴν αὐτὴν γίγνεται λέγειν τῷ ὀρθῶς λέγοντι καὶ ἐν μιᾷ ἀρμοιᾷ.

C σμικρὰς γὰρ αἱ μεταβολαί· καὶ δὴ ἐν τοῖς ῥυθμοῖς σωστοῖς παραπλησίω τινὶ; Κομιδὴ μὲν οὖν, ἔφη, οὔτως ἔχει. Τί δὲ; τὸ τοῦ 15 ἑτέρου εἴδος οὐ τῶν ἐναντίων δεῖται, πασῶν μὲν ἄρμοιῶν, πάντων δὲ ῥυθμῶν, εἰ μέδει μὴ ὁκείως λέγεσθαι, διὰ τὸ παντοδαπᾶς μορφᾶς τῶν μεταβολῶν ἔχειν; Καὶ σφόδρα γε οὔτως ἔχει. Ἀρ' οὖν πάντες οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ οὗ τι λέγοντες ἢ τῷ ἑτέρῳ τούτων ἐπιτυχ αὐνοῦν τύχῳ τῆς λέξεως, ἢ τῷ ἑτέρῳ, ἢ ἐξ αἱμποτέρων 20 δινι ἄνυκεραννύντες; Ἀνάγκη, ἔφη. Τί οὖν ποιήσομεν; ἦν δ' ἐγὼ· πότερον εἰς τὴν πόλιν πάντας τούτους παραδεξόμεθα ἡ τῶν ἀκρατῶν τοῦ ἑτέρου ἢ τῶν κεκραμένων; Ἐαν ἡ ἔμη, ἔφη, νικά, τού τοῦ ἐπιηθετοὺς μεμητὴν ἄκρατον. Ἀλλὰ μὴν, ὅ Ἀδείμαντε, ἡδὺς γε καὶ ὁ κεκραμένος, πολὺ δὲ ἥδιος τοιαὶ τε καὶ παιδαγογοῖς ὁ 25 ἐναντίος οὐ σὺ αἴρει, καὶ τῷ πλείστῳ ὄχλῳ. "Ἡδιστὸς γὰρ. Ἀλλ'

13 πρὸς τὴν αὐτὴν: sc. ἄρμοιαν, as Schneider saw. To supply λέξῃ with Stallbaum, Hartman, and others is not satisfactory, nor is it easy to understand χορηγὸν (with Campbell). On the other hand ἄρμοιαν may be readily supplied in view of ἐν μιᾷ ἀρμοιᾷ following, ὅ λόγος qualifies τὴν αὐτὴν. The somewhat vague expression πρὸς τὴν αὐτὴν, where the musical sense of πρὸς may be illustrated by πρὸς Λεβίων λακείων ἡ αἰδών (Eur. Alc. 346), is afterwards made more explicit and precise by ἐν μιᾷ ἀρμοιᾷ i.e. 'in one musical mode' (see on 398 E), as opposed to πασῶν—ἀρμοιῶν in C. μεταβολή was technically used of passing from one ἄρμοια to another; see Cleonid. Isag. Harm. 13 and Bacchius Isag. 53 ed. von Jan. We shall best apprehend the full meaning of the whole passage if we read it in connexion with 399 A, B. The general sentiment may be illustrated from Arist. Eth. Níc. IV 8. 1125ᵃ 12 ff. καὶ κόνυ ς δὲ βραδεία τοῦ μεγαλοπύργος δοκεῖ εἶναι, καὶ φωνῇ βαρείᾳ, καὶ λέξις στάσιμος, Pl. Charm. 159 B, Dem. 37. 52 and elsewhere.

397 C 17 διὰ τὸ παντοδαπᾶς—ἔχειν. As the λέξις itself is for variety, it requires for its proper or appropriate (οἰκέων) expression every variety of mode and rhythm or musical time. μορφᾶς τῶν μεταβολῶν is surely good enough Greek: I cannot see the point of Richards' μορφᾶς ἐκ τῶν μεταβολῶν, still less why Hartman should eject τῶν μεταβολῶν or—as an alternative—μορφᾶς.

20 ἐπιτυχ αὐνοῦν = 'hit upon.' 'stumble upon,' as if by accident and ἄνευ τοῦ, not 'succeed,' as J. B. Mayor is disposed to construe (Cl. Rev. X p. 109). The same scholar proposes to change ἄνυκεραννύντες into ἄνυκεραννύντες, but the text is much more idiomatic as it stands.

397 D—398 B We shall therefore admit that style only which imitates the good man's way of speaking. The mixed and minuet varieties do not suit us, for the character of our citizens is simple and uniform. Those poets who refuse to comply we will dismiss with compliments into another city.

397 D 23 τοῦ ἑτέρου: 'one or other.' Presently τοῦ ἑτεροῦ 'the good man' is said for 'the good man's style of speaking'; see 398 B and cf. 399 B n. Before ἄκρατον, many editors add τῶν (with Ε''): but the position of ἄκρατον is normal: cf. τά ἐν ἰδίῳ φαντάσματα θέλη νη 532 C and note ad loc.

25 πασὶ—τῷ πλείστῳ ὄχλῳ. The expression recurs in Latas 700 C (quoted by J. and C.).
397 E 29 οὐκοῦν διὰ ταῦτα κτλ. There is probably a satirical reference to Athenian democracy: see Prot. 319 D.
398 A 3 αὐτὸς—ἐπιδείξασθαι: 'anxious to shew himself off together with his poems.' ἐπιδείξασθαι is intransitive—i.e. ἐπιδείξεως ποίησασθαί, cf. Lach. 179 E—with αὐτός, but transitive with ποίημα. This explanation, which is due to Schneider, gives a much better sense than if we regard αὐτός τε καὶ τὰ ποίημα as subject to ἄφικοτο, or translate 'himself, and wanting to shew his poems' (J. and C.). A reference to αὐτός τε καὶ τὸν ἄδελφον παρακάλει in IV 427 D is therefore hardly to the point.

προσκυνοῦμεν. The insertion of μὲν, recommended by Shilleto (Dem. F. L. § 91) and Richards, is unnecessary: cf. 1 340 D n. For προσκυνεῖν 'to kiss the hand' (adorare), as to the image or shrine of a god, see Cope's Rhetoric of Aristotle Vol. 1 p. 96.
5 οὐτ' ἔστιν—οὔτε θέμις. It is perhaps better to correct οὐκ into οὐτ'—see ev. n.—than the second οὔτε into οὔδε (with Bekker and the other editors).
6 μέρον—στέφανες. The idea suggested by προσκυνοῦμεν and λειφόν, that the poet is a sort of θέος or θείας ἀνήρ, is now elaborated with ironical politeness. The images of the gods were anointed, and crowned with garlands, not only on great occasions (cf. Cic. Verr. IV 77), but also at other times, according to Proclus, who remarks on this passage μέρον αὐτῆς (sc. τῆς ποιητικῆς) καταχέας, ώς τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἁγιωτάτοις λειφομένων, ἀλλὰ πῶς ἅγια στέφανα, ὡς περὶ καὶ κέκειται στέφεν τῶν νόμων (in Resp. p. 42 ed. Kroll). Schneider aptly compares Paus. x 24. 6 τούτων (a sacred stone) καὶ ἔλαιον ὁμήρως καταχέας καὶ κατὰ ἄρτην ἐκάστην ἔρια ἐπιτειθέα τὰ ἁργά. For other illustrations see Frazer on Paus. l.c., and Munro on Lucr. v 1199. Apropos of the present passage, Dio Chrysostom and other ancient writers cited by Ast refer to the anointing of swallows by Greek women: καὶ κελέεις μαλα εἰρήνικος (so Ast; MSS eἰρηνικός) στέφανας αὐτῶν ἐρω' καὶ μέρος καταχέας αὕτη μαίνεται παρ' ἄλλους τότε δὲ αἱ γυναῖκες ἐπὶ τῶν χειλῶν τοιοῦτα (Dio Chr. Or. 53 p. 276 ed. Reiske). To this custom Ast supposes that Plato is alluding, the poets being as it were faithless and garrulous swallows (cf. χειλῶν κῦκλος), as well as to the Pythagorean precept 'not to admit swallows into the house' (Plut. Symp. VIII 727 B ff.), on which see Frazer in Cl. Rev. v pp. 1—3. This explanation lends an additional point to ἀποστέφαμεν: and προσκυνοῦμεν might fairly be interpreted of the joyful salutations with which the Greeks hailed the advent of the swallow in the spring (see e.g. Baumeister Denk. d. Kl. Alterth. p. 1985). G. B. Hussey
(Proceedings of the American Philol. Association Vol. xxii pp. xiii ff.) thinks that Plato has in his mind the well-known χειλόνομα ὧν which we read in Athenaeus (VIII 360 ff.), remarking that in the swallow song ‘the custom seems to have been to carry some sort of symbolic swallow from house to house.’ It is perhaps more probable (as Mr J. G. Frazer suggests to me) that ‘the ceremony of anointing the swallows and crowning them with wool was performed on the children who went from door to door in spring, singing the swallow song and apparently personating the swallow.’ But the tone of the whole passage, with its air of studiously exaggerated politeness and compliment, as well as the particular expressions προσκυνούμεν, λειψών, and αὐθμαστῶν, are strongly in favour of Proclus’ interpretation, although Plato’s thoughts may have dwelt for a moment on the practices connected with the χειλόνομα when he wrote the words ἀποσείπομεν—στέψαντες.

398 Β· io κατ’ ἀρχᾶς. Π 379 A ff.

398 C—399 E We have now to treat of lyric poetry. Song involves three factors, viz. words, a certain musical mode, and a certain movement or time. Our regulations about words when unaccompanied by music apply equally to words when sung, and the musical mode and time must conform to the words. Now we proscribed all lamentation in our city, so that we must exclude the lugubrious modes; and those which are relaxing in their effects must be rejected on similar grounds. In short, we shall retain two modes and no more, one to imitate the brave man’s utterances in times of stress and strain, the other to imitate his accents in seasons of peace and calm. We shall deal similarly with instruments of music, forbidding all those which tend themselves to a variety of modes. It is thus that we purge our luxurious city.’

398 C οὐ το περὶ ὕδης κτλ. The discussion has hitherto confined itself chiefly to tragedy and comedy. It remains to discuss lyrical poetry also on its formal side. Now the chief formal characteristic of lyric poetry is its invariable association with music. It is therefore necessary to lay down canons for musical composition. This is the justification for the sections on ‘harmony’ and rhythm, which are wrongly pronounced to be irrelevant by Krohn (Pl. St. p. 15).

The present section, and its ancient commentators (Arist. Pol. 9. 1342 δ. 28—1344 b· 34; Plut. de Mus. cc. 15—17, Aristid. Quint. 1 pp. 21, 22 ed. Meibom), have been fully discussed by Westphal (Gr. Harmonik pp. 187—234). Westphal’s views have been combatted by C. von Jan (see especially his article Die Tonarten bei Platon im dritten Buche der Republik in Fl. jahrb. 1867 pp. 815 ff. and 1883, pp. 1354—1362 and 1568—1579), and more recently (in other respects) by Monro in his ‘Modes of ancient Greek Music.’ The last edition of the Harmonik (1886) contains Westphal’s reply to von Jan’s criticism (pp. 209—215). See also von Jan in Baumeister’s Denkmäler d. Kl. All. pp. 976 ff., Susemihl and Hicks The Politics of Aristotle Vol. 1 pp. 595 ff. and 624—631, and H. S. Jones and Monro in the Cl. Rev. viii pp. 448—454 and ix pp. 79—81. The writers in Meibom’s Antiquae Musicae auctores septem have
now been re-edited—Aristoxenus by Marquard (Berlin 1868), Aristides Quintilianus by A. Jahn (Berlin 1882), Alpyius and others by von Jan in his Musici scriptores Graeci (Lipsiae 1895), where also the passages of Aristotle bearing on the subject are carefully collected, together with all the extant remains of Greek Music. The account of Die Musik der Griechen by Gleditsch in Iwan Müller's Handbuch will be found a useful and compendious introduction to the study of this part of the Republic. Von Kralik's recent monograph Altgriechische Musik (Stuttgart und Wien) is interesting, but too slight to be of much service. Taken by itself, the language of Plato in this chapter seems to me to point to the existence of four leading or simple modes, viz., Dorian, Phrygian, Lydian and Ionian (the last two having each two varieties, a σύντωνος and a χαλαρά), and one composite mode, the Mixolydian. See App. II.

16 τρόπον. Hartman suggests τρόπων, in view of τό περί μυθών 399 E; but cf. 392 c. τρόπος is not here used in its technical sense, for which see Monro l. c. p. 63.

19 συμφωνήσειν. The metaphor may be suggested by the subject under discussion: cf. Phaed. 92 c.

398 D 24 λόγου—ρυθμοῦ. In the best period of Greek music, lyric poetry was written only for music, and music only for poetry, the separation of the two being condemned as illegitimate: see Monro l. c. pp. 119, 120. The elements of music are ὑμβούς and ἀρμονία. The former 'reconciles' ταυτό and βαρύ by arranging a proper sequence of short and long notes and syllables, the latter ἄμφος and μέθος by a proper arrangement of notes of higher and lower pitch (Symp. 187 A—C). In the wider sense, therefore, any ὑμλογία of ἄμφος and μέθος is an ἀρμονία, but in practice the word was used specifically of certain scales or modes, and it is in this sense (according to Westphal) that Plato uses it here and in 398 E, where see note.

27 ἀρμονίας: i.e. ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ λέγει as defined in 396 E, 397 D.

καὶ μὴ κτλ. The poet should be his own musician, and write the music to suit the words, not ὀνειρεύεσθαι. This was another characteristic feature of classical Greek music, although a change set in during the fourth century B.C. See Westphal Gr. Rhythmis p. 1 and Latos 699 D, E, 812 D.

398 E 30 ἀρμονίαι (according to the orthodox view) are 'musical modes' and not simply 'keys.' They differed from each other both in the arrangement of the intervals (like our major and minor modes) and also in pitch. It must have been the former difference which chiefly—though not perhaps exclusively—accounted for the different effects of different modes upon the character and emotions, just as we are ourselves affected in different ways by music written in major and in minor keys. See H. S. Jones in Cl. Rev. viii p. 449.
muiskos. Miexoludistt, efh, kai symtovoludistt kai toiautai tines. Oukouin autai, hwn de 'egw, afairetetai; arxhestoi gar kai yunaihiv ws dei epitiekeis einai, mli oti andrasio. Paini ye. Alhla mnen mebby gie phulaxi unprerestanov kai malakia kai arxia. Pios yap ou; Tines ouv malakai te kai symptikai ton armonwov; 35 399 'Iastl, h d' os, kai luidistl ad tines xalaraia kalovntai. Ta taunov ouv, o file, epit polemikov andrown esto' o ti chrisei; Oudomwos, efh: allha kivdunewi sou dwoisty leipesbai kai frugyisti. Ouk oida, efhno egw, tas armonias, allha katallpe ekeinyn thn armonian, ev te polemik praxe ouv anovreion kai ev pantia biain ergasia 5 prepolilos an myhsaito phdgyonos te kai poresfia, kal apotu-
chans h eis traumata h eis thavutovs ioutos h eis tina alhn B evmforan 1 pevontos, ev passes touitov parasatagmenov kai karpe-

31. symtovoludistt A' A: symtovoludistt A': symtrosoi luidistt II q. 36. ad

31 miexoludistt ktl. The omission of the article has been questioned, but in merely naming the scales it can be dispensed with: cf. (with Stallbaum) Arist. Pol. Th 6. 1340b 1 (thi miexoludistti kalovmen). On the armonia recognized by Plato see App. II.

36 'Iastl—kalovntai: 'there are also varieties of Lydian and Ionian which are called 'slack'." Jowett and Campbell, reading atinov (see cr. n.), remark that the "indefinite relative suits with Plato's affected ignorance"; but the speaker is Glaucos, not Socrates, and Glaucos is mu-
sikos. See note on 399 c. Richards condemns atinov xalaraia kalovntai as spurious because atinov "cannot be used in this way in good Attic prose of Plato's date." With the older and better attested reading ad tinov, which I have ventured to restore, everything is plain. The words ad tinov establish once for all what Westphal (I.c. p. 198) and von Jan (I.c. p. 816) detected even when atinov was read, viz. that Plato is referring not to Ionian and Lydian, but to slack Ionian and slack Lydian, a point which escaped Monro (I.c. p. 7) but not his reviewer (Cl. Rev. VIII p. 449). See also my article in Cl. Rev. x pp. 378 f. We learn from Aristotle that certain musical criticisms censured Plato for rejecting tais anemian armonias and for characterising them as mevstikai, baakhev-
tikov gar h ge melbby teci-maillov (Pol. Th 7. 1342b 23—27). It was partly perhaps in deference to these criticisms that Plato altered his view of melbby in Laws 666 Aff.: see also Grote Plato III p. 328 n.

399 A 3 dwoisty kal frugyisti. The absence of the Aeolian mode is remarkable, for it must certainly have been known to Plato (see Pratinas quoted in App. II). Westphal agrees with Jellermann in supposing (l.c.p.195) that apolysti is included under dwoisty. Aristotle also ignores apolysti, unless indeed (as Westphal holds ib. p. 196) it was identical with uydoyysti. In Lach. 188 B frugyisti is excluded (perhaps because the speaker is Laches, whose ideal of courage is military rather than pacific), and Dorian, 'the only national Greek mode,' alone recognized.

4 ekeinyn thn armonian: viz. Dorian, not Phrygian, as Ast seems to have thought.

6 myhsaito. Cf. Laws 708 D ta peri touis robvov kai pasian monistikyn evti tropovs myhsaitovs baxitovn kai xerovn anbropwov 397 B above.

kai apotuontos. kai connects ouvov and ammovmon. apotuontos (which is itself logically subordinate to ammovmon) has three subordinate alternatives (η—pe-

378 f. We learn from Aristotle that certain musical criticisms censured Plato for rejecting tais anemian armonias and for characterising them as mevstikai, baakhev-

notinov kai pasian monistikyn evti tropeovn ammovmonov)
Plato

399 b 9 ἄλλην: viz. Phrygian. Aristotle blames Plato for retaining the Phrygian mode, while rejecting the ἀδός, with which it was usually associated: ἀμφω γὰρ ἄρρητακαὶ παθητικά (Pol. θ 7. 1342β 3). Plato, however, rejects the flute, not because it is oristic, but because it is πολυναρμώνοις (399 b). In Plato’s opinion the Phrygian mode expressed sobriety and resignation: Aristotle thought it ecstatic and purgative (i.e. 1341b 23). The difference of view is interesting and important as shewing that the ethical effect of different modes was a disputed point even among the ancients.

11 ἡ εὐχή—ἀνθρωπος is subordinate to πειθότος τε καὶ δεομένου.

13 ὑπέχοντα. ἐπέχοντα—see cr. n.—cannot, I think, be right. ἐπέχειν τῷ διάνοια (Laws 526 c) certainly does not justify ἐπέχειν ἑαυτῶν, and even if it did, ‘submitting to’ and not merely ‘attending to’ is the sense required. With ὑπέχοντα cf. Σοργ. 497 b ὑπόδεικτες Σκώρατε ἐξελέγχεις ὡς ὁ βολήτας, where the reflexive pronoun is omitted, as often with παρέχειν. Here it is better to take ἑαυτῶν with ὑπέχοντα than with μεταπείθοιντι. By changing the construction and writing accusatives instead of genitives, Plato makes the man himself rather than his φύλογαν appear the object of imitation (cf. 397 a 14). This is natural enough, because the situations described in ἡ τούτων—ἀγαπῶντα give less scope for φύλογαν. Stephanus wished to read the genitive throughout (ὑπέχοντος, πράξάντος etc.: so also v and two Florentine mss); but there is also inscriptions evidence for a genitive or dative participle followed by an accusative in the course of a long sentence: see Meisterhans 9 p. 205.

15 κατὰ νόον: ‘to his liking’: cf. εὐπυρχοῦσιν below.

399 c 15 ταύτας—λείπει. The style is intentionally weighty and formal, as befits a solemn pronouncement: cf. x 617 b, E. After ταύτας there is a slight pause: ‘Just these, two modes and none other.’ The insertion of ταύτα would impair the effect, besides suggesting that Socrates had in view two of the current modes, which, not being himself ἄρμονις, he professedly had not. It is Glauco’s business to fit the cap (398 e, 399 b); Socrates only makes it. The indefinite αὐτίνες (before φύλογος) is therefore strictly appropriate in the mouth of Socrates, although it would not be in Glauco’s. ἄρμονις is rejected by Herwerden in both places (see cr. n.), but it is almost as indispensable here as it is wrong after ἀνδρείων, although Stallbaum rejects the word here and retains it there. The genitives δυστυρχοῦσιν etc. must depend on φύλογον. For βιαίον, ἐκούσιον (‘one involuntary, one voluntary’), Ast suggests βιαίον, ἐκούσιον, Hartman βιαίον ἐκούσιον. A human being cannot however be called βιαίος because he is engaged ἐν βιαίῳ πράξῃ, although the mode which imitates his accents may be so described with propriety and even elegance: cf. (with Schneider) such expressions as φόνος ἐγγενής for the slaughter of kindred. The words δυστυρχοῦσιν—κάλλιστα simply define the meaning of βιαῖον and ἐκούσιον (‘whatever musical modes they be that shall best imitate the accents of’ etc.): the relative is postponed in order to keep the essential marks of the ἄρμονια together, but the careful reader will note that Plato begins a chiasmus with δυστυ·

χοῦσιν, as if to separate the genitives from what precedes and prepare us to
find their construction in the sequel. Had he written εἰσυχαστῶν, διασυχαστῶν, ἀνδρέων, σοφρόνων the double chiasmus would have compelled us to connect the genitives with διὸ ἀρμονίας.

17 οὖν ἄλλας—ἐλεγον. The Dorian to express ἀνδρέα, the Phrygian σοφρό-

σῶν. These are the two contrasting virtues which Plato’s μουσική endeavours to combine (410 Ε).

19 παναρμονίων. In Plato the noun παναρμονίων occurs only here and in 404 D ωθή τῇ ἐν τῷ παναρμονίῳ καὶ ἐν παῖν ἀρμονίᾳ πεποιημένη. In the latter passage it certainly does not denote a musical instrument of any kind. Here the word is sometimes understood of a particular and definite musical instrument, but a careful study of the context shews that it does not bear this meaning even here. Plato has decided to admit only two modes, the Dorian and the Phrygian. ‘Consequently,’ he continues, ‘we shall have no need in our songs and melodies of πολυχορδία or παναρμονίων, and therefore (ἀρκόν) we shall dispense with τριγύων, πηκτίδες etc., with all instruments, in short, which are πολυχορδαὶ καὶ πολυμορφοῖα. The prohibition of certain musical instruments is an inference from the general principle that πολυχορδία and παναρμονίων are unnecessary, so that παναρμονίων cannot itself be a particular musical instrument. Probably, as Mr Archer-Hind has suggested to me, the παναρμονίων was not a mode or modes, but a style of composition, in which the

‘Tondichter’ passed freely from δωριστὶ to φρυγιστὶ and λυδιστὶ and as many others as he chose. The name may even have been given to well-known compositions in this style—cf. νόμος πολυκέφαλος—the fantasia with many subjects. The effect, I should think, may have been analogous to a series of bold and sudden modula-

tions in modern music.” See also on αὕτα τὰ παναρμονία in 399 D.

20 τριγύων—πηκτίδων. These were foreign instruments of high pitch, and many strings. The τριγύων in particular was associated with loose and voluptuous melodies. For an exhaustive account of both see Susemihl and Hicks’ Politics of Arist. vol. I pp. 632—636 or von Jan’s de fidibus Graecorum pp. 29 ff., 33 ff.

399 D 23 αὐλήτας. The αὐλὸς resembled the clarinet. It had a “mouth-

piece (στύγος) in which a vibrating reed (γαλάτα) was fitted,” and was sometimes played in pairs. See Dict. Aut. sv. tibia. Plato banishes the ‘flute’ and re-

tains the Dorian mode, although Dorian melodies were often played on it, as Milton well knew: see the noble description of the “Dorian mood of flutes and soft recorders” in Par. Lost I 550 ff. In Boeotia, where the αὐλὸς was highly esteemed, it was supposed rather to calm than to excite the feelings. See Rhys Roberts The Ancient Boeotians pp. 33—35.

ἡ οὖ τούτῳ πολυχορδότατον; τούτῳ is that with which αὐλάσπουι and αὐλήτας are concerned, viz. the ‘flute’: cf. 11 377 c. οὐτὸς instead of τούτῳ would have been a trifle harsh. πολυχορδότατον has been repeatedly called in question, and there is the usual crop of emenda-

tions, intended to obliterare the metaphor. Schneider has however shewn that the MS reading is sound, by citing Pollux IV 67 Πάλαιν δὲ καὶ πολυχορδάς εἰρήκει τὸν αὐλόν, and Simon. Fr. 46 ο καλλιβίδας πολυχορδός αὐλὸς, and comparing expressions like αὐλὸν κρέμας, ἀμβρόςκασ, κρούνες. Many other illustrations are given by Smyth, Greek Melic Poets p. 326. Here the metaphor is intended to arrest attention by its boldness and prepare us for the theory of the origin of παναρμονία in the next clause; but πολυχορδότατον in itself, like τάμφωφος in Pindar (Pyth. 12. 19 al.), refers only to the number of different notes which the flute, thanks to various contrivances, such as plucks, wax, etc., was capable of producing.
See Abdy Williams in *Proceedings of the Musical Association* 1897—8 p. 135. Plato objects to the multiplicity of strings and notes as admitting and even inviting change and fusion of modes. We are told by Paus. ix 12. 5 (cited by Monro l.c. p. 38: cf. Ath. xiv 631 e) that it was one Pronomus of Thebes who *πρότος ἐπινόησεν αὐλοῦς ἐκ ἀπαν ἀρμονίαν ἐνδός ἑξοντας ἐπιτρέψεως*. Down to his day there were three forms of ‘flutes,’ intended for the Dorian, Phrygian and Lydian modes respectively. On the means by which this change was effected see *Dict. Ant. s.v. τιμία*.

24 αὐτά τὰ παναρμόνια: sc. ὄργανα, such as *πηνίδες* and τρίγυμοι. Plato means those instruments on which panharmonic melodies could be played (cf. Proclus *in temp.* p. 63 ed. Kroll); but we must beware of translating (with D. and V.) ‘the panharmonium itself,’ for no single specific instrument is here intended, as some later lexicographers appear to have supposed. The gloss in Hesychius *παναρμόνιον· ἐνδός ὄργανον, ἐξ διὸν τεταγμένον* is not quite clear, and may conceivably refer to a whole class of instruments, but Photiūs appears to think that there was a special instrument called *παναρμόνιον*. His note (p. 388, 26 ed. Porson) is as follows: *παναρμόνιον· ὄργανον μονικόν. Ἀλέξις, ἐν τῷ τὸ παναρμόνιον τὸ καίνῳ ἐντεύκη τεχνῶν (Τέχνων Μεινέκη). Photiūs may of course be right in his interpretation of Alexis’ line: but *παναρμόνιον* in Plato never, I believe, refers to one particular instrument: and even Alexis may mean no more than ‘perform the new panharmonic melody,’ ἐντεύκη being used as in τὸ κάλλιστον ἐντεύκη καθᾶρος, Dionys. *Hal. de admir. vi dicendi in Dem.* c. 48.

25 λύρα—κιβάρα. The *λύρα* was the stringed instrument in common use; the *κιβάρα* was employed chiefly by professional musicians or κιβάραφολ. See Monro in *Dict. Ant. s.v. Λύρα*, where illustrations of the two instruments are given, and von Jan *de fid.* Gr. pp. 5—26. By admitting the professional κιβάρα, Plato perhaps lends his sanction to musical festivals or contests in the approved modes.

399 E 27 οὐδὲν γε· ὄργανον. Plato puts himself in the position of the Muses, who preferred Apollo’s performance on the κιβάρα to that of Marsyas on the flute (Apolloid. 1 4. 2). This is the force of οὐδὲν γε καίνῳ ποιούμεν. The words τὰ τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος ὄργανα must not be pressed; for although Apollo invented the cithara, the lyre was ascribed to Hermes (Paus. v 14. 8: cf. the Homeric *Hymn to Hermes*), and the syrinx to Pan. The discovery of the flute was also ascribed to Athena, especially by the Boeotians. A third account represents Marsyas as picking up the instrument after Athena had discovered and discarded it. This legend may be an attempt to reconcile the two conflicting stories, and probably dates from the decline of the flute as an instrument of education in Athens during the fourth century (Arist. *Pol.* Θ 6. 1341a 32 ff. Cf. Preller *Gr. Myth.* p. 223). In making Marsyas its discoverer, Plato declares the flute a
Mà Δία, ἣ δ' ὄς, οὗ μοι φανόμεθα. Καὶ νῦ τὸν κόνα, εἰπον, 30 λελήθαμεν γε διακαθαίροντες πάλιν ἣν ἀρτι τρυφαν ἐφαμεν πόλιν. Σωφρονούντες γε ἢμεῖς, ἣ δ' ὄς.

XI. "Ἰθι δή, ἔφην, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ καθαίρομεν. ἐπόμενον γὰρ δὴ ταῖς ἁρμονίαις ἂν ἴμιν εἶν τὸ περί ῥυθμοῦ, μὴ ποικίλως αὐτοὺς διάκειν μηδὲ παντοδαπὰς βάσεις, ἀλλὰ βίου ῥυθμοὺς ίδειν 35 400 κοσμίου τε καὶ ἀνδρείου τῶν εἰσίν· οὐς ἴδοντα | τὸν πόδα τῷ τοιοῦτον λόγον ἀναγκαζέν ἐπεσθαί καὶ τὸ μέλος, ἀλλὰ μὴ λόγον ποδὶ τε καὶ μέλει. ὀντίνες δ' ἂν ἐἰνεν ὤντι ὀν ῥυθμοῖ, ὅπερ ἄστερ τὰς ἁρμονίας, φράσας. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δι', ἔφην, οὐκ ἔχω λέγειν. οὕτως μὲν γὰρ τρὶ' ἄττα ἐστὶν εἰδῆ, ἐξ δὲν αἱ βάσεις πλέκονται, 5 ὡσπερ ἐν τοῖς θεοὺς τετταρα, δὲν αἱ πάσαι ἁρμονίαι, τεθεα-

[Foreign instrument, and appropriately excludes it from his 'Greek city' (v 470 e). 30 νῦ τὸν κόνα. This peculiarly Socratic oath occurs only once again in the Republic (IX 502 a). In both passages it marks the highest degree of emphasis. On the oath itself see my note on Ap. 21 e and Blaydes on Ar. Wasps 83.]

31 άρτι: Π 372 ε.ν. 399 ε—401 Α Let us now continue the purgation of our city by laying down rules for rhythm and time. Our rhythm must not be varied or manifold; for time as well as tune should conform to words, and not conversely. It is agreed that there are certain rhythms expressive of sobriety and courage. These and these only will be admitted into our city. For particulars, we shall apply to Damon; but we can enunciate the general principle ourselves. Rhythm and Mode reflect style, and style expresses character. It is to promote the growth of character that we shall require the young to pursue the beautiful throughout the realms alike of Art and Nature.

The section on Rhythms is hardly less difficult than that on Modes. Westphal translates it with a short commentary in his Gr. Rhythmik pp. 237—239, but without shedding any light upon the darkest places. Schneider and Stallbaum give little help. I have found Gleditsch’s summary account of die Metrik der Grie-

35 βάσεις. The word βάσεις in the technical writers on Rhythm generally means a dipody or combination of two feet under one main ictus: cf. Schol. in Heph. I 3. 1 p. 124 ed. Westphal βάσεις δὲ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐκ δύο ποδῶν ἀναστράτηκι, τοῦ μὲν ἀρτι, τοῦ δὲ θείαι παραλαβαμομένων. Such a technical use of the word would be out of place here, especially in the mouth of Socrates; and the word is employed throughout as equivalent simply to ‘step’ or ‘foot.’ Even technical writers sometimes so use it: cf. the Scholiast already cited δέξεται δὲ (sc. the Iambic metre) ἐν μὲν τῇ πρώτῃ βάσει λαμβάνων καὶ σπονδεῖον 11. 5. 151 and Gleditsch l.c. p. 702.

36 κοσμίου τε καὶ ἀνδρείου recalls 399 c σοφρόνων ἀνδρείων, and would seem to point to the necessity of two kinds of rhythm, one to go with the Phrygian mode and express sobriety and self-control, the other to join the Dorian mode in expressing courage. On the ethical qualities of Greek rhythm in general, consult Westphal Gr. Rhythmik pp. 226—239 and Arist. Rhet. III 8, with Cope’s notes.

400 Α 2 μὴ λόγον—μέλει. See 398 d n.

5 τρὶ' ἄττα εἰδῆ. Arist. Quint. I 34 ed. Meibom γενὴ τοῦν ἐστὶ νυμβακά τρία τὸ ἴσον (γ), τὸ ἴμιλιον (δ), τὸ διπλάσιον (θ). To the first belong dactyls, spon-

6 ὡσπερ—ἀρμονίαι. What are the τεττάρα εἰδῆ? The following answers (among others) have been given: το the intervals of the fourth, fifth, octave, and
double octave (Ast): 2° the four notes of the tetrachord, which was probably the historical and at all events the 'theoretical unit of the scale' (Stallbaum, Jowett and Campbell): 3° ‘the four ratios which give the primary musical intervals—viz. the ratios 2 : 1, 3 : 2, 4 : 3 and 9 : 8, which give the octave, fifth, fourth, and tone.' (Monroe l.c. p. 106 n.; cf. also Dict. Ant. II p. 193): 4° the four ārmsvai āfrojstī, Auvstāi, Dvōrstī, Larkorāti (Westphal Rhythmik p. 238). Ast's view cannot be right, unless we suppose that ārmsvai here includes scales of double compass, which is most unlikely. Westphal's explanation is improbable, for Plato has said nothing of Larkorāti, and (though perhaps no great stress should be laid on this) it is awkward to derive the ārmvai (θεν αι πάσαι ārmvai) from themselves. If the principle of Westphal's interpretation is right, I should be inclined to substitute Ιαστί for Larkorāti, having regard to 398 E, where see n. Cf. Cl. Rev. X p. 379. (I have since found that Prantl also took this view: see n. 116 in his translation.) I do not think that Stallbaum has hit the truth, for Plato's language is not suggestive of any allusion to the origin of the octave from the combination of two tetrachords, and a single tetrachord cannot produce a ārmvai (θεν αι πάσαι ārmvai). Possibly the tētpara eido en tois phōgous doνe simply the keynote, its octave, and the intervals of a tone and a semitone; for these are as it were the threads out of which all modes are woven' (πλέκονται should be repeated with ārmvai), the difference between the modes depending on the difference in position of the tones and semitones. But Euclid lays the greatest stress upon the ratios 3 : 2 and 4 : 3 as the component elements of the octave: see for example Sect. Ca. 6 τὸ θυπάλασιν διάστημα ἐκ δύο τῶν μεγάλων ἐπιμαζύνοντος οἰστήσεως, ἐκ τοῦ ἡμιολοῦ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἐπιτροποῦ and cf. ib. 8, 12, and for this reason I now believe that Monro's view has most in its favour.

7. ποία ἡ ὀρθού βιού Π. On ὀρθοῦ see 1348 B n., and for the error in Paris A Introduct. § 5.

400 B 8 Δάμωνος. μετὰ Δάμωνος is almost a formula with Plato: cf. infra C, 424 C, and Lach. 200 B. Susemihl (on Arist. Pol. Θ 5, 1340 b 5) thinks that Plato is alluding to a special work by Damon on the ἤδος and πάθος of modes and rhythms. The word ἀκηκοέναι and the general tone of the passage seem rather to refer to an oral demonstration.

10. τίνας—ῥυθμοὺς. In general, πόδες ἀπὸ ἀρσεως, or feet in which the θεσί (i.e. the syllable bearing the iactus) followed the ἀρσις, were believed to express more energy and life, than πόδες ἀπὸ βέσεως. See Gleditsch p. 694, and for details as to the ἤδος of the different rhythms ib. pp. 713, 721, 725, 730, 739, 744, 766.

11. οἷα δὲ μὲ κτλ. Schneider's δὲ γε (found in some inferior mss) is not appropriate here. The superfluous pronoun after οἷα is a well-established colloquialism: cf. Charm. 173 A, ἱμηκοέναι, and οὐ σαφῶς διωμαξύντος are just the words one might employ in giving one's recollections of an abstruse and half-understood lecture, and this is just what Plato is either doing or, more probably, affecting to do. A few technical terms and a vague idea (οὐδ' ὀποῖς) of some of the processes are all that he remembers.

ἐνύπλωον—ἡμιόλον. ἐνύπλωος ξύνθετος, διάκυδος, ἡμιόλος are expressions from the lecture: in English they would be in inverted commas. The ἐνύπλωος is not (Proclus in temp. p. 61, if, as appears probable, by παραμβλῆς he means the παραμβλοῦ or pyrrich), nor the cretic (J. and C.), nor, strictly speaking, the anaepastic foot (Hartman), but 

, a common processional
The diagram above the latter, in some such way as —. The position of the ictus —ἀνω καὶ κάτω, not κάτω καὶ ἀνω—shews that Plato is speaking of the dactyl and spondee which replace the anapaest in the anapaestic rhythm; for in the dactylic rhythm proper the ictus falls on the first syllable (see Gleditsch p. 693). Now the ἐνόπλος is also anapaestic, so that it looks as if Damon had taken as the subject of his demonstration some passage like Persae 9, το κάτω ᾠδα τετραεταὶ, and analysed it into an ἐνόπλος ξώνητος, a dactyl, and a spondee (included, as stated above, under the ἤρως ὑπόμοιος).


### 14. τῶν ΑΣ: fortasse τῶν Α aroused point.

The diagram above the latter, in some such way as —. The position of the ictus —ἀνω καὶ κάτω, not κάτω καὶ ἀνω—shews that Plato is speaking of the dactyl and spondee which replace the anapaest in the anapaestic rhythm; for in the dactylic rhythm proper the ictus falls on the first syllable (see Gleditsch p. 693). Now the ἐνόπλος is also anapaestic, so that it looks as if Damon had taken as the subject of his demonstration some passage like Persae 9, το κάτω ᾠδα τετραεταὶ, and analysed it into an ἐνόπλος ξώνητος, a dactyl, and a spondee (included, as stated above, under the ἤρως ὑπόμοιος).

### 15 μήκη—προσήπτε. Hartman takes these words as explaining the trochee only, laying emphasis on the precedence given to μήκη; but the use of the plural shews that the iambus is also included.
οἵμα τάς ἀγωγάς τοῦ ποδοῦ αὐτῶν οὐχ ἦττον ψέγεω τε καὶ ἐπαινεῖν ἢ τοὺς ῥυθμοὺς αὐτῶς, ἦτοι ἐνναμοφότερον τι· οὐ γάρ ἔχω λέγειν. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μέν, ὁσπερ εἴπον, εἰς Δάμωνα ἀναβεβλησθοῦ· διελέσθαι γάρ οὐ σμικροῦ λόγου. ἢ σὺ οὐει; Μὰ Δι', 20 οὐκ ἔγογη, 'Ἀλλὰ τὸ δέ γε, ὅτι τὸ τῆς εὔχρησμονς τε καὶ ἀσχήμονον τῷ εὐρύθμῳ τε καὶ ἀρρύθμῳ ἀκολουθεῖ, δύνασαι διελέσθαι; Πῶς δ' οὖ; 'Ἀλλὰ μήν τὸ εὐρυθμὸν γε καὶ τὸ ἀρρυθμον, τὸ μὲν τῇ καλῇ λέξει ἐπεται ὁμοούσιον, τὸ δὲ τῇ ἐναντίᾳ, καὶ τὸ εὐάρμουστον καὶ ἀνάρμουστον ὤσαύτως, εἴπερ ῥυθμὸς γε καὶ ἁρμονία 25 λόγῳ, ὡσπερ ἀρτι ἔλεγετο, ἀλλὰ μή λόγος τούτου. 'Ἀλλὰ μήν, ἢ δ' οὔ, ταῦτ' γε λόγῳ ἀκολουθητέον. Τί δ' ὁ τρόπος τῆς λέξεος, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ ὁ λόγος; οὐ τῷ τῆς ψυχῆς ἦδεί ἐπεται; Πῶς γάρ οὖ; Τῇ δέ λέξει τὰ ἄλλα; Ναί. Εὐλογία ἀρὰ καὶ εὐαρμοστία καὶ εὔχρησμον καὶ εὐρυθμία εὐθεία ἀκολουθεῖ, οὐχ ἢν ἀνοιάν ἔπον ὑποκοριζόμενοι καλοῦμεν ὡς εὐθείαιν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ἡς ἀληθῶς

24. καὶ ἀνάρμουστον Π. om. A.

The meaning is simply 'and he assigned them longs and shorts,' i.e. to each one long, and one short. This clause is in favour of keeping εἰς βραχὺ—γεγραμμένων in its place; if we transpose (as suggested in the last note), the short and long of the iambus will be alluded to twice.

400 C 16 ἀγωγή. ἀγωγή is tempr (Gleditsch p. 688). The unit of measurement was the χρῶνος πρῶτος or ω; and hence the dactyl, for example, usually a τετράτμης ἀγωγή, the iambus a τρίτομος, and so on. See Excerpta Neapoli in von Jan's Mis. Script. Gt. § 14. The duration of the χρῶνος πρῶτος was of course relative, and not absolute, so that the time occupied in singing or declaiming a foot often varied, and we are told that ἔστιν ὅτε καὶ εἴν διάσμα (sc. ἀγωγή) γίνεται δακτυλεύς ποίη (Ex. Neap. 1. c.). But it is clear that in general the ἀγωγαί of the different kinds of feet were different from one another. Hartman equates τοῦ ποδός, "cum apud Platonem ποῖς et ῥυθμὸν non disreperit." The distinction between ποῖς and ῥυθμὸν is not always preserved by writers on metre (e.g. Bacchius Isag. 100 ff. ed. von Jan), but Plato seems to make the ποῖς differ from the ῥυθμὸν as the unit from the whole.

20 εὐχρησμονής: grace or beauty of form in the widest sense. The word is introduced in view of the application of these principles to objects appealing to the eye: see 401 A.

400 D 24 ἀνάρμουστον. The article (which Baier and Hartman require) is unnecessary. See on 1 334 E.

26 ἀκολουθητέον (i.e. δεὶ ἀκολουθητέον) has ταῦτα for its subject, as Stallbaum points out: cf. Laws 803 D τι παύοντα ἐστὶ διαμεστῶν; and infra ν 467 C.

27 τῷ τῆς ψυχῆς ἦδεί ἐπεται. Τὸ style c'est l'homme. Conversely, thought is the dialogue of the soul with itself: see Theoet. 189 E (with Wohlrab's note) and Soph. 263 E. Cf. also IV 437 C n. and Homer's διέλεια τιμής.

400 E 30 ὡς εὐθείαιν is expunged by Herwerden; Baier would omit ὡς. ὡς belonged to εὐθείαιν (as these critics apparently supposed), it would deserve expulsio; but it goes with ὡς ὁσειν understood. The antithesis is between ἄνοον and εὐθείαιν; and if the sentence is read so as to lay stress on these two words, it will be seen how easily ὡς ὁσειν can be repeated after εὐθείαιν. The sense is: not the εὐθείαιν which is really ἄνοον, but which we euphemistically designate as if it were εὐθείαιν (i.e., as before, in the good sense of the word), but εὐθείαιν in
its true and etymological sense (ὡς ἀληθὸς)—the εὖ τὸ ἱδος κατεσκευασμένον διάνοιαν. This explanation seems to me better than to regard ὡς εὐθείαν as attracted for ὡς εὐθεία (σχ. ἐστιν), a construction for which we may compare Προτ. 357 D: see my note ad loc. For ὡς ἀληθὸς cf. I 343 C n.

The principle of ἀπλότητι, which is the corner-stone of Plato's city, presents itself in the education of the young, as the pursuit of εὐθεία.

This lofty conception of ἄμοια and ῥημαὶ—for ἀυτῶν shews that these are included no less than ἀσχημοσύνη—stretching throughout the whole domain of art and nature, may have been suggested by Pythagorean teaching: but the view of education as the pursuit and assimilation of all this beauty is due to Plato himself. Cf. 403 C n.

401 A 2—403 C. To these canons not only poets but all other artists must conform. We shall admit no artists save those who are able to track out the nature of the beautiful, and beguile our children even in their earliest years into unconscious harmony with the beauty of reason. The value of a musical training lies in its peculiar power of imparting grace and beauty to the soul. It enables the learner to discriminate between the fair and the foul in other spheres, admitting only that which is beautiful and fair, at first instinctively, but afterwards, when reason comes, with fullest consciousness, and joyful recognition of the beauty to which he is himself akin. No one is truly imbued with musical culture until he can recognise the originals of virtue wherever they are found, as well as their copies everywhere. Such an one will love supremely the union of a beautiful soul with physical beauty, but will let inner beauty alone in part for outward defect, and his passion will be pure from sensual taint. Our account of Music is now ended; for the end of Music is the love of Beauty.

401 B 10 Τῆς τοῦ ἄγαθοῦ κτλ. This famous section describes in glowing language, like that of the Symposium, Plato's ideal of art. He does not desire to banish art, as is sometimes asserted, but rather idealises it by effecting—as he believed—its reconciliation with beauty and truth. Art aspired to be καλὸν in his day: Plato wished it to be so in the fullest sense of the word: and his idea of beauty is sufficiently comprehensive to include moral and spiritual beauty as well as physical. Plato was doubtless unfair in the application of his principle to some of the Greek artists and poets, but in itself his ideal—the love of spiritual beauty—is one to which the best and most enduring art—which alone can find a place in an ideal city—consciously or unconsciously ever seeks to conform. See Nettleship Lect. and Rem. II pp. 112—116.

Toίς ποιήμασιν κτλ. Cf. Laws 656D, E. Nettleship (Hed. pp. 117 f.) remarks on the fact that "Plato in his criticism of
Greek art has almost ignored the painters and sculptors, and confined his assaults to the musicians and still more to the poets.” This is true, although the present passage shows that his canons were intended to regulate painting, sculpture, architecture, and the minor arts as well as music and poetry. Among other reasons, Nettle-ship plausibly suggests that Plato “did not see in the sculptors and architects of his time the signs of degeneracy which drew his attention to the poets and musicians.” Cf. 401 c.

401 c 21 ὅποδέν ἄν κτλ. No Greek could read these words without thinking of Olympia; no Athenian without recalling the glories of the Acropolis. It was probably in the spirit of this ideal that Epaminondas—himself a man of Platonic sympathies, if not a Platonist—hinted to his countrymen that their city could not be truly great until the Propylaea crowned their citadel (Aesch. πέρι παραπτερεσβελας 105. See also Nettle-ship Hell. pp. 115—123). Partly on grounds of style, and partly for grammatical reasons, I believe that Plato wrote τις and not τι (see cr. n.). ‘Wherever anything strikes on their eyes or ears from fair works of art’ sounds material and gross in a passage so full of poetic feeling; and in the second place ἄγους agrees with ἀφα, whereas it should be ἄγον and agree with τι if τι is right. Translate ‘Where-soever from beautiful works of art there smites upon their eyes or ears as it were a salubrious breath from healthful regions.’ In the same way a sort of ἄγους flows into the soul from beauty, awakening love and admiration (Phaedr. 251 c). The melodic current of Plato’s rhythmic utterance flows onward like the steady though gentle breeze which it describes. With ἀφα—ἄγους cf. Arist. Probl. 1 52. 865 b 19 τόπος ἄγους καὶ τόπος εὐπνοος (ὡς καὶ ἡ θάλασσα ἄγους). For the syntax of τις—ὡς ἄφαρα ἄγους cf. τᾶς τῆς γενέσεως ἄγγελε ως ἄφαρ μαθηματικ διὰ τῆς 719 B, where a similar corruption occurs in some of the mss; see n. ad loc. Paris A has τι for τις again in II 360 E.

401 D 27 ἐν μουσικῇ τροφῇ. The insertion of ἦ before ἐν (suggested by Rückert) is needless: cf. 404 B.
autēs, fέροντα τήν εύσχημοσύνην, καὶ ποιεῖ εὐσχήμονα, εἶν τις ὥς ὁ ὁρθὸς τραφείς; δὲ δὲ μη, τοιναυτόν; καὶ ὧν τῶν παραλεῖπος-3ο μένων καὶ μη καλῶς δημιουργηθέντων ἢ μη καλῶς φύσεως ἥματα ἐμι οἰκείοντο ἢ ἐκεῖ τραφείς ὡς ἔδει, καὶ ὥς ὁ ὁρθὸς δη δυσχεραίνων τὰ μὲν καλὰ ἔπαινοι καὶ χαίρων καὶ καταδεχόμενοι ἐστὶν τήν ψυχήν τέρηος τὴν ἀπ' αὐτῶν καὶ γέννουτο καλῶς τε κάγαθος, τὸ δ', αἰσχρά ψέγων τ' ἀν ὁρθῶς καὶ μυσίν ἔτι νέος ἡν, πρὶν λόγον ὄνωπος εἶναι λαβεῖν, ἔλθοντος ἐτ τοῦ λόγου ἀσπάζοτι ἀν αὐτῶν γνωρίζων δι᾽ οἰκείοτητα μᾶλλον ὡς ὅτου τραφείς; Ἐμοί γοῦν δοκεῖ, ἐγεῖ, τῶν τοιναυτῶν ἔνεκα ἐν μουσικῆ ἐνεή τροφῆ; Ωσπέρ 5 ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγὼ, γραμμάτων πέρι τότε ἱκανός εἶχομεν, ὅτε τὰ στοιχεῖα μὴ λαυθάνοι ἡμᾶς ὁλίγα ὤντα ἐν ἀπασίν οὗς ἔστιν περιφερέμενα, καὶ ὃτ' ἐν οὐκρινῷ οὗτ' ἐν μεγάλῳ ἡμιάμουμεν

Β αὐτῷ, ὡς οὐ δεότι αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἀλλά πανταχοῦ προϋθυμομεθα διαγνώσκειν, ὡς οὐ πρότερον ἐσώμενοι γραμματικοὶ πρὶν ὅτους 10 ἐχομεν—Ἀληθή. Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰκόνας γραμμάτων, εἰ τοῦ ἦ ἐν

30. αὐ τῶν Π.: αὐτῶν Α. 4. ἐμοὶ γοῦν Α'/Π.: ἐμοί· οὖν Α. 11. εἰκόνας Σχ.: εἰ εἰκόνας ΠΙII.
Republic is only by way of illustration, and we must beware of reading more into Plato's words than they are capable of meaning in the context where they occur. No doubt it is true, as Dr Jackson remarks, that "this passage makes us acquainted with the relation of copy and model which is to become important later," but Bosanquet goes too far when he asserts that "the expression 'images of letters' points forward to the classification of grades of knowledge, at the end of Book VI, the allegory of the cave at the beginning of Book VII, and the argument of Book X."

13 αὕτα is emphatic: 'the letters themselves' as opposed to their εἰκόνες. There is of course no allusion to 'Ideas' of letters.

402 c 16 τά τῆς σωφροσύνης εἰδή κτά. Are the εἰδή Plato's Ideas? So Zeller (II 1 p. 560 n.), and many other critics, understand the word; nor can it be denied that the language of Plato, if interpreted in the light of Book VII, can bear this meaning. Nevertheless we are bound in the first instance to interpret this passage by itself, and not by Book VII, the more so as the doctrine of transcendent or separate (χωρισταί) Ideas appears nowhere else in I—IV, and seems to be expressly reserved by Plato for his philosophical, as distinct from his musical education (see IV 435 b and VI 504 b n.). What is meant by the words εἰκόνες αὐτῶν? The context shews conclusively that εἰκόνες refers to copies (sc. of the virtues σωφροσύνη etc.) represented in poetry and the fine arts (so also Krohn Pl. Frage p. 47). On any other interpretation the introduction of these εἰκόνες is irrelevant in a discussion on the rules which imitative art must obey. This being so, if εἰδή means the Ideas, Poetry will be a direct imitation of the Ideas, which is inconsistent with X 595 c — 598 d. Or does Plato mean to suggest that Poetry and Art in his ideal city are really to imitate the Ideas directly? This is a bold and attractive solution, and there are several hints elsewhere to the same or nearly the same effect, but Plato expressly speaks of the εἰδή here only as immanent, and not transcendent (ἐνωτά ἐν οἷς ἐνέργεια), and we must therefore suppose that the artist copies from the life (cf. ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καλὰ ἤθεν ἐνωτά d). The word εἰδή is repeatedly used by Plato without reference to transcendent Ideas, as has been amply proved by Krohn (Pl. St. pp. 65, 66), Pfeiderer (Zur Lösung etc. p. 17), and Campbell (II pp. 296 ff.). Here it does not mean 'varieties' (as if there were more than one variety of σωφροσύνη), but simply 'forms' or 'kinds,' in the sense in which the immanent reality which every general notion attempts to express is a 'form' or 'kind'—a genus or species—of the totality of things. Cf. IV 435 b n. The genitives are genitives of definition. The use of εἰδή in the sense of "immanente Seinsformen" (Krohn) is interesting as a harbinger of the Ideal theory of VI and VII—a sort of half-way house between the Socratic λόγοι and Plato's ideas. It recurs in IV 434 d, 435 b, 437 d. See further Krohn Pl. Frage pp. 54—58, and cf. VI 504 d n. But although the separatists have (as I think) made out their claim that transcendent Ideas do not appear in Books I—IV, I agree with Hirmen (Entst. u. Komp. d. Pl. Pol. p. 645) in thinking their deductions from this fact unwarrantable.

17 μεγαλοπρεπεῖα. μεγαλοπρεπεῖα in Plato is 'highmindedness,' not, as in Aristotle, 'magnificence': cf. VI 486 a n. In like manner Plato's ελευθερίας denotes the virtue proper to an ελευθερος, and is not restricted to liberality in spending money. Contrast Arist. Eth. Nic. IV cc. 2—6.
403 D 26 τοῦ δὲ — διάπλησσαμένοι μωθομένηι καὶ ιερά καὶ εἰκόνας αυτῶν καὶ μὴ τε σμικροὶς μὴ τε ἐν μεγάλους ἀτιμάζομεν, ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτῆς οἰόμεθα τέχνης εἶναι καὶ μελέτης; Πολλῆς ἀνάγκης, ἐς ἑφθ. Οὐκοῦν, ὃς ἡ ἐγώ, ὅτεν αὖ ἔμμετρότητα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καλά ἔνοικται καὶ ἐν τῷ εἰδικῶς ὀμολογοῦντα ἐκείνους καὶ ἔμμετρά τοῦτον, τούτῳ ἄν εἰ δέν γον ψεδόμος θέαμα τοῦ δυνάμενον θέα, τόπος γε. Καὶ μὴν τὸ γε κάλλιστον ἔρασμοι—25 ταῦτα. Πῶς δὲ οὐ; Τῶν δὴ τοῦ μάλιστα τοιοῦτων ἀνθρώπων ὅ τε μουσικὸς ἐρήμῳ ἄν· εἰ δὲ ἀξυμάχους εἴη, οὐκ ἄν ἔρημοι. Οὐκ οὖν, εἰ γε τι, ἐφθ. κατὰ τὴν ψυχήν ἐξελέπτοι· εἰ μεντοι τι κατὰ τὸ σῶμα, ὡς τε ἐθέλειν αὐτὰ καὶ μελέτης. Μανθάνω, ὃς ἡ ἐγώ, ὅτι ἐστὶν σοι ἡ γέγονες παιδικὰ τοιαῦτα· καὶ συγχαρώ. ἀλλὰ τοῦτο με εἴπει: σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡδονὴ ὑπερβαλλοῦσα ἐστὶ τις κοινωνία; Καὶ πῶς, ἐφθ. ἢ γε ἐκφράσατε ποιεῖν οὐχ ἤττον ἢ ἄλτη; 403 Ἀλλὰ τῇ ἄλλῃ ἀρέτῃ; | Οὐδαμῶς. Τί δὲ; ὑβρεῖ τε καὶ ἀκολαστία; Πάντων μάλιστα. Μεῖκω δὲ τινα καὶ ἐδυστέραν ἐχεις εἰπεὶς ἡδονῆς τῆς περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια; Ὁὐκ ἔχω, ὃς ἡ ὅσ, οὐδὲ γε μανικώτεραν. Ὅ δὲ ὁρθὸς ἐρως πέφυκε κοσμίου τε καὶ καλοῦ σοφρώνως τε καὶ μουσικὸς ἔραφαν; Καὶ μάλα, ὃς ὅσ. Οὐδὲν ἄρα προσοιστέοι 5 μανικῶν οὐδὲ γεγεννεῖς ἀκολασίας τῷ ὀρθῷ ἔρωτι. Οὐ προσοιστέοι. Β Οὐ προσοιστέον ἄρα ἀλήθεια ἡ ἡδονή, οὐδὲ κοινωνητέον αὐτῆς ἔραστή τε καὶ παιδικοὶ ὀρθῶς ἔρωτι τε καὶ ἔρωμενοι; Οὐ μέντοι, μᾶ Δί, ἐφε, ὃς Σώκρατες, προσοιστέοι. Οὐτώ δὴ, ὅς οὐκε, νομοθετήσεις εἰν τῇ ὀκίνησει ἥπελιν, φίλειν μὲν καὶ ἔμμεναι καὶ 10

402 D 26 τῶν δὲ — διάπλησσαμένοι. Cf. Symp. 209 b and 210 b, c. The whole of Diotima's wonderful speech (210 D—212 Α) should be compared with the closing sections of this chapter. In point of language the words καλλιστον θέαμα—ἐρασμωτῶν closely resemble Tim. 87 D. 27 ἀξιμάχους: i.e. (as Glauco's answer shews) strictly speaking one whose soul and body do not harmonise in point of beauty, but the word also suggests "the man who has no music in his soul." Cf. Symp. 206 ε τῶν δὲ (κύριος καὶ γέμωσις) ἐν τῷ ἀναμίμησι δώθησεν γενίσειαν. With the sentiment in general cf. Tim. 87 D ι. 402 E 29 μανθάνω—ὅτι: 'I understand: (you say so) because.' etc.: see I 332 Α. 403 Α 7 οὐ προσοιστέον ἄρα. This somewhat extreme example of a common liberty in concord serves to increase the rhetorical emphasis by the energetic repetition of Glauco's ἵππεισις verba. The emphasis becomes still greater in Glauco's reply οὐ μέντοι, μᾶ Δί, προσοιστέοι. The particle μέντοι is especially used in replies when the words of a previous speaker are repeated (Hoefer de part. Phal. p. 32). ἐν and Flor. U have προσοιστάτη. 403 E 10 φίλειν is 'kiss' (as Schnei- der rightly translates the word): cf.
v 468 b and Arist. Pol. B 4. 126b2 32 ff., where χρήσεως (as Hicks observes) means ‘endearments.’

11 ἀπεσθαί κτλ. We think of Socrates and the ‘disciple whom he loved’ in the Phaedo: εἴδεις γάρ, ὅποτε τούχοι, παλίκους μοι εἰς τὰς τρίχας (89 b).

ὡστερ ὑδός. Herderwen’s conjecture ὡς πατὴρ ὑδός (or ὡστερ πατὴρ ὑδός) deserves the praise of ingenuity, but Plato’s text is better and more expressive, because it represents the object of affection almost as the lover’s very son. It should be noted that in Plato’s ἔρως it is the elder who loves, and the younger who is loved; and that the aim and purpose of Platonic love is τὸ ὑδός ἐν καλῷ (Symph. 206 b)—the bringing to birth of noble thoughts and aspirations from the beautiful soul of youth. Socrates was the embodiment of Plato’s ideal in this respect (Symph. 216 D ff.). Some true and excellent observations on the subject will be found in Dugas L’Amitté Antique pp. 50—53 al.

τῶν καλῶν χάρων. Plato is resolved that Love, as well as Art, shall serve Virtue and not Vice.

12 τὰ δ’ ἀλλα—ἐνυψηθεῖσαν. ἱσοῦται πρὸς τινα occurs with the same sense in Gorg., 510 c.

Madvig’s περὶ ὑδόν for πρὸς ὑδόν would give quite a wrong meaning. ἵσοῦται has been suggested for ἱσοῦται (Ast, Richards, Hartman), but the optative puts the case more generally: any one in whom one may be interested. Cf. Soph. Ant. 666 ἡλικίαν ἐν πόλις στήσει τοῖς καλέσμενοι εἰς τὴν χρή κλείσεις, with Jebb’s note. The previous sentence has told us what the actual relations of the pair of friends must be; and Plato now forbids all conduct likely in any way to occasion scandal or misapprehension: hence δόξη (‘be supposed to’). Such conduct is in bad taste (ὑδόν ἀμοινίας), rather than positively ἀειχρήν or immoral, like actual vice. μαρτύρεια τούτων (Herwerden) is steady of μακρότερα τούτων is a singularly gross conjecture.

403 c 14 ὑφέξοντα. ‘If ὑφέξοντα non sanum, corrige ὑφέξου’ (Hartman). This catches the point, but, as Hartman admits, the text can be defended as it stands. The participle agrees with the subject of ὑμεῖσιν, εἰ δὲ μὴ being all but adverbial, and therefore not followed by a main clause. Cf. Prot. 341 b.

16 δει δει του κτλ. The love of Beauty is φιλοσοφια (Symph. 204 b); so that the famous saying of the Phaedo (61 A) φιλοσοφια μετίτη μονικη ἐρεξεμιστέσσης, I agree with Krohn (Pl. St. p. 71) in holding that τοῦ καλὸν is still beauty as it is revealed in Nature and in Art (see on 402 c), the πολὺ πείλαγος τοῦ καλὸν of Symph. 210 b, and not yet the transcendental Idea of the Beautiful, the contemplation of which demands a still higher flight (ib. 210 d—212 A). But Plato leaves his μονικοσ already knocking at the gates ‘of the best promised Land.’

403 c—405 a Let us now discuss the subject of physical training. We may safely entrust the duty of making specific rules to the intelligent which we train, and content ourselves with tracing outlines. Every kind of excess or self-indulgence in eating, drinking, and the other appetites, must be forbidden. Gymnastic must be ‘simple’ like her sister Music. Complexity in the one case breeds disease, in the other vice; so that doctors and judges rise in public estimation, and charitocracy and medicine give themselves airs.

403 c 18 γυμναστική κτλ. Plato’s statements on γυμναστική have been carefully collected and expounded by Kantor Platos Anschauungen über Gymnastik, Graudenz 1886. Admireable remarks on the whole subject will be found in Nettleship Hell. pp. 132—134: cf. also his Lectures and Remains ii pp.
123—126. Plato deals here chiefly with the hygienic aspect of gymnastics—a subject which was much discussed in his day: see Dict. Ant. I p. 929, where we are reminded that gymnasia were dedicated to Apollo, father of Asclepius, and himself a god of healing. In his interesting treatise Die Platonischen Dialoge in ihrem Verhältnisse zu den Hippokratischen Schriften (Landshut 1882) Poschenrieder has shewn that Plato was strongly influenced throughout this passage by the views of Hippocrates and his school. See also Häs. Lehrb. d. Gesch. d. Med. etc. I pp. 94 ff. The athletics of Gymnastic are treated of in Lavor 795 D ff., 833 ff.

403 D 22 ψυχή ἄγαθή—βελτιστόν. No very recondite theory of the relation of body and soul is here involved. Plato simply means that the soul has more power over the body than the body over the soul. (The restriction in ὡς ὁδὴ τε should be noted.) On this principle some doctors held that to cure the body one should minister to the mind diseased: see the curious passage in Charm. 156 B—157 C. The general sentiment is well illustrated by J. and C. from Democrit. Fr. Mor. 128 (Mühlach) ἀνθρώπωςις ἀρμάδιον ψυχής μᾶλ- λον ἦν σώματος ποιεσθαι λόγον· ψυχή μὲν γὰρ τελεωτὰτ σκέψεως μοχθήρια ὄρθω, σκέψεως δὲ ἱσχύς ἀνεπ λογισμῷ ψυχήν οὐδὲν τι ἀμείνων ποιεῖ.


404 A 3 ἕν σμικρὰ ἐκβωστῶν κτλ. Poschenrieder (l.c.) cites the Hippocratic Praedictiones II c. I Littre τούς ἀθλητάς γινόμενοι...ἤν τι τοῦ στιοῦ ἀπο- λιπτόνων, ἡ ἑτεραία τὰ φάσων, ἡ ποτὶ πλεοὺ χρησίμως, ἡ τοῦ περιπάτου ἀπολιπ- των ἢ ἁφροδισιών τοῖς πάντων οὐδὲν λαθάνει, οὕτως εἰ σμικρὸν τι ἐκ ἀπελθήσας ἀνθρωπος.
6. the II: to καὶ Α. 7. στρατείας Θξ: στρατείας ΑΞξ: στρατείας (sic) Π. 14. στρατείας Πξγ: στρατείας ΑΣξ: στρατείας (sic) ΠΙ.

6 ωσπερ κύνας. Π 375 Α.

404 Β Π οπλή—πόλεμοι. The sentence is usually explained by carrying on ἡ βελτίστη γυμναστική ἡ καὶ regarding ἀπλή—γυμναστική as the predicate both to ἡ βελτίστη γυμναστική and to ἡ τῶν περὶ τῶν πόλεμων. Besides its extreme cumbrous view, this makes Plato say that the best gymnastic is good (ἐπιεικής is practically synonymous with ἀγάθη) which is, to say the least, unnecessary. It seems to me much simpler and better to make ἐπιεικής γυμναστική the subject to ἀλή, the meaning is: will the best course of training be sister to the music we described? How so? ἐπιεικής γυμναστική, like ἐπιείκης μουσική (this is the force of καὶ), is (έςτι understood) ἀπλή, and so above all is that of soldiers. Hartman, who saw that the passage must be taken in this way, would write τι for καὶ, and I once preferred καὶ < ἃς>, but the article can be dispensed with (cf. 401 D n.), and καὶ is necessary. As the emphasis is primarily on γυμναστική, some may prefer to read γυμναστική ἐπιεικής or γυμναστική ἡ ἐπιεικής; but if the stress of the voice is laid on γυμναστική, and ἐπιεικῆς γυμναστική treated as a single expression (cf. v 453 Α. ο.). I think the text may stand.


404 C 15 ἐν Ἐλλησπόντῳ is rejected by Cobet and Hartmann; if the Homeric heroes were ἐν Ἐλλησπόντῳ, the fish forsooth would more easily have eaten them than they the fish! This is however so obvious that even Cobet’s “scriba sciolus” would have seen it, and avoided the preposition ἐν. The fact is that Ἐλλησπόντως was constantly used to denote the whole coast stretching from the Pontus to the Aegean, including Bosporus and Propontis. See Stein on Hdt. IV 38 and cf. Thuc. II 9. The usage is also found in Inscriptions (Meisterhans p. 236. 16). An Athenian of Plato’s day was much more likely to employ the name Ἐλλησπόντως in this idiomatic sense than a later copyist; and for this reason I have no doubt that the expression is genuine, although the words of Hartman “nihil refert utrum ἐν Ἐλλησπόντῳ an ἐν Ἀγάπτῃ sint” are nearly, if not quite, true. Plato may however intend to remind us that fish were plentiful in the region of the Hellespont: cf. II. IX 360 and Athen. IV 157 B.

17 ὡς ἔτος ἐπείν. I 341 B n.
21 καὶ ὅρθως γε—ἀπέχονται. ὅρθως must be taken with both verbs: 'Yes, and they do well in knowing it and in abstaining.'

404 d 22 Συρακοσίαν—δούον. For δέ (‘autem’) Stallbaum unnecessarily reads δή. The Συρακοσία τράπεζα was proverbial: see Blaydes on Ar. Fr. 206 and the curious account of Syracusan gluttony in Pl. Epn. vii 326 b ff. There is no sufficient basis for Cobet’s idea that Plato is here borrowing from some comic poet. Later scandal insinuated that it was the delights of Syracusan living that drew Plato thrice to Sicily (Hermann Gesch. u. System p. 116 n. 133, where the authorities are cited).

24 Κορινθίαν κόρην. Cf. II 373 A n. Κορινθία κόρη is a grisette: see the commentators on Ar. Plat. 140, and on the general subject Blümmer Privatbl. pp. 254—256. φίλην is more refined for 'mistress' (ήταρχια). The word κόρη has been doubted: ‘innocentem puellam ecicer ex Platonis republica voluerunt triumviri praestantissimi Buttmannus, Morgensternius, et nuperrime Astius.’ So says Stallbaum, her successful champion.

26 Ἀττικῶν πεμμάτων. The fame of Athenian pastry was as great as its variety: see Athen. xiv cc. 51—58 and other references in Blümmer l.c. p. 220.

28 παναρμονία. See on 399 c.

405 A 2 ἱατρεία were both dispensaries and consulting-rooms etc. See Laws 646 c and other references in Blümmer l.c. p. 359. In some ἱατρεία patients were also housed and treated by doctors (Häser Lehrbuch d. Gesch. d. Med. etc. i pp. 86 ff.), so that in certain cases they resembled a sort of private hospital. For the remedial conception of punishment prevailing in the whole of this section see Π 380 b n.

диκαιική. Cobet calls for δικαιική, and at first sight δικαστῶν just below seems to favour his view. But Plato deliberately selects the less reputable word, meaning by it the arts by which men try to lead the true δικαστῆς (cf. Ap. 40 A) astray: see infra B. C. In his own city there is no δικαιική, but only δικαστική (409 ε, 410 Α). It appears from Laws IV 720 C ff. that a doctor’s assistants were usually slaves, and that slaves for the most part treated slaves, and freemen freemen, but the rule was not universal (see Blümmer l.c. p. 359 n. i). Plato holds that the increase of citizen doctors points to the spread of self-indulgence among the free-born population.

405 Α—410 Α It is a sign of bad education when we require first-rate physicians and judges; still more shameful is it to pride oneself on escaping the
punishment of wrong-doing by the aid of legal subterfuges. We should also be ashamed to enlarge the terminology of medicine by our self-indulgence. It was otherwise with medical science in the time of Homer, although Herodicas has now invented a new sort of treatment, whose only result is to prolong the process of dying. Asclepius knew better; for he knew that work was more than life. We recognise this fact in the case of artisans and mechanics; but Asclepius knew that rich men also have a work to do, and in the interests both of his patients and their country, declined to treat incurable diseases. Legends to the contrary effect are false. Yet we cannot dispense with doctors and judges: only they must be good doctors and good judges. The most skilled physicians are those who, besides having learnt their art, have had the largest experience of disease in their own persons; but no one can be a good judge whose soul is not unstained. Our judges must be old, and gain their knowledge of crime by science, not by personal experience. The vicious judge cannot recognise innocence when he sees it. Vice will never know Virtue, but Virtue may be taught to know Vice as well as herself. Our doctors will permit the physically incurable to die; the morally incurable our judges will put to death.

405 b 11 καλ ἀπορία οἰκεῖων has suffered severely at the hands of critics, who have bracketed καλ (Ast and others), or read καλ ἀπορία οἰκεῖων (Hermann), or δικαίως ἀπορία οἰκεῖων (Madvig), or finally denounced the words as a 'futile interpretation.' Schneider explains καλ as "idque" ("und zwar" in his translation), and so also Prantl, and Shilleto (on Dem. F. L. § 101). This interpretation appears to me forced and unnatural. It is simplest to make ἀπορία as well as τῷ δικαίῳ depend on χρῆσθαι, and regard χρῆσθαι ἀπορία as equivalent to εἶναι ἀποροῦ, just as χρῆσθαι ἀρκεῖα (for example) means no more than εἶναι ἀμαθεῖς.

The plural οἰκεῖων does not refer to διστατῶν, but is the genitive of οἰκεία, which means 'resources of one's own,' 'personal resources' (ἐπακτῷ πάρῳ ἄλλῳ. Cf. the use of τὰ οἰκεῖα in the literal sense for res familiāris i 343 e 4a.

ἡ δοκεῖ κτλ. Glauco has said that χρῆσθαι ἐπακτῷ τῷ δικαίῳ is the most disgraceful thing of all. Socrates asks him whether it (τόσο) is more disgraceful than the other case (τόσον) which he is about to mention; and Glauco's reply is 'no: this other case is even more disgraceful than the first' (infra c). The meaning was missed by the critic who (see Rev. de Philol. xv p. 83) ingeniously suggested the insertion of ἐδο; after δικαστῷ just before Glauco's reply. In what follows the litigiousness of the Athenian nature is satirised.
The word is found in the Hippocratican writings, and denotes "defluxionem aut omnem humoris ex capite ad os et asperam arteriam, atque per eam ad pulmonem, delationem ac ascensus" (Stephanus-Hase s.v., where examples are quoted).

24 τούς κομψοὺς Ἀσκληπιάδας. The epithets κομψὸς and χαρετῶτες were often applied to the more advanced and scientific sort of physicians (Blümner Privatall. p. 358 n. 2). The Ἀσκληπιάδαι were a well-recognized sect or college of physicians, with schools in Cyrene, Rhodes, Cos, and Cnidus. See Günther in Iwan Müller’s Handbuch ν τ. p. 103, and Hug on Symb. 186 B.

25 καὶ μάλ’—ονόματα: ‘Yes, indeed, these are truly’ etc. Glauco does not reply to ὅν κεροῖδος δοκεῖ, but simply corrobates what Socrates has said about the new medical terminology. This is simpler than to place (with Schneider) a colon after ἐφη, and take καὶ μάλα with αἰσχρὸν. The asyndeton on Schneider’s view is too harsh, and would almost require the insertion of καὶ before ὃς, or (if ὃς ἄλληθος were taken as ὃς ἄλληθος αἰσχρὸν) before καὶ; neither of which alternatives is satisfying. For similar inexactness in replies see ν. 465 B n.

405 D E 27 οἱ υἱὲς—ἐπέτιμησαν. In themselves these words can only mean that Machaon and Podalirius (the two chief army doctors to the Greek host, H. xi 833) found no fault with the damsel who gave the wounded Euryphylus an inflammatory potion, or with Patroclus, who was curing him, for directing or permitting her to do so. In our Homer, however, the potion is given, not to Euryphylus but to the wounded Machaon, by
Hecamede, Nestor's slave (*Iliad* xi 624); and this is correctly related in *Iliad* 538 B. The inconsistency led Ast to suspect the genuineness both of Εὐρυπόλου—see however 408 A—and of οὐδὲ Πατρόκλου τῷ ἱμέρῳ ἐπετίμησαν: but there can be little doubt that the text is sound. We must suppose either that Plato is confused, or else that in his text of Homer such a potion was administered, not only to the wounded Machaon (as in the *Iliad* l.c.), but also to the wounded Eurypylus, with Patroclus' sanction. The first alternative is possible, and approved by Howes (*Harvard Studies* etc. vi p. 198): but as it is clear from the *Iliad*—if the *Iliad* is genuine—that Plato was familiar with the story of Machaon's treatment, I think it more likely that Plato's Homer related a similar incident in connexion with the treatment of Eurypylus also. For the healing of Eurypylus see *Iliad* xi 844 ff., xv 394.

405 E 28 οἶνον Πράμνειον. Athenaeus, alluding to this passage, informs us that Prameinean wine was παχὺς καὶ πολυστρόφος (1 10 B).


5 'Ἡροδίκων. Herodicus, a native of Megara, and afterwards a citizen of Selymbria, is mentioned by Plato again in *Protagoras* 316 E and *Phaedrus* 227 D. He was one of the earliest to study scientifically the therapeutics of exercise and diet, and particularly recommended long walks, according to Plato (*Phaedrus* l.c. τὸν περίπατον Μέγαρδε. Cf. Häser *Lehrb. d. Gesch. d. Med.* etc. 1 p. 94). The description of his health given here is confirmed by Aristotle *Rhet.* i 5. 1361 b 4—6 πολλοὶ—ὑγιαίνοντο ὄσπερ 'Ἡροδίκος λέγεται, φοβοῦται αὖ ἐνδομοσιαίες τῇ ὠγείᾳ διὰ τὸ πάντων ἀπέχεισθαι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἢ τῶν πλεῖστων (a passage curiously misunderstood by J. and C., who seem to take λέγεται for λέγει). Plato himself thoroughly appreciates the connexion between physiognomy and physiognomy: see for example *Gorgias* 452 A ffr., 454 b ffr., *Sophocles* 228 E, *Pol.* 295 c.

6 νοσοδήμος γενόμενος. εἰς φθῖον ἀνήκειστο τῶν ἐπεδομ. says Plutarch (de *his qui sero* etc. 554 c).


12 δυσθανατῶν: not "dum malam obit mortem" (Stallbaum), but 'dying hard,' like δυσθανατὸν.
13 καλόν. Because he was the first to profit by his own invention. The assonance γήρας—γήρας is quite in Plato's manner: cf. IV 439 C, VI 487 C, VIII 557 C nn.

406 C 18 οδύειν σχολή κτλ. Stein- hart (Platon's Werke V p. 172) thinks it strange that so idealistic a thinker as Plato should not recognise the power of spiritual strength to rise superior to bodily weakness. This truth was not ignored by Plato (see infra 408 E and VI 496 B), although here, perhaps, he forgets that conspicuous examples of fortitude and resignation have a political as well as a private value: "they also serve who only stand and wait."

406 D 22 καύσει τι κτη. The two methods of ancient surgery: see Blümner Privatall. p. 323 n.

23 μακράν has less authority than μικράν (see cr. n.), but is probably right. The contrast with the immediate remedies just described seems to require an allusion to the duration of the regimen: cf. also μακρός—τόν θανάτον in B above. μακράν is not sufficiently defended by a reference to κατά σμικράν in 407 D, nor by the allusion to πυλίδα καί τά τούτοις ετόμενα. Moreover σμικρός, and not μικρός, is the prevailing form throughout the Republic. μικρός appears to occur only in V 453 D and VI 498 D. On the inscriptive usage see Meisterhans 8, p. 89.

406 E 28 ύψης—απηλλάγη. He regains his health on losing his doctor, or if he dies, dies without help. Cf. Plut. Apophth. Lac. 231 λ οδή γάρ κατά τον ιατρόν εἰσόντος
178

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

[406 E]

iatrivh chrhsthai. 'Ara, hν d' evw, oti hν ti avtω érgon, | d ei 407 mì prɔttov, oûk eluvstelē z'ë'; | δhλov, éph. 'O dè dh ploušios, ὦς φαμεν, oude̱n ἔχει τοιουτον érgon prokeimewn, ou anagkaizomewn απεχθεσθαι αβιωτον. Oûkouv dh lègetai ye. Φωκυλίδου ἡμα, 5 ὢν d' ἔγω, oûk ákoueis, πῶς φησι δείν, ὅταν τῷ ᾧδί βιο αἱ, ἀρετὴν ἀσκεῖν; Oûmai dh τε, ἐφι, καὶ πρότερον. Μηδὲν, εἶπον, περὶ τοῦτον αὐτὸν μαχώμεθα, ἀλλ' ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς διδαξομεν, πότερον μελετητέον τοῦτο τῷ πλουσίῳ καὶ αβιωτόν τῷ μῆ 1 μελετῶντι Β ἥ νοσοτροφία τεκτονική μὲν καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις ἐμπόδιον τῇ 10 προσέξει τοῦ νοῦ, τὸ δὲ Φωκυλίδου παρακέλευμα οὐδὲν ἐμποδίζει. Ναί μὰ τὸν Δία, ἡ d' ὁς, σχεδὸν γε τὶ πάντων μάλιστα ἡ γε

9. ἡ II: ἡ Α.

autw, Gérown γέγονα, Δάτι, εἶπεν, oué ἐχρησάμην σοι λατρψ. (The anecdote is told of Pausanias the Spartan king.)

31 Ὕν. The carpenter is now dismissed: hence the imperfect ὤν, which should be retained in translating. Stallbaum (followed by J. and C.) explains ὤν as the 'philosophic' imperfect = ἐστίν, ὥς ἄρτι ἐλέγουμεν (in 406 c). This is much less simple and lively. "Wohl weil er ein Geschäft hatte, bei dessen Unterlassung es ihm nicht ersprießlich war zu leben?" Schneider, rightly. Cf. Ι 361 c n.

407 A 3 éργον προκείμενον. The view of work and duty here presented recalls I 352 E−353 E.

5 ἄκουεσ. Phocylides, being dead, yet speaketh. The present akoues is just as legitimate as φησι, and well expresses the living voice of poetry in oral circulation. Heindorf (on Gorg. 503 C) misses the point of the idiom when he says that akoues is for ἀκοή; while Stallbaum's explanation 'probas' is positively wrong. The line, as restored by Bergk Phoc. Fr. 10, is δι' ἐγναθι βιοτιν, ἀρετὴν ν nad ὦ ἀρετὴν ἔτι. The Horatian 'quarerenda pecunia primum, | virtus post nummos' gives the meaning, if primum and post are understood in a strictly temporal sense. Phocylides' maxim is one of the earliest expressions of the all but universal cτυ χρήματα χρήματι ἀνήρ (first in Alcaeus Fr. 49 Bergk), which Socrates and Plato continually preached against. It will be noticed that Plato for his own purposes represents Phocylides as laying the stress on ἀρετὴν ἀσκεῖν rather than on δι' ἐγναθι βιοτιν, where it really falls.

8 τοῦτο: viz. τὸ ἀρετὴν ἀσκεῖν, as explained in the margin of Α.

407 B 9 τῇ προσέξει τοῦ νοῦ is added as a kind of afterthought or additional specification, precisely like the infinitives in Gorg. 513 E ἐπικεφαλήτης ἐστι τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς πόλεως βεβαιώσεως, infra 407 c, IV 437 B, 443 B, V 450 B, Χ 598 B, Crito 52 B. The datives τεκτονικ’ et al. depend grammatically on ἐμπόδιον only, and have nothing to do with προσέξει. παρακέλευμα hence is of course the accusative, the subject to ἐμποδίζει being νοσοτροφία, and οὐδὲν advers. Richter (in Fl. Jahrb. 1867 p. 149) should not have revived the reading of Bekker μελετῶντι Β νοσοτροφία τεκτονική μὲν γὰρ κτλ., which is lacking both in authority and point.

II ναι μὰ τὸν Δία—εἰκὸς γε, ἐφη (in C). See cr. n. With the ἕρσ reading εἰκὸς γ’ ἐφη, the distribution of the speeches causes difficulty. It will be enough to mention three alternatives, for no one has adopted or is likely to adopt the punctuation of A, where σχεδὸν γε τὶ —περὶ τοῦ σώματος is assigned to Socrates. We may give either (1) the whole speech ναι μὰ—περὶ τοῦ σώματος to Glaucos, excising εἰκὸς γε, ἐφη with Π γ and some other MSS (so Schneider 1830); or (2) ναι μὰ—ἐπιμελεία τοῦ σώματος to Glaucos, and γε τῷ περὶ τοῦ σώματος to Socrates (Stallbaum); or (3) ναι μὰ—δοκεῖος to Glaucos, and τὸ δὲ δὴ—περὶ τοῦ σώματος to Socrates (Baiter and others, including Schneider 1842). The first view fails to account for the appearance of εἰκὸς γε ἐφη in A, but is right, I think, in assigning the whole speech to Glaucos. Neither
at καὶ γὰρ πρὸς οἰκονομιὰς nor at τὸ δὲ μέγεθος is it easy and natural to change the speakers. The simple extension of writing ἐφην for εἴη appears to me to set matters straight. For the corruption see Introd. § 5. οὐκών ταῦτα etc. is also said by Socrates.

32 ἀποκεκριμένον: an isolated, local malady; "morbum separatum, non totum corpus efficientem" (Ast). Unnecessary difficulty has been raised. The word is in no sense technical, and ἀποκριθῶς in the sense of 'separate' is common enough. The corruption ἀποκεκριμένον might have been foretold.

16. τινὰς Ξ: τινος (sic) ΑΠ. διατάσεις v cum Galeno (v p. 874 Kühn): διατάσεις ΑΠΞ. έπιθαλής τινάς αἰεὶ διατάσεις καὶ λύγγοις ὑποτεύουσα καὶ αἰτιωμένη ἐκ φιλοσοφίας ἐγγίζονται, ὡστε, ὅπῃ αὕτη, ἀρετὴ ἀσκεῖσθαι καὶ δοκιμᾶσθαι πάντῃ ἐμπόδιοις. κάμνειν γὰρ οὐσίας ποιεῖ αἰεὶ καὶ ὀδύνηται μὴ ποτὲ λέγειν περὶ τοῦ σώματος. Εἶκος, γε, ἐφην, οὐκών ταῦτα γιγαντούτα φῶμεν καὶ Ἀσκληπίου τοῦς μὲν φῦσε τε καὶ διαίτη ὑγεινῶς ἔχοντας τὰ σώματα, νόσημα δὲ D τῷ ἀποκεκριμένῳ ἵπτοντας ἐν αὐτοῖς, τούτους μὲν καὶ ταῦτη τῇ...
Katadeiexai with proostattevn is a little awkward, I prefer the second alternative. The asyndeton, which is of the usual explanatory or ampliative kind, is in keeping with the loose structure of the whole sentence, and seems to me to add a certain didactic impressiveness here: cf. 409 B, τα δ᾿ εἰσώ—σῶματα depends not so much on ἀπαντλοῦντα directly as on the composite notion ἀπαντλοῦντα καὶ ἐπιχείροντα, which expresses a certain mode of treatment, and is as it were a species of the general idiom ποιεῖν τινὰ τι, φυτεύειν must depend on ποιεῖν. Plato’s sentences are seldom so disjointed as this: cf. however VI 488 Bff., VIII 558 A.

407 E 29 μὴ οἴσθαι: for the negative (which is the more natural here, as it belongs logically to δὲν, though grammatically to οἴσθαι) see 1 346 E n. οἴσθαι, like ἐπιχείρειν, depends on φῶνειν.

30 ὁ λυστελῇ is taken by Schneider as the accusative neuter in apposition to the idea in ὑπεραπείνειν. If so, αὐτῷ for αὐτῷ must be written (with A). It is however so natural to take λυστελῇ as masculine that Plato would surely have expressed the other meaning in a less ambiguous way. The usual view yields a satisfactory sense, and should be preferred.

31 δῆλον κτλ. See er. n. The awkwardness of taking ὅτι as ‘because’ was early felt and led to the insertion of διεκνύοντες ἄν in several mss (καὶ οἱ παίδες αὐτῶν διεκνύοντες ἄν ὅτι τοιοῦτος ἦν)—a reading adopted by the older editors. Few will now dispute that διεκνύοντες ἄν is a gloss. Besides Schneider’s suggestion, which I adopt, two other proposals merit consideration: (1) δῆλον, ἦν δ᾿ ἐγώ, καὶ οἱ παιδεῖς αὐτῶν ὅρας ὃς καὶ ἐν Τροίᾳ ἀγαθοὶ πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἔφανεν, καὶ τῇ 408 ιατρικῇ, ὃς ἐγὼ λέγω, ἐχρόντω; ὡς οὖν μέμνησαι, ὅτι καὶ τῷ Μενέλεῳ ἐκ τοῦ τραύματος, οὐ ο.lines 26b—27b, ἐβαλεν, αἷμ’ ἐκμυζῆσαι τ’ ἐπὶ τ’ ἡπία φάρμακ’ ἐπάσσον,

31. ὅτι—ὅρω, quae ante οὐχ ὅρας praebent AII, e Schneideri conjectura huc transstulimus.
ingeniously accommodates the line to his own purposes. εκμισθαντ’ is of course the aorist indicative εκμιθήσατα, not the dual participle as J. and C. hold. This was pointed out by Schneider. Verbs denoting any kind of organic action are apt to be middle in Attic (Rutherford *New Phrynichus* pp. 138 ff.). It would be easy to write εκμισθαν’ τ’ (as I once did) and retain Homer’s active, but it is not worth while.

408 δ' κάν εί has come to mean no more than καλ εί: cf. infra V 477 A, ix 575 D, x 612 C and Jebb on Soph. E. pp. 224 f. The change from the plural πιέστες to the singular πιέσθαν has been doubted by Herwerden; but see I 347 A. In illustration of κυκέφαλα πιέστες Schneider (Adlitt. p. 25) refers to Hippocr. περι διαίης δέξεων 11 p. 304 f. Littre οί γαρ ἀρχόμενοι τοίς δέξεων νουσμάτων ἐστίν ότε οί μὲν στίτα ἔφαγον—οί δὲ καὶ κυκέφαλα ἐρρόφεον’ ἀπαντά δέ ταύτα κακώ μὲν ἐστίν δ’ εί ἐπερώτως τις διαμηνύει κτλ.

11 Μίδου πλουσιώτερου: with reference (as Stallbaurn observes) to Tyrt. 12. 6 (Bergk): cf. Laxos 660 E.


408 C 17 πειθόμεθα was much more likely to be corrupted to πειθόμεθα (so ὡς, with Stallbaum and others) than vice versa, on account of φήσομεν. The present is more pointed and expressive; our rule has been laid down (391 D), and we abide by it now and always.

21 ὅσοι κτλ. Glauc’s conception of the medical art resembles that of the later ἐπιστρατοί: see Celsus de med. Proem. pp. 5—9 ed. Daremberg, and infra 408 D n.

408 D 23 καὶ μᾶλα—λέγω. Socrates replies to ἀρ’ οὐκ—ὑποροί: ignoring, or nearly ignoring, εἰς δ’ ἄρι—ὑποκείμενα: cf. V 405 E n. καὶ μᾶλα is simply ‘certainly,’ and ἀγαθοὶ λέγω lays stress on ἀγαθοὶ: ‘that is, if they are really good,’ ‘good ones, I mean.’ There is perhaps a hint that the good physician and the good judge must also be good men: cf. 409 C. To substitute with Hartman μάλιστα for μᾶλα (as in many MSS) is to mistake the force of λέγω.
26 ἑατρόλ κτλ. The combination of scientific knowledge (πρὸς τῷ μαθήματι τῆς τέχνης) and medical experience which Plato desiderates reminds us of the standpoint of the ἡθοδοκοῦ, whose principles were in some respects a compromise between those of the δογματικὸς or Theorists, and those of the Ἐπιστήμων: see Celsus I.c. pp. 9—13 and Häser Lehrb. d. Gesch. d. Med. etc. pp. 245 ff., 268 ff.

408 E 33 ἡμῆς ἡμῆς. Cf. Gorg. 523 c—e.

409 A, B 2 αὐτὴν: ἵππαμ, not καμ, as Jowett apparently translates it.

6 διὸ δὴ καὶ εὐθὺς. "For unstained thoughts do seldom dream on evil: Birds never limed no secret bushes fear" (Rape of Lucrece). Cf. infra vii 517 d ff., Theaet. 174 c ff. The use of παραδείγματα recalls Theaet. 176 e, though the idea is somewhat different here. The word means 'models,' 'standards,' not 'samples of experience' (J. and C.), and τοῖς πονηροῖς is equivalent to τοῖς τῶν πονηρῶν παραδείγμασι. Cf. infra c, d, where παραδείγματα τοῖς τουτοῖς is 'a model' (not 'a sample') 'of such a character.' So also Schneider, who translates by 'Vorbild.'

10 ὁμομοιόμενος κτλ. The common taunt ὁμομοιόμενος is in such a case an epithet of praise.

11 οὐκ οἰκεῖαν κτλ. For the asyndetic see 407 d n. δὲ αὐτοῦ: ἵππαμ, not τοῖς τοιούτων διασκέδασθαι (Stob. Flor. 45. 90) is ingenious, but weak. As Steinhart remarks (Einleitung p. 173), the scientific knowledge of virtue, according to Socrates and Plato, implies a knowledge of its opposite, viz. vice: see on I 334 A, and cf. infra 409 D.

20 καὶ προσβυτέρως κτλ. The touching allusion to Socrates' condemnation will not escape the sympathetic reader. Plato seldom talks in this vein without thinking of his master: cf. Theaet. 174 C and the still more affecting words in VII 517 A. It is from incidental references such as these that we can best appreciate the profound influence which the death of Socrates exercised upon Plato. See also VIII 560 D n.

409 D 26 πονηρία μὲν γὰρ—λήψεις. See on 409 B and the suggestive remarks of Stewart on Aristotle's Eth. Nic. v 1. 1129a 17. Strictly speaking, Virtue cannot have scientific knowledge (ἐπιστήμην) even of herself, since Virtue is ignorance (and scientific knowledge of Virtue would imply a scientific knowledge of Virtue); but she recognises herself by ἐμπειρία oikeía: cf. 409 B.

27 ἀρετῆς κτλ.: 'whereas Virtue will in course of time, if natural endowments are improved by education, attain to scientific knowledge at once of herself and Vice.' The contrast between πονηρία μὲν and ἀρετῆς δὲ is much impaired if we connect ἀρετῆς with φύσεως (in the sense of 'a virtuous nature'): and for this reason I now agree with Schneider in thinking φύσεως παιδευμένης a genitive absolute. I formerly accepted Richards' emendation παιδευμένη, which is decidedly more logical, if φύσεως depends on ἀρετῆς: but Schneider's view is better. χρόνῳ belongs to λήψεις, and not to παιδευμένης (as if 'educated by time,' Jouwett): mere lapse of time will never give ἐπιστήμην. Cf. ὄψιμαθῆς and ἐν τολῷ χρόνῳ διαπαθήθαι in 409 B.

410 A 2 ἀπόθητικες εἰδώλους. Cf. Plut. Aροφήλ. Lact. 231 A κράταστον δὲ ἔλεγε (sc. Παυσανίας) τοῦτον ἱατρὸν εἶναι τὸν μη καταστησάντα τοὺς ἀρρώστως, ἀλλὰ τάξιστα ἔστοιτα. In laying down this law, Plato speaks from the standpoint of the Regal or Political Art, prescribing for the subordinate arts of Medicine and Justice the conditions under
which it is good to live and good to die. See Grote Plato 1 p. 362.
3 αὐτοὶ = ἵσι is said in opposition to the mere permission to die which bodily disease requires. αἵτα (suggested by Richards) is unnecessary: see 11 377 c n.
410 A—412 B Our young men will seldom need the help of judges and doctors, thanks to their education in Music and Gymnastic. They will pursue both arts with a view to the cultivation of the soul rather than of the body. Exclusive devotion to one of the two makes men in the one case hard and fierce, in the other, effeminate and mild. The psychological elements of Spirit and the Love of Knowledge must be attuned to one another. Music and Gymnastic are intended to effect this harmony: and excess or deficiency in either of these educative instruments reflects itself in morbid and degenerate phases of character. He who can best blend Music with Gymnastic is the true musician; and such an one we must provide in our city, if it is to last.

410 A 7 ἀρ' οὖν κτλ. This epilogue describes concisely the aim and underlying principle of Plato's earlier scheme of education. Its object is to produce citizens who shall combine gentleness and strength—sensibility and courage—intellectual activity and moral steadfastness. It is an ideal in which the distinctive virtues of Athens and Sparta—of Greece and Rome—are united and transfigured.

See 11 375 c and the passages referred to there. The ideal of Pericles (φιλοσοφεῖν ἄνευ μαλακίας) in many ways resembles Plato's (Thuc. II 40). Cf. also Netleship Hell. pp. 88—90 and Bosanquet Companion pp. 115—117. It is noteworthy that the doctrine of this section is best explained by a comparison with one of the dialogues often held to be late (Pol. 306 c—311 c): see also Laws 773 c, d. This is not pointed out by Krohn in his otherwise acute analysis (Pl. Sc. pp. 24—28).

410 B 8 ὁ μουσικός—ἀληθεία. ὁ μουσικός is ὁ τῇ ἄπλη μουσικῇ χρώμενος, as defined in the last sentence. ἄπλη διώκων and ἀληθεία are metaphors from the chase: see 11 375 a.
10 αὐτὰ μὴν—ἰσχῦν. The theory of gymnastic propounded here was apparently new in Plato's time (see on 11 376 e), although the practice of athletics as an educative discipline, especially at Sparta, conformed to it in no small measure (see Plut. Lyc. 17 ff., Xen. Rep. Lac. 2 ff.).

13 μεταξειρέουσα. See cr. n. I have followed Hermann in adopting Galen's text. With ὁχ μὴν ὅσον οὖσα the verb should have for its subject the nominative contained in the ὅς clause: cf. vii 539 D, x 610 D. Symp. 179 E is in reality no exception to this rule.

410 C 15 τίνες. It has been supposed that τίνες refers to Isocrates, who in his Antidosis (180—185) expounds at
length the usual Greek view of gymnastic. This is possible only if the present section was added within the last four years or so of Plato's life, which is most improbable. See Hirmer Entst. u. Komp. d. Pl. Pol. p. 663, and Introd. § 4. In other passages the Antidosis has been held to presuppose the Republic: see Dümmller Chronologische Beitr. etc. pp. 12, 13.

kathistaves. Cf. Dem. 24. 135 ouvoi γάρ (sc. κσ κόσμοι)—οὐκ ἐπὶ τούς κεκριμένους—κεῖται, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τούς ἄκριτους, ἦν μὴ—ἀναγκάζοντο ἀγωνίζεσθαι, and Phil. 34 c (where however it is easy to write λάβωμεν). In the first of these cases the reference is, as here, to the establishment of laws or ordinances. kathistaven is used somewhat like φεύγε 407 a. Madvig's emendation kathistēs commune itself to Weber (Funct. d. Absichtsätze in Schenz's Beiträge ii 2 p. 58) and others, but has not yet been proved to be necessary, and kathistās below tells rather against it. For other examples of the idiom see Kühner Gr. Gr. ii pp. 897, 898. Cases like Soph. O. C. 11 and El. 57, 76o are different, and have been justly emended. As regards the sentiment, it is characteristic of Plato to invent a historical sanction for his theories (cf. 414 B ff.); but he doubtless sincerely believed that the spirit of Greek gymnastics had degenerated.

410 D 22 ἦν δ' ἐγώ. There seems to be no other case in which ἦν δ' ἐγώ is so long deferred. Stallbaum and Bekker insert the words after σκληρότητος without any mis authority. If change is needed, ἦν δ' ἐγώ had better be omitted (so ἦν, whose reading is very different here). But it is better to note than to obliterate such peculiarities.

24 ἦ ὁς is not 'pro simplici ἦ vel ὁς positum' (Stallbaum), but 'quam quomodo.'

410 E 29 αὐτοῦ. Does the pronoun mean τοῦ ἡμεροῦ όι τού δολοσφοβοῦ? Four qualities are first distinguished: viz. the wild, the hard, the soft and the tame. The source of wiliness is the spirited element, which if rightly cultivated becomes brave, if unduly strained, hard. So far, all is clear; but difficulties now begin. We should expect Plato to continue: τὸ ἡμερον is an attribute of τὸ δολοσφοβον, and τὸ φιλοσοφον—not τὸ ἡμερον—when relaxed becomes too soft, when rightly educated becomes κόσμιον (the virtue which contrasts with τὸ ἀνδρεῖον). At first sight, then, it looks as if αὐτοῦ meant 'the philosophic temperament' (so Stallbaum and J. and C.); but this is grammatically impossible, unless we make τὸ ἡμερον the subject to μαλακωτερον εἰς and therefore to ἡμερον τε καὶ κόσμιον, which is hardly tolerable. We must therefore acquiesce in taking αὐτοῦ as τοῦ ἡμεροῦ, unless there is corruption somewhere. If Plato had written καὶ μᾶλλον μὲν ἀνεθέν μαλακωτερον εἰς τοῦ δέοντος, καλῶς δὲ τραφέν σώφρον τε καὶ κόσμιον, everything would be clear,
but I do not venture to change the text. σώφρον for ἰμερόν is suggested also by Krohn (Pl. St. p. 26). Apelt proposes ἰμετρών (Berl. Philol. Wochenschr. 1895 p. 96). 

31. ἀμφοτέρα—φύσει: viz. τὸ θυμοειδὲς and τὸ φιλόσοφον.

33. σώφρων τε καὶ ἀνδρεία. σωφροσύνη is the virtue of τὸ φιλόσοφον, ἀνδρεία of τὸ θυμοειδὲς: cf. 399 c and Pol. 307 c. The meaning would be caught more easily if Plato had written—as perhaps he did—σώφρων τε καὶ κόσμον ἵνα ἤμερόν τε καὶ κόσμον above, just as he wrote ἀνδρείας (410 D), ἄγροικος (implying, like ἀνέλειφερος, ἀνδραποδόδυσθι, with which it is coupled in Latus 880 a, lack of power to control the feelings) is properly opposed to σώφρων here.

411 A 3 καταυλεῖν—ἀρμονίας. καταυλεῖν (as Ast observes) does not govern ἀρμονίας, but is used absolutely: cf. Latus 790 E (of mothers singing and rocking their children to sleep) ἀτεχνώ ὡς καταυλοῦσι τῶν παιδίων, καθάπερ αἱ τῶν ἐκφόρων βασιλείων ἱάσεις, ταύτη τῇ τῆς κυνῆσεως ἀμα χορέιά καὶ μονή χρώματα. So expressive a word could ill be spared, although van Heusde’s καταυλεῖν is ingenious enough. Cobet would read καταυλεῖ and cut out καὶ κατακεί, while Hartman inclines to eject καταφυλακέω καὶ, but the text is sound. ἀρμονίας depends on καταυλεῖν. With χώνης cf. (with Hiller Pl. Jahrb. 1874 p. 174) Ar. Thesm. 18 δύσην δὲ χώνης ὥτα: see Blaydes ad loc. The context in Aristophanes lends some colour to Hiller’s notion that the comparison was taken from some earlier philosopher: cf. Theophr. de sensu 89.

411 B 7 σύνθηρον ἐμάλαξε κτλ. See on 387 c. Apparently then the first effect even of the μαλακάτον ἁμονίας is good. This apparent inconsistency with 398 E ff. is emphasized by Krohn (Pl. St. p. 25), but Krohn fails to observe that Plato is here describing the facts of common experience, whereas before he was making laws of his own. It is quite possible to admit that the relaxing modes are beneficial in moderation, and yet forbid them, because moderation in them is difficult to maintain.

8. ὅταν—τήκει. The object of κηλή, τήκει and λείβει is τὸ θυμοειδὲς: that of ποιήσῃ is τὴν ψυχήν. So much is, I think, certain; but ἐπέχων is less easy. The word has been interpreted as (i) ‘listening to’ (Schneider, comparing 399 B, where, however, ἐπέχοντα should probably be read), (2) ‘pressing on,’ ‘persevering,’ ‘continuing’: cf. Theaet. 105 D ἐπέχον καὶ οὐκ ἀνέλεις (J. and C.). The sense which Schneider gives to ἐπέχον is ill-supported: and we must accept the second alternative. Morgenstern’s emendation ἐπίγειον (accepted by Herverden and Hartman) is attractive but not quite convincing (‘when he ceases not to pour the music in’ etc.). ἐπίγειον would preserve the metaphor, which is clearly intended (in καταυλεῖν, χώνης, and σύνθηρον ἐμάλαξε) to suggest the process of smelting, and of which an echo still survives in τῆκει, λείβει and ἐκτῆσιν. See
Bliimner Technologie etc. IV pp. 108ff. nn. The 

15. ákráchoi Π. ákráchoi A. Cf. Lobeck Phgyis. p. 664. gegevnyetai
16. gymanstiky ΑΠΙ. γymanstikos corr. Α.2
22. gyveneyon ζ: gyveneyon A: gyveneyon Π. 24, 25. diakadairomenov ΑΣΣ: 

dιακαθαρισμένον και διακαθαρισμένον ΑΠΙ.

D Μούσης μηδαμί, 1 ουκ εί τι και ενήν αυτοί φιλομάθες εν τῇ ψυχῇ,

12 έαν—λαβή: 'if he has received,' not 'if he act upon' (J. and C.). Plato 

means that if the individual in question 

received at the beginning a soul—ψυχή 

is understood naturally spiritless, he 

soon makes it a 'feeble warrior.' “Wenn 

er gleich cine von Natur zornlose Seele 

bekommen hat” (Schneider). The 

subject throughout is the τις with which the 

sentence began. For the usual Greek 

idiom, by which the person concerned is 

represented as acting on himself (εκτήσις 

τῶν θυμῶν etc.) instead of being acted on, 

cf. Eur. 7. A. 187 φωνισσον παρεβ' 

ἐμάν | αἰσθών νεωθαλεί with Headlam’s 

note: also v 462 c, D nn. and IX 572 

Α. η. 

14 έρεθισμένον. ριπηδομένον, 

suggested by Herverden, is picturesque 

enough: but ‘provoked and extinguished’ 

is even more natural in Greek than in 

English; for ἐρεθισμόν could readily be 

used of fanning a fire: see the lexica s.v.

15 ἀντι θυμοειδῶς—ἐμπείρει. ἡμειο 

dοῦς is of course masculine and not neuter 

(as J. and C. suggest). Even if we allow 

that the dative is neuter in cases like 

Συνικ. 105 c νέος—εστι, πρῶς δέ τού νέω 

ἀπαλός, and Thead. 185 E, the presence of 

the article makes all the difference. Ast 

(with Ξ) reads θυμοειδῶν. So harsh a 

change from plural to singular (δρόμος 

but θυμοειδῶς) is remarkable, but hardly 

more so than ἀποθανομένους δέ in IV 

426 c. Cf. also I 347 Α. η. Krohn points 

out that ἀνδρείους is here represented as 

a μεσητὸς between σκληρῶν and ὄργηλ 

(Pl. St. p. 27). 

17 εὐωξηται: should be understood 

literally, of good living.
411 D 27 ὀστερὸς θηρίον—διαπράττεται. If the MSS are right, πάντα is masculine. But although διαπράττεσθαι by itself can be used without an expressed object (Prot. 319 C al.), it is strange to find διαπράττεσθαι πρὸς τινα so used: see Crat. 395 B, Alc. II. 143 C. On this account διαπράττεται has been by some ejected (Hermann), by others emended into διαπράττεται (Morgenstern), διαπράτ-


tεται (Madvig and one Florentine MS); while others read θηρίον τὰ πάντα διαπράττεται (Lambrechts), or προσδιαπράττεται πάντα (Chandler), or expunge πρὸς (Bywater). Perhaps we should read ὀστερὸς θηρίον πρὸς <θηρίων> κτλ. (‘attains all his ends by violence and ferocity, like one wild beast with another’). Cf. Shakespeare Rape of Lucrece “The rough beast that knows no gentle right.”


29 ἀχαριστίας is ‘ungraciousness.’

32 εἰ μὴ εἰ πάρεργον occurs also in Phaed. 91 A (according to the Bodleian MS). Phrases of this kind seldom admit of variation; for which reason we should hesitate to admit the εἰ μὴ εἰ πάρεργον of ΠΙ.

33 ὡς ἂν κτλ. The soul has, so to speak, two strings, the ϕιλόσοφον and the θυμωείδες, which make a kind of ἄμονια when they are tuned to the proper pitch by Music and Gymnastic. The θυμωείδες is slackened (ἀνειότα) by μούσικη, tightened or braced (ἐπιτευνωμένη) by γυμναστική (410 D, 411 Α—Ε); conversely, we must suppose that the ϕιλόσοφον is slackened by γυμναστική, and tightened by μούσικη. Music and Gymnastic are therefore both of them necessary for each of the two strings (cf. IV 441 Ε n.), although the slackening of the θυμωείδες of itself also tightens the ϕιλόσοφον, which is likewise slackened when the tension of the other is increased. Cf. Tim. 88 b, c. The effect of all this musical imagery is to suggest that Character is the Music of the Soul: cf. Lach. 188 D.
such as we find in \textit{Laws} 765 D ff. The same function is in \textit{Pol.} 308 D ff. assigned to the Regal or Political Art.

\textbf{412 B 8} \textit{ὅς ὅσον τε γε μάλιστα.} I have placed a comma before ὅς; cf. \textit{Phaed.} 74 B φῶμεν μέντοι \nu\textit{'D}, ἔφορ ὅ \textit{Σωμιας, θαυμαστὸς γε} (Hoefner \textit{Tur. Plat.} p. 33).

\textbf{412 B—414 B} So much for Education. It remains to ask: \textit{Which of the guardians are to be our rulers?} The elder shall rule the younger, and the better the worse. Now the best guardians are those who care most for their country and her interests. We shall make our selection on this principle; and we must further try those whom we select and see whether their patriotism is proof against all seductive influences. Every true opinion or belief—and the belief on which patriotism rests is true, like everything else which we call good, is unawilly discarded, but may be forcibly expelled by persuasion or forgetfulness, by pain, pleasure and the like. We shall apply these tests to prove our guardians. Those who emerge unsathed will become our rulers. They are the true Guardians; the others should be called Auxiliaries.

\textbf{412 B ff.} This is the first appearance of the Rulers in Plato's \textit{State}, if we except the passing allusion in 389 C. Their presence is necessary to take the place of the original \textit{νομοθέτης} when the State has once been founded (\textit{vi} 147 D); they represent in fact the Royal or Kingly art, whose business it is to prescribe to others their specific good or end. See on \textit{410 A} and \textit{Nohle die Staatslehre Platos} pp. 47 ff., 85 ff., 113 ff. Such is their duty according to the later books; but here it is not so described, and the whole subject is treated in an esoteric way. The full and esoteric discussion of this subject is reserved for \textit{vi} and \textit{vii}. To this later treatment reference is made in \textit{414 A} and \textit{416 B}. The advocates of the original unity of the \textit{Republic} justly lay stress upon the tentative and provisional nature of the regulations here laid down (e.g. Susemihl \textit{Gen. Entw.} p. 143, Zeller\textit{11 t. p. 560 n.}); whereas the separatists hold that Plato's wider conception of the Ruling class is chronologically later than the account now given (Krohn \textit{Pl. St.} pp. 28—31). An excellent defence of the conservative view will be found in Hirmer \textit{Entst. u. Komp. d. pl. Pol. pp. 613 ff.} See also \textit{Introduct. }§ 4.

\textit{11} χορείας—\textit{ιππικοφίς}. See \textit{Laws} 814 D ff., 832 D ff., 830 C ff., 832 D ff.

\textit{13} \textit{οὐκήτε}: 'not now,' sc. when we have trained our Guardians. On such idiomatic uses of \textit{οὐκήτε} and its opposite \textit{ἡδο} see Cope's \textit{Rhetoric of Aristotle}, Vol. I p. 13.

\textbf{412 C 16} \textit{πρεσβυτέρους κτλ.} The different principles on which rulers may be appointed are fully discussed in \textit{Laws} 690 A ff.

\textit{21} \textit{φρονίμους κτλ.} Intellectual ability and accomplishments, authority, and pa-
Plato has not expressly said so—that the guardians believe their own interests to be best consulted by promoting those of their country. μὴ δὲ ἢ μὴ δὲ εὑρίσκεται, τοῦτον εὐρύτερον καὶ ἕκαστον καὶ ἕκαστον ἐπιθυμεῖν πρὸς τὸν πολέμον, ἀναφέρει τὸν πολέμον τόν πολέμον δὲν ἀν τῇ πόλει βέλτιστα. Τίνα, ἐφή, λέγεις τὴν ἐκβολήν; Ἐγώ σοι, ἐφήν, ἐρώτησα μοι δόξα ἐξίναι εἰς διανοίαν ἢ ἐκουσίως ἢ ἄκουσίως, ἐκουσίως μὲν ἢ ψευδώς τοῦ μεταμανθάνοντος, ἄκουσίως δὲ πᾶσα ἢ ἀλθής. Τὸ μὲν τῆς ἐκουσίου, ἐφή, μανθάνω, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἄκουσίου δέχομαι μαθεῖν. Τί δαί; οὐ καὶ σὺ ἰγνοί, ἐφήν, ἐγώ, τῶν μὲν ἀγαθῶν ἄκουσίως στέρησθαι

καὶ ἐκεῖνον Ἡρμάννον: καὶ ἐκεῖνον μάλιστα ἐκεῖνον κατὰ.
to us υπηρέτουσι, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἐκουσίως; ἢ οὐ τὸ μὲν ἐφεύσθαι 5 τῆς ἀληθείας κακῶν, τὸ δὲ ἀληθευέν ἄγαθον; ἢ οὐ τὰ τὰ ὄντα δοξάζειν ἀληθευέν δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι; Ἄλλη, ἢ δ’ ὡς, ὅρθως λέγεις, καὶ μοι δοκοῦσιν ἀκοῦσεις ἀληθοὺς δόξης στερίσκεσθαι. Οὐκοῦν

Β' κλαπέντες ἡ γοητευόμεντες ἡ βιασθέντες τοῦτο πάσχονυ; Οὔδε

vūν, ἐφη, μανθάνω. Τραγικὸς, ἡν δ' ἐγώ, κινδυνεύω λέγειν. ιο κλαπέντες μὲν γὰρ τοὺς μεταπειθέντας λέγω καὶ τοὺς ἐπιλαμβανομένους, ὅτι τῶν μὲν χρόνως, τῶν δὲ λόγως ἐξαιρούμενοι λανθάνει. vūν γὰρ ποι μανθάνεις; Ναὶ. Τοὺς τοῖνυ βιασθέντας λέγῳ οὐς ἀν ὀδύνη τις ἡ ἀληθῶν μεταδοξάσαι ποιήσῃ. Καὶ τοῦτ', ἐφη, C ἐμαθοῦ, καὶ ὅρθως λέγεις. Τοὺς μὲν γοητευόμεντας, 1 ὡς ἐγώμαι, 15 καὶ οὐ φαίης εἶναι οὐ ἀν μεταδοξάσωσιν ἡ ύφ' ἡδονῆς κηληθέντες ἡ ὑπὸ φόβῳ τι deiáantet. Ἐοικε γὰρ, ἢ δ' ὡς, γοητευέων πάντα ὀσα ὑπάτα.

XX. 'Ὁ τοῖνυ ἀρτὶ ἔλεγον, ξητητέουν, τίνες ἀριστοὶ φύλακες τοῦ παρ' αὐτοῖς δόγματος, τοῦτο ὡς ποιητέου, ὃ δ' ἐν τῇ πόλει ἀεὶ 20 δοκόσι βέλτιστον εἶναι αὐτοῖς ποιεῖν. τηρητέου δὴ εὐθὺς ἐκ παιδῶν, προθεμένων ἔργα, ἐν οἷς ἀν τις τὸ τοιοῦτον μάλιστα

413 A 4 τῶν μὲν ἄγαθων—ἐκουσίως.

See IV. 438 A n.

6 ἢ οὐ—εἶναι. It is necessary expressly to equate ἀληθευέν with ἄλθηθις ὀδή, because ordinarily it means to speak rather than to think what is true. Cf. II. 352 A. Hartman approves of Ast for bracketing the words "quod argumentationem turbant," but the contrary is true. Men unwillingly relinquish what is good. ἀληθευέν is good; and ἄλθηθις ὀδή is ἀληθευέν; therefore we unwillingly relinquish ἄλθηθις ὀδή—which is just what we wished to prove.

413 B io τραγικὸς: i.e. ψηφιλογογομε-

νος, in lofty high-flown metaphorical lan-
guage such as may well become obscure: cf.
vIII. 545 E. κλεστένθα τόσο thus used is tragic:
 cf. (with J. and C.) Soph. Ant. 681 εἰ μὴ τὸ χάος κεκλείμεθα.

13 τοῖνυ = 'praefera' here, not 'igi-
tur': 1 339 D n.

413 C 17 τὶ δεισάνται = 'having some fear' (J. and C.).

20 τοῦτο ὡς ποιητέου κτλ.; 'that it is their duty to do that which on each occasion they think it is best for them to do in the interests of the State.' I have provisionally retained the reading of the best MSS, although it is open to suspicion on several grounds. The position of τοῦτο is unusual, and αὐτοῖς ποιεῖν is, to say the least, superfluous. Gaisford (with whom Cobet agrees) wished to expunge the entire clause as a gloss on δόγματος. This solution, though drastic, may be right: for an explanation of δόγματος is hardly needed after 412 D, E, and τοῦτο looks like the commencement of an explanatory note 'this, viz. that' etc. A simpler alternative, adopted by most editors, is to cancel αὐτοῖς ποιεῖν, but it is difficult to see why a scribe should have introduced the words. The sentence, if genuine, seems to want the finishing touch. Cf. 407 D n.

22 προθεμένων ἔργα. It is clear that Plato is referring to specific tests, and not (as Bosanquet seems to think) to the duties of war and the public service generally. So also Susemihl (Gen. Enthw. II p. 143), and Steinhart (Einleitung p. 173), the latter of whom compares, not very aptly, the tests of the Pythagorean brotherhood and the appalling spectacles displayed in the mysteries. Three kinds of tests are required: (1) κλαπή, (2) βία, (3) γοητεία. Examples of the second kind are furnished by the severer discipline of gymnastic, the chace etc.: cf.

413 D 27 τοῦ τῆς—θετέουν. Two ἔδη of tests have been described, κλοσή and βία: the third is γοητεία. I incline to think that Stallbaum is right in restoring τοῦ τῆς; see cr. n. and Introd. § 5. τοῦτοι ‘misere languet,’ and if a daive were needed, it should rather be αὐτοῦ. Herwerden expunges θετέου; but asyndeton before ὁσπερ is frequent in sentences of this kind.

413 E 31 δυσγοητεύοντο. For the change from plural to singular cf. 1 347 Α n.

414 Α 3 λαγχαύνοντα. The accusative recurs to φιλακα, and is all the easier because τιμᾶς δοτέον is little more than τιμητέον. Plato’s usage is lax in such matters, and it is better not to emend: cf. (with Schneider) Latos 760 E, 877 Α and Engelhardt Anac. IV. Spec. 111 p. 42.

5 ὁσ ἐν τῦτῳ—εἰρήσθαι. Cf. VI 503 D n.
414 B in ἑπικούροις. Plato henceforward uses this expression when he wishes specifically to allude to the second class of his citizens. ὕλακας remains the general term including both ἔργοις and ἑπικούροις. See on Π 374 D.

414 B—415 D In order to establish all these regulations in the city, we must have recourse to a heroic falsehood. We shall tell the citizens that they were only dreaming when they believed themselves to be trained by us. In reality, they were being moulded and fashioned in the womb of Earth, they and all their equipments; so that it is their duty to defend their country like a mother, and regard their fellow-citizens as brothers born of Earth. We shall add that in creating some to be rulers, God mingled in their substance gold; silver he put in the auxiliaries; iron and copper in the farmers and artisans. The citizens will for the most part produce children like themselves; but silver offspring will sometimes come from gold, or gold from silver and the like. It is the first and foremost duty of the Rulers to lift and degrade children into their proper classes, alleging an oracle that the city shall perish when iron or copper becomes its guardian. It may be impossible to convince the first generation of our citizens that the lie is true; but their posterity may credit it.

414 B ff. After discrediting the current mythological and religious views, Plato now proceeds to replace them by something more in harmony with his own principles. Throughout this episode he is making legend in accordance with Π 382 D διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι δὴ παλαιότερα ἔχει περὶ τῶν παλαιῶν, ἀφομοιοῦσα τῷ ἀληθείᾳ τὸ στίχος δὲ τι μάλιστα οὕτω χρήσιμον ποιεῖται. His particular object is to give a religious and quasi-historical sanction to the sentiment of patriotism and the institution of caste. With this aim in view he frames a μοῦθος in which the belief of many Greek communities (especially the Athenians: cf. Isocr. Paneg. 24 f., Eur. Fr. 362) in an autochthonous ancestry is skillfully combined with the popular association of different metals with different degrees of merit, as in the Hesiodic ages of man. Cf. Hirzel Der Dialog pp. 263 f. The episode should not be understood as ironical: without it, the present sketch of a State would be incomplete. We require some guarantee for the permanence of the city and its institutions; and nothing could be more in keeping with the prevailingly moral and religious spirit of Plato’s ‘musical’ education than that he should find that guarantee in faith rather than in reason. The case is different when the Platonic city attains its full maturity, and it is equally appropriate that Reason, embodied in the Rulers, should then become the final guarantee.

414 B 13 ὅν νῦν ἄφι. See cr. n. Although νῦν occasionally refers to the immediate past (e.g. I 341 C, IX 592 Α, X 611 B: see also Jebb on Soph. Ant. 151), neither here nor in obv νῦν ἄφι just before can δὴ νῦν be retained; for δὴ “neque per se intelligi neque ad ὅν referri potest” (Schneider). The reference is to Π 382 D, III 389 B.

414 C 14 μάλιστα μὲν. See on 415 D.

15 μὴ δὲν καίνων κτλ. We want no novelty, but something with which the Greeks are already familiar, for our city is a Greek city (v. 470 E).
έγώ, ἀλλὰ Φοινικικὸν τι, πρότερον μὲν ἣδη πολλαχοῦ γεγονός, ὃς φασιν οἱ ποιηταὶ καὶ πεπείκασιν, ἐφ᾽ ἡμῶν δὲ οὐ γεγονός οὗτος ὁ ἄλλος ἀν, πεῖσαι δὲ συνήθης πειθοῦς. ὃς ἔσοικας, ἐφ᾽, ὁκνούντι λέγειν. Δόξῳ δὲ σοι, ἢν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καὶ καὶ έκόστως ὁκνεῖν, ἐπειδὰν εὑπω. Λέγη, ἐφη, καὶ μὴ φοβθοῦ. Λέγω δὴ ἕκαστοι οὐκ ὁ ἄλλος ὁ ποιήσας λόγους χρώμενος ἐρῶ καὶ ἐπιχειρήσω πρῶτον μὲν αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἀρχοντας πείθει καὶ τοὺς στρατιώτας, ἐπειτὰ δὲ καὶ τὴν ἄλλην πόλιν, ὡς ἀρ᾽ ἡ ἡμείς αὐτοὶ ἐπέφευγαν τε καὶ ἐπαιδεύεμεν, ὅπερ ὄνειρατα ἐδοκοῦν ταῦτα πάντα πάσχειν 25 τε καὶ γίγνεσθαι περὶ αὐτοὺς, ἦσαν δὲ τότε τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ὕπο γῆς ἐντὸς πλαττόμενοι καὶ τρέφομεν καὶ αὐτοί καὶ τὰ ὀπλα αὐτῶν καὶ ἡ ἄλλη σκευή δημοιρουμένη. ἐπειδὴ δὲ παντελῶς ἐξεργάζετο Εὐσμένος ἦσαν, καὶ ἡ γῆ αὐτῶς μὴν ὄσα ἀνήκεν, καὶ νῦν δεὶ ως

16 Φοινικικόν τι: because the story of the Σπαρταῖοι was Phoenician, Cadmus the Phoenician having sown the dragon's teeth from which they sprang (Apollod. iii 4. 1). Cf. Λατος 665 Ε. Steinhardt (Einleitung, p. 177) and Susemihl (Gen. Entw. II p. 144) find in Φοινικικόν a further hint that the institution of caste was something foreign and non-Hellenic: but the words cannot be thus interpreted. The Egyptian system of caste (see Hdt. ii 164 ff.), differed from Plato's in essential points, and there is no real evidence to shew that he was influenced by it in any way: nor is 'Phoenician' ('Sidonian', in Λατος l.c.) equivalent to 'Egyptian.' Cf. Hermann Gesch. u. Sprach, p. 55 and mn. Ψεύδημά Φοινικικόν afterwards became a proverb, perhaps owing to this passage.

πολλαχοῦ γεγονός means simply 'which has happened in many places.' γεγονός and γεγένημεν in themselves refer to the actual occurrences, which ὃς φασώ—πεπείκασιν reduces again to legend and matter of faith. πολλαχοῦ is plenitly illustrated in Preller Gr. Myth., pp. 79 ff. Presently οὖθι οἴδα εἰ γεγένημεν ἂν (for which Herderwen neatly but needlessly suggests οὐδὲ οὐδὲ ἄν εἰ γεγένημεν) hints that the age of miracles is past. 414 D 21 ὁποῖα—ἡ πολιος. Cf. 400 Λ n. It is very exceptional to find the indirect interrogative preceding the direct: cf. Soph. O. T. 71 with Jebb's note. ἐρώ. I have removed the colon after ἐρω on Richards' suggestion.

24 ὅπερ ὄνειρατα—αὐτοῖς: lit. 'all these things which they fancied themselves suffering and happening to them were so to speak dreams.' ἐδοκοῦν is 'imagined' as in Aesch. Pers. 188 (also of a dream) and elsewhere. The object of πάρχειν, viz. ταῦτα πάντα, becomes the subject of γίγνεσθαι: cf. (for the change of subject) Ap. 40 Α, Symp. 200 D and supra 1 333 C, II 359 D, E, 360 A. It must be allowed that the effect of this idiom is here unusually harsh. I once conjectured ὑπάρχειν for πάρχειν, taking ἐδοκοῦν still as 'fancied': but the text is probably sound.

25 ὑπὸ γῆς κτλ. Herderwen bids us bracket either ὑπὸ or ἐντὸς: but Plato rarely if ever lets the preposition ἐντὸς follow its noun. ἐντὸς is 'under,' not 'by' (it is a θέα, not ἡ γῆ, who πλάτει, infra 415 A), and ἐντὸς is adverbial; "drinnen unter der Erde" (Schneider). Mortal creatures are similarly moulded within the earth in Protagoras' prehistoric myth (τυπούσα αὐτὰ θεός γῆς ἐνδον 320 D): cf. also Symp. 191 C, Pol. 272 A, Tim. 42 D. The myth of the Politicus (260 Α ff.) connects the autochthonous origin of man with the golden age, in agreement with a wide-spread tradition, which gave rise to a considerable literature (Dümmler Proleg. zu Platons Staats p. 46). It is in the spirit of this tradition that Plato here represents the first generation of his ideal city as autochthonous.

414 E 28 καὶ—καλ. The double καὶ marks "the correspondence of the
two clauses” (J. and C.). As the Earth proved herself their mother, so they must shew themselves her sons. If the text is sound, it must be explained in this way; but exact parallels are rare. Thuc. IV 8. 9 (cited by Schneider Addit. p. 27) is different: see Classes ad loc. and on VIII 27. 5. More to the point is Soph. Ant. 1192 f. καὶ παρῶν ἐρώ | κοινόν παρῆσω τίς ἄλλης ἔσος: see Jebb ad loc. Ast expunges καὶ before ἥ γῆ, while Hermann alters it to ὡς (carrying on the ὡς of ὡς ἄρα). Neither change can be called satisfactory. I formerly suggested ἀνθρωπομονήν ἔτι. ἐδόκει κτλ. (Cf. Ἱστ. X p. 385): cf. Symp. 220 c ἐδόκει ἵνα με- σμητία, καὶ ἀνθρωποὶ ἴθανότα. The change is slight, but ἐτι ‘langue,’ and it is better to retain the ms reading.

ὡς περὶ μὴντὸς — διανοεῖσθαι. Cf. (with J. and C.) Aesch. Sept. 10—20, 412—416, and infra V 470 D. For the omission of the preposition before τῆς χώρας cf. VIII 553 B n. ὑπὲρ τῶν ἄλλων is scarcely more than περὶ: see Π 367 λ. n.

415 λ. 3 ὡς φήσωμεν. The sense (as Schneider observes) is ὡς ὁ μῶδος λέγει, διὸ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἐρώσομαι. Hartman cancels ὡς, but it was more likely to have been wrongly omitted here than inserted.

5 χρυσὸν κτλ. The metals are borrowed from Hesiod (O. D. 109—201), as Plato indicates in VIII 546 E. Hesiod enumerates five ages of men (interposing the age of heroes between those of copper and iron), but the older legend probably recognised four only: see Rohde Psych. 1 p. 87. Plato makes the golden and the other classes coexist—a truer and more profound view than Hesiod’s. In other respects, the myth (as Jackson has pointed out in Susemihl and Hicks Politics of Aristotle p. 244) is not to be pressed: for “it does not recognise the promotion of ἐπικουροῦ to be ἄρχωντες. We should expect the φύλακες to contain admixtures, both of gold and silver, such as are to be Rulers receiving more gold than silver, and conversely; but the Greek does not favour this idea. Iron again seems to be exclusively (though less emphatically) reserved for the farmers, and copper for the artisans: cf. infra B, C, VIII 547 A, B, and Arist. Pol. B 5. 126 b 14. It makes the ψεῦδος all the more γενναῖον and effective to tell the citizens that the classes are even more distinct than they really are.

7 ἀτε όν χυγγενεῖς ὡντες is said with reference to the δὲ clause, on which the stress falls. The fundamental kinship of the different classes will occasionally reassert itself in their offspring. So J. and C. rightly.

415 B 9 ἣ ἄργυρου: sc. ἐκγόνου, which should also be supplied with χρυσοῦ. Plato sees in fancy the onward march of generations καθάπερ λαμπάδα τοῦ βλασ παραλλπότε: cf. IV 424 A. Ast’s proposal ἄργυρου should not have received the approval of Hartman; and D. and V. miss a characteristic touch by translating ἄργυρου “a silver parent.”

13—2
19. ὁ σίδηρος ἕ ὁ χαλκὸς ἕ: ὁ σίδηρος φίλαξ ἕ ὁ χαλκὸς Δ' ὁ σίδηρος φίλαξ ἕ ὁ χαλκὸς Δ'' ὁ σίδηρος ἕ ὁ χαλκὸς Ξ.

13 ἔστε ὑμῖν. This provision is the corner-stone of Plato's State, and as soon as it gives way, the edifice is doomed (VIII 546 E—547 A). It is only by the elevation of the worthy and the degradation of the unfit that class-distinctions can be made to coincide with those of Nature (cf. IV 423 D); and unless they do, the foundation of the city, which is ὁ ἐαυτὸν πράττει, is sapped. Hence the emphasis with which Plato introduces this subject. His theory, it should be noted, conforms at least as much to the interest of the individual as to that of the State; for it provides congenial work for all according to their natural capacities, and uncongenial labour, whether above or below one's powers, is a fertile source of misery and crime. Aristotle (Pol. B 4. 1262b 27) seems to doubt if Plato's scheme was feasible. Granted rulers who are φύσιμοι εἰς τοῦτο, δυνατοὶ, and κηδεύων τῆς πόλεως (412 c), in a small city—a thousand warriors, says Plato, will suffice (IV 423 A, cf. Grote Plato III p. 206 n.)—it could probably be worked without much difficulty. See also IV 423 E f f. We are not of course to suppose that the child was once for all assigned to his class at birth; he would be watched and tested again and again, before being finally disposed of, so that the likelihood of mistakes on the part of the Rulers is greatly lessened. Cf. Tim. 19 A.

415 c 17 τιμήσατε: not "having estimated their values" (J. and C.); but simply "they will do him honour and" etc. The suggestions ἀντιτιμήσατε or τιμήσατε κατ' ἄξιαν will hardly command assent. τιμήν in τιμήν ἀπόδοντες above may also be translated "honour" if τὴν τῇ φύσει προσήκουσαν is taken in its full force: the honour appropriate to his nature and no more.

415 d 21 ἔστιν μὲν ὑμῖν ἐκ τῆς. Cf. Laws 663 E—664 A. Grote justly observes that "Plato has fair reason for his confident assertion that if such legends could once be imprinted on the minds of his citizens, as portions of an established creed, they would maintain themselves for a long time in unimpaired force and credit" (l. c. III p. 188). The first generation of citizens would remain incredulous, but the γενναίον ψεύδος would be impressed upon their children, and soon be universally believed. It would require but little effort for a Greek city like Plato's (v 470 E) to entertain in course of time a view which has so many points of contact with Greek tradition. Here Plato seems to hint that even his Rulers (τοὺς τούτων ἕπει must include these also) will in time believe; the Rulers of VI—VII might teach the legend as an ἐν δεόντι ψεύδος, but would themselves refuse their assent.

24 σκέδον—λέγει: viz. that the story
XXII. *Kai toûto mév de epì ev tòn aúto, ἡ φήμη ἡ ἀγάπη. 25 ἡμεῖς δὲ τοῦτος τούς γραμμεῖς ὑπάρχοντες προάγομεν ἤγομένων τῶν ἀρχόντων. Ἐλθοῦντες δὲ θεασάσθων τῆς πόλεως ὅπου κάλλιον, Στρατοπεδεύσασθαι, ὅθεν τοὺς τέ δίδουν ἁμάλιστον τὰ κατέχοντες, εἰ τις μὴ ἐθέλοι τὸς νόμοις πειθεῖσθαι, τοὺς τέ ἔξοθεν ἀμείωτοιαν, εἰ πολέμους ὄσπερ λύκος ἐπὶ πολέμην τις ίος, ἀπὸ τοῦτο πολεμεύσαντες ὑπὸ πάντων, ἡ πῶς; Ὅμως, ἔφη. Οὐκοῦν τοιοῦτα, οίας χειμῶνος τοῦ στέγεσι καὶ θέρους ἰκανάς εἶναι; Πῶς γὰρ οὐχὶ; ἀδικίσεις γὰρ, ἔφη, δοκεῖς μοι λέγειν. Ναὶ, 416 ἡν δ' ἐγώ, ἀριστοτεικάς γε, ἀλλ' οὐ χρηματιστικάς. Πῶς, ἔφη, αὐτὸ τότε λέγεις διαφέρειν ἐκείνου; Ἐγώ σοι, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, πειράσομαι εὔπειν. Δεινότατον γὰρ πού πάντων καὶ ἀδικίστοι ποιμέσθε τοιούτους γε καὶ οὕτω τρέφειν κύνας ἑπικούρους ποιμνίων, ὡστε ὑπὸ ἀκαλασίας ἢ λιμοῦ ἢ τινὸς ἀλλού κακοῦ ἔθους αὐτοῦς τῶν κύνας

3. ἀδικίστοι Ἕλ: ἀδικίστοι ποι Ἄ: ἀδικίσιν ποι Π.

is intended to form part of the city's permanent religious creed, and so encourage patriotism and fraternity. 415 D—417 B Our Rulers and Auxiliaries shall have a camp within the city, so as to check lawless citizens and ward off foreign foes. Their education will prevent them from preying on the others, provided we arrange their circumstances rightly. We shall assign them common property and houses, as well as common meals, to be furnished by the other citizens in return for the protection they enjoy. The use of gold and silver must be forbidden to our Guardians. 415 D ff. The communism of the Republic is, next to its educational curriculum, the principal guarantee which Plato provides against the abuse of political power on the part of his Guardians (Noble die Statlehre Platos pp. 139 ff.). At the present stage Socrates gives only a brief and exoteric account of the system, reserving the full and final exposition for Book V. Plato may have been thinking of certain Spartan and Pythagorean institutions when he framed some of the regulations in this section; but his communism is much more thorough-going than anything of the kind before his day. See Steinhart Einleitung pp. 179—181, and especially Grote L.c. III pp. 207—216. Aristotle’s criticisms (Pol. B 5, 1361 b 37—1363 b 29) are interesting and acute, although he ignores some essential points, and is unable throughout to rise to the level of Plato’s idealism. See also Jowett Introd. pp. 175—179 and Nettleship Lect. and Rem. II pp. 136 f.

25 toûto—ἄγαπη: ‘this will be as the vox populi shall determine’: i.e. it will depend upon φήμη whether our fable is believed or not. φήμη is not of course an oracle (as Ficinus supposed), but the half-personified voice of popular belief. Cf. Laws 838 c, d.

28 tōn priēnov κτλ. Henkel (Studien zur Gesch. d. Gr. Lehre vom Staat p. 52 n. 13) remarks that the prevention of faction inside the city is characteristically put in the foreground. The greatest danger to a Greek city was from internal dissension: cf. V. 470 c ff. nn.

415 Ε 30 στρατοπεδεύσαμεν. The Spartan government was compared to that of a στρατόσεθον (Isocr. 6. 81; cf. Gilbert Gr. Const. Aut. E. T. pp. 61 ff.). Plato’s city is literally a camp. His proposals would probably strike the average Athenian as a dangerous and tyrannical exaggeration of Spartan usages. See Jowett Introd. p. 176.

416 Α 2 διαφέρειν ἐκείνου is rejected by Herwerden; but Schneider’s explanation hits the mark: “ad alterum hoc de discrimine insolentius dictum notat: prius fuerat quod domos eivdas dixerat.”
The (optative) other toivov from Kal oðrhes 15 ητις ποτέ ἑστιν, εἰ μέλλουσι τὸ μέγιστον ἑχειν πρὸς τὸ ημεροι εἶναι αὐτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς φυλαττομένοις ὑπ' αὐτῶν. Καὶ ὄρθως γε, η ὅς. Πρὸς τούτων τῇ παιδείᾳ ταυτὴ φαίη ἀν τις νοῦν ἔχων δεῖν καὶ τὰς οἰκήσεις καὶ τὴν ἀλλήν οὐσίαν τοιαύτην αὐτοῦς παρεσκευάσθαι, ητις μήτε τούς φύλακας ὡς ἀρίστους εἶναι πάσοι 20 αὐτοὺς, κακουργεῖν τῇ μη ἑπαροὶ περὶ τοὺς ἄλλους 1 πολῖτας. Ὁ Καὶ ἀληθῶς γε φήσει. "Ορα δὴ, εἰπον ἐγώ, εἰ τοιοῦδε τινὰ τρόπον ἔκακουρει. See 407 B n. The idiom is abundantly attested, both in Plato and in other Greek authors, although Madvig and Cobet have done their best to expel it from Plato's text here and wherever else it occurs.

6 κακουρεῖν. See 407 B n. The idiom is abundantly attested, both in Plato and in other Greek authors, although Madvig and Cobet have done their best to expel it from Plato's text here and wherever else it occurs.


9 αντί ξυμμάχων — ἀφομοιωθῶσι. For the usual ampliative or explanatory аσυνδετο cf. 409 B. Aristotle objects that Plato's regulations would virtually divide his city into two hostile camps (Pol. B 5. 1264a 24), and Grote does not see "what reply the Platonic Republic furnishes to this objection" (l.c. III p. 213). In reply to Aristotle, Plato might have pointed to his regulations about the interchange of classes (415 B ff.), which would have the effect of binding them together more securely. Moreover, where each individual has the work to do for which he is best qualified, one fruitful cause of discontent and sedition is removed. The wives and families of the lower class would also tend to keep them quiet. Nor does Aristotle's objection allow sufficient weight to the training by which Plato tries to protect his guardians from such 'spiritual pride' as would alienate their subjects.

12 καὶ ἐγὼ εἶπον. See cr. n. καὶ ἐγωγ' εἶπον, though generally retained, is surely wrong: it could only mean 'I too, said I.' No editor cites any other instance of ἐγωγε in this formula.


146 C 19 ἡτις — ἑπαροὶ. αὐτοῦς is emphatic: "ipsos per se" (Schneider). The contrast is between the guardians in themselves, and in their dealings with the others. It is difficult to decide between παῖδει — ἑπαρεί (Lekker and others) and παῖδοι — ἑπαρο. The latter is exquisitissim, and better supported on the whole. For the confusion between -η (subjunctive) and -ωi (optative) in A see Introd. § 5. Cobet calls for τοῦ instead of τοὺς before φύλακας, but φύλακας requires the article. παῖδει with the infinitive is rare, and means 'prevent,' not 'make to cease'; cf. Hdt. v 67 (with Stein's note) and Ar. Ach. 634, where Reiske's conjecture πείλας should not be accepted.
417 A] ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ Γ

199

dei autous xin te kai oikein, ei melounso toiuotou eosebhai. prouton mev oustian kekteimeron mudeimian mudeia idian, ev mepasa anagke. epeita oikeisai kai tammieion mudeion einai mudein toiuoton, eis o ou pas o Boulovmenos eisei. ta d' epitideia, osow deountai andres 25

E adeltau polemon sofroynes te kai andreioun, taXamvenous 1 para taon allon poliwtwn dekesebhai musbon tis fylakih tosouton, osow mhte perieinai autous eis ton eniavton mhte endein. fowitiastata de eis euxisitia osper estrapatopedemousin kouj xin: xurisoi de kai argyroun eipseis autous osi theian para theon aiei en tis puxhi 30 exousai kai oudeis proodeontai tov andrwpoteinon, oude osia tivn ekineiou kthoun tiv tov theitou xursoy kthsei euximigruntas maives,

417 dioti polla kai anoxia peri to twn | poulh funktion geyovei, to par' exinein de akiratou. alla monous autous twn ev tiv polei metaxheirizebhai kai aptebhai xursoy kai argyroun ou theis, oude upo tov auton drofoun lenei oude periaphasbhai oude pines evn xinargyrou h xursoy. kai outw men sofiontai t' an kai sofionen tvn 5

4. ton auton A2III*ξq1; ton auton A1; ton auton III1; ton auton corr. in mg. φα. 

416 B 22 prouton men kta. A certain measure of communism in property seems to have existed among the Pythagoreans (RP.7 p. 43); but there is no reason to suppose that Plato is deliberately borrowing from them here: cf. Steinhart Einleitung p. 179. The main object of Plato is of course to prevent the formation of private interests likely to compete with the claims of public duty. We remark that there has been no hint so far of common wives and children, although Blaschke (der Zusammenhang d. Fam. u. GuIltergemeinschaft d. pl. St. m. d. pol. u. phil. Syst. Platos p. 7) thinks he finds one in 415 A. Cf. 415 D H.

23 ev mepasa anagke. For ἦ omitted see Π 371 A H. The conjecture ἦν for ἦν (Herwarden) is elegant, but superfluous.

25 ta d' epitideia—muqéon. It is fair that the lower classes should provide the others with the means of leisure, for it is they who ‘reap all the benefit of the laborious training bestowed on the guardians.’ They are the ‘ultimate and capital objects’ of Plato’s solicitude. Grote justly adds that “this is a larger and more generous view of the purpose of political institutions than we find either in Aristotle or in Xenophon.” (l.c. III p. 213).

26 taXamvenous is strangely represented in Schneider’s translation by “zu bestimmten Zeiten.” It refers to the fixing of fees or payments in return for services rendered. Cf. Men. 91 B.


xursoy kta. So also in Sparta, according to Xen. Rep. Lac. 7. 6; with which cf. Plut. Lys. 19. 6, where the ephors are said to have put to death a friend of Lysander λαβώσει ἀργοφόρον ἴδια κεκτημένον. Plato is keenly conscious of the corrupting influence of wealth: see Gorg. 525 D ff., and cf. Π 373 E, IV 421 D nn. His guardians are φύει πλουσιω τάς πυχάς (VIII 547 8) and need no other riches.

417 A 4. upo—lénai: as though Wealth communicated a taint, like a murderer sub idem trabilius (στοματόφοιος). The Greek is much more expressive and picturesque than Apelt’s conjecture ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν δρόμον προσέναι (Observ. Cr. p. 11).

5 sofiontai t' an kai sofionei. Cf.
πόλιν· ὃπότε δ' αὐτοὶ γῆν τε ἰδίαν καὶ οἰκίας καὶ νομίσματα κτήσονται, οἰκονομοὶ μὲν καὶ γεωργοὶ ἀντὶ φυλάκων ἔσονται, δεσπόται δ' ἑχθροὶ ἀντὶ ξυμμάχων τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν γενήσονται, Β μισοῦντες δὲ δὴ καὶ μισοῦμενοι καὶ ἐπιβουλεύοντες καὶ ἐπιβουλεύοντες δεικτέοι διάξοουσι πάντα τὸν βίον, πολὺ πλεῖός καὶ μᾶλλον δεδιότες τοὺς ἐνδον ἢ τοὺς ἐξωθέν πολεμίους, θέοντες ἢ δὴ τότε ἐγκύτατα ὀλέθρου αὐτοὶ τε καὶ ἡ ἄλλη πόλις. τοῦτων οὖν πάντων ἐνεκα, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, φῶμεν οὕτω δεῖν κατεσκεύασθαι τοὺς φύλακας οἰκήσεως τε πέρι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, καὶ ταῦτα νομοθετήσομεν, ἢ μή; 15 Πάνυ γε, ἢ δ' ὅς ὁ Γλαύκων.

τέλος πολιτείας Γ'.
APPENDICES TO BOOK III.

I.

III 389 b—d. The section on truth offers some serious difficulties. Throughout the whole of this division of the Republic (377 α—392 α) Plato is laying down precepts to which the μάθημα of poets are to conform (cf. 377 b and 392 α), and in each case it is pointed out how the precept in question has been violated by Homer and other poets. Here, however, nothing is said to shew that we are prescribing for the poets, and no illustrations, either of our precept or of its violation, are cited from them. Schneider, indeed, attempts to extort this meaning from the section; but his theory, strictly understood, would require us to suppose that ἱστόριας δοτέων, ἱστώταις οὐχ ἀπτέον, προσήκεις ψεύτεσθαι, οὐχ ἀπτέον τοῦ τοιοῦτου in b, ψεύτασθαι, ψεύδόμενον in c, and κολάσει in D refer not to Plato's own city, but to poetical representations; that τῆς πόλεως in b is not Plato's city, but any city figuring in poetry; and that τοῦ τοιοῦτους ἀρχοντας in c are not Plato's rulers, but others. Such a supposition is hardly possible, if τοιοῦτος in c is genuine (see note ad loc.), and in any case it is neither natural nor obvious. It may with safety be asserted that if the section had occurred in any other context no one would have supposed it to contain rules for poetical fables: in itself it merely lays down the duty of the lower classes to speak the truth, with the conditions under which the rulers may lie. Cf. Rettig Proleg. pp. 62, 63 and notes on 389 d. Rettig, following up a hint of Schleiermacher's, thinks the section was introduced to prepare the way for the rulers' 'lie' about the origin of the State; while Susemihl (Genet. Entw. ii p. 120) in some mysterious way appears to connect it with the theory of Ideas "as the true and higher Measure of the correct representation of Gods, Daemons, Heroes and the lower world." The latter view is altogether fanciful; and neither of these explanations justifies Plato for having inserted the passage in this particular connexion, where he is discussing poetical legend, however much Rettig may extol the "art" with which he has concealed his art. The following seems to me a more probable explanation. We are professedly dealing with poetical representations of the gods and heroes, and we should expect Plato to require the poets to represent them as truthful and to enforce his remarks by poetical illustrations. He does not do so, because it has
already been done in 11 382—383. Instead of this, he reverts to 382 c
(tôte ἀποτροπῆς ἐνεκα ὡς φάρμακον χρήσιμον γίγνεται sc. τὸ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις
ψευδός), and emphasizes, more than he has hitherto done, the reason
why truthfulness must be ascribed to the gods, viz. in order to encourage
the virtue among men. That Plato laid the greatest stress upon the
virtue of Truth appears from the fine passage in Λαώς 730 b, c, be-
ginning Ἀλήθεια δὴ πάντων μὲν ἀγαθῶν θεῶν ἡγεῖται, πάντων δὲ ἄνθρωποι:—thus it is not unnatural that he should recur to the subject here. The
section should be taken as a kind of afterthought to 382—383, which it
is intended partly to explain and partly to supplement. The whole
section on Truth is for this and other reasons possibly later than the
context in which it appears: see also on τοὺς τοιούτους ἄρχοντας, 389 c.

A further question has been raised as to what Plato intended by the
virtue of Ἀλήθεια. Rettig (l.c. pp. 61 and 65 ff.) and Stallbaum,
anxious to find in all this a preliminary sketch of the cardinal virtues,
interpret it as a sort of wisdom; but in that case, why did not Plato call
it by its name? He is content to use the names of two other cardinal
virtues, ἀνδρεία and σωφροσύνη, although they have not yet been defined.
Nor does this account of Ἀλήθεια contain any of the distinctive features
of Wisdom, either in its popular sense or in the sense which it bears in
Book iv. There is no reason to suppose that Plato means anything but
what he says, and he himself describes the virtue as 'speaking the
truth.' The whole attempt to see in this division of the dialogue a
foreshadowing of the psychological theory of the virtues is, I believe, a
mistake: only two of the virtues are named at all, ἀνδρεία and σωφρο-
sύνη, and these quite without any ulterior meaning or motive. Plato is
simply describing in a somewhat desultory way (σος ἐν ὧ ν λόγοις ὡ σπέρ
πνεύμα φέρη)—since a rigid plan is not necessary here—the kind of
character which Poetry should endeavour to foster: a character which
shall honour gods and parents, set value on reciprocal friendship
(386 α), be courageous, truthful, and distinguished for self-control. To
force this description into the strait-jacket of the cardinal virtues would
be pedantic. As it is, no essential feature of the καλὸς καγαθὸς is
omitted.

II.

On Plato's ἄρμονίας.

III 398 ἐ—399 β. Plato enumerates in all six scales in three groups.
The first group is θρηνοδές, and includes Mixo-Lyian, Syntono-Lyian,
and such like; the second is μαλακόν, and embraces Chalaro-Ionian and
Chalaro-Lyian; to the third, which occupies a middle position between
the other two, belong Dorian and Phrygian. Chalaro-Ionian seems
further to imply the existence of Syntono-Ionian, and we read of both
in Pratinas Fr. 5 Bergk, μήτε σύντονον δίωκε μήτε τάν ἀνεμέναν ἵστει
μοῦσαν, ἀλλὰ τὰν μέσαν...νεόν ἄρουραν αἰώλιζε τῷ μέλει, if Westphal's
interpretation is (as I believe) right (Harmonik p. 186. See also Monro Modes of Greek Music pp. 5, 6). It has been supposed that Plato's μεσολυδιστή is only συντονοιαστή under another name; but the name Mixo-Lydan seems rather to point to a compromise between two distinct modes, one of which was the Lydian. Possibly the συντονοιαστή is included under τοϊαύται τυνες, as von Jan holds Fl. Jahrb. 1867 p. 823.

According to Westphal (l.c. pp. 215 ff.), whose theory is partly based upon what must, I fear, be regarded as a speculative deduction from Aristides Quintil. 1 pp. 21, 22 ed. Meibom, Plato's ἀρμονία were as follows:—

(1) Mixo-Lydan  B C D E F G A B,
(2) Syntono-Lydan  A B C' D' E' F' G' A',
(3) Chalaro-Ionian  G A B C' D' E' F' G',
(4) Chalaro-Lydan  F G A B C' D' E' F',
(5) Dorian  E F G A B C' D' E',
(6) Phrygian  D E F G A B C' D'.

It will be observed that Westphal's scales are all of them ἀρμονία in the strict sense of the term, i.e. they differ in the order of their intervals; and that the Syntono-Lydan begins a major third higher than the Chalaro-Lydan.

An entirely different theory has been propounded by von Jan (Fl. Jahrb. 1867 pp. 815 ff.), who gives the following series of scales:—

(1) Mixo-Lydan  E# F# G# A# B C# D# E'#,  
(2) Syntono-Lydan  E F# G# A B C# D# E',  
(3) Chalaro-Ionian  E♭ F G A♭ B♭ C' D♭ E♭,  
(4) Chalaro-Lydan  E♭ F G A♭ B♭ C' D' E♭,  
(5) Dorian  E F G A B C' D' E',  
(6) Phrygian  E F# G A B C' D' E'.

According to this view, the Syntono-Lydan and the Chalaro-Lydan are in reality the same mode, differing from one another only in pitch. Plato's language appears to me to point to such a conclusion (see on 398 c, e), but it is not altogether easy for us to believe that the difference of a semitone in pitch could have converted το θρηνώδες into το συμπτωτικόν. It will further be remarked that if we take the Dorian as the original and fundamental ἀρμονία (Lach. 188 d), the θρηνώδες ἀρμονία, according to von Jan's theory, can be made from it by tuning different strings a semitone higher, and the χαλαρατί by tuning different strings a semitone lower.
Von Jan’s hypothesis is severely censured by Westphal (l.c. pp. 209—215), and strong arguments can be urged against it from the standpoint of modern music. I have quoted it in this Appendix because of its symmetry, and also because, so far as it goes, it seems to me to be more in harmony with the scanty indications furnished by Plato’s language than the theory of Westphal. It is true, as Westphal urges, that Plato applies the term ἀρμονία to Syntono-Lydian and Chalaro-Lydian as well as to Dorian, Phrygian etc.; but I do not think it follows that Syntono-Lydian and Chalaro-Lydian differed in the arrangement of intervals: for σύντονος and χαλαρά ought to refer to pitch alone: and συντονολυδωστή or χαλαρολυδωστή may have been called a ἀρμονία not qua σύντονος or χαλαρά, but qua λυδωστή. The references to Plato’s ἀρμονίαι in Arist. Pol. Θ 5. 1340a 40 ff. may be explained in the same way. Wherever Aristotle speaks of ἀνειμέναι and σύντονοι ἀρμονίαι, he is referring, as the editors hold, to Chalaro-Lydian, Chalaro-Ionian, and Syntono-Lydian, Syntono-Ionian; and these are properly called ἀρμονίαι as being varieties of λυδωστή and ιαστή. See my article in Cl. Rev. x pp. 378 f. The passage on the modes or (as he calls them) τρόποι in Bacchius’ Isagoge § 46 ff. seems—as far as concerns the relative pitch of the scales—to point to a solution with which neither Westphal nor von Jan agrees, but Bacchius gives us no information about the order of intervals in Plato’s ἀρμονίαι.
I.  Kal ὁ 'Αδείμαντος ὑπολαβὼν Τί οὖν, ἐφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀπολογίσει, εάν τις σε φη μὴ πάνι τι εὐδαιμονας ποιεῖν τούτοις τοὺς ἀνδρας, καὶ ταῦτα δὲ ἑαυτούς, ὅν ἐστι μὲν ἡ πόλεις τῇ ἅληθείᾳ, οἱ δὲ μηδὲν ἀπολαύουσιν ἄγαθον τῆς πόλεως, οἷον ἀλλοι ἁγρούς τε

419 A—423 B  Adimantus now interposes with the objection that the Guardians will be far from happy. Although they are in reality masters of the city, they have nothing which they can call their own—none of the contributing factors of individual or personal gratification. In reply, it is not admitted that the Guardians will be unhappy, but even supposing that they are, our purpose was, not to make happy Guardians, but to found a happy City, in order to discover justice within its borders. Our Guardians must not be made happy at the cost of efficiency in their peculiar duty. Wealth is hardly less unprosuits to the exercise of arts and professions than Poverty. When our city is at war with two communities, she will not lack resources; for she will make alliance with one of the two by promising to it the other's wealth. Nor will she be in danger from her ally afterwards. Other States are each of them not one but manifold, and our city, if she have but a thousand defenders, is the greatest single state in Greece or Barbary.

419 A ff. 1 καὶ ὁ 'Αδείμαντος κτλ. Adimantus' objection is the dying echo of the view already advocated by Thrasymachus, that a ruler should rule for his own profit: cf. I 343 A, 344 B ss. Socrates declines to discuss the question now, because it is irrelevant. In the further account of the communism of the ruling class, the difficulty solves itself. A higher happiness—so we are told—comes from self-victory than from indulgence (V 463 B ff.: cf. IX 58; c ii.). Compare the conversation of Socrates with Aristippus in Mem. II 17 ff.

2 μὴ. Οἱ μὴ with the infinitive after verbs of saying see I 346 E n.

3 δὲ ἑαυτοῖς: i.e. they have themselves to thank for not being εὐδαιμόνες. Cf. V 465 E οὐκ ἂν ὅταν λόγος ἦμων ἐπέπλησεν διὶ τοῖς φίλακας οὐκ εὐδαιμονας ποιοίμεν, οἱ ἐξεν πάντα ἐκεῖν τὰ τῶν πολιτῶν οὐδὲν ἔχειν; and Solon 33 i f. οὐκ ἐφι Σδὼν βαθύφορον οὐδὲ βουλημένης ἀνήρ | ἐσθλὰ γάρ θεοῦ διάνοιας αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἐδεχότο (he of his own initiative refused). δα is used exactly as in I 354 B. This view, which is Ast.'s, gives an excellent meaning, and Schneider, who at first proposed a subtler explanation, adopts it in his translation ("durch ihre eigene Schuld"). The various conjectures δή, αὐτοῖς ὁ (Stephanus), δὴ αὐτοῖς ὁ (Bettmann), αὐτοῖς δέ ὁ (Herwerden) need no refutation.

4 ἄλλοι: not οἱ ἄλλοι (Bekker, Stallbaum, etc.), which might be taken as referring to the lower classes in Plato's State. Plato would not be likely to permit these to have οἴκια καλαὶ καὶ μυγάλαι. ἄλλοι means 'other rulers,' i.e. rulers in other cities; and κεκτημένοι belongs to οἱ δὲ: 'possessing, like other rulers, lands,' etc. So Schneider, rightly. For the idiomatic position of ὁδον ἄλλοι cf. VII 515 A, 528 B, IX 589 B al.
5 κεκτημένοι καὶ οἰκίας οἰκοδομούμενοι καλὰς καὶ μεγάλας καὶ
tαύταις πρέπει ταύτας κατασκευὴν κτώμενοι καὶ θυσίας θεοῦ ἱδίαι
θύνητες καὶ ξενοδοκοῦντος καὶ δὴ καὶ, ἃ νῦν δὴ σὺ ἔλεγες, χρυσόν
tε καὶ ἄργυρον κεκτημένοι καὶ πάντα ὅσα νομίζεται τοῖς μέλλουσι
μακαρίοις εἰναι; ἀλλ’ ἀτεχνῶς, φαίν ἂν, ὅσπερ ἐπίκουροι μισθω-
τοί ἐν τῇ πόλει φαίνονται | καθήσαθιοι οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἡ φρουρώντες. 420
Ναὶ, ἃὶ δ’ ἐγὼ, καὶ ταῦτα γε ἐπίστικοι καὶ οὐδὲ μισθὸν πρὸς τοῖς
σιτίοις λαμβάνοντες ὦστε οἱ ἄλλοι, ἄστε οὐδ’ ἂν ἀποδημήσαι
βούλωνται ἱδία, ἐξέσται αὐτοῖς, οὐδ’ ἐταίραις διδόναι οὐδ’ ἄνα-
5 λίσκεις ἂν τοι βούλωνται ἄλλοσπ, οἷα δὴ οἱ εὐδαιμόνες δοκοῦντες
εἰναι ἀνάλισκουσιν. ταῦτα καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα συχνὰ τῆς κατη-
γορίας ἀπολείπεις. ’Αλλ’, ἃ δ’ ὅς, ἐστὼ καὶ ταῦτα κατηγορημένα.
Τὸ ὄν τὸν’ ἰ’ ἀπολογισόμεθα, φης; Ναὶ. Τὸν αὐτὸν οἶμον, ἧν δ’ Ἐ
ἐγὼ, πορεύομεν εὐρήσομεν, ὅς ἐγὼμαι, ἃ λεκτεά. ἐροῦμεν γὰρ,
10 ἃτι θαυμαστὸν μὲν ἄν οὐδὲν ἐξή, εἰ καὶ οὔτοι οὕτως εὐδαιμονεῖστατοι
eἰσιν, οὐ μὴν πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντες τὴν πόλιν οἰκίζομεν, ὅπως ἐν
tι ἡμῖν ἔνοσο ἐστώ διαφέροντος εὐδαιμον, ἀλλ’ ὅπως ὅ τι μάλιστα
ἀλὴ ἡ πόλις. ὡςθημεν γὰρ ἐν τῇ τοιαύτῃ μάλιστα ἄν εὐρεῖ
dικαιοσύνην καὶ αὐ ἐν τῇ κἄκιστα οἰκουμένη ἀδικιάν, κατιδύντες

13. ἂν εἴρεϊς Π: ἀνεβείν Α.

9 μισθωτὸς is not otiose as Badham supposes. We should translate 'just like paid auxiliaries.' The emphasis on μισθω-
toί prepares us for Socrates' correction when they say they do not, strictly speak-
ing, even get wages.

420 A 2 ἐπίστικοι. ἐπίστικοι (which Cobet and Hartman call for) would be more in accordance with the analogy of
παράστητος etc.; but the longer form is established by fragments of comic poets (ap. Ath. vi 246 f—247 A, where ἐπί-
sιτιων in the fragment of Timocles defies emendation).

3 οἱ ἄλλοι: sc. ἐπίκουροι or mercen-
caries.

ἀποδημήσαι. Regulations about ἀπο-
dημία are laid down in Latus 949 Ε Φ.

5 οἰα δὴ κτλ. For οἰα Hermann once conjectured οἱ: neatly, but οἱ is too precise. οἰα δὴ = οἰα δὴ ἀναλώματα. With
οἱ εὐδαιμόνες δοκοῦντες εἰναι cf. ΙΙΙ.406 C.

It is εὐδαιμονία in the popular sense of 'having a good time' which Adimantus complains is denied to the guardians.

420 Β 8 οἴμον. A poetic word. Plato is perhaps thinking of some such phrase as Pindar's ἑπέων οἶμος (Ol. ix 47).
The 'way' is simply that each class must do its own appointed work, if the city is to be a happy and harmonious whole: cf. 423 D.

10 οὐ καὶ οὔτοι κτλ. καὶ means 'as well as the rest of the city.' Aristotle misrepresents Plato when, in spite of this sentence and Υ 465 D ff., he says that the guardians are deprived of εὐδαιμονία (Pol. B 5. 126A f. 15 ff., with Susemihl's note). They are happy not only because they triumph over self (465 D), but—like the others—because they do the work to which Nature has called them: cf. I. 352 D —354 Α.

11 οὐκ ἐν τῇ κτλ. Cf. Latus 715 Β and Thuc. II 60. 2, where Pericles says ἐν γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ πόλιν πλεῖον εὐπρέπον
ορθομενήν ωφηλείν τοὺς ἐμφατάς ἡ καθ’
ἐκαστὸν τῶν πολιτῶν εὑραγοῦσαν, ἀδρανὸν
dε σφαλλόμενη.

13 ὡςθημεν—σκεφτομένα. See on ΙΙ
369 Α.
C δὲ 1 κρίναι ἂν, δὲ τὰλαι ζητοῦμεν. νῦν μὲν οὖν, ώς οἴομεθα, τὴν 15 εὐδαιμονα πλάττομεν οὐκ ἀπολαβόντες δόλες καὶ ἀυτὴ τοιοῦτος τινὰς τιθέντες, ἀλλὰ ὅλης αὐτίκα δὲ τὴν ἐναντίαν σκεφόμεθα. ὥσπερ οὖν ἂν εἰ ἡμᾶς ἀνδριάντας γράφοντας προσεθῶν τις ἐνεγεί λέγων, ὅτι οὗ τοῖς καλλίστοις τοῦ ζύφου τὰ κάλλιστα φάρμακα προστίθεμεν· οἱ γὰρ ὀφθαλμοὶ, κάλλιστον ὄν, οὐκ 20 ὀστρεῖν ἐναληλυμένοι εἶν, ἄλλα μέλαιν· μετρίως ἂν ἐδοκοῦμεν 1

D πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀπολογείσθαί λέγοντες· Ὅ θαυμάσσει, μὴ οὖν δεῖν ἡμᾶς οὐτὸς καλοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς γράφειν, ὡστε μηδὲ ὀφθαλμοὺς φαίνεσθαι, μηδὲ αὖ τάλλα μέρη, ἀλλὰ ἄθρετο εἰ τὰ προσφύγων ἐκάστους ἀποδιδόντες τὸ ὄλον καλὸν ποιῶμεν· καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν μὴ 25 ἀνάγκαζε ἡμᾶς τοιαύτην εὐδαιμονίαν τοῖς φύλαξὶ προσάπτειν,

Ε ἢ ἔκεινος πάν μᾶλλον ἀπεργάσεται ἢ φύλακας. ἐπιστάμεθα 1 γὰρ καὶ τοὺς γεωργοὺς ἕνωσίδας ἁμφιέσαντες καὶ χρυσοῦ περιθέντες πρὸς ἡδονήν ἐγράφεσθαι κελευθέν τὴν γῆν, καὶ τοὺς κεραμείς κατακλίναντες ἐπὶ δεξιά πρὸς τὸ πῦρ διαπίνοντάς τε καὶ εὐχοῦν· 30 ἐπὶ δεξιὰ Ηγ.: ἐπιδεξία Λ: ἐπὶ δεξία (sic) Π.

420 C 16 οὐκ ἀπολαβόντες—τιθέντες. ἀπολαβόντες is absolute, almost adverbial (cf. Gorg. 495 E); and δόλες goes with τιθέντες. So Schneider and others rightly explain the construction.

17 αὐτίκα δὲ τὴν ἐναντίαν κτλ. Here we have the first express promise of Books viii and ix, although the promise is afterwards fulfilled in an ampler manner than is indicated here. See also 427 B.

18 ὥσπερ οὖν ἂν—μέλαιν. Cf. (with J. and C.) Ἰβηρ. Μαίσ. 290 B. ἀνείδαντας γράφοντας means ‘painting statues of men.’ Cf. Euripides Fr. 764. 2 γραπτοὺς ἄνεισθώ ὄντως προσβίλεισ τὺπους. The question whether statues were ever painted in the best period is an old controversy, the echoes of which have hardly yet died away. Schubart (Fl. Jahr. 1874, pp. 20 ff.) and others prefer to take ἀνείδαντας merely as ‘likenesses of men,’ but the word was regularly, if not indeed always, used of statues. That the surface of archaic statues was regularly painted is now no longer doubtful: see Gardner Handbook of Greek Sculpture pp. 28 ff. During the best period, in the case of marble or other polished surfaces, the painting was regularly confined to the eyes, eyelids, eyebrows, hair and the like. See on the whole subject Sittl’s Arch. der Kunst (in Iwan Müller’s Handbuch) pp. 413, 414. μέλαιν does not necessarily mean jet black, but only some dark and quiet colour. In point of fact, the eyes of the early marble statues on the Acropolis ‘are painted with a dark pigment, almost black’ (Gardner l.c. p. 30). The use—regular in Greek—of γράφειν for painting is an interesting survival of the time when decorative art was little beyond carving in relief (Sittl l.c. p. 416). The present passage is strangely ignored by Sertorius in his interesting article “Plato und die Malerei” in Arch. f. Gesch. d. Phil. 19 pp. 123—148.

420 E 28 ἕνωσίδας. The name ἕνωσίδας was given to various kinds of purple robes or mantles—among them those worn by kings upon the stage, and by riders in festal processions. The authorities are cited in Müller Gr. Bühnenalt. p. 234 n. 1. If the Scholiasts on Ar. Clouds 70 and Theocr. 11 74 are to be trusted, we should write ἕνωσίδας, not ἕνωσίδας.

30 ἐπὶ δεξιά. Whether we read ἐπι- δεξία or ἐπὶ δεξιά the word should be understood as ‘from left to right.’ At a Greek banquet, the guests were always placed ἐπὶ δεξιά, i.e. so that the guest on your right hand occupied a lower place.
μένουσ, τὸν τροχὸν παραθεμένους, ὅσον ἂν ἐπιθυμῶσι κεραμεύειν, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους πάντας τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ μακαρίους ποιεῖν, ἵνα δὴ ὅλη ἡ πόλις εὑδαιμονή. ἀλλὰ ἡμῖν μὴ οὕτω νοθετείν ὡς, ἂν σοὶ πειθόμεθα, οὔτε ὁ γεωργὸς γεωργὸς ἔσται, οὔτε ὁ κεραμεῦς κεραμεῦς, οὔτε ἄλλος οὐδεὶς οὐδὲν ἔχων σχῆμα ἐξ ὧν πόλις γίγνεται. ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν ἄλλους ἐλάττων λόγος· νευρορράφοι γὰρ φαύλοι γενόμενοι καὶ διαφθάροντες καὶ προσποιησάμενοι εἰναι μὴ οὔτε 5 πόλει οὐδὲν δείων· φύλακες δὲ νόμων τε καὶ πόλεως μὴ οὔτε ἀλλὰ δοκοῦντες ὀρᾶσι δὴ ὅτι πᾶσαν ἁρδήν πόλιν ἀπολλυάσων καὶ οὗ τοῦ εὕ οίκειν καὶ εὑδαιμονεῖν μόνον τὸν καίρων ἔχουσιν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἡμῖν μὲν φύλακας ὡς ἀληθῶς ποιοῦμεν, ἥκιστα κακοῦργοι τῆς πόλεως, ὁ δὲ ἐκεῖνο λέγων γεωργοῦς τινας καὶ ὀστεόν ἐν πανηγύρι ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐν πόλει ἐστιάτορας εὑδαιμόνας, ἀλλ’ ἁν τι ἡ πόλιν λέγοι. σκεπτέον ὦν, πότερον πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντες τοὺς φύλακας καθιστῶμεν, ὅπως ὃ τι πλείστῳ αὐτοῦς εὑδαιμονία ἐγγενη-σεται, ἡ τούτο μὲν εἰς τὴν πόλιν ὅλην βλέποντας θεατέον εἰ ἐκείνη

(ὑποκατακελμένος) than you, and the wine circulated from left to right of the banqueters. See Blümmer Privatall. p. 237 n. 7 and Darbishire Relig. Philol. p. 78. The word suggests a banquet with all the formalities, and heightens the incongruity of the situation, like the purple robes and golden crowns of the farmers. Schneider's exhaustive discussion seems to me conclusive in favour of writing ἐπὶ δεξιὰ as two words. Casaubon has been followed by most of the editors (except Schneider) in taking ἐπὶ ἐξία as an adverb = com MODE (Ast), 'com mode' (Stallbaum etc.), or 'dexterously,' 'cleverly' (J. and C.); but it may well be doubted if the word could mean 'commode,' and 'dexterically' is inappropriate. Cf. Darbishire I. c. p. 78 n. 1. ἐπὶ δεξιὰ goes with κατακλίναντες and πρὸς τὸ πῦρ (cf. Blaydes on Ar. Aesch. 751) with δια- πινοῦντας. The fire is that by which the potters bake their pottery; their workshop has for the nonce become a hall of banqueting.

421 ἢ ἂν οὖν: i.e. τοῖς τῶν σχημάτων ἑξ οὖν. Cf. II 373 E n. 6 καὶ αὐ: τυρωσιμε (Ficinus), i.e. sicut et contra, as Ast observes.
7 εἰ μὲν οὖν—λέγοι. This difficult passage has suffered severely at the hands of critics, but the text is probably nearly, if not quite, sound. If we take the words as they stand in A, they mean, broadly speaking, that if we are making true guardians, and he (ὁ ἐκεῖνο λέγων means the τις in 419 A) is making something different, he cannot, like ourselves, be speaking of a πόλις, but of something else. This is logical and gives an excellent sense: cf. 422 εὐδαίμων εἰ—ὅτι οὐκ ἔχου ἐκέχειν τινα προσεπεῖν πόλεις ἢ τὴν τοιχίαν οὐάν ἡμῖν κατε- σκευάζομεν. Now we are making guardians in the true sense of the term, such as are least likely to harm the city; whereas the author of the other proposals is making (not guardians, but since he gives them ἄγροι 419 A) a sort of farmers (cf. III 417 B οἰκονόμοι μὲν καὶ γεωργοί ἀντὶ πυλάκων ἐστοικαί) and men who do harm their city, because they "for their bellies' sake, Creep, and intrude and climb into the fold." The advocates of such a theory must mean something different from a city—something like the "shearers' feast" in Lycidas: cf. I 343 A n. γεωργοὺς is possibly corrupt; if so, I think we should read λεωργοὺς to contrast with ἱκάστα κακοοφινοὺ�. The word occurs in the Memorabilia, if not in Plato. See Cl. Rev. X p. 385. Other emendations are enumerated in App. I.
éγγίνεται, τοὺς δ’ ἐπικούροις τοὺς καὶ τοὺς φύλακας ἐκεῖνοι 1
C αὐτοκατσέων ποιεῖν καὶ πειστέον, ὡσποῦ ὦ τι ἀριστοὶ δημουργοὶ 15
tοῦ ἐαυτῶν ἔργον ἐσονταί, καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἀπαντᾶς ωσαύτως, καὶ
οὕτω ἐξιμπάσης τῆς πόλεως αὐξανομένης καὶ καλὸς οἰκισμένης
ἐατέον ὡσποῦ ἐκάστοις τοῖς ἔθνεσιν ἢ φύσις ἀποδίδουσι τοῦ μετα-
λαμβάνειν εὐδαιμονίας.
Π. ’Ἀλλ’, ἢ δ’ ὅσι, καλὸς μοι δοκεῖς λέγειν. ἐγ’ οὖν, ἢν δ’ 20
ἔγι, καὶ τὸ τούτον ἀδελφὸν δόξῳ σοι μετρίως λέγεις; Τί μάλιστα;
D Τοὺς ἄλλους αὐτὶ δημουργοὺς οὐκόπε εἰ τάδε ἐδιαφείρει, ὡστε καὶ
κακοὶς γέγνεσθαι. Τὰ ποία δὴ ταῦτα; Πλοῦτος, ἢν δ’ ἔγι, καὶ
πενία. Πῶς δή; Ἔμε. πλουτὴσας χυτρεύς δοκεῖ σοι ἐτὶ ἐθελήσῃς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι τῆς τέχνης; Οὐδαμῶς, ἔφη. Ἄργος δὲ 25
καὶ ἀμέλης γενήσεται μᾶλλον αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ; Πολύ γε. Οὐκοῦν
κακῶν χυτρεύς γέγνεται; Καὶ τοῦτο, ἔφη, πολύ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ
ὁργανά γε μὴ ἔχων παρέχεσθαι ὑπὸ πενίας ἢ τι ἄλλο τῶν εἰς
E τὴν τέχνην τὰ τὰ ἐργά τοι πονηρότερα 1 ἐργάσεται καὶ τοὺς ὑπὲρ
Ἕλλους, οὐδὲν διδάσκη, χείρος δημουργοὺς διδάξεταί. Πῶς δ’ 30

22. διαφείρει Π.: διαφείρει Λ.

14 ἐκεῖνο κτλ.: i.e. to pursue the other policy, which we enjoin. ἐκεῖνο does more than merely anticipate ὅπως—
θέονται.

421 C 18 ἐστέον. The infinitive, which would naturally follow ἐστέον, is turned into a construction with ὅπως—
ἀποδίδουσι. I once thought of ἐστέον (i.e. δεῖ ἔχειν, cf. ν 468 A), taking the genitive as in ὅποι ἔχει
tοῦ μεταλαμβάνειν εὐδαιμονίας; But the ms reading is satisfactory enough.

421 D 22 ὠστε—γέγνεσθαι: 'so that they also become bad.' These words, though expunged by Hartman, are welcome, if not necessary, in view of κακῶν χυτρεύς γέγνεται and χείρος δὲ αὐτοῦ in D and E. καὶ indicates that κακῶς γέγνεσθαι is more than διαφείρει; and so it is represented in the sequel. The reading of A (see cr. n.) perhaps points to a variant διαφείρει.

24 πλουτησάς—τέχνης. Ait. Plut. 510—534 (cited by Ast) furnishes an excellent commentary on this text. See also on ιιι 416 E.

28 παρέχεσθαι is 'to provide out of his own resources' (de suo praebere):

A. P.

cf. VIII 554 A. Cobet cancels the word; Herwerden and Hartman prefer πορί-
ζεσθαι, for which there is no ms authority. πορίζεσθαι would imply that the χυτρεύς
buys his ὁργανὰ ready-made from others, whereas παρέχεσθαι expresses no opinion
on this point.

421 E 30 διδάκτει. W. H. Thompson, Cobet, and others peremptorily call for διδάξει. See however Riddell Digest of
Idioms § 87 and E. S. Thompson's edition of the Meno, p. 195 ff. It is clear that the
alleged distinction between διδάκτο 'I teach' and διδάκτομαι 'I get a person
taught' cannot be fully maintained; for διδάξει is used of a parent getting his
sons taught by others in Men. 94 B and 94 D (bis). Another example of this
usage is Prot. 324 D. The fact is that
the Active Voice is quite as susceptible
as the Middle of the meaning 'to get a
ting done by another'; neither Voice,
however, by any proper inherent force,
but in virtue solely of the common
principle, that qui factit per alium facit
per se,' Riddell. Jebb (on Soph. Ant.
356) observes that 'once or twice ἐδι-
dαξάμην is merely ἐδίδαξα with the idea of
the teacher's interest superadded": it may be doubted if "once or twice" is strong enough, but at all events this is the usage here, and in v. 467 E. The active διδασκῇ is appropriately used of teaching others (ἄλλως κτλ.); in διδασκάω the personal interest reappears, for it is the sons who are the prominent pupils (whence ἦ ἄλλως and not καὶ ἄλλως). Richter's view (Fl. Jähn. 1867 p. 147) that διδασκάω denotes the result of the action rather than the action itself is partly true, but it is not the middle which gives it this force. In Ar. Clouds 783, as Socrates is not Strepsiades' father, we may accept Elmsley's emendation διδασκαίων ἢ ἢν for διδασκάων without prejudice to the present case.

32 αὐτῷ: viz. of τεχνῶν: see II 377 C n. We need not change τεχνῶν to τεχνῖνων.

422 A 2 ποιοῦσιν = 'producing,' gives a satisfactory sense. Wealth and Poverty are not to be allowed παραδώναι εἰς τὴν πολιτ. because—we have here the statement of a general law—they are the authors of luxury etc. ἐμποιοῦσιν (in Z and other MSS) is an obvious 'emendation,' though adopted by Stallbaum and others: cf. 444 D.

κακοεργιάν. If the form is right, Plato must intend to draw attention to the etymology of the word. κακοεργιάν appears in two or three inferior MSS, and (as ε seems to be written over an erasure) was perhaps the original reading in Paris A.

422 C 14 τολλάκις: not 'perhaps' (one of J. and C.'s alternative suggestions) but 'frequently,' 'repeatedly.' τολλάκις does not mean 'perhaps,' except after εἰ, εὖ, ταῦ, μή and the like: see Ast's lex. Plat. III p. 144 and Heindorf on Phaed. 60 E.
oи ἀθληταὶ ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων διπλασίοις τε καὶ τριπλασίοις αὐτῶν μαχοῦται. Συνχωρήσομαι σοι, ἐφή· δοκεῖς γὰρ μοι ὅρθως λέγειν. 1 20

De ὑ' δ'; ἄν προσβείαν πέμψαντες εἰς τὴν ἐτέραν πόλιν τάλθη ἐξίσουσι, ὅτι ἡμεῖς μὲν οὐδὲν χρυσὸν οὐδ' ἀργυρίῳ χρώμεθα, οὐδ' ἡμῖν θέμες, οὐμὲν δὲ· συμπολεμήσαντες οὐν μεθ' ἡμῶν ἔχετε τὰ τῶν ἑτέρων· οἱ τινὰς ἀκούσαντες ταύτα αἱρήσεσθαι κυοῖ πολεμεῖν στρεφόμεν τε καὶ ἵσχυοι μᾶλλον ἢ μετὰ κυνῶν προβάτων πίοι τε 25 καὶ ἀπαλοῖς; Οὐ μοι δοκεί. ἀλλ' ἐὰν εἰς μίαν, ἐφή, πόλιν συνα-Ε ὑσιοθῆ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων χρῆματα, ὅπερ μὴ· κύδωνος φέρῃ τῇ μὴ πλουτοῦσῃ. Ἐνδαίμονε εἰ, ἢ δ' ἐγώ, ὅτι οἱ ἄξιοι εἶναι ἄλλην τινὰ προσεπεῖν πόλιν ἢ τὴν τοιαύτην οίαν ἡμεῖς κατεσκευάζομεν. Ἁλλὰ τὶ μὴν; ἐφή. Μειζόνως, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, χρῆ προσαγωρεύειν ταῖς 30 ἄλλαις· ἐκάκτη γὰρ αὐτῶν πόλεις εἰσὶ πάμπολλαι, ἁλλ' ὑ' πόλις,

31. πάμπολλαι Α'Π: πάμπολαι Α'.

422 D 21 τὶ δὲ; κτλ. ἃν προσβείαν κτλ. has for its apodosis οἶει τινὰς κτλ. I have placed a mark of interrogation after τὶ δὲ. The alternatives are to place it after τῶν ἑτέρων, or else to suppose with Ast that the construction is suddenly changed at οἶει. Neither solution is so simple as to write τὶ δ' ; Cf. 425 C, 426 λ, and (for the elision before a pause) 428 C.

24 κυρί. In the game of πόλεις, the counters were called ‘Dogs’ (Pollux ix 98). The comparison of our auxiliaries to dogs prepares the way for the allusion in 422 E: where see note. This has been pointed out by Ridgeway (Journal of Hell. Studies XVI p. 288), who gives illustrations of three ‘dogs’ of this description found in Egypt and now in the British Museum.

422 E 28 εὐδαίμων εἴ κτλ.: 'you are fortunate to be able to think etc.' : cf. ν 450 σ. εὐδαίμων is less common in this ironical sense than μακάρως.

31 ἐκάκτη γὰρ κτλ.: 'for each of them is, as the saying goes, no city, but a-many cities.' The phrase τὸ τῶν παρ-ζωτῶν in Plato seems always to mean 'as they say in the proverb' or 'proverbial saying': see ix 573 C, Laws 750 σ, and cf. ib. 723 D. Now it is probable from the position of τὸ τῶν παρζωτῶν that ἀλλ' οὐ πόλις forms part of the proverb: so that the whole saying may have run πόλεις μὲν εἰς παμπόλεις, ἁλλ' οὐ πόλις. (Her-werden, more suo, cancels ἁλλ' οὐ πόλις, but we have of course no right to take this step.) The form παμπόλεις for παμ-πολλαί may be allowed in a pun on πόλεις, especially as the Epic plural of πόλις is sometimes found with feminine nouns. It should be remarked also that the first hand in Paris A wrote παμπολαι (see cr. n.), though this may be merely accidental. What the ordinary application of the proverb was, we cannot say: presumably it was generally employed, as here by Plato, in speaking of a city divided against itself. The origin of the saying is to be sought in the variety of πετεία known as πόλεις παίζεων, an expression which, according to the Scholast on this passage of Plato, as well as Suidas s.v. πόλις, and Hesychius s.v. πόλεις παίζεων, had itself also a proverbial significance. In this game the abacus was divided into 60 spaces, each of which was called πόλις in ancient times (Photius s.v. πόλεις παίζεων ed. Porson. Porson's alteration of ἔξι ν. 60 into ἔξι is a gratuitous change, as Schneider hints. See also Eustathius on Od. 1 p. 29. 13 ff., ed. Lips., quoted by Schneider). The name πόλις was moreover sometimes applied to the game itself (Cratinus ἔραστεῖς Fr. 3 ed. Meineke καὶ κάτι καλὸν ἡ πόλιν ἡ παί-ζουσαν), as well as to the πλήθωρ or abacus on which it was played (Pollux ix 98). There is also, I think, some reason
for believing that each of the players' sides was called collectively his πόλις. In Susenmilh and Hicks Politics of Aristotle p. 148 n., Dr Jackson remarks that the words πάμπολαι πόλεις, ἄλλοι ὡς πόλις make it likely "that a compact body of pieces was called πόλις." If we may go further, and suppose that the whole of a player's side was called his πόλις, the words of Plato δύο μὲν—πολεμία ἀλλήλαις, ἡ μὲν πενήτων, ἡ δὲ πλουσίων· τοῦτων δ' ἐν ἐκατέρα πάνυ πόλλαι receive additional point by becoming an exact counterpart of the game. A defeated player, gazing ruefully at his depopulated squares, each of which, as well as the whole of his side, is a 'city,' might therefore well exclaim, 'Cities upon cities, but no city!' for there can be no city without men (ἐρήμος ἄνδρῶν μὴ ξενοκούωτων ἐσώ Soph. O. T. 57). I have thought of other possibilities, but this hypothesis as to the origin of the proverb suits the words of Plato better than any other which I can devise. For a different view see Hoffmann in Fl. Jahrb. 1863 pp. 240 ff. Cf. also Meineke Fr. Comm. Gr. II pp. 44 ff. It should be mentioned that Stewart (Cl. Rev. vii p. 359) thinks there need be no allusion to the game of πόλεις in this passage, but only a jest about making one into many (cf. Men. 77 A πάντα πολλὰ ποιῶν ἐκ τοῦ ἐνός, ὅπερ φασὶ τοὺς συντηροῦντας τι ἐκάστοτε οἱ σκῶττωτες), while Schneider finds only a "lusus in verbis atque in consociatione singularis et pluralis." Neither of these suggestions meets the situation.

32. δύο—καὶ ὅτιον ἡ: ‘two, in any case,’ lit. ‘if there be even anything at all,’ i.e. ‘whatever there be.’ So also Schneider. The subject to ὅτιον ἡ is impersonal, and not the city, as Jowett seems to suppose.

πολεμία. On this—comparatively rare—termination of the dual feminine in Plato see Koeppe de dual. usw Pl. pp. 3 ff. Cf. ix 587 b n.

423 α ἐνδοκμεῖν. Stallbaum and others read ὄκεῖν with one inferior ms. But ἐνδοκμεῖν is at least equally good: ‘great, I do not say in fame, but great in the true sense of the word “great.”’ ἄνδρον ὅστις ἀλλήλους ἐστίν is a city’s truest greatness, not aggression, and ‘the applauding thunder at its heels, Which men call Fame.”

7. χιλιών. Aristotle takes this seriously as fixing the number of Plato¹s ἐπίκοιοι (Pol. B 6. 1265a 9), but it is only the minimum: see 423 b n. We hear of constitutions of a thousand very frequently throughout Greek political history, especially in the Greek colonies of Italy; and Plato may have had some of these precedents in his mind, both here and in Pol. 293 e 18ν χιλιάρεσ πόλεις. See Whibley Gk. Oligarchies pp. 134 ff. By Aristotle’s time the ruling Spartans, it is interesting to notice, numbered under 1000 (Pol. B 6. 1270b 29–31). See Grote Pol. 111 p. 206 n.

423 b 9 καὶ πολλαπλασίας is the predicate to ὄκεῖν, and καὶ means ‘even.’ So J. and C. rightly.
Our city must not be increased beyond the limits essential to its unity. It will be the duty of the Guardians to see to this, as well as to assign the children to their proper classes in the State. These and similar duties will be easy, if our educational curriculum is steadfastly upheld; and it will readily appear that the principle of community should also be applied to marriage and procreation. Our citizens will thus improve as one generation succeeds another. We must forbid all innovations in music and gymnastic because they are productive of political change.

The extent to which the city may safely increase beyond 1000 προσπαλαιών (and the necessary farmers etc.) is therefore left to the judgment of the guardians. Like every natural organism, it should grow to the limits prescribed for it by nature (cf. \textit{424 A. n.}); but Plato probably conceived of it even in its maturity as relatively small. The regulations about marriage and the interchange between the different classes would be easier to work if the State was not too large. See also on χιλιῶν in \textit{423 A}, and on the general subject New-
The text is a page from a manuscript in Greek, discussing various philosophical and educational topics. The page contains several paragraphs, each discussing different aspects of education and thought. The paragraphs are numbered, with references to earlier works and discussions. The text is dense and likely requires a background in ancient philosophy to understand fully.
κύκλος a specific kind of circle; but nothing in the context warrants this. It is also very doubtful if αὐξανομένη can = "with accumulating force": certainly κύκλος αὐξάνεται could not bear this meaning; and to exclude αὐξανομένη from the comparison (as J. and C. also suggest) renders ὃσπερ κύκλος practically otiose. The fact is that the growth of a natural (κατὰ φύσιν) city is just like the drawing of a circle in Plato's way of thinking. Like a circle it grows and expands, like a circle too, when its zenith is passed, it narrows to the inevitable end. Here it is only the growth which is dwelt upon; but ὃσπερ κύκλος seems to warn us of impending decay and foreshadow Books VIII—IX. For more on this point see my Number of Plato pp. 58—62. αὐξανομένη is "growing" in the widest sense i.e. reaching its full maturity of size and strength and beauty; but in what follows Plato characteristically confines himself to what he conceived to be a city's truest growth, the improvement of the citizens.

τροφή γὰρ κτλ. Plato seems therefore to hold that acquired characters can be transmitted to posterity. The general sentiment may be illustrated by the quaint catches sung by choirs of old men, men in their prime, and boys at Sparta:


424 b 9 τούτον is not intended to anticipate the ὅπος clause, but means—like αὐτό below—our system of education. This is clear from διαφορά, which is the antithesis to σφυμομένη above, and like it, is said of the παιδεία. τὸ μὴ νεωτερίζειν is in loose apposition to αὐτό. 13 τὴν—ἀμφιπέληται. Od. 1 351 ff. τὴν γὰρ ἀοιδὴν μάλλον ἐπικλείοντο ἄνθρωποι κτλ. Plato's variant probably points to a different recension; for ἐπικρονιούν (sic) ἐπικοῦσαι in Hesychius seems to refer to the same passage (Schneider).


424 c 16 πολλάκις. 422 c ν. 17 τρόπον φῶς νέον. Pind. Ol. 3. 4 Μοίσα δ’ οὖν μα παρεστάκα νεόσιγαλον εὐφάντητο τρόπον. Pindar would inure Plato's censure for these words.

18 ὑπολαβάνειν: i.e. understand such to be the poet's meaning.
20 μουσικῆς τρόποι. In later musical theory τρόποι was technically used to denote the three varieties of musical composition—νομικός, δυθυραμβικός, τραγικός. They were called τρόποι (according to Aristid. Quint. p. 30 Meib.) because they expressed different psychological characters (διὰ τὸ συνεφαλαίνει παρὰ τὸ ἴδος κατὰ τὰ μέλη τῆς διανοίας), because, in short, they were μικρήματα τρόπων. Plato’s μουσικῆς τρόποι need not however be confined to Aristides’ three varieties. On the connexion between musical and political changes see Laws 700 A—701 D. The connexion was recognised universally throughout Greece, and particularly at Sparta, where—as Pausanias (III 12. 10) tells us—Timoteus had his lyre confiscated for adding to it four new strings: cf. also Cic. de Leg. II 39. Wherever in the ancient Greek πόλις the conception of the individual is hardly separated from that of the citizen, moral and political changes are believed to go hand in hand; and the effect of music on morality is explained in III 300 D—401 A: cf. Laws 673 A τὰ μὲν τοῖνυ τῆς φωνῆς μέχρι τῆς ψυχῆς πρός ἀρετῆς παιδείαν αὐτὸν ὡς ὑπὸ τρόπων ὄνομάζομεν μουσικῆς. Bosanquet raises the question whether musical innovations are the cause or only the symptoms of political. Plato, I think, regarded them primarily as the cause (Laws II. cc.). We can better understand their effect if we remember that they were accompanied by changes not only in rhythm, but also in the quality, ethical and otherwise, of the words sung; and if we also bear in mind the enormous influence of the theatre in Greek life. The latter point is emphasized in this connexion by Plato (II. cc.) and Aristoxenus (ap. Ath. xiv 31). See on the whole subject Newman’s Politics of Aristotle 1 pp. 359—369 and Nettleship Hellenica pp. 123—130.

21 τοίνυν = ‘also’: see I 339 D n.

424 D—427 A Our Guardians must above all things guard against changes in musical education. Musical innovations even if sanctioned only in play soon make themselves felt in every quarter of the State. The spirit of law and virtue must be infused into children even through their pastimes. For this reason, we should not neglect details of dress and manners, although they call for no special enactments, but will readily conform to the spirit of our rules about education. Many other individual points may safely be left to our Guardians, if only God vouchsafes to them the preservation of our laws; otherwise it is in vain for them to pass law upon law, acting like those who hope to cure their diseases by continually changing their medicines. As nothing but a complete change in their habits will benefit such men, so only a revolution will cure a state which is similarly situated. Such cities honour and make proud the men who minister to their desires; but the true statesman does not care to cut the Hydra. In a bad city, petty legislation is useless; in a good, superfluous.

424 D ff. This section has a certain historical interest from its scarcely-veiled impecachment of Athenian politics and manners; see on 425 A, 425 C, 426 C.

23 φυλακτήριον—μουσικὴ. μουσικῆς is at once the vital and the most vulnerable —see next note—part of our State; hence the guard-house must be built in Music. ἐν is quasi-local, as ενταυθά πού shews; we shall confuse the metaphor if we suppose (as some have done) that Music is itself the guard-house.

24 ἡ γοῦν—αὕτη. αὕτη is ἡ ἐν μουσικῇ. Madvig’s suggestion ταύτη should not be accepted; it would make παραόμοια ‘lawlessness’ in general, whereas Socrates’ reply and Adimantus’ next remark shew that only ἡ ἀμοιβας παραόμοια (Laws 700 D) is meant. παραόμοια is aptly used of heterodoxy in music, thanks to the musical sense of νόμος. Cf. infra 424 v. and Shorey in Chicago Studies in Cl. Phil. 1 p. 222 n. 4. The position of αὕτη increases its emphasis.
Plato is animadverting on the common view that music should be cultivated πρὸς παϊδίαν rather than πρὸς παίδειαν. Aristotle allows a threefold use of music—for pastime (παίδια), education, and the rational employment of leisure: *Pol. Θ* 5. 1339a 16 and b 14 ff.

27 ὑπορρέει κτλ.: as a gentle river may become a destructive torrent before its course is ended. The sentence eloquently describes the decay of Athenian music, character, and politics from the simplicity of earlier times, as appears from *Laws* 700a—701d. See also on ὁ πρῶτον 425a. For παλαιάς Hartman would read the singular; but the plural is more forcible. Laws and constitutions are overthrown by the devouring flood. σὺν in Plato (as in good Attic generally) is rare; one of its recognised uses is in modal phrases of this kind, especially where (as here and in *V* 492b, *VIII* 564c, *X* 619b) the style seeks elevation; cf. Lina De praep. usu. Plat. pp. 32—34 and Mommsen Beiträge z. d. Lehre v. u. d. Gr. Praep. pp. 376 ff.

424 ε 32 δ—ὁλέγωμεν: 'as we were trying to say at the outset,' i.e. of this discussion 424a. No specific reference to an earlier part of the dialogue is intended: at all events 11 377b is not in point. According to Plato παιδία should—(to borrow a saying of Aristotle's)—παίδειαν πρὸς τὴν πολιτείαν—educate children in the spirit of their commonwealth: *Laws* 798b ff. Conversely, Aristotle reminds us, education is itself the older boys' rattle (*Pol. Θ* 6. 1340b 30). It should be noted that παιδίας (cf. παίδειαν in 425a) refers like παιδία in b above to music; if music is to be a pastime, it must be one which is ἐννομος. In ἐννομοτέρου and παρανόμοι there may also be a play on the musical sense of νόμοι: cf. *424 d ν.*

34 τοιούτων: viz. παρανόμων.

425 a 4. 'Καίνοι: those whom Adimantus in effect described in 424d. See also next note.

6 ὁ πρῶτον: 'their predecessors' (Jowett), i.e. the predecessors of our citizens. The expression betrays the fact that Plato is now censuring the decay of Athenian manners, as of Athenian music and character in 424d. In ἐξευθέσκοιν —πάντα Plato speaks as if his regulations were a programme for the reform of his native city. Cf. Krohn *Pl. St.* pp. 32, 33.
425 A, B 7 σηγάς τε—τοιαύτα. Cf. Ar. Clouds 961—1023. Aristophanes mentions the σηγαί των νεωτέρων (963), the ὑπαναστάσεις (993), the γονέων θεραπείας (994, 998), and various details of τοῦ σώματος σχηματισμὸν καὶ τάλα ὁσα τοιαύτα. ὡς οὖν οἶξε; "Ἐγώγε. Νομοθετεῖν δ’ αὐτὰ οἴμαι εὐθές: οὔτε γὰρ ποὺ γίγνεται οὔτ’ ἂν μείνειν λόγῳ τε καὶ γράμμασιν νομοθετήσετα. Πῶς γὰρ; Καὶδυναύει γοῦν, ὡς δ’ ἐγώ, ὁ Ἀδεψάνται, ἐκ τῆς παιδείας ὅποι ἦν τὶς ὀρμήσῃ, τοιαύτα 1 καὶ C 15 τὰ ἐπόμενα εἶναι. ὡς οὖν αὐτ’ ἐδ’ ὁμοίον ὁ ὅμων παρακαλεῖ; Τι μήν; Καὶ τελευτῶν δή, οἴμαι, βαίνειν ἄν εἰς ἐν τι τέλεον καὶ νεανικὸν ἀποβαίνειν αὐτὸ ἢ ἀγαθὸν ἢ καὶ τοιούτιον. Τι γὰρ οὖκ; ὡς ὁ δ’ ὁ σ.; Ἔγῳ μὲν τοίνυν, ἐποιον, διὰ ταῦτα οὖκ ἄν ἔτι τα τοιαύτα ἐπιχειρήσαμι νομοθετεῖν. Εἰκότως γ’, ἐφη. Τί δε; ὁ πρὸς θεὼν,
emphasis on ω πρὸς θεοῖν: cf. I 332 c ω πρὸς Δίος, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, εἰ οὖν κτλ. Herwerden puts the pause after τάδε, where it is less suitable; others wrongly omit the word. τάδε (see cr. n.) cannot well be dispensed with: it means ‘these familiar’: cf. III 403 ε and for the omission in A Introd. § 5. Herwerden also cuts out ἀγοραία on account of κατ᾽ ἀγοράν, but the reduplication is quite in Plato’s way. The postponement of ἂ throws emphasis on κατ᾽ ἀγοράν, and thereby helps to contrast ἀγοραία ἐξυμβολαία with χειροτεχνικα etc.: cf. III 390 δ. It is natural to see in this sentence a reference to the judicial and mercantile arrangements of Athens and her empire: see 424 D ν.

425 D 21 χειροτεχνικῶν κτλ. χειρο-

22 τικῶν ληξεως means simply ‘the bringing of lawsuits’; originally ‘obtaining (by lot) one’s rights,’ hence ‘obtaining leave to claim one’s rights’ (Meier and Schömann Att. Process pp. 790–794). The reading ληξεως (see cr. n.) cannot be defended.

23 θέσεις: not ‘the imposition of taxes’ (L. and S.), but ‘the payments,’ as πράξεις is ‘the exactions.’

24 τὸ παράπαν means ‘in general,’ ‘generally.’ τὸ πάμπαν (see cr. n.) is never (I believe) so used, not even in Tim. 64 E cited by Baiter. Regulations on nearly all the points here specified are laid down in the Laws: on ἐξυμβολαία 913 A ff., 920 D ff., on λαιδορία 934 E ff., on αἰκεία (unprovoked assault) 879 B ff., on δικών ληξεως 949 C, on δικαστῶν κατά-

27 καλοῖς κάγαθοις. Cf. VI 489 ε ν. ὅσα δὲ νομοθετήσασθαι shews that Plato does not wish to leave all these matters undefined by legislation; but the legislation is to come from the guardians he has educated. One reason is that laws on matters of this kind can never be final: cf. Laws 760 D. If the guardians are true to the spirit of Plato’s commonwealth, they will easily frame such minor regulations, and re-adjust them—should it prove necessary—from time to time. The effort to obtain finality (οὕτως ἐπιλήψεσθαι τοῦ βελτίστου) in such matters is foredoomed to failure (cf. 426 E), and no one makes it, until he has forgotten the real foundation of a nation’s greatness, and lost his sense of the proportion of things. This is Plato’s meaning.
Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Καὶ μὴν | οὕτω γε χαριέντως διατελοῦσιν. 426
ιατρευόμενοι ἃρ ποῦδεν περαινουσιν, πλὴν γε ποικιλώτερα καὶ
μείζω ποιοῦσι τὰ νοσήματα, καὶ ἀεὶ ἐλπίζοντες, ἕαν τις φάρμακον
συμβουλεύσῃ, ὕπο τούτου ἔσεσθαι ύγιεῖς. Πάνω γὰρ, ἐφι, τῶν
5 οὕτω καμάντων τὰ τοιαῦτα πάθη. Τί δὲ; ἢν δ᾽ ἐγὼ· τόδε αὐτῶν
οὐ χαρίετε, τὸ πάντων ἐχθιστὸν ἡγεῖσθαι τὸν τάληθη λέγοντα, ὅτι,
πρὶν ἄν μεθύων καὶ ἐμπιμπλάμενοι καὶ ἀφροδισιώτης καὶ ἀγρόν
παυσηται, | οὕτω φάρμακα οὕτε καῦσεις οὕτε τομαι οὐδὲ αὖ ἐπαθήναι B
αὐτῶν οὕδε περιάσσα τοῦδε ἄλλῳ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲν ὑνίηςει; | Ὁ
10 πάνω χαρίεν, ἐφι· τὸ γὰρ τῷ εὖ λέγοντι χαλεπαίνειν οὐκ ἔχει
χάριν. Οὐκ ἐπαινέτης εἰ, ἐφιν ἐγὼ, ὡς ἔοικας, τῶν τοιούτων
αὐτῶν. Οὐ μέντοι μὰ Διὰ.

V. Οὖν ἢν ἡ πόλις ἁρὰ, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἐλέγομεν, ὅλη τοιούτων
ποιή, οὐκ ἐπαινέσει. ἢ οὐ φαίνονται σοι ταύτων ἑργαζέσθαι
15 τοῦτοι τῶν πόλεων οὐκ αἰκῶς πολιτευόμεναι | προαγορεύοντοι C
τοῖς πολίταις τὴν μὲν κατάστασιν τῆς πόλεως ὅλην μὴ κινεῖν,
ὅς ἀποθανομένους, ὅς ἄν τοῦτο δρά· ὅς δὲ ἄν σφας οὕτω

4. ύγιεῖς Σῃ: ύγιῆς Λ.Π. 9. αὐτῶν Α.Π.: αὐτῶν Α.².

426 A 2 πλὴν γε κτλ. | If the text
is sound we must take πλὴν γε as πλὴν
γε ὅτι (which H. Wolf was wishful to
restore) and καὶ before δεὶ ἐλπίζοντες
as = idgμε (with Stallbaum), unless we
supply διάγωσι or the like by a sort of
zeugma after ἐλπίζοντες. As regards καὶ
dεὶ ἐλπίζοντες, J. and C. hold that
the participle is resumed from ἱατρευόμενοι;
but the effect of this interpretation is very
harsh, because ἱατρευόμενοι goes so closely
with οὐδὲν περαινοῦν as almost to form
a single expression. It is not ‘they make
no advance, submitting to a cure and
always hoping,’ but ‘they make no ad-
vance under treatment.’ The troublesome
καὶ before δεὶ ἐλπίζοντες is omitted by some
inferior MSS, is dotted in σ, and apparently
erased in Z. I once conjectured ποιοῦσι,
comparing Crit. 109 B πλὴν οὖ—βιαζο-
μένον, but it is perhaps safer to acquiesce
in the ms reading. Dümmler (Chron.
Beitr. pp. 9—11) believes that Isocrates
Avid. 63 expressly alludes to this passage.
Isocrates at all events censures τοὺς εἰπ.
πλήντοτας τοῖς νῦν ἀμαρτανομένοις in
words that might easily refer to Plato.
See also on 426 C.

5 αὐτῶν—μεθύων. | On the plural
passing into the singular see 1.347 A ἡ.
Athens is plainly in Plato’s mind. The Athenians
carefully guarded their constitution by means
of the γραφή παραβώμων and the
ἐλαστήλα (see Gilbert’s Gk. Const. Ant.
E.T. pp. 299, 304 ff.); but nowhere were
ὑψηλόματα so common, and in these the
demagogue found a wide field for exercis-
ing the arts of flattery and insinuation. Cf.
Gilbert Beiträge zur innern Gesch. Athens
pp. 73—93. With ἀποθανομένους δος ἐσ.
III 441 C n., VIII 566 D (πάντας ὃς ἄν
περιστράχαν). 17 ὅς δὲ ἄν σφας κτλ. Dümmler
(l.c.) takes this to be Isocrates, who is
also—so he thinks—satirised in the similar
passage VI 493 A ff., and elsewhere. If
so, σφάδος τὰ μεγάλα, οἰκεῖα τῇ ἀληθείᾳ
πολιτικοὶ εἶναι, καὶ ἢ οἰκ—περὶ αὐτῶν
(ὁ, κ) are sufficiently true and scathing.
We must however observe that Plato is
describing a type, and the type is that
of the demagogue rather than the merely
academic and sophistical rhetorician, as
appears from δεινὸς ἃ ἀποτλησίων and
ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑΣ Δ

πολιτευομένους ἥδιστα θεραπεύῃ καὶ χαρίζῃ ταῖς σφετέρας βουλήσεις καὶ ταύτας δεινός ἑ ἀποπληροῦν, οὕτως ἄρα ἄγαθός τε ἔσται ἄνηρ καὶ σοφὸς τὰ μεγάλα 20 καὶ τιμῆσται ὑπὸ σφῶν; Ταύτων μὲν οὖν, ἐφε, ἐμοιγε δοκοῦσι δρᾶν, καὶ οὐδὲ ὀπωσδονοῦ ἐπαινῶ. Τί δὲ αὖ; τοὺς ἐθέλοντας θεραπεύειν τὰς τοιαύτας πόλεις καὶ προθυμομένους οὐκ ἄγασι τῆς ἀνδρείας τε καὶ εὐχέρειας; 'Εγὼν', ἐφι, πλὴν ἡ ὁσοὶ ἐξή-πάντησαν ὑπ’ αὐτῶν καὶ οἶνοι τῇ ἄλθει τοῖς πολιτικοῖς εἶναι, ὅτι 25 ἐπαινόντων ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν. Πῶς λέγεις; οὐ δὲ ἐν εὐγεγενῶσεις, ἢν δὲ ἐγὼ, τοὺς ἀνδρᾶς; ἢ οἶει οἶον τ’ εἶναι ἀνδρὶ μὴ ἐπισταμένῳ μετρεῖν, ἐτέρων τοιοῦτων πολλῶν λεγόντων ὅτι τετράπηκσις εἶστιν,

Ε αὐτῶν ταῦτα μὴ ἢ ἑγεῖσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν; Οὐκ ἂν, ἐφι, τοῦτο γε. Μὴ τοιῶν χαλέπαινε· καὶ γὰρ ποῦ εἰςί πάντων χαριστατοί οἱ 30 τοιοῦτοι, νομοθετοῦντες τε οὐλ ἀρτὶ διήλθομεν καὶ ἐπανορθοῦντε, ἢ οἶομένοι τι πέρας εὑρίσκειν περὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς ἐξιμβολαίοις κακομετρήματα καὶ περὶ ἀ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ ἐλεγον, ἄγριοντες ὅτι τὸ ὅμως 427 ὅστερ’ Τὸδραν τέμνουσιν. Καὶ μὴ, ἐφι, οὐκ ἄλλο τί γε ποιοῦσιν. 'Εγὼ μὲν τοιῶν, ἢν δὲ ἐγὼ, τὸ τοιοῦτον εἰδος νόμων πέρι καὶ πολιτείαις οὔτ’ ἐν κακῶς οὔτ’ ἐν εὖ πολιτευομένῃ πόλει ὡμιν ἃν

426 E. These two types are cast in similar moulds; and Dümmler may be right in supposing that Plato thought of Isocrates as he wrote this satire, and pointed his shafts accordingly. If so, they hit the mark, and rankled, as it was natural they should. Isocrates apparently attempts a reply in his *Antidosis* (Dümmler l.c. p. 9).

20 οὕτως ἄρα—ἐσται. To insert ὡς after οὕτως (as Richards proposes) would spoil the effect, and be grammatically awkward. Plato wishes to suggest the language of a proclamation 'he shall be a good man and true,' etc. ἄρα is enough (as Hartman notes) to mark the indirect: cf. ΙΙ 358 c u.

426 D 24 ἀνδρείας—εὐχέρεια: 'courage and complaisance.' εὐχέρεια is not 'dexterity (L. and S., with the English translators), a meaning which the word never bears in Plato; but 'facilitas,' 'humanitas,' kind, obliging behaviour, 'Herzhaftigkeit und Gutmütigkeit,' Schneider, rightly.

28 τετράπηκσις: 'a six-footer,' Dümmler (l.c.) questions this word, without saying why. It is more appropriate than a word expressing greater height; especially if any personal allusion is intended. Isocrates was not an intellectual giant, nor would even his applauding contemporaries (I think) have called him so.

426 E 29 οὐκ αὖ—τοῦτο γε; sc. οὖκα. The point of αὖ is that Adi- mantus returned an affirmative answer last time (426 D). οὐκ ἂν, which is generally read, has not sufficient authority, and is difficult to justify. For οὐκ αὖ cf. ΙΙΙ 393 D and infra 442 Α.

30 τῶν χαριστατοί. To this perhaps Isocrates replies in *Antid. 62* χαριστῶν μὲν εἰρθαί ταῦτα φήσωσι, τὸ γὰρ εὐ φθονίσουσι εἰπεὶ (Dümmler l.c.).

31 νομοθετοῦντες κτλ. It improves the rhetorical effect to treat all the particulars as coordinate, instead of making the first two dependent on the third, or the third subordinate to them. For this reason I have placed a comma after ἐπανορθοῦντες.

427 Α 3 οὔτ’—ὡμιν ἃν: 'I should not have thought so' were it not for these
great authorities. Jowett misses the irony by neglecting the tense ("I conceive that the true legislator will not trouble himself," etc.). τῶν ἀληθῶν νομοθέτων and κάν ὀστίσων εὕρω would strike Home, if Isocrates is meant.

5 ἀνωφελή — ἐπιτηδευμάτων. For ἀνωφελή Σ has ἀνωφελές, an obvious 'correction.' The plural, as Schneider observes, is supported by τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν (where αὐτῶν is also neutral). ὅτι after τά δέ has been called in question by Stallbaum and Hartman. Taken strictly, it must depend on a verbal notion supplied out of πραγματεύεσθαι (Stallbaum) or κάν ὀστίσων εὕρω; but in a half-adverbial phrase like τά δέ, we should not pry too closely into the grammatical construction. The effect is exactly like the English 'because some of them, etc., in other cases, because,' etc.

427 b, c In all that appertains to temples and religious worship, as well as services paid to the dead, Apollo, the guide of our fathers, and indeed of all mankind, shall direct us.

427 b τί οὖν κτλ. With this section of the Republic we should compare V 461 E, 469 A, VII 540 C, and Laws 738 B ff. Plato would fain be no iconoclast: his object is to purify, rather than to abolish, the old religion. He tries, in short, to put new wine into old bottles. In particular, when he makes Apollo preside at the foundation of his city (οἰκίσωντες τε πόλιν οὐδεὶς ἄλλῳ πεισόμεθα), he is acting in accordance with the universal custom of the Greeks, who consulted the oracle at Delphi before planting colonies, and revered him as the universal ἄρχοντας and ὀικιστής (Preller Gr. Myth. p. 269).

It is equally in harmony with Hellenic, and especially Athenian, usage to refer all matters of public worship to Apollo: see on 427 c. Delphi was the abiding centre of Greek religious and political unity; and it is therefore right that a Greek city (V 470 ε), one of whose objects is to promote unity and comity among Greeks (ib. 469 B ff.), should attach itself to Apollo.

9 τῷ μέντοι Ἀπόλλωνι κτλ. Cf. Meg. I 3. 1 (of Socrates) φανερῶς ἦν καὶ ποιῶν καὶ λέγων, ἀπὸ τὴν Πυθίαν ἀποκρύπτεται τοῖς ἐρωτηματικοῖς δει τοιούτως τὸς ἄνθρωπον καὶ περὶ προβολῶν θεοποιήσεις ἦ γὰρ ἄλλῳ τυμβῶν τῶν τοιούτων. The answer of the priestess was 'Serve the gods nobly in the temple.' (l.c. and IV 3. 16.) The spirit in which we worship matters, rather than whom or how we worship. So large and tolerant a sentiment is worthy of the Delphic priesthood and of Plato.

12 τελευτησάντων τε. See cr. n. Asyndeton is indefensible here. We must either with all the editors (except J. and C.) read τε, or add καὶ after θεοποιήσα.
427 D—429 A Our city is now founded. Where then is Justice, where Injustice? How do they differ, and which is essential to happiness? Let us approach the question thus. Our city is perfectly virtuous, and must therefore be wise, brave, temperate and just. If we discover three of these elements in the city, the residue will be the fourth.

Let us take Wisdom first. It is not the technical knowledge or skill of the lower classes which renders our city wise, but rather the knowledge which deliberates for the whole city’s interests. Now this knowledge is embodied in the Rulers. They form the smallest section of the State, but it is none the less in virtue of their presence that we call the whole city wise.

427 D ff. The process of purgation has now been ended, and Plato’s διευθέτησις is complete (see II 372 ff.). We are therefore ready to look for the second view of Justice. See on II 372 A.
should be observed, that this part of the Republic has an independent value in the history of Ethics as the first explicit assertion of the doctrine of four cardinal virtues, (427 E n.) For an account of Plato's teaching on the Virtues we may refer to Michaelis die Entwicklungstage in Plato's Tugendlehre, and especially to Hammond On the Notion of Virtue in the Dialogues of Plato Boston 1892.

427 D 22 αὐτός τε καὶ—παρακάλει. For the idiom cf. (with Schneider) Phaedr. 253 B μεμύησανιν αὐτό τε καὶ τὰ παιδικά πείδουντε. 24 ποῦ ἡ δίκαια. If our city is τελείως ἀγαθή (427 E), it is useless to look for δίκαια in it. On this difficulty see II 369 A n.


33 σοφῆ—δικαια. This is apparently the earliest passage in Greek literature where the doctrine of four cardinal virtues (if by cardinal virtues we mean those which make up the sum of perfect goodness) is expressly enunciated. The doctrine may of course be Pythagorean, but evidence is wanting, and it is doubtful whether Pindar's τέσσαρες ἄρεται Nem. III 7.4 are to be interpreted as the cardinal virtues: see Bury ad loc. The nearest approach to the doctrine before Plato is in Xen. Mem. III 9. 1—5 (as Krohn has pointed out Pl. St. p. 373), with which compare IV 6. 1—12, where Justice, Wisdom, and Courage are named, as well as other virtues, including ὀσωτρία. Cf. also Aesch. Sept. 610 ὁφρόνω δίκαια ἀγαθός ὀσωτρική ἄνήρ. From other passages in Plato, none of which is so precise and technical as this, it would seem that ὀσωτρία made a good fight for a fifth place: Prot. 339 C, Lach. 199 D, Men. 75 D, Gorg. 507 B. In Phaed. 69 C and Laws 631 C σωφροσύνη, δικαιοσύνη, ἀνδρεία and φρόνησις (not σοφία) are named together, without ὀσωτρία, which in the Lysis (12 D ff.) is a subdivision of δικαιοσύνη. From Adimantus' ready assent (cf. V 476 A n.), we may reasonably infer that the doctrine of four cardinal virtues was already a familiar tenet of the Platonic school.

Schleiermacher thinks it may have been taken over "aus dem allgemeinen Gebrauch" (Einleitung p. 26). There is however no evidence to shew that these four virtues and no others were regarded as the essential elements of a perfect character before Plato. If the theory was originated by Plato himself, it is possible enough that in restricting the number to four, Plato was not uninfluenced by the sacred character of the number four in Pythagoreanism, just as Aristotle has been supposed to have limited his categories to ten on similar grounds. An interesting conjecture is
suggested by the remarks of Schleiermacher (I.e. p. 21). Our city is ex hypothesi perfectly virtuous. Its constituent elements are Rulers, Auxiliaries, Farmers and Artisans. Now the virtues which are exhibited in the lives and mutual relationship of these classes are, as Plato holds, Wisdom, Courage, Temperance, and Justice. Consequently these virtues are the component factors of moral perfection; in other words they are the cardinal virtues. We may admit that there is no petitio principii in such a method of investigation, which is, in fact, akin to the perfectly legitimate method described in Men. 86 E. cf. also V 458 A. If this suggestion is correct, the doctrine of four cardinal virtues will be directly descended from the arrangements of Plato’s ideal city. But it is clear from what Plato himself says, both here and in 429 A, 430 D, 432 B, 433 E ff., that the doctrine is already an accepted part of his ethical system, and not merely a provisional hypothesis which is intended to be confirmed by what follows. For the relative value and importance of the four cardinal virtues in Plato’s way of thinking see Laws 630 D ff.

οὐκοῦν—ηὔρημένον. Essentially the same method is used by Aristotle to reach his conclusion that virtue is a ἔξω (Eth. Nic. II 4). Cf. also (with J. and C.) ὕπ. 216 D, E. Jowett observes that the true function of “this half-logico, half-mathematical method of residues” is in dealing with “abstract quantity” and “the laws of Nature.” It is undeniable that this method is much more likely to lead us astray in ethics than in mathematics or the natural sciences, owing to the nature of the subject; but it is valid if our analysis of the phenomena is exhaustive and exact. A similar method was frequently employed in the Platonic school: see II 350 D E. Plato not unfrequently extends the methods of mathematical reasoning beyond what we should consider their proper sphere: the whole of the preliminary studies, for example, in Book VII are to be pursued according to the methods of pure mathematics. See on VII 528 E ff. and the Appendix to Book VII “On the propaedeutic studies of the Republic.”

428 A 1 ὤσπερ τοῖς ἄντων—ἄντων. For the logically superfluous (though welcome) αὐτῶν cf. II 375 E, infra 439 B, VIII 528 A, and Heindorf on Gorg. 482 D. Th. 155 E is a much harsher example, and has often been emended. The apodosis to the ὤσπερ clause is contained in οὐκοῦν—ἠὔρημένον.

4. οὐκ ἄλλο ἔτι ἢν. On ἔτι (i.e. “after the other three were found” J. and C.) see III 412 B n.

7. αὐτῷ. A corrector in q wrote αὐτῷ, which Schleiermacher preferred. Hartman suggests αὐτῷς. αὐτῷ is, however, not the city, but simply ‘the matter,’ ‘the subject under discussion’; an idiosyncratic usage for which cf. I 339 E n. For the neuter κατάδηλος cf. 427 D n. Hartman’s κατάδηλος is unnecessary.

428 B 8 σοφία as here described means φρόνησις—so it is called in 433 B, c—in its application to politics, not metaphysical knowledge of the Idea of Good. It deliberates for the good of the whole city (428 D), but the good is not yet elevated to the rank of an Idea. This point has been rightly emphasized by Krohn (Pl. St. pp. 40, 362), who points out the essentially Socratic character of this virtue, comparing Xen. Mem. I 2. 64 and IV 1. 2 (a sentiment of which Books II—IV of the Republic are an amplification and exposition in detail).
μὲν τῷ ὑπαιθεὶν οὖ ἐστὶν ἡ πόλις εἶναι ἢν ἔνθισθομεν· εὔβουλος γὰρ.
οὐ γὰρ τοῦτο ἡ εὐβουλία, δῆλον ὅτι ἐπιστήμη τις ἐστὶν· οὐ γὰρ ποὺ ἀμαθία γε ἀλλὰ ἐπιστήμη εὑρισκόμεθαι. Δῆλον. Πολλαὶ δὲ γε καὶ παντὸς πολιτικὸς ἐπιστήμη εἶναι ἡ πόλις εἰσίν. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; Ἄρ' οὖν διὰ τήν τῶν τεκτονῶν ἐπιστήμην σοφήν καὶ εὔβουλος ἡ πόλις προσφέρεται; Οὐδαμῶς, ὡς νῦν, ἵνα ἐν τῇ πόλει εἰσίν.

31 ἰδ. δὲ γε ταύτῃ, ἀλλὰ τεκτονική. Ὁ γὰρ διὰ τήν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἔνθισθων σκευῶν ἐπιστήμην βουλευόμεθα ὡς ἂν ἔχοι βέλτιστα, σοφὴ κλητέα πόλις. Οὐ μέντοι. Τί δὲ; τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ χαλκοῦ ἡ τῶν τοιούτων; Ὁ γὰρ ἔτυχος, ἐφι. Οὔδε τὴν ὑπὲρ τοῦ καρποῦ τῆς γενέσεως ἐκ τῆς γῆς, ἀλλὰ γεωργική.

32 Δοκεῖ μοι. Τί δ; ἣν δ' ἐγὼ ἔστι τις ἐπιστήμη εὑρίσκειν τῆς ἀρτι ὑπὸ ἡμῶν ὁμοιοθείαν παρὰ τις τῶν πολιτικῶν, ὅ οὐχ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει τινὸς βουλεύομαι, ἀλλὰ ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς ὄλης, ὡστιν ἂν τρόπον αὐτὴ τῆς πρὸς αὐτὴν καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας πόλεις ἀριστα ἔμιλοι; ἡ ἐστὶ μέντοι. Τίς, ἐφιν ἐγώ, καὶ ἐν τίς; Ἀρτί, ἢ δ' ὡς, ἢ 25 φύλακείναι καὶ ἐν τούτοις τῶν ἀρχοῦσιν, οὐς νῦν δὴ τελεός φύλακας.


See also Prot. 352 B and Laws III 689 B. Commentators before Krohn (Steinhart for example Einleit. p. 185, and Susemihl Gen. Enit. II p. 153) did not sufficiently grasp the almost exclusively political character of σοφία here, although it is expressly dwelt upon by Plato throughout, and particularly in 429 Α. I say almost, because here, as elsewhere, Plato, as his manner is, contrives to drop some hints preparing us for a still higher conception of the virtue of the guardians. See on 429 C and 442 C.

According: because it is its smallest section which makes the whole city wise (428 E).

429 εὖβουλος. εὐβουλία was primarily a political virtue: see on I 348 D.

428 c 16 βουλευόμενη. Heindorf's emendation (see cr. n.), which is accepted by Ast, Stallbaum, Baiter and Hartman, appears to me certain for these reasons. First, in τὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ χαλκοῦ ἡ τῶν ἄλλον τῶν τοιούτων below we must understand ἐπιστήμην βουλευόμενην, so that βουλευόμενη and not βουλευομένη must have been written before. Secondly, if we read βουλευόμενη, we must write (with Hermann etc. and a few inferior mss) γάρ for γάρ before οἷς ὑπὲρ τῶν below. Schneider retains βουλευομένη, but understands βουλευομένη before ἐπιστήμην—

an indefensible construction, which Laws 807 C (to which he appeals in Addit. p. 31) in no way justifies.

17 τὴν ὑπὲρ—τοιούτων. For the carrying on of the preposition (here διά) cf. (with Schneider) Phaed. 63D ἐποίησεν περὶ τῶν ᾿Ιδίων καλομένας τὸ τοιαῦτα, οἷον αὐτῶν κτλ. "Ἡκαίτια γε κτλ. Τί διὰ τὶς τῶν ἀρρητάς;"

428 D 22 ὡστιν' ἄν—ὁμολογεῖν. ἂν cannot, I think, be dispensed with here. It is better to insert it after ὡστιν than (with Baiter) after ἀριστα, for (as Schneider shews by many examples) ἂν likes to attach itself to the relative in sentences of this kind. The political wisdom here described is akin to the βασιλική τεχνὴ of Euthyd. 291 C ff. and elsewhere, as well as to Aristotle's view of πολιτική as the architectonic art (Eth. Nic. 1 1. 1094 b 27 with Stewart's note). It knows what is good and evil, and legislates for the other arts, but the good which it knows is a political and moral conception, not (as yet) the metaphysical Idea of Book VI.

25 νῦν δη. III 414 B (φύλακας παντελεῖς).
ονομάζομεν. Διὰ ταύτην οὖν τὴν ἐπιστήμην τί τὴν πόλιν προσα-
γορεύεις; Εὐθείου λογίου, ἐφι, καὶ τῷ ὑπὶ σοφῆν. Πότερον οὖν, ἢν δ’
Ε ἐγὼ, ἐν τῇ πόλει οἷεὶ ἥμιν χαλκέας τε πλείους ἐνέσεσθαι ἢ τοὺς
ἀληθινῶν φύλακας τούτους; Πολύ, ἐφι, χαλκέας. Οὐκοῦν, ἐφι, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσοι ἐπιστήμας ἔχουσι ὄνομάζονται τινες εἶναι, 3ο
πάντων τούτων οὗτοι ἀν εἶν ὀλγιστοὶ; Πολύ γε. Τῷ σμικροτάτῳ
ἄρα ἔθει καὶ μέρει ἑαυτῆς καὶ τῇ ἐν τούτῳ ἐπιστήμῃ, τὸ προεστῶτι
καὶ ἄρχουτι, ὅλη σοφή ἄν εἰς κατὰ φύσιν οἰκισθέεσα πόλις· καὶ
429 τούτῳ, ὅσ οὐκε, φύσει ὀλυγιστον γίνεται | γένος, ὃ προσήκει
ταύτης τῆς ἐπιστήμης μεταλαγχάνειν, ἢ μόνην δεὶ τῶν ἄλλων
ἐπιστημῶν σοφίαν καλεῖσθαι. 'Αληθεστάτα, ἐφι, λέγεις. Τούτῳ
μὲν δὴ ἐν τῶν τεττάρων οὐκ οἴδα ὄντινα τρόπουν ἡμᾶς· ἀλλὰ
τε καὶ ὅπου τῆς πόλεως ὑδρυθαίτω. Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ, ἐφι, ἀπὸ-5
χρώντων ἡμᾶς·

27. οὖν Σε: om. AΠγ. 5. ἐμοὶ γοῦν ΠΙ: ἐμοὶ' οὖν Α.

26 τί τὴν πόλιν προσαγορεύεις. It should be noted that ‘wise’ (to confine
ourselves for the present to the virtue of
wisdom) is used (1) of the rulers in the
State and the λογιστικῶν in man, (2) of the
city and the individual as wholes: cf.
441 ff. Which of these two meanings
is intended to be original and primary? This
subject is admirably discussed by
Hirzel Hermes VIII pp. 379 ff., who shews
that the wisdom of the rulers and the
λογιστικῶν is the fundamental one: cf.
Arist. Ἰορ. ν 8. 1386 ἡ ἐν, where τὸ
πρῶτον φόρμουν is said to be ἐν
λογιστικῶν. The same, μιντατίς μιντανίς,
holds good of Courage; and also, though
with a difference, of Temperance and
Justice. In calling the whole city wise
because the rulers are wise, Plato is
influenced by its analogy with the indi-
vidual man, whom we readily and easily
call wise, although strictly speaking he
is wise only by reason of the λογιστικῶν
within him. Comparing 443 C ff., we
observe that the city is wise because its
rulers are wise, and its rulers are wise
because their λογιστικῶν is wise. In
other words the wisdom of the λογιστικῶν
is the unit out of which the wisdom of
the whole city is constructed. See on
443 B ff.

27 πότερον οὖν. See cr. n. We have
still to explain τί ἄγων in 428 Β, for
Adimantus' τί has not yet been answered.
For this reason οὖν after πότερον is wel-
come, if not (as Schneider thinks) indis-
perable.

428 Ε 29 πολύ—χαλκέας. C. Π
379 C n.
33 ὅλη σοφή κτλ. The subject is
πόλις κατὰ φύσιν οἰκισθείσα, 'a city
founded in accordance with Nature.' On
κατὰ φύσιν see II 370 A n.

429 Α 2 ἢ οὖν—σοφιαν κα-
λεσθαι. Pfeiferer (Zur Lösung d. Pl.
Frage pp. 46 ff.) compares Symp. 209 A ff.
πολύ δὲ μεγαλίτω—καὶ καλλιστή τῆς
δομής ἦν περὶ τὰς τῶν πόλεως τε καὶ ἀληθεῖν
διακοσμήσεις, ἢ δὴ ὅνομα ἐστὶ σφραγίσθη
τε καὶ δικαιοσύνη. The difference in
phraseology does not obscure the essential
kinship of the two passages.

429 Α—430 C The virtue of Courage
will reside in the Warrior-class. It is
owing to their bravery that we call the
city brave, for the general character of the
city as a whole cannot be determined by
any courage or cowardice present among
the others. The Soldiers will in spite
of every temptation continue true to the
principles laid down by law concerning
what should, and what should not, be
feared; and they will do so the more sird-
fastly, because their musical and gymnastic
training has already prepared them for
the legislation in question. It is in the

15—2
VII. 'Ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀνδρεία γε αὐτή τε καὶ ἐν ὃ κεῖται τῆς πόλεως, δι’ ὅ τοιαύτη κλητέα ἡ πόλις, οὐ πάνω χαλεπτὸν ἰδεῖν. Πῶς δή; Τίς ἂν, ἂν δ’ ἐγώ, ἐις ἄλλο τι ἀποβλέψας ἢ δειλὴν ἢ ἀνδρείαν πόλιν εἰποι, ἀλλ’ ἢ εἰς τούτο τὸ μέρος, ὁ προπολεμεῖ τε καὶ στρατεύεται ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς; Οὔδ’ ἂν εἰς, ἐφ’ ἂν ἄλλο τι. Οὐ γὰρ οἶμαι, εἰποι, οὐ γε ἄλλοι ἢ αὐτῆς ἢ δειλοὶ ἢ ἀνδρείαοι ὅφελες κύριοι ἢ εἰς ἢ τοιάν αὐτὴν εἶναι ἢ τοιάν. Οὐ γὰρ. Καὶ ἀνδρεία ἀρα πόλις μέρει τινὶ ἑαυτῆς ἔστι, διὰ τὸ ἐν ἑκεῖνῳ ἑχειν δύναμιν 15 τοιαύτην, ἢ διὰ παντὸς σῶσει τὴν ἑπὶ τῶν δεινῶν δόξαν, ταύτα τε αὐτὰ εἶναι καὶ τοιαύτα, ἢ τε καὶ οἶα ὁ νομοθέτης παρῆγγειλεν ἐν τῇ παιδείᾳ, ἢ οὐ τούτο ἀνδρείαν καλεῖς; Οὐ πάνω, ἐφ’ ἐμαθὼν ὁ εἶπες, ἀλλ’ αὐθίς εἶπε. Σωτηρίαν ἔγωγ’, εἰποι, λέγω τι σωτηρίαν τὴν ἀνδρείαν. Ποιαν δὴ σωτηρίαν; Τὴν τῆς δόξης τῆς ὑπὸ νόμον 20 διὰ τῆς παιδείας γεγονύσας περὶ τῶν δεινῶν, ἢ τε ἑστι καὶ ὅτα διὰ παντὸς δὲ ἐλεγον αὐτῆς σωτηρίαν τὸ ἐν τε λύπας ὅντα

[429 A]

preservation of these principles that the courage of a city consists, a kind of courage which is distinct from the corresponding virtue in lower animals and slaves, because its basis is education. Another time we may discuss the virtue of Courage more fully, but for our present purpose this suffices.

429 C. ὁ νομοθέτης—παιδεία. The δόξα is then prescribed by the legislator (i.e. in Plato’s city, by Plato, cf. ὕπο νόμου below, νομίμοι in 430 B, and o δομοθέτης in vi 497 D), not by the rulers from time to time. It is important to notice this point, because it shews that the rulers are not here, as in a certain sense they are in VI—VII, in the position of the original legislator: see vi 497 C. N. Cf. however i 414 A. N. and infra 442 C. N.

19 ποιάν δὴ σωτηρίαν; ποιάν expresses incredulity and wonder, which ἤδη saves from falling into contempt. See 1 330 A. N. On the definition of courage given here see 430 C. N.

20 γεγονύσας. Cf. γεγονύσαν in 430 B.

21 αὐτῆς σωτηρίαν. See cr. n. αὐτῆς of the mss must mean either (1) the σωτηρία of (2) ἀνδρεία (so Hartman). In either case the αὐτῆς which follows has a different antecedent viz. τὴν περὶ τῶν δεινῶν δόξαν, so that the sentence becomes both awkward and obscure. Moreover, in whichever way we understand αὐτῆς, the mss leave us with three accusatives (αὐτῆς, σωτηρία and the clause introduced by τῷ), the precise relationship of which is far from clear. Various suggestions have been made to escape these difficulties. Instead of αὐτῆς Jackson suggests αὐ τῷ τῆν (J. Ph. iv. p. 148); while Stallbaum and others read τῷ (so quod) for τῷ, before which Hartman for his part wishes to insert ὅτα. Hermann and Baiter cut the knot by expunging both αὐτῆς and σωτηρίαν. Jackson’s remedy is the simplest, but αὐτῆς creates a difficulty. The new point in the explanation which he supposes it to mark is, I think, emphasized too much by αὐτῆς; nor indeed is it quite easy to separate αὐτῆς from ἐλεγον. I believe Plato wrote αὐτῆς. The words διὰ παντὸς αὐτῆς σωτηρίαν recall and correspond exactly to διὰ παντὸς σώσει τὴν περὶ τῶν δεινῶν δόξαν, and to 430 B σωτηρίαν διὰ παντὸς δόξης κτλ., and the meaning is ‘by preserving it perpetually’ I meant preserving it throughout when one is in pains and in pleasures’ etc. Grammatically, the infinitives are the direct object of ἐλεγον (‘I called’), and διὰ παντὸς αὐτῆς σωτηρίαν is its secondary object. The presence of αὐτῆς σωτηρίαν
is necessary to correspond to διασφέσθαι αὐτὴν, but it is the phrase requiring elucidation. The corruption of αὐτὴς to αὐτὴν is of a piece with that of γεγονυίας to γεγονυίαν (see cr. n.) and its all but inescapable consequence. The correction printed above is accepted by a reviewer of my Text of the Republic in Hermeithena XXIV p. 252.

Λύταιο—φόβοι. III 412 e ff.

429 D 25 ἀλουργὰ = 'purple': see Tim. 68 b, with Archer-Hind's note. Herwerden cuts out ὡστ' εἶναι, but without these words the wool which we are dyeing would be purple, whereas it is white, and we are making it purple. See on ἔναν τε καὶ ταῦτα in e.

20 πρώτων μὲν κτλ. - As far as concerns the language and grammatical construction of this passage it is clear that the object of ἐκλέγωνται should be the same as that of προπαρασκευάζουσιν, θεραπεύοντες, and θάπτουσιν, and identical with the subject of δέεσται. Now the object of θάπτουσι is the wool selected to be dyed; it is therefore the wool which is subjected to προπαρασκευή, and consequently white substances of wool are meant by μᾶν φύσιν τὴν τῶν λευκῶν (so also Blümner Technologie etc. i pp. 221 ff.). That this interpretation is right, appears also from the application of the simile. The guardians are the white woollen substances specially selected (note ἐξελεύγματα 429 E), their education is the προπαρασκευή; and the δῶς περὶ δεινῶν κτλ. is the dye. This is expressly pointed out in 429 E—430 A. τοσοῦτον is strictly in point, for woollen substances may be of any colour, since they may have been already dyed. Plato informs us that dyers selected white woollen substances when they wished to impart a lasting purple hue. Cf. Tim. 50 D, E. The προπαρασκευὴ included the process called στύψις, i.e. steeping the wool in an astringent solution (πρόστυμμα) to make it take the dye better (Arist. de Col. 4. 794 a 29 and Probl. XXII 11. 931 b 13 ff. προβρέχουσιν ἐν τοῖς στρυφοῖς τῷ διεργασθέντι μᾶλλον δέκσομα τὴν βαφήν. cf. also Theophr. de Odor. 17 ύστατοφοιν φάρ πάν τί δὲξασθαι μᾶλλον τὴν διάφορον ἡπτὰ τὰ ἐραὶ τὴν βαφήν. Aristotle uses a metaphor from dyeing in a similar way in Eth. Nic. 11. 2. 1105 b 3. Cf. also Cicero Hortens. Fr. 62 ed. Nobbe "ut ei qui combib purpuream voluit, sufficient prius lanam medicamentis quibusdam, sic litteris talibusque doctrinis ante excoli animos et ad sapientiam concipiendam imbu et præparari decet," and see on the whole subject Blümner L. c. i pp. 221 ff., 238 ff.

28 θεραπεύοντες. If the text is sound, we must suppose either that two processes of preparation are alluded to, viz. θεραπεύει and προπαρασκευῇ; or else that θεραπεύοντες is used for θεραπεύοντες. The first alternative is inadmissible: for προθεραπεύονται in E shews that the θεραπεύει and προπαρασκευῇ are identical. As for the second, Schneider remarks "aoristum ipsum pro præsenti positum vix credo." There are some instances in which "an aorist participle denoting that in which the action of a verb of past time consists may express time coincident with that of the verb, when the actions of the verb and the participle are practically one" (Goodwin MT. p. 52: cf. Kühner Gr. Gr. 11 pp. 161 ff.), but as προπαρασκευάζουσιν is a verb of present or universal time, Goodwin's rule is inapplicable here. Hartman ejects the participle, and Schneider is anxious to read θεραπεύοντες. In my edition of the Text, I had recourse to transposition, and placed θεραπεύοντες before οὕτω δὴ ("and they do not dip the wool till they have finished dressing it"). It is, however, safer to adhere to the MSS and regard θεραπεύοντες as one of those 'timeless aorists,' of which many examples are quoted by F. Carter in Cl. Rev. v pp. 4 ff. The MS reading is supported not only by Stobaeus (Flor. 43-
βάπτουσι. καὶ ὁ μὲν ἂν τοῦτο τὸ τρόπος βαφῆ, δευσοποιῶν τὸ γίγνεται τὸ βαφέν, καὶ ἡ πλύωσιν οὐτ' ἀνευ ῥυμμάτων οὔτε μετὰ ῥυμμάτων δύναται αὐτῶν τὸ ἀνὸς ἀφαίρεσθαι. ἄ δ' ἄν μὴ, οἴσθα σοι δὴ γίγνεται, εάν τε τις ἄλλα χρώματα βάπτη ἐάν τε καὶ ταῦτα μὴ προθεραπεύσαι. Οἶδα, ἐφ' ὃτι ἐκπλυται καὶ γελοία. Τοὐστὸν τοῦν, ἂν ὅ εὖ, ὑπόλαβε κατὰ δύναμιν ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ἡμᾶς, ὁτε ἐξελεγόμεθα τοὺς στρατιώτας καὶ ἐπαιδεύομεν | μουσικῇ καὶ γυμναστικῇ μηδὲν οἶου ἄλλο μιχανάσθαι, ἢ ὅπως ἡμῖν ὅ τι καλλιστα τοὺς νόμους πεισθέντες δέξοιτο ὠστερ βαφήν, ὡς δευσοποιῶν αὐτῶν ἡ δόξα γίγνοιτο καὶ περὶ δεινῶν καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων διὰ τὸ τὴν τε φύσιν καὶ τὴν τροφήν ἐπιτηδείαν ἐσχηκέναι, καὶ μὴ αὐτῶν ἐκπλυναί τῆν βαφήν τὰ ρύμματα ταῦτα, δεινὰ ὄντα ἐκκλείζειν, ἢ τε ἠδονή, παντὸς χαλεστραίου δεινότερα οὕσα τοῦτο δράν καὶ κονίας, λύπη τε καὶ φόβος καὶ ἐπιθυμία, παντὸς ἄλλου ρύμματος. τὴν δὴ τοιαύτην δύναμιν καὶ σωτηρίαν διὰ παντός ἐκπλυτα καὶ γελοία: a sort of hendiadys: cf. VIII 558 Αθεσπαστα καὶ ἡδεία. Stallbaum's suggestion αγελαία for γελοία is itself χελούστερον. For τοιούτου cf. III 388 D n. 430 A ὁ ἐκπλυναί. Not ἐκπλυναί (with Herwerden); for the action of ἐκ

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97), but also (as Jackson has pointed out to me) by Theo Smyrnaeus de utilit. math. p. 13 ed. Hiller. 28 τὸ ἄνθος: the colour, as appears from Arist. de Col. I. c. 794a 34 et al. Though it is used of purple here, it was not confined to purple; see on VIII 557 C. 429 E 29 δευσοποιῶν—βαφήν. δευσο

30 ρύμματος. ρύμματα is the generic word for detergents of any kind (Blümmer Privatatt. p. 214 n. 1): cf. παντὸς ἄλλου ρύμματος 430 B. 32 ἐὰν τε καὶ ταῦτα. ταῦτα is τά λευκα i.e. white substances; cf. τῶν λευκῶν in d above. Even white wool, unless specially prepared, will not retain the dye when it is dipped: much less other colours. This is the force of καὶ in καὶ ταῦτα. The words ἄλλα χρώματα refer to the colour of the wool which is dipped, not to the colour of the dye, as Herwerden supposes when he calls for τοῖς: cf. η. on ὡστ' ἐκεῖ in d above.
used by Stobaeus and Theo Smyrnaeus: see Flor. 43. 97 and de util. math. p. 14. I suggest the following interpretation. The action of pleasure differs from that of pain, fear, and desire, in being more gentle, and less violent (βιαστικός). Pleasure in short relieves (χαλαρὰ) while pain (of which fear and desire as such are both varieties) contracts: cf. III 411 A on the effect of γυναὶκα ἀρμονία, Tim. 66 c and Stallbaum on Phil. 46 D. Now χαλαστρεῖν suggests χαλαρός, and it is probably for this reason that Plato compares pleasure to that. It such a play on words is quite in Plato's manner: cf. Prot. 361 D. If we suppose that other ρύμματα were harder, and less agreeable in their action, the point of comparing pain etc. with 'every other deterrent' will appear.

12 τῆν ὀρθὴν δόξαν has been questioned, on the ground that beasts cannot have ὀρθὴ δόξα. It was no doubt a feeling of this kind which gave birth to the reading αὐτὴν for ὀρθὴν in some inferior MSS. Herderen employs his favourite remedy of excision; and other equally unsatisfactory remedies will be found in Hartman. The text is quite sound. True opinion is in Plato the basis of what is right done in ignorance of what is right but in obedience to an authority which knows. A dog and a slave act from true opinion as often as they obey a master who orders them to do what is right. So also (among others) Rettig (Proleg. p. 109) and Krohn (Pl. St. p. 42) rightly understand the passage. Cf. n. on πολιτικὴν in C below.

13 οὖτε—τε = 'not only not—but also' lays stress on the second clause: cf. 427 c, VIII 666 D, E, IX 587 A al.

14 μόνιμον. See cf. n. The reading of some of Stobaeus' MSS (Flor. 43. 97) (which Dobree and others approved) appears to me almost certainly right, although it has been adopted by no recent editor. νόμιμον, as Rettig shews (Proleg. p. 110), must be used in precisely the same sense as in δόξης ὀρθῆς τε καὶ νόμιμων just before. If so, Plato flatly (except for the οὖτε πᾶν) contradicts himself. For the only reason why a δόξα is ὀρθὴ is that it is νόμιμος 'in accordance with the law': nor is it possible for even a dog to possess an ὀρθὴ δόξα which is not νόμιμος.

In obeying a just command, the δόξα of a dog is therefore not οὐ πᾶν νόμιμον, but wholly νόμιμος. On the other hand μόνιμον is not only appropriate but necessary in what is practically a résumé of Socrates' whole account of courage (δοκεῖς γὰρ μοι —καλεῖν). The only difference between the ὀρθὴ δόξα of a guardian and a dog lies in this, that the former has received παίδεια, while the latter has not. And it is precisely this difference which makes the guardian's δόξα lasting, as the whole of the simile from dyeing was intended to shew (ὑπαγειαύθειον κτλ. 430 λ). Finally, the soldier's ὀρθὴ δόξα has just been defined (in 430 B) as σωτηρίαν διὰ παντὸς κτλ. To διὰ παντὸς the words οὐ πάνω μόνιμων are the necessary contrast: the δόξα is in both cases ὀρθὴ τε καὶ νόμιμος, only you can depend on the guardian always, ἐν τῷ λύτῳ καὶ ἐν ὑδάαι καὶ ἐν ἐπίσκεψι καὶ ἐν φόβοις (429 D), but not always on your dog and slave. Cf. Men. 97 ε. f.

430 с 16 πολιτικήν γε—δίμεν. In this passage πολιτικὴν ἀνδρείαν means, I think, primarily the virtue of a πόλις as opposed to that of an ἰδιωτῆς: cf. 442 D
πόλεως τε καὶ ιδιώτου. Our Πόλεως is brave because her soldiers are brave (429 ν.), so that in describing the courage of the soldiers we have really and truly been describing that of our city. But the ἀνδρεία with which we are now concerned is πολιτική in another, and more important sense, being based on 'correct opinion' (cf. Phaed. 82 Α, ἤπατον, i.e., in this instance on opinion which is in conformity with the law of the πόλις (cf. Aristotle's πολιτικὴ ἀνδρεία Eth. Nic. ΙΙΙ. ΙΙ. 1116a 16 ff.), and not on 'knowledge,' like the scientific or philosophic virtue to which we are introduced in Books VI and VII. In this Platonic connotation of the term, δηματικὴ or πολιτικὴ ἀνδρεία is inferior both to the courage which rests upon knowledge in the Socratic sense (Lach. 195 Α, 196 Ε ff., Prot. 349 Β ff.) and to that which rests on knowledge of the Idea of the Good (cf. VI 506 ἂ.), although it is nevertheless on a much higher plane than the so-called courage of slaves and brute beasts, because it is μετὰ παθῶν γεγονότα. In ἀδύναμοι—διόμεν Siebeck (Zur Chron. d. Pl. Dial. pp. 126 ff.) finds a promise of the Laches. To this view it seems to me a serious objection that the Laches has nothing to say of the characteristically Platonic distinction between ἐπιτηρή and ὅρθη δόξα: for that very reason it is probably earlier than this passage. Courage in the Laches is little more than Socratic courage (cf. Λευτ. IV 6. 10 ff.), for the knowledge of the good into which it is finally resolved is not knowledge of the Idea. Others have found in ἀδύναμοι a reference to the account of Courage in the individual (442 ν.), or to ν. 467 Α ff., or to VI 486 Β. None of these references are in point; and it is simplest to take Plato at his word. He drops the subject because further discussion of it would be irrelevant; he will resume it on another occasion if Adimantus wishes, but Adimantus is content. Cf. VII 532 D ην and see also on I 347 Ε. The whole of this section of the dialogue is important because it emphatically reaffirms the principle that courage as well as the other virtues enumerated here rests on ὅρθη δόξα and not on ἐπιτηρήμα. We have already seen that Plato's earlier scheme of education aims at implanting only ὅρθη δόξα. Cf. I 375 Ε η.

17 ὅποιοι ἡτοι—ἔξτοιμοι. 1ν = "as it is": so that Cobet's ἔξτοιμοι (found also in one or two manuscripts) is unnecessary.

ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ

[430 C]

αὔτος δὲ περὶ αὐτοῦ, ἐάν βούλη, ἐτι κάλλιου δίμεν: νῦν γὰρ οὐ τοῦτο ἔξτοιμοι, ἀλλὰ δικαιοσύνην πρὸς οὖν τὴν ἐκείνου ζήτησιν, ὡς ἐγὼ μιᾶ, ἤκαν ὑμεῖς ἐχει. Ἀλλὰ καλὸς, ἐφή, λέγεις. 20

VIII. Δῦν μὴν ἢ, ἢ δὲ ἐγὼ, ἢ τοιαύτα, ἢ δὲ γιαδιέτι ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἢ τε σωφροσύνη καὶ οὐ δὴ ἐνεκα πάντα ἔξτοιμοι, δικαιοσύνη. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Ποὺς οὖν ἂν τὴν δικαιοσύνην εὑρομεν, ἵνα μηκέτι πραγματευόμεθα περὶ σωφροσύνης; Ἐγώ μὲν τοιοῦτο, ἐφή, οὕτε
his ideal city falls to pieces. Cf. Rettig Proleg. p. 137. Hirzel succeeds in shewing that Justice and Temperance are different, and both of them necessary to Plato's perfect city; nor does he employ any other method than a strict interpretation of Plato's own words as they occur. See on 432 A.

430 D 24 πρότερον is omitted by Richards as illogical. So slight a flaw is easy to forgive; and ἐρι in μηκέτι suggests that πρότερον is genuine. Nor could Adimantus well have said that in any event he did not wish Justice—οὐ δὲ ἐκεῖνα πάντα ἐρημοῦνε—so as to be discovered.

430 E 27 εὐθεῖα ἀδικία. Cf. x 608 d, 612 d, Charm. 156 A, Menex. 236 b. The translation "as I am an honest man" (D. and V.) is inaccurate; but Schneider's "ich thätte ja sonst nichts recht," hits the mark. In English we require an independent clause, 'I have no right to refuse.'

ὡς γε ἐντεῦθεν ἰδεῖν: 'seen from where we stand,' i.e. on a first view: cf. ὡς ἐνθεύοντα ἰδεῖν Pol. 289 D, infra 432 B, x 595 b, and see Grünwald in Schanz's Beiträge etc. 11 3 pp. 1—37.

28 ἐμφανία—ἀμφανία. On ἀμφανία see 111 398 έ n. In its musical application συμφανία is used both of consonance as in the octave or double octave and also of other musical intervals: cf. VII 531 A and von Jan's Mus. Script. Gr. p. 102 and passim. The ἐμφανία in which συμφανία consists is apparently of the former kind: cf. 432 έ n.

30 ἵδιον—ἐγκράτεια. It is chiefly this which is insisted on in the popular view of σωφροσύνη taken in 111 380 D ff. Cf. Xen. Cyr. viii 1. 32, Isocr. 3. 44, and other passages cited by Nägelsbach Nachhom. Theol. 11 p. 233. Here the essential mark of σωφροσύνη is ἐμφανία as to who shall be rulers, and who subjects; a point which is not mentioned in III. In other fundamental respects, also, the two descriptions differ; and Hirzel rightly insists that the σωφροσύνη of Book IV must be examined independently and by itself (l.c. p. 409).

κρείττω—αὐτό: a common formula in the popular acceptance of σωφροσύνη: see Nägelsbach l.c.

31 λέγοντες. See cf. n. λέγοντες is found also in Flor. A, in some MSS of Stobaeus (Flor. 111. 97) and in Cesenas M. λέγοντες should (with Stallbaum) be taken as agreeing with the nominative of φασι, 'as men say, calling one lord of oneself in some mysterious way.' ἄδικα, 'forsooth,' helps out οὐκ ὃδ' ὄντων τρόπων. For other views on this passage see App. II.

33 κρείττω αὐτό. Stallbaum reads κρείττων αὐτό, and wishes to do so also in 431 A below. The accusative is more natural in both places, partly because it suggests τὸ κρείττων αὐτοῦ εἶναι (cf. δ' ἀν αὐτοῦ κρείττων καὶ ἢττων—ἀν αὐτοῦ εἶναι), partly because of κρείττω αὐτό just before.
éνώ, φαίνεται μοι βούλεσθαι λέγειν οὗτος ὁ λόγος, ὡς τι ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ περὶ τὴν ψυχήν τοῦ μὲν βέλτιον ἐν, τὸ δὲ χείρον, καὶ ὅταν μὲν τὸ βέλτιον φύσει τοῦ χείρονος ἐγκρατεῖς ἣ, τούτῳ λέγειν τὸ κρεῖττον αὐτοῦ. ἔπαινει γοῦν ὅταν δὲ ὑπὸ τροφῆς κακῆς ἢ τινος ὁμιλίας κρατηθῇ ὑπὸ πλῆθους τοῦ χείρονος σμικρότερον τὸ βέλτιον ὁν, τούτῳ δὲ ὡς ἐν οὐκείης φέγειν 1 τε καὶ καλεῖν ἧττω B ἐαυτοῦ καὶ ἀκόλουστον τοῦ ὦτω διακείμενον. Καὶ γὰρ ἕοικεν, ἔφη.

Ἀπόβλεπε τοῖνυν, ἢ δὲ ἐγὼ, πρὸς τὴν νέαν ἡμῖν πόλιν, καὶ εὑρίσκεις ἐν αὐτῇ τὸ ἔτερον τούτῳ ἑνῶν κρεῖττον γὰρ αὐτὴν αὐτῆς δικαίως φήσεις προσαγορεύεσθαι, ἔπετερ, οὐ τὸ ἀμενον τοῦ χείρονος ἀρχεῖ, σώφρον κλητέον καὶ κρεῖττον αὐτοῦ. Ἀλλὰ ἀποβλεπόν, ἔφη, καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγεις. Καὶ μὴν καὶ τάς ἑς πολλὰς καὶ 15 παντοδαπᾶς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ ἡδονάς τε 1 καὶ λύπας ἐν παισὶ μάλιστα C ἃν τις εὕρω καὶ γυναιξί καὶ οἰκέταις καὶ τῶν ἑλευθέρων λεγομένων ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς τε καὶ φαίοις. Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Τάς δὲ ἑς ἀπλάς


431 A 3 τι—τὸ μὲν—τὸ δὲ. For the subdivision of τι cf. V 463 B, VIII 560 A, Gorg. 499 C. Other examples of 'partitive apposition' are V 461 D, 477 C, VIII 552 C: cf. also VIII 550 B, IX 592 A, X 618 E.

6 τὸ κρεῖττον αὐτοῦ: sc. φαίνεται μοι τοῦτο λέγειν. The expression κρεῖττον αὐτοῦ is the subject, and τοῦτο the object. τῶν for τὸ (see cr. n.) is indefinable. See also on τὸν δὲ below.

7 πλῆθος τοῦ χείρονος. 11 379 C n.

8 τὸ τοῦ δὲ—διακείμενον. τοῦτο is the object of ἐπίςειν, whose subject is still strictly speaking τὸ κρεῖττον αὐτοῦ or (which is the same thing) οὗτος ὁ λόγος. In ἐπίςειν and καλέων the λόγος is half-personified: 'this the phrase censures as something disgraceful, and calls the man who is in this condition a slave to himself and intemperate.' For the recapitulatory τότε δὲ cf. Ap. 28 E with my note ad loc. Hartman's τότε δὲ is an unhappy suggestion.

431 B 9 ἔοικεν: sc. ὁ λόγος τοῦτο βούλεσθαι λέγειν: not (as J. and C.) "it seems a natural way of speaking."

11 κρεῖττον—αὐτῆς. Cf. Latos 626 Eff., where κρεῖττον αὐτῆς is similarly applied to a city and explained in the same way.

12 οὖ: not the adverb, as Stallbaum supposed, but a partitive genitive: 'that

whereof the better part rules the worse' etc.

431 C 15 παίων. See cr. n. The corruption—an easy one in minuscule MSS—recurs in VI 494 B. See Introd. § 5 and Best Comm. Pal. p. 705. The object of this part of the argument is to show that our city is σώφρον not only as being κρεῖττον αὐτῆς but as being κρεῖττον ἥδονας τε καὶ ἐπίθυμοι—a kindred, but not quite identical, notion: cf. 431 D. In adding γυναιξί Plato speaks from the ordinary Greek standpoint; in permitting some women to be guardians, he tacitly allows that in some cases their desires (unlike those of οἰκέται etc.) are metά νοῦ. Cf. Latos 780 E ff.

16 λεγομένων is emphatic. No one is free who is a slave to his desires. Cf. I 330 A n.

17 τάς τε γε κτλ. I have returned to the MS reading. The accusative with τυγχάνω and its congener is—except with neuter pronouns (Jebb on Soph. O. T. 1298)—almost unexamined (ἐπικείμενος with accusative in Prud. Styth. 10. 33), and Herwerden reads the dative, an easy correction; but it is perhaps safer to take the accusative as a sort of anacoluthon "occasional by the parallel of the previous sentence" τάς τε πολλὰς—ἐλπις (J. and C.). Baiter brackets the verb ἐπικείμενος.
te καὶ μετρίας, αἱ δὲ μετὰ νοῦ τε καὶ δόξης ὀρθῆς λογισμὸν ἀγονταί, ἐν ὅλητις τε ἐπιτεύξει καὶ τοῖς βέλτιστα μὲν φύσιν, βέλτιστα δὲ παλινδρέων. Ἀληθῆ, ἕφη. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ταῦτα ὀρᾶς ἐνώντα σοι 20 ἐν τῇ πόλει, καὶ κρατούμενας αὐτόθι τὰς ἐπιθυμίας τὰς ἐν τοῖς

Πολλοῖς τε καὶ 1 φαύλοις ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐπιθυμοῦν καὶ τῆς φρονήσεως τῆς ἐν τοῖς ἐλάττοσι τε καὶ ἐπιεικεστέροις; "Ἐγώ, ἕφη.

IX. Εἶ ἄρα δεῖ τινὰ πόλιν προσαγορεῦειν κρείττων ἣδουν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦν καὶ αὐτῆς αὐτῆς, καὶ ταύτην προσρητέου. Παντά—25 πασὶν μὲν οὖν, ἕφη. Ὀρὲ οὖν οὐ καὶ σωφρονα κατὰ πάντα ταῦτα; Καὶ μάλα, ἕφη. Καὶ μήν εἰπέρ αὐ ἐν ἀλλή πόλει ἡ αὐτή δόξα ἔγενος τοῖς τε ἄρχοντες καὶ ἄρχομενοι 1 περὶ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ δεῖ ἄρχειν, καὶ ἐν ταύτῃ ἄν εἶν τούτῳ ἐνών. ὦ ὑδε δοκεῖ; Καὶ μάλα, ἕφη, σφόδρα. Ἕν ποτέροις οὖν φύσεως τῶν πολιτῶν τὸ σωφρονεῖν 30 ἑνείναι, ὅταν οὕτως ἔχοσιν; ἐν τοῖς ἄρχονσι ἡ ἐν τοῖς ἄρχομενοι; Ἕν ἀμφοτέρους που, ἕφη. Ὁρᾶς οὖν, ἢν δὲ ἐγώ, ὃτι ἐπιεικος ἐμαυτοῦμεθα ἄρτι, ὡς ἀρμονία τιν ἡ σωφρόσυνῃ ὑμοῖοτα; Τί ὅτι; "Ὅτι οὐχ ὤσπερ ἡ ἀνδρεία καὶ ἡ σοφία ἐν μέρει τινὶ ἐκατέρα ἐνοῦσα ἡ μὲν | σοφή, ἡ δὲ ἀνδρείαν τὴν πόλιν παρείχετο, 35 οὐχ οὕτω ποιεῖ αὐτή, ἀλλὰ δὲ ὢλης ἄτεχνος τέταται, διὰ πασῶν

1. παρείχετο Α'ΠΙ: παρέσχετο Α',

431 d 27 καὶ μήν—σφόδρα gives a third feature of the σωφροσύνη of a city. We have shewn our city to be (1) κρείττων αὐτῆς, (2) κρείττων ἡδουν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμων. It is also (3) δραματικῆς περὶ τοῦ οὕτως δεῖ ἄρχειν. (3) corresponds to κόσμος, (2) to ἐγκράτεια, (1) to κρείττων αὐτοῦ in 430 e. Thus the discussion in this chapter follows a chiastic order.

431 e 32 ἐν ἀμφότεροις. Cf. 442 c, d. Aristotle and others seem to have supposed that σωφροσύνη was the special virtue of the lowest class in the State and the lowest element in the soul: see Τοῦ ν. 6. 135b 10 ff. and 8. 135b 1 ff. and [Arist.] perị ἄρετον καὶ κακῶν 1. 1249a 30 ff. ἐν ἀμφότεροις proves this view erroneously. The error arose partly perhaps from a desire to make the theory superficially symmetrical, partly perhaps from a notion that Plato's rulers would not be likely to dispute their own right to rule. But σωφροσύνη in Plato's sense is necessary for his Rulers as well as for their subjects; without it, they might nolle episcopari: cf. 1 346 d n.

432 a 2 δὲ ὢλης—διὰ πασῶν. δὲ' ὢλης sc. τῆς πόλεως, not ὑδρης, as J. and C. strangely suppose. διὰ πασῶν sc. τῶν χρόνων should be taken with ἔξωθόντας (so also Schneider). ἡ διὰ πασῶν συμφωνία is the octave (Arist. Probl. XIX 35. 920a 27 ff.), the κάλλιτα συμφωνία, according to the Greeks (Arist. L.), readily sounding to the ear as absolute unison; hence the point of ταῦτων, which is an accusative depending directly on ἔξωθόντας. See Arist. l.c. 14. 918b 7 ff. διὰ τὸ λανθάνει τὸ διὰ πασῶν καὶ δοκεῖ διὰ χρόνων ὑπαίτιον, οὖν εἰν τῷ φθορίῳ καὶ εἰν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ: The whole expression διὰ πασῶν ἔξωθόντας ταῦτων therefore means that the concord of the citizens on the matter in question is absolute and complete. Further than this I do not think the comparison is to be pressed. If we seek to find analogies between ἀθενεστάτως, ἀθεροράτως, μέσως, and the ὑπάτη, ἡνητη and μέση of the scale, we are met by the difficulty that the μέση cannot be said to produce the same (ταῦτον) note as the ὑπάτη and ἡνητη, and we are not at liberty.
to suppose that Plato is thinking of ἡ δις διὰ πάσων in the face of his own words, which refer only to a single octave (διὰ πάσων παρεχομένη κτλ.). In talking of σωφροσύνη Plato usually distinguishes only between two classes—rulers and ruled: 431 D. E and infra χείρων τε καὶ ἀμέϊνονς. See also on 443 D.

4 φρονήσει — ἵσχυι — πλήθει define ἀδεσθενατός, ἵσχυροτάτος, μέσος. The equipoise and measured cadence of this stately sentence may well suggest a chorus of voices singing in unison. Cf. 111.401 C. Cobet’s excision of the second boule is sadly out of tune.

6 ταύτην τὰν ὁμόνοιαν prepares us for the definition about to follow. There are various ὁμόνοιαι: this one is agreement ὀπότερον δὲ ἄρχειν etc.

7 χείρων κτλ.: ‘concord between the naturally better and the naturally worse, on the question which should rule, whether in a city or in an individual.’ ἐν ἑνὶ ἐκάστῳ anticipates 442 c f.; but is justified here by 431 A, B.

We may now sum up Plato’s account of σωφροσύνη so far as it is a virtue of the State. It involves three elements: (1) the rule of the better over the worse, (2) the rule of φρονήσει over the desires, (3) the agreement of better and worse as to which shall rule. (1) and (2) are different ways of expressing the same thing; neither is fundamental, for (granted the presence of σοφία and ἀνδρεία) both of them follow from (3), whereas (3) does not follow from either. Plato accordingly admits (3) only into his final definition. It follows from (3) that σωφροσύνη, unlike σοφία and ἀνδρεία, is a virtue possessed by all the three classes of the City. Kröhn (Pl. St. p. 372) pronounces σωφροσύνη oriose and “ornamental.” The charge is best refuted by considering whether the City is complete without it. (The part played by Justice will be discussed later.) Apart from σωφροσύνη, what virtue remains for the third class of citizens? and what guarantee is there that σοφία will consent to rule? (see on ἐν ἀμφότεροις 431 E). Whereas σωφροσύνη not only provides for the third class, but furnishes a point of union in which all the classes may meet, and the City, so far, become μία ἐκ πολλῶν (cf. 443 E).

If we bear in mind that the Rulers are only select Guardians, and that φόλακες includes both Rulers and Auxiliaries, we may tabulate the virtues of the three classes thus:-

Virtues of Rulers, σοφία + ἀνδρεία + σωφροσύνη.

Virtues of Soldiers, ἀνδρεία + σωφροσύνη.

Virtues of Farmers, etc., σωφροσύνη.

Hirzel is, I think, mistaken in holding that σωφροσύνη is a virtue of the whole and not of the parts; the fact is that it is a virtue both of the whole and of each of the parts. Strictly speaking, of course, ὁμόνοια or ξυμφωνία implies more parts than one, and concord is impossible to a unit; but the essence of the virtue consists in the view that the best shall rule, and this view is present in each of the three classes. For δικαιοσύνη see 434 c f.

Plato’s account of σωφροσύνη in other dialogues differs in many respects from this, and is rather a hindrance than a help in elucidating the present passage. Cf. Hirzel l.c. p. 409. The σωφροσύνη of the Charmides is fully discussed by Knuth Quaestiones de not. τῆς σωφροσύνης Plat. criticae (1874): cf. also Hammond l.c. pp. 138 f., 157 f.

432 b—434 c Where then is Justice? We must beware lest she escape us. Socrates presently exclaims that he has found the trait. Justice is the principle, or else one form of the principle, which we laid down at the beginning, viz. that each individual shall fulful that function only for which he is naturally best fitted. In other words,
justice is, in a certain sense, 'minding one's own business.' Four considerations point to this conclusion. In the first place, it is in order to make the other three take root that we require a fourth virtue; and it is just the division of duty according to natural capacity which renders the other three virtues possible. Secondly, this is the only principle which can be compared with the other three virtues in respect of benefit conferred upon the State: and justice must be comparable with them in this respect. Thirdly, it is by this principle that the Rulers will direct their judicial decisions, and justice is the principle by which our Rulers judge. Lastly, the violation of this principle works the greatest mischief in the City. So does injustice; so that the principle itself is identical with justice.

For Plato's view of Civic Justice see on 434 C. 432 B 10 ἄς γε—δοξαί. This phrase is apparently quite unique in Plato; see Grünenwald cited on 430 E. 13 ὁσπερ κυνηγήτας. The image is a favourite one with Plato: cf. Laws 654 E, Parm. 128 C, Lys. 218 C. Other examples may be found in Stallbaum's note on this passage. The particular kind of hunting from which Plato takes his illustration is clearly described in Xen. de Ven. 8. 4—8. A net was drawn round the bush where the hare was; and the hunters stood round, ready metathēn κατά τὰ ἤχεσθαι, δὲ ἐκκυλισθῆ ἐκ τῶν δικτύων, 432 C 16 φράσεα: 'point out.' There is no occasion to read (with Ast and q) καὶ μια φράσεα. 18 μετριώς. See cr. n. μετριως χρήσθαν could only mean 'to treat fairly,' but this is not to the point. The only relevant meaning is 'you will find me very tolerable,' and μετριώ μοι χρήσει conveys this sense exactly. Cf. ἐπομένως χρή—καὶ δυναμένω and Xen. Cyr. III 2. 4 ἀλγός τε καὶ ἄσθενεις χρήσαμεθ' ἐν πολεμοῖς, Symph. 2. 9, 10. On the error see Introd. § 5. 19 εὐθαμέονος: like a pious huntsman: cf. Xen. de Ven. 6. 13 εὐθαμέονος τῷ Ἀτταλωνι καὶ τῇ Ἀρτέμιδι τῇ Ἀγρότερᾳ μετα-δύνατης ἡμᾶς. Cf. also (with Stallbaum) Phil. 25 B εὐθαμένη δὴ καὶ σκόπεται καὶ Tim. 27 C. ἐπον ὅτι (suggested by Richards) seems to me much less spirited and picturesque than ἐπον; and the cacophony is also unpleasing. For the asyndeton cf. Π 373 E n. 21 έστι γούν—δυσδειρείνητος has been objected to as adding little or nothing to δυσδειρείνητος—ἐπίκλοσ. But δυσδε-}


of Justice is not exhausted till individual Justice has been discussed. See on τοιοῦτο in 443 C.

6 ἐπιτηδειοτάτη. ἐπιτηδειοτάτα (Herwerden) is not good: cf. 11 374 E and supra 430 A. A few MSS omit πεφυκια, not unnaturally; but the reduplication in φύσις—πεφυκια adds to the emphasis. Plato never tires of emphasizing the ‘natural’ features of his city in Books II—IV.

7 δικαιοσύνη has been questioned by Richards, on the ground that “the inference announced in τοῦτο τόλμων κτλ. is already stated in καὶ μὲν δὴ κτλ., which from its form (καὶ μὲν) is yet evidently only a step in the reasoning.” Richards suggests δικαιο, and Hartman δικαιοσύνης, neatly but needlessly. τόλμων in B does not express an inference, but is simply ‘well,’ as in 11 369 B, 33 413 C, 4 436 B and a host of other passages collected by Kugler (de part. τοικ. etc. p. 35). Plato first states a popular view, and then proceeds to show that it is mainly right on grounds presently to be stated (whence ὁιδ᾽ ὠθεὶν τεκμαίρομαι).
No stress should be laid on the fact that dikaiosùnè is in one case the predicate, and in the other the subject; complete identity is predicated in both cases, as the abstract dikaiosùnè shews. It might be different if we read dikaios, but for this there is no occasion. There is still however a difficulty in dikaiosùnè: see next note.

433 B 9 εἰρήκαμεν γάρ. This has not been said in the Republic, nor (so far as I know) in any of Plato's earlier dialogues (if we except Alc. 1127 c), so that εἰρήκαμεν refers to ordinary conversation. Such a view has affinities with the legal view of Justice as the virtue which respects the rights of others (cf. 433 E and 1 331 a f.), and is natural enough, especially with the loose connotation which dikaiosùnè had in popular language. It is however curious that in Charm. 101 B ff. precisely the same account is given of Temperance: ἀρτί γὰρ ἀνεμφασίσθη δὴ δὴ τοῦ ἠκουσα λέγοντος, ὥστε σοφροσύνη ἂν εἶναι τὰ τὰ ἅγια πράττειν: cf. Tim. 72 a εδ καὶ πάλαι λέγεται τὰ πράττειν καὶ γνωρίζει τὰ τὰ αὐτὸ καὶ ἅγια σοφρονί μόνος προσήκειν. In its popular connotation, σοφροσύνη was not always distinguished from dikaiosùnè, and even the philosophers (as Strabo vii 3. 4 observes) sometimes used the words in nearly an identical sense. See Nägelsbach Nachh. Theol. p. 238. Steinhart and others find in the difference between this passage and the Charmides i.e. an indication of the Socratic and Platonic doctrine of the unity of Virtue. No doubt there is a certain sense in which virtue is one (see below on 434 C), but we must insist that the specific virtues are represented by Plato in the Republic as distinct; on any other hypothesis, the perfect City fails to pieces. Perhaps δικαιοσύνη after πολυπραγμονέων is an error for σωφροσύνη, and Plato is here deliberately correcting the popular view. If so, καὶ μὴ—γε means 'and yet,' i.e. in spite of what we now say that Ἰστικέ is εἰς ἐν κατὰ φύσιν, 'we and others have also said that Temperance is τὰ αὐτῶν πράττειν.' Adimantus assents. 'Well,' continues Socrates, 'it is apparently (not Temperance, but) Ἰστικέ which is τὰ αὐτῶν πράττειν.' This view gives a much better sense to καὶ in καὶ τοῦτο, and ἡ δικαιοσύνη receives the proper emphasis.

11 δοκεῖ—ἐφορμέομεν. Things which are equal to the same thing are equal to one another. Now (1) the Virtue which enables the others to take root, and (2) Justice, each =τὸ ὑπόλοιπον. Therefore Justice enables the other Virtues to take root. <But that which does so is τὰ αὐτῶν πράττειν. Consequently Justice is τὰ αὐτῶν πράττειν.> Plato seldom leaves so much to be mentally supplied in his reasoning.

15 παρέχει. See cr. n. Former editors (except Ast) retain παρέχει and explain it as depending directly on δοκεῖ. If this is right, καὶ before ἐγγενομένου joins τοῦτο εἶναι and παρέχει; but καὶ ἐγγενομένου γε, following immediately on ἐγγενοῦσα, naturally suggests that παρέχει and ἐγγενοῦσα are coordinate and both under the government of ὡστε. That this was felt in antiquity is proved by the variant ἐγγενομένα for ἐγγενομένου, preserved in Stobaeus (Flor. 43. 98) and in Σ. The author of the reading ἐγγενομένα must have understood Plato to mean 'which enabled them all to make their appearance in the city, and having done so, to keep it safe, so long as they are there,' and this, I think, is the natural meaning of Plato's words, if παρέχει is retained. But the sentiment is compara-
tively weak; and consequently Ast and Hartman wish to cancel paréchei, making σωτρίαν depend upon παρέχειν; but a present tense is necessary. paréchei seems to me what Plato wrote, 'aye, and after they have appeared it preserves them, so long as it is present in the city.' A relative clause often passes into an independent sentence (see on Π 357 B); and the idiom is appropriate here because it responds to the emphatic και—γέ. For και—γέ cf. 425 B n.

433 D 23 οὐδὲν—ἀρχιμένω. On οὐδὲν see ν 409 C n. Richards would insert καὶ γεωργὶς after δημιουργία, pointing out that the other words go in pairs; but the difference between δημιουργία and γεωργία is insignificant, since both artisan and farmer belong to the same class in the city.

24 εἰς ὄν. Most of Stobaeus' mss (Flor. l.c.) read εἰς ὄν ὑν. εν is unnecessary with καὶ οὐκ ἐπολυπραγμόνει following (Schneider).

433 Ε 30 σκόπελοι κτλ. This τεκ- μήρων turns on the judicial sense of δικαιοσύνη; cf. I 331 Ε ff. The judicial functions of the rulers follow naturally from 428 D, where it is said that σοφία βουλεύεται—δικην' ἀν τρόπον αὐτῆς τε (sc. η πόλις) πρὸς αὐτῆς—ἀριστα ὁμολογεῖ τοῦτον. It is clear that no class except the rulers can be judges in the State, and judges are necessary; see III 408 D ff.

35 αὐτοῦ κτλ. αὐτοῦ is a possessive genitive depending on τοῦ. It should be noted that although εἰς τοῦ ὁκελοῦ is not the same thing as πράξει τοῦ ὁκελοῦ, the latter involves the former. Plato is looking for a point of contact between his own view of Justice and the popular judicial meaning of the word, and finds it in εἰς τοῦ ὁκελοῦ. Krohn (Pl. St. p. 49) appears to me to attach too much weight to εἰς τοῦ ὁκελοῦ when he calls it a new 'Begriffselement,' and complains that it is "weder sachlich erläutert, noch logisch streng abgeleitet."
It should be mentioned that the poet Gray (with less than his usual critical acumen) conjectured τοῦ <τοιῶν> τὸ οίκειον τε καὶ <τὸ> ἐαυτοῦ, comparing οἰκεσπραγία in 434 C.

5 πάντα τάλλα means everything except what Socrates is about to mention, that is everything except the interchange of rulers and ruled. So J. and C., rightly, I think: cf. 431 A, VII 518 D and Laws 798 D. Other editors explain τάλλα as "reliquorum opificium opera"; and so also ο, reading ἡ πάντα τάλλα τα γε σκοιάτα; but it is difficult to extract this meaning out of τάλλα without τα γε τοιάστα, and the asyndeton is also very harsh. Madvig's conjecture πάντα is improbable, though adopted by Baiter. Adimantus would catch the meaning all the more easily on account of the similar statement in 431 A, and because πάντα would be pronounced with emphasis, as the asyndeton also indicates. I have removed the comma usually printed after μεταλλαττόμενα; for πάντα τάλλα includes within its scope all the cases mentioned, and is directly the subject of δοκεῖ.

6 ἄλλ’ ὄταν κτλ. Plato is probably thinking of Athens again: cf. supra 424 D n. and Krohn PL. St. p. 46. φύσει belongs to ὅν. Hartman needlessly expunges ὅν and reads φύσι for φύσει. The subject to ὅν is simply the pronoun 'he,' used loosely, as often in English.

8. τῷ Π: τῷ Α.
20 ékástou—pólei is cancelled by Herwerden as a marginal note on oikeio-

tragía. The words add to the weight and impressiveness of the sentence, and have a decidedly Platonic sound.

21 toúvnaít翁 ékeívon. ékeívon is ‘the other,’ i.e. πολυπραγμοσύνη (rather than ἄδικας); and toúvnaít翁 is probably nomi-
native, and not adverbial accusative. So also Schneider. It is not necessary to add ὑν after toúvnaít翁 as I formerly did. The style of argument is familiar τὸ τὸν ἐναντίων (see Arist. Rhét. II 23.

1397* 7 ff.).

To sum up. Civic Justice is the fulfil-
ment of the maxim τὸ αὐτὸ πράττειν by the three classes in the City. There is nothing transcendental or metaphysical about it, as Krohn rightly observes (Pl. St. p. 48); it is simply the principle εἰς ἐν καθα ψιθνεν applied to the three component units or factors of the State. Cf. II 370 A m. It is moreover the soil out of which all the other virtues grow; its fruits are Wisdom, Courage, Temperance, of which the last appears in the Farmers and Artisans, the last two in the Auxi-
liaries, while the Rulers possess all three (432 Α π.). Thus all the Virtues meet in Justice (ἐν δὲ δικαιοσύνη συνάλλαζον πᾶσ' ἀρέτην’ τινι απ. Arist. Eth. Nic. v 3. 1120b 25 ff.) and it is in Justice, not in σοφία (as the historical Socrates held Mem. III 9, 5), that the true unity of Virtue consists. Plato's Justice is in reality not so much a specific virtue, as Virtue or Righteous-

ness in general: καὶ οἴδ᾽ ἐσπεροσ οἴδ᾽ ἐφῶς οἶτα 

θαυμαστὸς (Arist. I.c.): cf. 442 ε. Ν. He desired to build a city, wherein Righteousness dwelleth (καὶ συναρμοσ 

καὶ γῆς καινῆ—προσδοκομεν, 

ἐν οἶς δικαιοσύνη κατακει 1 Pet. 3. 13), and interpreted Righteousness as the law of εἰς ἐν καθα ψιθνεν. In taking this view of political δικαιοσύνη, there is every reason to suppose (with Krohn i.c. p. 46) that Plato was not uninfluenced by the πολυπραγμοσύνη (as he conceived it) of Athenian democracy, although it is in reality a particular psychological inter-

pretation of Nature's law of ἀπλότητα that forms the true philosophical basis of the City described in Books II—IV. See also on II 370 A.

434 D—435 A Adimantius agrees; 

but Socrates will wait until he has discov-

ered Justicw in Man before being sure 

that he is right. If the features of Justice 

are the same in Man and in the State, 

we shall be satisfied.

434 D 23 παγίωσ—λέγομεν: cf. v 

479 C παγίωσ νοθά, Thæat. 157 A νοθά 

—παγίωσ, Tim. 49 D. οὐκ ἐστὶ παγίω 

νοθά was probably a phrase in vogue 

among Heraclitus’ followers: see Wohlrab 

on Thæat. I.c.

24 λόγος τοῦ εἰδος. εἰδος is not yet the 

Idea (III 402 C) but refers to oikeio-

tragía. For λόγος Richards conjectures λοθόν; but surely εἰς would then be wrong. How can ‘we’ be said to pass into an indi-

vidual? The εἰδος is half personified (cf. 

οῦτα—οἶδον ἑρωτημα ἑρημα VII 538 D); it is said to ‘pass into’ the individual merely because we have discovered it first in the State. See also on ἀπαλο- 

νεται 442 D. The passage in Phædr. 

249 B is different, whether we accept 

Badham’s conjecture λοθτ or not.

27 ᾧπ is a loose internal accusative, 

exactly like δ in 443 B below. The re-

dence is to Π 308 D.

28 ἐκεί. The reading ἐκείνο, found 

in Σ and other second-rate MSS, would 

probably have been discarded sooner, if it 

had been known that A as well as II 

reads ἐκεί. Campbell first pointed this 

out. ἐκείνο is not quite suitable because,
although it must mean justice, it suggests something more remote. *ἐκεῖ* on the other hand helps out the antithesis between ἐν μείζων—ἐχθρῶν and ἐν ἐν ἄνθρωπῳ, and is in harmony with ἐκεῖ ἐφάνη below. *δικαιοσύνη* depends on θεάσασθαι, and τῶν ἐχθρῶν is 'its possessors': cf. II 367 B, D, E. In reciting the sentence, the voice pauses after ἐχθρῶν and pronounces ἐκεῖ with emphasis. ἐκεῖ (with which cf. ἐκείνον in Parm. 133 D) was rightly retained by Stallbaum, who did not know that it was the reading of A.

433 E 29 τούτῳ: i.e. τὸ μείζων τῶν ἐχθρῶν δικαιοσύνης.

434 A 4 καθ' ὄνων. Cf. (with Schneider) infra vii 533 B and Crat. 425 B. μέθοδον for καθ' ὄνων (Herwerden) is a sorry piece of criticism.

435 A—436 D The point to be determined is this: are there three psychological forms or kinds in the soul of the Individual, corresponding to the three orders in our City? And is the Individual temperate, brave, wise and just in virtue of the corresponding affections of these kinds? Our present methods of investigation are wanting in exactness; but they are sufficient for our immediate object.

435 A ff. The passages in Plato dealing with psychology have been collected and carefully expounded by E. W. Simson Der Begriff der Seele bei Plato (Leipzig 1889). I have found Simson's treatise more serviceable than Chaignet De la Psychologie de Platon (Paris 1862). Dr Brandt's Program Zur Entwickelung der Platoni- schen Lehre von den Seelenst heading (Leipzig 1890) will also be found useful in studying the psychological theory here unfolded. For an attempt to shew that Plato always believed in the unity of soul see Archer-Hind in J. Ph. x pp. 120—131. The fundamental principle on which the theory of Book IV should be interpreted is that the just soul is an image of the just city. Now the just city is a ἁρ with three πολλά: so therefore is the just soul. Plato states this quite clearly in 443 E ἐνα γενεσίμην εκ πολλῶν. In this sense, therefore—and to Plato it was something real and no mere figure of speech—the soul has unity; but not, strictly speaking, in any other sense; otherwise we are in danger of obliterating the distinction between the three orders of the city, and so destroying the whole fabric. Of course nothing which Plato now says should be taken as pre-judging the question about the nature of soul in its ἀληθεστάτη φύσις, i.e. when exempt from all the evils which are inseparable from matter (X 611 B ff.): if wholly separated from material accretions it is probably μονοείδες (612 A), λογιστικόν alone remaining. See on X 611 B. For the present we are concerned with soul incarnate; and Plato certainly speaks of this as having three parts. Cf. Zeller's II i, pp 845 ff. In what sense an immaterial thing like the soul even when present in body can be said to contain 'parts' or 'kinds' (μέρη, ἐνόης, γένους) is a further question, which Plato does not here raise, although his followers have done so. It is doubtless true (as Archer-Hind holds l.c.) that 'parts' of soul can only be different modes of its operation; and a consciousness of this fact seems to betray itself in 439 B, D; but we shall best apprehend the meaning of Plato in this passage by treating the analogy as Plato does, i.e. as valid throughout, and speaking, in common with Plato and his commentators, of 'parts' of soul. See also on 435 B.
IIAATQNOI

Kαὶ δίκαιος ἄρα ἀνὴρ δικαίας πόλεως ἢ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ τῆς δικαίως

σύνης εἰδὸς οὐδὲν διώσει, ἀλλ' ὁμοίως ἔσται. "Ομοίως, ἐφη. Ἀλλὰ

10 μέντοι πόλεις γε ἐδοξην εἶναι δικαία, ὅτι ἐν αὐτῇ τριττὰ γένη

φύσεων ἐνότα τὸ αὐτῶν ἐκαστοῦ ἐπραττεν: σώφρων δὲ αὐ καὶ

ἀνδρεία καὶ σοφή διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων γενῶν ἀλλ' ἀττά πάθη

tε καὶ ἐξεις. Ἀληθῆ, ἐφη. Καὶ τὸν ένα ἄρα, δοφίλη, οὐτὸς

ἀξίωσομεν, τὰ αὐτὰ ταύτα ἐδή ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ ψυχή ἔσυντα, διὰ C

15 τὰ αὐτὰ πάθη ἐκείνους τῶν αὐτῶν ὁμομάτων ὦρθῶς ἀξιούσθαί τῇ

πόλει. Πάσα ἀνάγκη, ἐφη. Εἰς φαύλου γε αὐ, ἢν δ', ἐγώ, ὁ

θαυμάσιες, σκέμα ἐμπεπτώκαμεν περὶ ψυχῆς, εἰτε ἔχει τὰ τρία

eἰδή ταύτα ἐν αὐτῇ εἴτε μη. Οὐ πάνω μοι δοκούμεν, ἐφη, εἰς

φαύλοιν. ἵως γάρ, ὁ Σῶκρατες, τὸ λεγόμενον ἀληθές, ὅτι χαλέπα

20 τὰ καλὰ. Φαίνεται, ἢν δ' ἐγώ. καὶ εὐ γ' ἵσθι, ὁ Γλαύκων, ἢ D

ἡ ἐμὴ δόξα, ἀκριβῶς μὲν τούτο ἐκ τοιούτων μεθὸδων, οἷας νῦν ἐν

10. ὅτι II: ὅτε A. αὐτῇ II: ἐαυτῇ A.

435 a 6 μαίον—ἐλάττων: 'whether greater or smaller.' The insertion of ὅ

after ἐλάττων, suggested by Dobree, is

unnecessary.

435 b 14 τὰ αὐτὰ ταύτα ἐδή, ἐδή

used in this sense is slightly confusing

after ἐδή has just been applied to δικαιο-

σύνης; and τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων γενῶν would

lead us to expect γένη. The psychological

elements are called ἐδή, γένη, or μέρη:

ἐδή in 435 B, C, E, 439 E, γένη in 441 C,


Brandt l.c. p. 17 and Zeller 4 II 1, p. 845.

ἐδή ψυχῆς does not, strictly speaking, mean 'varieties of soul' but rather 'kinds'

belonging to or present in soul (ἐδή ἐν

ψυχῇ 439 E; see also on III 402 C), and

much the same is true of γένη. There

is some authority for holding that the

Pythagoreans before the time of Plato

recognised at least two 'parts' of soul—
an ἄλογον and a λογικόν (see Diels Dox.

Gr. pp. 389 f. and other evidence in

Rohde Psyche II 1 p. 170 n.); but Zeller 5

pp. 447, 448 may be right in regarding

the Pythagorean form of this theory as

post-Platonic.

435 c 16 φαύλον is of course ironi-

cal, although Glauc pretends to take it

seriously. Cf. (with J. and C.) 423 c—e,

426 A, b.

435 d 20 καὶ εὖ γ'—ἐξακριβῶς. The difficulties connected with this passage

have led to much discussion: see for

example Rettig Proleg. pp. 126 ff., Krohn

Pl. St. pp. 128 ff., 144, Pfeiderer Zur

Lösung etc. pp. 25, 73, Hirmer Entst. u.

Komp. etc. p. 518. τούτῳ in ἀκριβῶς μὲν

τούτῳ and in ἤ εἰπο τὸ τούτῳ ἄγωνα ought,

so far as grammar goes, to mean the question

whether the soul has τρία εἴδη or not.

But the μακροτέρα περιόδος in VI 509 b ff.,

where Plato expressly refers back to this

passage, eschews the psychological pro-

blem altogether. The μακροτέρα περιόδος

of Books VI—VII is in harmony with the

present enquiry in so far as it seeks to

determine the nature of Justice and the

other virtues (VI 504 D, 506 A), but it is

nowhere in the Republic expressly used

either to confirm or to overthrow the

triple division of soul which is here pro-

pounded. (The analysis of mental faculties

in VI 509 D—511 E is introductory to the

μακροτέρα περιόδος, not a result obtained

by it; nor has that analysis, strictly speak-

ing, any bearing on the question whether

soul has three εἴδη or not: cf. Pfeiderer

Zur Lösung etc. p. 25.) Krohn accordingly
holds that the ‘longer ways’ of iv and vi are different and distinct (Pl. St. p. 128); and Schleiermacher supposes (Einführung p. 71) that the πελούς ὁδός of iv is to be found in the psychology of the Timaeus; but that Plato meant the two ways to be identical is certain, for he explicitly says that they are (v1 504 B fl.). The only way out of these difficulties is to suppose that τάρο here was not intended by Plato to refer to the psychological, but to the ethical question, to which the psychological enquiry is introductory. τάρο must then be taken as δικαιοσύνης τε πέρι καὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ σοφίας δ ἐκαστῶν ἢπί (v1 504 A). This view becomes easy if we suppose that the words καὶ εὖ γε—ἐξέρχεται were not written by Plato immediately after he wrote 435 C, but at a later time, when v1 504 A—D was composed. It is in itself highly probable that the most important passages referring forward or backward to one another throughout the dialogue were either written together, or at all events revised by Plato side by side. Cf. Brandt l. c. p. 13 n. 3, where a kindred view is taken. In any case, we must adhere to our explanation of τάρο, if we would preserve the artistic unity of the Republic. See also on v1 504 A—D.

22 ἄλλη. See εἴρ. n. ἄλλη is in itself much better, to say the least, than ἄλλα, and is confirmed by ἄλλη μακροτέρα—περιοδος in v1 504 B. The corruption was easy, owing to the frequency of ἄλλα γὰρ.

435 e—439 e The presence of three kinds or characters in the city establishes the existence of the same characters in the individual; but the question is, do they exist in him as three separate elements, or not? Do we employ the whole soul in every psychical act, or do we learn with one part, feel angry with a second, desire with a third? In examining this question we begin by laying it down that the same thing cannot do or suffer opposites at the same time in the same part of itself, and with reference to the same thing. This rule is of universal application; apparent exceptions there may be, but never real. Desire and Aversion are opposites; and Hunger and Thirst are two specific varieties of Desire, relating to meat and drink, considered absolutely and without qualification. Now it sometimes happens that we are at one and the same moment both thirsty and unwilling to drink, in other words, experience both Desire and Aversion. But Desire and Aversion are opposites. They must therefore spring from different psychical elements. The truth is, in such cases it is one part of soul, the Rational part, which says ‘Refrain!’ another, the Appetitive, which bids us drink.

435 28 ὅτι γε—πόλεμοι. Broadly speaking, what Plato says is true, that the predominant character of a State depends on the predominant character of the individual citizens (cf. Bosanquet Companion pp. 147 f.): but it does not necessarily follow, because a city contains three psychologically different classes of citizens, that each of us (ἐκάστῳ ῥήματι) has within his soul the three corresponding psychological elements. In making this assertion, Plato relies upon the fundamental hypothesis of the Republic, viz. that the individual is a commonwealth writ small. See on Π 369 A. γε after ὅτι, though omitted in Π, is strictly appropriate, and warns us of a further point—τὸ δὲ ἐὰν χαλεπόν 436 A—on which agreement is not so easy.
30 εἰς, εἰ τις οἰηθεῖν τὸ θυμοειδὲς μὴ ἐκ τῶν ἱδιώτων ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν ἐγγεγονέναι, οἳ δὴ καὶ ἔχοντων ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν, οἵνοι οἱ κατὰ τὴν Θράκην τε καὶ Σκυθικὴν καὶ σχεδὸν τι κατὰ τὸν ἄνω τόπον, ἢ τὸ φιλομαθές, ὃ δὴ περὶ τὸν παρ' ἡμῖν μάλιστ' ἂν τις αἰτιάσασί τοῦτον, ἢ τὸ φιλοχρήματον, ὃ περὶ τοὺς τε Φοίνικας εἶναι καὶ τοὺς κατὰ Αἰγυπτόν φαίνει τις ἄν οὐχ ἤκιστα. Καὶ μᾶλα, ἐφι. Τοῦτο μὲν δὴ οὕτως ἔχει, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, καὶ οὐδὲν χαλεπὸν γνῶναι. Οὐ δὴτα. 5 XII. Τόδε δὲ ἦδη χαλεπὸν, εἰ τῷ αὐτῷ τοῦτων ἐκαστα πράττομεν ἢ τρισίν οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἄλλω· μανθάνομεν μὲν ἐτέρῳ, θυμομέθα, οὔτ' ἄλλο τόν ἐν ἡμῖν, ἐπιθυμοῦμεν δ' αὐτὶ τρίτῳ τοῖς περὶ τὴν τροφὴν τε καὶ γέννησιν ἡδονάς καὶ ὧν καὶ τοῦτων Β ἄδελφων, ἢ δῆλῳ τῇ ψυχῇ καθ' ἐκαστὸν αὐτῶν πράττομεν, ὅταν ὀρμήσωμεν. ταῦτ' ἐσται τὰ χαλεπὰ διορίσασθαι ἄξιος λόγουν. Καὶ ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ἐφη. Ἡδὲ τούτων ἐπιθυμοῦμεν αὐτὰ ὀρίζεσθαι, εἰτε τὰ αὐτὰ ἀλλήλους εἰτε ἐτερα ἐστι. Πῶς; Δήλοι ὅτι ταῦτων τὰναντία ποιεῖν ἡ πάσχειν κατὰ ταῦτον γε καὶ πρὸς ταῦτον ὄνοκ ἐθελήσει ἄμα, ὡστε ἂν που εὐρίσκομεν ἐν αὐτοῖς ταῦτα γνωρίσαμεν. 1. δ Ξ et in mg. q²: το ΑΠ q¹. 5. τοῦτον Ἀπέλτ (cum q²): τοῦτῳ ΑΠΞ q¹.

31 οἱ δὴ—αἰτίαν: 'that is, among peoples who bear this reputation.' ταὐτὴν is του ὕμοιος εἶναι. The phrase αἰτίαν ἔχειν is used both in a good and in a bad sense as the passive of αἰτίωμαι: for the good sense cf. (with Ast) Gorg. 503 B. What follows is (as Teichmüller observes Litt. Phkd. 1 p. 146) conceived in the vein of Hippocrates' enquiries as to the influence of climate on character: see his treatise de aere aquis locis 12 ff. ed. Kuehlewein, and cf. also Arist. Physiog. 2. 806b 15, Probl. XIV 8, 15, 16, and especially Pol. II 7. 1327b 23—33 with Sussemlhof's note. Aristotile for his part represents the Greek nature as the mean between the two extremes of oriental διανοητικῶν and τεχνικῶν and northern ὅμοιος. There is no good reason for supposing (with Steinhart Einleitung p. 191) that Plato was thinking of the wild races of the North when he instituted his second order of citizens, and of Egyptians etc. when he established his third. On the Phoenician and Egyptian characters cf. Laws 7.47 c ff. 32 τὸν ἄνω τόπον: 'the Northern region,' not 'the highland country' (L. and S.): cf. Arist. Meteor. II 5. 362a 33 τὸν ἄνω πόλον and Hdt. I 142 al. 33 αἰτίασιτο. εἶναι should be understood. For the construction cf. X 599 E. 436 Α 1 φιλοχρήματον is another name for ἐπιθυμητικόν, ὅτι διὰ χρηστάτω μάλασιν αποτελοῦνται αἱ τοιαῦτα ἐπιθυμιάς (IX 586 E). 5 τοῦτον ἕκαστα refers to the actions described in μανθάνομεν μὲν ἐτέρῳ etc. τοῦτο (see cr. n.) can only be defended by referring it (with Schneider) "to the subject of the triple predicate τὸ θυμοειδὲς, τὸ φιλομαθές, and τὸ φιλοχρήματος." There is a certain obscurity in this construction, and τοῦτον ἕκαστα prepares us for μανθάνομεν μὲν ἐτέρῳ, θυμομέθα δὲ etc. better than ἕκαστα alone would do. 436 B 12 ταύτον—ἄμα is the earliest explicit statement in Greek literature of the maxim of Contradiction; cf. Theae. 188 A, Phaed. 102 E, 103 B, Soph. 230 B and infra X 602 E. Plato may have been led to formulate it in opposition to Heraclitanism, which was supposed by some to be the negation of the principle (see Arist. Met. I 3. 1005b 24 and Theae. 152 D ff.), or against the Megarian puzzles.

(see RP. 7 § 226), or as a counterblast to both. Many of the sophistries of the Euthydemus turn on the violation of this law. In Aristotle's formula (Met. IC. 1005b 19) πρὸς ταῦτα does not occur; and Hartman would cancel καὶ πρὸς ταῦτων here and πρὸς τὸ αὐτῷ in 436 ε. on the ground that it means the same as κατὰ ταῦτα. But assuredly it does not. κατὰ ταῦτα is 'in the same part of it', as the instances presently cited show; while πρὸς ταῦτα is 'relatively to the same thing', viz. to something other than the subject of the proposition. πρὸς τὰ αὐτὰ and κατὰ ταῦτα are also both of them found in the parallel passage Soph. 230 β. πρὸς ταῦτων covers such cases as are adduced in Theaet. 154 C—155 С: si dice are πλείους πρὸς τέταρας, ἐλάττους πρὸς δώδεκα, but they are not ἐπιπέτα πρὸς ταῦτων. Cf. VII 524 A ff., and see also ἡ καὶ ἐπὶ in 437 A.

436 C 15 ήν is not precisely ἐστὶν ὥστε ποιμεν (Stallbaum); for the reference is actually to the past, and the past tense should be kept in translating it. See II 357 A. and cf. X 609 B. The so-called 'philosophic imperfect' gets credit for more than it deserves, because we are apt to suppose that the past excludes the present, which is not always true: cf. VI 497 C n.

ἐν by itself in replies is rare. It occurs (if the MSS are right) in Symp. 206 ε. Crat. 410 C, Men. 75 C. In the last two passages, Heindorf (on Crat. l.c.) is inclined to rearrange the speakers; but it is safer, both there and here, to keep the traditional arrangement. See on I 332 D.

436 D 23 χαριντίζοιτο—κομψευόμενος may refer to some Megarian quibbles on this subject. Zeno's argument to shew that ἡ ὁλόθος φερομενη ἐστηκεν proceeded on a different principle: see Arist. Phys. VI 9. 239b 30 ff.

25 ἡ καὶ—δρα. "Repetendum ως ex praegressis" (Stallbaum). Schneider connects δρα with ὅταν: in that case we must understand after τοῦτ δρα something like ὃ καὶ τοῦτο διον ἐστηκε τε ἁμα και κινεῖται. Stallbaum's view is the simpler, and should, I think, be preferred. I have accordingly removed the comma usually printed after κινοῦν—

26 ὡς οὐ—φερομενων. This clause has proved a source of great perplexity. Schneider suggests that μενοντων is a partitive genitive, ἐστι being omitted; Stallbaum, that τὰ ταῦτα is adverbial, like τοιοτορροτο; while, according to J. and C., τὰ ταῦτα "is to be taken as cognate accusative with the participles." Rather than accept any of these suggestions, it would, I think, be preferable to expunge τὰ ταῦτα altogether (with Ast), or to place it after ἄποδεξοιμεθα (as Gildersleeve suggests, A. J. Ph. VI p. 333 n. 2), or even perhaps to read τῶν ταουτων with Richards, although little short of a miracle could have corrupted
The following interpretation, which appears to me right, has not, so far as I know, been hitherto suggested. *tautā* goes closely with the partitive genitive *eautōn*, and is a predicate to *tā toautā*, which is also governed by *katā* (cf. the familiar usage with *ὅπερ* and a preposition in similes, e.g. *Theaet. 170 οὐ ὅπερ πρὸς θεοῦς έχειν τῶν ἐν ἑκάσταις ἀρχοντάς ετc.*: see on VIII 553). The meaning of which is easy to catch after the examples given above — forms a welcome preparation for *εὐθύ* τε καὶ περιφέρεις in the following clause.  

436 E 32. ἐστὶν. I formerly rejected this word (with Galen de Hippi et Plat. decr. ix Vol. p. 799 ed. Kühn, Herwerden, and Flor. U.). It is certainly more pointed to connect *ἐστάναι* with *φαίνειν ἄν*, and Glauco's *καὶ ὁρθὸς γε* (sc. *φαίνειν ἄν*) is easier without *ἐστίν*. But there is not sufficient ground for deserting the best MSS. For other examples of replies referring to the earlier part of the previous sentence see v 465 E n.

437 A 2 ἢ καὶ εἶν. I agree with Bekker, Schneider, and J. and C. in retaining these words, which Galen l.c. also read, and only a few inferior MSS (with the majority of editors) omit. If the words are spurious, no satisfactory theory has yet been advanced to account for their presence in the text; certainly no scribe is at all likely to have added them. A fuller and more emphatic statement of the maxim is natural enough after the emphasis with which the sentence opens (*οὖν—ἐκπλήξει*), and Schneider truly observes: "obiter et quodam modo praeter exspectationem eius" (i.e. *τού εὖν*). "mentionem fieri adiectum kai indicat, quod semel positum mox sine offensione repetitur, omissis vero verbis *καὶ εἶν* ante ποιήσεσιν non magis quam supra p. 436 B ante πάσχειν locum habitationem fuisse." ἀπάθω καὶ ποιήσεσιν have reference to actions, *εἶν* to a state, and *εἶν* naturally follows *ἀπάθω* because e.g. *πλεον ἔγνεσθαι* (an example of πάντως πάσχειν) leads up to *πλεον* εἶναι. It should also be observed that the meaning of *πρὸς τού ἀντί, which the discussion has not yet brought out, is best apprehended in examples not of πάσχειν or πάντως, but of εἶναι τάναντα; see 436 B n.

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**Δάλλος ομος κτλ.** The usual Greek idiom, as shewn for example in ἀλγώ τὴν κεφαλήν (cf. v 462 C ff.), rests on a psychological theory which is inconsistent with that now proposed by Plato. This may be one reason why Plato is at such pains to establish and emphasize his point.
to ato touton xymvaxinonta leluména ësesthai. 'Alla chrî, ëphi, taúta poiein.

B XIII. "Ar' oûn, 1 ën ð' ëgyw, to épivneun tò ananewein kai to éfíssthai tinos labein tò ἀπαρνεῖσθαι kai to prosoángesthai tò òpótheisthai, pánta ta tontat tòn ëvanastôn ãn álλhlois theîs eîte poîmátoin eîte pâthmátoin; oudein gar taúth dîoîseí. 'All', ÷ òs, tòn ëvanastwv. Tì oûn; ën ð' ëgyw: ìvîtìm kai peinvn kai òllos tûs építhumias, kai av to ëðelwv kai to boûlèsthai, ou pánta
taúta eîs èkeïnâ poi ãn ëðis tâ eidh tì ñûn ëi léxhênta; 1 oîon 15 ãei tênav tòu épivmuontos ðvûchyn ouîh ëtòi éfíssthai ðhîes èkeînouv ou ãn épivûmë; ë prosoángesthai tûtov ãn boûlëtwai oî genéståi, ãv ãv kal' Ïsou èheîxei tî òi porisîhêi, épivneun toutov prôs àvûn òwstere tûs ëróntovn, ëtoporegmênhn àvûtw tûs genêståwv; Ò'ëgów. Tì dè; tò ãbouleîn kai mê ëðelwv mêz' építhumwv ouk 20 eîs òt ãpôthein kai òpêlauñwv ãp' àvûtw kai eîs ãpânta tânantia

dè ëkeînous ðhîsmewv; ðwv 1 ñâр oû; Tûtwv ãh ñûtwv òxóntwn építhumwv tî ðhîsmew ëîna ëldos, kai ënârgvestatâs àvûtw tûtwv ãn te ðìsau kaloumew kai ãn peînav; Ðhîsmewv, ÷ ð' òs. Òûkouv


437 B 10 λαβεών has been doubted: but see III 407 B n.
11 ãn (see cr. n.) is better inserted after èvaníston than after ñeis (Ast) or òvòthra (Hartman). Stallbaum (who formerly read ãn ñeis) in his last edition acquireses, like Schneider, in the omission of ãn; but few will agree with him. I have noted the—certain or probable—omission of ãn in all or the best MSS in Phaed. 62 C, 109 E, Euthyd. 291 E (?), Ref. V 457 D, VII 516 E, VIII 558 D, where the omission is lipographical; also in Phaed. 72 E, Euthyd. 281 C, Crat. 309 E, 409 A, Alt. I 132 B, 133 E, Soph. 166 A, Phil. 47 V, H. Mai. 398 A. Sometimes (as occasionally after πω) the insertion is perhaps a poetical touch: see my note in Cl. Rev. IV p. 193.
14 kaî av. Krohn (Pl. St. p. 57) presses av too much when he says that ðèlwein and boûleîn are definitely represented as not belonging to the category of épîthumias, Plato expresses no opinion on this point; for av, 'also,' merely marks the introduction of two new terms.
437 C 18 ðèlwe—inëpivmûntos. The difference between ðèlwe, 'is willing,' and boûleîn, 'wishes,' is well brought out by the contrast between the more active process described in prosoángesthai and the passive assent which épivneun expresses. The point is missed by translating (with J. and C.) 'beckons this with a nod towards herself,' it is merely 'nods assent to this in reply to herself.' One part of the soul asks, and the other answers, the psychological process being compared to a kind of dialectic or question and answer inside the soul: see III 400 D n. and cf. Isocr. Antid. 256. For the confusion of épivmûntos and ëpivmûntos—ëróntos is found in several MSS—cf. [Erast.] 132 D, and Euthyphr. 14 C. With the analysis of desire in this passage cf. Phil. 34 E ff.
21 ãp' àvûtw. âph' àvûtw Hartman (with Vind. E only), but àpêlauñwv is active, not middle. The actions are described as though by a spectator ab extremo.
437 D 23 épivmuon: a defining genitive. For ëldos see III 402 C n.
25 τὴν μὲν ποτοῦ, τὴν δὲ εἴδωθε; Ναί. ἂρ' οὖν, καθ' ὅσον δίψα ἐστι, πλέονος ἂν τίνος ἢ οὔ λέγομεν ἐπιθυμία ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ εἰπῃ; οἶνον δίψα ἐστι δίψα ἀρά γε θερμοῦ ποτοῦ ἢ ψυχροῦ, ἢ πολλοῦ ἢ ὀλιγοῦ, ἢ καὶ ἐν λόγῳ ποιῶν τινὸς πῶματος; ἢ εἰν μὲν τις θερμότης τῷ δίψει προση, τῇ 1 τοῦ ψυχροῦ ἐπιθυμίαν προσπαρέ·

30 χοτ' ἂν, εὰν δὲ ψυχρότητι, τὴν τοῦ θερμοῦ; εὰν δὲ διὰ πλήθους παρουσίαν πολλὴ δίψα ἢ δίψα ἢ, τὴν τοῦ πολλοῦ παρέξεται, εὰν δὲ ὀλίγη, τὴν τοῦ ὀλιγοῦ; αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ δεψῆν ὁμι ὡς ποτε ἄλλον γένηται


25 ἄρ' οὖν κτλ. This discussion (down to 438 E) is apparently regarded by Susemihi (Gen. Ench. II pp. 163 f.) as unnecessary for the immediate purposes of the argument, but it is not so. Plato's object is to remove a difficulty which might be felt in holding that desire is restrained, and that by the logistikón. Why should thirst be restrained? an objector might ask. You yourself, Socrates, hold that (1) desire is always of the good; consequently (2) thirst is always the desire of good drink, and (3) is therefore always good. See 438 A, where the gist of the objection is contained. Socrates would reply: The fallacy lurks in (2), for 'good' drink is ambiguous. If 'good' drink means drink which desire thinks good, then (2) is true; if it means drink which is in reality good, (2) is not true. Desire cannot know what is good. We must therefore amend (2) by omitting 'good,' for in reality it is sometimes good and sometimes bad to drink. To what then is the final appeal? To the αὐγοτικόν. It is this which decides on each occasion whether it is really good or bad to drink, and gives or refuses its assent accordingly (439 c). Bosanquet takes a somewhat similar view (Companion p. 154). See also notes on 438 A.

27 οἶνον δίψα—ψυχροῦ. 'Thirst thirst is thirst—of hot drink, is it, or of cold?' For the genitive with δίψα (which Richards doubts) cf. 439 A. The repetition of δίψα is like that of ἐπιστήμη in 438 c, and makes the statement formal and precise.

437 E 29 ψυχροῦ—θερμοῦ. Hermann transposes these words and is followed by Stallbaum, Baiter, and others. "Palmaria emendatio," cries Stallbaum; whereas J. and C. hold that it "makes nonsense of the passage." It is not at first sight quite easy to decide between these conflicting views. The words εὰν μὲν τις—προσπαρέχωτ' ἂν clearly mean that the desire of cold drink is due to thirst plus heat, i.e. thirst supplies the desire for drink, and the heat present in the thirst supplies in addition (προσπαρέχως;) the desire of cold. see also on τοῦ δὲ—προσγεγραμμένα below. This is in harmony with common sense and also with the theory of Lys. 215 Ε ἐπιθυμεῖν γάρ τοῦ ποιῶν (sc. ἑαυτοῦ) ἐκασταθ. ἀλλ' οὐ τοῦ ὄμασθ αὐτοῦ τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἔπειρος ὑγρόν τὸ δὲ ψυχρὸν θερμοῦ κτλ.: cf. also Symp. 186 B. But εὰν δὲ—πολλὴ δίψα ἢ seems to proceed on the opposite or homoeopathic principle. The presence of πλῆθος produces a desire not for its opposite but for itself. The solution of the difficulty is to be found in the different character of the notions θερμότης and πλῆθος. θερμότης is something distinct from δίψα, though superadded to it, for which reason Plato does not use the expression θερμῶν δίψας; whereas πλῆθος is in reality πλῆθος δίψης, and πολλὴ δίψα, as experience shews, desires much drink. The common sense point of view is taken by Plato throughout, and is expressly justified by him in 438 E οὗ τὶ λέγω ὡς οἶνον ἢ, τοιαῦτα καὶ ἄλλα. For these reasons I heartily agree with the Oxford editors. Hermann's proposal is a product of the inveterate tendency to suppose that wherever we turn in Plato we rub against the theory of Ideas; but the use of παροφια here (in spite of Peiper's Ontol. Pl. pp. 502 ff., Zeller 11 1, p. 560 n., and many other critics) is not metaphysical, but logical, and παροφια is certainly not an Idea in this passage. See on this point 438 B, 438 ον.
епибυμία η οὕτε πέφυκεν, αὐτοῦ πώματος, καὶ αὐ τὸ πεινὴν βρῶματος; Οὕτως, ἑφή, αὐτὴ γε η ἐπιθυμία ἐκαστῇ αὐτοῦ μόνον ἐκάστου οὐ πέφυκεν, τοῦ δὲ τοιοῦ ἢ τοιοῦ τὰ προσγυγομένα. 35

Μήτου τις, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, ἀσκέπτους ἡμᾶς ὄντας θορυβῆσθαι, ὡς οὐδεὶς ποτοῦ ἑπιθυμεῖ, ἀλλὰ χρηστοῦ ποτοῦ, καὶ οὐ σίτου, ἀλλὰ χρηστοῦ σίτου: πάντες γὰρ ἁρὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἑπιθυμοῦσιν. εἰ οὖν ἡ δίψα ἐπιθυμία ἐστί, χρηστοῦ ἄν εἴῃ εἴτε πώματος εἴτε ἄλλου ὅτου ἐστὶν ἐπιθυμία, καὶ αἰ ἄλλων οὕτω. "Ἰσως γὰρ ἁρὰ αὐτὸν, ἑφη, δοκοὶ τι λέγειν 5

Β’ ὁ ταῦτα λέγων. Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, ὡσα γ’ ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα ἢ αἰα εἰναὶ τού, τὰ μὲν ποιὰ ἄττα ποιοῦ τινὸς ἐστιν, ὡς ἐμοί δοκεῖ, τὰ δ’ αὐτὰ ἐκάστα αὐτοῦ ἐκάστου μόνον. Οὐκ ἔμαθον, ἑφη. Οὐκ ἔμαθες, ἑφην, ὅτι τὸ μείζων τοιούτων ἐστὶν ὁδὸν τινὸς εἶναι μεῖζον; Πάνω γε. Οὐκόν τοῦ ἐλάττονος; Ναί. Τὸ δὲ γε πολὺ μεῖζον οὐ πολὺ ἐλάττονος. ἡ γὰρ; Ναί. "Αρ’ οὖν καὶ τὸ ποτὲ μεῖζον ποτὲ

33 αὐτοῦ πώματος: 'merely of drink'

35 τοῦ δὲ—προσγυγομένα: as e.g. 

38 A 1 μήτου has been doubted, and is not, apparently, elsewhere so used in Plato (Kügel de part. τοῦ etc. p. 11), though often in Tragedy. Here too it strikes, I think, a lofty note 'Wherefore let not any' etc. θορυβῆσθαι is also highly dramatic. All this parade is affected because it is a deduction from one of his own favourite commonplaces which Socrates is about to parody: see next note.

3 πάντες γὰρ κτλ. γὰρ ἄρα—α rare combination—occurs also in Prot. 315 D, Symp. 205 B (according to Ven. T, but the Bodleian reads γὰρ), Laws 698 d. ἄρα indicates that the objector is quoting another man's view (II 358 c n), and the doctrine that all men desire the good was in point of fact a common-place in the Platonic school. See for example Gorg. 468 A, Men. 77 c ff., Symp. 204 E and Rep. III 413 A, vi 505 D. Here, as always, Socrates would of course concede that all men desire the good; but we need the λογιστικοὶ in each act of desire to specify what the good really is (437 D n). Moreover, according to our present theory, the desire of good drink is the product of two desires, viz. (1) thirst or the desire of drink, and (2) the desire of good. That (2) is in a certain sense universal, does not alter the fact that the two desires are logically distinct. See on τοῦ δὲ—προσγυγομένα 437 E.

438 B 8 αὐτὰ ἐκάστα. αὐτὰ is ἱστα, i.e. by themselves, alone, without qualification: cf. αὐτὰ—μ��α αὐτῶν μόνων in D and αὐτῶν πώματος etc. 437 E. Plato now proceeds to establish the universality of his rule. It is obvious that the reasons for believing the rule true of ἐπιθυμία are confirmed if we can shew that it is true universally. The phraseology of this passage—πλήθους παρουσία, αὐτὰ ἐκάστα, αὐτὴ ἐπιθυμία—
is no doubt interesting for the light which it throws on the origin of the terminology adopted in the Theory of Ideas (cf. vi 507 B n) but we could make no greater mistake than to suppose that Plato is here speaking of hypostasized Ideas. Cf. Pfeiderer Zur Lösung etc. p. 19.

9 τὸ μεῖζον—μεῖζον. Cf. (with Stallbaum) Charm. 168 B ff., where the nature of relative notions is similarly defined: also Gorg. 476 Β ff.
έλαττονος, καὶ τὸ ἑσόμενον μείζον ἑσομένου ἐλάττονος; ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν; ἤ δὲ ὅσ. Καὶ τὰ πλείω δὴ πρὸς τὰ ἐλάττων καὶ τὰ δυπλάσια πρὸς τὰ ἡμίσεα καὶ πάντα τὰ τουαῦτα, καὶ αὐτὶ βαρύτερα πρὸς 15 κοψφότερα καὶ θάπτω πρὸς τὰ βραδύτερα, καὶ ἐτι γε τὰ θερμὰ πρὸς τὰ ψυχρὰ καὶ πάντα τὰ βροιδύτερα, καὶ τὸν βροιδύτερον τοῦτον ὅμοιο ἄρ' οὖν, οὕτως ἔχει; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Τί δὲ τὰ περὶ τὰς ἑπιστήμας; οὐκ ὁ αὐτὸς πρόπος; ἑπιστήμη μὲν αὐτῇ μαθήματος αὐτοῦ ἑπιστήμη ἐστὶν, ἢ ὅτι δὴ δει θείη ἡ ἑπιστήμην, ἑπιστήμη δὲ τις καὶ ποια τις ποιοῦ τινὸς καὶ τινὸς. Ἴηγὼ δὲ τὸ τοιόνυν ὅ, τι, ἕπειθη οἰκίας ἐργασίας. 18 ἑπιστήμη ἑγένετο, διήνεγκε τῶν ἄλλων ἑπιστήμων, ὡστε οἰκοδομική κληθῆναι; Τί μὲν; ἢ ἂρ' οὖ τῷ ποια τις εἶναι, οἷς ἓπείρα ὀδύμην τῶν ἄλλων; Ναὶ. Οὔκοιν ἑπείθη ποιοῦ τινὸς, καὶ αὐτῇ ποια τις ἑγένετο; καὶ αἱ οὖν ὑπὸ τέχνας τε καὶ ἑπιστήμαι; ἢ ἐστὶν 25 οὐτως.

XIV. Τοῦτο τοιοῦτο, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, φαθί με τότε βουλήσθαι λέγειν, εἰ ἄρα νῦν ἔμαθες, ο springfox ἐστὶν οἷα εἶναι του, αὐτα μὲν μόνα αὐτῶν μόνων ἐστὶν, τὼν δὲ ποιῶν τίνων 1 ποιὰ ἀττα. καὶ οὐ τι Ε λέγω, ὡς, οὖν ἄν ἢ, τοιαῦτα καὶ ἐστίν, ἢς ἅρα καὶ τῶν ὑγιεινῶν 30 καὶ νοσσωδῶν ἡ ἑπιστήμη ὑγείης καὶ νοσοῦσης καὶ τῶν κακῶν καὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν κακῆ καὶ ἀγαθῆ· ἀλλ' ἑπείθη οὐκ αὐτοῦ ὑπερ ἑπιστήμη ἐστὶν ἐγένετο ἑπιστήμη, ἀλλὰ ποιοῦ τινὸς, τοῦτο δ' ἢν 20. οἰκίας Ε. οἰκίας ΑΠπ.

438 C 15 τὰ βραδύτερα. Stallbaum and others read βραδύτερα without the article (on slight ms authority), but praestal lectio difficilior. Cf. εἰτε ἐγχεῖνον εἰτε τῶν ᾑγων vi 491 D. τὰ is certainly not wrong, and the variety of expression is pleasing: 'and heavier also to lighter, and swifter to that which is slower—do they not stand to one another in this relation?' i.e. such that if βαρύτερα, for example, is qualified, κοψφότερα is qualified too.

18 ἑπιστήμη μὲν αὐτή. 'Knowledge and nothing more,' as opposed to knowledge plus some specification, e.g. astronomical knowledge, literary knowledge etc. It is interesting and instructive to study Parm. 134 A ff. side by side with this passage. There αὐτῆ ἑπιστήμη has for its object τῷ δ ἐστὶν ἄλλῃθες, ι. e. the Ideas; here we do not soar so high, for μαθήματος αὐτοῦ is only 'learning and nothing more' (e.g. physical learning, classical learning, etc.

438 D 20 ἑπείθη—κληθῆναι. Plato's theory is very clearly conceived. οἰκοδομική ἑπιστήμη is a combination of αὐτή ἑπιστήμη and οἰκοδομία: ἑπιστήμη correlates with μάθημα, οἰκοδομία with οἰκίας ἐργασία, so that ἑπιστήμη οἰκοδομική is ἑπιστήμη οἰκίας ἐργασίας μαθήματος: it is therefore ποιοῦ τινὸς (i.e. in this case οἰκοδομικοῦ) μαθήματος. Cf. note on τοῦ δὲ—προγυνώμενα in 437 E.

438 E 29 τῶν ὑγιείων καὶ νοσσω- δῶν. If we carry the analysis less far than Plato, we can still make the added determinants the same by saying that ιατρική ἑπιστήμη is of ιατρικῶν μάθημα. But this will not suit with κακή, for 'bad knowledge' is not 'knowledge of bad things'; nor does it—in many cases—apply to desires. Cf. 437 E μ.

31 αὐτοῦ ὑπερ—ἐστὶν: i.e. μαθήμα- τος αὐτοῦ. αὐτοῦ is emphatic and con- trasted with ποιοῦ τινὸς.
υγιείων καὶ νοσόδες, ποιὰ δὴ τις συνέβη καὶ αὐτὴ γενέσθαι, καὶ
tοῦτο αὐτὴν ἐποίησεν μηκέτι ἐπιστήμην ἀπλῶς καλείσθαι, ἀλλὰ
τοῦ ποιοῦ τινὸς προσγενομένου ἰατρικῆν. Ἔμαθον, ἔφη, καὶ μοι 35

36 τὸ δὲ δῆ διψῶς κτλ. Here begins
the application of the argument on Relativity.

439 Α ι οὗ τοῦτων κτλ.; i.e. οἷον
θήσεις τὸ δίψως εἶναι τοῦτο, ὅπερ ἐστὶ,
tοῦτον τὸν τινὸς στίμων esse id, quod est,
inter ea s. lampanam unum eorum, quae
dicamus sunt (Schneider). We must,
I think, acquiesce in this interpretation,
if the text is sound; but there is
great difficulty in taking εἶναι twice over, as
Schneider virtually does (is that which
it is, and is one of, etc.). I am
strongly inclined that Plato wrote οἷον τοῦ-
tων θήσεων τῶν τινῶν, <κἂν τινὸς> εἶναι
tοῦτο ὑπὲρ ἑστὶν κτλ. With this emenda-
tion the meaning is: ' Well now, about
thirst, will you not place it in this category
of things relative, and hold that it is what
it is—that is, of course, thirst—relatively
to something? Yes, said he, relatively
to drink,' τὰ τινῶς ἤτοι. ' the things relative
to something' for ' the category of things
relative,' is further explained in κἂν τινὸς
—ὑπὲρ ἑστὶν. ἔγωγε answers the first
part of Socrates' question, and πῶματος
γε the second. For other views on this
passage see App. III.

4 δίψως δ᾽ οὖν κτλ. δ᾽ οὖν = ' however,'
as in I 337 C. The reading δ᾽ αὖ
(q and some other inferior mss) is un-
pleasantly cacophonous before αὖτο.

439 Β τὸ οὖσα δῆ—πράττειν. See
cr. ii. Ast's emendation πράττει is per-
fable to inserting αὖ or changing δὴ to ἄν
(with Schanz). The particle δὴ could ill
be spared. The infinitive πράττει could be
read by Galen (de Hipp. et Plat. decr. v p. 488
ed. Kühn) and two inferior mss. Those
who retain the μσ reading suppose that
ἄν is carried on from ἐτερον ἄν ἐλθ.; but
the instances cited in support (I 352 Ε,
11 360 C, 381 D, 111 398 A) are very much
easier than this. περὶ τὸ αὖτον refers of
course to the object of the action in
question: πῶμα for instance in a case of
thirst. Note that Plato betrays a sense of
the unity of soul when he uses the
expressions αὐτὴ—διψῶσαν, and τὸ γε
αὐτὰ—πράττει. So also in D below ψ
λογίζεται sc. ἡ ψυχή. See on 435 A ff.

13 αὐτοῦ. See 428 A n. The illustra-
tion, as Bosanquet conjectures, may
have been suggested by Heraclitus' ἀληθ-
τροπός ἀριστοὶ δικαστέρω τῶν καὶ λύρας
(Fr. 45 Byw.).
15 προσαγορέμεν. | Παντάπαιν μὲν οὖν, ἐφί. Πότερον δὲ φώμεν ζ 
κινας ἄρτιν ὅτε διψῶντας οὐκ ἐθέλειν πιεῖν; | Καὶ μᾶλα γ', ἐφί, πολλοὺς καὶ πολλάκις. Τί οὖν, ἐφίνυ ἐγὼ, φαίν τις ἄν τούτων πέρι; οὐκ ἐνείαι μὲν ἐν τῇ ψυγῇ αὐτῶν τὸ κελευθ., ἐνείαι δὲ τὸ κωλὺν πιεῖν, ἄλλο ὡς καὶ κρατοῦν τὸν κελεύοντος; | Ἕμονε, 20 ἐφί, δοκεῖ. 'Αρ' οὖν οὐκ τὸ μὲν κωλὺν τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐγγύνεται, ὅταν ἐγγύνησαι, ἔκ λογισμοῦ, | τὰ δὲ ἀγοντα καὶ ἐλκοντα διὰ παθημάτων τε καὶ νοσημάτων παραγίνεται; | Φαίνεται. Οὐ δὴ ἀλόγως, ἴν δ' ἐγὼ, αξιωσομεν αὐτὰ διίτα τε καὶ ἔτερα ἄλληλων εἶναι, τὸ μὲν φ' λογίζεται λογιστικῶν προσαγορέυοντες τῆς ψυγῆς, 25 τὸ δὲ ἐὰν ἐκ τοῖς καὶ πιεῦ καὶ διψῆ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιθυμίας ἐπτόηται ἀλόγιστον τε καὶ ἑπιθυμητικῶν, πληρώσεων τυγω καὶ ἥδους ἐταίρων. Οὐκ, ἀλλ' εἰκότως, 1 ἐφί, ἡγοίμεδ' ἀν οὕτως. Ε

21. ἐγγύνησαν conicicit Schneider: ἐγγύνησαν codd. 27. ἐταίρων II: ἔτερον Λ.

439 c 16 οὐκ ἔθελεν: 'refuse'; cf. infra τὸ κωλὺν—κρατούν τὸν κελεύοντος. So also Bosanquet 'decline to drink.' 18 ἐνείαι δὲ. The repetition of ἐνείαι with μὲν and δὲ has almost the force of a conjunction; cf. Phaed. 83 A ἀπάτης μὲν μεστῇ ἢ διὰ τῶν διμώματων σκέψεως, ἀπάτης δὲ ἢ διὰ τῶν ὀρῶν. It is quite unnecessary to insert καὶ after δὲ (with Ast and Hartman). For the verbal play in κελευθ. —κωλὺν cf. ι11 406 B n.

21 ὅταν ἐγγύνησα—παραγίνεται. See cf. n. The present ἐγγύνησα is, I think, necessary, and the corruption (through ἐγγύνησα) easy enough. ὅταν ἐγγύνησα i could scarcely mean ἔκόστα, which is the meaning here required. The subject to ἐγγύνησα is τὸ κωλὺν. It is not hinted that 'all men have not right reason' (J. and C.), but only that there is not on every occasion to be distinguished from the appetite principle itself.

439 D 24 λογιστικον. The φιλοσοφον of 11 and 111 shewed itself in moral rather than in intellectual relations: see ι1 376 B n. λογιστικὸν, though as yet directed only to moral questions, is intellectual more than moral. Intellect gradually absorbs its predominance over will until in Books vi and vii it achieves its final triumph. Cf. 439 e, 441 e nn.

439 e—441 c There is also a third element or part of soul, that which we call the element of Spirit. It is distinct from the Appetitive element, with which, indeed, it frequently contends. Its function is to support the Rational part of the soul. In a man of noble character the spirited element is quiescent or the reverse in accordance with the commands of Reason. It must not however be identified with Reason; for it is present in children and the lower animals, whereas Reason is not. Homer also recognises that the two elements are distinct.

439 e ff. The analogy between the righteous city and the righteous soul is
continued throughout this section. It should be noted however that the parallel is no longer quite exact. The difference between θυμωδεῖς and λογιστικῶν in the soul is greater than that between auxiliary and rulers in the State: for the λογιστικῶν is not a select part of the θυμωδεῖς—as the rulers are of the soldiers—but something generically distinct from it. Otherwise the analogy holds (with the reservations mentioned on 435 A). Cf. Steinhard Einleitung p. 192 and Susemihl Generalw. p. 160.

439 ε 29 τὸ δὲ δὴ τοῦ θυμοῦ κτλ. Hitherto θυμωδεῖς has been chiefly the source of courage and the natural anti-thesis of φιλόσοφοι (II 375 A ff., III 410 D, 411 C). It now enters on a wider sphere as the ally of λογιστικῶν, and becomes thus far, more intellectual, as Krohn points out: note also the ὅρθος διὰ of 430 B. Its ethical connotation is also intensified; for it is not now simply spirit, but the sentiment of moral indignation at everything evil—"ein edler Unwillen über alles Schlechte" (Krohn Pl. St. p. 55)—everything which tends to destroy the πολιτεία ἐν ἡμῖν. It becomes in short, as Brandt (Zur Entwick. d. Pl. Lehr. v. d. Sedenheilen. p. 18) says truly enough though ponderously, "leiden-schaftlicher Selbsterhaltungs- und Selbstvervollkommnungstrieb." Cf. Simon der Begriff der Seele bei Plato p. 110, and see also on II 375 A.

30 ἰῶς κτλ. The θυγατέων εἰδών ψυχῆς of the Timaeus includes both the θυμωδεῖς and the ἐπιθυμητικῶν: see 69 C ff. and cf. Pol. 309 C. Similarly in the Phaedrus the two lower faculties are figured as the two horses, and the highest as the charioteer of the soul's chariot (253 D): cf. Simon l.c. p. 109 nn.

31 ποτε—τοῦτο. The antecedent of τοῦτο is τί: 'having once heard something I trust to this,' i.e. 'I rely on an incident which I once heard.' πιστεύω means that he relies on it for a proof; and ὥς ἢρα goes with ἀκούσας. So Schneider correctly explains the Greek. The precise force of πιστεύω τοῦτο has, I think, been missed by most of those who have suspected corruption. For τί there have been various conjectures: ἔν (Madvig), ἔν (Liebhold Pl. Jahrh. 1888 p. 110), τίνος (Zeller Archiv f. Gesch. d. Phil. II p. 694)—all superfluous, and the first two very weak; while Campbell suggests that ὥς has dropped before πιστεύω, taking τοῦτο to refer to Glauco's suggestion. But in that case τοῦτο would be necessary.

32 Λεοντῖος. 'Ad hunc Leontium eiusque insanam cupiditatem spectat depravatissimum Theopompi comici ταπεινῶν locus.' (Herwerden Mn. N.S. x. p. 346). The fragment is emended by Kock (Com. Att. Frag. I p. 739) into Δεωτροφίδης ὁ τρίμενος (trium librarum homo, i.e. levissimus) Δεωστίφων eúχρως τε φαίνεται χαρίες ὡφαντερ νεκρός. Bergk was the first to connect the two passages.

υπὸ—ἐκτός: 'close to the outer side of the North wall.' Cf. (with Stallbaum) Lys. 203 A τὴν ἔξω τείχους ύπ' αὐτὸ τοῦ τείχους. The North wall was the outer of the two walls connecting Athens with the Piraeus; the other, or South wall, was called τὸ διὰ μέσου τείχους, because it lay between the βόρειον and the Φαληρικόν, which connected Athens and the Phalerum. See Gorg. 455 Ε and the other authorities cited by Milchhöfer Schriftenquellen zur Topographie von Athen pp. CXIII ff., and Curtius u. Kaupert Ατλας von Athen Bl. II.

33 παρὰ—κείμενοι: 'lying by' or 'near the executioner'; not of course 'at the executioner's' as has been suggested. When seen by Leontius, the hangman was engaged in throwing the bodies into the pit (ὅρνιμα or βάραβρον, from which he was often called ὁ ἐπὶ s. πρὸς τῷ ὀρνιματί). The βάραβρον into which the bodies of executed criminals
were thrown, was a deep ravine outside the walls, in the deme Kerámata. Leontius would pass near it, just before entering the city (probably by the Melanippe sūlai); see Curtius u. Kaupert l.c. Bl. 11. The place is still pointed out to visitors to Athens on the western declivity of the Hill of the Nymphs. For the ancient authorities see Milchhöfer l.c. pp. 1—11. Various suggestions have been made for δημιώ. Valckenier's δημιω is a coinage of his own, and otherwise objectionable; Αυκέλω (also Valckenier) is topographically impossible, and so is Διομείω (Hemsterhuis), if it has anything to do with the Διομήδης πυλή. The explanation which I have given seems also to have been held by Milchhöfer, for he quotes the present passage among the authorities for the βάρβαρον.

440 a 3 οι κακοδαίμονες. 'Confound you!'

5 τῆς ὀργῆς. ο reads τον θυμόν, which Ast and others have preferred. But, as Schneider observes, ὀργή is to θυμός, as ἐπιθυμίαι to ἐπιθυμητικόν. If anger fights with desire, the source of anger, θυμοειδές, must be different from that of desire, ἐπιθυμητικόν. This is the whole moral of the anecdote, which is intended to establish the difference between θυμοειδές and ἐπιθυμητικόν only, not also λογιστικόν.

440 B 11 ταῖς δ ἐπιθυμήμασι κτλ. αὐτόν is τὸν θυμόν. ἀντιπάτται "ad singularem aliquid actionem referendum est, quam ratio suspicere eaque in re sibi repugnare prohibet, quasi dictum sit: μὴ δείν τι πράττει καὶ τοῦτο ὅντων ἀντιπάτται" (Schneider). The words γενομένου τοῦ τοιοῦτον refer to ταῖς— κοινωνήσατα. The anacoluthon is an easy one. Plato means merely that θυμός does not unite with the desires against the reason. For αἱροῦτος λόγον cf. X 604 c. n. On other views on this passage consult App. iv.

440 C 15 ὁσω—ἡ. The restriction will be noted. It is not ὁ γενναῖος who, as the saying is, hate those whom they have injured.
of an ádikeíathai tís ἦγῆται, οὐκ ἐν τούτῳ ξεῖ τε καὶ χαλεπαίνει,
καὶ ξυμμαχεῖ τῷ δοκοῦντι δικαίον, καὶ διὰ τὸ πεινὴν καὶ διὰ τὸ 20
ῥῆγον καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα πάσχειν, καὶ υπομένων νικᾶ, καὶ
οὐ λήγει τῶν γενναιῶν, πρὶν ἂν ἡ διαπράξῃ ἡ τελευτήσῃ ἡ
ώσπερ κύων ὑπὸ νομέων ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου του παρ᾽ αὐτῷ ἀνακληθεῖς
πραώθη; Πάνω μὲν οὖν, ἐφί, ἐοικε τοῦτο φ λέγεις: καϊτοί γ´ ἐν
τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ πόλει τοὺς ἐπικούρους ὡσπερ κύναις ἔθεμεθα ὑπηκόους 25
τῶν ἀρχόντων ὡσπερ ποιμένων πόλεως.

Καλὸς γὰρ, ἢν δ᾽ ἐγὼ, νοεῖς ὃ βουλομαι λέγειν. ἀλλ᾽ ἡ πρὸς τοῦτο καὶ τὸδὲ ἐνθυμεῖ;

Ε Τὸ ποίμ; Ὁτι τοιναντίων ἡ ἀρτίως ἡμῖν χαίνεται περὶ τοῦ
θυμειδοῦς. τὸτε μὲν γὰρ ἐπιθυμητικὸν τι αὐτὸ φόμεθα εἰναι, νῦν
de τολλοῦ δεὲ φαμέν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς 30
στάσει τίθεσθαι πάντα πρὸς τὸ λογιστικόν.
Παντάπασιν, ἐφί. 'Αρ' οὖν έτερον ὃν καὶ τούτου, ἡ λογιστικὸν τι εἰδός, ὡστε μη τρία,

ομ. q. 27. ἕ Ast: el codd. 29. αὐτὸ Ξγ: αὐτῷ ΑΠ.
32. τοῦτον Ξ: τοῦτον ΑΠ q. τι Π: ομ. Α.

19. οὐκ ἐν τούτῳ κτλ.: 'does not he then fume and chafe—and fight on the side of what he believes to be just—both at hunger and at cold and all such injunctions, and hide his ground and conquer, abating not his noble indignation, until he has either achieved his purpose, or perished, or has been called back and soothed by the reason within him, as a herdsman recalls his dog?' The words καὶ διὰ τὸ πεῖνην-πάσχειν must be taken with ξεῖ τε καὶ χαλεπαίνει, but possibly καὶ ξυμμαχεῖ τῷ δοκοῦντι δικαίον has been displaced, and we should read ξεῖ τε καὶ χαλεπαίνει καὶ διὰ τὸ πεῖνην-πάσχειν, καὶ ξυμμαχεῖ τῷ δοκοῦντι δικαίον, καὶ υπομένων κτλ. 

νικᾶ is not merely 'tries to conquer' or 'persecutes' (Schneider), but 'conquers,' in spite of the pardonable inconsistency of this translation with τελευτήσῃ—πραώθη. τῶν γενναιῶν cannot mean 'in the case of the noble.' (P. Shorey A. Ζ. Ph. xvi p. 237), unless θυμός is the subject of λῆγει, which is not, I think, the case. The meaning is caught the more readily by reason of οὐκ ὑπὸ ἡ γενναιότερος ἢ in c, and we ought not to substitute ἀγανάκτητον or the like with Richards. See, on the whole passage App. v.

440 D 24. καίτοι νετ 'and surely' has no adversative force here. See Kugler de part. τοι ετ. p. 18. Hartman emends, but see on I 331 E.

27. ἕ. See cr. n. el in direct interrogation is unclassical, and ἐπιστὸς cannot be supplied. Nor can el well be taken as conditional (with Stallbaum) and τὸ ποίμ as a sudden interruption. For the confusion of εἰ and ἕ see Introd. § 5.

440 E 28. ἀρτίως, 439 E.

31. τίθεσθαι κτλ.: 'defends the rational element.' I have retained the accusative on the strength of ΠΑΙ ΠΑΙ 9. λάβοντο τοὺς δύναμιν τὰ δέλτα ὑπὸ τῆς έλέους -ερφ -ος καὶ παρακαλοῦ <ν> τοι καὶ τους στρατιῶτας τίθεσθαι πρὸς τὴν πόλιν. The inscription dates from about 280 B.C. Other editors read τοῦ λογιστικοῦ (with Ξ alone among the mss), but do not cite any example of the phrase τίθεσθαι τὰ δέλτα πρὸς τινα, although πρὸς with the genitive is common enough in similar expressions. Thucydides (II 2. 4) has παρὰ with the accusative like πρὸς here. The original meaning of the idiom was to take up a position in arms by the side of: see Schneider's Xen. Anabasis pp. 537—540 and the commentators on Thuc. l.c. For the metaphor cf. Arist. Pol. Allh. 8. 5. F. K. Hertlein (quoted in Hartman) also defends the accusative, citing Xen. Polior. 4. 3 έτερον τὰ δέλτα, παρὰ τοὺς πολεμίους ὡς παρὰ φίλους.
441 A 3 ἔδυν μή κτλ. See App. IV.
441 B 11 ἐκί: 'in the other place,' viz. 111 390 D. If Kühn is to be trusted, Galen (Vol. v. p. 500) does not, as Hartman asserts, omit the word; and there is no good reason for suspecting corruption.

441 C—443 B Thus we see that the soul contains within itself the same kinds or elements as our city. It follows that the individual is wise, brave etc. in the same way and in virtue of the same internal elements. We are therefore just when each of our psychological factors does its own work. Reason should rule, with Spirit for its obedient ally; and both of them together, harmonised by music and gymnastic, will control Desire, and ward off foreign enemies from soul and body. The individual is brave in virtue of the element of Spirit, if in spite of pain and pleasure that element continues faithful to the commands of Reason touching what should and should not be feared; wise, by reason of the part of soul that rules and knows; temperate, through the harmony of ruled and ruler on the question which shall rule; and just, in virtue of our oft-repeated principle. We may examine our view of Justice by various tests derived from the popular connotation of the word, and we shall find that we are right.

441 C ff. The parallel between the City and the Soul is maintained throughout this section. Like the City, the Soul is also wise and brave, in virtue of the wisdom and courage of its parts, and temperate and just for similar reasons (see on τὶ τὴν πόλιν προσαγορεύεις 428 D); the relation between logistìc, themoièdès, and episthēmētikôν is the same as that between the three orders of the city (see however on 442 C); and the specific virtues are defined in the same way. Finally, as Justice in the State was at last identified with Righteousness or Moral Perfection, so likewise is Justice in the soul (442 E—443 B).

441 C 18 όμολογεται. όμολογεταί (sic) ἡ; όμολογηταί ὁ (with Stob. Flor. 9. 64). The present, 'we pretty well agree,' is satisfactory enough.
ένδος ἐκάστου τῷ ψυχῇ γένη ἐνείναι καὶ ἵσα τὸν ἀριθμὸν. ἩΕΣΤΙ ταῦτα. Οὐκόν ἐκεῖνο νέ κη ἀναγκαίων, ὃς πόλις ἦν σοφῆ καὶ ὦ, 20 οὕτω καὶ τὸν ἰδιωτὴν καὶ τούτῳ σοφὸν εἶναι; Τῇ μη; Καὶ ὃ δὴ ἂν ἄνδρειος ἰδιώτης καὶ ὦς, τούτῳ καὶ πόλις ἦν δικαία. Καὶ τούτῳ πᾶσα ἀνάγκη. ἩΕΛΛ' οὗ πῇ μὴν τούτῳ ἐπιλεξίμεθα, ὥτι ἐκεῖνη γε τὸ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἐκαστῶν ἐν αὐτῷ πράττει τριῶν ὀντῶν γενῶν δικαία ἦν. Οὐ μοι δοκοῦμεν, ἐφη, ἐπιλεξίσθαι. Μνημονευτέον ἄρα ἤμων, ὅτι καὶ Ἐ ἡμῶν ἐκαστος, ὅτου ἄν τὰ αὐτοῦ ἐκαστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ πράττη, οὕτως δίκαιος τε ἐσται καὶ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττων. Καὶ μᾶλα, ἃ δὲ ὅσον μνημονευτέον. Οὐκόν τὸ μὲν λογιστικὸν ἀρχεῖον προσήκει, σοφὸν ὄντος καὶ ἐχοντι τὴν ὑπέρ ἀπάσης τῆς ψυχῆς προμηθείαν, τὸ δὲ θυμοειδεῖ ὑπηκοόν εἶναι καὶ ξυμμάχω τούτῳ; Πάνω γε. ἩΡ' οὖν οὐχ, ὥσπερ ἐλέγομεν, μουσικῆς καὶ γυμναστικῆς κράσις σύμφωνα αὐτά ποιήσει, τὸ μὲν ἐπιτείνουσα καὶ τρέφουσα λόγους | τε καλοῖς καὶ μαθημασιν, τὸ δὲ ἀνείσα παραμυθουμένη, ἡμερούσα ἀρμονία τε καὶ ῥυμῶν; Κομιδῇ γε, ἃ δ' ὅσ. Καὶ τούτῳ δὴ οὕτω τραφέντε καὶ ὃς ἀληθῶς τὰ αὐτῶν μαθών καὶ παίδευσιν προστατηθέσετον τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ, δ' ἂν πλείστον τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν 5 ἐκαστῷ ἐστὶ καὶ θρημάτων φύσει ἀπληστότατον; δ' τηρήσετον, μὴ τῷ πάιπλασθαι τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα καλουμένων ἱδρυμὶ πολὺ.


441 D D 22 ἄνδρειαν. See cr. n., and for the error in A cf. ix 573 B n.

23 ἐκεῖν is intransitive, and not transitive as D. and V. suppose.

441 Ε 34 ὥσπερ ἐλέγομεν. ΙΙΙ 411 Ε —412 Λ. This passage enables us to identify the λογιστικοῦ with the φιλόσοφον of Books II—III. See on 439 D, and cf. Krohn Pl. St. p. 57.

35 τὸ μὲν: i.e. τὸ λογιστικὸν, as τὸ δὲ is τὸ θυμοειδές. As the subject to the participles is κράσις, we see again that Plato did not intend 'Music' and Gymnastic each to affect one part of Soul exclusively. It is curious however that the participles here describe the effect of music only: for it is music (not gymnastic) which επιτείνει τὸ φιλόσοφον: see on ὅπως ἂν—προσήκοντος ΙΙΙ 411 E. The partial ignoring of gymnastic in this passage is perhaps premonitory of the intellectualism of VI and VII; cf. on 439 D and E.

442 Α 2 ἀνείσα κτλ.: 'slackening the other by soothing address, taming it,' etc. The three participles are not co-ordinate, but παραμυθουμένη explains the action of ἀνείσα. It is unnecessary to desert the best MSS (as I once did) and read ἀνείσα, παραμυθουμένη καὶ ἡμερούσα with Ξ n. and the older editors.

5 προστατήσετον κτλ. Bekker's emendation—see cr. n.—is now generally accepted. τούτω means λογιστικὸν καὶ θυμοειδές: so also in B below. On δὴ πλείστον etc. see ΙΙ 379 C n.

7 καλουμένων κτλ. καλουμένων is said because such pleasures are no true
pleasures: cf. 1 336 A 4 n. and (for the implication itself) ix 583 b ff., Phil. 36 c ff. On oüv aì see 426 e n. The imagery of this passage suggests that the ἐνδυναμικών is a sort of θηρίων: cf. ix 588 e ff.

442 b 9 ὧν—γένει: sc. ἄρχειν. 'Daivus causam indicat, cur tertiae parti non conveniat dubius relinquis praesesse et imperare, eamque in ipsius genere et in-dole positam demonstrat' (Schneider). If this is the meaning, we should expect φῶς rather than γένει. Perhaps Plato wrote γενών (so q Flor. U, Stallbaum etc.): cf. γένη in 441 c. To προσήκον Campbell prefers προσήκειν, but the present (προσήκον sc. εἰσίν) is better here.

12 φυλαττοῖτην. The two higher parts of soul are to be φιλάκες both of the lower part and (in a different sense) 'also' (kaif) 'of external enemies': cf. III 415 D, E. Dobreb's φυλαττολαθήν fails to give its proper force to καὶ before τοῦ ἐξουθένων. For φυλάττω used in this way cf. II 307 A: οἴκθ αὐτὸν ἐφ' ὑπάρκει τοις μη ἀδικεῖν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς αὐτῷ τὴν ἔκαστος φιλαξ.

442 c 16 ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου. In this particular the analogy between the city and the soul is not quite exact, otherwise it would be the rulers in the city who prescribe τὸ δεῖν· τοις μη, whereas it is the legislator (see on ὁ νομοθέτης 439 c). This point is emphasized, perhaps unduly so, by Krohn (Pl. St. p. 43). Unless Plato made the Deity the αἰκατήσις of the soul, as the original legislator is of the city, it was impossible for him to avoid placing the λογισμοὺκαν in a position of even greater authority than the rulers. In Books vi and vii the inequality is redressed by making the power of the Rulers in the city commensurate with that of λόγος in the soul: see vi 407 c n.

18 ἡρχέν τε κτλ.: 'ruled within him and issued these instructions.' The imperfect is used because the instructions must be given before they can be obeyed by θυμοειδές, as described in the last sentence. J. and C. say that ἡρχει refers to 438 e; but Plato is not there speaking of the individual, only of the State. Although a reference to 439 c or 441 e is barely possible, it is much simpler to regard the imperfect as real, and not 'philosophic.' See above on III 406 e. Schneider, to judge from his translation, takes the same view. With σμικρῶν μέρει cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. x. 1177 ff. εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὸ γένος μικρῶν εἶστι (sc. τὸ κράτιστον τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ) κτλ.

19 αὕτε κακείσιν κτλ. αὕτα καὶ has been interpreted (i) as implying that the θυμοειδές also has a sort of knowledge: cf. 429 c and 439 e n.; (2) as 'like the rulers in the State': cf. 438 b ff. The first view is slightly more natural on linguistic grounds, but I think Plato would hardly have attributed ἐπιστήμη in any shape to the θυμοειδές. Probably (2) is right, for the analogy between the
city and the soul is in Plato's mind all through this section: see 441 c, D, and 442 D.  
442 D 25 φελλάκις κτλ.: 'in virtue of our oft-repeated maxim and in that way': i.e. τῷ τὰ αὐτὸν πράττειν. Ficinus seems to have read καὶ ὄσων. At first sight καὶ ὄσων appears to demand the insertion; but Plato is speaking with less formality and precision than in 441 c, D. The reading of Vind. E καὶ ὄσων (for καὶ ὄσων), i.e. 'the individual, as well as the city,' is attractive, but unnecessary. Hartman proposes φελλάκις κτλ.: a solution which will commend itself to few.  
26 μὴ πη — εἶναι. 'Do we find Justice growing dimmer in any way? Does it appear something different from what it was discovered to be in the city?' lit. 'blunted, so as to appear' etc. In the language of 434 D (to which Socrates' question refers) Justice has now 'passed into' the Individual; and no feature has been blunted, or lost its clearness of outline. We are therefore confirmed in our view of Justice, both civic and individual. Hartman would read ἀπειθείᾳ, taking ἠμῶν as 'by us,' but the present is more expressive, and (with ἠμῶν) represents us as in a certain sense spectators of the self-evolution of Justice: cf. εἶν μὲν ἡμῖν καὶ εἰς ἔνα ἰδόν τὸ τοῦτο κτλ. 434 D. ἀπειθείᾳ = 'retunditur' (Schneider).  
442 E 29 τὰ φορτικά. Plato tests his view of Justice by four criteria taken as it were dé foro and turning on various popular associations of the word: cf. ix 573 b ff. Of these the first three are concerned with honesty and trustworthiness in public and private life; while the last (ἀθεία — ἀδέρπασεια) refers to morality in general, including the service of the gods. Taken together, they sum up the leading features of the perfect character, and shew that Plato's conception of private, as of political, Justice is in reality Righteousness or Moral Perfection, whereof the other virtues are the fruit. Plato's innovation lay in interpreting Righteousness as τὰ αὐτὸν πράττειν, or rather in the peculiar meaning which he attached to this phrase: see on 434 c and infra 443 b n.  
32 παρακαταθήκην χρυσοῦ κτλ. Honesty and truthfulness were generally recognised as characteristic of the δίκαιον ἄνεξ: see the passages collected by Nagelsbach Nachhom. Theol. pp. 240—246.  
34 τοῦτο αὐτῶν. See cr. n. "Fortasse Plato τοῦτον αὐτὸς scripsit" (Schneider).
true virtue therefore rests upon psychology; not yet, as in vi and vii, on the metaphysical knowledge of the Idea of Good. The full meaning of Plato's 'natural city' (κατὰ φύσιν ὀικεθεία πόλις) now appears. It is a commonwealth whose institutions and political life are the outward expression or embodiment of the true and uncorrupted nature of the soul, regarded as in very truth a φύσιν ὁκ ἐγγενέω, ἀλλ' ὁφάρον (Tima. 90 a). Hence arise the three orders of the city; hence too, each order performs its own function; for it is part of soul's 'nature' tā ἐαυτῆς πράττειν, and πολυπραγμονέων is a consequence of unnatural degeneration (441 a). This optimistic view of 'nature' is noteworthy. It rests on the wide-spread Greek belief that good is natural, and evil unnatural; cf. infra 444 d and Aristotle's δ ὁ θεός καὶ ἡ φύσις οὐδὲν μάτην ποιοῦσα (de Caelo i 4. 271a 33), οὐδὲν τῶν παρὰ φύσιν καλῶν (Pol. Π 3. 1325 b 10) and the like. For more on this subject I may be allowed to refer to my essay on Classical Education, Deighton, Bell and Co. 1895 pp. 14 ff. Although not itself expressly a deduction from the theory of Ideas, Plato's conception of 'nature' as good and not evil is altogether in harmony with the sovereignty of the Idea of Good in Book vi: see on 505 a ff.

12 τέλεων κτλ. The language is suggested by Homer's οὐκ ἔπαιρ, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ἐσθλόν, δ τοι τετελεσμένον ἔσται (Od. XIX 547). δ is a vague internal accusative: see on ἐκφαίρεσιν in 424 d.

ἐφαμεν κτλ. The reference is to 433 a.
443 D] POLITEIAS Δ

οὐποττεύσαι, ὡς εὐθύς ἀρχόμενοι τῆς πόλεως οἰκίζειν κατὰ θεόν
C τινα εἰς ἀρχήν τε καὶ τύπον τινὰ τῆς δικαιοσύνης κινδυνεύομεν ἐμβεβηκέναι. Παντάπασιν μὲν οὕν. Τὸ δὲ γε ἢν ἀρα, ὦ Γλαύκων, 15
dι᾽ δὲ καὶ ὡφέλει, εἶδολον τι τῆς δικαιοσύνης, τὸ τὸν μὲν σκυτοτο-
mικὸν φύσει ὥρθως ἔχειν σκυτοτομεῖν καὶ ἄλλο μηδεν πράττειν, τὸν δὲ τεκτονικὸν τεκταίνεσθαι, καὶ τάλλα δὲ οὕτως. Φαίνεται.
Τὸ δὲ γε ἄλθῆς, τοιοῦτο μὲν τι ἢν, ὡς ἐσκεν, ἡ δικαιοσύνη, ἀλλ᾽
D οὐ περὶ τὴν ἠξο πράξειν τῶν αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ περὶ τὴν ἐντὸς, ὡς 20
ἀλθῆς περὶ ἐαυτὸν καὶ τὰ ἐαυτοῦ, μη ἐσάντα τάλλοτρα πράττειν ἐκαστὸν ἐν αὐτῷ μηδὲ πολυπραγμονεῖν πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ ἐν τῇ
ψυχῇ γένε, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὄντι τὰ οἰκεία εὖ τθέμενον καὶ ἄρξαντα αὐτοῦ
αὐτοῦ καὶ κοιμημένατα καὶ φιλον γενόμενον ἐαυτοῦ καὶ κυναρμόσαντα
τρία ὄντα ὀσπερ ὄρους τρεῖς ἄρμονίας ἀτεχνᾶς, νεάτης τε καὶ 25

16. ὡφέλει Αστ.: ὡφέλει ΑΠΕΞ.γ.
21. ἐαυτὸν Π: ἐαυτὸν Α.
23. αὐτὸν—ἐαυτῷ Π: om. Α.

Oπολίκες εἰς III.407 B n. For κινδυνεύομεν Hartman suggests κινδυνεύομεν; but pres-
sents do not of course become imperfects in indirect.

443 C 15 τὸ δὲ γε: 'yes, but in
point of fact.' For τὸ δὲ in this sense cf. I 340 D n. τὸ δὲ γε ἄλθῆς below
expresses the same meaning more fully and emphatically.

16 δι᾽ οὐτως. The imperfect ὡφέ-
λει (see cr. n.), 'for which reason also it
was of service to us,' viz. in discovering
the real or original justice, seems to be
to better than the present. See II 368 D ff.
Plato is justifying himself for having taken
so much trouble about a mere εἰδώλων; it
was in order to learn the original through
the copy. So also Hartman. The present
could only mean 'benefits the city' (so
Schneider, Rettig and others). Madvig,
strangely enough, suspects the whole
phrase. Civic Justice is an εἰδώλων of
Justice in the soul as being its reflection
in outward conduct. See also on 443 B ff.
above.

19 τοιοῦτο takes its meaning from τὸ
τῶν μὲν σκυτοτομικῶν etc. 'Justice was
indeed something of this kind' (i.e. a sort
of τά αὐτῶν πράττειν), but not τοί
τῷ ἐξ ἑαυτῶν πράξειν. The warning conveyed by
εἶδος and τρόπον τινά in 433 A (where see
note), 433 B and 432 E is now justified:
for Justice is said to be περὶ τὴν ἐντὸς
πράξειν, and is therefore not, strictly speak-
ing, that which we have called 'Civic
Justice.'

443 D 20 ὡς ἄλθῆς should be con-
structed with περὶ εαυτῶν. The soul is the
true self, as Socrates continually main-
tained. It is better to regard περὶ before
ἐαυτῶν as coordinate with περὶ in περὶ τὴν
ἐντὸς, than to translate "with internal
actions which are in very truth concerned
with himself" (J. and C.). ὡς ἄλθῆς
περὶ εαυτῶν etc. merely emphasizes and
explains περὶ τὴν ἐντὸς.

22 ἐκαστόν. Ast would read ἐκαστὸν
τῶν; but the meaning is easily caught
after τὰ εαυτῶν just before.

23 τῷ ὄντι κτλ.: 'having set his
house in order in the truest sense.' So
Schneider, rightly. For οἰκεία cf. III
405 B n.

24 κυναρμόσαντα—ἱμμοσμένον. Cf.
432 A, where a similar image is em-
ployed. The figure here is taken from
the Octachord, the λογιστικὸν being re-
presented by the ἑπάτη or highest string
(which gave out the lowest note), the
ἐπιθυμητικὸν by the νεάτη (an octave
higher in pitch), and the θυμοειδές by the
μέος or fourth. See Dict. Ant. II p. 195
or Gleditsch Die Musik d. Gr. p. 86d.
The single notes of a ἀρμονία could be
called δροι because they were in reality
terms in a proportion and depended on
the relative length of the string: cf. Tim.
35 B, C. Hartman's correction of νεάτης,
ὑπάτης, μέος to νεάτην, ὑπάτην, μέον is
very attractive: for the genitives can
only be explained as ὅπως νεάτην etc., and
the effect is unpleasing, especially with
áρμονίας coming between. Retaining the Greek nomenclature, we may translate: 'having harmoniously joined together three different elements, just like three terms in a musical proportion or scale, lowest and highest and intermediate,' etc. In ἀλλα ἀττα μεταξύ Plato indicates (as J. and C. observe) that his threefold division of soul may not be 'strictly exhaustive' (cf. ἡυ reader E 548 D n.). The missing faculties would thus correspond to the notes intervening between the ὑπάθη and μέση, and the μέση and νέατη. It will be noted that the unity resulting is not that of union, but that of a scale or mode. Nevertheless it is clear from the language used that the ἀρμονία which Plato describes is, as before, συφρόνησι: cf. ἀρξείται αὐτὸν αὐτῷ with 431 A, B, φίλον γενόμενον with 442 C; κοσμήσατα too suggests κοσμίησι, and the word σωφρόνησι itself is finally employed. Cf. 434 C n. A different explanation is given by the Scholiast. Holding that Plato is referring to a system of two octaves ( δίδ διὰ πασῶν) he explains νέατῆ, μέση, and ὑπάθη as e.g. Ἄ, A, and o (not a, which is the προσλαμβανόμενον). His note is as follows: νέατη ἢγουν νήτη ὑπέρβολαῖον ἡ ἐσθήτα χορή τοῦ δίδ διὰ πασῶν συστηματοσ, ὑπάθη ἢ διὰ τῶν προσλαμβανόμενον φθυγγόν πρώτη χορή τοῦ αὐτὸν τοῦ δίδ διὰ πασῶν συστηματοσ. μέση ἡ καὶ αὐτὴ ἢτοι φθυγγόν ἡ χορή ἡ τελευταία μὲν τοῦ πρῶτον διὰ πασῶν, ἄρχη δὲ τοῦ δευτέρου, ὡς εἶναι τοῦτον κοινόν, ὡς πολεμαίον τέ φησι καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι μοικοῖ. But in the δίδ διὰ πασῶν συστημα, the ὑπάθη is not συμφωνοι with the νήτη ὑπέρβολαῖον, although the προσλαμβανόμενον of course is (see Gleditsch Lc. p. 861 and Euclid Sect. Can. 10 ed. von Jan): so that according to the Scholiast there is a serious breach of συμφωνία. It seems to me quite certain that in ἤσθεν ἄριστον μέσης Plato is thinking of three ἔξωμφωνοι φθυγγοι, and in the single octave or διὰ πασῶν, the ὑπάθη, μέσῃ or fourth, and νέατῃ were συμφωνα ἄλλης: see Cleonid. Ἰσαγ. Harm. 5 ed. von Jan. In 432 A also, Plato contemplates only a single octave: see note ad loc.

443 E 27 ἐνα—πολλῶν. Cf. 423 D n. and [Epdin.] 992 B ἐκ πολλῶν ἐνα γεγονότα. The phrase ἐν ἐκ πολλῶν is a sort of Platonic motto or text (like the φωναί of post-Aristotelian ethics).


29 η καὶ. Stallbaum and others add περὶ (with ἐξ) before πολίτευκα, but τι πράτη τι περὶ πολίτευκα τι is very unpleasing. πολίτευκα depends directly on πράτη and is equivalent to περὶ πολίων. The slight variety of expression is easy and elegant after ἡ καὶ 'aut etiam.'

33 ἐπιστήμην—δόξαν. This is, as Krohn points out (Pl. St. p. 68), the first precise and explicit separation of ἐπιστήμη and δόξα in the Republic. Each of them, however, is still concerned with conduct, and not, as in the end of ν, with the theory of knowledge.

444 A 4 τυχάναι—ὅν = 'really is': 1 337 B n.
Injustice, like every variety of Vice, implies sedition and confusion among the parts of the soul. It is spiritual disease, deformity and weakness; while Virtue is the reverse. Virtuous institutions promote virtue, vicious institutions vice.

Now that we have discovered Justice, it is necessary to look for Injustice, in order that we may compare the two and decide the question at issue, viz. πότερον δει κεκτήσαθαι τὸν μέλλοντα ευδαιμονίαν εἶναι, εάν τε λανθάνῃ εάν τε μὴ πάντας θεοὺς τε καὶ ἀνθρώπους (437 D; cf. n. 11 368 E n.). The full exposition of Injustice is reserved for Books VIII and IX, where Plato takes the subject in its proper order, considering civic injustice first, and afterwards that of the individual. At present he contents himself with a preliminary or exoteric sketch of Injustice in the soul, representing it as unrighteousness in general, just as Justice, both in the State and in the individual, has been identified with righteousness or moral perfection (434 C; 442 E n.).

The reading of Ξ and other inferior MSS, which (in common with all the editors) I have printed above, seems to be an attempt to emend the older and more difficult reading preserved in A and II. Stallbaum supposes that A here represents a corruption of Ξ, αὐτῷ δουλεύων being presumably a correction (of αὐτῷ δουλεύων) which has crept into the text; but this is unlikely in itself, and also leaves τοῦ δ’ before αὐτῷ δουλεύων unexplained. The text of Ξ is not in itself quite satisfactory, as Richards has pointed out. Οἷον πρέπειν αὐτῷ ὧδε πρέπειν αὐτῷ seems unexampled, although οἷον δουλεύων would of course be right. The expression τῷ τοῦ ἀρχικοῦ γένους ὄντι, 'that which is of the ruling class,' is also curious for the more direct and accurate τῷ ἀρχικῷ γένει. The reading of Α and Π yields no tolerable sense, and certainly cannot come from Plato. Madvig (with Vind. E) proposes οἷον πρέπειν αὐτῷ δουλεύων, τῷ δ’ αὖ <μὴ> δουλεύων ἀρχικοῦ γένους ὄντι, which is intelligible, if weak. I have thought of οἷον πρέπειν αὐτῷ δουλεύων, τῷ δ’ αὖ βουλεύων (or δεσπόζεων, after Schneider) ἀρχικοῦ γένους ὄντι, but there are obvious objections. I should not be surprised if the whole clause ἀλλὰ —ὀντι, as it appears in A and II, is only an attempt by some illiterate scribe to work out the antithesis of προσήκον: lit., 'being by nature such as to be proper for it to be a slave, and the slavery again <being such as to be slavery> to that which is of the ruling class.' The clause, even as read in Ξ, adds nothing to the sense, and the references in τοιαύτῃ ἀττά and τοιούτων just below are caught more easily without the obnoxious words. See 442 B ἀρχικῶν ἐπιχειρήσεων ὕπον ὑπὸ προσήκον αὐτῷ γένει. Cf. n. 111 413 C n.

οὐ, εἰ φαίμεν ἑπρηκέναι, οὐκ ἂν πάντι τι, οἴμαι, δόξαιμεν ψεύδεσθαι. 5 Μᾶ Δία οὐ μέντοι, ἐφη. Φῶμεν ἀρα; Φῶμεν.

XVIII. Ἔστω δ’, ἣν δ’ ἐγὼ μετὰ γὰρ τούτῳ σκεπτόμεθα, οἴμαι, ἀδικίαν. Δήλον. Οὐκοῦν στάσιν τινα αὕτη τοῦ ὄντων Β’ τοιούτων δει αὕτην εἶναι καὶ πολυπραγμοσύνην καὶ ἀλλοτριοπραγμοσύνην καὶ ἐπανάστασιν μέρους τινὸς τοῦ ὅλου τῆς ψυχῆς, ἵν’ ἁρχὴ ἐν αὐτῇ οὐ προσήκον, ἀλλὰ τοιούτῳ ἐντος φύσει, οἷον πρέπειν αὐτῷ δουλεύων τῷ τοῦ ἀρχικοῦ γένους ὄντι; τοιαῦτ’ ἀττά, οἴμαι, φήσομεν καὶ τὴν τοῦτον ταραχήν καὶ πλάνην εἶναι τὴν τε αδικίαν καὶ ἀκόλουθον καὶ δειλίαν καὶ ἰμαθίαν καὶ συλ- 

C λῆβδην πᾶσαν κακίαν. Ταῦτα μὲν οὐν ταῦτα, ἐφη. Οὐκοῦν, 15

II. ἀλλὰ—γένους ὄντι Ξ: πρό τῷ τοῦ ΑΠΙ habent τοῦ δ’ αὕτω δουλεύον, ὅ τῷ δ’ αὕτω δουλεύον.
haec ipsa'), others τοιαύτα, but there is not sufficient reason for deserting A.


444 D 23 ὑγιείαν ποιεῖν. Ξ (with a few other MSS) reads ἐμποιεῖ; and Stallbaum and others adopt this reading, ποιεῖν, 'to produce,' is however satisfactory: cf. 422 a.


30 κάλλος—ἐυεξία; with reference perhaps to Thrasymachus' statement in 348 ε f. that Injustice is καλὸν and ἰχθυρὸν.

444 E—445 E It remains to ask whether Justice is better than Injustice. Regarding Injustice as a disease of soul, Glauco is ready to declare for Justice; but Socrates would examine the question more carefully. There are four varieties of Vice which deserve investigation, alike in cities and in individuals. Let us take them in order. The perfect commonwealth, which we have described, may be called Kingship or Aristocracy, according as there are one or more rulers. Glauco assents.

444 E 34 τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν κτλ. 'What remains for us now to enquire is whether, etc. For the position of ἡμῖν cf. that of πάντων in 445 B. Herwerden suggests τὸδε or τὸδε ὡς, neither of which is necessary.
35 Πότερον αὐτοί λυσιτελεί δίκαια τε πράττειν καὶ | καλὰ ἐπιτηδεύειν 35 καὶ εἶναι δίκαιον, ἐὰν τε λαυβάνῃ ἐὰν τε μὴ τοιοῦτο ὃν, ἡ ἄδικειν τε καὶ ἂδικον εἶναι, ἐὰντερ μὴ διδῷ δίκην μηδὲ βελτίων γίγνηται κολαζόμενοι. 'Αλλ', ἐφη, ὁ Σώκρατες, γελοιον ἐμομφαίονται τὸ σκέμμα γίγνεσθαι ἓδη, εἰ τοῦ μὲν σώματος τῆς φύσεως δια-5 φθειρομένης δοκεῖ οὗ βιωτὸν εἶναι οὐδὲ μετὰ πάντων στιῶν ταῖς καὶ ποιῶν καὶ παντὸς πλοῦτον καὶ πάσης ἀρχῆς, τῆς δὲ αὐτοῦ τούτον ὁ ζώμεν φύσεως παρατηρομένης καὶ 1 διαφθειρομένης βιωτὸν ἀρα ἦσται, ἐὰντερ τοιὰ μὴ οὖν βουλιθῇ ἄλλο πλὴν τοῦτο, ὅποθεν κακίας μὲν καὶ ἄδικιας ἀπαλλαγῆσεται, δικαιοσύνην δὲ 10 καὶ ἀρετῆν κτῆσεται, ἐπειδὴπερ ἐφαίνη γε οὕτα ἐκάτερα οἷα ἤμεις διεληλύθαμεν. Γελοιον γὰρ, ἤτιν 8 ἐγώ. 'Αλλ' ὁμοίον ἐπείπερ ἐνταύθα ἐληλύθαμεν, ὅσον οἶλο τε σαφέστατα κατιδεῖν ὃτι ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει, οὗ χρῆ ἀποκάμμενε. "Ἡκιστα νη τὸν Δία, ἐφη, πάντων C ἀποκυνητέον. Δεῦρο νῦν, ἴνα καὶ ἀθῆ, ὅσα καὶ εἰδῆ 15 ἔχει ἡ κακία, ὃς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ἀγε δὴ καὶ ἄξια θέας. "Επομεν, ἐφη-10 μόνον λέγε. Καὶ μὴν, ἤτιν 8 ἐγώ, ὁστερ ἀπὸ σκοπίας μοι φαίνεται, ἐπειδὴ ἐνταύθα ἀναβεβήκαμεν τοῦ λόγου, ἐν μὲν ἐγὼ εἰδὸς τῆς ἀρετῆς, ἀπειρα δὲ τῆς κακίας, τέταρα δὲ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἄττα, ὅν καὶ

[The text continues...]

...ing, with which Schneider and later editors agree, taking κατιδεῖν as explanatory of ἐνταύθα. But it is hard to find another instance of ὅσον οἶλο τε, although καθ' ὅσον οἶλο τε and ὅσον δυνάτων (Thuc. ι. 22. 2) occur. ὃς οἶλο τε is the almost invariable phrase. For ὅσον Stephanus proposed ὃνε, Ast ὅσον. I think the meaning is 'now that we have come far enough to be able most clearly to discern that these things are so,' ἐνταύθα being equivalent to ἐπὶ τοιοῦτον, and ὅσον οἶλο τε ὅσον ἐλθόντα οἶλο τέ ἐστιν. 445 C 15 ἀποκυνητέον. I have reverted to the MS reading. Bekker's emendation ἀποκυνητέον is very attractive, but ἀποκυνητέον gives excellent sense (cf. I 349 A), and there is no real reason why Glauco should repeat the word employed by Socrates (see on V 465 E); nor does there appear to be any instance in Greek literature of the verbal of ἀποκύνναι.

16 ἀξία τίας. Plato does not claim that his enumeration of degenerate commonwealths is complete. Cf. viii 544 D.

18 ἐν—κακίας. An old Pythagorean principle, whence the parade with which
20 άξιον ἐπιμεμηθήμαι. Πῶς λέγεις; ἐφη. "Ὅσοι, ἂν ἦν ἐγώ, πολιτείων τρόποι εἰσὶν εἰδή ἐχοντες, τοσοῦτοι κινδυνεύοντι καὶ ψυχῆς τρόποι εἶναι. Πῶσοι ἢ δή; Πέντε μὲν, ἂν ἦν ἐγώ, πολιτείων, δὲ πέντε δὲ ψυχῆς. Λέγε, ἐφη, τίνες. Λέγω, εἶπον, ὅτι εἰς μὲν οὕτως ὅπως διεξελευθαμένοι πολιτείαι εἰδή ἄν τρόπος, ἐπονομασθείς δὲ 25 ἀν καὶ διχῇ ἐγγενομένου μὲν γὰρ ἄνδρος ἐῶς ἐν τοῖς ἄρχουσι διαφέρουστοι βασιλεία ἐν κληθείς, πλειόνων δὲ ἀριστοκρατία. Ἀληθῆ, ἐφη. Τότῳ μὲν τοίνυν, ἂν ἦν ἐγώ, ἐν εἰδος λέγω. οὕτε γὰρ ἀν πλείους οὔτε εἰς ἐγγενομένοις κινήσεις ἄν τῶν ἄξιῶν Ε λόγου νόμων τῆς πόλεως, τροφῆ τε καὶ παιδεία χρησάμενος, ἢ 30 διήλθομεν. Οὐ γὰρ εἰκός, ἐφη.

τέλος πολιτείας Δ.

28. ἐγγενόμενος Ση: ἐγγενόμενοι ΑΠ.


21 εἰδῆ ἔχοντες: ‘having’ (i.e. as we should say ‘forming’) ‘specific kinds’: cf. VIII 544 D.

445 D 25 ἐγγενομένου—ἀριστοκρατία. Knowledge, not number, is the criterion of good government: cf. Pol. 292 c. Hitherto however the rulers have always been represented as a plurality, and we have heard nothing of a king. In the later books (from V 473 c onwards) we often hear of kingship; and in IX 576 D (as Newman points out Politics of Aristotle I p. 413 n.) the ideal city is called βασιλευομένην, οίαν τὸ πρῶτον διήλθομεν. With the present passage cf. VII 540 D ἢ πλείους ἢ εἰς and IX 587 D, where the ἀριστοκρατία and the βασιλικός are identified. The fact is, as Henkel has pointed out (Stud. zur Gesch. d. gr. Lehr. v. St. p. 57), that “Kingship is only a form of Aristocracy throughout the whole political theory of antiquity, and rests on no distinct and independent basis of its own.” It must be regarded as exceptional when in the Politicus (302 c ff.), probably a later dialogue, Plato distinguishes between kingship and aristocracy and places aristocracy on a lower plane. See also Whibley Gk. Olig. pp. 15 ff.

445 E 28 τῶν—νόμων. For the genitive cf. (with Stallbaum) Gorg. 514 άνθος παράξενος τῶν πολιτικῶν πραγμάτων, and infra VI 485 B.
APPENDICES TO BOOK IV.

I.

IV 421 A, B. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἡμεῖς μὲν φίλακας ὡς ἀληθῶς ποιούμενεν, ἡκιστα κακούργουσ τῆς πόλεως, ὦ δ’ έκεινοι λέγων γεωργούσ τίνα καὶ ὃσπερ ἐν πανηγύρει ἀλλ’ οὖκ ἐν πόλει ἐστιάτορας εὐδαίμονας, ἀλλο ἄν τι ἂ πόλιν λέγοι.

I hope my note has proved that this sentence is sound in the main; but Madvig’s emendation has obtained such a wide currency, owing to its adoption by Baiter, that the text has fallen under grave suspicion, and it may be well to record the different conjectures.

They are as follows:

(1) εἰ εὐν οὖν ἡμεῖς κτλ. (Orelli, cited by Schneider): (2) ἡμεῖς μὲν οὖν φίλακας κτλ. (Ast in his third edition): (3) ἡ μὲν οὖν ἡμεῖς <λέγο>μὲν, φίλακας κτλ. (Herwerden, with whom Hartman agrees so far, although Hartman goes further and expunges καὶ before ὃσπερ as well as the entire clause ἀλλ’ ἄν τι ἂ πόλιν λέγοι): (4) εἰ μὲν οὖν—ἐστιάτορας, εὐδαίμον ἀλλ’ ἄν τι ἂ πόλιν λέγοι (Madvig): (5) εἰ [μὲν] οὖν ἡμεῖς—λέγον ἄργούς (or κακούργους) τίνας—εὐδαίμονας, ἀλλ’ ἄν τι ἂ πόλιν λέγει (Richards).

It should be mentioned also that Wytenbach (quoted by Stallbaum) had conjectured ἐστιάτορας καὶ δαιτυμόνας instead of ἐστιάτορας εὐδαίμονας (ἐστιάτορας καὶ εὐδαίμονας in a few inferior MSS).

A glance at these proposals will shew that the difficulties felt have been chiefly in connexion with (a) εἰ μὲν οὖν ἡμεῖς μὲν, (b) γεωργοὺς, (c) ἐστιάτορας εὐδαίμονας and (d) ἀλλ’ ἄν τι ἂ πόλιν λέγοι. I can see no reason for Richards’ correction of (d): ‘mixed’ conditional sentences of this kind are surely common enough.

For ἐστιάτορας εὐδαίμονας cf. 111 420 A οἱ εὐδαίμονες δοκοῦντες εἶναι and especially X 612 οἱ εὐδαίμονων λέγομένων ἐστιάσεως. The μὲν after εἰ is omitted in one Florentine ms, but μὲν without δὲ occurs tolerably often in Plato (cf. v 475 E, c.). Here it has the effect of italicising the preceding word by suggesting a possible antithesis. The only real difficulty is in γεωργοὺς, and in view of 419 ά to which δ’ έκεινοι λέγων refers, some may doubt whether even γεωργούς is not also genuine. For my own part I am inclined to think that Plato wrote λεωργοῦς.

II.

IV 430 E. Κόσμος ποῦ τίς, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, ἢ σωφροσύνη ἑστὶν καὶ ἴδοιν τῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμίων ἐγκράτεια, ὡς φασὶ, κρεῖττο δ’ αὐτοῦ λέγοντες οὐκ οἶδ’ οὖν τρόπον. καὶ ἀλλα ἄτα τοιαῦτα ὃσπερ ἰχνη αὐτῆς λέγεται.
The reading φαίνονται, which replaces λέγοντες in Α¹, Π and a majority of mss, is admittedly corrupt. One Florentine ms has λέγοντες φαίνονται, another φαίνονται λέγοντες; and it is possible that φαίνονται was originally only an adscript intended to be taken with λέγοντες. The emendations proceed for the most part on the assumption that λέγοντες and not φαίνονται is the gloss. This may be so, but unfortunately no satisfactory remedy has yet been suggested on these lines. The most important corrections are ἄποφαίνονται (Cornarius), φαίνονται (Madvig, taking the participle in agreement with κόσμος and ἐγκράτεια, but φαίνονται cannot be used for ἀπεργαζόμενα, as Hartman points out), φαίνεσθαι (Hartman, who connects the infinitive with φασί, and construes ὠς boldly as γωνίαμ). Other corrections enumerated by Hartman are φασίν τινα (Dobree), φαμέν (Badham), ἄποφαίνοντες (Richards). Apelt has thought of cancelling the entire clause κρείττω δη—τρόπον as an "interpretatio etymologica ad praegressam vocem ἐγκράτεια pertinens" (Obs. cr. in Pl. dialogos, p. 11). It would be easy to multiply conjectures of this sort; but until something better is proposed, we should hold fast to λέγοντες. The λέγεται of the next sentence suits λέγοντες very well, for the phrase κρείττω αὐτῶ is itself one of the ἔχειν. I have placed a full stop before καὶ ἄλλα. Ast suggested a colon, and wished to add ἄ after τοιοῦτα, but no change is necessary.

III.

IV 438 E—439 A. Το δὲ δὴ δύψος, ἦν δὲ ἐγώ, οὐ τοὺτον θῆσεις τῶν τινῶν εἶναι τοῦτο ὅπερ ἐστίν—ἐστί δὲ δῆπον δύψος—; "Εγώγε, ἦ δὲ ὡς τῶν ἃματός γε.

In this difficult passage Stallbaum, who is followed by the Oxford editors, construes εἶναι with τοὺτων ("is one of" etc.), and regards τοῦτο ὅπερ ἐστίν as no more than "ipsam per se" ("as far as its essence is concerned," J. and C.). This interpretation is grammatically awkward, and otherwise objectionable, inasmuch as it anticipates δύψος δ᾽ οὖν αὐτό below. Plato evidently means to present his argument in two steps: (1) Thirst, as you will agree, is something relative to drink, (2) Thirst qualified is relative to drink qualified, and thirst by itself, without qualification, to drink by itself, without qualification.

A large number of emendations has been proposed. The late Mr W. A. Gill was inclined to omit τοῦτο ὅπερ ἐστίν (Proceedings of the Cambridge Philol. Soc. xviii p. 35), and Hartman boldly expunges the words, leaving ἐστί δὲ δῆπον δύψος, as it appears to me, in a lonely and unsheltered situation. The suggestion τῶν δῶν τῶν (Madvig), i.e. "which are such as to be that which they are relatively to something," is very cumbrous, and renders ἐστί δὲ δῆπον δύψος far from natural. Mr Cook Wilson's defence or explanation of Madvig's proposal in the Academy no. 824 (Feb. 18, 1888) does not carry conviction to my mind. Baiter combines the conjecture of Madvig with Morgenstern's δὴ τοῦ for δῆπον, in which case Socrates repeats his question, if ἐστί δὲ δῆπον δύψος is interrogative, or, if not, answers it himself. It
seems to me clear that ἐστὶ δὲ δὴ τὸν δύος is intended to explain τούτων ὁπερ ἐστὶν and nothing more. J. and C. translate "Thirst is, I imagine—Yes, said he, thirst is of drink," remarking that "two questions are asked; before the second is completed Glauco breaks in with a reply to the first (ἐγώγε): and πόματός γε he completes and answers the second." I can see no occasion for so much impatience on Glauco's part. The insertion of καὶ τινὸς after τῶν τινὸς appears to me to solve all the difficulties, and the error is of a kind that frequently occurs in our oldest ms. See Introd. § 5.

IV.

IV 440 b. ταῖς δ' ἐπιθυμίαις αὐτὸν κοινώνησαντα, αἵροῦντος λόγου μὴ δεῖν αὐτιπράττειν, οἷμα σε οὐκ ἂν φαναι γενομένου ποτὲ ἐν σαντῷ τοῦ τουεύτου αἰσθάθη, οἷμα δ' οὔδ' ἐν ἀλλω.

The difficulties of this passage have been much canvassed. The only important variant is ἐν ἐαυτῷ (II and corr. A², with several other ms) instead of ἐν σαντῷ. Η does not, as Bekker asserted, give μὴ δεῖν, but μὴ δεῖν like A. The ἄν τι πράττειν for αὐτιπράττειν of q, although adopted by Bekker, is indefensible, as other editors have observed, for ἄν has no meaning or construction.

Against the ordinary interpretation, which I have given in the notes, it has been urged that θυμός does, in point of fact, sometimes join with the Desires against the Reason. Thus in the degenerate phases of character depicted in VIII 553 c ff. and elsewhere, θυμοείδες is the slave and minister of the ἐπιθυμητικῶν, and in 441 A ἐπίκουρον ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ φύσει ἑαυτῷ μὴ ὑπὸ κακῆς τροφῆς διαφαραγή, the same implication appears to be involved. Cf. Krohn Fl. St. pp. 52 ff. But in such cases the λογιστικῶν would seem also to be corrupted (τό δὲ γε, οἷμαι, λογιστικοῦ τε καὶ θυμοείδες χαμαί ἐθνὲν καὶ ἐθνὲν παρακαθίσας ὑπ' ἑκαίῳ—sc. τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ—καὶ καταδουλοσώμενος VIII 1.c.), so that there is no conflict between the allied forces of the θυμοείδες and ἐπιθυμητικῶν on the one hand and the λογιστικῶν on the other. It is true that the language of 441 A, taken in its full force, appears to imply that the θυμοείδες can be corrupted without the λογιστικῶν, but Plato would hardly, I think, have held such a view, and the implication is not to be pressed. See Phadr. 253 d—256 e. There is some difficulty about the construction of αὐτιπράττειν, and Hartman would expunge the word. Schneider's punctuation, which I have adopted, connects it with δεῖν. Others make its subject αὐτὸν ('but that θυμός, having made common cause with the desires, when Reason forbids, should oppose Reason—this' etc.). The explanation of Hermann (adopted also by Schmelzer) avoids the anacoluthon, but is exceedingly tortuous and unpleasing: 'I think you would not say that you have perceived θυμός making common cause with the desires and opposing Reason when Reason forbade' etc. Richter also (Fl. Jahrb. 1867 p. 139) evades the anacoluthon by defending the more than dubious construction αἰσθάθη τοιε τινὸν κοινώνησαντα,
Finally Nitzsch conjectures (Rh. Mus. 1857 p. 472) μη δειν <τι πράττεν>, ἀντιπράττειν, ορ μηδ’ ειν<αί τι πράττεν>, ἀντιπράττειν. None of these devices seems to me so probable as Schneider's view.

An entirely different view of this passage is suggested by a Scholiast's note, to which Warren has recently again called attention. The Scholium runs: ὁ δὲ νοῦς οὖτος. ταῖς δὲ ἐπιθυμίαις σε κοινωνήσαντα ταῖς εὐλογίστοις, καὶ γνώσκοντα σε τοῦτο ἐκ τῆς πειρᾶς, οὐχ ὑπολαμβάνω σε εἶπεν ὅτι ἔσθημαι ἐν ταῖς τοιούταις ἀγαθαῖς ἰδοναῖς τῶν θυμῶν ἀντιπράττοντα ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις, ὥστε ἐπὶ ταῖς τοῦ Δεοντίου ἀλογίως ἰδοναὶς ἀντιπράττειν.

It is obvious that the Scholiast connected σε with αὐτῶν and took the sentence to mean, broadly speaking, that when Reason on the other hand sanctions indulgence (αἵροῦντος λόγου μη δείν ἀντιπράττειν sc. ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις), we do not find any conflict between θυμός and the desires. The meaning is satisfactory, and furnishes a fair antithesis to the first half of the sentence ὅταν βιάζωνται—τοῦ τοιοῦτου, but it is difficult to reconcile this view with the Greek as we have it. Warren, who sympathises in general with the Scholiast, translates “but that dealing with desires it”—viz. θυμός—“should, when reason says it ought not, oppose them, this I imagine” etc. κοινωνήσαντα must however be more than ‘dealing with,’ and the aorist (which on the ordinary view means ‘having joined,’ ‘made common cause with’) presents a serious difficulty in this interpretation.

Reading ἐν ἐαυτῷ, for which there is good authority (see cr. n.), I formerly construed the passage as follows: ‘but when he’ (αὐτῶν with reference not to τῶν θυμῶν, but to τινά and τοῦ τοιοῦτον alone) ‘has joined partnership with his desires, because reason decides that he ought not to oppose them, you will not, I imagine, say that he has observed anything of the sort’ (i.e. such internal στάσις as has just been described) ‘ever happen in his own soul, or in the soul of another? Assuredly not.’ By this solution we get rid of the anacoluthon, while adopting generally the Scholiast's view; but it is an unnecessary and irrelevant elaboration to make Glauco speak of what the hypothetical person has observed in himself or in another: we wish to know what Glauco has himself observed.

On the whole I am now inclined to believe that the traditional interpretation is correct.

V.

IV 440 c. Τί δὲ; ὅταν ἀδικεῖσθαι τις ἡγήται, οὐκ ὑπὸ τοῦτο χεὶ τε καὶ χαλεπαίνει, καὶ ἐμμαχεῖ τῷ δοκοῦντι δικαίω, καὶ διὰ τὸ πεινὴν καὶ διὰ τὸ ρήγαν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαύτα πάχοιν, καὶ υπομένων νικᾶ, καὶ οὐ λήγει τῶν γενιαλῶν, πρὶν ἄν ἡ διαπραξητή ἡ τελευτήτη ἡ ὥστε κυών ὑπὸ νομίων ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ παρ’ αὐτῷ ἀνακληθεῖς πραυνθῆς;

The interpretation of this sentence is very difficult, and has given rise to a vast amount of discussion. The only important variants are καὶ διὰ τοῦ πεινῆν καὶ διὰ τοῦ ρήγαν ἐν q and Flor. U, and υπομένων καὶ (A, II etc.) instead of καὶ υπομένων.
On account of ὀργίζομαι καὶ πεινῶν καὶ ῥέγων καὶ ἄλλο ὀτιῶν τῶν τοιούτων πάσχων, in the previous sentence, it appears to me certain (1) that καὶ διὰ τὸ πεινῆν etc. is right as against καὶ διὰ τοῦ πεινῆν etc., and (2) that these words should be construed with ζεὶ τε καὶ χαλεπαῖνει. That which in the first case was represented as the cause of anger should be so represented in the second case also. The same view was held by Schneider. It is more difficult to defend ὑπομένων καὶ, and Schneider is probably justified in preferring the less authoritative reading καὶ ὑπομένων. The expression πάσχειν ὑπομένων can hardly be a mere periphrasis for πάσχειν, nor is πάσχειν ὑπομένων altogether equivalent to ὑπομένων πάσχων, as Jowett supposes. If the best mss are right in placing καὶ after ὑπομένων, it is possible that ὑπομένων is corrupt, and conceals ὑπὸ with a genitive (cf. πάσχειν ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνου in the parallel passage just before), but until the right correction has been proposed, we must adhere to the text of Σ.

The subject of ζεὶ and the other verbs is supposed by J. and C. to be not the man himself, but ὁ θυμός. This is unlikely, on account of πεινῆν etc., and still more of τέλευσην. The parallel with 440 c τοσοῦτῳ ἢττον δύναται ὀργίζομαι κτλ. is also in favour of making the individual the subject.

That the text of A is in the main sound I have no doubt, although I should like to read καὶ ἡμμαχεὶ τὸ δοκοῦντι δικαίω ἀρχαῖω πάσχειν rather than after χαλεπαῖνει.

There is an unusually large supply of emendations. That of Madvig is peculiarly unhappy, though adopted by Baiter in his text, and apparently approved by Apelt (Berl. Philol. Wochenschr. 1895 p. 968): καὶ δὲ αὐτὸ πεινῆν καὶ δὲ αὐτὸ ῥέγων καὶ πάντα τὰ τουαῦτα πάσχειν ὑπομένουν, κἂν νικᾶται, οὗ λήγει κτλ. The other proposals are enumerated by Hartman. They are as follows: καὶ διὰ τὸ πεινῆν καὶ διὰ τὸ—πάσχειν καὶ ὑπομένει νικᾶν καὶ οὗ λήγει κτλ. (Ast): καὶ δὲ αὐτὸ πεινῆν καὶ δὲ αὐτὸ—πάσχειν ὑπομένουν διανεκό οὗ λήγει κτλ. (H. Sauppe, quoted by Hartman): καὶ διὰ τοῦ πεινῆν καὶ διὰ τοῦ—πάσχειν ὑπομένει νικᾶ καὶ κτλ. (Liebhold): καὶ διὰ τοῦ πεινῆν καὶ διὰ τοῦ κτλ. (Campbell, who in other respects acquiesces in the text of A): καὶ διὰ τοῦ πεινῆν καὶ διὰ τοῦ—ὑπομένουν [καὶ] νικᾶν [καὶ] οὗ λήγει κτλ. (Hartman). Richards apparently accepts the suggestion of Madvig as far as it goes, but thinks that τῶν γενναίων 'is most feeble. Plainly Plato wrote οὗ λήγει ἄγανακτῶν, possibly with some additional word before ἄγανακτῶν' (Cl. Rev. vii p. 254). The reading printed above is not only more authoritative but also in my judgment infinitely better than any of these rash and unjustifiable alterations.
Ε.

I. Ἀγαθὴν μὲν τοῖνυν τὴν τοιαύτην πόλιν τε καὶ πολιτείαν καὶ ὅρθην καλὸν, καὶ ἀνδρὰ τὸν τοιοῦτον· κακὰς δὲ τὰς ἀλλὰς καὶ ἡμαρτημένας, εἰτέρα αὐτή ὅρθη, περί τε πόλεων διοικήσεως καὶ περὶ ἰδιωτῶν ψυχῶν τρόπου κατασκευήν, ἐν τέταρτει ποιηρίας εἴδεσιν

449 a—451 c. Socrates is about to describe the different kinds of depraved politics, when Adimantus, prompted by Polemarchus, and supported by Glaucon and Thrasymachus, demands from him a fuller explanation of the community of wives and children, and of the arrangements for begotting and rearing offspring. Socrates professes reluctance, both because it will be doubted whether his scheme is either practicable or expedient, and because he is himself uncertain of his ground and unwilling to involve his friends in possible discomfiture. At last, after propitiating Nemiis, and being exonerated by his friends, he proceeds to comply with their request.

449 a ff. Considered in its merely formal aspect, the portion of the Republic contained in Books V—VII, may be described as a digression (ἀναμεθάθειν πόθεν δεύο ἔξετραπόμεθα), and in reality, these books fulfil the hopes held out in sundry parts of III and IV (see 414 A. 416 B, 423 E, 433 D, 439 E, 442 C n.), and complete the picture of the perfect city and the perfect man by giving us Plato’s third or crowning effort—the philosophic City and the Philosopher-King. See on Π. 372 D. As we often find in Plato (see e.g. Phaed. 84 C ff.), the new departure is occasioned by an objection, or rather a request for further information, on the part of one of the interlocutors. Adimantus invites Socrates to explain the remark made by him in IV 423 E f. and fully expound the principle of κοινὰ τὰ φίλων as it affects women and children. The challenge is accepted, and Socrates deals with the question under three main heads, which he figures as waves through which the argument must swim in safety. The first wave concerns the male and female Guardians (451 c—457 B); the second, the Community in wives and children (457 B 466 D); the third and greatest, whose advent is long delayed, deals with the question whether Communism and therewithal the perfect city itself can be realised in the world (471 C ff.). The fast of these three waves is not finally surmounted until the description of the Philosopher and his City reaches its conclusion at the end of VII: so that Books V—VII closely cohere together. In the first two divisions (V 451 c—466 D), the dominating principle is still φόινις or Nature (see on 451 c): but from 474 D onwards the metaphysical standpoint is gradually superseded by the metaphysical, until in Book VII the Idea of Good becomes the supreme inspiring force—at once the formal, the efficient, and the final cause—of Plato’s City. See on 451 506 E, 509 B ff. On the alleged connexion between the earlier part of Book V (451 c—466 D) and the Ecclesiastes of Aristophanes see App. I.

4. ἰδιωτῶν—κατασκευήν: ‘the organization of the character of the individual soul.’ ψυχῆς was doubted by Αντ.; but cf. IV 445 C τοσοῦτοι κινδυνεύοι ταῖς ψυχῆς τρόποι εἶναι, and for the collocation
of genitives VII 525 C atthēs tῆς ψυχῆς ῥαστώνης μεταστροφῆς, VIII 544 D, 559 E, 560 B, Τίμι. 24 B and other cases in Kühner Gr. Gr. 11 p. 289. ψυχῆς τρόπου is practically a single word like 'soul-character' ('Seelenbeschaffenheit' Schneider).

449 B 7 σμικρὸν κτλ. explains ἐκτείνας τὴν χεῖρα: 'paullo longius ab Adimanto, quan clandestinum colloquium requirebat' or 'paullo remotor, quam reliqui a suis vicinis,' not "a little further away from Socrates than Adimantus" (J. and C.): for "cur propterea manum propter indicet in Adimantum attracter, non apparat" (Schneider).

449 B, C 1 τῇ μάλιστα κτλ. 'What particular thing is it that you decline to let off?' 'You,' said he. 'Because of what particular remark of mine?' (lit. 'because I said what in particular?') There is not, as J. and C. suppose, a play on the two senses of τῇ μάλιστα—cur potissimum and quid potissimum: for it must be observed that ἀφήσομεν has no expressed object, and Socrates could not have known that it was intended to refer to him. The removal of the commas usually printed after ὁτι and εἴπον restores sense, I think, to the remainder of this passage. ὁτι for ὑπ. (see cr. n.) can scarcely stand, for ὁτι εἴπον cannot mean 'I repeated' (Jowett), nor can we read ήτι, εἴπον, τῇ μάλιστα 'once more, said I' etc. In none of the parallels hitherto cited does ὁτι mean merely 'once more' or 'again.' Those who print ὁτι, εἴπον, τῇ μάλιστα (Stallbaum) mostly take ὁτι—τῇ μάλιστα as in 1 343 A ὁτι δὴ τῇ μάλιστα; ἡν δ᾽ εἴπον. Ὁτι κτλ. But in such cases (as Schneider points out) there must be a second ὁτι to introduce the answer, and here there is not.

14 ἐκκλεπτεῖν = 'to cheat out of' as in μὴ—ἐκκλετέρσῃ λόγον Soph. Trach. 436 f. see Jebb ad loc.

16 κοινὰ τὰ ϕίλικα. See IV 423 E, 424 A πν. κοινὰ τὰ τῶν φίλων is preferred by Ast and Stallbaum (with two late MSS), but the shorter form is far more racy of the soil, and occurs also in Lys. 207 C, Latin 739 C (Schneider on IV 424 A).

449 D 22 καὶ οἶλην κτλ. : i.e. καὶ
te καὶ παιδών: μέγα γὰρ τι οἴομεθα φέρειν καὶ ὅλον εἰς πολιτείαν ὀρθῶς ἢ μὴ ὀρθῶς γιγνύμενον. νῦν οὖν, ἑπειδὴ ἄλλης ἐπιλαμβάνειν 25 πολιτείας πρὶν ταῦτα ἴκανῶς διελέσθαι, δεδοκται ἡμῖν τοῦτο, ὅ σὺ ἰκουσας, τό σὲ ἢ μὴ μεθείναι, πρὶν ἂν ταῦτα πάντα ὡσπερ τάλλα διελθῆς. Καλ ἐμὲ τοιοῦν, ὁ Γλαυκών ἥφη, κοινώνων τῆς ψήφου ταύτης τίθετε. 'Αμέλει, ἥφη ὁ Ὁρασίμαχος, πᾶσι ταῦτα δεδομένα ἡμῖν νόμισε, ὃ Σώκρατες.

5 II. Οἶον, ἢν δ' ἔγνω, εἰργάσασθε ἐπιλαμβόμενοι μον. ὁσον λόγον πάλιν ὡςπερ εξ ἀρχῆς κινεῖτε περὶ τῆς πολιτείας: ἢν ὦς ἢδι διελθωθύν ἔγγορ ἔχαριον, ἀγαπῶν εἰ τις εὔσοι ταῦτα ἀπο- δεξάμενος ὡς τότε ἐρρήθη. ἢ νῦν ὑμεῖς ἵ παρακαλοῦντες οὐκ ἰστε B ὁσον ἐσμέν ὡσπερ ἐπεγέρσθε: ὅν ὄρων ἐγὼ παρῆκα τότε, μὴ 10 παραίσχοι πολὺν ὤχλον. Τί δέ; ἢ δ' ὠς ὁ Ὁρασίμαχος: χρυσο- χοήσοντας οἰεὶ τούσδε νῦν εὐθάδε ἀφίχθαι, ἀλλ' αὐτῷ λόγων ἀκοινο- 3. ταῦτα II: τὰυτὰ (sic, ut solet) Α.

ἐγνάσασθαι or the like, supplied from μνήμησασθαι. The construction cannot (as J. and C. suggest) go back to μὴ οὖν παρῇ. 23 μέγα κτλ. καὶ αἱτήν φέρειν = 'or rather' (atque) as in διέγον τινὸς—καὶ οὐδένα (Ἀρ. 23 Α). For γιγνόμενον Liegbold proposes γεγομένην, but see on ΙV 427 D. The feminine would be awkward after πολιτείαν, and κοινωνίαν—παῖδων, though grammatically feminine, is logically neuter. 24 ἄλλης—πολιτείας is explained by ἡ τὰς ἐρείξας ἑρων (449 A). Stallbaum makes a curious slip: "'quoniam ad alias polietales partes considerandae celeriter accedis.'” 450 Β 1ον χρυσοχοήσοντας κτλ. Socrates shudders at the swarm of λόγοι to be encountered. "Why," says Thrasymachus, "it was precisely to listen to λόγοι, and not to smelt ore for gold, that we came here." χρυσοχοίων is a proverbial expression said of those who neglect their proper duty for some more fascinating—if less profitable—pursuit. Cf. Harpocr. s.v. χρυσοχοίων: Δείναρχος ἐν τῷ κατὰ Πιθεύναν πάλιν παρ' Ἀλεξάνδρην ἀποφοιτήσας παρὰ τούτῳ δήλῳ ὅτι χρυσοχοί ἔμαθενεν, ἀλλ' οὖ τῷ προκειμένον αὐτῷ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν. Here τῷ προκειμένῳ is λό- γων ἀκοίνων. The origin of the proverb is thus explained. A heap of gold-dust having been discovered on Hymettus, the Athenian populace deserted their usual avocations, and sallied out to seize it. But as it was guarded ὑπὸ τῶν μοιχι- μαν μικτήρων (cf. Πτ. 111 102 ff. with the parallels cited by Stein), they failed. On returning ἐςκαμότον ἀλλήλους λέγοντες 'οὖ δὲ ύπὸ χρυσοχοίων.' Cf. Suidas s.v. and Leutsch u. Schneiderin Paroem.
μένους; Ναί, εἴπον, μετρῶν γε. Μέτρον δὲ γ', ἐφη, ο Σώκρατες, ὁ Γαλαύκον, τοιοῦτον λόγων ἀκούειν ὅλος ὁ βίος νοῦν ἔχουσιν. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἥμετερον ἐκ· σὺ δὲ περὶ ὧν ἑρωτῶμεν μηδαμῶς

C ἀποκάμψεις γ' σοι δοκεῖ διεξόνων, τίς ἡ κοινονία τοῖς φύλαξίν ἦμιν 15 παῖδων τε πέρι καὶ γυναικῶν ἔσται καὶ τροφῆς νέων ἐτὶ ὄντων, τῆς ἐν τῷ μεταφ' χρόνῳ γνωριμενὶς γενέσεως τε καὶ παιδείας, ἡ δ' ἐπιτιμονοτάτη δοκεῖ εἶναι. πειρὸν οὖν εἰπεῖν τίνα τρόπον δεὶ γίγνεσθαι αὐτήν. Οὐ ράδιον, ὦ εὑδαμων, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, διελθεῖν πολλὰς γὰρ ἀπιστίας ἔχει ἐτὶ μᾶλλον τῶν ἔμπροσθέν ὑπὸ διήλθομεν, καὶ 20 γὰρ ὡς δυνατὰ λέγεται, ἀπίστοιτ' ἂν, καὶ εἰ ὁ τι μάλιστα γένοιτο, D ὦς ἄριστον' ἂν εἴη ταῦτα, καὶ ταύτῃ ἀπιστησεται. διὸ δὴ καὶ ὅκνοι τις αὐτῶν ἀπέπαινε, μὴ εὐχή δοκῇ εἶναι ὁ λόγος, ὁ φίλε ἐταίρε. Μηδέν, ἦ δ' ὅς, ὅκνει οὔτε γὰρ ἀγνώμονες οὔτε ἀπιστοὶ οὔτε δύσοι οἱ ἀκούσόμενοι. καὶ ἔγω εἴπον Ὡ ἄριστο, ἦ πον 25 βουλομένος μὲ παραβαρρώνειν λέγεις; Ἑγογ', ἐφή. Πάν τοῖς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, τοῦνατιον ποιεῖς. πιστεύοντος μὲν γὰρ ἔμοι ἐμοὶ

18. οὖν Π.; ἂν Α. 23. δοκῇ A2γ2 long: dokei A1Πρ; dokei Ξ.
450 E 29 ϕιλῶν κτλ. ϕιλῶν though neuter is of course intended to balance ϕιλῶν. The conjecture ϕιλήτατος (Richards, Hartman) destroys the balance and is in itself superfluous: see Kühner Gr. Gr. ii p. 23. Note the characteristic chiasmus ἀσφαλέως καὶ θαρραλέων, φοβεῖν τα καὶ σφαλεῖν.  

451 A 1 ὁφλευν κτλ. The infinitive depends on φοβεῖν, and is like the infinitive after φοβεῖμαι. In the anti-thetical clause Plato substitutes the more usual construction with μή. The future indicative clause μήτε εἰρήνην μήτε εἰρήνουν is rare after words of fearing (Goodwin MT. p. 132), and represents the danger as imminent. To regard μή τι γελώσα αἵλευν as a reference to the Ecclesiasticiis is rash and unjustifiable: see App. I.  

3 προσκυνοῦν κτλ. The apology looks forward, and not backward; whence δὲ rather than δὴ (which Herwerden would read).  

'Αδράστεια. Aдрáстеia was originally, perhaps, a personification of ἀνάγκη in its relation to humanity and the issues of human conduct. This meaning survived in the ὘ρθή theology (Abel Ὀρθ. Fr. 36. 109—111) and appears in Παθεῖρ. 248 C. Specifically, she was viewed as a variety of Nemesis, θεά τις τούς ὑπερφάνους τιμωροῦσα (Schoel. on Aesch. Prom. 936), and in this sense Aeschylus (l.c.) writes οἵ προσκυνοῦντες τὴν 'Αδράστειαν σφολ (the first mention of Aдрáстеia in Greek literature). Aдрáстеia is in a still more special sense the punisher of proud words; so that προσκυνῶ 'Αδράστειαν becomes, as here, a sort of apologetic preface to a bold assertion or rash utterance: cf. Eur. Νῆς. 342, 458 (ξίν δ' 'Αδράστεια λέγω). See Nägelsbach Nachhun. Theol. p. 47 and Seymour in the Proceedings of the Amer. Philol. Assoc. for July 1891 pp. XLVIII ff.  

4 ἐλπίζω κτλ. ἐλπίζω is 'I fancy,' not 'I expect;' cf. ii 383 B n. The omission of εἴναι is curious: Madvig would restore it after ἀμάρτημα. I can find no parallel to its omission with ἐλπίζω, but ὑόμαι, ὑγόμαι and other verbs of thinking often dispense with it. For examples see Schanz Nov. Comm. Pl. p. 34.  

5 καλῶν κτλ.: "concerning noble and good and just institutions" (D. and V.), not "about the beautiful, the good, and the just, in the matter of laws" (J. and C.). The latter explanation gives a good sense, but it is harsh to separate δικαίων from νομίμων, and still harsher to take καλῶν as equivalent to πέρι καλῶν. Schneider was inclined to treat δικαίων as a gloss on νομίμων. But 'about things beautiful and good and institutions' is an anti-climax; and, besides, it is of institutions in conjunction with, not as distinct from, justice etc. that Plato is about to speak. In his translation Schneider takes the right view.  

7 εὖ. ὅ is ὅν εὖ, an obvious but audacious correction, suggested, no doubt, by καλῶς εἴχεν ἡ παραμυθια in 450 D. εὖ is ironical. Glauco had comforted Socrates by saying inter alia that his hearers were friendly (οὔτε δύνατον οἱ ἀκούσμενοι 450 D). Excellent comfort! says Socrates: I had rather, in the circumstances, that they were enemies! Stallbaum and others read ὅν εὖ, and Hermann οὖ, for εὖ, thinking the irony misplaced; but Glauco's smile (γελάσας)
favours the ironic interpretation, and so does the 'Socratic irony' with which the whole sentence is overflowing. I agree with J. and C. in rejecting the pointless alternative rendering 'you do well to comfort me.'

451 b 9 ὡσπερ φόνον κτλ. See cr. n. kal before καθαρὸν is absent from the great majority of MSS and can scarcely, I think, be sound: for the difference in meaning between καθαρὸν and μὴ ἀπατεώνα is hardly enough to carry off the double καλ. ὡσπερ belongs to the whole expression φόνον καθαρὸν, which is virtually one word. Hartman would expunge καλ. μὴ ἀπατεώνα ἢμῶν, but it is quite in Plato's way to subjoin the interpretation of a metaphor or simile (cf. 470 c, viii 553 D, 555 D, and my note on Prot. 314 A), nor have we any right to excise such expressions wholesale, as many Dutch critics would do (especially J. J. Hartman de embi. in Pl. text. obs. 1858).

11 ἐκεῖ: viz. in cases of φώνας ἄκουσις (so Schneider, Stallbaum, etc.), not (with D. and V.) 'in the next world,' κανθάμεν is relevant only if it means 'in this case too,' i.e. ἐν τῷ ἀπατεώνα εἶναι καλῶν τε καὶ ἀγαθῶν κτλ.: and this fixes the meaning of ἐκεῖ.

ὡς ὁ νόμος λέγει is explained by Dem. πρὸς Πανταλείτον 58 καὶ γὰρ ἄκουσιν φῶνα — καὶ πολλὰ ἐκλά τοιαῦτα γένεται — ἄλλ' ὅσοι ἄπαντων τοις ὁροῖς καὶ λόγοις τοῖς παθοῦσι τέσσαρα τοίς πειθέντας ἀφεῖναι, and ib. 59. See also Laws 869 e. 451 c 14 ἀνδρείον δράμα κτλ. There is probably a playful allusion to the mimes of Sophron, as was first pointed out by R. Förster in Rhein. Mis. XXX (1875) p. 316. According to Suidas (s.v. Ἀφρως) and others, Sophron's mimes were classifed as ἀνδρείοι μύματι and γυναικεῖοι μύματι.

In the former, as may be inferred from Choricius' Defence of Mimes (first published by Graux in Revue de Philologie i pp. 209 ff.) Sophron represented male characters, in the latter female (μεμεῖται μὲν ἄνδρας, μεμεῖται δὲ γυναῖκα ib. p. 215). This is corroborated by many of the titles of his plays, as such ὁ ἀγγουήφατος, ὁ θυνυ-θήρας, ὁ ἀγγελος contrasted with τὴν ἀδετριάν, ἡ γυνωφόσον, ἡ πενθέρα etc. Sophron's mimes are called δράματα (cf. ἀνδρείον δράμα) by Demetrius per ἐρμηνείας § 156 σχεδόν ταύτα τῶν δραμάτων τῶν αὐτού τόσο παρομασία ἔκλειξα ἐστιν. The point here is that just as custom required an ἀνδρείον μύμον to precede a γυναικείον—this is not otherwise attested, so far as I can discover,—so it will be proper (ὃρθων ἄν ἑξών) for Plato's women to come on the stage after his men have played their part. Plato's partiality for Sophron is frequently mentioned by ancient authors, as for example by D. L. III 18, Quintil. 10. 17: see Schuster in Rhein. Mis. xix (1874) pp. 605 ff., where these and other authorities are cited. Susemihl (Bursian's Jahresbericht 1874—1875 III p. 343) doubted whether Plato has Sophron in view here; but the allusion, which was admitted by Graux (l.c. p. 215 n.), and successfully reaffirmed by Förster (Rhein. Mis. for 1880 p. 472), is highly probable. I can see no point in making δράμα γυναικείον an ironic reference to the Ecclesiastæae of Aristophanes (with Munk die nat. Ordnung d. Pl. Schr. p. 296, and Chinappi l.c. p. 196), nor it is likely that the words allude to a dramatic caricature of Plato's policy by some other comedian, as is supposed by Bergk Gr. Literaturgesch. 4 p. 462 n. 134. On Sophron's prose-mimes as a preparation for the Socratic Dialogue see Hirzel der Dialog i pp. 20—26.
outset that our men were to be as it were guardians of the flock. Now the principle of community requires that our female
watch-dogs shall share the active duties of the males, allowance being made for their
inferiority in strength. Their education
must therefore be the same: they will have
to learn music, gymnastic, and the art of
war. No doubt the spectacle of women,
especially old women, exercising themselves
naked along with men, will seem ludicrous
at first; but it is not long since the Greeks
would have thought it ludicrous even for
men to strip for athletic exercises. Nothing
is truly ludicrous except what is mis-
chievous.

451 c ff. Socrates now prepares to
encounter the first ‘wave’ (451 c—457 b): see on 449 A ff. The outstanding feature in
his argument throughout this part of the
dialogue is the constant appeal which
he makes to φύσις (452 E, 453 B, C, E,
He maintains that community of work
and education between certain selected
men and women is ‘natural’ in two
senses. In the first place, it is, he main-
tains, in harmony with human nature,
that is, with the nature of man and woman
(455 E ff.), and in the second place, it is
recommended by the analogy of Nature’s
other children, the lower animals (451 D).
See also on ι 370 A. Puhlmann (Gesch. d.
antik. Kommunismus etc. pp. 114—146)
has shewn that the desire for a ‘return to
Nature’ found frequent and manifold ex-
pression in the literature of Plato’s times,
and we can see that Plato was himself
powerfully affected by the same impulse,
although his interpretation of ‘Nature’ is
coloured by an Idealism which is pecu-
larly his own (ιV 443 b n.). The special
regulations of Book V may be illustrated in
some particulars from the practices of
certain ‘Natur-völker’ before the time of
Plato (see e.g. Hdt. IV 116 and infra
463 c n.), as well as by certain features of
the Pythagorean and Spartan disciplines
(see RP, 7 48 A f. and nn. on 452 b al.),
but it is more important and relevant
to observe that Plato’s assignment of
common duties and common training to
the two sexes is part of a well-reasoned
and deliberate attempt by the Socratic
school to improve the position of women
in Greece. In this respect, as in many
others, the teaching of Socrates inaugu-
rated an era of protest against the old
Hellenic view of things. See in particu-
lar, for the views of Socrates himself, Xen.
Mem. ι 2, 5, Symp. 2. 9 ἡ γυναικεία ϕύσις
οὐδὲν χειρῶν τῆς τοῦ ἄνδρος ὁσα τυχόνται,
γνώμης δὲ καὶ ἀρχήν δειταί, Οἰσεο. 3. 12—
15, 7. 11 ff.; for Plato, Symp. 201 D ff.
and Λατος 780 E ff.; and for the opinion
of Antisthenes consult D. L. ι ν 12 ἄνδρος
καὶ γυναῖκος ἡ αὐτῆ ἀρετῆ. It is possible
that some of Euripides’ pictures of noble
and disinterested women were also in-
spired in some measure by the influence
of the same movement. In later times
the Stoics constituted themselves the
champions of similar views, and Cleanthes
wrote a treatise entitled περὶ τοῦ ὅτι ἡ
αὐτῆ ἀρετῆ καὶ ἄνδρος καὶ γυναῖκος: see
Dyroff Ethik d. aiten Stoa pp. 311—314,
where other evidence is cited. A learned
and acute discussion on the attitude of
the Socratic school in this matter will be
found in Chiappelli Riv. di Filologia etc.
XI pp. 229 ff. Finally it should be ob-
erved that, from Plato’s point of view,
the selection of suitable women as φίλακες
is strictly in harmony with the fundamental
principle of our city, viz. ‘to each one work
according to his or her nature’ (ι 370 B
n.); that it removes a dangerous source
of unrest, intrigue, and sedition, by pro-
viding an outlet for the energies of able
and politically-minded women in legiti-
mate channels and silencing them with the
responsibilities of rule, while it at the
same time secures for the service of the
State all that is best in the other half of
the population (Λατος 781 A), and justifies
the claim of the perfect city to be in literal
truth an Aristocracy.

451 c 19 κατ’ εἰκόνα κτλ.: “in
following out that original impulse which
we communicated to them” (D. and V.).
πρῶτον ὀρμήσαμεν, ἐπεχειρήσαμεν δὲ ποὺ ὡς ἁγέλης φύλακας 20 ὜ν τοῖς ἄνδρας καθιστάναι τῷ λόγῳ. Ναὶ. Ἀκολουθῶμεν 1 τοῖς καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τροφὴν παραπλησίαν ἀποδίδοντες, καὶ σκοποῦμεν, εἰ ἦμιν πρέπει ἥ οὐ. Πῶς; ἐφέ. ἩΩδέ. τὰς θηλείας τῶν φυλάκων κυνῶν πότερα ἠξυμφυλάττετον οὐμέθα δείν, ἀπερ ἀν οἱ ἄρρενες φυλάττοσιν, καὶ ἠξυμφυλάττειν καὶ τάλλα κοινὴ πράττειν, 25 ἥ ταῖς μὲν οἰκουρεῖν ἐνδόν ὡς ἀδύνατος διὰ τῶν τῶν σκυλάκων τόκον τε καὶ τροφήν, τοὺς δὲ πονεῖν τε καὶ πᾶσαν ἐπιμέλειαν ἑχειν περὶ τὰ τοίμια; Κοινὴ, ἐφή, πάντα: πλὴν ὡς ἀσθενεῖ.  

Εὐστεραίς 1 χρώματα, τοῖς δὲ ὡς ἰσχυροτέροις. Ὁλὸν τ’ ὄνω, ἐφήν ἔγω, ἐπὶ τὰ αὐτὰ χρῆσις τίνι ξώρω, ἀν μὴ τὴν αὐτὴν τροφὴν τε 30 καὶ παιδείαν ἀποδίδοις; Ὁνιχ ὄνω τε. Εἰ ἄρα ταῖς γυναιξίν ἐπὶ ταύτα χρησόμεθα καὶ τοῖς ἄνδράσι, ταύτα καὶ διδακτέοιν αὐτάς. 

452 | Ναὶ. Μονικὴ μὲν ἐκείνως τε καὶ γυμναστικὴ ἐδὸθη. Ναὶ. Καὶ ταῖς γυναιξίν ἂρα τούτω τῷ τέχνα καὶ τὰ περὶ τοῦ πόλεμου ἀποδοτέον καὶ χρηστέον κατά ταύτα. Εἰκὸς ἐξ 6 ὄν ἥργεις, ἐφή. Ἡσώς δὴ, εἶπον, παρὰ τὸ ἔδος γελοῖα ἀν φαίνοντο πολλά περὶ τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα, εἰ πράξεται ἢ λέγεται. Καὶ μᾶλα, ἐφή. Τῇ, ἦν δ’ 5

32. καὶ διδακτέων ΑΠ: διδακτέων Α. 

20 ὀρμήσαμεν (sc. αὐτούς) is causative, and not intransitive, as Jowett supposes. ἀγάλης. Cf. II 375 D and infra 460 c, 466 D nn. 451 D 28 πλῆν κτλ. One ms inserts ταίς μὲν after πλῆν; but, "ταῖς δηλείας utpote ex ipsa sententia et ex adjectivo ἀσθενετέρας facile intelligendum dum entuntatim non est" (Schneider). Schneider’s explanation is more accurate than to say (with Stallbaum) that ταῖς μὲν is idiomatically suppressed, like τὸ μὲν before ἄλλο in Prot. 330 A (ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ ἄλλο): cf. infra 455 E. This passage is thus criticised by Aristotle (Pol. B. 5. 1264 b 4) ἄτοπον ἐκαὶ τὸ ἐκ τῶν θηρίων ποιεῖται τὴν παραβολήν, ὅτι δεῖ ταύτα ἐπιτηθεῖν τὰς γνώμας τοῖς ἄνδραῖς, οἷς ὀικονομίας οὐδὲν μετέστην. But, from Plato’s point of view, the analogy holds; for he regards οἰκονομία as παρὰ φύσις even for human beings, and aims at abolishing it. 

452 A 1 μονική μὲν. The particle μὲν "Latino atque non multo debilus" (Schneider, comparing I 339 B and III 412 C ὥτι μὲν προσβητέρους τοὺς ἀρχηγοὺς δεὶ εἶναι—δῆλον). Richards conjectures μόνω, which would certainly be more usual (cf. 465 B): but no change is necessary. Although the position of τε (which a few inferior mss. omit) is irregular, we ought not to read ye: cf. infra 465 E n., and (with Schneider) Laws 800 A, 966 A (ἵ καὶ ὅσων ἐν τε καὶ ὅτι). In these cases τε suffers hyperbaton, being attracted forward by καὶ. The reverse kind of hyperbaton is more usual with this word: see Prot. 316 D, with my note ad loc. Here it would be awkward to place τε after either μονική ὡς μὲν. For ἐδόθη Richards proposes ἀπεδόθη, to correspond with ἀποδοτός above; but cf. δοτέων infra 457 A and see on I 336 E. 

4 παρὰ τὸ ἔδος: 'contra consuetudinem,' not 'respectu consuetudinis' as Hartman thinks. The phrase specifies the particular variety of γελοῖα intended by Plato: 'many ludicrous breaches of etiquette.' It is not quite easy (with J. and C.) to understand παρτάθενα. 

5 πράξεται. ὁ has πεπράξεται, which is tempting, and may be right; but, as Schneider points out, 'si peragentur' is somewhat more appropriate than 'si peracta fuerint.' πράξεται as passive seems to occur only here in Attic.
452 B 8 ἡδη = demum adds emphasis to ἀλλὰ καλ. We may translate: 'but positively also the older women.' On this use of ἡδη ('now that we have reached this point') and kindred words see Cope Aristotlē's Rhetoric Vol. 1 pp. 13 ff. J. and C. (with other editors) suppose a hyperbaton for τὰς ἡδη πρεσβυτέρας (which Herwerden would actually read); but the hyperbaton is harsh, and no parallel has yet been adduced. The rules laid down by Plato in this passage are an exaggeration of Spartan usage: cf. Plut. Lyce. 14 and the passages cited by Paley on Eur. Androm. 596 ff. Σπαρτιάδων —αἱ εὗν νέωσιν ἑξερμοῦσαν δόμων | γυμνοίς μηραῖς | τέπλους ἀνείμενοι | δόμων παλαίστρας τ' οὐκ ἀνάσχετον ἐμοί | κούμας ἐχουσι, and by Blaydes on Ar. Lys. 82: cf. also Laws 813 E ff., 833 C ff. and infra 457 A. The words ἦν ὅταν μῆνι — ψυχογυμναστέων are a characteristically Hellenic touch: cf. Theod. 162 B.

12 τῶν χαριέντων. It is tempting to see in this an allusion to the author of the Ecclesiasticusae (with Krohn Pl. St. 81 and Chiappelli Rév. di Filol. XI p. 198). If —with the majority of modern critics—we hold that the Ecclesiasticusae is earlier than Book v, and if we consider the play as at least in some measure directed against theories on communism and the position of women with which the Socratic school sympathised, it is easy to interpret Plato here as addressing a rebuke to the comic stage in the form of a further challenge. In any case, however, the words ὧν φοβητέων—ἀχύρεσις are not a vaticinium ex eventu, for the Ecclesiasticusae does not touch on any of the points specifically mentioned here. See also on 452 D, 455 A, 457 B, 464 B, and 473 E ff. In each of these passages there is some prima facie ground for suspecting a personal or polemical motive of some kind. See on the whole subject App. I.

452 C 16 τὰ αὐτῶν πράττειν: i.e. παίζειν. Herwerden's conjecture τὰ τωντί τοι αἰπτεῖν is both needless and inelegant.

17 οὐ πολύς χρόνος κτλ. Stallbaum cites Hdt. I 10 παρὰ γάρ τοίς Λυκότης, σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ παρά τοῖς ἄλλοις βιβαζομένοι, καὶ ἄνδρα οὕτως γυμνὸν ἐς αἰσχύνην μεγάλην φέρει, and Thuc. I 6 ἔγινομινθανε τῷ πρώτῳ (Ἀλκεδαμίου) κτλ. 20 γυμνασίων use in its strict etymological sense of γυμνὸς σώματε: we ought not to insert γυμνῶν (with Richards) or τοιοῦτων (with Herwerden) before γυμ-

452 D 23 καὶ κτλ. καὶ begins the apodosis: ‘then too’ etc. The general idea is that when experience proved that it was better to take exercise in a nude condition, nudity also ceased to be ludicrous. Plato thus prepares the way for the identification to be presently made (see next note). The particle δὴ (‘for sooth’) hints that the eye is less trustworthy than the reason; and the contrast is further accentuated by the somewhat artificial balance between ἐν τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς and ἐν τοῖς λόγοις. D. and V. wrongly make the apodosis begin with καὶ τοῦτο (where τοῦτο is of course nominative).

25 μάταιοι κτλ. I have (with the Oxford editors) retained the text of A. It at least affords an intelligible sense, and none of the numerous variants or emendations is at all convincing. The general drift of the passage is clear enough. Nothing is γελοῖον except what is κακόν (μάταιον—κακόν), and, conversely, nothing is σπουδαῖον except what is ἁγαθόν (καὶ καλὸν—ἀγαθὸν. σπουδαίον is involved in σπουδάζει). Both inferences are expressed in such a way as to suggest a personal reference: cf. χαρινωτών in B, and see App. I. γελοστοιεύς, especially after κωμιδῶν just above, points to the comic stage: and Aristophanes is perhaps intended. See on 452 B. The whole sentence means: ‘Foolish is the man who identifies the laughable with anything but the bad, and he who attempts to raise a laugh by looking at any spectacle as laughable except the spectacle of folly and evil aims in all seriousness also at another standard of beauty, which he has set up for himself, than the standard of the good.’ The analysis of τὸ γελοῖον, so far as it goes, is in harmony with Phil. 48 A ff.: cf. especially 49 A. With σπουδαίους we must supply αὐτῶν, i.e. τῶν σκοτῶν. On the difficulties of this passage see App. II.

Let us first determine whether our proposal is possible—in other words, whether woman is naturally able to share the duties of man—all, or none, or some, and, if some, whether war is one of these. It may be argued: ‘man’s nature is different from that of woman: we should therefore assign them different duties.’ A little analysis will show the superficial and eristic character of such reasoning. The word ‘different’ is ambiguous. Natures may differ without differing at all in respect of the powers by which certain duties are performed. Consequently, if man and woman differ only in sex, they may each perform those duties in which sex plays no part. Among such duties are those which appertain to the administration of a city. Doubtless man is superior, as a whole, in capacity and strength, although many women excel many men; but the natural aptitudes of individual women are as various as those of men, and there is no administrative duty which is by Nature exclusively appropriated either to men, or to women. Thus Nature produces women who are fitted to guard our city. These we shall select as the wives and colleagues of the male guardians. Our proposal is possible, because it is natural: the term ‘unnatural’ may sooner be applied to the present condition of women.

On the principle laid down in this part of Socrates’ argument see 451 C ff. nn.


33 ή ἂνθρωπινή was objected to by Cobet; but ή θήλεια alone would be too general: we are dealing only with ‘female human nature.’

453 A 4 καὶ κάλλιστα. Dobree conjectured καλλίστα καὶ, neatly, but needlessly, for καὶ τελευτή, like καὶ ἀρχή, may be treated as a single notion. Cf. III 404 B 11.

453 B 9 κατοικίσεως: sc. τῆς πόλεως, but the antecedent is attracted into the relative clause (ἤν ψίλιτε πόλειν), as often: cf. I 350 C 11.

10 ωμολογεῖτε. II 369 E ff.

12 πῶς δ' οὖ διαφέρει; Baiter follows Hirschig in bracketing διαφέρει. The formula πῶς δ' οὖ; is however so common, that no scribe is likely to have added διαφέρει. Cf. διαφέρει in VI 496 Α. For the sentiment see Xen. Oec. 7. 22 τὴν...
and γάρ is absent from each of these passages. Hartman strangely explains γάρ as 'profecto'; while Stallbaum inclines to cut it out. Groen van Prinsterer (Prosop. Plat. p. 209) proposed to read οὐ γάρ εὐκόλως έικονεν. Οὔ μά τὸν Δία, ἐφε. Οὐ γάρ, εἰπον. It appears to me that the emphatic οὐ μά τὸν Δία is more appropriate in the mouth of Socrates, who is continually dwelling on the difficulty of his task, and I therefore think that Plato wrote οὐ γάρ εὐκόλως έικονεν, ἐφε. Οὐ γάρ, εἰπον, οὐ μά τὸν Δία, although I have not ventured to change the text. εὐκόλως is of course neuter, not masculine, as Richter supposed (Fl. Jahrb. 1867 p. 143).

24 κολυμβηθραν: a swimming tank. See Blümner Privatalt. p. 210 n. 2. In what follows we have the first suggestion of the wave metaphor, which dominates nearly the whole of Book ν: see on 449 Α.

28 άτοπον. As άλλον here means 'other' and not 'else,' the epithet άτοπον ('difficult to procure,' cf. Π 378 Α) must be applicable to the dolphin also. The Platonic ilotes seems delicately to suggest that the miraculous story of Arion and the dolphin is not above suspicion. Herwerden conjectured άτοπον, but no change is necessary.

453 Ε 31 κατηγορεῖται. Socrates identifies his audience with the imaginary opponents of 453 Α—C, and Glauco replies in their name. As άλλον means primarily Socrates and Glauco (453 Β), the situation is somewhat confusing: and some may wish to read κατηγορεῖται, as I formerly printed (with Vind. F. Flor. R T, Ficinus and Hartman). The confusion of έ and ά is of course common (see Introd. § 5), but it is better to adhere to the best MSS. Cf. VI 489 B.

454 A 2 άντιλογικής τέχνης. άντιλογική is defined in Soph. 225 Β as a variety of ἀμφιβοτητικῶν: viz. τὸ ἐπίλοιος—opposed to τὸ δικαίον, which is δημοσία—αὐτ καὶ κατακεκεχρισμένον ἐρωτήσει πρὸς ἀποκρισίας. It is described in Phaedr. 261 d ff., and practical illustrations are given in the sophisms of Euthyd. 275 c ff. The 'Ἀντιλογικόι are spoken of as almost a distinct sect in Plato's time: see Lys. 216 Α and Isocr. περὶ ἀντιδώσεως 45 ἄλλοι δὲ τινες περὶ τὰς ἐρωτήσεις καὶ τὰς ἀποκρίσεις—οὐδό άντιλογικοῦς καλοῦν. Here Plato probably has in view some of the 'Sophists' (as in VI 499 Α) as well as the Megarian学校, whose well-known puzzles—ὁ ψευδόμενος, ὁ διαλαλαθόν, ὁ Μέλετρα, ὁ ἀγκακαλώμενος: see D. L. Π 108—are excellent examples of verbal fallacies. The same class of people are also called ἐρωτικοὶ and ἁγωνιστικοὶ: see Men. 75 c and cf. Thead. 167 ε, Phil. 17 a and Isocr. in Soph. 20 τῶν περὶ τὰς ἐρωτήσεις καλυπτούμενον—τοιαύτα λογία διεξέγοντο ὡς εἰ τις ἐπὶ τῶν πράξεων ἐμμείνειν, εἰδὼς ἐν ἐν πάσιν ἐπὶ κακισί. On the history and place of Eristic in Greek philosophy see E. S. Thompson's elaborate excursus in his edition of the Αἰνοι pp. 272—285.

4 κατ’ εἶδος διαφορμένων. εἶδος is not of course 'the Ideas': but 'species'
5 λεγόμενον ἐπισκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ κατ' αὐτῷ τὸ ὄνομα διώκειν τοῦ λεχθέντος τὴν ἐναντίωσιν, ἐρμικοῦ, οὐ διαλέκτῳ πρὸς ἀλλήλους χρώμενοι. Ἡστι γὰρ δὴ, ἠφη, περὶ πολλοὺς τούτο τὸ πάθος· ἀλλὰ μῶν καὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς τούτο τείνει εἰν τῷ παρόντι; Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἣν δὲ ἤγοι· Κινδυνεύομεν γοῦν ἀκοντες ἀντιλογίας ἀπετείχοντες γοῦν. Πώς; Τὸ μὴ τῆς αὐτῆς φύσις ὅτι οὐ τῶν αὐτῶν δεῖ ἐπιτηδευμάτων τυγχάνειν πάντων ἀνδρεώς τε καὶ ἑριστικῶς κατὰ τὸ ὄνομα διώκομεν, ἐπεσκεφάμεθα δὲ οὐδὲ ἤποιν, τι εἶδος τὸ τῆς ἐτέρᾳ τε καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς φύσεως καὶ πρὸς τί τείνου ὁρίζομεν τότε, ὅτα τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα ἄλλη φύσει ἀλλὰ, τῇ δὲ αὐτῇ τὰ αὐτὰ ἀπεδίδομεν. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν, ἠφη, ἐπεσκεφάμεθα. Τοιχώματι, εἰπον, ἐξεστὶν ἡμῖν, ὡς ἐοικε, ἀνερωτάν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς, εἰ ἡ αὐτῇ φύσις φαλάκρων καὶ κομητῶν καὶ ὦν ἡ ἐναντία, καὶ ἐπειδὰν ὁμολογοῦμεν ἐναντίαν εἶναι, εἰάν φαλάκροι σκυττομόσων, μὴ ἐάν κομῆται, εἰάν δ' αὐτοῦ κομίζηται, μὴ τοὺς ἐτέρους. Γελοῖον μέντ' ἂν ἦν, ἠφή. Ἄρα 20 κατ' ἄλλο τι, εἰπον εὐγόν, γελοῖον, ἢ ὅτι τότε οὐ πάντως τὴν αὐτήν ἐπετείχον. 

10. μὴ ξι: om. AIIq.

'kinds': cf. Pol. 285 A κατ' εἶδος—diarouménos and Soph. 253 B κατά γένη διαφελέσθαι. That κατά γένη (s. εἶδος) διαλέγεται is the peculiar province of dialectic was the view of Socrates as well as of Plato: see Xen. Mem. IV 5, 12 ἢθη δ' καὶ τὸ διαλέγεσθαι ὅνομασθήναι ἐκ τοῦ συνώνυμου καὶ βουλέσθαι διαλέγονται κατὰ γένη τὰ πράγματα. See also on III 402 C.

5 κατ' αὐτῷ—ἐναντίωσιν: lit. 'pursue the contradiction of what has been said according to the name and nothing more.' i.e. 'aim at the merely verbal contradiction of what has been said.' We are told by Clement (Strom. II 7. 968 B ed. Migne) that Critolaus called such persons ὄνοματομάχοι. With διώκων ἐναντίωσιν cf. III 410 B γυμναστικὴ διώκεσθαι. The implied antithesis to κατ' αὐτῷ τὸ ὄνομα is κατ' αὐτῷ τὸ πράγμα: cf. Soph. 218 C δὲ δὲ αἰτὶ παντὸς πέρα τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτῷ μάλλον διὰ λόγου ἢ τοῦπομά μόνον συνομολογήσασθαι χωρὶς λόγου.

6 ἵπποι—διαλέκτω: a common opposition: cf. Mem. 75 C ff. and Phil. 17 A.

454 B τὸ τοῦ μὴ τῆς αὐτῆς κτλ. See cfr. II. 454 B τὸ τοῦ μὴ τῆς αὐτῆς κτλ. See cfr. II. 454 B τὸ τοῦ μὴ τῆς αὐτῆς κτλ. See cfr. II. 454 B τὸ τοῦ μὴ τῆς αὐτῆς κτλ. See cfr. II. 454 B τὸ τοῦ μὴ τῆς αὐτῆς κτλ. See cfr. II.
καὶ τὴν ἔτεραν φύσιν ἐπιθέμεθα, ἀλλ’ ἔκειν τὸ εἴδος τῆς ἄλλοιων.

D seōs τε καὶ ὑμιτωσεῖς μόνον οὐφυλάττομεν, τὸ πρὸς αὐτά τείνον τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα; οἶον ἱατρικῶν μὲν καὶ ἱατρικῶν τὴν αὐτήν φύσιν ἔχειν ἐλέγομεν’ ἤ οὐκ οἶει; Ἐγώγη. Ἱατρικὸν δὲ καὶ τεκτονικὸν ἄλλην; Πάντως ποι.

V. Οὐκοῦν, ἢν δ’ ἐγὼ, καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ τὸ τῶν γυναικῶν γένος, ἢν μὲν πρὸς τέχνην τινὰ ἢ ἄλλο ἐπιτηδεύμα διαφέρον φαίνηται, τοῦτο δὴ ψῆμον ἐκατέρω δεῖ ἀποδιδόναι: ἢν δ’ αὐτῷ τοῦτο φαίνηται διαφέρειν, τοῦ τὸ μὲν θῆλυ τίκτεων, τὸ δὲ ἄρρεν ἐχεῖν, οὐδέν τι πιθήνομεν μᾶλλον ἀποδειχθεῖν, ὡς πρὸς δ’ ἠμεῖς λέγομεν διαφέρει γυνὴ ἀνδρός, ἀλλ’ ἔτι οἰδόμεθα δεῖν τὰ αὐτὰ ἐπιτηδεύνειν τούτων τοὺς φύλακας ἢμών καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας αὐτῶν.

Καὶ ὀρθῶς, ἐφ’ Οὐκοῦν μετὰ τοῦτο κελεύομεν τῶν τὰ ἐναντία

21. καὶ τὴν II et in mg. Α’; om. Α’.


23. ἱατρικῶν μὲν Α’’; ἱατρικῶν μὲν Α’.


454 E 22 πρὸς—τείνον corresponds to πρὸς τί τείνον in B above. On the corruption in A see Ιntrod. § 5.

23. ἱατρικῶν κτλ. Plato is illustrating that particular variety of ὑμιτωσεῖς and ἄλλοιος which πρὸς αὐτὰ τείνει τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα. As an instance of ὑμιτωσεῖς he gives two ἱατρικῶν (cf. 3. 350 A): these clearly have the same nature πρὸς αὐτὰ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, i.e. in this case πρὸς τὸ ἱατρεύεσθαι. ἄλλοιος he illustrates by the difference between an ἱατρικός and a τεκτονικός: these have different natures πρὸς τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, for the one is qualified ἱατρεύεσθαι, the other τεκταίνεσθαι. Nothing could be more clear; but the text has been plunged into confusion by the introduction of the words τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπα after the second ἱατρικῶν. The reading of A—see εἰρ. ν.—is indefensible; and the majority of recent editors print ἱατρικῶν μὲν καὶ ἱατρικῶν τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπα with q. But τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπα adds nothing to ἱατρικῶν. It has indeed been thought that ἱατρικῶν by itself suggests a doctor in actual practice, whereas an ἱατρικὸς τὴν ψυχὴν need not practise. If so, we may fairly doubt whether the two have the same nature; and at all events the difference between them renders them inapt illustrations of Plato’s argument. Jowett and Campbell attempt to escape these difficulties by taking τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπα with the first ἱατρικῶν as well as with the second; but the Greek does not permit of this solution. Similar objections apply to the readings of Bekker (and apparently Ficinus) ἱατρόν μὲν καὶ ἱατρικῶν τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπα, of Stephanus and other early editors ἱατρικῶν μὲν καὶ ἱατρικὴν τὴν ψυχὴν ἔχοντα (partly supported by Θ), and also, with some modifications, to Richards’ otherwise unhappy proposal ἱατρικῶν μὲν καὶ ἱατρικῶν <ἐδῦνα> τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπα. Hermann reads ἱατρικῶν μὲν καὶ ἱατρικὴν τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπα, but the introduction of women is of course premature. I regard τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπα as a relic of ἱατρόν τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπα, a marginal annotation on ἱατρικῶν. Cf. Ιntrod. § 5.

24. Ὀλυμπών: ‘we were saying,’ i.e. ‘we meant.’ Nothing of the sort was actually said before.

27. διαφέρων: ‘excelling’ rather than ‘differing’ (D. and V.): hence τὸ τὸ δὴ—ἀποδιδοῖ. Richards proposes διαφέρων, to avoid the singular. But the subjects are distributed, as appears from καὶ τὸ—καὶ τὸ, as well as from ἐκατέρω; and the infinitive is somewhat less suitable here than it is below. Translate ‘if either the male or the female sex plainly excels the other’ etc.

454 E 33. Οὐκοῦν κτλ. ‘Is not our next step to invite?’ &c. Σ reads κελεύομεν, which may be right, but the
λέγοντα τούτο αὐτὸ διὰδασκεῖν ἡμᾶς, πρὸς τίνα τέχνην ἢ τὶ ἔπιτιθέμενα τῶν περὶ πόλεως κατασκευήν οὐχ ἢ αὐτῇ, ἀλλὰ ἐτέρα φύσις γυναικός τε καὶ ἄνδρός; Δίκαιον γοῦν. Τάχα τοίνυν ἂν, ὅπερ σὺ ὀλίγον πρότερον ἔλεγες, εἴποι ἄν καὶ ἄλλος, ὅτι ἐν μὲν 5 τῷ παραχρῆμα ἰκανῶς εἰπὲν οὐ ράδιον, ἐπισκεφαμένω δὲ οὐδὲν χαλεπόν. Ἐἴποι γὰρ ἄν. Βούλεις οὖν δεώμεθα τοῦ τὰ τουαῦτα ἀντιλέγοντος ἀκολουθήσαι ἡμῖν, εάν πως ἡμεῖς ἔκειναι εὐνεῖξωμεθα, ὥστε οὐδέν ἔστιν ἐπιτιθέμενα ἔδιον γυναικί πρὸς διοίκησιν πόλεως; Πάνω γε. Ἡθε δή, φίλοσοφοι πρὸς αὐτῶν, ἀποκρίνουν ἄρα οὕτως 10 ἔλεγης τὸν μὲν εὐφυὴ πρὸς τι εἶναι, τὸν δὲ ἀφυή, ἐν φ' ὃ ὁ μὲν ραδίως τι μανθάνω, ὁ δὲ χαλεπῶς, καὶ ὁ μὲν ἀπὸ βραχείας μαθήσεως ἐπὶ πολὺ εὑρέτικος εἰ τι ἐμαθεὶ, ὃ δὲ πολλὴς μαθήσεως τυχών καὶ μελετήσας μηδὲ ἀ ἐμαθε σφόζιον, καὶ τῷ μὲν τὰ τοῦ σώματος ἰκανῶς 1 ὑπηρετοῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ, τῷ δὲ ἐναντίοτο; ἄρ' ἄλλα ἄττα ἔστιν η 15 ταύτα, οἷς τὸν εὐφυὴ πρὸς ἐκαστα καὶ τὸν μὴ ὁρίζου; Ὀνυδεῖς, ἴ δ' ὑς, ἀλλὰ φίλοι. Οἰσαθα τι ὁν ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπων μελετῶμεν, ἐν φ' οὐ πάντα ταύτα τὸ τῶν ἀνδρῶν γένος διαφερόντως ἐχεῖ ἢ τὸ τῶν γυναικῶν; ἢ μακρολογοῦμεν τὴν τε ύφαντικὴν λέγοντας καὶ τὴν τῶν ποπάνων τε καὶ ἐψηφισμάτων θεραπείαν, ἐν οἷς δὴ τι δοκεῖ 20 τὸ γυναικεῖον γένος εἶναι, οὐ καὶ καταγελαστότατον ἔστι πάντων ἤπτώμενον; Ἄληθῆ, ἔρη, λέγεις, ὅτι πολὺ κρατεῖται ἐν ἀπασίω ὡς ἔστι εἰπτεῖ τὸ γένος τοῦ γένους. γυναικές μέντοι πολλαί

indicative is quite defensible. With τὸν τὰ ἑναντία λέγοντα cf. infra 455 A. It is not likely that a specific allusion to Aristophanes is here intended (see Chippelli Riv. di Filolog. XI p. 200), but there is some plausibility in the conjecture that the coming argument may be inspired in some measure by the Ecclesiasticus, where the essentially domestic qualities of women are contrasted with their incapacity for government. See App. I. 455 A 4 ἄλγον πρότερον, 453 C. 6 τοῦ—ἀντιλέγοντος, 454 E π. 455 C 18 ἢ μακρολογοῦμεν κτλ. Socrates is unwilling to bore us (μακρολογεῖν) by enumerating the exceptions, which are—he implies—quite trivial. Cf. Xen. Mem. III 9. 11 ἐν δὲ ταλασίᾳ καὶ τὰς γυναίκας ἐπεδεικνυν ἁρχούσας τῶν ἄνδρων, διὰ τὸ τὰς μὲν εἰδέναι ὅτι χρὴ ταλασιουργεῖν, τοὺς δὲ μὴ εἰδέναι. It is hinted in δὲ—ἡττώμενον that, even in these, women may sometimes be excelled by men; but the general rule was the other way, otherwise the ridicule would be pointless. Grote somewhat exaggerates the significance of the clause ἢ δὲ—ἡττώμενον, when he suggests that Plato may have seen finer webs in Egypt—where weaving was performed by men—than in Greece (Plato III p. 200 n.). Cf. Proclus in remp. I pp. 242, 253 ed. Kroll. 455 D 21 κρατεῖται is construed like ἱττάται, κακοῦται, κυκαῖται and the like; but a parallel instance is hard to find. (In Aeschin. F. L. 152, cited by J. and C., the reading is ποία κρατεῖτε ἡρου;). Richards proposes κρατεῖ, in which case τὸ γένος would be the male sex—an awkward change of subject. 22 ὥς ἔστοι εἰπτεῖν. See I 341 B ὡς. The sentiment is illustrated by J. and C. from Crat. 392 C πρότερον οὖν αἱ γυναίκες ἐν ταῖς πόλεισιν φρονιμώτεραι σοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι ἢ οἱ ἄνδρες, ὡς τὸ δόλον εἰπτεῖν γένος; Οἱ ἄνδρες.
TTOAITEIAC

polllon andron beltious eis polla: to de olon exei os su legeis. Oudenv are eistin, o filie, eptitheuma twon polion dioukoyonton


gynakios dioti gineta, oud anerdos diosti anhi, all omoulous diespar-25

menai ai fusis en amfoin toin xofin, kai patonon mven metexhe

E gynh eptitheumato kata fusin, pantoan de anhi, eti pazi de asbevasteron gynhe andros. Panu ge. "H ouv andrasa pantaa

prostazomen, gynakia d ouden; kai paws; 'Al' eisti gypar, oimai, ows phsosen, kai gynhe laitrikhe, h d ou, kai moustikhe, h d' amouso 30

fusie. Ti mhn; Gymnastikhe d' are ou, oude polemikey, h de apolemos kai ou philogymnastikhe; Oimai egophe. Ti de; filosofos te kai misosofos; kai thmoeidh, h d' athmos; "Esti kai tauta. "Estit anrea kai phulakikhe gineta, h d ou. h ou toiauthin kai twon andron twon phulakikon fusin ezelexameba; Toiauthin 5

men ouv. Kai gynaikos are kai andros h authe fusis eis phulakih

poloos, plhn osa asbevastera h ischurotera eistin. Fainetai.

VI. Kai gynaikes are aif toiauta tois 1 toioontos andrasin ekлектei synokein te kai sympulattei, etpeiter eisou icanai kai

gynegeneis autous tin fusin. Panu ge. Ta d eptitheumata ou 10


26 pantow mven ktl. Plato, in short, makes government a question of capacity, and not of sex. With what follows cf. the


passages cited above on 451 c. For the relative weakness of woman cf. infra 457 a and Laws 781 a.

455 e 27 esti pasi is doubted by Herderen, who proposes en pase or en apase. eti may however mean 'with a


view to,' 'for,' as in 471 a.

30 h d' ou. h men is idiomatically omitted: see 451 d n.

31 are better, I think, than are, though somewhat more difficult: the interrogative are is moreover generally elided before ou. The sentence (as J. and C. remark) is "an ironical negation with an interrogative tone." The irony in this passage lies in are. As might be expected from the accumulation of negatives, late mss shew a great variety of readings. Bekker follows q and reads kal gynostisi are kai polemik-an obvious but wholly


superfluous attempt to simplify the authoritative text.

456 a 7 plhn osa ktl. For osa

Eusebius (Pracp. Ev. XII 32. 5) read oso followed by asbevastera, h de ischurotera esti, and the dative was also preferred by


Schneider (Addit. p. 38). The neuter plural of oso is however used adverbially as well as the neuter singular; and the
dative of 'amount of difference' is scarcely to the point. Instead of asbevastera, h ischurotera we might read (with A2)
asbevastera ischuroteras. But the reading in the text is preferable, because it lays more stress on the identity of the male and female nature. It is the same nature, only it is stronger in men, and weaker in women. h = 'or' and not 'than.'

456 b 10 gynegeneis-thin fusin. J. and C. remark that "in the Politicus and Laws, on the other hand, the aim of the legislator is rather to unite in marriage opposite natures that they may supplement each other: Pol. 309, 310, Laws 773 ff." Such a marriage law is unneccessary in the Republic, where the opposite qualities of strength and sensibility are already united in the character of each of the parents. See on II 375 c.

A. P.
ta auta apohtete taiz autai phiseis; Ta auta. "Hkomeu aera eis ta protera periferomevoi, kai omolougemvei me parafusin einai taiz ton vulakon ynnai mouvaktikin te kai ymmvastikin apohtidivai. Pantaapanisin men ouv. Ouk aera advanata ge oude.

15 euraisi omiai enomobetoumen, eteipter katafusin etihemen ton vomoi. Alla ta vun parata tauta ygnomene parafusin maallov, ovs einike, ginnetai. "Eoikev. Oukouv he etiskpepsin himin, ei dynata te kai betaista legoyme; "Hn gar. Kai oti men de dynata, diwmologytais. Nai. "Oti de de betaista, to metad 20 touto de diomologytai; Dhlou. Oukou prós ge to vulakini ynnaike genevdhai ouk allh men himin andras poishiei paiideia, allh de ynnaikeas, alllos te kal 1 thn autin fousin paralabousa; D Ouk allh. Pws ouv echis doxhes tou toioide peri; Tinos de; Toi ypolaambainen paral seantoth ton men amein ano, ton de

cheiroi he pantas omoiou ygei; Oudamos. 'En ouv th polei, hyn fikizomen, potevren oiei himin ameinous andras exerygathai toui vulakas tychontas his dyilboven paiideias, h tois skutotoomous th skutikai paiadevntas; Gelotov, ef, erotas. Manvainw, efyn. th de; toin allwn polutow 1 ouv outoi aristoi; Polu ge. Th de; E 30 aij ynnaikeis ton vulakon ouv autai esonai betaistai. Kai touto, ef, polu. "Esti de th polei ameunon his ynnaikeis te kai andras ois aristous egigynesthai; Ouk estin. Touto de mouvakti te kai ymmvastikai paragugvomevai, ovs himiesi dyilboven, apereg-a 457 soutai; Pws de ou; Ov monon aera dynatov, alla kai ariston polei vomiom enetibemen. Ovtois. 'Apodoitw de taiz ton vulakon

18. te Flor. T: ge APX.

456 c 15 euraisi omia. Cf. 450 d n. kata phusin. 449 a nn. Plato's proposals — so he asserts — are 'natural,' because in harmony with the natural endowments of gifted women; and it is because they are natural that he calls them possible. The definition of dunatow is interesting and noteworthy: see 466 D and 471 C n. Grote (Plato III p. 201) has observed that Plato is here refuting a current objection to his theories: in the next sentence he turns his adversaries' weapon against themselves.

17 on. 452 E. 456 c — 457 b It remains to prove that our policy is the best for the State. We are agreed that the training which qualifies a man to be a guardian will qualify a woman also, if their natural capacities are the same to start with. Now our male guardians, owing to their education, are the best men in the city. Our female guardians will in like manner be the best women. And there is nothing better for a city than to be peopled by the best women and the best men. This end is secured by our system of education. Therefore our women must strip for athletic exercises, and share all the labours of guardianship, in spite of the foolish laughter of those who forget that utility is the true standard of good taste.
457 A 4 ἀρετὴν—ἀμφιέστωνται: 'they will clothe themselves with excellence instead of garments,' viz. by thus stripping for exercise, because τοῦ βελτίστου ἕνεκα γυμναίαν: see B below. Jowett's translation "for their virtue will be their robe" is incorrect, and would require the future perfect instead of ἀμφιέστωνται. The correct explanation is given by Schneider on p. 300 of his translation. ἀμφιέστωνται (for the usual Attic ἀμφισκέτω, which Herwerden would write) has a certain archaic effect (cf. I 330 B n.), and the saying may be borrowed or adapted from some earlier author. The same metaphor is found in Plutarch Frac. Comin. 10. 139 C τοῦ τινος γὰρ ἢ σώφρων ἀντενδόται τὴν αἰδώ (with reference to Hdt. I 8, a passage which is hardly likely—as Ast supposed—to have suggested Plato's phrase), but Plutarch's meaning is different from Plato's. So—for except for the metaphor—is Tennyson's in the line quoted by Warren from Godiva "Then she rode forth, clothed on with chastity."

κοινωνιτέον πολέμου κτλ. The wives of the Saumotreans are described by Herodotus (IV 116) as ἐπὶ θηρίῳ ἐπὶ ἄσωπων ἐκφοβοῦσαι ἀμὰ τοῖς ἀνδρῶι καὶ χορὶς τῶν ἀνδρῶν, καὶ ἐς πόλεων φαίνουσαι καὶ στολῆν τὴν αὐτὴν τοῖς ἀνδράσι φορέωσαι. Cf. also Lass 804 E—806 B. See also on 451 C ff.

7 δοτέοιν. There is no reason whatever for thinking (as some critics have thought) that Plato is not serious in making these regulations. Stobaeus (Flor. 43. 100) has ἀπόδοτον: but see 452 A n.

457 B 7 γελοῦν ἄνηρ. ἄνηρ is said with a fine touch of scorn. It is difficult to read this passage without suspecting a personal reference, perhaps to some representative of the comic stage. J. and C. remark that jests of the kind objected to by Plato occur in Ar. Lys. 80—83. See also next note and App. I. Spartan precedents are cited by Hermann-Thumser Gr. Staatsalt. p. 180 n. 3.

9 ἀτελῆ—καρπῶν: 'plucking unripe fruit of laughter.' Pindar (Fr. 209 Bergk) satirised physical speculation (τῶν φυσιολογιῶν) in the words ἀτελῆ σοφίας ὑφέποντος καρπῶν, where σοφία is a defining genitive, denoting not the tree, but the fruit. Pindar means that their σοφία is ἀτελής or inconsummable—misses its mark—is no real σοφία at all. More so Plato adapts the Pindaric fragment to his own purpose. The object of his attack is Comedy, and Comedy cultivates, not σοφία, but τὸ γελοῖον. Hence—according to the reading of the text—Plato replaces Pindar's σοφίας by the words τοῦ γελοίου. The humour of his adversary is ἀτελὲς or inconsummable—no real humour at all: for οὐδὲν οἶδεν—ἐφ᾽ ὃ γελά χιλ' ὃ τι πράττει. Cf. 452 D μάταιος δός γελοῖον ἄλλο τί ἤγειται ἦ το κακόν. This interpretation assumes that σοφία in Plato is a gloss interpolated to complete the quotation. See see cr. n. and App. III.

10 κάλλιστα κτλ. The doctrine of this famous sentence, which sounds like a manifesto, and was characteristically selected by Grote as one of the mottoes to his Plato, is essentially Socratic: see especially Xen. Mem. IV 6. 8, 9 and other passages quoted by Zeller 4 II 1. pp. 149—153. Utilitarianism of this kind pervades the Republic, as Krohn has amply proved (Pl. St. p. 370), and asserts itself even in the highest flights of Plato's idealism (ἡ τοῦ ἀγάθου ἵδει—ἡ δικαιία καὶ τάλλα προσχρησμένα χρήσιμα καὶ ωφελίμα γίγνεται VI 505 A). But even Socrates ennobles his utilitarianism by placing soul far above body in dignity and worth. In Plato utilitarianism becomes transfigured by Idealism and the doctrine of Immortality. Here it should be noted that καλῶν

19—2
combines, as often, the ideas of artistic
fitness or propriety, and propriety of
conduct. The moral sense of the Greeks
lay in their appreciation of the beautiful.

457 B—458 B Thus do we success-
fully evade one of the waves which threat-
ened us, but a more formidable wave is
now approaching. The women and children
are to belong to all the guardians in com-
non. No one shall know his father or his
child. That such a state of society is both
possible and beneficial, we shall have to
prove; but for the present, we will assume
its possibility, and try to show that com-
munity of wives and children is the best of
all policies for the city and its guardians.

457 B ff. We now confront the second
wave (see 449 A ff. n.). The Platonic
doctrine of community in wives and
children, as a certain critic drily remarks,
has been more often censured than un-
derstood. The object of the present note
is not to sit in judgment upon Plato, but to
endeavour to explain his attitude on this
subject. In its general aspect, the theory
should be regarded as an extreme de-
velopment of the Naturalism prevailing
in Books II—IV: see on 11 370 A f. and
supra 451 C ff. Several precedents have
been cited from the institutions of various
primitive peoples who were sometimes re-
garded by the Greeks as types of 'natural'
societies, as for example the Scythians (see
on 463 C and other references in Pohllmann
121 ff., with Newman's Politics of Aristotle
Vol. II p. 282 and especially Riese's in-
teresting tract on Die Idealisirung der
Naturvölker d. Nordens in d. gr. u. röm.
Literatur 1875), and even Sparta, a State
which was constantly extolled by Greek
political theorists as a model of the kató
φύσιν οικεῖον πόλις (Pohlmann l.c. pp.
125 ff., Grote Plato 111 p. 209 f.), furnished
some parallels to the Platonic communism
in this respect (Plut. Lyc. 15. 9—11, Xen.
Rep. Lac. 1. 8, 9). But Plato's real
motive in advocating his theory is simply
and solely the good of the commonwealth
(452 A). On the one hand, he dreaded
the effect of domestic ties in encouraging
selfishness and weakening the bonds of
civic obligation; and, with his customary
disregard of the limitations of ordinary

human nature, he expected his citizens to
transfer the domestic affections, without
surrendering aught of their intensity, from
the family to the State. We may therefore
truly say that Plato's intention was not to
abolish the family, but rather to enlarge
its borders and make it coincident with
the State. "Die Sonderfamilie," as Noble
remarks (die Statslehre Platos etc. p. 133),
"wird nur aufgehoben, damit das Ganze
eine grosse Familie set." On the other
hand, he was profoundly impressed with
the necessity of restricting the population,
and at the same time maintaining and im-
proving the breed of guardians, and the
measures which he here prescribes are to
a large extent devised with a view to
securing these ends (459 A—461 E).
In this respect Plato might fairly hope that
his proposals would not be abhorrent to
a nation whose idea of marriage was pri-
marily only a legalised union for the pro-
creation of legitimate children. It may
be argued that Plato sacrifices more
than he gains, even if we judge him from
the standpoint of his own political ideal-
ism, but it shews a complete misappre-
hension of the situation to charge him
with deliberate encouragement of vice:
the community of wives and children
"hat mit 'freier Liebe' nichts zu thun"
(Pohlmann l.c. p. 280). Finally, we
should remember that it is only the Gu-
ardians and Auxiliaries who are subject to
these rules (see on 111 417 A), and that in
the second-best city depicted in the Laws
Plato revives the institution of marriage,
as we understand the word, without, how-
ever, surrendering in the smallest degree
his earlier ideal (807 B). Perhaps the
wisest and most temperate discussion on
Plato's conception of marriage and the
family is that of Grote (Plato III pp. 220
—234). Some judicious remarks will
also be found in Jowett Introduction
pp. clxxi—ccxvi, and Nettleship Lectures
and Remains II pp. 174—180; but Jowett
goes beyond the province of the inter-
preter, and lays too much stress on the
antagonism between the views of Plato
and those of modern civilised com-
munities. See also on 458 E and App. I ad
fin.

13 διαφεύγειν. The present is less
presumptuous than διαφυγεῖν conjectured by Herderen. It is proved to be right by διαφυγέας below, which Herderen more so ejects.

14 γυναικεῖον—νόμον. 1 γυναικεῖον is equivalent only to περὶ γυναικῶν, it is strangely used. I suspect that Plato is playing on the musical sense of νόμος, as in VII 532 A; cf. IV 424 D, E III. γυναικεῖον νόμον—a melody sung by women—is thus exactly parallel to the γυναικείου δράμα (451 C n.), which it is clearly intended to recall.

**457 C** 19 λέγε is changed to φέρε by Cohet, to ἀγε by Richards. ἀγε may of course be right: the confusion occurs in the MSS of Plato Theaet. 162 d and 169 c (see Schanz’s critical notes on these two passages), and doubtless elsewhere also. But in default of MS authority, it is safer to retain λέγε. Praestat lectio difficilior. ‘Say on: let me see it’ gives an excellent meaning, and could not have been otherwise expressed. The hortatory subjunctive of the first person is occasionally used after imperatives other than ἰσσε and φέρε, as in Eur. Hipp. 567. See Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 185.

21 τὰς γυναῖκας κτλ. Plato imitates the emphasis and precision of a legal enactment. The Aristophanic parallel is καὶ τῶν γυνῶν τοῖς ἀνδρῶν γυναικακείσθαι (Eicl. 614, 615). See App. I.

**457 D** 25 οἷκ οἴμαι κτλ. Aristotle disappointed Plato’s expectations: for he will not admit that such arrangements are even ὀφέλιμα (Pol. B 1. 1261c 2 ff.).

28 πλειοστὶν ἀν κτλ. On the omission of ἀν see IV 437 B n. and Prot. 316 c, with my note ad loc. Without ἀν, the reference must, I think, be to the past, in which case πλειοστὶν—γενέσθαι will allude to some controversy which the doctrine of the community of wives may have occasioned before these words were written. But εἶ μάλι ἂν ἀμφισβητήσει makes it pretty clear that Plato is thinking of the future.

**457 E** 30 λόγων σύστασιν: "sermonum conspirationem" Ficinus, rightly. The passage which follows is an excellent example of Socratic εἰρωνεία.
33. ἰφεκτέων—δίκην: 'I must pay the penalty,' viz. for trying to run away. The natural penalty for running away is of course to have to stay and fight. Herodotus misses the point when he proposes to excuse βιερ and understand λόγον.

34. ἔασον μὲ κτλ. For the metaphor in ἔργασαί and ἐστίασαί see 354 A η. ἐστίασαί ὧν ἔαστον is like our 'castles in the air.'

458 A 3 πρὶν ἔξευρεῖν κτλ. Cf. Min. 86 E.

5. θέντες κτλ. εἶναι goes with θέντες: "das Dasein des gewünschten als gegeben annehmend" (Schneider). A few inferior MSS omit εἶναι; but "apparet εἶναι facile supervacaneum, minime vero explicatius gratia addendum videre libraris potuisse" (id.). To write ἢδη for εἶναι (with Vind. E: cf. also Postgate in J. Ph. xv. p. 113) is too great a change, and otherwise objectionable, in view of the ἢδη which follows.

458 B 9 καὶ ὑπότερον. καὶ is 'and' (Jowett), not 'also' (Campbell).

ἡ δυνατὰ. Stallbaum (with q and a few late MSS) reads ei δυνατά, which is more accurate, no doubt. But in saying 'how it is possible' instead of 'whether it is possible' Socrates hints that he will be able to prove the possibility of his scheme. We have here in fact a sort of prophecy of 473 B ff. Schneider (Addit. p. 39) cites a close parallel from Tim. 27 C ἢ γέγονεν ἡ καὶ ἄγευς ἔστων.


458 B—461 E. The mutual association of male and female guardians will naturally lead them to form conjugal ties. But no irregular unions will be permitted. We too shall have our 'holy weddings,' but by 'holy' we shall mean 'profitable' or 'beneficial.' Now the most beneficial unions among lower animals are those by which the best offspring is produced from parents in the prime of life. If the same is true of the human race, how skillful must our rulers be! They must unite the best couples as frequently, the worst as rarely as possible; and only the children of the best couples shall be reared. No one except the archons is to know how this result is attained. Bridegrooms and brides will be brought together at certain marriage festivals, accompanied with sacrifice and song; and the number of marriages will be settled on each occasion by the rulers, so as to keep the population as far as possible the same. The rulers will effect their object by using lots with which they have already tampered. They will also reward excellence in fighting and otherwise by more liberal intercourse with women. The children who are to be reared will be taken to an establishment of nurses, where the mothers, and other women, will come to suckle them, but every precaution will be taken to prevent the mothers from recognising their offspring. Woman is in her prime from twenty to forty, man from twenty-five to fifty-five, and it is only during these periods that we shall permit them to bear and beget children for the State. Violations of this rule will be severely condemned. After the prescribed
ἀν εἴη πραχθέντα τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς φύλαξιν. ταύτα πειράσομαι
σοι πρότερα συνιδασκοπείσθαι, ὅστε δὲ ἐκείνα, εἴπερ παρίσης.
Ἀλλὰ παρίσημον, ἐφι, καὶ σκόπειν.

Οἷμαι τοίνυν, ἣν δ᾿ ἐγώ, εἴπερ ἐσονται οἱ ἄρχωντες ἄξιοι 15

C τοῦτον τοῦ ὀνόματος, οἳ τε τούτους ὑπέκουροι κατὰ ταύτα, τοὺς
μὲν ἐθελήσῃς ποιεῖν τὰ ἐπιταττόμενα, τοὺς δὲ ἐπιτάξειν τὰ μὲν
ἀιτοὺς πειθομένους τοὺς νόμους, τὰ δὲ καὶ μιμομύρενος, ὅσα ἄν
ἐκείνοις ἐπιτρέψωμεν. Εἰκός, ἐφι. Σὺ μὲν τοίνυν, ἣν δ᾿ ἐγώ,
ὁ νομοθέτης αὐτοὺς ἄσπερ τοὺς ἀνδρας ἐξελέξας οὕτω καὶ τὰς 20
γυναικὰς ἐκλέξας παραδώσεις καθ᾿ ὅσον οὐδὲν τὸ ὁμοφυεῖς· οἱ δὲ
ἀτε οἰκίας τε καὶ ἐνσεϊνα κοινά ἐχοντες, ἱδιὰ δὲ οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν

D τοιοῦτο κεκτημένου, ὅμοι δὴ ἢ ἐσονται, ὁμοί δὲ ἀναμεμηγμένον καὶ
ἐν γυμνασίαις καὶ ἐν τῇ ἄλλῃ τροφῇ ὑπ᾿ ἀνάγκης, οἷς, τῆς
ἐμφύτου ἄξοντας πρὸς τὴν ἀλλήλως μίξειν. ἢ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα σοι 25
δοκῶ λέγειν; Ὅν γεωμετρικαῖς γε, ἢ δ᾿ ὦς, ἀλλ᾿ ἐρωτικαῖς ἀνάγ-

age has been passed, we shall remove the
restrictions on sexual intercourse, observing
only such regulations as are necessary to
prevent incest; but, if possible, these un-
official unions shall be banished, and, in any
case, their offspring must not be reared.
Socrates lays down some further regulations
about new meanings to be attached to names
of family relationships, and adds that
brothers and sisters may marry, with
the sanction of the lot and the Pythian
priestess’s approval.

458 C 18 αὐτοῖς—νόμοις. In issuing
their commands, the rulers will either
themselves obey the laws (i.e. issue such
orders as the laws direct) or act in
accordance with the spirit of the laws; see next
note. αὐτοῖς = ἵππος sc. as well as τῶν
ἄρχομένων. The reading αὐτοῖς (K and
Ficinus) is intrinsically good, and may be
right: for it accenuates the contrast be-
tween cases prescribed for by actual law,
and such as are left to the rulers’ dis-
cretion. But there is hardly sufficient
ground for deserting A.

μιμομύρενος: sc. τῶν νόμους. In
matters not actually prescribed for by
legislative enactment, the rulers will
imitate,” i.e. will issue commands in
harmony with the spirit of such laws as
do exist. The reading of ἤ, μὴ πειθομέ-
νους, recommended by Herwerden, gives a
poor, if not actually an erroneous, meaning.

21 ὁμοφυεῖς. See on 456 B.

458 D 23 ἀναμεμηγμένων. ἀναμε-

μηγμένοι would be more usual, but the
genitive lays more stress on the parti-
cipial clause: cf. Thuc. III 13. 6 βοηθη-
σάντων δὲ ὄμοι προδήμως πολὺν τε προσλή-
ψεθε κτλ., and other examples quoted in
Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 666. See also
infra on 459 C. Here, too, it should be
noted that the addition of a parenthetical
ὁμαί helps to render ἀναμεμηγμένον in-
dependent of ἐσονται. The genitive abso-
lute in ἰδιὰ δε—κεκτημένου may also, as
Jackson suggests, have influenced Plato’s
choice of construction in this clause.
Plato perhaps thought of Sparta when
he wrote the present sentence: cf. Plut.
Lyc. 15. 1 ἤδιν μὲν οὖν καὶ ταύτα παρορμη-
tικά πρὸς γάμοις· λέγω δὲ τὰς πομπὰς τῶν
παρθένων καὶ τὰς ἀποδοικεις καὶ τὰς ἀγώνας
ἐν ὤψι τῶν νέων, ἀγωμένων οὐ γεωμετρι-
καῖς, ἀλλ᾿ ἐρωτικαῖς, ὧς φησιν ὁ Πλάτων,
ἀνάγκαις.

26 γεωμετρικαῖς γε: sc. ἀναγκαῖα, with
which the dative goes, as in Soph.
252 D τὰς μεγάλας ἀνάγκαις ἀδύνατον
(cited by J. and C.). We have here one
of the earliest assertions of the famous
doctrine which has played so large
and important a part in the history of philo-
sophy—the doctrine of the so-called
“necessity” of mathematical reasoning.
See for instance Mill’s Logic Book II c. 5.
In the rest of this sentence Schneider
suspects that Glauce is paraphrasing some
passage of poetry. τῶν πολὺν λεών cer-
tainly sounds tragic.
καὶ, αἱ κινδυνεύουσιν ἐκεῖνων ὁμοιότεραι εἶναι πρὸς τὸ πεῖθειν τε καὶ ἐλκεῖν τὸν πολὺν λεῶν.

VIII. Καὶ μάλα, εἶπον, ἀλλὰ μετὰ δὴ ταῦτα, ὃ Γλαύκων, 30 ατάκτως μὲν μίγνυσθαι ἀλλήλοις ἢ ἂν ὅτι οίνων ποιεῖν οὐτέ ὁσιον ἐν εὐδαιμόνων πολεῖ οὐν᾽ εἶσοσοι οἱ ἀρχοντες. Οὐ γὰρ δίκαιον, ἐφι. Δῆλον δὴ ὅτι γάμους τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ποιῆσομεν ἱεροῦς εἰς δύναμιν ὅ τι μάλιστα: εἶνεν δ᾽ ἂν ἱεροὶ οἱ ὀφελιμῶται. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. Πώς οὖν δὴ ὀφελιμῶται ἐσονται; τόδε μοι λέγει, 45 ὃ Γλαύκων· ὥρα γὰρ σου ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ καὶ κύνας θερετικοὺς καὶ τῶν γενναίων οἰκίων μάλα συνχούν· ἃρ οὖν, ὃ πρὸς Δίος, προσεχηκάς τι τοῖς τούτοις γάμοις τε καὶ παιδοποιιαίς; Τὸ 5 ποιόν; ἐφι. Πρὶντον μὲν αὐτῶν τούτων, καίπερ ὄντων γενναίων, ἃρ οὖν εἰσὶν τινες καὶ γύρνονται ἄριστοι; Εἰσίν. Πότερον οὖν εἰς ἀπάντων ὁμοίους γεννάς, ἢ προθυμεῖ ὅ τι μάλιστα ἐκ τῶν ἀρίστων; Ἑκ τῶν ἀρίστων. 1 Τί δ᾽; ἐκ τῶν νυετάτων ἢ ἐκ τῶν γεραιτάτων Β ἢ εἰς ἀκμαζόντων ὅ τι μάλιστα; Ἑξ ακμαζόντων. Καὶ ἂν μὴ 10 οὕτω γεννάται, πολὺ σοι ἤγειρεν ἔσεσθαι τὸ τε τῶν ὀρνιθῶν

30. μίγνυσθαι Π; γυμνόνθαι Λ.

4. παιδοποιιαίς Ε; παιδοποιία Αγ; παιδοποιία (sic) Π.
καὶ τὸ τῶν κυνῶν γένος; "Εγώγ', ἐφ. Τί δὲ ἵππων οἷς, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ τῶν ἀλλῶν ζη' ὄν; ἢ ἀλλη πη ἔχεω; "Ατοπον μέντ' ἂν, ἢ δ' οὐ, εἴη. Βαβαί, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, ὁ φίλος έταιρε, ὥς ἀρα σφόδρα ἡμῖν δεὶ ἄκρων εἶναι τῶν ἀρχόντων, εἴπερ καὶ περὶ τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος ὁσαύτως ἔχει. ἢ ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ ἔχει, ἐφι. ἢ ἀλλὰ τὶ δὴ; 15 ὁτι ἀναγκὴ αὐτοῖς, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, φαρμάκως πολλοῖς χρήσαται. ἱατρὸν δὲ ποὺ μὲ δεσμένους μὲν σώματι φαρμάκως, ἀλλὰ διαίτη ἐθελόντων ὑπακοέναι, καὶ ψυλλότερον ἐξαρκεῖν ἥγουμεθα; ὅταν δὲ δὴ καὶ φαρμακεύειν δέη, ἵσμεν ὅτι ἀνδρειστέρου δεὶ εἶναι τὸν ἱατρόν. Ἀληθῆ: ἢ ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὶ λέγεις; Πρὸς τὸ δὲ, ἢν δ' ἐγώ· 20 συνυχρὸ τῷ ψεύδει καὶ τῇ ἀπάτῃ κινδυνεύει ἡμῖν δεήσειν χρησθαί δ τοὺς ἀρχόντας ἐπ' ὠφελεία τῶν ἀρχομένων. ἐφαμεν δὲ ποὺ ἐν φαρμάκου εἰδεί πάντα τὰ τοιαύτα χρήσιμα εἶναι. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γε, ἐφι. Ἔν τοῖς γάμασι τοιχῶν καὶ παιδοποιοῖς ἑσύκε τὸ ὀρθὸν τούτο 12. ἡ Π. ἢ Α. 19. εἶναι post δε' nos: post ἕγομεθα codd.

14 ἄκρων εἶναι. εἶναι is omitted by δ and Flor. U. Without it, however, as Schneider points out, σφόδρα might be taken with δεί; whereas the sense requires it to go with ἄκρων. We should expect ἄκρους εῖναι—τῶν ἀρχόντων, but the accusatives are attracted into the genitive by δεί. For an analogous idiom see III 407 b n.

459 c 17 ἱατρὸν δὲ ποὺ κτλ. μὲν after δεσμένως balances δὲ in ὡτιν δὲ δὴ, and not ἀλλὰ—ὑπακοέναι, which merely explains φαρμάκως by stating its anti-thesis. There is consequently no sufficient reason for changing ἐθελόντως into ἐθέλοντος (with some inferior MSS, Stephanus, Madvig, and others), although ἐθέλοντος would no doubt be more usual. For the genitive absolute cf. 458 d n. I agree with Schneider and Campbell in taking the participle as neuter and not masculine (so Stallbaum and Jowett). ὑπακοέναι is not ‘submit to’ but ‘respond to’—‘are willing to respond to,’ i.e. be cured by ‘a course of treatment without drugs’: cf. Prot. 325 a, and for διάητα contrasted with drugs III 406 d.

18 ἕγομεθα κτλ. See κτλ. n. If εἶναι is retained after ἕγομεθα, we must (with Ast in his second edition) understand Plato to mean ἕγομεθα ἔχαρκει καὶ ψυλλότερον εἶναι, i.e. καίπερ ψυλλότερον ὄντα, or else suppose that ἱατρὸν καὶ ψυλλότερον εἶναι is an accusative and infinitive forming the subject to ἔχαρκειν.

Neither explanation is simple or natural; and Stephanus, Madvig, and others have in my judgment some reason for expunging εἶναι, although its intrusion is not altogether easy to explain. It is possible enough that Plato wrote ἀνδρειστέρου δεί <εἶναι> τοῦ ἱατροῦ in line 19 (cf. δεὶ ἄκρων εἶναι τῶν ἀρχόντων in b above); and the possibility is raised, I think, into a probability, when we thus obtain a natural explanation of the erroneous εἶναι after ἕγομεθα. εἶναι following δεί appeared difficult, and was omitted, as it is in b above by δ; a later scribe reinserted it in the wrong place. I have therefore ventured to transpose the word.

19 ἀνδρειστέρου. It needs more courage to use drugs than to prescribe a regimen, because the risk is greater. Nothing could be more appropriate than Plato’s use of the word, although it has been doubted by Richards, who proposed ἀδ ὄμοιτέρου at first, and afterwards ἀνδρικότερου. With the general sentiment Poschenrieder (die Plat. Dial. in ihrem Verhältnisse zu den Hippokr. Schr. p. 57) compares [Hippocr.] de victus ratione VI p. 592 c. 67 Littre προκατα-λαμβάνειν τὶν ύπερίειν, ώστε τὰς νόσους μὴ προσπελάζεις, εἰ μὴ τὰ μεγάλα πάντα ἐξαμαρτάναι καὶ πολλάκις ταῖτα δὲ φαρ-μάκων δέταις ἢδη.

459 d 22 ἔφαμεν. III 389 b. Cf. also II 381 c, d.

24 τὸ ὀρθὸν τούτο: i.e. this which
you call right, viz. τὰ ζεύδας. The medicinal lie frequently appears (γίγνεται οὐκ ἐλάχιστον) in connexion with the marriages of the guardians, as Plato proceeds to shew. τοῖς γάμοις should not be made general: the reference is specific.

25 δὲ μὲν κτλ. "The case resembles that of a breeding stud of horses and mares, to which Plato compares it: nothing else is wanted but the finest progeny attainable." Grote Plato III p. 205. It is worth while to compare Plato's arrangements with those of Aristophanes in Eccl. 616—634, in spite of the comedian's lewdness and buffoonery.

459 E 28 τῶν δὲ μῆ. Cf. 460 c and 461 c. It seems to me certain from these passages that Plato in this book lends his sanction to infanticide. This has often been denied, but without sufficient reason. The subject is discussed in App. IV.

29 ἀκρότατον. Cf. (with Schneider) σφιόδρα ἀκρῶν in B above and ἡ ἀκρότατον in Laws 730 b. Stephanus' ἀκροτάται is neat, but unnecessary, in spite of καθαρόν in 460 c.

30 ἁγήλη, like ποιμὼν, is intended "to recall the analogy of the lower animals" (J. and C.). Cf. 451 c n. αὐτοί serves the same purpose, by suggesting that ἁγήλη has another and a more primitive signification.

31 ἐορταῖ κτλ. As the ἱερὸς γάμος was celebrated with a procession and sacrifices, ending with the κλήσις Ἑρας, so Plato's ἱεροί γάμοι are attended with religious rites and ceremonies: see 458 e n. Plato apparently does not intend these State-marriages to last beyond the duration of a single festival. At each successive festival fresh unions would be tried.

460 A 2 τῶν αὐτῶν ἄριστων. See IV 423 A n.

460 B 9 γέρα κτλ. Special privileges seem to have been awarded at Sparta for bravery in the field (cf. Tyrtaeus Fr. 12. 35—44): it is certain at all events that cowardice was visited with every mark of disgrace (Xen. Rep. Lac. 9. 4—6 and other references in Gilbert's Gk. Const. Ant. E. T. p. 77). γέρα must be nominative, and δοτέων passive, in spite of its singular number: cf. Symp. 188 β πάντα καὶ χάλαζα καὶ ἑρνίαζοι—

γίγνεται. Examples like Crat. 410 c αὐτὶ μὲν δὴ ὡραι Ἀττικατι ὡς τὸ παλαῖον ῥήτεον (cited by Schneider and others) are not to the point, because αὐτὶ—ὡραι
means τὸ ἄνομα ‘αἰ ὀραί.’ It is scarcely possible to take δοτέων as active, and understand from it a passive δοτέα with ἔξωσια, because the connexion between γέρα, ἄλα, and ἔξωσια—note ἄλα τε καὶ κτλ.—is too close to permit of γέρα being in the accusative case.

12 ἐπὶ τούτων. For the construction cf. Dem. F. L. 298 tov ἐπὶ τὰς πολιτείας ἐφεστηκότας and de Cor. 247 τοῦ ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων.

13 ἀμφότερα. ᾑ and some other MSS read ἀμφότερά, which is quite wrong: cf. Lach. 187 α νεώνων ἡ δύορο ἡ χάρισιν ἢ ἀμφότερα.

14 καὶ ἄραι: sc. as well as the other duties of guardians. It has not yet been specifically said that magistrates are to be open to women as well as men. J. and C. observe that “Plato seems to betray a certain consciousness that the office immediately in question might be specially suitable for women.” Kindred duties are actually assigned to a female vigilance committee in Laws 784 A, 794 A ff.

460 C 15 τῶν σηκῶν. Α σηκός is an enclosed pen or fold in which the young of animals may be reared. Hartman prefers τῶν σηκῶν (with ᾑ and a Florentine MS), because the σηκός has not been mentioned before. The way has, however, been prepared for it by 459 A, 459 B (τὶ δὲ ἐπὶ παῖσι κτλ.), παῖσιν (459 E), ἀγέλη (ib.), and σύνεργις (460 A). The comparison with a sort of ‘breeding-stud’—see above on 459 D—runs through all this passage and supplies the metaphors. See also on 460 E. The whole discussion affords an excellent example of the uncompromising rationalism with which Plato carries out his theories to their logical conclusion.

17 ἀνάπηρον. Pollux (Π 61) explains this word as ὁ παῖς τὸ σώμα πεπρωμένος; but it is little more than πηρὸς: cf. ἀνάπλεως, ἀναπλάναυι etc. The present passage is not inconsistent with Π 415 B, for ὑπόχαλκος and ὑποσίθερος do not imply deformity.

18 ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ κτλ. is a euphemism for infanticide: see App. IV. Compare the Spartan usage: εἶ δ’ ἀγενναῖ καὶ ἀμορφον, ἀπέπεμψον εἰς τὰς λεγομένας Ἀποθέτας, παρὰ Ταῦταν βαραθρόν τότον (Plut. Lyç. 16. 1). (The word for the exposure of infants was ἀπώθεσις.) See also Whibley Greek Oligarchies p. 113 οἰκ.

ἐπερ μέλλει. μέλλει (see cr. n.) might possibly be defended, if it referred to a previous statement to the same effect (‘if, as we saw,’ etc.). But there has been no such statement, unless with Stephanus we write ἀκραστάτων for ἀκράστων in 459 E. ἐπερ γε μέλλει, conjectured by Herwerden, would be in danger of meaning κατακραύγουσιν, ἐπερ μέλλει κτλ. As it is, ἐπερ μέλλει qualifies ὃς πρέπει ‘as is proper.’ Gl. ‘If the class of guardians is to be kept pure.’ Glauc, in fact, takes the words out of Socrates’ mouth. On the meaning and usage of ἐπερ in Greek see E. S. Thompson’s edition of the Meno pp. 258—264.
21 πάσαν μηχανήν κτλ. Aristotle (Pol. B 3. 1262a 14 ff.) argues that no precautions would prevent parents from occasionally recognising their children. In such cases Plato might reasonably hope that the general weakening of parental sentiment would secure his city against serious harm.

24 θηλάσανται: θηλάσανται has more MS authority than θηλάσανται; but the future indicative (and not the aorist subjunctive) is the regular construction after ὅπως in semi-final clauses: cf. IV 429 D, VII 519 E. The exceptions are—besides this passage—Symp. 198 E, Phaed. 91 a, Gorg. 480 a, b, 510 a. In most of these places there is inferior MS authority for the future, which editors now for the most part read. See Weber Entwickelung d. Absichtssätze in Schanzer's Beiträge II 2. p. 66; and for the confusion in Paris A of ο and ω Interrod. § 5.

27 προδέμεθα. See cr. n. προδέμεθα is intrinsically so much better than προδοταλαμέθα that we can hardly refuse to regard this as one of the passages in which ν has preserved the right reading. See Interrod. § 5.

28 εῇ ἀκμαζοντων. The same principle was observed in Sparta (Xen. Rep. Loc. I. 6 and Plut. Lyce. 15. 4). It is possible, though I believe incapable of proof, that Plato's limits of age were in agreement with Spartan usage.

29 τὰ εἰκοσὶν ἔτη κτλ. A woman's ἀκμὴ lasts 'the twenty,' a man's 'the thirty' years. Glauc. asks 'which twenty and which thirty?' and Socrates then explains. τὰ before εἰκοσὶ is correctly explained by Stallbaum: 'articulum ponit de certo quodam cognitum temporis spatio quod deinceps definit accuratism.' The antecedent to αὐτῶν is not simply ἄτη (so J. and C., with the English translators), but the duplicate expression εἰκοσὶν ἄτην and τράκμων. In γυναῖκι μὲν κτλ. Socrates proceeds as if Glauc. had not interrupted: the construction is μέτριοι χρόνοι ἀκμῆς—γυναῖκι, ἀνδρὶ δὲ τὰ τράκμων, γυναικὶ μὲν—τίκτειν, ἀνδρὶ δὲ—γεννᾶν, τὸ ποιοῦν, τὰ ποῖαν and the like are idiomatically used in asking for further specification, and are sometimes only impatient interruptions, intended to draw attention to the important point and add liveliness to the style: see Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 540. Schneider takes τὰ εἰκοσὶν ἄτην and τὰ τράκμων as twenty and thirty years respectively, comparing τῶν ἐννεάκοντα ἐτῶν in Tim. 21 A, but χρόνος in χρόνος ἀκμῆς means duration, as is clear from ἀμφιτέρων—φρονήσεως below. It should be observed that in the Laws Plato fixes the inferior limit for men sometimes at 25 (772 D), sometimes at 30 (721 A, 783 B). By thirty-five he expected them to be married (ibid.). Girls are to marry between 16 (785 B) or 18 (833 D) and 20 (ibid.). Cf. Hesiod ΟD. 696 ff., pseudo-Solon Fr. 27. 9 and Arist. Pol. H 16. 1335a 28. The Greeks seem generally to have recommended men to marry a little under or a little over thirty. See on this subject Blümner Privatalterthümer p. 36 n. 1.
32 Τίκτεων τῇ πόλει—γεννάν τῇ πόλει. These phrases express concisely the Platonic view of marriage. They are equally applicable to the Spartan ideal, and may have been borrowed from Sparta. Cf. Plut. Lyg. 28. 5 τῶν δὲ πρεσβυτέρων τινὲς ἐπηκολούθουσαν βωντές: Όξε Ακρότατε, καὶ οὐδὲ τὰν Χλωνίδα: μόνον παῖς ἀγαθὸς τὰ Σπάρτα πολεῖ. "What Lucan observes about Cato of Utica, is applicable to the Guardians of the Platonic Republic:—Venerisque huic maximus usus | probigenes: | Urbis pater est, Urbique maritus." (Phars. 11 387 f.) Grote.

ἐπαδᾶν—ἀκμήν: 'when he has outlived his swiftest prime of running.' The expression ἐπαδᾶν δρόμον ἀκμήν is doubtless borrowed from some epinikian poet, perhaps Bacchylides or Pindar. The dactylic rhythm is not in itself enough to justify us in assigning the phrase (with Herwerden) to epic or elegy. The author of the quotation was probably not of a man, but of a race-horse. By applying the phrase (of course in a metaphorical sense) to his bridegrooms, Plato contrives again to suggest the now familiar analogy of a 'breeding-stud of horses and mares': see on 460 c. The comparison gains in realism and point, if it was the custom of antiquity, as it is now, to bring a first-rate racer to the stud (ἵπποφόρβοι, ἵπποπτορφείων) when he ceased to run. This is probable in itself, and supported to some extent by a comparison of Plut. Lyg. 15. 12 ἱπποὺς ὑπὸ τοῦ κρατάσεως τῶν ἱππεῶν βιβδάσωσι, ἱπποτε πληθύνει ἡ μοῦθο τῶν κυρίων with Virg. Géorg. 3. 209—211. Just so Plato will not allow his guardians to marry until the fever in the blood has somewhat cooled: cf. Latus 775 b—776 b and J. B. Mayor in Cl. Rev. x. p. 111. Stallbaum was the first to detect the poetical quotation. J. and C., though translating by "his swiftest prime of running," follow Schleiermacher in understanding the phrase literally; but we may fairly doubt if Greek runners had passed their prime at 25, and, even if they had, "non hic erat talis designationi locus, nisi forte ob id ipsum, quod cursus minus idonei foret, ad nuptias idoneos visos credimus" (Schneider). παρῇ means 'let go by,' "hinder itself behind." (Schneider): cf. such expressions as παρεῖναι καρον (11 370 b al.), νῦκτα μένον παρεῖνε (Hdt. viii 9), and especially Soph. O. C. 1230 εἰτ' ἀν τὸ νῦν παρῇ 'when he hath seen youth go by' (Jebb), and Bacchylides 3. 88 ed. Kenyon ἀνδρὶ δ᾽ [οὗ θείους πολον παρεῖνε] γῆς ἥλθαι εἰς αὐτὸν ἀγκομίασαι | ήβα. 461 A 4 ἀν λάθη. "Si non latuerit foetus praeter legem susceptus, ne in lucem quidem edetur, sed antea opprimetur" (Schneider). Cf. c below.

5 γεννήσοται = 'will be produced' must, if right, refer to birth ("hervorkommen wird") (Schneider), otherwise φῶς is superfluous. Bekker and others are possibly right in reading γεννήσοται with ζήγ, and some other MSS: cf. Hdt. vi 69, where Stein prints γεγεννημένοις in place of γεγεννημένον. See Introd. § 5.

5 φῶς ἂς. See cr. n. and Introd. § 5.

7 ἐξ ὀφέλων κτλ. Cf. IV 424 A n.
The cases enumerated are all in the direct line, and nothing is said forbidding unions between 'brothers' and 'sisters.' See however 461 b n. Greek law permitted the marriage of uncles with nieces, uncles with nephews, and even half-brothers and half-sisters, provided they were not ἄνεγγυοι (Becker's Charicles E. T. p. 478, with the passages there cited). Some of Plato's contemporaries, notably the Cynics, entertained peculiarly revolting views on this subject, and the question was frequently agitated in his time: see Dümmler Proleg. zu Pl. St. pp. 52 ff. The Stoics agreed with the Cynics: see the authorities cited in Henkel Stud. zur Geschichte d. Gr. Lehre vom Staat p. 30.

The extreme emphasis shews what importance Plato attached to this provision. The procuring of abortion, though perhaps in certain cases punishable by law (Meier and Schömann Att. Process p. 381), was in practice common enough: see Blümmer Privatalt. p. 76. Plato permits it also in the Laws (740 D). The general Greek sentiment on this matter is fairly represented by Aristotle when he says (Fol. II 16. 1335b)
οὐσίας τροφῆς τοῦ τοιοῦτον. Καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἦν, ἐφη, μετρίως 20 
δὲ λέγεται: πατέρας δὲ καὶ θυγατέρας καὶ ἄνδρων ἡ ἐλεγες, \( \pi\) ὅς 
διαγνώστωσιν ἀλλήλων; Ὑπάρχοντι, ἵνα δὲ ἐγὼ ἀλλ' ἀφ' ἦς ἢν 
ήμερας τις αὐτῶν υμιφίος γένηται, μετ' ἐκείνην δεκάτῳ μηνὶ καὶ 
βδόμῳ δὴ ἓ ἂν γένηται ἐκγονα, τάντα πάντα προσερεῖ τά μὲν 
ἀρρενα νείς, τά δὲ θῆλεα θυγατέρας, καὶ ἐκεῖνα ἐκείνου πατέρα, καὶ 25 
οὗτοι τὴν τούτων ἐκγονα παῖδας παῖδας, καὶ ἐκεῖνα αὐτὸ ἐκείνων 
πάππους τε καὶ τηθᾶς, τὰ δὲ ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ χρόνῳ γεγονότα, ἐν δὲ 
μητέρες καὶ οἱ πατέρες αὐτῶν ἐγέννων, ἀδελφὰς τε καὶ ἀδελφοὺς, 
Ε ὧστε, δ' ἄν ἐλέγομεν, ἀλλήλων μὴ ἀπτεθανί: ἀδελφοὺς δὲ καὶ 
25. ἐκείνου ΑΠ; ἐκείνων Α. 26. ἐκείνα Ση: ἐκείνου ΑΠ. 

22 π. ὑποθέτω γὰρ δει τῆς τεκνοποίας τὸ 
πλῆθος. ἐὰν δὲ γιὰ γίνηται παρὰ τὰν 
συνδυασθέντων, πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἐγγενέθαι 
καὶ γονῆ, ἐμπιστεύθαι δὲ τὴν ἀμβλουσίαν 
τὸ γὰρ ὕλον καὶ τὸ μὴ διαφορισμένον τῇ 
αἰσθήσει καὶ τῷ ἥπνῳ ἐστιν. 

τιθέναι κτλ.: 'so deal with them.' 
τιθέναι is more delicate than ἐκτίθεναι, 
which was read before Bekker, although it 
has no ms authority. Herwerden 
suggests that τιθέναι means ἄπλατών (as in 
469 Α.), but Plato expresses himself with 
more refinement. τροφή does not mean, 
as some are fond to believe, merely the 
educational system reserved for the 
guardians: see on 459 Ε. and App. IV. 

21 πατέρας κτλ.: 'how will they 
distinguish one another's fathers' etc.? The 
Aristophanic parallel is here very close: 
Πῶς ὁνὸν οὐτός ζῶντων ἠμῶν τοὺς αὐτῶ 
παιδές ἔκαστο; ἐστὶν δυνάτον διαγνώσθαι 
ἐκεῖνη οὐκ εὐφραντῶν; τί δὲ δει: 
πατέρας γὰρ ἀναπαύσας τοὺς 
πρεσβύτερους αὐτῶν εἶναι τοὺς 
χρήσιμοις νομοῖς (Eccl, 653—637). The question 
touches an obvious difficulty in any system 
of the community of children; but, as 
a link in the chain of evidence connecting 
the Ecclesiastics and the Republic, 
the parallel deserves to carry weight, 
although it has sometimes been pressed 
too far. See on the one hand Teichmiller 
Lit. Feldh. Π. Π. 1pp. 18—19 and Chiappelli 
Riv. di Filolog. xi p. 213, and on the 
other Zeller Β. 1 Π. 551 n. 2. Cf. also 
App. I. 

461 δ' 23 δεκάτῳ κτλ.: 'in the tenth 
month and also in the seventh month.' 
δη (as J. and C. remark) draws attention 
to the more exceptional case: cf. Π. 397 Α. 

The Greek cannot, I think, be taken 
as an inexact way of saying 'from seven 
to ten months after' (J. and C.). In 
point of fact the majority of ancient writers 
that children were 
ever born in the eighth month of preg- 
nancy: see Gallus Notit. Αττ. ΙΙΙ 16 and 
Censorinus de die natali 7. 2. 

28 ἐγέννων: 'were engaged in be- 
getting children': cf. 460 Ε, and 461 Β 
(τῶν ἐπὶ γεννώντων). Richards has 
pointed out (Cl. Rev. IV p. 7) that the 
imperfect refers 'to the whole time of life 
during which father and mother were 
allowed, if the lot fell upon them, to take 
part in the regular unions.' Cf. Tim. 18 δ 
νομισόντας δὲ πάντας πάντως αὐτῶν διογενείς, 
ἀδελφὰς μὲν καὶ ἀδελφοῖς οὐσίαν ἀν τῆς 
πρεποῦσας ἐν τόσο ἡλικίας γέρνωνται. 
Jowett's version—'all who were begotten 
at the time when their fathers and mothers 
came together'—mistakes both εὑ and 
ἐγέννων. Schneider translates the passage 
correctly.

29 ὧστε—Ἀπτεθανί. I agree with 
Richards in understanding this of the 
"irregular unions which were last men- 
tioned" (461 Μ). But in spite of the 
explicit reference in δ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, 
Plato has not as yet forbidden such unions 
between 'brothers' and 'sisters': see 
461 Μ. The discrepancy is hard to 
explain, especially as the list in 461 Μ 
seems intended to be exhaustive. The 
effect of the prohibition (owing to the 
meaning now given to 'brother' and 
'sister') would be greatly to restrict, but 
not to abolish, unauthorised liaisons.
impossible.” Surely not; although they would have unduly favoured the τηλυγέτος παῖς. A son, for example, who is born when his mother is 21 and his father 26, cannot marry till he is 49, because he is 29 before his bride can possibly be born, and she cannot marry under 20; whereas a son, whose father is 54 and mother 39 when he is born, can marry a girl only one year younger than himself, because his father and mother retire at 55 and 40 respectively. Did Plato intend the sons of elderly couples to marry young, and those of young couples to marry late? Such an inference is unlikely, although it is the logical outcome of his theories. In any case Plato did well to introduce a saving clause. The κοινὸς κλῆρος, obedient to the archons, would couple ‘brothers’ and ‘sisters,’ whenever it seemed desirable in the interests of the State, so long as they were not really blood-relations. (This the archons of course would know.) Apollo’s priestess would platonize. We must suppose that her assent is given in advance, and once for all (although προσωμαίρεσ is present and follows εὐμπίτητα), unless she had an accredited representative on the spot, which there is nothing to indicate. On Plato’s attitude to Apollo see IV 427 c n.

461 E—464 B Let us now endeavour to show that community of wives and children is best, and in agreement with the general plan of our constitution. That it is the best policy Plato proves as follows. A legislator should above all things aim at maintaining unity within his city. The most effective instrument for this purpose is community of pleasure and pain. As in an individual man, the sufferings of a single member affect the whole, so also in a well-governed city, the joys and sorrows of every citizen are shared by all. It is easy to show that our ideal city fulfils this condition in a unique degree, both by means of its other institutions, and more especially through the community of wives and children.

462 B 9 ποιη μιαν. J. and C. assert that Plato "has no idea of a unity of opposites or differences—το ἀντίστοιχον συνφέρων," and Aristotle argues to the same effect in Pol. B 2. 1261a 22 ff. But it is in fact on such a unity that the entire fabric of Plato's city rests: see IV 423 D π., and cf. also 432 A, 443 D. The perfect city is a ζή with three πολλα—rulers, auxiliaries, farmers and artisans, or, if rulers and auxiliaries are classed together as guardians, then with two. Plato's object throughout this episode is to keep the whole city "one" by preventing one of its constituent factors, viz. the guardians, from becoming "many." If the guardians are united—so he holds—no danger to the city's unity need be apprehended from the others (463 B). With the sentiment generally cf. Ar. Eccl. 594 and 674 (μιαν οἰκεῖοι φημι ποιήσαν συρρήξει' εἰς ἐν ἀπαντα | ὡστε βαθικὰς εἰς ἀλλοιῶν). See also on 463 E and App. I.

13 οἱ μὲν—τῆς πόλεως. As when a national disaster is made the occasion of a party victory. Plato may be thinking of scenes which he had witnessed in his native city. Bosanquet cites an excellent illustration from Dem. de Cor. 217.

462 C 17 καὶ—ταυτα: i.e. οὗτος οὐκ ἀμα φθέγγεται τό τε ἄλλοτρόν καὶ τὸ σὺν ἄλλοτρόν. Hartman ejects καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἄλλοτρόν as a "futile interpreta-

mentum" on τὸ οὐκ ἐμὸν. There is nothing to prove that καὶ—ταυτα was read by Aristotle (Pol. B 3. 1261b 18), Plutarch (140 B, 484 B, 767 D), Iamblichus (de vita Pythag. 167) or Proclus (in remp. ed. Kroll Π pp. 78, 28, 365. 11), though Iamblichus uses the word ἄλλοτρον instead of Plato's οὐκ ἐμὸν. But as none of these authors pretends to be quoting Plato's ipsissima verba, the omission proves nothing. Although the words add nothing to the sense, they approach the matter from another point of view, and are in my judgment certainly genuine.

18 ἐν ἔτυμοι κτλ. 'Thus in whatever city the largest number of men agree in applying these expressions, "mine" and "not mine," to the same thing," etc. τοῦτο agrees with the nearest of the two objects, viz. τὸ ἐμὸν. For the use of ἐπὶ cf. Parm. 147 D. The reading ἐπὶ τὸ ἄνω—see cr. n.—is as old as Iamblichus: see the passage referred to above, where Iamblichus has ἐπὶ τὸ ἄνω τὸ ἐμὸν φθέγγεται καὶ τὸ ἄλλοτρον. It is retained by the majority of editors; but no other instance of λέγειν ἐπὶ τι has yet been adduced, and the expression is certainly very strange. φρεῖνυν ὄνομα ἐπὶ τι (Soph. 237 C, D; cf. also Tim. 37 E), of which Schneider reminds us, is a different thing from λέγειν ὄνομα ἐπὶ τι. Various emendations have been proposed. The choice seems to me to lie between ἐπὶ τὸ ἄνω and ἐπὶ τοῦ ἄνω. The latter emendation—which I once adopted—was (as I learn from Schneider) proposed by Küster instead of ἐπὶ τοῦ ἄνω in Iamblichus: cf. ὅσπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ

A. P.
19. τῷ αὐτῷ ὑπανέθηκεν ὁ Ὠττόναβαχ: τῷ αὐτῷ ΑΣ: κομμῳδῇ-ταυτὰ ὀμ. Ἐ.θ. 22. τεταγμένη Σ: τεταγμένη ἈΠ. Ἐ.

δακτύλων ἐλέγῳμεν VII 524 E (‘in the case of the finger’) al. Although the genitive may be right, the dative now seems to me slightly more natural and easy. Hartman ejects ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ altogether, but there is no occasion for the knife. Cf. IV 436 B n. For the error see Introd. § 5.

20 καὶ ἡτίς δὴ κτλ. δὴ is illative, and καὶ ἀλὰ.’ καὶ—ἐχεῖ (sc. ἁρπάζω διοικεῖται) is certainly interrogatory, as Schneider pointed out: see in D below τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐρωτάται. Plato recurs to his favourite analogy between man and the State: cf. ΠΙ 308 E Ι. η. m.

21 οἶνον ὅταν κτλ. Poschenrieder (Die Pl. Dial. in ihrem Verhältnisse zu d. Hippokratischen Schr. p. 67) cites a remarkable parallel from the author of the treatise de locis in homine (Litteré VI p. 278 c. 1) el τις ἀραίται τοῦ σώματος ἀπολαμβάνων μέρος κακῶς ποιεῖ τὸ σκήνατον, πάν τὸ σώμα αὐξάνεται τὴν πείναν, ὡσεὶ ἄν τις ἄλλος τὸ ἄρχον ἂς τὸ σκήνατον; τοῦτο δ᾽ ὁ πόθον ἐν τις πάθη ἐπαναφέρει πρὸς τὴν ὀμοιότητι ἐκαστὸν πρὸς τὴν ἑωτοῦ, ἢν τε κακῶν, ἢν τε ἄγαθῶν ἢ: καὶ διὰ τούτων καὶ ἄλγει καὶ ἠδεῖται ὑπὸ θρύσος τοῦ σκήνατος τὸ σώμα, ἢν ἐν τῷ σκήνατος πάντες ἑν τῷ μέρει καὶ ταῦτα ἐπαναφέροντες ἐὰς τὰ σφόντων ἕκαστα καὶ διαγγέλλοντες πάντα. The ‘sympathy’ of the different parts of the human body was a Hippocratean tenet (ἐμπαθεία πάντα de alimento IX c. 23 Litteré). Cf. Shakespeare Othello III 4. 146—148, “For let our finger ache, and it indues Our other healthful members ev’n to that sense Of pain.” Plato goes farther, and represents the partnership as extending also to the soul; see next note.

πάσα ἡ κοινωνία κτλ.: ‘the entire partnership pervading the body with the soul, organized into a single composite organization, viz. that of the ruling power in the partnership’ etc. Plato’s language is precise, but difficult. I take ἤ—ψυχή as defining the κοινωνία. κατὰ τὸ σῶμα is written rather than τοῦ σώματος, because the partnership is not only a partnership of body with soul, but also a partnership of the different parts of body with one another. τεταγμένη—see ev. n. and App. V—appears to suit σύνταξις better than τεταγμένη. A σύνταξις is the ordered combination of two or more elements: cf. Tim. 24 c and Laws 903 D ὑπ’ ἑνταγμένη σωματικαί. The words τοῦ ἄρχοντος define the σύνταξις; although neuter in gender, they really refer, not to the soul, but to the whole σύνταξις or σύνολον, i.e. ὁ ἄρχων. It is ὁ ἄρχων who rules in the partnership, although he is himself a partner only in the sense in which the whole is partner with its parts. The expression ὁ ἄρχων τῶν δακτυλίων ἄλγει is thus seen to be as exact as possible. The confusion between τεταγμένοις and τεταγμένοις is easy: συνταγμένως, for example, and συνταγμένοις are often confused in MSS: see Ast’s Lex. Plat. s.v. συνταγμένως and my edition of the Apology p. 127. Cf. also infra 474 A n.

23 ἐν αὐτῷ: i.e. ἐν τῇ κοινωνίᾳ (so also Schneider), not (as Stallbaum) ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. Plato means that every single man (ἐν ὁ ἄρχωντος above) is a single organized whole—a partnership in which the whole is partner with, and rules, the parts. See also App. V.

28 ἐνὸς δὴ κτλ. We may compare the Stoic doctrine “incommoda autem et commoda (ita enim εὐχρηστήματα et δυσχρηστήματα appello) communia (sc. inter sapientes) esse voluerunt” (see Cicero de Fin. III 69, and Madvig's note). Not a few of Plato's regulations in Book v foreshadow the communistic theories of Stoicism; see Diroff Ethik d. alten Stoa pp. 211 f., 226—231. Plato however contrives to make his communism live; whereas the Stoics seldom did.

462 E 34 αὐτή. See cr. n. Schneider says αὐτή is "en potissimum," referring to vii 516 b, where however we should (I believe) read ὦτος. See note ad loc. Here αὐτή is required by the contrast with εἰτε καὶ ἄλλη τις μάλλον. For the error cf. viii 552 a, where γ and several MSS wrongly read αὐτή. See also Intro. § 5. 36 ἕστι. For the syntax see on π 303 a. ἕστι is a privileged verb in Attic prose; cf. Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 61. 463 a 5 δεισιόταται. Demostenes remarks that the subjects in an oligarchy are 'cowards and slaves' (ἀνανδροὺς καὶ δουλοὶ). See in Timoc. 75 and Whibley Gk. Oligarchies p. 143.

6 ἄρχοντας. Plato is thinking of the Athenian Archons. The object of this chapter, which seems at first sight somewhat loosely constructed, is to prove that συμπάθεια prevails to a unique extent in the Platonic city. The appellations σωτηρός and ἐπικουροῦς, on the one hand, and μισθοδόται and τροφεῖς on the other, involve a greater degree of interdependence than is expressed by the corresponding names in other cities. The archons too are more than fellow-rulers: they are fellow-guardians, their official designation among one another serving continually to remind them of their duty to the lower classes. Among themselves they use the terms of family relationship, and with these their actions correspond. Thus the distinction between μεῖον and μεῖον is more nearly obliterated than in any other city. Everything is μεῖον.

463 b 7 ἐπικουροῦς. The official designation of the second order is applied by the people to the ruling class as a whole. They are expected to look upon the ἐπικουροῦς as 'helpers of the people' rather than as the rulers’ auxiliaries, although it is the latter function which gave them their name (III 414 b). This is clear from σωτηράς τε καὶ ἐπικουροῦς, both of which epithets are suggestive of protecting deities. See also on 464 b.
Τί δ’ οὕτω τού δήμου; Μισθοδότας τε καὶ τροφέας. Οἱ δὲ ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις ἄρχοντες τοὺς δήμους; Δούλους, ἐφη. Τί δ’ οἱ ἁρχόντες ἄλληλοις; Ξυνάρχοντας, ἐφη. Τί δ’ οἱ ἥμετεροι; Ξυμφόλακας. Ἐχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν τῶν ἁρχόντων τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις πόλεσιν εἰ τίς τινα ἔχει προσεπεῖν τῶν ξυμφόλακτων τῶν μὲν ὡς οἰκεῖον, τῶν δ’ ὡς ἄλλοτροι; Καὶ πολλοὺς γε. Οὐκοῦν τὸν μὲν οἰκεῖον ὡς ἑαυτοῦ νομίζει τε καὶ λέγει, ἕν τὸν δ’ ἄλλοτρον ὡς οὐχ C 15 ἑαυτοῦ; Οὕτω. Τί δὲ οἱ παρὰ σοὶ φύλακες; ἐσθ’ ὅστις αὐτῶν ἔχοι ἄν τῶν ξυμφόλακων νομίζαι τινὰ ἡ προσεπεῖν ὡς ἄλλοτροι; Οἰδαμώς, ἐφη· παντὶ γὰρ, ὃ ἄν ἐνυγχανὴς τίς, ἢ ὡς ἀδελφῆ ἢ ὡς ἀδελφῆ ἢ ὡς πατρὶ ἢ ὡς μητρὶ ἢ ὡς θυγατρὶ ἢ τούτων ἐκγενοῦς ἢ προσγόνως νομεῖ ἐνυγχάνειν. Κάλλιστα, ἦν δ’ ἐγὼ, λέγεις· 20 ἄλλ’ ἔτι καὶ τόδε εἰπέ· πότερον αὐτοῖς τὰ ὀνόματα μόνον οἰκεῖα νομοθετήσεις, ἦ καὶ τὰς πράξεις πάσας ἢ κατὰ τὰ ὀνόματα πράττειν, δι’ ἐπὶ τοὺς πατέρας, δόσα νῦμος πέρι πατέρας αἰδοῦς τε πέρι καὶ κηδεμονίας καὶ τοῦ ὑπέκουον δεῖν εἶναι τῶν γονέων, ἢ μήτης πρὸς ἰδίον μήτε πρὸς ἄνθρωπον αὐτῷ ἀμενόν ἐσσοθαί, ὡς οὔτε ὦσιν 25 οὔτε δίκαια πράττοντος ἂν, εἰ ἄλλα πράττοι ἡ ταύτα; αὐτὰί σεὶς ἡ ἄλλαι φήμαι εἰς ἀπάντων τῶν πολιτῶν ψυχήσουσιν εὐθὺς πέρι τὰ τῶν παιδίων ὅτα καὶ περὶ πατέρων, οὗς ἂν αὐτοῖς τις ἀποφήγη, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων εὐγγένων; ἡ Αὐταί, ἐφη· γελοίον γὰρ ἀν εἰ, Εἰ εἰ ἣνερον οἰκεία ὀνόματα διὰ τῶν στομάτων μόνον φθέγγοντο. 30 Πασῶν ἀρα πόλεως μάλιστα ἐν αὐτῇ εὐμφανήσουσιν ἐνός τινος ἡ εὗ ἢ κακῶς πράττοντος ὃ νῦν δή ἐλέγομεν τὸ φῆμα, τὸ ὅτι τὸ ἐμὸν

11. τῶν ἐν ζ.; ἐν ΑΠΕ.

463 C 17 παντὶ γάρ—ἐνυγχάνειν. Αἱ σχετικὲς εἰκόνας: see 461 D, E II. Cf. Ἰδρ. IV 104 ἐπίκοινον δὲ τῶν γυναικῶν τὴν μὲν ποιεῖται (οἱ Ἀγάθυροι), ὡς καὶ γνησίωτα τε ἀλλήλων ἦσω καὶ ὑπόθεσι ἔνωσα παντεῖς μήτε φθόνῳ μήτε ἐχθρωπεῖ ὡς ἄλλοι καὶ ἡμῶν ἐπὶ 180 ad fin. Similar motivations for domestic communism are mentioned by Diod. Sic. II 58. See also, for other traces, whether real or legendary, of community of wives and children in antiquity Xanthus Fr. 28, Ephorus Fr. 70, and Theopompus Fr. 222 (in Müller Frag. Hist. Gr. Vol. 1), together with Arist. Pol. B 3, 126a 19.

463 D 22 περὶ τε κτλ. τε ἐς ἀνακλάνθην: we should expect καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἄλλου εὐγγενεῖς to follow. Instead, we have a change of construction, and καὶ περὶ πατέρων—καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων εὐγγενῶν (line 27). Cf. II 373 B ν. ἦ· ἅλιοικίν,—as often after a verb of obligation (here δοθήν): cf. VI 489 E, 503 A. νῦμοι: sc. ἐστὶ πράττειν. 24 αὐτῷ: though αὐτοῖς in c: cf. I 347 A πν. 26 φήμαι. See on III 415 D. φήμη is the half-personified τοις πορολι, σοι Δεὶ· cf. Nagel's Nachth. Theol. p. 165. It is the quasi-personification of φήμα which accounts for the active εὑρίσκοντα (415 D ·s·· will sing in the ears of etc.) of: c. IX 573 A περὶ αὐτῶν βοιμοῦσαι. 463 E 31 δ—βήμα is the object of εὐμφανήσουσιν (Schneider), just as in IV 432 A ταύτων depends upon ἐνυγχάνειν.
Aristotle’s criticism deserves to be quoted (Pol. B 3. 1263 a 1 ff.) oúτως ἐκατόσ τό ἐμός τέλει τῶν εὐ πράττων τῶν πολιτῶν ἡ κακώς, ὅποτε τυχάνει τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἐν, ὥστε τό ἐμός τό τεῦν, τοῦτον τόν τρόπον ἐν γάρ ἐκατόσ τῶν κιλῶν, ὡς ὅσων θέλεις ἐστί, καὶ τούτου διστάσῃς τῷ ἐν γάρ φι συνέβη γενέσθαι τέκνων ἢ σωθήμα γενόμενοι. "There is a far deeper truth in Plato’s saying than in Aristotle’s animadversions thereupon, and "das schöne Wort, dass alle dasselbe mein nennen sollen, hat es nicht verdient, von Aristoteles mit logischen Regeln gehetzt zu werden. Die Geschichte hat überall wo eine erhabene Idee eine Gruppe von Menschen so durchdringen sollten, dass der Wille jedes einzelnen auf dieses Gemeinsame gerichtet sei, dem platonischen Gedanken im Prinzip Recht gebühren" (Nolte Die Staatslehre Platons etc. p. 133). see also 565 B ff.

464 A 1 ἐφαμέν κτλ. 462 B 2, c. οὐκόν—ἐξουσίαν ὑπὸ δὲ—ἀνομάσιων is parenthetical, ‘to which, as we have seen, they will apply the name “mine.”’

464 B 9 ἀπεικάζοντες κτλ. See on 462 C and App. V.

12 ἐπίκουροι. Why not φίλακε; The word φίλακε regularly includes both the ἄρχοντες and the ἐπίκουροι, but it is strange to find ἐπίκουροι including the τέλειοι φίλακες or rulers (see on 11 374 D), as it appears to do here and in 466 A. The following explanations may be suggested. (1) Plato intends the community of wives and children to extend only to the Auxiliaries, and not also to the Guardians. This view is taken by Blaschke (Familien- u. Gütergen. d. Pl. St. p. 10), who asserts that the Rulers proper have already past the limits of age prescribed for matrimony. In point of fact, however, a man may become a τέλεος φίλακας at 50 (vii 540 a, b), whereas he can marry till he is 55 (460 e). (2) As by far the largest number of husbands would be only Auxiliaries, Plato speaks somewhat loosely, as if matrimonial community were confined to them. This explanation is possible enough in itself, but fails to explain the usage in 466 A. (3) ἐπίκουροι is used with the new and deeper meaning given to it in 463 b (where see note), 'helpers of the people,' rather than in its original and technical sense of the rulers' auxiliaries. This suits all the passages, and is in my judgment what Plato intended. ἐπίκουροι is not the only term whose connotation deepens as the Republic proceeds: cf. 11 376 B, 111 392 C nn.

464 B—465 D Domestic communism is also in harmony with the general communist character of the city. It will cement the union of the guardians and so consolidate the State. It will also deliver us from lawsuits arising out of disputes about the family and property. In cases of attempted violence to the person, we shall expect a man’s fellows to defend him. The older citizens will exercise disciplinary powers over the younger; reverence and fear will keep the latter from retaliating. All these arrangements will tend to keep the rulers at peace with one another, and,
γυναικῶν. Καὶ μάλ’ ἐφη. Καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ τοῖς πρόσθεν γε ὠμολογοῦμεν* ἐφαμεν γὰρ πον ὠντες οἰκίας τοῦτοι ἰδιὰς δεῖν 15 εἶναι οὕτε γῆν οὕτε τι κτῆμα, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων τροφῆν C λαμβάνοντας μισθὸν τῆς φυλακῆς κομὴν πάντας ἀναλίσκειν, εἰ μέλλονει ὄντως φύλακες εἶναι. 'Ορθώς, ἐφη. 'Αρ’ οὖν ὦν, ὅπερ λέγω, τὰ τε πρόσθεν εἰρημένα καὶ τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα ἐτί μᾶλλον ἀπεργάζεται αὐτοὺς ἀληθινοὺς φύλακας καὶ ποιεῖ μὴ διαστάνει τὴν πόλιν τὸ ἐμὸν ὀνομάζοντας μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ, ἄλλ’ ἄλλον ἄλλο, τὸν μὲν εἰς τὴν ἐαυτοῦ οἰκίαν ἔλκνοντα, τὸ τε ἀν διώνυσται χωρίς τῶν ἄλλων κτήσασθαι, τὸν δὲ εἰς τὴν ἐαυτοῦ ἐτέραν 1 οὕσαν, καὶ D γυναῖκα τε καὶ παιδάς ἐτέρους, ἱδωνάς τε καὶ ἀληθινῶς ἐμπροσθύν- τας ἱδίων ὄντων ἰδιὰς, ἄλλ’ εἰς δὸν ματι οἰκεῖον πέρι ἐπὶ τὸ 25 αὐτὸ τεῦνοντας πάντας εἰς τὸ δυνατὸν ὁμοπαθεῖς λύπης τε καὶ ἱδώνης εἶναι; Κομιδὴ μὲν οὖν, ἐφη. Τὰ δὲ; δικαί τε καὶ ἐγκλη- ματα πρὸς ἄλληλους οὐκ οἰχήσεται εἰς αὐτῶν, ὡς ἔτος εἰπέν, διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἱδίον ἐκτῆσθαι πλὴν τὸ σῶμα, τὰ δ’ ἄλλα κοίνα; οἶδεν δὴ ὑπάρχει τούτους ἀστασίατοι εἶναι ὁσὰ 1 γε διὰ χρημάτων E 30 ή παῖΔων καὶ μυγγενῶν κτήσιν ἀνθρωποι στασιάζοντο; Πολλή ἀνόγκη, ἐφη, ἀπηλλάχθαι. Καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ βιαίον γε οὐδ’ αἰκείας δικαί δικαιὸς ἄν εἰνεν ἐν αὐτοῖς. ἦλεξι μὲν γὰρ ἦλικας ἀμύνεσθαι

if they are united, we shall not expect sedition in the rest of the State. Other minor advantages there are, too trivial to specify.

464 B 14 ὠμολογοῦμεν. I formerly read ὠμολογοῦμεν with E &d, Stallbaum, and others; but Schneider, as I now think, is right in retaining the imperfect and referring it to the original mention of domestic communism in Book iv. The whole of this discussion may in fact be regarded as a defence in the form of an explanation of the sentence IV 423 E—424 A. See also App. I.

464 C 15 τροφῆν λαμβάνοντας κτλ. summarises III 416 E, D.  

464 D 23 ἐτέρους = μὴ τοὺς αὐτούς depends on ὄνομαζοντας understood. D. and V. make ἐλέησα govern γυναῖκα—ἐτέρους, as Stallbaum formerly did, but Plato could not have said anything so ludicrous.

25 ὀμοπαθεῖς: ‘simultaneously affected by’ D. and V. ὀμοπάθης (Ast) would mean ‘of like passions with.’

27 ὡς ἔτος εἰπέν with ποιήσαι = ‘almost have disappeared,’ “so gut wie verschwunden sein” (Schneider): see on 1 341 B. The English translators either omit or misinterpret the phrase. Aristophanes furnishes several pretty close parallels to Plato’s reasoning here: cf. Ecc, 560—610 and especially 637 (ἀλλ’ οὔδε δικαίος πρῶτον ἔσονται)—672. See Chiappelli Riv. di Filol. xi p. 212 ff. and on the whole subject App. I.

464 E 31 οὐδὲ—αὐτοῖς. The first οὐδὲ is of course ne—guīdem. Hoefer should not have conjectured οὐδὲ—οὐδὲ (de part. Pl. p. 41).

32 δικαίως is ejected by Cobet and Herwerden, but δικαίως just below supports it. There cannot justly be any lawsuits for outrages on the person, if we declare it just and honourable for a man to take the law into his own hands. This explanation is perhaps better than to translate ‘we may fairly suppose that there will not be’ etc.

ἡλεξι κτλ. Cf. (with J. and C.) Laws 870 E ἢλεξι δὲ ἥλικα—ἀμινθέον κατὰ φῶς ἄνεν βέλους ψιλάις ταῖς χερσίν. It should be remembered that in cases of aikēia the guilty party was the one ὃς ἄν
καλὸν καὶ δίκαιον ποι φήσομεν, ἀνάγκην σωμάτων ἐπιμελείαν τιθέντες. Ἡρόδως, ἐφ. Καὶ γὰρ τὸ διὸ ὀρθὸν ἢ ἡμῖν δ' ἐγώ, οὐτός ὁ νόμος· εἰ ποὺ τὸ τῷ θυμῷ, ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ πληρῶν τὸν θυμὸν ἤττου ἐπὶ μείζους ἄν οἱ στάσεις. Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Πρεσβυτέρῳ μὴν νεοτέρων πάντων ἀρχεῖν τε καὶ κολάζειν προστετάζεται. Δήλου. Καὶ μὴν ὥτι γε νεότερος πρεσβύτερον, ἀν μὴ ἄρχοντες προστάτευσα, ὡς ἀλλο βιάζεσθαι ἐπιχειρήσει ποτὲ ὦτε τύπτειν, ὡς το εἰκός· οἴμαι δ' οὔτε ἄλλῳς ἀτιμάσει· ἵκανον γὰρ τὸ φύλακεν

B κολύνουτε, δέος τε καὶ αἰδῶς, αἰδῶς μὲν ὡς γονέων μὴ ἄρχεσθαι εἰρήνουσα, δέος τε τὸ τῷ πάσχοντι τοὺς ἄλλους βοηθέων, τοὺς μὲν

33. ἐπιμελεία ΛΠΠ: ἐπιμελείαις ΛΣ: ἐπιμελείαις θ. 4. πάντων ΛΠΠ: πάντῃ corr. Λ. Π.


33 ἀνάγκην—τιθέντες = 'cura corporum necessitatem imponentes,' 'compelling them to keep themselves in condition.' Cf. Xen. Rep. Lac. 4. 6 ἀνάγκη η δ' αὐτοὶ εὖ εἰδεικα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ γὰρ πυκνοὺς διὰ τὴν ἑμαυτάς. It is probably of Spartan that Plato is thinking. I have now reverted to the best supported reading, although the use of τιθέντες as virtually equivalent to ἐπιτιθέντες is not free from difficulty. There is considerable MS authority (including II) for ἀνάγκη, and as ἐπιμελείαν was read by A1 (see cr. n.) and several other MSS, I once conjectured <ἐν> ἀνάγκη σωμάτων ἐπιμελεῖαν τιθέντες, taking ἐν ἀνάγκη as meaning ἀνάγκας; but this idiom is very rare except with ἐστὶ, ἐν and the like. Stobaeus (Flor. 43, 102) and Stallbaum read ἀνάγκη σωμάτων ἐπιμελεῖας. In q and two other MSS the text runs ἀνάγκη (or ἀνάγκη) σωμάτων ἐπιμελεῖας τιθέντες. Does this mean 'requiring them to guard against violence to the person' (ἀνάγκη σωμάτων)? If Plato meant to convey this meaning, it would be preferable to read ἀνάγκη σωμάτων ἐπιμελείας τιθέντες (for which there is also better MS authority), or possibly ἀνάγκη σωμάτων ἐπιμελείας <ἀντι> τιθέντες, but ἀνάγκη σωμάτων would be a fantastic expression, though perhaps intelligible after βιάσων and αἰκεῖς. On the whole, I think the reading printed above has most in its favour.

465 Α 2 ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ: i.e. by a personal encounter. 3 πρεσβυτέρῳ κτλ. This too is probably Spartan: cf. Xen. Rep. Lac. 2. 10. Patriarchal discipline is in perfect harmony with Plato's conception of the State as a single family.

5 καὶ μὴν ὥτι γε κτλ. An anacoluthon, the construction being broken by οἴμαι δ' οὔτε κτλ.: see I 352 B n. and infra 471 c. Here the apodosis would have been δῆλον ἢ ἐνῇ or the like: cf. Stallbaum on Lact. 677 B. Schneider and others suppose that ὥτι το εἰκός is substituted ἀνακολοθέωσι for εἰκός ἐστι— a tolerably common form of anacoluthon in Plato and elsewhere (1 347 A n.). but such an idiom is awkward here. It is difficult again to supply δῆλον from Glauco's answer, though the presence of δῆλον may render the anacoluthon a trifle easier; nor can a governing verb be elicited from προστετάζεται. Others propose to abolish the anacoluthon: Ast by reading ὥτι γε νεότερος, Hartman by emending to προστετάζεσθαι <δῆλον> . Δῆλον. Καὶ μὴν κτλ. Neither alternative is satisfactory: and Hartman's is not even Greek. It should be noted that Aristophanes deals with the same subject in Eccl. 638 ff. See App. I. ἄρχοντες. Stallbaum reads οἱ ἄρχοντες with q. "At variis sunt in civitatis magistratus, neque semper eorumde norma omnium est, tale quid mandare junioribus" (Schneider).

465 Β 9 τὸ—βοηθεῖν. τὸ belongs to δῆς, "ut sensus idem sit, ac si dictum esset δῆς δὲ τὸ τίς τῶν ἄλλων βοηθεῖα τῷ πάσχοντι. δῆς εἶτι τοὺς ἄλλους βοηθεῖν quin recte dicatur, nemo ambigit: quidni etiam τὸ τοὺς ἄλλους βοηθεῖν δῆς dicere licet" (Schneider). Cf. οὐ παρὰ φύσεων
10 òς υεις, τους δε ώς αδελφους, τους δε ώς πατέρας. Ξυμβαίνει γὰρ οὕτως, ἐφ. Πανταχῆ δὴ ἐκ τῶν νόμων εἰρήνην πρὸς ἀλλήλους οἱ ἅνδρες ἄξουσι; Πολλὴν γε. Τούτων μὴν ἐν ζαυτοῖς μὴ στασια-ζόντων οὐδὲν δεινὸν μὴ ποτε ἡ ἄλλη πόλεις πρὸς τούτοις ἡ πρὸς ἀλλήλους διχοστασίας. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. Τά γε μὴν 1 συμκρότατα C 15 τῶν κακῶν δὲ ἀπρέπειαν ὁκνώ καὶ λέγειν, δὲν ἀπηλλαγμένου ἀν ἐνε, κολακείας τε πλουσίων πέντες ἀπορίας τε καὶ ἀλγηδονάς ὡς ἐν παιδοτροφία καὶ χρηματισμοίς διὰ τροφὴν οἰκετών ἀναγκαίαν ἰσχύον, τὰ μὲν δανειζόμενοι, τὰ δὲ ἐξαρνοῦμενοι, τὰ δὲ πάντως πορισάμενοι, θέμενοι παρὰ γνυαίκας τε καὶ οἰκέτας, 20 ταμεύειν παραδόντες, ὥσα τε, ὃ φίλε, περὶ αὐτὰ καὶ οία πᾶσχοι, δὴλά τε δὴ καὶ ἀγεννή καὶ οὐκ ἀξία 1 λέγειν.

14. διχοστασίας ΑΣἐη: διχοστασίαι ΑΠ.Π.

πὴν τοῦ θῆλεσ πρὸς τὸ ἄρρεν (466 D). Madvig's change of τὸ to τοῦ has met with much favour, and is accepted even by J. and C. To my mind it destroys the balance of the two clauses, by dropping the personification of ἄρρεν, while retaining that of αἰδώς. For the sense cf. Αρ. Εκκ. 641—643 ἀλλ' ὁ παρετός οὐκ ἐπηρεάζει· τὸτε δ' αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἐμελ' οὐδέν; τῶν ἄλλοτρων (sc. πατέρων) δότις τῦπτοι· τῶν δ' ἦν πληγέων ἀκοῦσθη, μὴ αὐτῶν ἐκείνων (illum ipsum sc. suum ipsius parentem, as Blaydes explains) τύπη ἐσθίως τοῖς οἰκέων τοῦτο μακεστά. Aristophanes' verses illustrate τοὺς μὲν ως υεις exactly; the parallel could scarcely be closer. Cf. Αρρ. 1.

13 οὐδεν δεινόν μή. This construction occurs only four times in the Platonic corpus: viz. in Αρ. 28 Α, Φαεδ. 84 Β, Κορ. 520 Ρ, and Ἐπ. 7. 344 Ε (Weber in Schanz's Beiträge II 2, p. 50).

465 C 16 κολακείας κτλ. πέντες has been variously explained as (1) for <αἰς ἐνοχόι αἷν εἰεν> πέντες or the like (Schneider), (2) in partitive apposition with the subject of ἀπηλλαγμένου ἀν εἰεν (one of J. and C.'s alternatives), (3) nominative to ἱσχύον (Shorey in A. Τ. Rh. xvi p. 237). J. and C. also suggest that κολακείας is "genitive singular in the same case as ὅν." If so, we should read ἀληθῶς with ὅ, but there is no room for doubt that κολακείας is the accusative plural. Of these interpretations (1) is too difficult, while (3) is hardly possible, unless πέντες is placed after ἵσχυον, as was once proposed by Ast, who afterwards preferred to read ἀπηλλαγμένου ἀν εἰεν <πέντες>, and finally wished to excise the word altogether. (2) is, I think, defensible, if we remember the Greek partiality for this kind of construction (ΙΤ 431 Α κ.), and the occasional irregularities of Platonic style. See also on VΙΙΙ 556 C, D. Jackson conjectures πέντες ("the poor man's flatters of the rich"), Stallbaum πενίας in the sense of πενίης. I think πέντες is probably due to Plato: but if not, the word may be a gloss on κολακείας τε πλουσίων ἢ ὑπάρχων.

17 οἰκετῶν: not =οἰκελων as the Scho- liast says, but <δομένη>, 'those of the household' (οἵ κατὰ τὸν οἶκον πάντες Ησαύχηους), including, of course, slaves. Where there is no οἰκία, as in Plato's city, there can be no οἰκέται. Plato's communism involves the abolition of domestic slavery as well as of family ties. See also on 469 Β, C.

18 τὰ μὲν—παραδόντες: an interesting glimpse of the economic condition of the Athenian poor. Cf. Αρ. Κλοῦδας 1172 ι. The agreement in tense makes it probable that παραδοσεῖν, βέβαιον, and παραδόντες are grammatically coordinate; although the money must of course be procured before it is deposited. The asyndeton has a rhetorical effect: cf. Π 362 Β Μ. Hartman would omit παρα- δόντες; but παραδόνται takes an infinitive more easily than τίθεσθαι.

20 ὅσα τε κτλ.: 'and the various and
manifold troubles which men suffer in connexion with such matters, all of them obvious enough and ignoble, and not worth spending words upon. But it is an absurd attempt to represent a and *apartes* in c above. Still worse is the conjecture *doulα*, which Herderwen approves.

465 d—466 D The life of our guardians will be more glorious than that of victors in the games. So far from being unhappy, they are the happiest of the citizens, and any attempt to aggrandize themselves at the expense of their country will only make them miserable. We conclude that the best policy for a city is to make women share with men in everything, and such community is in harmony with the natural relations between the sexes.

465 D 23 ἀπαλλάξονται. I formerly adopted Cobet’s conjecture ἀπηλλάξονται (N. L. p. 243), which is attractive in itself, and also because of its correspondence with ἀπηλλαγμένοι αὐτό εἶναι in c. But even on the score of meaning the change can hardly be called a necessary one, and there is no MS authority for the form ἀπαλλάξονται either here or (so far as I can discover) elsewhere.

Δλυμπτιονικά κτλ. ‘To him that overcometh’ etc. Plato frequently borrows similitudes and phrases from the national games. Cf. VI 503 A, 504 A, IX 583 B n., X 613 B, C, 621 D, and Phaedr. 256 B. Here he sings a sort of paean in honour of his more than Olympic conquerors. νίκη, ἢ εκ τοῦ δημοσίου τροφή (cf. Ap. 36 D), ἀναδόνται, γέφα (such as προεδρία Xenophanes Fr. 2. 7) and ταφῆς ἀξίας μετέχοντιν are each of them significant points in the comparison.

25 ὡν—ὑπάρχει. The nominative of a relative pronoun is very rarely attracted into the genitive. Van Cleef (de attract. in enunt. rel. nst. Plat. p. 42) cites only two other certain instances in Plato, viz. Thaet. 158 A and Alc. II 148 A. πεπλα纳税 ὦ γέφα is found in an Attic inscription about the end of the fourth century B.C. (Meisterhans 3 p. 238). In Phaed. 69 A the nominative passes into a dative: cf. also ὡς ἐξώ in 466 A and Gorg. 492 B.

466 E 29 ἦς τέ. We should expect τέ to follow γέφα, but cf. 452 A. Here, as there, one or two MSS (with Stobaeus Flor. 43. 102 ad fin.) omit τέ. Hartman is suspicious of ταφῆς ἀξίας μετέχοντων, especially as καὶ μᾶλα—καλά refers to γέφα. καλά might conceivably be the marginal comment of an approving reader; but this kind of looseness is not uncommon in replies (cf. II 372 A, III 405 D, IV 436 E, 468 A, VI 500 B, VII 535 C, VIII 558 A, B, Gorg. 467 E and elsewhere, with Kiddell Digest of Platonic Idiom § 306), and the expression ταφῆς ἀξίας μετέχοντιν is much too quiet and refined for the ordinary scribe.

31 οὐκ οἶδα ὅτων: said with a glance at Adimantus, who had been the spokesman of these views (IV 419 A ff.). Cf. the use of τῶν in II 372 E.

466 A I ποιοὶμεν — σκέφτομαι. See v. 28. I agree with most of the recent editors in writing the optative.
πολτῶν οὖδεν ἔχοιεν; ἡμεῖς δὲ ποιν οὐπομεν, ὅτι τοῦτο μέν, εἰ ποι
παραπότιοι, εἰσαύθις σκέφοιμέθα, νῦν δὲ τὸς μὲν φύλακας
φυλακας ποιοίμεν, τὴν δὲ πόλιν ὡς ὁλοί τ' εἰμὲν εὐθαμονεστάτην,
5 ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰς ἐν ἔθνος ἀποβλέπουσε ἐν αὐτῇ τούτῳ εὐθαμον
πλάττομεν; Μέμνημαι, ἐφή. Τι οὖν; νῦν ἡμῖν ὁ τῶν ἐπικούρων
βίοι, ἐπερ τοῦ γε τῶν ὀλυμπιανικῶν πολῦ τε καλλίων καὶ ἀμείων
ται, μὴ πη 1 κατὰ τὸν τὸν σκυτότομον φαίνεται βιὸν ἡ τινων Β
ἀλλων δημιουργῶν ἢ τῶν τῶν γεωργῶν; Οὐ μοι δοκεῖ, ἐφη.
10 Ἀλλὰ μέντοι, ο γε καὶ ἐκεί ἔλεγον, δίκαιοι καὶ ἐνταῦθα εἰπεῖν,
ὅτι εἰ οὖν οὗ τὸ φύλαξ ἐπιχειρήσει εὐθαμίων γέγενθαι, ὥστε μηδὲ
φύλαξ εἰμεν, μηδ' ἄρκεσε αὐτῷ βίος οὖτος μέτριος καὶ βέβαιοις
καὶ ὃς ἡμεῖς φαρμέν ἄριστος, ἀλλ' ἀνόητος τε καὶ μειρακίωδης δόξα
ἐμπεσοῦσα εὐθαμίων περί ὁμίας αὐτῶν διὰ δύναμιν ἐπὶ τὸ
15 ἀπαντα 1 τὰ ἐν τῇ πόλει οἰκεῖονθαί, γνώσται τὸν Ἡσίοδον ὅτι Σ
τῷ ὁπτὶ ἡ σοφός λέγειν πλέον εῖναι ποι ἡμῖν παντὸς. Ἐμοὶ
μὲν, ἐφη, ἡμυμβουλο χρόμενοι μενει ἐπὶ τούτῳ το βίῳ. Συγχωρεῖς
άρα, ἢν δ' ἐγὼ, τὴν τῶν γυναικῶν κοινωνίαν τοῖς ἄνδρασι, ἢν

3. σκεφομέθα: v. σκεφομέθα ΑΠΞ. 4. ποιοίμεν Π: ποιοίμεν Α.

σκέφομέθα is perhaps defensible, for we may regard τοῦτο μέν—σκεφομέθα as
οραίο reclusa; but ποιοίμεν would be very awkward, if not positively wrong, in view
of the optative οἡ ο(coder. It is noticeable that Plato did not expressly
promise to examine this point; although the solution is already hinted at in IV
420 B.

οἷς ἔδων. Hirschic would write ὅτι for ὅ, but see 465 D. n. The same attraction
is found in other authors besides
Plato; see Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 925.

ὅ ἐπικούρων has now a more ex-
alated sense than formerly (see 463 B,
464 B n.), and includes the Rulers.
Aristotle perversely misrepresents Plato’s
position in regard to the happiness of the
guardsians when he remarks ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὴν
eὐθαμίων ἄραρμούνες τῶν φυλακῶν,
ὅλην φύλιν δευταμώνον τοιείς τὴν πόλιν
τὸν νομοθέτην (Pol. B 5. 1264b 15 ff.):
see Susemihl ad loc.

466 B 10 ἐκεῖ. IV 420 B.
14 διὰ δύναμιν: ‘because he has the
power,’ “well er kann” (Schneider). The
possess of the power to do wrong is
itself a temptation, according to Plato:
cf. Gorg. 525 D οὗτοι (tyrants etc.) γάρ
dιὰ τὴν ἐξουσίαν μέγιστα καὶ ἀνοιω-
tata ἀμαθηματο ἀμάθημον, and ib.
526 A. Whibley points out that in the
language of Greek politics and political
science δύναμι is often used in a quasi-
technical sense, denoting 'power due to
wealth, connections,' etc. (Gk. Olig. p. 125
n. 7), but it can hardly have such a mean-
ning here. Madvig conjectures, absurdly
enough, διάδιναι.

466 C 15 Ἡσίοδον. Ο.Δ. 40.
17 μενε ἐπὶ: ‘will remain true to,’
as in VI 496 B.

Συγχωρεῖς is followed first by the
accusative κοινωνίαν and afterwards by
the accusative with infinitive κατὰ τε
πόλιν—ἄδειον (J. and C.). Ast desired
to cancel καὶ before παίδων, and is com-
mented for this by Hartman, who remarks
“quasi unquam paides gigni possint sine
mulieris et viri kovohnia!” “Novum in
scirpo,” as Schneider caustically observes.
Plato is speaking of κοινωνία περὶ παίδων
not between one woman and one man,
but between several women and several
men (τῶν γυναικῶν τῶν ἀνδρῶν). The
children are common to all the guardians
of either sex.
466 D 23 οὐ παρὰ φύσιν. Before taking leave of the subject, Plato reiterates the principle on which his communism rests. "Equal companionship in the work and interests of life is the natural relation of the sexes, whereas it is the existing relation which is unnatural" (Bosanquet). Cf. 456 c n.

466 D—467 E We have still to determine whether such a state of society is possible among men, as it is among the lower animals. But first let us provide for the management of war.

Our men and our women will take the field in common, accompanied by such of their offspring as are not too young. The children will attend to their parents' wants and encourage them by their presence on the ground. They will thus have the advantage of witnessing the actual exercise of the profession which awaits them in later life. The risk is considerable, but the issues at stake require it to be run: and we shall take every precaution to ensure the children's safety.

466 D 26 ὀστὲρ—ζώοις. Cf. 451 D 28 περὶ μὲν γὰρ κτλ. = 'for as to war' etc. is a dexterous way of making room for the episode on war, and at the same time postponing 'the great peri- peteia, the on-rushing of the third wave,' which "is made more impressive by being delayed" (J. and C.). For μὲν γὰρ cf. VIII 562 A n.

466 E 31 ὀστὲρ κτλ. Handicrafts were usually hereditary among the Greeks: cf. Prot. 328 A and Blümner Privatalt. p. 395 πι. διακονέων should be taken with ἀξίωσι. The change of construction is illustrated by Schneider (Addit. p. 41) from Tim. 74 b ἔμπνευσα, ἤνα—παρέχοι, τὴν δὲ σάρκα—ἐσεθαί κτλ. Herwerden inserts δὲ, and Richards διδάσκονται, after θέλ, but the text is probably sound.

467 A 7 μαχεῖται—τέκνη. Cf. Xen. Cyr. IV 3 2 and Tac. Germ. 7 quodque praecipuum fortitudinis incitamentum est—in proximo pignora, unde semenarium ululatus audiri, unde vagitus infantium.
This intransitive use of ἀναλαβέων is especially common in medical writers; see Stephanus-Hase Lex. s.v. It arises from the omission of the reflexive pronoun, which is a common way of making transitive verbs into intransitive; see on 1 336 B.

With several other MSS reads τοὺς παιδᾶς instead of παιδᾶς. But παιδᾶς is predicative, and goes with θεωρέω. "Socrates plurimum referre dicit, ut qui adults bellicosi futuri sint, iam pueri res bellicas spectent" (Schneider). Hartman seriously weakens the contrast between παιδᾶς and ἀνδρᾶς by reading ἀνδρᾶς <τοὺς> πολέμικος.

16 διαφέρει. We should at first sight expect ἂν τὸν διαφέρει, and so Richards suggests. But (as Hartman points out) the introduction of ὃς ἄξιον κινδύνου breaks the continuity between the original question and the reply. Hence, too, the reply has διαφέρει, not διαφέρειν (the reading of Σ and a few other MSS, wrongly preferred by Hartman).

tοῦτο μὲν κτλ. ὑπαρκτέων = δεὶ ὑπ-ἀρχεῖον (intransitive), not "we must begin with," as J. and C. suppose. Cf. ἐκτένον 468 A. τοῦτο (accusative; see on 111 400 D) is explained by θεωρέω—τοις. With προσμικανάσθαι, δεὶ or the like is understood out of ὑπαρκτέων: cf. οὐκέτι, 492 D τάς μὲν ἐπίθυμας φης "ὁ κολαστέων—ἐπόνω δὲ αὐτὰς ἄς μεγάλα πλήρωσι—ἐποιμάζεται καὶ Θρῖτο 51 C. Richards needlessly proposes to read προσμικανάσθαι or to insert "something like δεῖσθαι."
467 B 29 διδαξαμένους. Schneider reads διδαχθέντας, while preferring his own conjecture δεδιδαξαμένους. The future διδαξαμένους cannot be right for the children would certainly be taught to ride, before going on such expeditions (J. and C.). It would be too hazardous in such a case in πίθων κεραμεύειν. Against Schneider’s conjecture it may be urged that the future perfect participle should not be used where the aorist participle is enough. διδαχθέντας is an obvious ‘correction.’ With διδαξαμένους the meaning is simply ‘when they have taught them to ride.’ The middle expresses personal interest; and does not imply that the ἐπίκουροι get them taught by others. See on this point IV 421 E n. It may be noted that in Sparta great importance was attached to learning the accomplishment of riding (Müller Dorians II p. 316).

468 A—469 B Touching the citizens’ duty to one another in the field, Socrates enumerates various means by which cowardice will be discouraged and bravery rewarded.

468 A 2 τι δὲ δὴ κτλ. This punctuation is better than to place the mark of interrogation after δὴ, and take τὰ περὶ τῶν πολέμων as an internal accusative with πῶς ἐκτένω κτλ., because τὰ περὶ τῶν πολέμων is already practically involved in the word στρατιώτικα. I agree with Hartman that Richards’ proposal—τι δὲ δὴ; εἰσπον’ τὰ περὶ τῶν πολέμων, πῶς—πολεμίους, ἀρὰ κτλ.,—is far from elegant.

469 B 4 ποία. See cr. n. ποία’ ἄν, which is generally read, surely cannot be right. Schneider remarks ‘ποία’ ἄν breviter dicrum accipio pro ποία ἄν ὅτα τὰ περὶ τῶν πολέμων ὥρθος ἔχειν λέγει,” J. and C. are content with supplying εἰς τὰ σοὶ καταφαίνομενα. But ellipses of this kind are too severe a strain upon the imagination. ποία δὴ is suggested by Richards, πὴ δὴ by Hartman: but is δὴ in place here? I think not. I take ποία sc. εἰς to refer to τὰ περὶ τῶν πολέμων. Glaucus addresses himself to the first of Socrates’ questions: cf. 465 E n. and Soph. Trach. 421—423. The corruption is common enough: see Introd. § 5.

αὐτῶν = ‘ipsorum’ contrasts Plato’s soldiers with their enemies (cf. πῶς ἀντύφλωσε τε καὶ τῶν πολέμιων just before). μὲν prepares us for the second part of this topic, beginning at 469 B. We certainly should not read μὴν (with Hartman). Plato’s treatment of cowardice in battle may be compared with the punishment of τρέπαντες in Sparta: see Gilbert Gk. Const. Ant. E.T. p. 77. Cf. also Laws 943 D ff.

8 ἑλώσθη. Van Leeuwen’s emendation—see cr. n.—seems to me admirable. The contrast between ἑλώσθη and ὑλὼν is precisely what is wanted: cf. Xen. Cyr. VII 5. 72 ὑμῶν γὰρ ἐν πᾶσιν ἄθροποις ἀδίδος ἔστιν, ὅταν πολεμίουν πόλις ἄλας, τῶν ἑλώσων εἰναι καὶ τὰ σώματα—καὶ τὰ χρήματα. With the infinitive van Leeuwen compares Laws 879 A παραδότω τὸν δοῦλον—χρήσθαι δ’ τι ἄν
Kormidh ge. Tov dè åristeússantâ te kai evdokimhîsanâ ou 10 prôton mèn êpî stratateias úpò toûs suntrateunomévonu meirakion te kai prinov èn méreî úpò ekástou dôkei ói chrînai stefanavnîhînai; ëh ou; 'Emouye. Tî dè; deexwthnai; Kâi toûto. Alhâ toû', oûmai, ëh d' ègô, oukëtî sói dôkei. Tô poîou; Tô filhîsai te kai filhîthnai úpò ekástou. Pántwv, ëph, málwsta' kai prostatîthmi 15 ge tôv nómov, èwos án êpî taunî 1 õsoi tîs stratateias, mëhêvî êxeiniS àparthîthnai, õn án boûlthai filièv, õna kai, éaî tôs tôv túkh èrôw ëh ãrrènes ëh ñhleîas, prôsthôteros ëh prôs tô tàristeia fêrêw. Kaîlôs, ëh d' ègô. õti mên yaw âgâdô õnti ãmîoî te ètoîmou plêionês ëh tôis álloous kai aîrêèes tôs tôioutôv tôplakês 20 parâ tôs álloous èsontau, ùn ëh õ tô pîleîstoi èk tô tôioutôv xigwîntai, eîrnhthai ÿndî. Eîpomevn yaw, ëph.

XV. Alhâ ùnh kai kâth "Ômîroû tois tôioutôde dîkaiou tîmân tôs nêvôn õsoi âgâboi. kai 1 yaw "Ômîrhoû tôs evdokimhîsanâ en D 12. tî dè; deexwthnai Aêx: tî dâî d' êxeiîhînai corr. A² et in mg, ãp tî dè ëxaihînai. Pro deexwthnai II præbet deexwthnai (sic). 15. stratelas q: stratías Aê: stratias (sic) II q.

êthêlê. ðelwos is not free from objection. Paris A generally has êthêlê, the usual Attic form; moreover, the word itself, if taken with xrôsthâ, is too weak; nor can we (with J. and C.) readily understand êxeîn. Plato's ordinances on this matter are far more drastic than anything known even in Sparta: see Müller Dorianis II p. 238.

466 B 13 oukêpî sói dôkei: said with playful irony, for Glauco is an ánhî fôrtêkês (474 D). A vein of irony runs through all this passage, as Dugas has pointed out (L'Amîlii Antiqué p. 121); but it is not wholly ironical. Plato may have been willing to allow more latitude to soldiers on a campaign than he would permit to others, without sanctioning the usual abuses of camp life (see Dugas i.c. p. 87). There is nothing in this passage which is necessarily inconsistent with the self-restraint enjoined in 493 B, although in practice abuses might have arisen. See also Laws 636 C ff.

14 kai prostatîthmî ge kta. Glauco's enthusiasm is in keeping with his character: see last note.

468 C 16 boûlthai: sc. õ åristeûsas te kai evdokimhîsas. õaî tîs—féreîn. See Symp. 178 E—

179 B. The principle underlying Glauco's remark was widely accepted by Greek military authorities (see Hug on Symp. I.c. and Dugas i.c. pp. 90—104). The Theban Sacred Band, composed of érastal and èrwvnoi, is the best-known instance of its application in actual warfare (Athen. XIII 561 F).

19 aîrhtîs means selections by the rulers (so also Schneider): cf. 460 B, to which eîrnhthai ÿndî refers. J. and C's alternative rendering "success in winning such prizes" cannot stand: still less the translation of D. and V. "to exercise more than the usual liberty of choice in such matters."

tôv tôioutôv: i.e. tôv ãgâboi.

468 D 23 "Ômîrhoû kta. II. 7. 321 f. nótoîouv õ d' Alhânta ònìnkefesoi gêrâmîren | ùños 'Ârthêvhs. In Plato, Alhânta is omitted by q, and three other MSs: one MS places it before nótoîouv, and four after ëph. The word may be a gloss; but as it is present in AÎX, in the same position as in Homer, it is safer to retain it. Plato often makes his Homeric quotations complete, even at the cost of a little awkwardness: cf. 11 363 B. Aristophanes, it may be noted, has the converse of Plato's proposal in Ecc. 680.
to ἄν οἱ μὲν—ἄνθρωποι. Cf. Crat. 397 B. The nearest approach to these lines in our Hesiod is to be found in OD. 122 f. τοῖς μὲν—the departed children of the golden age—δαίμόνες εἰπὶ Δίως μεγάλου διὰ βουλᾶς | ἑσθολοι, ἐπι-
χόμνοι, φύλακες θυτῶν ἄνθρωπων;
3 τοῦ θεοῦ. Apollo, our πατρίος ἐξη-
γήσεις: see IV 427 B n.
4 τινέα: 'to bury,' τίνι διαφόρῳ: 'with what distinc-
tion' ("mit welcher Auszeichnung"
Scherer). The occurrence of θήκας
diaphónous in Læw 947 B is no ground for reading <θηκ> τίνι διαφόρῳ here, as
Richards bids us read.
6 ὡς δαίμόνων—θήκας is another
1000 ff. καὶ τίς δοξαίων κλεόνθων | ἔμ-
βανων τῶν ἐρεῖ | "αὐτὰ ποτὲ προβανθ' ἄν-
δρός, | νῦν δ' ἐστὶ μάκαρα δαίμων. | χαῖρ' ὠ πῶς, εὖ ὃ ἐθε θοῖς." | τοῖς μὲν προσερεύοντι φάμαι, and other passages
cited by Nagelbach Nachkom. Theol.
pp. 108—110.
469 π. 171 C. We have also a duty
to our enemies. No Greek city is to be
enslaved, and there must be no unwisely plundering of the dead. Armour captured in the field shall not be dedicated in temples, least of all such armour as we take from Greeks, unless the God shall otherwise decree. We forbid Greek territory to be ravaged, or Greek houses to be burnt. The entire Hellenic race are children of one family, and conflicts between its members should not be called war, but civil strife. Our natural enemy is the Barbarian, and if we plunder Greece, we do but ravage our nurse and mother. Remember that our city is a Greek city. She may chastise, but will not enslave, other Greek States. Glauco agrees: he thinks our citizens should treat the Barbarian as Greeks now treat their fellow-countrymen.

469 B ff. In this episode Plato discusses the principles which are to regulate the international policy of his city in her dealings both with Greeks and Barbarians. The Greeks themselves recognised certain unwritten laws or usages (νόμοι κοινοί της Ἑλλάδος, νόματα τῶν Ἑλλήνων) in matters of this kind, and to these Plato frequently makes allusion throughout his argument: see on 469 E, 470 C al. Cf. Nägelsbach Nachkomme, Theol. pp. 300—307. The policy which Plato here prescribes for his ideal city was clearly intended by him to have a direct and immediate bearing on the circumstances of his own day; and this part of the Republic is in no small degree, as Jackson remarks, “a contribution to practical politics.” See on 470 C.

12 Ἑλληνας—ἲλην. Ἑλληνας is the object, not, as is sometimes held, the subject, of ἀνδραποδίζεσθαι. It rightly occupies the emphatic place, because the point is that Greek cities should not enslave Greeks—not one objects to their en-slaving barbarians,—and not that Greeks (as opposed to barbarians) should not enslave Greek cities. Cf. the order in 471 A oυδὲ ἠρα τῆν Ἑλλάδα Ἑλλήνες διοτι κερδοῦν. A further reason for taking this view is that Ἑλλήνιδας πόλεις points the allusion to Plato’s city, which is a Ἑλληνίδας πόλις (470 E), and therefore will not reduce Greeks to slavery. Finally, μηδὲ ἢλη (sc. Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις) is easy and natural only if Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις is treated as the subject. The difficulty of μηδὲ ἢλη (on the usual interpretation) led to the correction μηδὲ ἢλης (Stallbaum et al.); and has recently caused Hartman to propose μηδαμὴν, on the ground that ἢλη after Ἑλληνας could only mean μακρά. In so saying, he goes, I think, too far; but my explanation removes the difficulty.

13 ἔθεσεν: sc. τοὺς Ἑλλήνας.

14 εὐλαβοῦντος agrees with the subject of φείδεσθαι rather than with that of ἔθεσεν. The Spartan Callinircidas agreed with Plato here: οὐκ ἐπὶ ἔμνυτον γε ἄρχοντος οὐδένα Ἑλλήνων εἰς τούκειν εὐφανὸς ἐνναύοι στρατιωθῆναι (Xen. Hell. I 6. 14). To enslave barbarians, on the other hand, is just: for the barbarian is φόνοις δοθέν (Eur. Iph. Aul. 1401 and elsewhere: Arist. Pol. I 2. 1252 b 9). See also on 470 C.

469 C 15 ὅλον καὶ παντὶ. So in Phaed. 79 E, Crat. 433 E. In VII 517 C we have τὸ ὅλον καὶ παντὶ, and even τὸ παντὶ καὶ ὅλον in Laws 734 E.

μηδὲ: with ἐκτίθεσαι. They must neither enslave their countrymen (ἀνδραποδίζεσται above), nor hold a Greek in slavery: cf. I 351 B. J. and C. wrongly translate μηδὲ as ‘not even,’ and Hartman needlessly proposes μηδὲν. Greek slaves were of foreign nationality, except such as had been sold into slavery on the destruction of their city by war (Blümner Privatall. p. 87 n. 1). Plato disapproves of the exception: does he mean to approve the rule, so far as his own city is concerned? Steinhart (Einleitung p. 202)
asserts that Plato expressly recognises slavery in his State. It is clear from the present section that Plato does not impugn the principle of slavery, so long as the slaves are of barbarian origin; but he nowhere says that his perfect city is actually to contain slaves, nor is it easy to see what there would be for them to do, unless they were employed to work under the farmers and artizans, or as personal attendants at the sacrifices and the like. Slaves are present, of course, in the city of the Laws (776 C ff.).


469 D 25 ἀπόταμενον is (as Schulze pointed out in Fl. 7ähnb. 1887 pp. 226 ff.) a reminiscence of Homer's ἀπὸ δ' ἐπτατο θυμός (II. 16. 469 and elsewhere). Hence the poetico form, as in οἶκεται ἀπόταμενοι (Sypm. 183 ε from II. 11 71). The ordinary aorist in prose is -ἔπτατον, as in 11 353 A. Compare Íhæd. 115 C f. and Eur. Fr. 176. 3—δ' τις γὰρ πετρανός σκόπελον οὐτάτων δορὶ διδύμου δωσε; τις δ' ἄτιματον νέον, ἵπποι παθημάτων; and Plut. Apophtheg. Lac. 228 F.

A. P.
NOW usually read. With this reading, the sense would be 'as these things,' (viz. War and Discord) 'are called by two names, so also they are in reality two,' δύο ἐπὶ κτλ. That is to say, δύο ἐπὶ would be said of things; but it is clearly intended to be said of names; cf. κέκληται ἐπὶ just below. Schneider noticed the difficulty, but thought the confusion between names and things excusable. It is surely a grave blemish in a passage which is written expressly to distinguish between the two. Richards would transpose and read ὅπερ καί—στάσις, δύο ἐπὶ δύοιν τινῶν διαφοραῖν, ὅστις καὶ ἐναί δύο, or make δύο—διαφοράι follow ὄνομα. This solution effects, at great cost, what is only after all a partial cure.

10 δύο ἐπὶ κτλ. ὅπερ governs διαφοράιν, and δύοιν τινῶν, which is neuter, depends on διαφοράιν. The literal meaning is 'being applied to two kinds of disagreements, arising in two things.' The two things—continues Plato—are το οἰκεῖον (ἐξιγγενές), and το ἀλλότριον (οἴδημα). Disagreement—for διαφορά is substituted ἐξιδρά—where i is called ἀλλάτισι, in το ἀλλότριον, πόλεμος. ὅτα—diaphorain is a marvellous example of Greek brevity, simplicity, and precision. Schneider, and J. and C., explain the words correctly; but D. and V. plunge everything into confusion by taking δύοιν τινῶν with διαφοράιν.
The "We hard vocrelv..." text is not legible and contains numerous errors.

470 C 14 φημι γάρ κτλ.: a formal declaration of Plato's political faith in the Panhellenic ideal, which Cimon—

πανελλήνιον πόλιος, as Cratinus calls him (Archil. i ed. Meineke)—and Callicratidas (see Grote vii pp. 406–415) had striven to realise in fact, and which Isocrates as well as Plato constantly proclaimed in theory. See on 1 336 A, and cf. Spengel Isorates u. Plato pp. 7 ff. and Isocrates Panegyricus passim. The rallying points of Plato's Panhellenism are two—internally, the Delphic oracle (iv 427 b, c m.), and externally, hostility to Persia: cf. Menex. 245 c ff. See also on πολεμίων φόβει below.

17 πολεμίων μαχομένων. Hirschig and others transpose these words, on slight ms authority, into a marginal correction in A. But it is hard to see why they should have become displaced. By adopting the order in the text Plato restricts μαχομένων to πολεμίων: otherwise the participle would naturally go with πολεμίων φόβει too. The ms order also lays more stress on the emphatic πολεμίων than Hirschig's transposition would do. Cf. (with Stallbaum) Ap. 18 D.

πολεμίων φόβει. The universal Greek view: see e.g. Hdt. i 4 ad fin., Eur. Hec. i 1109, Isocrates Paneg. 158 al., and Nägelsbach Nachhom. Theol. pp. 305–307. "We should bear in mind," says Bosanquet, "that Greek civilisation was to Plato much what white civilisation is to us." This is, in part at least, true; but sentiments of chivalry and romance were far more powerful factors in fostering the ancestral feud with Persia than any apprehensions for the safety of Greek civilisation. The idea of a war against Persia always stirred the pulse of Hellas with a sense of continuity with the heroic past; and it was more than a meaningless ceremony when Agesilaus sacrificed at Aulis, and Alexander visited Achilles' tomb. See Grote ix p. 81 and xi pp. 395–397. None the less, in spite of his emphatic expression of the old Greek policy of splendid isolation, it is difficult to overestimate the effect of Plato's writings, and especially of the Republic, in breaking down the barrier between Barbarian and Greek. See on 470 E.

470 E 20 νοσείν κτλ. Compare the melancholy picture of the state of contemporary Greece in Isocr. Paneg. 115–117. Hartman would cancel καὶ στασίάζειν; but see 451 B n.

470 D 21 Συγκράτω κτλ. 'I agree to view the matter in this way.' ὅτως νομίζων would be more pointed, but is unnecessary. We are hardly justified in making νομίζων = 'to hold this language' (with J. and C.): for φωνή νομίζειν, φωνὴ νομίζειν and the like have a somewhat different meaning. See Stephanus-Hase Thes. s.v. νομίζειν.

22 ὅτι—ὡς. ὡς can hardly be exclamatory, as J. and C. suppose. For the anacoluthon cf. Hdt. iii 71 ad fin. ὅτε ἥμων ὅτι, ἢν ὑπερήφανος ἦν ἤμερή, ὡς ὅλοι ἄλλοι φθαε ἐμεῖς κατηγοροῦσαν ἤταν and other examples cited in Kühner Gr. Gr. ii p. 886. τῇ—στάσει is not 'that which we have acknowledged to be sedition' (Jowett), but 'that which, as things now are, is allowed to be sedition,'
25 te dokēi ἡ στάσις εἶναι καὶ οὐδέτεροι αὐτῶν φιλοσόφων, ὦ γάρ ἐν ποτὲ ἐτόλμων τὴν τροφὸν τε καὶ μητέρα κείρειν, ἀλλὰ μέτρουν εἶναι τοὺς καρποὺς ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τοὺς κρατούσι τῶν κρατουμένων, καὶ διανοοῦσαι ὡς διαλαγησθομένων καὶ οὐκ ἀεὶ πολεμητῶν. Πολὺ γάρ, ἐφ' ἣν ἡμεροτέρων αὕτη ἡ διάνοια ἐκείνη. Τί δεi δή; 30 ἐφ' ἃν οὐ πόλιν οἰκίζεις, οὐχ Ἐλληνις ἔσται; Δεῖ γ' αὐτήν, ἐφ'. Οὐκών καὶ ἁγαθοῦ τε καὶ ἡμερῶν ἔστωσιν; Σφόδρα γε. Ἀλλ' οὐ φιλελλήνες; οὐδὲ οἰκεῖαν τὴν Ἐλλάδα ἡγησόσθηναι, οὐδὲ κοινωνίζουσιν ὄντες οἱ ἄλλοι ἱερῶν; Καὶ σφόδρα γε. Οὐκών τὴν πρὸς τοὺς Ἐλληνας διαφαραν | ὡς οἰκείους στάσις ἡγησόσθαι 471 καὶ οὐδὲ ὄνομασοσοσιν πόλεμον; Οὐ γάρ. Καὶ ὡς διαλαγησθομένοι ἄρα διοίσοσται; Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Εὔμενος δ' σωφρονίσθην, οὐκ ἐπὶ δουλεία κολάζοντες οὐδ' ἐπ' ὀλέθρῳ, σωφρονιστὰ ὀντες, οὐ

viz. when one city is divided against itself (διαστηματάδα). Plato, it will be observed, does not deny that the abuse which he condemns occasionally happened in Greek civil strife: they certainly often did. He only asserts (and the admission is interesting and important) that the public conscience of Greece condemned them. The conduct of Athens in emergencies of this kind was sometimes honourable and patriotic: see for example Grote vii p. 318, viii pp. 69, 70.

26 τρόφον τε καὶ μητέρα. Cf. III 4.14 E. Not patriotism only, but filial love, such as Virgil felt for Italy (Georg. II 136—176), inspires these words.

μέτρου εἶναι: sc. δοκεῖ. Plato is still describing Greek public opinion.

470 καὶ 28 διανοοῦσαι καλ. The converse of Bias's maxim φιλεῖν ὃς μισήσωντας (D. L. 1. 87). ἐκεῖνηίς 'than the other,' viz. the γνώμη which διανοοῦσαι ὃς οὐ διαλαγησθομένων καὶ ἀεὶ πολεμησόντων. In view of Arist. Rhet. II 11. 1395a 25, where an orator is recommended, if he wishes to seem amiable, to say ὃν δεῖ ὡστε φασί, φιλεῖν ὃς μισήσωντας, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον μυστάν ὃς φιλήσωντας, it is tempting on a first glance to regard ἐκεῖνη οὐκ as the maxim of Bias itself: but the other interpretation is more natural and relevant. On Bias' saying see Jebb's Appendix on Soph. Α' 670 ff.

30 οὖχ Ἐλληνις ἔσται; Plato speaks hopefully, as if his perfect city were but one Greek city among many—a living example to the brotherhood of Hellas. It may be admitted that the city of 11—IV has not a few claims to be called Hellenic. But the 'third city'—that of the philosopher-king—is not Hellenic, nor even, in any proper sense, an earthly city at all: it is an ideal, an ensemble in the heavens—ἐν οὐρανώπιστο ἀνθρώπων τῷ βουλευμένῳ ὀρατῷ καὶ δρόμῳ εἰς τοὺς κατακίκειν (IX 589 B). The animating spirit of v 473 B—VII is assuredly not Hellenic exclusiveness, but the enthusiasm of humanity, if by 'humanity' we understand (with Plato) the divine element in man, in virtue of which we are most distinctively and truly human. See on vi 501 B, IX 589 D. In a certain sense it is even true that Platonism is the 'strongest protest ever raised against pre-Christian hellenism' (Krohn Pl. St. p. 33). But Plato's is no barren protest; for his city foreshadows the future while it passes judgment on the past. Cf. vi 499 C n. and IX 592 B n., with Zeller 119 f. pp. 921—923 and the same author's article on Der platonische Staat in seiner Bedeutung für die Folgezeit in his Vorträge n. Abhandlungen I pp. 68—88.

471 A 2 οὐδὲ ὄνομασοσοσιν: much less consider it so.

3. σωφρονιστῆν. The word σωφρονιστήν ('make σωφρών,' i.e. 'chastise') implies the remedial view of punishment: see on 11 380 B.

4. οὐ πολέμου. A few inferior MSS read οὐ ός πολέμοι, and ός appears also
in the margin of A. Campbell suggests
<kaí> or Παλέμιος, Förster <ως> σωφρο-
νιστάλ; but neither suggestion is nearly
so expressive and good as the reading of
the best mss.
7 αὐτοὶ. The ambiguity in αὐτοὶ
can mislead nobody, and αὐτοὶ (Hartman,
with A etc.) would be very unpleasing.
In such cases the authority of Plato's mss
is nought. The behaviour of Athens in
connexion with the Mitylenean revolt is
a conspicuous example of the inhumanity
which Plato here condemns: see Thuc.
III 36 ff.
471 B 12 ἀλγούων. "Significatur
necessitas innocentibus quoque damnnum
inferendi, quo nocentes punire et ad pacem
adiger et coguntur" Schneider.
13 τοὺς ἐναντίους. "Graecos adver-
sarios vocat, non hostes" Stallbaum.
ὁ has "Ελλήνας for ἐναντίους—an obvious
interpretemuntum.'
14 πρὸς δὲ—αὖλλοις. A bitter com-
mentary on the foreign policy of Greek
cities. The 'natural' relations between
Greece and Barby had been reversed:
not only did Greeks treat Greeks as
enemies, but they had begun to treat
barbarians as friends. Christ (Pl. Stud.
pp. 37—39) supposes that Plato wrote
this passage in 374, when Plataea was
destroyed by Thebes, and the surviving
inhabitants fled to Athens (Xen. Hell. vi
3. 1, Isocr. Plat. i ff.). The same view
is held by Hirmer Entst. u. Komp. etc.
p. 662. Plato's rebuke would have been
equally or even more telling in 386, when
Greece was exhausted by the Corinthian
war, and friendship with the 'natural
enemy' had forced the peace of Antal-
cidas upon the Greeks, to the bitter grief
120, 121. In any case τῶν should no
doubt be referred to the time when Plato
wrote these words, and not to the date of
action of the dialogue. See also Introd.
§ 4.
471 C—472 B Glauco recalls Socrates
to the task, already twice postponed,
of demonstrating that such a State is
possible.
471 C Here begins the transition to
the 'third' or philosophic city. See on
449 A.
20 ὡς δυνατή. In a certain sense,
this has already been proved, for the city
is κατὰ φύσιν: cf. 456 C, 466 D. We
have, however, still to shew that the
harmony with nature can be attained,
and this is what Plato proceeds to do.
γενέσθαι καὶ τών τρόπων ποτὲ δυνατῆ· ἐπεὶ ὅτι γε, εἰ γένοιτο, πάντ' ἂν εἰς ἄγαθα πόλεις ἢ γένοιτο, καὶ ἀνίπαραλείπεις ἔγω λέγω, ὅτι καὶ τοῖς πολεμίοις ἀριστ' ἂν 1 μάχοιν τῷ ἦκεστα δ ἠπαλείπεις ἄλλους, γυγυζήκουτές τε καὶ ἀνακαλοῦντες ταῦτα
25 τὰ ὄνοματα ἐαυτούς, ἀδέλφοις, πατέρας, γέλιοι· εἰ δὲ καὶ τὸ θῆλυ συστρατεύοιτο, εἴτε καὶ εἰ τῇ αὐτῇ τάξει εἴτε καὶ ὅπισθεν ἐπιτεταγμένου, φύσον τε ἔνεκα τοῖς ἔξυροις καὶ εἰ ποτὲ τις ἀνάγκη βοηθεῖας γένοιτο, οἴδ' ὅτι ταύτῃ πάντῃ ἁμαρχοῖ ἂν εἶναι· καὶ οἴκοι γε ἡ παραλείπεται ἀγαθή, ὅσα ἂν εἰς αὐτοῖς, ὅρωι· ἀλλ' ὂς ἐμοῦ
30 1 ὁμολογοῦντος πάντα ταῦτα ὅτι εἰς ἂν, καὶ ἄλλα γε μυρία, εἰ Ε γένοιτο ἡ πολιτεία αὐτῷ, μηκετί πλείω περὶ αὐτῆς λέγε, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο αὐτῷ ἢδ' πειρόμεθα ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς πείθειν, ὡς δυνατὸν καὶ ἃ δυνατῶν, τὰ δ' ἄλλα χαίρειν εἴσομεν. ἦς 'Εξαίφνης γε σῦ, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, 472 ὄσπερ καταδρομὴν ἐποίησον ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων μου, καὶ οὗ συγγνώσκεις στραγγευμένωι. ἦςος γὰρ οὐκ οἴσθα, ὅτι μῆνι μοι τὸ δύο κύματε ἐκφυγόντω νῦν τὸ μέγαστὸν καὶ χαλεπώτατον τῆς 5 τρικυμίας ἐπάγεις, ὅ ἐπεδειάν ἄδης τε καὶ ἀκούσης, πάνω συγγνώμων ἐξεις, ὅτι εἰκότως ἅρα ὅκουν τε καὶ ἐδεδοικὴ ὡτῳ παράδοξον λέγειν λόγον τε καὶ ἑπιχειρεῖν διασκοπεῖν. ὡςφ' ἂν, ἐφ' ου, οὐκαῦτα πλείω λέγης, ἢττον ἄφεθησεν ὑπ' ἰμάων 1 πρὸς τὸ μὴ εἰπεῖν, πη B


21 ἐπεὶ ὅτι γε κτλ. We should expect ὁμολογῶσαν ἀπὸ γένοιτο, but anacolutha after ὅ γενοιτο, but anacolutha after ὅ γενοιτο are so frequent that something of the sort may be mentally supplied: cf. I 352 B, ν 405 A mi. Richards would insert ὁμολογῶσας in the text. I formerly proposed καὶ ἔγω λέγω, <καί> δ' αὐτ' παραλείπεις ὅτι κτλ., ἴτι too assert' (sc. no less than you), 'and also what you omit, that' etc., but now acquiesce in the anacoluthon.


472 A 3 στραγγευμένῳ. See cr. n. στραγγευμένῳ could only be understood (with Stallbaum, who retains it, and Huber zu den Plat. Gleichnissen p. 10) as half-jocular for 'de re militaribus disputandis.' Such a usage is possible in itself (see on ἀποτλήσων II 363 C); but ἄκον τε καὶ ἐδεδοικὴ καὶ μὴ διάτριβε (in B) are strongly in favour of στραγγευμένῳ. The same corruption—due to confusion of γ and τ, combined with lipography—occurs in the mss of Ar. Ach. 136, as well as in Hesychius (στραγγευμα' διατριβῶ) and elsewhere: see Blaydes on Ar. 1c.

τὸ δύο κύματε. See 457 B, c. The first was ὦ δὲ κοινῇ πάντα ἐπηρήθθειν τῶν τῶν φύλακας καὶ τὰς φυλάκις; the second community of wives and children.

7 λέγειν λόγον τε. J. and C. read λόγων λέγειν τε with Ξ and M; but the other reading has far more authority, and is perhaps exquisitius. Cf. 452 A.

472 B—472 E. Socrates reminds Glaucon that it is the investigation of Justice and Injustice which has brought us to this point. It was in order to reach a standard or model of Justice that we examined the nature of perfect justice and the perfectly just man. By comparing them with their opposites in respect of happiness and unhappiness, we intended to obtain a measure of which to estimate
the effect of Justice and Injustice upon happiness in human life. Our object was not to prove that perfect justice is attainable, and therefore we are not obliged to show that our city can be realised.

472 B 12 ἄλλα τί τοῦτο; See cr. n. γε after τοῦτο is certainly wrong. It has no MS authority except that of A², and (as Stallbaum shews) ἄλλα τί τοῦτο is the regular form of this phrase in Plato: cf. Gorg. 497 ε, Charm. 164 A. In both these cases the reply is Οὔδεν, followed by ἄλλα, as here.

472 C 16 παραδείγματος κτλ. παρα-

dείγμα is not here an ‘illustration,’ but a ‘model’ or ‘standard’ (‘Musterbild’ Schneider) exactly as in ἸΧ 592 ε and Thead. 176 ε.


καὶ ἄνδρα κτλ.: ‘and the man who is perfectly just if he should come into existence, and what his character would be if he did.’ εἰ γένοιτο must be understood as a kind of protasis to τὸν τελέως δίκαιον (i.e. τὸν τελέως ὄντα or ὄντα δίκαιον). Schneider’s explanation is less simple: ‘virum perfecte iustum quaesituri ea conditione rem susceperant, si fieri et existere talis posset.’ We must beware of translating ‘num existeret’ (Stallbaum): for it is just in order to shew the irrelevancy of the question, ‘Can such a man exist?’ that Plato wrote this sentence. Madvig omits καὶ before ὃς. In that case εἰ γένοιτο goes with the following clause (cf. ἸV 419 A n.), and the meaning is: ‘if he should come into existence, what his character would be when he did.’ By this means we obtain an exact parallel between δικαιο-

σύνην ὄνων ἐστὶ καὶ ἄνδρα—ὀσὶ ἄν εἰς. It must be admitted, I think, that the emendation is an improvement: but the MS reading may stand. Campbell needlessly questions εἰ γένοιτο, thinking it a gloss on γενόμενος. The pleonasm is characteristic: cf. 471 C εἰ γένοιτο, πάντα ἄν εἰς ἄγαθα ἢ γένοιτο.

18 καὶ ἄδικιαν αὐτό κτλ. See ἸV 420 c n.

19 ὅνα—ἐξεύ. Cf. ἸVIII 544 A.

22 εἰκεῖνος. See cr. n. εἰκεῖνα, which Schneider alone retains, can hardly be defended. For the error see Introd. § 5.

472 D 23 τοῦτο μέν. On μέν without δι see 475 E n.
μὲν ἐφι, ἀληθεὶς λέγεις. Ὁ ὁ τοῦ ὅποιον τι ἀγαθὸν ἔσχον
25 εἶναι, ὦς ἀν γράψας παραδείγμα, ὅσον ἦν εἰθοὶ κάλλιστον ἀνθρώπος,
καὶ πάντα εἰς τὸ γράμμα ἰκανώς ἀποδοῦσιν, μὴ ἐχθρὸ ἀποδεῖξαι, ὡς καὶ
dυνατὸν γενέσθαι τοιούτων ἀνδρά; Μᾶ Δῆ ὦν ἔγωγ', ἐφι.
Τί οὖν; οὐ καὶ ἡμεῖς, φαμέν, παραδείγματι ἐποιοῦμεν λόγῳ ἀγαθὴν τὸ
πόλεως; Πάνω γε. Ἡττὸ τοῦ οὖν οἷς ἡμᾶς εὗριν λέγειν τοῦτον
30 ἐνεκα, εἰμὶ μὴ ἔχωμεν ἀποδεῖξαι, ὡς δυνατὸν οὐτοὶ πόλιν οἰκήσατε
ὡς ἔλεγετο; Οὐ δήτα, ἐφι. Τὸ μὲν τοῖνυν ἀληθεῖς, ἦν Δ' ἐγὼν,
οὕτω· εἴ δὲ δὴ καὶ τούτο προθυμηθήναι δει σην χάριν, ἀποδεῖξαι,
τῇ μάλιστα καὶ κατὰ τί δυνατότατ' ἂν εἰθ, πάλιν μοι πρὸς τὴν
τοιαύτην ἀποδείξειν τὰ αὐτὰ διαμολόγησαι. Τὰ ποία; Ἡρ ὅιον
35 τέ τι | πραχθήναι ὡς λέγεται, ἥ φύσιν ἐχει πραξαν λέξεως ὑπτὸν
473 ἀληθεῖας ἐφαπτοσθαί, καν εἰ μὴ τῷ δοκεί; ἀλλὰ σὺ πότερον
25. οἷον q; οἷον ΑΠΕ.
ἀνάγκαζε με, οδι το λόγῳ διήλθοιμεν, τοιαύτα παντάπασι καὶ τῷ ἀργῳ δειν γιγνόμενα ἀποφαίνειν· ἀλλ', εἶν οἶοι τε γενώμεθα εὑρεῖν, ώς ἀν ἐγγύτατα τῶν εἰρημένων πόλεων οἰκίσειεν, φάναι ἡμᾶς Β ἐξειρρηκέναι, ὡς δυνατὰ ταῦτα ἐγιγνεθαί, ἀ σὺ ἐπιτάττειν. ἢ οὐκ ἀγαπήσεις τούτων τυγχάνων; ἐγώ μὲν γὰρ ἀν ἀγαπήσω. Καὶ γὰρ ἐγώ, ἐφη.

XVIII. Τὸ δὲ δὴ μετὰ τούτῳ, ὃς ὦτε, πειρόμεθα ἥττειν τε ἐο καὶ ἀποδεικνύναι, τί ποτε νῦν κακῶς ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι πράττεται, δι' ὦ νὰν ὦτος οἰκώσαι, καὶ τίνος ἂν συμκροτάτου μεταβαλόντος ἔλθαι εἰς τούτων τοῦ ἄρου τῆς πολτείας πόλεως, μᾶλλον μὲν ἐνός, εἰ δὲ μὴ, δυνοῖ, εἰ δὲ μὴ, ὁ τι ὁλοκληρόν των ἀριθμῶν καὶ συμκροτάτων τῷ δύναμιν. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ἐφη. Ἑνὸς μὲν 15 τοινῦν, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, μεταβαλόντος δοκοῦμεν μοι ἔχειν δειξάντι μετατέσσαράν, οὐ μέντοι συμκροῦν γε οὐδὲ βαθίου, δυνατὸν δὲ. Τίνος; ἐφη. Ἐπ' αὐτῷ δὴ, ἢν δ' ἐγώ, εἴμι, δὲ τῷ μεγίστῳ προσκαλομένῳ κύματι ἐιρήσεται δ' οὖν, εἰ καὶ μέλλει γέλατός τε ἀτεχνώς.

5 δεῖν κτλ. dein is tautological after ἀνάγκαζε, but the addition of τοῦτο μὲν makes it easier. It has δὲ, perhaps a mistake for δὴ, which was read by Stobaeus Flor. 43. 109. For γιγνόμενα Bywater (f. Ph. X p. 73) would write γιγνόμενον ἃν οὐκ ἐν γιγνόμενα. The categorial distinction is however more in harmony with ἥρος οὖν τὲ—ἐφάσεσθαι. 'Do not compel me to shew that what we described in words is in all respects reproduced by experience.' See also on ἐπιτάττειν below.

6 φάναι: infinitive for imperative as in vi 508 b, 509 b, all of them examples of φάναι, although Plato is not averse to φάνι (vi 508 e) and ἔξεσθαι (vii 523 λ). The imperatival infinitive is very common in Attic inscriptions (Meisterhans9 p. 244). It is hardly possible to understand ἐξεσθήνων ὡς δυνατὰ ταῦτα γιγνόμεναι (with J. and C.). As in γιγνόμενα above, so also here Socrates represents Glauco as requiring that the city should be made into a reality: cf. ἵνα σὺ πόλιν οἰκίσης in 470 e.

473 b 10 πειράμαθα: subjunctive, i. q. δὲ πειράσατε: cf. ἄγωμεν δή, ὃς ἔοικεν (Theaet. 173 c, quoted by J. and C.).

473 c 18 ἐπ' αὐτῷ—εἶμι: 'well, said I, I will enter on the very topic which' etc. Cf. Thuc. 11 36. 4 ἐμι καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν τοῦν ἑπαίνοι. I have returned to the most authoritative reading, though previously I read (with Richards) ἐπ' ἁπόγο δὴ—εἶμι. In point of sense, εἶμι is only a sort of quasi-future, and should be compared with ἀλλ' εἶμι in the mouth of characters just about to leave the stage (e. g. Soph. Trach. 86). Cf. also Phaed. 100 b ἑρχομαι—ἐπιχειρῶν—καὶ εἶμι πάλιν ἐπ' ἐκείνα—καὶ ἀρχομαι κτλ. According to Kühner-Blass (Gr. Gr. 1 2, p. 217) the present use of εἶμι is found only in poetry and late prose; but ἀνίασων in vii 531 c is a certain case, and so also in my opinion are ἐπίσαιν and ἐπισαίαν in Thuc. 11 61. 3, 8. It should also be remembered that Plato by no means abjures archaic and poetical forms and idioms: see i 330 b n. Vind. f reads ἐπ' ἁπόγο (i. q. ἁπόγο) δ' εἶμι, and εἶμι was the reading of g. ἐπ' ἁπόγο δὴ εἶμι is highly idiomatic and may be supported (with Richards) by vi 490 D, Pol. 274 b; but it is safer to follow the MSS, which are all but unanimous.

19 εἰ καὶ—κατακλίσεων: 'even al-
though it is likely—just like a wave with its cachininations—to swamp me with laughter and disgrace.' Hartman would insert <με> before μέλλει, but the object is easily supplied; and με before μέλλει is very cacophonous. For other views of this passage see App. VI.

21 ἐὰν μὴ κτλ. Cf. Laws 709 ε ff. Plato's famous and often quoted paradox is not in its essence so paradoxical as it appears. The abiding truth of Plato's suggestion is "that somehow or other the best and deepest ideas about life and the world must be brought to bear on the conduct of social and political administration if any real progress is to take place in society" (Bosanquet). But it was a paradox in the Athenian democracy, or so at least Plato, like Socrates, thought: hence πολὺ παρὰ δόξαν ῥηθοσαν 473 ε. See for example Prot. 319 α—323 α and Gorg. 514 λ—519 δ; and cf. Krohn Pl. St. p. 93. Political evil is in Plato's view the result of a divorce between political power and knowledge of the good; it can only be cured by effecting their reconciliation. In the Politicus Plato's remedy is to make the philosopher (who is the true king) act through the statesman (305 c ff.; cf. Noble Die Staatslehre Platos pp. 82, 88, whose interpretation is—wrongly, as I think—questioned by Zeller4 II 1, p. 901 n. 5); but in the Republic the union between Thought and Action is complete, and the philosopher is himself a statesman. Whether even then he would be strong enough to found the perfect city of the Republic, depends upon the amount of resistance which he would be likely to encounter: see on VI 496 B and IX 577 A.

23 τούτο κτλ.: 'unless this coalition of political power and philosophy come to pass,' lit. 'unless this coalescence,' i.e. unless there be this coalescence, viz. 'political power and philosophy.' For a somewhat similar idiom see VII 527 B n. δύναμις—φιλοσοφία is in explanatory apposition to the whole phrase τούτο—εὐμετάσχεσθαι, rather than to τοῦτο alone. Otherwise we must suppose that τοῦτο is virtually for ταῦτα, the singular number emphasizing by anticipation the union of political power and philosophy (so J. and C.). But on this explanation the singular τοῦτο goes ill with εἰς ταῦτα εὐμετάσχησθαι, and with εἴκαστεν; nor are we justified in writing ταῦτα (with Richards). The dual τούτων might easily have been corrupted into τοῦτο, but τοῦτο εὐμετάσχησθαι is hardly defensible, in spite of εἰς τοῖς τοῦτος διδότω τῷ βίῳ (Gorg. 500 D): cf. Kühner Gr. Gr. II p. 57.

24 τὸν δὲ νῦν κτλ.: 'while the numerous natures who at present pursue either to the exclusion of the other are forcibly debarred,' sc. from exclusively pursuing either. The genitive τῶν—πολεμώμενων is not partitive (Schneider, Stallbaum, and others), but rather possessive, and depends on φύσεις. Had Plato meant to say 'most of those who pursue' he would have written οἱ πολλοὶ instead of αἱ πολλαὶ φύσεις, as Hartman points out. There is moreover no reason to suppose that Plato wishes to allow any exceptions whatever to his rule. Nor is πολλαὶ 'volgares' (Baiter), or 'commoner' (Jowett), but simply 'numerous,' 'plentiful': cf. the usage of ὁ πόλος in II 376 ε τῆς ὑπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ χρόνου περιμένης (παιδείας) and τὸν πολὺν λεών 458 D. Exclusive devotion either to politics or φιλοσοφία was common, but by no means universal, as the examples of Pythagoras, Solon, and many others sufficiently attest: see Arist. Rhet. II 23. 1398 b 16—19. Various emendations have been proposed for πολλαῖ, such as χωλαῖ (Madvig), πανγραί (Liebhold), and πολιτικαί (Apelt), but the above explanation removes the difficulty. As regards the sentiment, it
should be noted that Plato refuses to sanction the exclusive pursuit of knowledge as well as of politics. He holds that a specialised study of merely abstract questions unifies a man for the true grasp of life and character which is the centre of real philosophy” (Bosanquet), and on this ground he would probably have condemned the one-sided enthusiasm which many persons now profess for what is usually called by them ‘research.’ Cf. VI 497 A n. and 499 B.

473 E n.
30 πολὺ παρὰ δόξαν. 473 C n.
32 ἐκβεβληκας—‘have let fall’ is more appropriate here than ἐκβεβληκας, which Hartman (with Flor. T) prefers, on the strength of 1 344 B and other passages. ἐκβάλλειν in this sense is half-poetic, and suits well with Glauco’s excited mood.

33 παν ἐπολλοὺς τε κτλ. Chiappelli (L.c. p. 202) supposes that the allusion is to Aristophanes and the comic stage. Comedy would doubtless join in the outcry; but the loudest clamour would be raised by the ‘practical politician’ to whom philosophy is foolishness, and worse: see Gorg. 484 C—486 C and cf. Theaet. 172 D—175 B. The attitude of Isocrates and his adherents would also be hostile and contemptuous (Dümmel Chron. Beiträge pp. 43—45). Glauco clearly anticipates a combined assault from different quarters.

νῦν οὖσως: “jetzt ohne weiteres” (Schneider). οὖσως is used as in ἐξάψην ἐστοι and the like: cf. II 377 B n.

34 διπλασία τὰ ἰμάτια is illustrated by Blaydes on Ar. Wasps 408.

474 A 2 διατατμέονοις. Here and in VI 501 C ξ (with a few other MSS) reads διατατμέονοις, which is less appropriate: “nulla enim tāsīs in turba tumultuantium” (Stallbaum). Cf. 462 C n.


The phrase is idiomatic in Plato for any excess of ill-regulated zeal: c. Ap. 35 A with my note ad loc.

3 τῷ ὅτι—δίκην: ‘you will learn to your cost what flouting means.’ τῷ ὅτι indicates that τοῦτομένοις is to be taken in the fullest sense of the word: cf. IX 579 D, I 343 C, VI 511 B η. τοῦτομένοις always implies personal abuse, often of an indecent kind: see Cope’s interesting account of the word in Aristotle’s Rhetoric Vol. II pp. 49 f.
Пеиратеоν, ἥν δ' ἐγώ, ἐπειδὴ καὶ σὺ οὖτω μεγάλην ἐμφασίαν 10 παρέχει. ἀναγκαίον ὦν μοι δοκεῖ, εἰ μέλλομεν τῇ ἐκφεύγεσθαι οὕς λέγεις, διορίσσομαι πρὸς αὐτοὺς τοὺς φιλόσοφους τίνας λέγοντες τολμώμενον φάναι δεῖν ἄρχειν, ἵνα διαδηλών γενομένον δύνηται τὶς ἀμύνεσθαι, ἐνεκεικόμενος ὅτι τοῖς μὲν προσήκει φύσει ἀπτεσθαί τε ἐφιλοσοφίας ἰγκεμουνεῖν τ᾽ ἐν πόλει, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλοις 15 μὴ ἀπτεσθαί ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ ἰγκουμενῷ. "Ὅρα ἃν εὖ, ἐφη, ὀρίζεσθαί. "Ἰδι δὴ, ἀκολούθησον μοι τήδε, εάν αὐτὸ ἀμὴ γε πῇ ἰκανὸς ἐξηγηθομεθα. "Ἄγε, ἐφη. "Ἀναμμήνησκεν ὦν σε, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δεήσει, ἢ μέμνησαι ὅτι ὄν ἄν φῶμεν φιλεῖν τι, δεὶ φανῇ αὐτόν, εάν ορθῶς λέγεται, οὐ τὸ μὲν φιλούντα ἑκείνου, τὸ δὲ μὴ, 20 ἀλλὰ πάν στέργοντα;

XIX. 'Ἀναμμήνησκεν, ἐφη, ὡς οὐκεν, δεὶ: οὐ γὰρ 1 πάνν χρὸνος. '

474 b 13 ἀμύνεσθαι. The promise is fulfilled in vi 501—502 C.

474 c—480 A The philosopher, as analogy proves, is one who loves not a part of knowledge, but the whole. His passion is for Truth, and Truth means the Ideas. The Ideas are each of them One, but they appear many by union with particular things and one another. Lovers of sights and sounds and such like persons believe only in the many beautifuls; they cannot understand the One. Like dreamers, they mistake the copy for the original. Their condition of mind may be described as Opinion, that of the philosophers at Knowledge.

Let us proceed to prove this statement. The object of Knowledge 'is'; that of Ignorance 'is not.' If therefore anything both 'is' and 'is not,' it must lie between Being and not-Being, and the faculty which cognizes it will be something between Knowledge and Ignorance. 'Powers' differ from one another according to the objects over which they preside, and the effects which they produce. The 'power' called Knowledge presides over Being, and produces the act of knowing. It is therefore different from the 'power' called Opinion, whose result is opinion. What then is the object over which Opinion presides? We have seen that it is not Being; neither is it not-Being. Therefore Opinion is different both from Knowledge and from Ignorance. It is, in fact, something between Knowledge and Ignorance, less luminous than the one, more luminous than the other. Its object will therefore be that which both 'is' and 'is not.'

Now it is just the many beautifuls etc. which both are and are not. There is not one of them which 'is' more than it 'is not' that which we say it is. We are therefore justified in saying that the many beautifuls etc. lie between Being and not-Being. Thus we have discovered the object of Opinion.

We conclude that those who have eyes for the many beautifuls etc., opine; while those who see the Beautiful itself, know. The former are lovers of Opinion, the latter lovers of Knowledge or philosophers.

474 d ff. The δεύτερα τόμος of Books II—IV rested on a psychological basis and was the expression of a moral rather than of an intellectual ideal: see on ii 370 a and iv 443 b. In harmony with this conception Plato formerly used the word φιλόσοφος primarily and for the most part in its ethical sense (ii 376 b n.). Now that he is about to leave psychology for metaphysics, and describe the kingship of Knowledge, it becomes necessary to analyse again the meaning of φιλόσοφος. Henceforward, throughout Books VI and VII, the φιλόσοφος is one whose consuming passion is the love of Truth, that is, of the Ideas. See 480 a and vi 486 b nn.

21 ἐννοοῖ: i.q. νο辔 ἐξω, 'remember,' not 'understand' (as D. and V.). Cf. Enthphpr. 2 b, Polit. 296 a. The illus-
tration which follows is all the more appropriate because the philoso
phos is himself an ἔραστής, in love with Truth: cf. VI 490 B.

23 πάντες οἱ ἐν ὀρᾷ κτλ. So in Charm. 154 b (cited by J. and C.) Socrates, an ἄνδρα ἐρωτικός (Symp. 177 D.), confesses ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ λεικὴ στάθμη εἰμὶ πρὸς τοὺς καλοὺς: σχεδὸν γὰρ τί μοι πάντες οἱ ἐν τῇ ἤλεκτρᾳ καλοὶ φαίνονται.

26 ὁ μὲν, ὁτι σιμός κτλ. The point is that the ἄνδρα ἐρωτικόν, loving πᾶντας τοὺς ὀρᾶ, finds beauty even where there is none. He "sees Helen’s beauty in a brawn of Egypt." The passage has often been imitated, and may have suggested the well-known satirical outburst of Lucretius (IV 1160—1170).


474 E 29. λευκοῦν δὲ θεῶν παῖδες is in harmony with Ławos 156 XVI χρώματα δὲ λευκά πρέπειται οὐ δὴ θεῶν ἐστὶ καὶ ἄλλως καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ. See also Dieterich Νεκύια pp. 39 ff.

μελιχλώρους κτλ.: ‘and honey-pale darlings, with their name—do you sup-
pose they are the creation of anybody but a fond and euphemistic lover, who readily excuses pallor, if appearing on the cheek of youth?’ Plato is ridiculing the idea, as well as the name, μελιχλώρος: there never was a μελιχλώρος except in the lover’s brain. The word is not, apparently, earlier than Plato, and does not occur again till Aristotle (Physiog. 6. 812 a 19): Theocritus uses it hypothecically of the silkworm (10. 27). It is difficult, if not impossible, to connect τοῦνα μελιχλώροις, as is usually done, translating, ‘the name honey-pale, too,’ etc. Hartman proposes μελιχλώροι, which is ungrammatical, Richards μελιχλώροι. μελιχλώροι (which the poet Gray had already conjectured) is harmless enough: but emendation is unnecessary if καὶ is ‘and.’ μελιχλώροι—see cr. n.—has less mis authority than μελιχλώροι, though supported by the Scholiast on VI 485 B, by μελιχλώροι in Aristotle and Theocritus (II. cc.), and by the suitability of the word in the mouth of an ἔραστής ὑποκοριζόμενος. μελιχλώροι was apparently read by Plutarch (de rea rat. audiendi 45 a) and other ancient authorities: see Schneider’s note.

475 A 3 ἐπ’ ἐμοί: ‘in my case,’ ‘taking me as your example’: cf. VII 534 A ἐν ὅστε ἐπὶ τοῦ δακτύλου δέομεν and X 597 B.
5 τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα ποιοῦντα ὁρᾶς, πάντα ὦνον ἐπὶ πάσης προφάσεως ἀσταξομένους; Καὶ μᾶλα. Καὶ μὴν φιλοτίμοις γε, ὡς ἐγγὺς, καθοράς, ὅτι, ἂν μὴ στρατηγήσαι δύνωντα, τριτυπορχοῦσιν, κἀπὶ μὴ ὑπὸ μειξώνων καὶ σεμνοτέρων τιμᾶσθαι, ὑπὸ σμικροτέρων καὶ διὰ φαουλοτέρων τιμώμενοι ἄγαπόσων, ὡς ὅλως τιμῆς ἐπιθυμηταί ὦντες.

10 Κομιδῆ μὲν οὖν. Τούτῳ δὴ φάθη ἡ μὴ· ἢ ἄρα ὅν ἂν τινος ἐπιθυμητικῶς λέγομεν, παντὸς τοῦ εἴδους τούτου φήσομεν ἐπιθυμεῖν, ἢ τοῦ μὲν, τοῦ δὲ οὖ; Παιντὸς, ἔφη. Οὐκοίκεν καὶ τὸν φιλόσοφον σοφίας φήσομεν ἐπιθυμητήν εἶναι, οὐ τῆς μὲν, τῆς δ' οὖ, ἄλλα πάσης; Ἀληθῆ. Τὸν ἄρα περὶ τὰ μαθήματα δυσχεραίοντα, ἄλλως τε εἰς καὶ νέον ὄντα καὶ μὴπο λόγων ἔχοντα τί τε χρηστον καὶ μή, οὐ φήσομεν μελημαθηὸν οὐδὲ φιλόσοφον εἶναι, ὡστε τὸν περὶ τὰ συτία δυσχερή οὕτε πεινὴν φαμέν οὕτε ἐπιθυμεῖν συτίων, οὐδὲ φιλόσοτον ἄλλα κακόστοιν εἶναι. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γε φήσομεν. Τὸν δὲ δὴ εὐχέρως ἐθέλοντα παντὸς μαθήματος γεύσομαι καὶ ἀσμένως ἐπὶ τὸ μαυθάειν ὄντα καὶ ἀπλήστως ἔχοντα, τοῦτον δ' εἐν δίκη φήσομεν φιλόσοφον. ἢ γὰρ; καὶ ὁ Γλαύκων ἔφη, Πολλοὶ ἄρα καὶ ἄτοποι 1 ἐσονταί σοι τοιούτω. ο' τε γὰρ φιλοδεόμονες πάντες ἐμοιγε δοκοῦσι τῷ καταμαυθαίρω ἀχρόνους τοιούτου εἶναι, ο' τε φιλήκουσι ἀτοπώτατοι τινὲς εἰσιν ὡς γ' ἐν φιλοσοφοῖς τιθέναι, ο' τε 25 πρὸς μὲν λόγους καὶ τοιαύτην διατριβήν ἔκοντες οὐκ ἄν ἐθέλοιεν ἐλθεῖν, ὡστε δὲ ἀπομεμισθώκετε τὰ ὅτα ἐπακούσαι πάντων χρονῶν περιθέουσι τοῖς Διονυσίοις, οὕτε τῶν κατὰ πόλεις οὕτε

7 τριτυπορχοῦσιν. If they cannot become (not 'be' as J. and C.) στρατηγαῖ, they are glad to be τριτυπορχοῖ. In time of war, a στρατηγός was commander in chief; next to him came the 10 ταξίαρχοι, or "commanders of the 10 τάξεις of hoplites corresponding to the 10 φυλαί"; under the ταξίαρχοι were the τριτυπορχοὶ, who each commanded the hoplites of a single τριττή. There were in all 30 τριτταί, 3 in each tribe. See Gilbert's Cf. Const. Ant. pp. 209 f. and Sandys on Arist. Pol. Ath. 61 §8 1–3.


475 D 23 καταμαυθάειν. Apelt conjectures καλὰ μαυθάειν, but the text is free from objection.

τοιούτοι εἶναι: i.e. φιλοθεόμονες εἶναι, not φιλόσοφοι εἶναι, as the English translators appear to suppose. Glauco has clearly indicated that he does not consider such men philosophers. But as it is the love of learning which produces them, they will have to be included, unless Socrates narrows his definition, as Glauco is in fact inviting him to do. σοφία in φιλο-σοφία is presently defined so as to exclude sense-perception: hence 'lovers of sights and sounds' are not 'lovers of knowledge.' See also on ὁμοίως μὲν φιλόσοφοι in E.

25 πρὸς μὲν λόγους κτλ. Cf. Prot. 347 C, D with my note ad loc. ἐπακούσαι should be taken with ἀπομεμισθώκετε.

27 οὕτε—κώμας. Hartman would read πόλιν for πόλεις, "verum non Atticis solis urbana et ruralia erant Dionysia"
των κατά κώμας ἀπολειπόμενοι. τούτους ὁμι πάντας καὶ ἄλλους

Ε τοιούτων τινών 1 μαθητικού καὶ τοὺς τῶν τεχνιυδρίων φιλοσόφων
φήμων; Ὁδαμῷ, ἐπόν, ἄλλ' ὀμίλους μὲν φιλοσοφοῖς.

XX. Τοὺς δὲ ἀληθινούς, ἐφη, τίνας λέγεις; Τοὺς τῆς ἀληθείας,

ἡν δ’ ἐγώ, φιλοσοφεύομαι. Καὶ τούτο μὲν γ’, ἐφη, ὅρθως;

ἀλλὰ πῶς αὐτὸ λέγεις; Ὁδαμῷ, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, ῥαδίως πρὸς γε

ἄλλων: σὲ δὲ οὐμαί ὀμολογήσεις μοι τὸ τοιοῦτο. Τὸ τοιοῦ;

476 Ἐπειδὴ ἐστιν ἐναντίον καλὸν αἰσχρόν, δύο αὕτω εἶναι. Πῶς δ’ 35

οὖ; Ὅκουν ἐπειδὴ δύο, καὶ ἐν ἐκάτερον; Καὶ τοῦτο. Καὶ περὶ

δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ ἁγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ καὶ πάντων τῶν εἰδων

29. μαθητικὸς Α1: μαθηματικός ΑΠΕξ et corr. Α2.

(Schneider, quoting Laws 637 A, b). In Attica rural Dionysia were held during the month of Poseidon in many κώμαι, e.g. Eleusis, Philya, etc. “Prizes were offered by the different demes, and companies seem to have been formed in Athens for the purpose of travelling about the country and taking part in these provincial competitions” (Haigh Att. Theatre pp. 42 ff. Cf. Mommsen Fest. d. Stadt Athen pp. 349—359).

475 E 29 τοὺς τῶν τεχνιυδρίων: sc. μαθητικούς, or rather perhaps φιλοσοφοὺς or the like, supplied from the termination of μαθητικοί. Cf. φιλοτέχνους in 476 λ. Athenaeus (x 452 c) wrongly connects τοὺς with φιλοσοφοῖς.

30 ὀμίλους μὲν φιλοσοφοῖς. μὲν without δὲ is common enough after ἄλλα, the antithesis being contained in the preceding negative: cf. Prot. 344 a and Crito 43 b. It is also found in other cases where the antithesis is easy to supply: cf. IV 421 A, V 473 D, and Heindorf on Theaet. 161 E. Such men resemble φιλόσοφοι as the shadow resembles the substance; for the objects of sense, which they love, are shadows or copies of the objects of knowledge. The phrase receives its fullest interpretation from the simile of the Cave in Book VII.

33 οὐδαμῶς—τοιοῦτο. Cf. 473 Α n. Socrates again appeals to Glaucos as one Platonist to another. We are to infer that the Theory of Ideas was already familiar in the school of Plato.

35 διό αὐτῷ εἶναι should not be translated ‘that they are two things’ (D. and V.), but simply ‘that they are two.’

476 A 2 καὶ περὶ δικαίου κτλ. This is the first appearance of the Theory of ‘Ideas’ properly so called in the Republic. It should be carefully noted that Plato is not attempting to prove the theory: Glaucos, in fact, admits it from the first. The Theory was approached from two directions, from the side of Mind or Thought (οἱ λόγοι οἱ ἐκ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν Arist. Met. 1 9. 990b 12), and from the side of Existence (τὸ ἐν ἐπὶ ποιῶν 1c. Cf. Zeller 111 1, pp. 653 ff.). It is the first of these methods which is followed throughout the present investigation. The εἶδαι provide objects for Knowledge, as opposed to Opinion, and they are capable of being known: see 476 c, E ff., 478 λ, 479 E. Throughout a large part of the following discussion, we are not much concerned with the Ideas as strictly transcendent entities or χωριστά, existing apart not only from particulars but also from the knowing Mind, for it is only in so far as he knows the Ideas that the philosopher-king can make use of them (cf. VI 484 c, D): he cannot possibly frame political institutions on the model of Ideas which he does not know. We must admit that the philosopher’s apprehension of the Ideas is the relevant consideration here (cf. VI 484 c ἐναργεῖς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐξουσίες παράδειγμα), but it is none the less true, and the fact cannot be too strongly insisted on, that the Ideas themselves are not mere concepts of the mind, but have a separate and independent existence of their own. See the Appendix to Book VII ‘On Plato’s Dialectic.’ The translation ‘Class’ for εἴδουs (Fovetti) is inappropriate on many grounds: ‘Form’ is better: but it will be most convenient to retain the usual
πέρι ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, αὐτὸ μὲν ἐν ἑκαστὸν εἶναι, τῇ δὲ τῶν πράξεων 5 καὶ σωμάτων καὶ ἀλλήλῳ κοινωνίᾳ παυταχοῦ φανταζόμενα πολλά φαίνεσθαι ἑκαστὸν. Ὀρθῶς, ἐφι, λέγεις. Ταῦτα τοιών, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, διαμόρφωσιν, χωρίς μὲν οὐς νῦν δὴ ἐλεγεῖς φιλοθείμονας τε καὶ φιλοτέχνους καὶ πρακτικούς, καὶ χωρίς αὐτοὶ τί περὶ ὁ λόγος, Β οὐς μόνον ἄν τις ὀρθῶς προσέθηκε πιθοσόφους. Πώς, ἐφι, 10 λέγεις; Οἱ μὲν ποι, ἢν δ’ ἐγώ, φιλήκου καὶ φιλοθείμονες τάς τε καλὰς φωνὰς ἀστάξαται καὶ χράσας καὶ σχῆματα καὶ πάντα τὰ ἐκ τῶν τουτοῦτων δημιουργούμενα, αὐτοῖς δὲ τοῦ καλοῦ ἀδύνατος αὐτῶν ἡ διάνοια τὴν φύσιν ἑδείν τε καὶ ἀσπάσασθαι. Ἐξει γὰρ

10. τοῦ II: τοῦ Λ.

expression 'Idea,' although it is not a translation, but a transliteration, whose unfortunate identity with the English word 'idea' is responsible in no small measure for many imperfect and erroneous interpretations of Plato's Ideal Theory. The German translators mostly render by 'Begriff.' The further specifications of the Ideal Theory in this passage are as follows. Each Idea is, in and by itself, one (476 A), changeless (479 A, 479 E), and perfect (VI 484 C, D), contrasting, in each of these respects, with the phenomena which 'partake' of or 'imitate' it (476 D n.). Plato does not now touch on the question how it is that Mind has knowledge of a perfection above and beyond what can be derived from observation and experience. This faculty of Mind is elsewhere—in the Meno and the Phaedo—explained by the pre-existence of the Soul. See on 476 C.

Krohn has pointed out (Pl. St. p. 96) that the examples of ἑδθ now cited by Plato are all of them attributes—δίκαιον, ἀδικον, ἀγαθόν, κακών, etc. It does not however follow from this that the theory of Ideas is still in process of formation: on the contrary, the appeal to Glaucoc just above (475 E) implies that it was already a recognised dogma of the Platonic school. The simple explanation is that Plato prefers to cite relevant examples. The ἑδθ of δίκαιον, ἀγαθόν, κακών etc. are precisely those which it is the philosopher's duty to introduce into the practical administration of the State: cf. VI 484 C and X 596 A n.

4 αὐτὸ μὲν κτλ.: 'each is, in itself' (i.e. viewed apart from its association with πράξεις etc.), 'one, but by reason of their partnership with actions and bodies and one another, they each of them make their appearance everywhere and appear many.' The ἑδθ of Beautiful, for example, ἑδθ, in itself, one, but by κοινωνίᾳ with e.g. an act of heroism, a sunset, a river, etc., it appears many. Similarly the ἑδθ of Beautiful appears many by κοινωνίᾳ with other ἑδθ, as when we say 'the Good is beautiful,' the 'Useful is beautiful' etc. The expression πανταχοῦ φανταζόμενα is better suited to describe Ideas allied with sensible particulars, than Ideas allied with Ideas; but statements involving the κοινωνίᾳ of Ideas with Ideas 'make their appearance everywhere' as well as those which connect the objects of sense with Ideas. In all such cases the statements themselves are of course true or false according as the κοινωνίᾳ is real or imaginary; but whether they are false or true, the appearance of plurality which they give to the Idea is always fallacious. Cf. Zeller I I I, p. 738 n. 3 and see on 479 D. The words ἀλλήλων κοινωνίᾳ are further discussed in App. VII.

8 πρακτικούς: 'men of action.' These were not mentioned in 475 D, but they clearly belong to the same category.

476 B 13 τὴν φύσιν. Krohn (Pl. St. p. 95) justly observes that the φύσις τοῦ καλοῦ of III 401 C is "the true beauty, which has an adequate external form, whereas that of Book v is the essence of Beauty, which is never fully expressed in any outward form." The contrast significantly marks the greater Idealism of Books v—vii. Cf. X 597 B n.
476 c 16 καλα—πράγματα. πράγματα is a sufficiently general term to include all the φανώμενα πολλα which are specified in 476 λ. The persons in question may be willing to assert that a σώμα, α πράξει, το δίκαιον, το ἀγαθόν etc. are καλά. But they refuse to go beyond isolated observations of this sort and admit that Beauty itself exists αὐτῷ καθ’ αὐτό μεθ’ αὐτοῦ μονοειδές δι’ αὐτό (Συμφ. 211 b); and hence their notions of beauty are uncoordinated, inconsistent, unstable.

17 ἀν τις ἥγηται κτλ. Cf. Συμφ. 210 λ.

19 εάν τε ἐν υπνῷ κτλ. It is the pre-existence of the soul which qualifies her by nature due to the existence of the Idea or Original, and the phenomenon or copy. But as we lost at birth our antinatal knowledge of the Idea, we cannot distinguish between Ideas and phenomena until we recover that knowledge. To effect this recovery is the aim of education. The uneducated wander in a sort of dreamland, taking shadows for realities, the copy for the Original. Cf. Παρευ. 74 λ.—76 δ, Μεν. 81 λ. ff., Συμφ. 209 ε.—212 λ.

476 δ 23 μετέχοντα. Cf. Παρευ. 100 λ. The words by which Plato describes the relation of Ideas and particulars are of necessity figurative. κοινωνία is the vaguest, and least metaphorical; side by side with it comes πάρουσία (of the Idea) and μεθέξις (of the particular). A somewhat different figure is involved when the Idea is regarded as the Original (Urbild), and the particular as its likeness. Plato does not scruple to use both figures side by side: here, for example, the Idea was a παράδειγμα just above (αὐτῷ—ἐξουσιαZE 476 c: cf. VI 500 E ff., X 596 B).

27 όυτος. Dümmler (Antisthenica p. 42) supposes that Plato means Antisthenes. There was undoubtedly no love lost between the two philosophers: see the authorities cited in Urban Uber die Erwähnungen der Phil. d. Antisthenes in d. Pl. Schr. (Konigsberg 1882), and Zeller4 Ι Ι, p. 396 n. 2. Antisthenes was in particular a bitter opponent of the Theory of Ideas. The passage of arms between Plato and him is well known: ὃ Πλάτων, ἵππον μὲν ὀρό, ἵπποτητα δὲ οὐχ ὀρό, καὶ δὲ εἶπεν ἔχεις μὲν ὃ ἵππος ὀράται, τὸδε τὸ ὀμα, ὃ δὲ ἵπποτητ θεωρεῖται, οὐδὲν κέκτησαι (Simplicius in Schol. Arist. 66b 44 ed. Brandis, and other authorities quoted by Urban l.c. p. 3). It is no doubt true, as Stein observes in his Geschichte des Platonismus, that Plato’s “Kunst verallgemeinert nicht bloss das Historische, sondern individualisiert auch das Allgemeine”; but Antisthenes himself could scarcely deny that the cap fits. The deictic όυτος is in favour of Dümmler’s view, which certainly adds point to the whole passage; note in particular χαλεπαίη, παραμιθέοσαι, πεθεύω ἥρεμα (allusions perhaps to the ferocity of his opponent: Antisthenes had nicknamed Plato Σάθων! cf. Ath. v 220 d), οἷς
τὸν φαμὲν δοξάζειν ἄλλ᾽ ὁ γνωρισμός, καὶ ἀμφισβητῆ ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγομεν; ἐξομέν τι παραμυθεῖται αὐτὸν καὶ πείθειν.

οὐ γιαλείς (‘is barely sane’), οὔτε αὐτῷ φθόνος, and the delightful innuendo ᾧ σμενόν ἂν ἄδειμεν εἰδότα τι. Antithenes himself wrote a work περὶ δῆξης καὶ ἐπιστήμης (D. L. vi 17), and Plato may well be thinking of it here: see next note. But we must be careful to note that Plato, even if we allow that Antithenes is in his mind, does not refer to Antithenes alone; he merely individualizes the type in him.

476 e 36 τῶς γάρ—γνωσθεῖν; ‘for how can something which is not, be known?’ Cf. Parm. 132 b, where is εἰκαστον ἐστι τῶν νοημάτων, νόημα δὲ οὐδένος; Άλλ᾽ ἄδικον, εἰπέν. Ἀλλὰ εἰσιν; Ναι. ὁντὸς ἕ οὐκ ὅντος; ὁντος. Οὐκ ἔνοχ ὑποτ, δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν πόρων ἑκὼν νοεῖ, μὲν τινὰ οὖν ἄδικαν; Ναι. “Quod Parmenides simpliciter dicit ταῦτα δ᾽ ἐστὶ νοεῖν τα ταύτα καὶ οὐδέκεν ἐστίν νοημα, id sibi prorsus probari Plato plus semel significat.”

That everything which is known exists in a certain sense, is of course a truism. But when Plato says that the objects of knowledge ‘are,’ the kind of oðia which he means is substantial, self-existent oðia. If it is really Antithenes for whom Glauco is answering (ὑπὲρ εἰκείνου ἀποκρίσεως), the words πῶς—γνωσθεῖν are exceedingly well chosen; for Antithenes (perhaps in his περὶ δῆξης ἡ ἐπιστήμης, perhaps in Ζάθων, ἡ οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀντιλέγειν) had argued in almost exactly the same way to prove the impossibility of contradiction. See Proclus in Crat. 37 (Zeller 111. p. 302 n. 1) ἀπειθεῖσθαι ἐγενέτο, μη δεν ἀντιλέγετα πας γάρ, φησι, λόγος ἀνθεῖναι; ο γάρ λέγων τι λέγει, ο δε τι λέγων τον μη δεν; ο δε τον λέγων ἀληθεύεις καὶ cr. Plat. Crat. 420 D. It is by no means improbable that Plato has this or some similar argument of Antithenes in view, and feathers his arrows from his victim’s wing. Antithenes and his friends would not of course admit the connotation which Plato gives to δἐν, but Plato is not attempting to prove the Ideal theory. The object of the whole investigation is to show that his opponents possess only δῆκα, on the assumption that the theory of Ideas is true; cf. 476 a n.

477 a 2 κἂν εἰ—σκοποῦμεν. Further investigation from other points of view cannot weaken the conviction which Socrates and Glauco have already formed. The phrase is another indication that we are not here proving the Ideal Theory: see last note. Hartman should not have revived Ast’s conjecture ἔχωμεν < γ> καὶ πληγανική σκοποῦμεν.

6 εἰ ἐπὶ κτλ. See cr. n. Hermann’s conjecture, that ἐπὶ has been lost before ἐπὶ, has met with most favour. But ἐπὶ has an unpleasing sound, and εἴ might just as easily have disappeared as ἐπὶ. Schneider and Stallbaum (with Ε and the older editors) read οὐκόν εἰ μὲν—ἐπὶ τῷ
B ἐπὶ τῷ μεταξὺ τοῦτον 1 μεταξὺ τι καὶ ξητητέου ἄργοιας τε καὶ ἐπιστήμης, εἶ τι τυγχάνει ὅπ τοιοῦτον; Πάνω μὲν οὖν. Ἐρ' οὖν λέγομεν τι δόξαν εἶναι; Πῶς γὰρ οὖ; Πότερον ἄλλην δύναμιν ἐπιστήμης ἢ τὴν αὐτήν; Ἀλλην. Ἐπ' ἄλλω ἀρα τέτακται δόξα 10 καὶ ἐπ' ἄλλω ἐπιστήμην, κατ' αὐτήν τὴν δύναμιν ἐκατέρα τὴν αὐτής. Οὔτω. Οὕκουν ἐπιστήμη μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ ὄντι πέφυκε, γνώναι, ὡς ἐστὶ τὸ ὄν; μᾶλλον δὲ ὦδὲ μοι δοκεῖ πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι διελέσθαι. Πῶς;

C XXI. Φήσομεν 2 δυνάμεις εἶναι γένος τι τῶν ὄντων, αἷς δὴ 15 καὶ ἡμέως δυνάμεθα δι' ἐναλλοθως, καὶ ἄλλο πάν ὁ τί περ ἄν δύνηται; οἶον λέγω δή 8νι καὶ ἀκόμη τῶν δυνάμεων εἶναι, εἰ ἄρα μανθάνεις ὁ βουλομαι λέγεω τὸ εἶδος. Ἀλλὰ μανθάνω, ἡφι. Ἀκουσών δὴ ο μοί φαίνεται περὶ αὐτῶν. δυνάμεως γὰρ ἐγὼ οὔτε τινὰ χρόνων ὥστε σχῆμα οὔτε τι τῶν τοιοῦτων, οἶον καὶ ἄλλων 20 πολλῶν, πρὸς δὲ ἀποβλέπων ἐνια διορίζομαι παρ' ἐμαυτῷ τά μὲν ἄλλα εἶναι, τά δὲ ἄλλα. δυνάμεως δ' 1 εἰς ἐκείνῳ μόνον βλέπω, ἐφ' ο τε ἐστὶ καὶ δ' ἀπεργάζεται, καὶ ταύτῃ ἐκάστην αὐτῶν δύναμιν ἐκάλεσα, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ αὐτῷ τεταχμένην καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀπεργαζομένην τὴν αὐτήν καλῶ, τὴν δὲ ἐπὶ ἐτέρῳ καὶ ἐτερον 25 ἀπεργαζομένην ἄλλην, τί δὲ σὺ; πῶς ποιεῖς; Οὔτως, ἡφι. Δεύορ δὴ πάλιν, ὢν δ' ἐγὼ, ὃ ἄριστε. ἐπιστήμην πότερον δύναμιν Εἰς τα 3 φής εἶναι αὐτήν, ἢ εἰς τί γένος τίθης; Εἰς 1 τοῦτο, ἡφι,

11. αὐτὴν τὴν C. Schmidt: τὴν αὐτὴν ΑΠΠ. q: κατ'—αὐτῆς om. Ξ.

metaxu de ktl., but the reading of q is intrinsically better, and the error an easier one. The reference in τὴν ("is, as we saw") is to 476 E—477 A.

477 B 11 κατ' αὐτὴν—αὐτῆς: 'each of them in accordance just with its own peculiar power,' i.e. in accordance with this, and nothing else. αὐτὴν is ipsam in the sense of solam. Cf. 477 D, where it is shewn that δυνάμεις should be classified on this same principle: also 478 A ἐφ' ἐτέρῳ ἀρα ἐτερον τι δυνάμενη εκάτερα αὐτῶν πέφυκεν. The reading κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν—see cr. n.—gives precisely the wrong sense. Schneider and others—perhaps rightly—omit αὐτὴν (with Vind. F), while Baier adopts Hermann's ἄλλην—a very improbable correction. It is best, I think, to follow Schmidt, supposing that αὐτὴν was accidentally omitted, and afterwards wrongly replaced.

13 μᾶλλον δὲ кηλ. Socrates had somewhat awkwardly called δόξα α δύναμις, and at the same time spoken of it as possessing a δύναμις. The present sentence introduces a sort of πάρεργον in which the notion δύναμις is more accurately defined. We may infer that δυνάμεις in the sense of (the intellectual) 'powers' was unfamiliar at the time when this section was written. It was perhaps—like ποιήση for example—one of Plato's experiments in language. 'Faculties' is, I think, too concrete to be a right translation.

477 D 28 αὐτὴν is difficult. It is not quite easy to understand the word as ipsam, especially as it is so far from ἐπιστήμην. Had Plato written αὐτὴν τὴν ἐπιστήμην, or ἐπιστήμην—καὶ αὐτὴν there would have been little or no difficulty. As it is, if the text is right, we should probably (with Schneider and others) regard αὐτὴν as tautological: cf. 1V 428 A ισ.
πασῶν γε δυνάμεων ἐρρωμενοστάτην. Τι δέ; δόξαν εἰς δύναμιν

30 ἡ εἰς ἄλλο εἴδος οὖςομεν; Οὐδαμῶς, ἐφθαρνόντος δοξάζεων δυνά-

μεθα, οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἡ δόξα ἐστὶν. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ ὀλύγον γε πρὸ τερον

ὀμολογεῖς μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ δόξαν. Πῶς γὰρ ἄν,

ἐφθαρνόντος τι ἄναμαρτητοῦ τοῦ μὴ ἄναμαρτήτορο ταῦταν ποτὲ τις νοῦν

ἐχὼν τιθεὶς; Καλῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ δῆλον, ὅτι ἐτερόν ἐπιστήμης

35 δόξας ὀμολογεῖται ἡμῖν. Ἐτερον. Ἐφ' ἐτέρῳ ἄρα ἐτερόν τι 478

dυναμένη ἐκατέρα αὐτῶν πέφυκεν. Ἀνάγκη. Ἐπιστήμη μὲν γε

ποιν ἐτὶ τῷ ὄντι, τὸ ἄν γνῶναι ὡς ἤχει; Ναὶ. Δόξα δὲ, φαμὲν,

δοξάζει; Ναὶ. Ἦ ταυτῶν, ὅπερ ἐπιστήμην γνωσοῦσει; καὶ ἦσταί

5 γνωστὸν τε καὶ δοξαστὸν τοῦ αὐτοῦ; ἡ ἄδυνατον; Ἐπεὶ τοῦν,

ἀδύνατον, ἐφθαρνόντος τι ἄναμαρτητοῦ ταῦταν ποτὲ τις νοῦν

ἐχὼν τιθεὶς; Καλῶς, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, καὶ δῆλον, ὅτι ἐτερόν ἐπιστήμης

477 ε ὑπὸ σοῦμεν. Ο. with two Vienna MSS reads θῆσομεν, which is also

a correction in Cesens M. θῆσομεν was likewise conjectured by Cobet. A precise

parallel is hard to find; but φέρεις is used elsewhere of the operations of the mind (cf. 478 b), and θῆσομεν would not be likely to suffer corruption, especially as εἰς τι γένος τῆς occurs just before.

31 δόξα. Instead of δόξα O. Schneider (Versuch ein. genet. Entw. d. Pl. ἀγαθον. p. 13) would read δύναμις, but δυνάμεια should of course be taken in its full etymo-

logical sense.

32 πῶς γὰρ ἄν—τιθεὶς. The infallibil-


478 ε 4 δοξάζει. See εἰ. u. The same conjecture had occurred to Jackson. δοξάζειν is itself defensible and seems at first sight required by the balance of clauses ἐπιστήμη μὲν γε ποιοῦ—δόξα δὲ. But the introduction of φαμὲν breaks the balance, and suggests a new departure. The real reason for writing δοξάζει is the occurrence of ἄρ’ οὖν τὸ μὴ ἄν δοξαζέων (sc. δοξάζει); in 478 b. Unless δοξάζει is read here, it is very difficult to supply the subject of δοξαζέον there. Reading δοξάζει, again, we supply after ἰ ταυτῶν not δοξαζέων (as must be done if the infinitive is read), but δοξάζει. This too is an improvement, because it provides an exact balance to γνωσοῦσει. If Plato had meant ἰ ταυτῶν δοξαζέων, we should expect him to have written not γνωσοῦσει, but γνωσοῦσει. On the corruption see Introd. § 5.

7 ἀμφότερα ἐστον. The union of a plural subject with a dual verb is toler-

ably frequent in Plato: cf. Euthyd. 278 E, 303 C. These and other examples are quoted in Roepel de dualis usw Plat. p. 30.

478 b Ι τὸ ἄρ’ οὖν—δοξάζει; J. and C. understand οὐ δοξάζειαν: but δόξα is more appropriate in itself, and much more easily supplied, especially if δοξάζει is read in 478 a: see note ad loc.

11 ἦ ἄδυνατον κτλ. Cf. Theaet. 189 b ὑπὸ δρα οὖν τὸ μὴ ἄν δοξάζειν, οὔτε
περὶ τῶν ὅστων οὐστε ἀυτὸ καθ’ ἄυτόν. μὴ ὅν is here the bare negative—absolute not-being. Cf. Bosanquet Comp. p. 212.

14 μὴ ὅν ὅν: i. q. ὅτι μὴ ὅν ὅν (cf. μὴ ὅντι just below), not εἰ μὴ εἴη ὅν (as Stallbaum and Campbell suppose). Schneider and Jowett take the right view.

478 c 16 δοξάζειν. The subject is δόξα rather than ὅ δοξάζειν, in spite of ὅ δοξάζειν above. δοξάζειν was the subject of the verb in the two stages of the argument began (478 A ὅ τιαύτων sc. δόξα δοξάζειν, and ought to be so in the conclusion also.

18 σαφήνεια—ἀσαφήνεια. The full significance of these words does not appear till vi 508 D ff., where the relation between Light and Truth is explained. See note ad loc. and vi 511 c n.

21 ἐντὸς δ’ ἀμφοῖν. Hartman (with Ast) prefers ἐντὸς δὴ ἀμφοῖν. It is much better to regard the expression as a step in the argument, leading to the conclusion metaζύν ἄρα κτλ.

478 D 23 οὐκοί—ἔτι. οὐκοί is adverbial; if it were an adjective the infinitive would follow. The qualification suggests that in the ultimate analysis it is inaccurate to say that phenomena ‘both are and are not’: the truth is that they lie somewhere between being and not being. Hence also οὕτως ἔχει ὡς εἶναι τε καὶ μὴ εἴναι in 477 A. See also on καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα κτλ. in 479 C. It should be noted that Plato now adds ἄμα: in 477 A it was absent. See on 479 A τοῦτον γὰρ δὴ κτλ.

479 Α 1 ὁ χρηστός. Antisthenes is perhaps in Plato’s mind (Dümmler Antisth. p. 43). Others have thought of Isocrates, but with less reason. λέγετο μοι, φήσο, καὶ ἀποκρινέσθω certainly sounds like a personal challenge. See also on 476 D and 480 Α.
δι αυτό μὲν καλὸν καὶ ιδέαν τινὰ αυτοῦ κάλλους μηδεμίων ἡγεῖται ἀεὶ κατὰ ταύτα ὕσαυτὸς ἐχοῦσαν, πολλαὶ δὲ τὰ καλὰ νομίζει, ἐκείνος ὁ φιλοθεάμων καὶ οὐδαμὴ ἀνεχόμενος, ἃν τις ἐν τὸ καλὸν 5 φῇ εἶναι καὶ δίκαιον, καὶ τάλλα οὕτω. τούτων γὰρ δῆ, ὁ ἀριστε, φήσομεν, τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν μῶν τι ἐστίν, οὐκ αἰσχρὸν φανῆσεται; καὶ τῶν δίκαιων οὐκ ἄδικον; καὶ τῶν ὀσίων, οὐκ ἄνόσιον; οὐκ ἀλλ’ ἀνάγκη, ἐφί, καὶ καλὰ πῶς αὐτὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ B φανῆναι, καὶ οὐσα ἀλλὰ ἐρωτᾶς. Τί δὲ; τὰ πολλὰ διπλάσια ἢ πτότον τι ἴμασε, ἢ διπλάσια φαίνεται; Ὀμεν. Καὶ μεγάλα ὅταν καὶ σμίκρα καὶ κούφα καὶ βαρέα μή τι μᾶλλον, ὁ ἀν φήσομεν, ταύτα προσρηθῆσεται, ἢ τὰναντία; οὐκ, ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ, ἐφί, ἐκαστὸν ἀμφοτέρων ἔξεται. Πότερον οὖν ἔστι μᾶλλον ἢ οὐκ ἐστίν ἐκαστὸ τῶν πολλῶν τούτῳ, τὸ ἀν τις αἰτὸ ἐλέναι; Τοῖς ἐν ταῖς ἐστιν—

3. ἀεὶ Π: ἀεὶ μὲν Α.

2 ἰδεάν τινὰ. ἱδεὰ has not yet been used in the Republic of the Idea; hence τινά. Krohn (Pl. St. pp. 64, 96) has pointed this out, but makes too much of it. In ἰδεὰ, as Cohen remarks (Platonis Ideenlehr u. d. Mathematik p. 12), “das iden pulsirt”: cf. 475 E τοῦς τῆς ἀληθείας —φιλοθεάμων, vi 486 D and Symp. 211 D.

3 ἀεὶ—νομίζειν. μὲν after ἀεὶ—see cr. n.—is retained by Schneider and others. It is however much harsher than the ordinary cases of μὲν without ἄν (see on 475 E), and the majority of mss agree with Π in omitting it. Madvig would delete the article before καλὰ; but its retention provides a better antithesis to ἡ τις ἐν τῷ καλῷ φῇ εἶναι. τὰ καλὰ is here the plural, not of καλὸν τι, but of τὸ καλὸν; and Plato means that the φιλοθεάμων has many standardis of beauty: cf. 479 D οὖν.

4 ἐκεῖνοι —καλά. These words are certainly genuine, though omitted in Σ, and supposed by Hartman to be a marginal note on ὁ χρηστὸς ἀυξαμαχοῦ μενομενοσ by itself would be comparatively tame.

5 τούτων γὰρ δῆ κτλ. The many καλὰ ‘are’ and ‘are not,’ because they are beautiful and not-beautiful. We may infer, on the other hand, that the αὐτὸ καλὸν always ‘is,’ because (among other reasons) it is always beautiful. In other words, the essence of an Idea consists in its eternal unity and identity with itself. Cf. Symp. 211 A, where the αὐτὸ καλὸν is said to be οὐ τῇ μὲν καλῶν, τῇ δ’ αἰσχρῶν, οὔτε τότε μὲν, τότε δ’ οὐ, οὐδὲ πρὸς μὲν τὸ καλὸν, πρὸς δὲ τὸ αἰσχρὸν, οὐδὲ ἐνθα μὲν καλῶν, ἐνθα δὲ αἰσχρῶν, ὃς τις μὲν δὲ καλῶν, τις δὲ αἰσχρῶν. This passage will explain what Plato means by saying that there is not one of the πολλὰ καλὰ which is not also αἰσχρῶν. Cf. also Bosanquet Companion pp. 213 f. Krohn (Pl. Fr. p. 73) argues that this passage is inconsistent with the Maxim of Contradiction as laid down in IV 436 B. But Plato does not mean that τὰ πολλὰ καλὰ are αἰσχρὰ κατὰ ταύτων καὶ πρὸς ταύτων, nor should άμα in 475 D be interpreted in this sense. A particular καλὸν is άμα καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρὸν, ὃς τις μὲν δὲ καλῶν, τις δὲ αἰσχρῶν. Cf. Zeller4 II 1, p. 627 n. 2.

479 Β τὰ πολλὰ διπλάσια are πρὸς μὲν τὸ διπλάσια, πρὸς δὲ τὸ ἴμασε, whereas the αὐτὸ διπλάσιον is always and in every relation διπλάσιον: see last note and vii 523 c ff., Phaed. 102 b, c. The examples of διπλάσια, μεγάλα, βαρέα are examples and nothing more; the others, καλά, δίκαια, άσια, are relevant in a wider sense, for the aim of the philosopher-king is to frame his καλιτόλοσ on the model of the αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν. See on 476 Α.

13 ἀμφοτέρων ἔξεται: “utrisque adhaerescit” Stallbaum.

14 τοῖς ἐν τοῖς κτλ. ἐπαμφοτεριζούσων is certainly neuter, as Schneider shews, and not masculine: cf. ταῦτα ἐπαμφοτεριζεί below. The word is very frequently used in agreement with neuter or inanimate subjects: see Stephanus-
Hase Thes. s.v. The 'children's riddle' is (according to one of the two versions given by the Scholast.) αὐτοὶ τὰς ἔστιν ὡς ἄνιψ τοι καυκὸς ἄνηρ | ὁ δεῦρα καυκὸς δρυῖ | ἐδωροῦ τοι καυκὸς ἄνηρ | ἐπὶ δύον τοι καυκὸς ἄνηρ καθημένην | λύψ τοι καυκὸς βαλόν τοι καυκὸς βαλόν. Athenaeus (x 452c) assigns it (on the authority of C. Myers) to Panarces. The interpretation is "a eunuch aimed at a bat which he saw imperfectly sitting upon a reed with a pumice-stone and missed him" (J. and C.). This riddle was used as an exercise in logic among the Stoics (Dümmler Antisth. p. 43). But that is not a sufficient reason for supposing (with Dümmler) that they took it from Antisthenes.

479c 16 τῆς βολῆς πέρι κτλ. The ms. apparently read πέρι: πέρι is due to Benedictus. Stephanus wishes to delete the second, Richards the first preposition, but the whole sentence is loosely constructed, as if a mere child's riddle was not worth remembering or dwelling on: 'the children's riddle about the eunuch, don't you know, about hitting the bat, what it was the riddle says he struck it with, and on what it was sitting.' φ and not ὄς (as Baiter supposed) is the reading of A.

17 καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα κτλ. ταῦτα is of course τὸ πολλά, as Jowett and others rightly explain. Campbell appears strangely to take it of the children's riddle. I agree with Ast that ἐπαμφοτερίζειν—see cr. n.—must be wrong. It is usual to supply κοιτε, but this is very difficult, and the connective affirmative is much more to the point. For the error see Introd. § 5. Harman hastily pronounces ὡς ἀμφοτέρα ὡς οὐδέστερον spurious on the ground that "illas res οὐδέστερον esse modo (οὐτὲ ἄνω—νοῦσαι) dictum est," and that "non verum est illas res non esse ἀμφοτέρα." The text is perfectly sound. Phenomena, says Glauco, cannot be 'fixedly conceived of' as either (a) being or (b) not being, nor yet as (c) neither of the two. The fourth alternative is to 'fix them in the mind' as (d) both being and not being. This too is impossible, although we may say that they 'both are and are not' (477 A, 478 D). The reason is that they are not, in the last analysis, 'both being and not-being,' but something between the two, as Socrates presently points out. (See also on ὁδὸν in 478 D.) Phenomena cannot be fixedly conceived (παγίων νοὺςα) in any kind of way, because they have no fixity themselves. They are in a constant state of Heraclitean flux: cf. κυλινδείται, πλανητὸν in D and (for παγίως) IV 434 D n.

479d 23 τὰ τῶν πολλῶν κτλ.: 'the multitude's multitudinous formulae' Bosanquet. The words refer to general rules, standards, canons, believed in by the multitude (cf. τὰ τῶν πολλῶν δόγματα VI 493 A), who have on every single subject many such standards (πολλὰ νόμιμα), mutually inconsistent and uncoordinated, because they do not know that τὸ καλὸν, τὸ ἀγαθὸν etc. are each of them ἔν. They say, for example, 'τὸ ἄδει καὶ τὸ ἐναμφετέρον εἰ σαυτὸν, ὁ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν, τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ καλὸν,' and so on. Such assertions give the appearance of plurality τὸ καλὸν, by connecting it, not indeed with the objects of sense, but with other ἔδο (cf. 476 A, 476 C μυ). The form in which Plato expresses his conclusion (τὰ τῶν πολλῶν πολλὰ νόμιμα καλὸν πέρι and not simply τὰ πολλὰ καλὰ) prepares us for VI 484 C, where the whole purpose of this enquiry is disclosed. It is the business of the philosopher-king to bring order out of chaos by remodelling
πολλά νόμιμα καλόν τε πέρι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μεταξὺ ποιν κυλών
dεῦται τοῦ τε μὴ ὄντος καὶ τοῦ ὄντος εἰλικρινῶς. Ἡπήκαμεν.
Προσωμολογήσαμεν δὲ γε, εἰ τι τοιοῦτον φανεῖν, δοξαστὸν αὐτὸ
ἄλλ᾽ οὗ γνωστῶν δεῖν λέγεσθαι, τῇ μεταξὺ δυνάμει τὸ μεταξὺ
πλανητῶν ἄλησκόμενον. 'Ωμολογήκαμεν. Τούς άρα πολλὰ καλὰ
θεωμένους, ἂντι δὲ τὸ καλὸν μὴ ὄρθωτας μηδ᾽ ἄλλῳ ἐπ᾽ αὐτὸν
ἀγνοτι δυναμένους ἐπεσθαί, καὶ πολλὰ δίκαια, αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ δίκαιον
μή, καὶ πάντα ὄντω, δοξάζειν φήσομεν ἀπάντα, γιγνώσκειν δὲ ὄν
δοξάζοντι οὐδέν. 'Ανάγκη, ἐφη. Τί δὲ αὐτὸς αὐτὰ ἐκαστα
θεωμένους καὶ ἄεὶ κατὰ ταῦτα ὀσαύτως ὄντα; ἄρ᾽ οὗ γιγνώσκειν
ἄλλ᾽ οο δοξάζειν: 'Ανάγκη καὶ ταῦτα. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀσταξεθαί
τε καὶ φιλεῖν τούτους μὲν ταῦτα φήσομεν, ἐφ᾽ οἷς γνώσις ἐστὶν,
| ἐκείνους δὲ ἐφ' οἷς δόξα; ἢ οὗ μημονεύομεν, ὅτι φωνάς τε καὶ
χρόας καλάς καὶ τα τοιαῦτ᾽ ἐφαμεν τούτους φιλεῖν τε καὶ διεσπασθάι,
αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ καλόν οὖν ἀνέχεσθαι ὡς τι ὄν; Μεμιμήθησα. Μή οὖν
τι πλημμυλήσομεν φιλοσόφους καλούστης αὐτοὺς μᾶλλον ἢ φιλοσό-
5 φοὺς; καὶ ἀρα ἡμῖν σφόδρα χαλεπανοσίν, ἂν οὐτω λέγομεν;
Οὐκ, ἂν γ᾽ ἐμοὶ πεῖθονται, ἐφη δὲ γὰρ ἀληθεὶς χαλεπαίνειν οὐ
θέμις. Τοὺς αὐτὸς ἀρα ἐκαστον τὸ ὄν ἀσταξομένους φιλοσόφους
ἄλλ᾽ οὐ φιλοδόξους κλητέος; Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

τέλος πολιτείας ε.

the νόμιμα of the many in conformity with the Idea. He must not allow them to predicate κοινωνία of ἔση unless the ἔση really intercommunicate.
28 πολλὰ καλά. Is καλά the plural of 'the beautiful,' or of 'a beautiful' ? This question is raised by Bosanquet, who answers it thus: “the sentence about formulae leads me to interpret it in the former sense = many standards, or cases accepted as standards, ‘of beauty.’” Cf. 479 A, where however we have πολλὰ τὰ καλά, and its antithesis ἐν τὸ καλόν. The expression πολλὰ καλὰ must, I think, be taken in its usual sense, as the plural of καλὸν τι; but it includes not only the objects of sense, but also νόμιμα περὶ καλῶν, which are themselves πολλὰ καλά, because they connect αὐτῶ τὸ καλῶν with another ἐσος. See last note.

479 E 32 αὐτὰ ἐκαστα: the generalised expression including αὕτω καλῶν, αὕτω ἔσοιν and all the Ideas. Cf. vi 507 b n.

180 Α 2 ἐφαμεν. 476 B.

5 ἀρα—λέγομεν; See Isocrates de Soph. 8 πλεῖο κατορθοῦντας τῶν ταῖς
dόξαις χρωμένου ἢ τοὺς τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχειν ἐπεγεγέλλομενος. To this (according to Teichmüller Lit. Feldh. p. 103) Plato here replies, and the retort is supposed to be the more telling, because Isocrates, in spite of the sentence just quoted, aspired to the name φιλόσοφος: see Spengel Isocrates τ. Plato pp. 13, 22 ff. Dümmler, on the other hand, supposes that Antithenes is meant, as before (see on 476 d). I can see no sufficient reason for holding that Plato is here thinking specially of either, although the cap fits both.

4 φιλοσόφοις. The connotation of φιλόσοφος has greatly altered or developed since Book 11: see 11 316 b n., and cf. Krohn Pl. St. pp. 9, 29, 103. Krohn is fully justified when he calls the concluding part of Book v "the turning-point" of the Republic (ib. p. 107). Plato's lighthouse 'Hellenic city' is now well on the road to become an 'ensample in the Heavens.'
APPENDICES TO BOOK V.

I.


That there is some kind of connexion or interdependence between the Aristophanic and Platonic descriptions of a communistic ideal, is a theory which has been strenuously advocated by a succession of distinguished scholars from the middle of the 18th century to the present day. The author of the suggestion was apparently Bizet, who, as I learn from Tchorzewski (de Politia, Timaeo, Critia 1847 p. 150), appended to his argument of the Ecclesiazusae the note ὁ δὲ Ἀριστοφανὸς διὰ τούτων τῶν φιλοσόφων, ὃς ἔχθρος ἦν, μάλιστα δὲ τὰ τῶν Πλάτωνος περὶ πολιτείας βιβλία ψέγειν σκώπτειν καὶ κακωδεῖν ὁδεῖ. An attempt to establish the connexion was made by Lebeau in 1760 (Tchorzewski l. c.), but the first to advance any serious arguments in its support was Morgenstern (de Plat. Rep. comment. prima 1794 pp. 74—78). In one form or another, the theory received the support of, among the older generation of scholars, Boeckh (de simultatе Xen. et Plat. 1811 p. 26), Bergk (Comment. de rel. com. Attic. antiq. 1838 pp. 81, 494 n.), Meineke (Hist. crit. com. Graec. 1839 pp. 287 ff.), and Tchorzewski (l. c.): see Susemihl Gen. Entwick. ii pp. 296 ff., where the author mentions the most important writings on the subject down to 1857. The original theory has undergone some new and remarkable developments since the efflorescence of the chorizotic school of criticism, in whose hands the apparent connexion between the Ecclesiazusae and the Republic has formed a useful weapon for attacking the unity of Plato's dialogue. Foremost of these critics is Krohn (Pl. St. 1876 pp. 72—83, and Pl. Frage 1878 pp. 36 f.); among the others, we may refer in particular to Stein (de Ar. Eccles. arg. e quarto rep. Plat. lib. sumpto 1880), Teichmüller (Lit. Fehden i 1881 pp. 15 ff. and ii 1884 pp. 41 f.), Bergk (Gr. Literaturgesch. 1887 iv pp. 85, 462 ff.), Usener (in Brandt's zur Entwick. d. Pl. Lehr. v. d. Seelentheilen 1890 p. 6), and above all Chiappelli (in Riv. di Filologia etc. xi pp. 161—273 and xv pp. 343—352), to whom we owe what is in my opinion by far the most interesting and valuable discussion on the whole subject. A few distinguished writers still maintain that the philosopher and the comedian are probably independent of one another, notably Zeller (Phil. d. Griechen i 11, p. 551 n. 2) and on the whole also Hirmer (Entst. u. Komp. d. Plat. Pol. pp. 655—660), but the balance of published opinion is in favour of recognising in
some shape or other a historical connexion between the socialistic burlesque of Aristophanes and the serious communism of Plato.

In reviewing the available evidence, it will be convenient to consider, in the first place, any external indications which may be supposed to have a bearing on the theory; secondly, any alleged or possible references to Plato himself in the *Ecclesiazusae*, or to Aristophanes in the fifth book of the *Republic*; thirdly, the general similarity between the two writings; and finally, such particular resemblances of language and idea as have been added in support of the allegation that Plato has in view Aristophanes, or Aristophanes Plato.

I. Alleged external evidence.

According to Aristotle (Pol. B 7. 1266\(\alpha\) 34 ff.), σύναξις—οὗ τὸν πρὶν τὰ τέκνα κοινότητα καὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἄλλος (i.e. other than Plato) κεκαυνο-

τόμηκεν οὗ τε περὶ τὰ συντακτικὰ τῶν γυναικῶν, and Plato himself in the *Timaeus* 18c remarks, with reference to the communism of the *Republic*, ἕτοι μὲν διὰ τὴν ἁγιείαν τῶν λεχθέντων εὐμνημόνευτον, ὅτι κοινὰ τὰ τῶν γάμων καὶ τὰ τῶν παιδῶν πάσιν ἀπάντων ἐπίθεμεν κτλ.; On the strength of these passages Teichmüller (II. cc.) has argued that the fifth book of the *Republic* must have preceded the *Ecclesiazusae*. The argument is, however, as Zeller points out (I.c.), altogether inconclusive; for Aristotle does not assert that Plato was the first, but that he was the only authority, who introduced this innovation. It is therefore clear that Aristotle, who must have known the *Ecclesiazusae*, is excluding the fantastic creations of comedy from his survey. This inference is further supported by another passage in the *Politics* (ib. 12. 1274\(b\) 9—II), where ἕτε τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ παιδῶν καὶ τῆς ὀνοματο-

κοινότητος καὶ τὰ συντακτικὰ τῶν γυναικῶν are said to be ἰδιαί Πλάτωνος. See also Newman, *The Politics of Aristotle*, Vol. II p. 282. It has been maintained on the other hand that the *Ecclesiazusae* is earlier than the *Republic*, because Aristophanes declares his proposals to be μὴ τε δεδρα-

μένα μὴν εἰρημένα πτω πρῶτερον (*Eccl. 579*), but, in point of fact, the educated Greeks of Aristophanes' time probably knew that communistic societies had already existed (see on v. 451\(c\), 457\(b\)), and Zeller takes the comedian much too seriously when he supposes this line to demonstrate the priority of Aristophanes' play even to the proposals of the philosopher. No ancient writer, so far as I am aware, has suggested either that Aristophanes refers to Plato, or that Plato refers to Aristophanes; and there is no other external evidence of any kind, if we except certain chorizontic conjectures which are in harmony, so far as they go, with the well-known statement of Gellius (Noct. Att. xiv 3) about the separate publication of part of the *Republic*. See Introduct. § 4. The question must therefore be decided, if at all, on other grounds.

II. Alleged or primâ facie possible allusions either (a) to Plato in the *Ecclesiazusae*, or (b) to Aristophanes in the fifth book of the *Republic*.

(a) The name of Plato does not occur in the *Ecclesiazusae*. This fact has sometimes been used as an argument against the theories
connecting the *Ecclesiazusae* and the *Republic*: see for example Zeller\(^1\) \(\Pi\ 1, \text{p.} \ 551 \ \text{n.}\). But, as Bergk (*Gr. Literaturgesch.\ IV\ p. \ 86*) and others have pointed out, the later comedies of Aristophanes comparatively seldom attack contemporaries by name\(^1\), and in any case Aristophanes was quite at liberty, if he thought fit, to caricature the scheme of Plato without specifying its author. Cf. Krohn *Pl. St.* p. 76. Is Plato present in disguise in any portion of the play? Some critics have detected an allusion to the philosopher in the words with which the Aristophanic chorus introduces the communism of the *Ecclesiazusae*:

\[
\nu\nu \delta\ \delta\ \sigma\ \epsilon\ \pi\ \nu\ \kappa\ \nu\ \nu\ \phi\ \varepsilon\ \alpha\ \kappa\ \varphi\ \iota\ \lambda\ \sigma\ \phi\ \sigma\ \phi\ \nu\ \varepsilon\ \iota\ \varepsilon\ \iota\ \varepsilon\ \nu\ \mu\ \nu\ \\iota\ \nu\ \nu\ \nu\ \ (v\nu.\ 571—573).
\]

The reading of the mss is *φιλόσοφον*, and there is no sufficient justification for the conjectures *φιλόδημον* or *φιλόκουν*, for the dactylic measure may easily pass into the trochaic, as in *Frogs* 884 (quoted in Blaydes' note). It is of course possible, on the face of it, that Plato is in Aristophanes' mind, and the possibility becomes still more evident if we read *φιλόσοφον*, which Bergk declares—somewhat hastily, I think—to be necessary on metrical grounds (*Gr. Literaturgesch.\ IV\ p. \ 463\ n. \ 135*). But *φιλόσοφον* gives the better construction and sense, and the words of Aristophanes as they stand in the mss do not in themselves suggest a reference to the theories either of Plato or of any other philosopher. The adjective *φιλόσοφον* is merely an amplification of *πυκνήν*. Cf. Hirmer l.c. p. 659 n. 2. Others may be inclined to recognise Plato in the *εὐπρεπής* *νεανίας* who proposes the *γυναικοκρατία* of Aristophanes' play:

\[
\text{μετά τούτο τούτων εὐπρεπής νεανίας}
\]

\[
\text{λευκός τις ἀνεπήδης ἄριστος Νικία}
\]

\[
\text{δημηγορίσης, κατεξήρησεν λέγειν}
\]

\[
\text{ὡς χρή παραδοθῆναι ταῖς γυναιξὶ τὴν πόλιν κτλ.}
\]

\[
(v\nu.\ 427—454.)
\]

But in this instance also the identification would be purely speculative, and much the same may be said of Bergk's conjecture (*Com. de reliq. Comm. Att. ant.* p. \ 404 n.) that τὸν τῶν γραφέων ἀριστον in verse 995 refers to Plato:

\[
\text{Νεαν. \ ἄλλω μελέ ὀρρωδῷ τὸν ἐραστὴν σου. \ Γρ. τίνα;}
\]

\[
\text{Νεαν. \ τὸν τῶν γραφέων ἀριστον. \ Γρ. οὕτως δέ ἐστι τίς;}
\]

\[
\text{Νεαν. \ ὅς τοῖς νεκροῖς ζωγραφεῖ τὰς ληκύθους, \ ἄλλῳ ἀπιθ', ὡπες μὴ σ' ἐπὶ θύρασιν ὄθεναι. \ (v\nu.\ 994—997.)}
\]

---

\(^1\) Plato and his school are however frequently mentioned by the poets of the New Comedy. The following references are due to Stein (l.c. p. 9 n.). Theopompus ap. Meineke *Frag. Comic.* *Gr.\ II* p. 797, Anaxandrides ib. *III* p. 170, Amphipus pp. 302, \ 305, Ephippus p. 332, Epicrates p. 370, Cratinus Junior p. 378, Alexis pp. 382, \ 451, \ 453, \ 455, \ 468, Philippides *IV* p. 468. See D. L. \ 111\ 20 ff.
APPENDICES TO BOOK V.

There remains a single passage in which the fertile imagination of the same scholar discovered a precise and positive allusion to Plato. It is a tolerably well established tradition that Plato was originally called Aristocles (D. L. iii 4, and other evidence in Zeller's II 1, p. 392 n. 1), and Aristyllus is a diminutive or hypocoristic form of that name. See Etym. M. p. 142. 55 ff. 'Αριστυλλος: ὑπόμα παρὰ 'Αριστοφάνει, εἰρήσα δὲ ὑποκριστικῶς ὁ Ἀριστοκλῆς, and Eustath. ad II. p. 989. 45 ὑποκεκόμησαί ὁ Ἡρωλὺς ἐκ τοῦ Ἡρακλῆς ὡς ἐκ τοῦ Ἀριστοκλῆς ὁ Ἀρίστουλλος παρὰ τῷ κωμίκῳ, with Fick Griech. Personennam. p. 111. Now in the Ecclesiaizusae 646 ff., after Praxagora has described the advantages of domestic communism in language very like Plato's, we read:

Πραξ. πολὺ μέντοι δεινότερον τοῦτον τοῦ πράγματός ἐστι,—

Βλεπ. τὸ ποιον;

Πραξ. εἰ σε φιλήσειν Ἀρίστουλλος, φάσκων αὐτοῦ πατέρι εἰναι.

Βλεπ. οἰμώξιον τάν καὶ κωκίον.

Πραξ. σὺ δὲ γὺ ὅζοις ἀν καλαμίνθης,

ἀλλ' οὗτος μὲν πρότερον γέγονεν πρὶν τὸ ψήφισμα γενέσθαι,

ὥτ' οὐχί δέος μὴ σε φιλήσῃ.

Βλεπ. δεινὸν μένταν ἐπεπόνθη.

Why should not Aristyllus be Plato? Bergk had the boldness to suggest their identity (l.c. p. 403 n.), and in the following year Meineke upheld the same view by the citations which I have given. The conjecture deserves the praise of ingenuity, but is far from probable in itself, and has met with little favour at the hands of recent writers. If Plato is personated by Aristyllus, we can only say that his features are distorted beyond the possibility of recognition both here and in the Plutus

μινθώσομεν θ' ὁσπερ τράγου
tην μίνα. σὺ δ' Ἀρίστουλλος υποχάσκων ἑρεῖς

ἐπεσθε μητρὶ χούροι (v. 313—315):

nor is it at all likely that Aristophanes, even in a late comedy like the Ecclesiaizusae, would have had recourse to so far-fetched a cryptogram. We meet with Aristyllus as a distinct and separate proper name before the archonship of Euclides (CIA i 299, CIA i 447 col. 1, quoted by Hirmer l.c. p. 659), and we have no reason for disbelieving the Scholiasts when they remark that this particular Ἀριστυλλος was only some αἰσχροποιός or other whom Aristophanes wished to deride. To judge from his posthumous history of Greek literature (pp. 86, 463), Bergk himself afterwards abandoned the idea that Aristyllus stands for Plato.

It will be seen that the available evidence under this head is quite insufficient to establish the probability of any kind of connexion between the Ecclesiaizusae and the Republic.

(5) It has been maintained by Chiappelli (l.c.) and other writers that Plato makes frequent reference to Aristophanes in the course of Book v. The expressions in question have been separately dealt with
as they occur: but it will be easier to estimate the cumulative value of their evidence if we bring them under the compass of a single survey.

The following passages claim consideration:

(1) ὅποι ὦτε ὅσον ἐσμὸν λόγων ἐπεγείρετο· δν ἐγὼ ὅρων παρῆκα τύτε, μή παράσχοι πολλὰν ὠχλόν 450 B.
(2) ἀπιστούντα δε καὶ ζήτοιντα ἀμα τοῖς λόγοις ποιεῖσθαι, ὃ δὴ ἐγὼ δρῶν, φοβερὸν τε καὶ σφαλερὸν, οὐ τι γέλωτα ὀφλεῖν κτλ. 450 E.
(3) τὰχα δὲ οὔτως ἂν ὁρθὸς ἔχοι, μετὰ ἀνδρείον δράμα παντελῶς διαπεραθέν τὸ γυναικεῖον αὐ̄ περαίνειν 451 B C.
(4) οὐ φοβητέον τὰ τῶν χαριέτων σκόμματα, ὅσα καὶ οὐλ ἂν εἴποιεν εἰς τὴν τοιαύτην μεταβολὴν γενομένην καὶ περὶ τὰ γυμνάσια καὶ περὶ μονακηὴν καὶ οὐκ ἐλάχιστα περὶ τὴν τῶν ὀπλῶν σχέσιν καὶ ἐπτων ὀχῆτεος 452 B C.
(5) μάταιος ὃς γελοῦν ἀλλὰ τι ἣγειται ὅ τὸ κακὸν, καὶ ὁ γελωτοποιεῖν ἐπιχειρῶν πρὸς ἄλλην τινὰ ὄψιν ἀποβλέπεσθαι ὡς γελοῦν ὁ τὴν τοῦ ἀφροῖς τε καὶ κακοῦ, καὶ καλοῦ αὐ̄ σπουδάζει πρὸς ἄλλον τινὰ σκοτῶν σημαίνεος ὃ τῶν τοῦ ἁγαθῶν 452 D. Cf. also δεηθεῖσι τε τούτων μὴ τὰ αὐτῶν πράττειν, ἀλλὰ σπουδάζειν 452 C.
(6) τὸν τὰ ἐναντία λέγοντα 454 E καὶ τοῦ τὰ τοιαύτα ἀντιλέγοντος 455 A.
(7) ὃ δὲ γελῶν ἄνιρ ἔπι γυμναῖς γυναιξῖν, τοῦ βελτίστου ἕνεκα γυμνα-ζομάνεις, ἀτέλη τοῦ γελοιον [σοφίας] δρέπων καρπῶν, οὐδὲν οἴδειν, ὡς ἐοίκεν, ἐφ’ ὃ γελᾶ ὧν ὁ τι πράττει 457 B.
(8) καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ τοῖς πρόσθεν γε ὁμολογούμεν 464 B.
(9) ὃ Σώκρατες—τουῦτον ἐκβέβληκας ῥήμα τε καὶ λόγον, ὃν εἰπὼν ἰγνοῦ ἐπὶ σε πάνυ πολλοῖς τε καὶ οὐ φαίλουσ—oriously διατεταμένου ὡς θαυμασία ἐργασομένους 473 E f.

In nearly all these places Chiappelli (l.c.) suspects that Plato has Aristophanes in view. As regards the first, it is tolerably clear from Plato’s choice of the word παρῆκα that the ἐσμὸς λόγων means the swarm of subjects which Socrates will now have to discuss, and not the hostile criticism which he will encounter; see note ad loc. The notes on (2) and (3) will shew that neither of these passages warrants the conclusion that either Aristophanes or any other representative of Athenian comedy is intended. It would be almost equally rash to identify τὸν τὰ ἐναντία λέγοντα in (6) with Aristophanes, and in (9) Plato is manifestly thinking of a coalition of antagonists, not to mention the fact that the subject of the philosopher-king, which evokes this exclamation from Glauco, is nowhere hinted at in the Eclesiasusae. If the imperfect ὁμολογούμεν is to be retained in (8), the sentence becomes more pointed on the supposition that Plato is replying to some criticism or caricature of his communistic theories; but even without such a hypothesis, the meaning is satisfactory enough. In the other three passages, viz. (4), (5) and (7), it is difficult to resist the impression that Plato’s vigorous invective, though professedly general, has also a personal application. There are several places in the Republic where
Plato has with much probability been supposed to be thinking of an individual in describing the type, as, for example, when he pours contempt on the epideictic rhetorician in the person of Isocrates (vi 498 e n.); and it is quite possible that he thought of Aristophanes when he wrote these words. But there cannot be any reference to the Ecclesiazusae in particular, for the Ecclesiazusae does not touch upon any of the special topics which Plato here mentions, such as the athletic and military exercises of women. The most that we can reasonably affirm is that, if the Ecclesiazusae can be shewn on other grounds to be an attack either on Plato's own theories, or on views with which he sympathised, the personal tone of (4), and especially of (5) and (7), is most easily explicable on the hypothesis that they are a sort of counter attack on Aristophanes by Plato.

III. The general resemblances between the two works in respect of subject-matter and content.

The Ecclesiazusae falls into two well-marked divisions (1—876, and 877—1181), the second of which merely elaborates and illustrates the idea expressed in vv. 615—618, and contains nothing which can fairly be quoted in this connexion. It is otherwise with the first half of the play. There Aristophanes deals with a number of subjects which are treated also by Plato, viz. Community of Goods (590—594, 597—610, 673—692), Community of Women (611—634), Community of Children (635—650), the absence of every kind of δίκαιος (657—672), and the establishment of ἔσσεται (715 f.). The coincidence is remarkable and certainly requires explanation.

IV. Specific parallels in idea, or in language, or in both idea and language.

These are more numerous and sometimes, perhaps, more remarkable than is generally supposed. We may tabulate them as follows:

Plato.

(1) τὰς γυναίκας ταύτας τῶν ἀνδρῶν τούτων πάσας εἶναι κοινάς, ἵδια δὲ μηθὲν μηθὲν συνοικεῖν 457 C f.

(2) ὅτι πάντων ἐμφορώτατ' ἄν εἶη πρακτὸν τῇ πόλει καὶ τοῖς φύλαξι 458 B.

(3) πατέρας δὲ καὶ θυγατέρας καὶ αὐτῶν δὲ ἑλέγεις πῶς διαγινώσκονται ἀλλήλων; 461 C f. παντὶ γὰρ, ὥσεν ἐντυγχανεῖ τις, ὥσεν ἀδελφῷ ὥσεν ἁδελφῷ ὥσεν πατρὶ ὥσεν μητρὶ ὥσεν ἤ θυγατρὶ ὥσεν τοῖς ἐγκόσιοις ἤ προγόνοις νομεῖ ἐντυγχάνειν 463 C: cf. 461 D.

Aristophanes.

καὶ ταύτας γὰρ κοινὰς ποιοῦ τοῖς ἀνδραῖς συγκαταχείσθαι καὶ παιδοποιεῖ τῷ βουλομένῳ (614 f.)

καὶ μὴν ὅτι μεῖν χρηστὰ διδάξω πιστεύω (583).

τῶν οὖν οὖτω ἔσσεται ἡμῶν τούς αὐτοῦ παιδᾶς ἑκατὸς ἐσται διαγινώσκειν; Τί δὲ δεῖ; πατέρας γὰρ ἀπαντᾶς τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους αὐτῶν εἶναι τοῖς χρόνοις νομοῦσι (635—637).
APPENDICES TO BOOK V.

(4) εξομεν οὖν—μείζον ἀγάθων τοῦ ὃ ἐν εὐνόη τε καὶ ποιή μίαν (sc. τὴν πόλιν); Οὐκ ἔχομεν 462 A f.

(5) τί δέ; δίκαι τε καὶ ἐγκλήματα πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὐκ οἰκήσεται ἕξ αὐτῶν, ὥς ἐποιεῖν κτλ. ; 464 D.

(6) καὶ μὴ ὅτι γε νεώτερος πρεσβύτερον—οὔτε ἄλλο βιαζέσθαι ἐπι—χειρίζεσθαι ποτέ, οὔτε τύπτειν ὡς τὸ εἰκός· οἵμα τ' οὐδὲ ἄλλος ἀτιμάσει· ἵναυ ὡς τῷ φύλακε κυλῷντε, δέος τε καὶ αἰδώς, αἰδώς μὲν ὡς γονέων μὴ ἀπτεθῶσι ἐργονασά, δέος δὲ τῷ πάχοντι τοῖς ἄλλοις ἴσην ἐργάζοντο, τοὺς μὲν ὡς νείς, τοὺς δὲ ὡς αἰδέλφους, τοὺς δὲ ὡς πατέρας 465 A f.

(7) ἄλλα μὴ καὶ καθ' ὁμηρον τοῦς τουόσοις δίκαιος τιμᾶν τῶν νέων ὅσου ἀγάθοι· καὶ γὰρ ὁμηρος τὸν εἰδοκιμήνα τούτῳ πολέμῳ νυκτὸς ἄναντα ἔφη δυνηκέσσι γεραι—ρεσθαι, ὡς ταύτην οἰκείαν οὐσαν τιμᾶν τῷ ἡβοῦντι τε καὶ ἀνέρεως, ἐξ ἃ δέμο τῷ τιμᾶσθαι καὶ τὴν ἵσθιν αὐξήσει. Ἑρθότατα, ἔφη. Πεισόμεθα ἀρα, ἤν' δ' ἐγώ, ταῦτα γε ὁμήρῳ 468 C f.

άλλ' ἐναποκούντων τὰς βιοτικὰς καὶ τοὺς ὀμοίων (594 : cf. 590—593).

τὴν δὲ διάτασιν τῶν ποιήσεως; Κοινὴν τὰς βιοτικὰς· τῷ γὰρ ἀστω ἅμια οἰκήσαι φημὶ ποιήσεων συνηθίζον, εἰς ἑν ἀπαντά, ὥστε βαλίζειν εἰς ἀλλήλους (673—675 : cf. 690 ff.)

έλλ' οὐδ' δίκαι πρῶτον ἐσονται κτλ. (657—672 : cf. also 560—567).

καὶ βασιλείαι ἐσται τοῖς παταιρίωσιν τοὺς ἀνδρείως ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ, καὶ τὰς δειλίθα γεγενήσα, ἴνα μὴ δειπνωσοι αἰσχυνόμενοι (679—681).

I have drawn attention to the Aristophanic parallels in commenting on each of these passages of Plato individually. The impression which they produce as a whole will vary according to the observer's bent and attitude of mind. To Zeller and Hirmer they appear for the most part only accidental coincidences natural enough in the independent exposition and development of the same fundamental idea. By way of illustration Hirmer reminds us that one of the reasons which Plato assigns for domestic communism finds an echo in the motive to which Herodotus had already attributed the community of wives among the Agathyrsi: see note on 463 c. Sussemihl on the other hand seems to think that the resemblances are too striking to be merely accidental (Gen. Entwick. ii p. 297). Experience has shown that it would be rash to limit the possible degrees of approximation between two writers of ability discussing the same or similar subjects; but for my own part I am disposed to think that we should give the preference to an ex-
planation which, while it is probable on other grounds, leaves room for the possibility that some at least of these coincidences are not altogether fortuitous.

On a retrospect of the foregoing discussion, we see that the residue of solid fact awaiting explanation is first, the general resemblance of subject and treatment between the fifth book of the Republic and the Ecclesiazusae, and secondly, certain particular coincidences of idea and phraseology. No very great stress should be laid on the personal and polemical tone which seems to make itself felt in some of the passages cited under heading II (b); but it may be found that a solution which explains the other phenomena will provide a reasonable account of this matter also.

What explanations may be, or have been, offered?

It may be suggested, in the first place, that Aristophanes and Plato are borrowing from the same literary source. According to Aristoxenus ap. D. L. iii 37 and Favorinus ib. 57 the Republic of Plato was found almost entire εν τοῖς Πρωταγόρου Ἀντιλογικοῖς, but the fable is unworthy of serious discussion, and has not been accepted by any responsible critic (cf. Frei, Quaestiones Protagoreae p. 187). Apart from this testimony, there is no evidence to support the view that the resemblances between Aristophanes and Plato are due to imitations of the same original.

Secondly, it has been held that Aristophanes copies from Plato. According to this theory, the Ecclesiazusae caricatures the Platonic community of goods, wives and children, referred to or expounded in the end of Book iii, in iv 423 e f., and especially in Book v of the Republic. Zeller and others have endeavoured to refute this view by urging that communism in the Ecclesiazusae is represented rather as an extreme development of democracy and the democratic spirit than as "das Hirngespenst eines aristokratischen Doctrinärs" (Zeller l.c. p. 552 n.); that Aristophanes depicts a γυναικοκρατία, and exhibits in fact "a bill in Parliament for the putting down of men" (Merry Wives of Windsor ii 1), whereas in Plato we have an ἀριστοκρατία in which the best women and the best men are on an equality; and that there are many proposals in the fifth book of the Republic to which there is no analogy in the Ecclesiazusae, although they would have formed an admirable subject for Aristophanes' peculiar kind of wit, such as the κλήροι τινες κομψοί (460 a), the gymnastic exercises of the female guardians (452 b c al.), and their presence on the field of battle (471 d al.). These observations are certainly true, and conclusive against the theory that the Ecclesiazusae was intended by Aristophanes as an exhaustive polemic against Plato's communism, and nothing more; but such a theory is quite indefensible and betrays a complete misapprehension of the genius of Comedy. The primary object of Aristophanic Comedy, when all is said and done, was to amuse (452 b c, 457 b), and the accurate and complete recapitulation of Plato's theories would not only be slavish and pedantic, but also much less amusing than a partial and distorted view. "Dass Aristophanes nicht naturgetreue Farben liebt, wenn er seine Opfer der Bühne überantwortet, braucht
APPENDICES TO BOOK V.

nicht besonders gesagt zu werden; er hat am Sokrates eine wahrhaft thersiteische Rolle gespielt. Also soll Niemand behaupten, er habe den Wortlaut der Politei vor Augen seine Komödie gedichtet, bedacht dem Verfasser kein Unrecht zu thun. Er nahm, was seinem Zwecke diente; für seine Extravaganzen muss man zunächst das Wesen der Komik verantwortlich machen" (Krohn Pl. St. p. 79). The real question is whether the actual points of contact between the Republic and the Ecclesiazusae are sufficiently numerous and of such a kind as to shew that Aristophanes had the Republic in view in any part of his play. If we confine ourselves to the internal evidence, the possibility of such a direct and immediate reference to Plato's dialogue cannot be denied; but it is impossible for many reasons to believe that the whole of the Republic is earlier than 393—390 B.C., between which dates the Ecclesiazusae falls.

It is at this point that the separatist critics step in. In discussing the relationship between Aristophanes and Plato, Morgenstern (l.c. p. 83) had already made the suggestion that the Republic as we have it now is an editio aucta et emendata of an earlier Republic, and that Aristophanes had before him this preliminary treatise; and Teichmüller for his part places the first five books of the Republic in 392 or 391, and the Ecclesiazusae in 390 B.C. (l.c. I pp. 15 ff.). But the resemblances between the two works can be explained without having recourse to the hypotheses of the separatists, and the question whether the different books of the Republic were published together or not should be kept distinct from the present enquiry. See Introd. § 4, where I have tried to shew that the χωρίζουσαι have hitherto failed to prove their case.

Thirdly, Plato may have had the Ecclesiazusae in view when he wrote the fifth book of the Republic. This opinion was first, I think, expressed by Boeckh, who remarks "Plato quinto Reipublicae lepidorum hominum facetiis perstricta haec placita significans Aristophanis comœdiam videtur respicere" (l.c. p. 26). Boeckh's view seems to be regarded as possible both by Zeller (l.c.) and Hirmer (l.c.), the latter of whom reminds us that Plato alludes to Aristophanes also in other parts of the Republic (see on VII 529 B, C, and cf. VI 508 B n.): and, among the separatists, Krohn, Stein, Usener and Chiappelli, in one form or another, hold what is fundamentally the same belief. According to Krohn (Pl. St. l.c.), the order of publication was Republic t—IV., Ecclesiazusae, Republic v. In the Ecclesiazusae Aristophanes ridicules the Platonic community of wives and children alluded to in IV 423 ef., and doubtless familiar enough as a topic of conversation in the more cultivated circles of Athenian society; while the first half of Republic v reiterates, in view of Aristophanes' travesty, the principle of κοινα τα φιλολόγων, adding new and well-considered arguments in its support. Stein and Chiappelli (II.c.c.) agree pretty closely with Krohn, except that Stein thinks the remark of Socrates in IV 423 ef. was enough by itself to inspire the author of the Ecclesiazusae, without any assistance from the oral diffusion of Plato's paradoxical innovations. The hypothesis proposed by Usener (ap. Brandt l.c.), regarded merely as a work of art,
is singularly perfect and complete. Starting from the thesis that the recapitulation of the Republic in the Timaeus (17 c. ff.) refers to a preliminary draft of a portion of the dialogue published before the production of the Ecclesiazusae, Usener maintains that in Republic ii c. 15—iv c. 5 inclusive we have the substance of that earlier treatise, which included also a sketch of the community of wives and children, afterwards compressed into the single sentence iv 423 ef. Aristophanes’ travesty of this forerunner of the Republic is contained in the Ecclesiazusae, which was put on the stage, according to Usener, in 393 B.C., and in Book v of the Republic Plato treats the whole subject afresh in view of Aristophanes’ attack.

So much for the most important and representative theories which have been advanced on the question. In an enquiry of this kind, we cannot hope to attain the certainty of absolute demonstration; but I am strongly inclined to admit the probability that Plato had the Ecclesiazusae and its author in his mind when he wrote that part of the fifth book which deals with the subject of women and children. Granted that the Ecclesiazusae is earlier than Book v of the Republic, Plato must have known the play, and the subjects treated of in the two writings are so closely allied that it would have been difficult to ignore the comedian altogether in traversing what is nearly the same ground. The positive coincidences, again, both general and particular, though they do not perhaps compel us to assume any connexion between the two works, are, at all events in some cases, most readily explicable on that hypothesis. A similar remark will apply to the instances already cited of personal or apparently personal references to some representative of the comic stage in more than one passage of Book v. But there is nothing in this admission which lends support to any of the chorizontic hypotheses, and the separatists, with few exceptions, take much too narrow a view of the question at issue. No doubt Aristotle asserts that the community of wives and children and the συνσίτια γυναικών were novelties peculiar to Plato among all the authors both of theoretical and of practical polities (Pol. B 7. 1266a 34 ff.). As far as concerns actually existing States, Aristotle’s remark is demonstrably incorrect, if the word ‘polity’ is held to include barbarian as well as Hellenic constitutions; and though what he says may be true of the πολιτείαι τῶν φιλοσόφων, there is a considerable body of evidence to shew that the community of wives and children as well as of property was an idea freely mooted in Athenian speculative circles, even when it was not embodied in a formal πολιτεία like that of Plato, or that of Diogenes after him. The attitude of Euripides is highly significant in a question of this kind; and Dümmler (Proleg. zu Platons Staat p. 55) has drawn attention to a fragment of the Proteilsas where Euripides forestalls the Platonic conception in the words κώνον γὰρ εἶναι χρόνον γυναικεῖον γένος (Fr. 655 Dindorf. Cf. also Fr. 406, Med. 573 ff. and Hipp. 616 ff.). The wide-spread desire in Plato’s age to break

1 See on v 457 B, 453 C.
with 'convention' and reorganize society on a 'natural' basis, with the frequent appeal to the analogy of the dumb creation (see on 451 c), in which the 'vox Naturae' was supposed to be most plainly audible, points towards the same conclusion; and I do not think that Dümmler overshoots the mark when, in reviewing the available evidence, he affirms "Es ist kein Zweifel, Weber- und Gütergemeinschaft liegen auf dem Wege der Weltbegrücksichtigung des fünften Jahrhunderts" (l. c.). See also Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 111 p. 458 f., where Diels remarks "berühmte Gedanken, deren schulmässige Fassung uns erst aus dem Anfang des vierten Jahrhunderts vorliegt (z. B. Schleuenemancipation und Weibergemeinschaft), bereits im Jahrhundert der Aufklärung geboren sind." That such aspirations commanded a large measure of sympathy and support among some of Socrates' followers, including of course Plato, may be easily believed, both on account of the views which were afterwards promulgated by Plato and the Cynics, and also because there are signs that such an innovation would not have been altogether repugnant to the historical Socrates, whose attitude on sexual questions is almost repulsively utilitarian; see Xen. Mem. 1 3. 14, II 1. 5, 2. 4. It is from political and social ideas of this kind that Aristophanes, who everywhere shews himself familiar with the intellectual movements of his day, derived the materials of his comedy. Everything else had been tried in Athens; why not have recourse to the remedy offered by the so-called 'natural' state of society? εἰδόκει γάρ τούτο μόνον ἐν τῇ πόλει ὧν γεγενήσθαι (Ecc. 456 f.). Aristophanes' Ecclesiazusae is thus a satire both on Athenian democracy and on the socialistic theories of his age. The philosopher may well have been dissatisfied with the comedian's unscrupulous travesty of views with which he had himself no little sympathy. In the fifth book of the Republic Plato touches with serious purpose on nearly all the proposals which Aristophanes had tried to make ridiculous, sometimes expressing himself as if he were the self-nominated champion of the ideal so licentiously burlesqued upon the stage, and even appears to carry the war into the enemy's camp by a vigorous onslaught upon the principles and practice of Athenian comedy (452 C f.).

II.

V 452 D, E. μάταιος δς γελοιών ἄλλο τι ἕγειται ἣ τὸ κακὸν, καὶ ὃ γελοτοποιεῖν ἑπιχειρῶν πρὸς ἄλλην τινὰ ὄψιν ἀποβλέπων ὡς γελοιών ἣ τὴν τοῦ ἀφρονός τε καὶ κακοῦ, καὶ καλοῦ ἀν ἀπονσίαζει πρὸς ἄλλην τινὰ σκοπὸν στηρισμένον ἣ τὸν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.

With this text (that of Paris A) II agrees, except for the trifling error τινὰν ὄψιν for των ὄψιν. The words καὶ καλοῦ ἀν are omitted in Ξ and a few late MSS: in q they are replaced by καὶ οὐ καλοῦ ἀν. There is no other variant of any consequence in the MSS.

The explanation which I have given agrees with that of the Oxford editors except that they do not make ὃ γελοτοποιεῖν ἑπιχειρῶν subject
to σπουδάζει, but to μάταιος, which will therefore have a threefold subject, viz. (1) ὃς—κακὸν, (2) ὃ—κακοῦ, (3) ὃς (understood) καλὸν αὖ σπουδάζει κτλ. I think the view taken in the notes is both grammatically easier and better in point of sense. In any case, however, the sentence must be allowed to be ill-constructed and awkward, although in itself is not enough to justify us in accepting emendations which are far from probable or satisfactory.

The difficulties connect themselves (1) with ὃς γελοίον, (2) with καὶ καλὸν αὖ, (3) with τρός ἄλλον τινὰ σκοπὸν στηρίζομενος. ὃς γελοίον is cancelled by Cobet and Herwerden, and may of course be a gloss on ἄφρονός τε καὶ κακοῦ. The omission of these two words improves the style, but, as they are in all the MSS, it is safer to retain them as a Platonic pleonasm.

As regards καὶ καλὸν αὖ, the introduction of καλὸν (‘beauty’ or ‘taste’) as apparently a sort of duplicate of ἄγαθον seems at first sight unnecessary and irrelevant. But καλὸν appears in the sister passage below (457 B), and I think that καλὸν here makes Plato’s allusion to the Old Comedy somewhat more pointed and telling; for Comedy, like every form of Greek art, might be supposed to aim at τὸ καλὸν. It cannot however be denied that καὶ καλὸν may be an erroneous duplication of καὶ κακοῦ, and in that case the meaning will be ‘and he who attempts to raise a laugh etc. aims seriously also at another goal’ etc., ὃ γελοτοποιεῖν ἐπιχειρῶν being the nominative to σπουδάζει. I formerly felt disposed to take this view.

The expression τρός ἄλλον τινὰ σκοπὸν στηρίζομενος has been taken by Jebb to mean ‘having set himself to some other aim’: cf. Soph. Αντ. 299 τρός αὐξηρὰ πράγμαθ᾽ ἤσποσθαί. The Sophoclean line might justify σταῖς, but surely not στηρίζομενος, which is always I think—except of course where it means ‘having stopped’ (ἀποφεύγειν, ἀποβλέπειν: see Stephanus-Hase s.v.)—transitive in good Greek. My explanation of στηρίζομενος is due to J. and C.: it receives some support from the parallel idiom in 450 B (μέτρον—τοιοῦτον λόγῳ ἰκονεῖν), where see note: but at best we must allow that the participle is somewhat awkward. W. H. Thompson and others expunge the preposition τρός.

The other proposed solutions are as follows: (1) μάταιος ὃς γελοίον ἄλλο τι ἡγεῖται—κακοῦ, ἡ σπουδάζει κτλ. (Bekker, Schneider. There is however no ms authority for ἡ. Schneider also favours Stephanus’ conjecture σπουδάζειν for σπουδάζει.) (2) μάταιος—κακοῦ, καὶ ἂν σπουδάζει (Stallbaum). (3) Hermann bracketed ὃ γελοτοποιεῖν—κακοῦ, καὶ, and (4) Cobet desired to cancel ὃς γελοίον—κακοῦ, καὶ, as well as ὃς γελοίον and καὶ καλὸν αὖ, reading, after κακοῦ, ἡ σπουδάζειν [τρός] ἄλλον τινὰ σκοπὸν <τρός> στηρίζομενος κτλ. (5) μάταιος—κακοῦ, καὶ γελοτοποιεῖν—ἀποβλέπει [ὡς γελοίοιν]—κακοῦ, καὶ [καλὸν] αὖ σπουδάζει [τρός] ἄλλον κτλ. (Herwerden).

There is, it will be observed, a general tendency to omit καὶ καλὸν αὖ, or at least καλὸν. The presence of these words both in Α and in Π carries great weight. I have thought of suggesting μάταιος—κακοῦ καὶ καλὸν αὖ σπουδάζει τρός <ἄλλο>, ἄλλον τινὰ σκοπὸν κτλ. (‘Aims
seriously also at another standard of taste, having set himself another goal,' etc.), or καὶ καλοῦ αὖ σπουδάζει πρῶς ἄλλον τινὰ σκοπόν, <ἄλλον τινὰ σκοπόν> στηρίσμενος κτλ.

III.

V 457 B ἀτελῆ τοῦ γελοίου [σοφίας] δρέπων καρπῶν.

The word σοφίας is in all the mss, but there is no consensus of opinion as to how it should be explained. Schneider translates "die Weisheitsfrucht des lächerlichen," explaining this to mean "fructum sapientiae, quem risor iste quasi de arbore sapientiae suae decerpere, h.e. sapientia sua invenisse sibi videtur." "Plucks from his laughter an unripe fruit of wisdom" is Campbell's translation. Each of these editors therefore understands one of the two genitives as representing the tree—Schneider σοφίας, Campbell τοῦ γελοίου; but neither alternative is satisfactory, although Schneider's gives the better sense. A third possibility would be to make τοῦ γελοίου depend on the negative idea contained in ἀτελῆ (cf. ἀτελεῖς τῆς τοῦ ὄντος θεᾶς Phaedr. 248 B), the sense being that their wisdom or art falls short of τοῦ γελοίου, and so does not attain the end at which Comedy should aim. If the ms reading is to be retained, this explanation seems to me the best, but the relation of the two genitives still remains difficult and obscure. Jackson suggests that the expression may mean "a witcrop of ridicule." To me it appears most probable that σοφίας has been added by some scribe desirous of completing the quotation. See Introd. § 5. Others (Ast, Stallbaum, Herwerden, Hartman) retain σοφίας and omit τοῦ γελοίου, but the interpolation of these words is less easy to explain, and μάταιος δὲ γελοῖον ἄλλο τι ἧγεται ἤ το κακόν in 452 D is strongly in favour of keeping τοῦ γελοίου here. The object of Plato's stricures in both passages is a particular view of τοῦ γελοίου with which he has no sympathy: see on 452 D.

IV.

On Infanticide in the Republic.

The disputed passages are as follows:—

(1) V 459 D, ε δὲ μέν, εἶπον, ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων τοῦς ἀριστοὺς ταῖς ἀρίσταις συγγίγνεσθαι ὡς πλειστάκις, τοὺς δὲ φαυλολάτους τοῖς φαυλο-

tάταις τοῦπαιντον, καὶ τῶν μὲν τὰ ἐκγονα τρέφειν, τῶν δὲ μή, εἰ

mέλλει τὸ ποιμνόν ὃ τι ἀκρότατον εἶναι, καὶ ταῦτα πάντα γεμνόμενα λανθάνειν πλὴν αὐτοῦ τοῦς ἀρχοντας, εἰ αὐτῇ ἡ ἀγέλη τῶν φυλάκων ὃ τι

μάλιστα ἀστασίαστος ἦσσαι.

(2) V 460 C τὰ δὲ τῶν κερόνων, καὶ ἐὰν τὶ τῶν ἐτέρων ἀνάπηρον γίγνηται, ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τε καὶ ἀδήλῳ κατακρύψουσιν, ὡς πρέπει.

(3) V 461 B, C ὅταν δὲ δὴ, οἴμαι, αἰ τε γυναίκες καὶ οἱ ἄνδρες τοῦ

gεννᾶν ἐκβάοι τὴν ἥλικιαν, ἀφήσομεν ποτὲ ἐλευθέρους αὐτοὺς συγγίγνεσθαι
APPENDICES TO BOOK V.

...αν ἐθέλωσι,— καὶ ταύτα γ' ἴδῃ πάντα διακελευούμενοι προθυμεῖσθαι, μάλιστα μὲν μηδ' εἰς φῶς ἐκφερέαν κόψμα μηδὲ ἔν, ἐὰν γένηται, ἐὰν δὲ τι βιάστηται, οὕτω τιθεῖναι, ὡς οὐκ οὕτως τροφῆς τῷ τοιούτῳ.

From these passages it would seem undeniable that Plato contemplates in Book V the exposure of (A) the offspring of inferior guardians, (B) any deformed offspring produced by guardians of the better sort, (C) the offspring of guardians who have passed the limits of age laid down for those who are to produce children for the State. We have no right on linguistic grounds to suggest that τρεφεῖν in (1) and τροφή in (3) are "used in the emphatic sense of educating as Guardians and Auxiliaries" (Nettleship Lect. and Rem. ii p. 174 n. 3. The same explanation has been advanced by others).

Nevertheless, a number of critics, from Morgenstern (de Pl. Rep. p. 228 n. 141) onwards, have taken a different view, and that for two reasons. It is desired, on the one hand, to acquit Plato of sanctioning "a practice so repugnant to modern Christian notions." The argument is irrelevant; and it is a sufficient reply that the practice was widely prevalent in ancient Greece (see Blümner, Privatalterthümer p. 77 n. 1), and expressly enjoined in Sparta on precisely the same grounds on which Plato prescribes it in the Republic (Plut. Lyc. 16. 1). Aristotle also permits infanticide in the case of deformed offspring (Pol. H. 16. 1335b 19 ff.). In point of fact, Plato's abolition of marriage would strike the Greeks as far more revolutionary and offensive than his toleration of infanticide; nor would a legislator who is bold enough to overthrow the institution of marriage, as it is commonly understood, be likely to prohibit the exposure of weaklings, if it seemed to him conducive to the welfare of the State.

The second objection is at first sight more serious. When he is recapitulating the leading features of the Republic in the opening of the Timaeus (19 A), Plato writes: καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε τὰ μὲν τῶν ἀγαθῶν ὑβρεπτέων ἀφαίει εἰναι, τὰ δὲ τῶν κακῶν εἰς τὴν ἀλήθη λαθρὰ διαδοθέων πόλιν τοποθεμομένοιν δὲ σκοπούντες ὑπ’ οὐόντος τάλων ἀνάγεσεν δεῖν, τοὺς δὲ παρὰ σφάλην ἀνάξιον εἰς τὴν τῶν ἐπαινοῦντων χώραν μεταλλάσσειν; Οὕτως. This sentence, taken strictly, asserts that the offspring of inferior guardians in the Republic were to be distributed among the lower classes, but says nothing about the other two classes enumerated above, viz. (B) and (C). The apparent contradiction has been variously explained. Zeller (Phil. d. Gr. 4 11 1, p. 909 n. 2) and others suppose that Plato had changed his view when the Timaeus was written, and this is doubtless possible, especially as nothing is said about the exposure of children in the Laws. The suggestion made by Jowett, that Plato "may have forgotten," surely lacks every element of probability.

A recent chorizontic theory on the subject is deserving of mention. According to Usener and Brandt, the earlier books of the Republic, as

1 Aristotle also understood infanticide to be intended, when, in criticising Plato's community of children, he wrote ἀδηλον γάρ ὁ συνείη γενέσθαι τέκνον καὶ σωθῆναι γενέμενον (Pol. B. 3. 1262a 5).
we know it now, contain material which was originally published separately, and it is to this earlier edition that Aristophanes alludes in the *Ecclesiazusae*. It is further supposed that Plato's recapitulation in the *Timaeus* refers, not to the existing *Republic*, but to the original publication\(^1\), in which, therefore, Plato did not countenance infanticide, but was content merely to degrade the offspring of the inferior guardians. The bulk of the present Book III, according to Usener, formed part of the first edition. Now, in 111 415 b, c Plato does actually propose to deal with unsatisfactory offspring by the method described in the *Timaeus*. His words are εάν τε σφήτερος ἐκγένος ὑπό-χαλκος ἢ ὑποσίδηρος γένηται, μηδενὶ τρόπῳ κατελείφσωσιν, ἀλλὰ τὴν τῇ φύσει προσήκουσαν τιμὴν ἀποδόντες φόρουσιν εἰς δημοουργὸς ἢ εἰς γεωργοὺς, καὶ ἂν ἂν τούτων τις ὑπόγρυφος ἢ ὑπάργυρος φυή, τιμήσαντες ἀνάξουσι τῶν μὲν εἰς φυλακῆν, τοὺς δὲ εἰς ἐπικουρίαν. The cases of deterioration referred to in εάν τε σφήτερος—γένηται do not exactly coincide with any of the three cases for which Plato prescribes infanticide in the *Republic*; but he may have originally applied the milder remedy in dealing also with the offspring of inferior parents (A), as he tells us in the *Timaeus* that he did (ἐφαμεν). The difficulty of keeping down the population may have afterwards induced him to recommend the more drastic course. In the *Laws*, colonization provides an outlet for the surplus inhabitants (740 e); but this expedient is unknown in the *Republic*.

So much for Usener's theory. This is not the place in which to discuss it at length, but we may admit that it provides, though at tremendous and quite unjustifiable cost, an ingenious explanation of the particular difficulty with which we are here concerned. For my own part, I do not think sufficient stress has been laid upon the fact that the reference in the *Timaeus* is not to Book v of the *Republic*, but to 111 415 b, c. That this is so, appears clearly from the words ἐπανέκαθιμένων—μεταλάττειν, which correspond to ἀλλὰ τὴν τῇ φύσει προσήκουσαν τιμὴν—ἀνάξουσι in *Rep.* II. 415 c, but are not echoed anywhere in Book v. It is true that the reference is inaccurate, for 'the offspring of inferior parents' (τὰ τῶν κακῶν) is not quite synonymous with the ἐκγένος ὑπόχαλκος ἢ ὑποσίδηρος of Book III; but it is not more inaccurate than Plato's cross-references often are, even within the limits of a single dialogue. The difficulty which calls for explanation is therefore Plato's silence on the subject of the exposure of children in the summary of the *Republic* which he prefixes to the *Timaeus*, rather than any positive contradiction—if we make allowance for the inaccuracy which I have spoken of—between the two dialogues. How is that silence to be accounted for? Plato may no doubt have altered his views; but his recapitulation in the *Timaeus* is by no means complete even in other respects (see Archer-Hind on 17 b), and I think it much more likely that he omitted this point because it seemed to him, as in point of fact it would have seemed to many, if not most, of his contemporaries, by no means one of the most peculiar and distinctive features of his common-

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wealth. Although Plato says nothing about the exposure of children in
the constitution of the Laws, that is only a second-best polity, and he
nowhere surrenders his earlier ideal (see Laws 739 c ff.). In any case,
we must interpret the Republic by itself: and none of Plato’s own
contemporaries could possibly have read the sentences printed above
without supposing that he meant Infanticide.

V.

V 462 c, δ ὅταν τοῦ ἡμῶν δάκτυλός του πληγῇ, πάσα ἡ κοινωνία ἡ
κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν ταταμένη ἐις μίαν σύνταξιν τὴν τοῦ ἄρχοντος
ἐν αὐτῇ ἔστε τε καὶ πάσα ἀμα ἐπιθέγνησαν μέρους ποιήσαντος ὄλην, καὶ
οὕτω δὴ λέγομεν ὅτι ὥς ἄνθρωπος τὸν δάκτυλον ἄλγει.

The difficulties of this passage have not received sufficient attention
at the hands of editors.

The only textual question is whether we should read τεταμένη or
τεταγμένη. τεταμένη occurs in one ms of Stobaeus (Flor. 43. 102),
and also in Θ and Vind. E, as well as in Ξ. τεταμένη is much better
supported, and has been preferred by former editors.

Schneider, Davies and Vaughan, and Jowett respectively translate as
follows: “die ganze durch den Leib nach der Seele zur Einheit der
Zusammenordnung unter das regierende in ihr” (i.e. der Gemeinschaft)
“sich erstreckende Gemeinschaft,” “the whole fellowship that spreads
through the body up to the soul, and then forms an organized unit under
the governing principle”; “the whole frame, drawn towards the soul as
a centre and forming one kingdom under the ruling power therein.”
They apparently agree in taking τεταμένη both with πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν
and with εἰς μίαν σύνταξιν, although the English translators evade the
difficulty by a paraphrase which can hardly be elicited from the Greek.
It is, I think, difficult, if not impossible, to connect τεταμένη with both
πρὸς and εἰς, and as it cannot be separated from εἰς μίαν σύνταξιν, I
take πρὸς with κοινωνία as in Symp. 188 c. If τεταμένη is right, it
should probably be separated from πρὸς τὴν ψυχήν and understood as
‘strung into a single organization,’ an expression which suggests the
Stoic theory of τῶν (see Stein, Psych. d. Sitt. 1 pp. 73, 74 nm.).
Jowett’s “forming one kingdom” shews an instinctive sense of what
the meaning ought to be. The ambiguity in τεταμένη is however
perplexing, especially in view of ix 584 c αἱ γε διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐπὶ
τὴν ψυχήν τείνουσα—ἡδοναί and Theaet. 186 c ὡςα διὰ τοῦ σώματος
παθήματα ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχήν τείνει, although the general sense of these
passages is somewhat different. Partly for this reason, but more for
that mentioned in the notes, I now prefer τεταγμένη. The translators
agree also in their view of τοῦ ἄρχοντος, which they apparently take as a
sort of possessive genitive, the σύνταξις belonging to the ἄρχων as a
kingdom belongs to its ruler. It is grammatically easier and more
natural to regard τοῦ ἄρχοντος as a genitive of definition; and the sense
also—see note ad loc.—favours this view. If Stallbaum is right in
understanding ἐν αὐτῇ as ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, the Stoic parallel is remarkably
Thus but have parts, all that S. shall think, am little much 'said, believe Greek. 931" laugh death make; to avOpw-n-os about laughter applicable not yeha probable cf. seen. teal el wave Thompson is already also the So the on it itself. I wa-rrep in but hounded likely 13.) xaraxXvaeLV. spray. piXXet 199 is this But strict 199, elpycrerai he merely where it about it of It Alyes. Whether the simile is applicable in all its details may be doubted. The wave is the proposal which Socrates is about to make; the laughter is that of derisive opponents. On a strict interpretation, Plato personifies the wave, and makes it laugh at itself. But a simile should not be hounded to death in this fashion; and the same difficulty is already implicitly involved in γέλωτι κατακλύσεων. The general idea is merely that the proposal dissolves in laughter as a wave in spray. For these reasons, I am inclined, on the whole, to believe that the text is sound. Numerous corrections have been proposed. The reading of γ—εἰ καὶ μέλλει γέλως τε τις ἀτεχνῶς ὁσπερ κύμα καὶ ἀδοξία κατακλύσεων—is doubtless one; it is comparatively tame, but unobjectionable, and was formerly adopted by Stallbaum. Herwarden's proposal is on the same lines: εἰ καὶ μέλλει ἐκγελῶς γέ τις καὶ ἀδοξία ἀτεχνῶς ὁσπερ κύμα κατακλύσεων. (The word ἐκγελῶς is mentioned by Pollux vi 199, but it is not clear that he meant to attribute it to
APPENDICES TO BOOK V.

Plato.) Few will feel themselves able to assent to this; nor is Richards’ ἐκπηδοῦν for ἐκγέλων probable or satisfactory in point of meaning. Excision has also been freely resorted to. In his second edition Ast was disposed to bracket ὁσπερ κύμα ἐκγέλων, and Hartman applauds the proposal. E. S. Thompson (l. c.) would eject ἐκγέλων; but it is difficult to see why such a word should have been added by itself. If excision is necessary, it would be better to cancel the whole phrase ἀτεχνώς—ἐκγέλων as a marginal explanation of γέλωτι κατακλύσεων. This suggestion was made in my edition of the Text, and I still hanker after it at intervals. Another solution has recently occurred to me. If we transpose and write εἰ καὶ μέλλει ἀτεχνώς ὁσπερ κύμα γέλωτι τε ἐκγέλων καὶ ἄδοξία κατακλύσεων, the whole sentence might be translated ‘Spoken, however, it shall be, even although it is likely to swamp us beneath a wave of roaring laughter’—lit. ‘roaring with laughter’—‘and disgrace.’ On this view κύμα is the object of κατακλύσεων, as Ast in his third edition wished it to be, although his emendation γέλων τις ἀτεχνώς ὁσπερ κύμα ἄδοξία κατακλύσεων can hardly be right. (Benedictus’ change of μέλλει into μέλλεις gives the same construction to κύμα.) But it is not possible, I think, to extract this meaning from the Greek without transposition, and such a double transposition is very improbable. On the whole I believe the text is sound.

VII.

V 476 Α καὶ περὶ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ καὶ πάντων τῶν εἰδῶν πέρι ὧν αὐτὸς λόγος, αὐτὸ μὲν ἐν ἔκαστον εἶναι, τῇ δὲ τῶν πράξεων καὶ σωμάτων καὶ ἀλλήλων κοινωνία πανταχοῦ φανταζόμενα πολλά φαίνεσθαι ἔκαστον.

The words καὶ ἀλλήλων are in all the mss. They present no difficulty in point of construction; for it is an error to suppose, as Hartman does, that the subject of φαίνεσθαι is ἔκαστον. The subject is πάντα τὰ εἰδή, with which ἔκαστον is in ‘distributive apposition,’ as usual with this word: see Kühner Gr. Gr. ii p. 245.

If καὶ ἀλλήλων is genuine, there can be no doubt that Plato is speaking of the κοινωνία of εἰδή with one another. It is impossible to take ἀλλήλων in the sense of ἐαυτῶν, and interpret ‘by the partnership of actions and bodies and’ i.e. ‘with’ ‘themselves’ viz. εἰδή. Nor can the words be explained by 479 A, B, for there it is not the εἰδός Beautiful which becomes ugly, but τὰ πολλὰ καλά. It is thought by Stumpf (Verhältniss d. Pl. Gottes zur Idee des Guten p. 49) that Plato means the παρονοσία of two εἰδή in one object, as when a man is both beautiful and just. In such a case there is, no doubt, a sort of κοινωνία between the two εἰδή, but the juxtaposition of ἀλλήλων with πράξεων and σωμάτων shews that the kind of κοινωνία between εἰδή which Plato has here in view is analogous to the κοινωνία between an εἰδός and a πράξις, an εἰδός and a σῶμα, etc. He is thinking, for example, of sentences like ‘The Beautiful is good,’ in which there is κοινωνία
between the two Ideas, Good and Beautiful, just as 'Simmias is tall' is an instance of κοινωνία between a particular body and the Idea of Tallness.

The κοινωνία of ἐπί in Plato's philosophy has been discussed by Bonitz, Plat. Stud. pp. 200 ff., by Jackson in the Journal of Philology xiv pp. 212—218, by Zeller 11 i, pp. 673 ff., and by many other critics. The doctrine in question is sometimes supposed to be a later development, or at all events a 'Weiterbildung,' of the Theory of Ideas. It is explicitly laid down in the Sophist (251a ff.), a large section of which dialogue is an attempt to prove the intercommunion of certain ἐπί. (Of course all ἐπί do not communicate with one another, otherwise every general statement would be true: it is the business of the philosopher to discover which do and which do not unite: Soph. 253c ff. We should therefore distinguish between real or ontological κοινωνία ἐπί and the κοινωνία which we attribute to ἐπί when we predicate one general notion of another: see on 479d. The former is true κοινωνία ἐπί: the latter may be either true or false.) Unless καὶ ἄλληλων is corrupt or spurious, the κοινωνία of ἐπί must be attributed also to the Republic.

In point of fact, according to the Platonic theory of predication, the real and ontological κοινωνία of one ἐπί with others is inevitable, if any true proposition of any kind is to be predicated of the Ideas. And Plato constantly throughout the Republic describes the Ideas by a variety of predicates, such as ὑν, αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ, ἀεὶ κατὰ ταύτα ὦσιν ὡς ἄνδρος ἡμῖν etc. Moreover, the κοινωνία of the Idea of Good with the other Ideas is surely implied in the description of the Good as the cause of Truth and Being in vi 508e ff., although Plato does not himself express the relationship in this way. Such a statement as that 'the ἐπί of ὕκακου is good' is not merely admissible, but necessary, in the metaphysical theory of Books v—vii. And no such statement can be made, unless there is κοινωνία of the Ideas of Justice and Goodness. If it be urged that such a communion of Ideas is open to the objection known as τρίτος ἄνθρωπος, it may be replied 'So is the communion of Ideas and particulars, which Plato certainly maintains in the Republic.' If he was not aware of this objection in the one case, or deliberately ignored or overruled it, why not also in the other? Similarly with the unity of the Idea. The communion of Ideas with Ideas affects their unity just as much or as little as the community of Ideas with particulars. Compare Fouillée La Phil. de Platon i pp. 202—211, and Chiapelli Della Interpretazione panteistica di Platone p. 119. There is accordingly, I think, no reason whatever for holding that Plato in the Republic denied the possibility of κοινωνία between ἐπί, although the full exposition of this difficult and important subject is reserved for the Sophist. We should therefore hesitate before regarding the words ἄλληλων κοινωνία in our dialogue as either spurious or corrupt. Nor can it be said that any of the attempts at emendation is in the least degree convincing. The most elegant, I think, is Badham's ἄλη ἄλλων (accepted by Schmitt Die Verschiedenheit d. Ideenlehre in Pl. Rep. und Philebus p. 3), though ἄλη is somewhat unpleasing. Hart-
man proposes ἄλλων, Bywater (J. Ph. v p. 123) ἄλλα ἄλλων (surely a doubtful piece of grammar), Voegelin the excision of καὶ, Liebhold ἄλλων τολλών. Others will no doubt think of cancelling καὶ ἄλληλων altogether, regarding it as a confused attempt to indicate that the κοινωνία in question is a κοινωνία between 'one another,' i.e. between Ideas on the one hand, and πράξεις or σώματα on the other. I have myself no doubt that the text is sound. Jackson writes as follows: "I believe the text to be right. Plato realizes that Ideas must carry predicates: e.g. μεγάλη σωφροσύνη is a possible phrase. But it has not yet occurred to him that there is any difficulty in thus making one idea 'contain' other ideas. That there is a difficulty in this immanence is not perceived before the Parmenides." I do not feel sure that Plato was unaware of the difficulties involved in this conception even when he wrote the Republic: he may have known but passed them by: nor do I think that the Parmenides is certainly later than the Republic: but I am glad to find that Jackson also holds emphatically that ἄλληλων κοινωνία was written by Plato in this passage.