Plato: Parmenides
An Interlinear Translation with English and Ancient Greek

Juan and Maria Balboa, translators

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We Dedicate This Book
with All Gratitude
to our Dear Friend
and Beloved Teacher
Dr Pierre Grimes

On the one hand, we have had The Good Fortune to have had this book examined in The Ancient Socratic “Round-The-Hearth” Way, through The Vision of our Dear Friend Barbara Stecker; and by the senior members of The Noetic Society; such as Nancy Grimes, Regina Uliana, David Coe, Bill and Rhonda Gilbert, Sarah Wallbank, Julie Hoigaard and Julie Grabel-Postel who have made This Book so much Better by Their Insight and Their Loving Dedication to The Logos, but also on the other hand, with The Boetheia of All Our Friends at The Noetic Society and The Parmenides Group: Jeff Stern, Natasja Dorandi, Nobuya Teraoka, Eldar Iz, Bradley Baumkirshner, Yoni Gileadi, Brian Miller, Jeff Lowe, Josh Bean, Oralia Balboa, Robin Russell, Ingmar Northcutt, Kevin Gray, Alex Dei, Phil Simpkin, Jeff Terrill, Darlene Anderson, Kate Shannon, Sayon Syprasoeuth, Adina Bezerita and also with the Boetheia of those who have moved on to the other place, such as Rod Wallbank, Ken King and Paul Katz.

Juan & Maria Balboa
PLATO

PARMENIDES

[Or Concerning Ideas : Dialectical]

THE CHARACTERS OF THE DIALOGUE
TA PROSWPA TOU DIALOYU
CEPHALOS, ADEIMANTOS, ANTIPHON, GLAUCON, PYTHODOROS
KEFALOS, ADEIMANTOS, ANTIFON, GLAUKON, PYTHODOROS
SOCRATES, ZENO, PARMENIDES, ARISTOTLE
ZOKRATES, ZEHN, PARMENIDES, ARISTOTELIS

Translated by Juan and Maria Balboa, following The Lead of Dr Pierre Grimes

Cephalos: 1 Immediately after we arrived at Athens from Clazomenae, the place of our abode,

126A (1) Επειδή αφικομεθα Αθηναζε εκ Κλαζομενον οικοθεν
we happened to meet with Adeimantos and Glaucon at the place of assembly (the agora);

(2) ενεπιχομεν Αδειμαντω τε και Γλαυκωνι, κατ’ αγοραν:
and Adeimantos, taking me by the hand said . . .

(3) και ο Αδειμαντος λαβομενον μου της χειρος εφη

Adeimantos: Welcome, O Cephalos, and if there is anything Thou needs, of Those

(4) χειρ, ω Κεφαλε, και ει του δει των
we have here, of which we are able to provide, please ask .

(5) τηδε, ον ημεις δυνατοι, φραζε.

Ceph: Then on the one hand, I am certainly here indeed, for this Self,

(6) Άλλα μεν δη παρειμι γε επ’ τουτο αυτο
by being in need of Thine help .

(7) δεησομενος υμων .

Adei: Please tell us, Thine need .

(8) αν λεγοις, την δεησιν .

Ceph: What was the name of the brother of Thine Mother ? For I do not remember .

126B (1) τι ην ονομα το αδελφο υμων τω ομομενω; γαρ ου μεμνημαι.
For at that time he was just a child when I came here before to the assembly from Clazomenae ;

(2) δε το ην που παις οτε δευρο προτερον επεδημησαι εκ Κλαζομενον: but since that time, a great length of time has already taken place .

(3) δε εξ εκεινου, πολυς χρονος ηδη.

But, his father’s name was, Pyrilampes, I believe .

(4) γαρ μεν τω πατρι ονομα, Πυριλαμπης, δοκω.

Adei: Quite so. (Παινο γε.)

Ceph: To be sure, but what about Self ?

(5) γε δε Αυτω ;

2
**Adei:** Antiphon. But what is it that you need most to enquire after?

6. Αντιφων. ἄλλα τι μαλλιστα πυνθανει;

**Ceph:** Thou knowest, that these fellow-citizens of mine, are quite philosophical,

7. Οδ’, τε πολλαι εμαι, εισι μαλλα φιλοσοφοι,

and have heard that this very Antiphon, was frequently present with one Pythodoros,

8. τε ακηκοσαι οτι ουτος ο Αντιφων πολλα εντευχηκε τινι Πυθοδωρω

the companion of Zeno, and that he treasured in his memory The Logos’ Discourses which

126C (1) επαιρω Ζηνωνος, και απομνημονευει τους λογους ους

Socrates, Zeno, and Parmenides had with each other at that time, having been often heard

(2) Σωκρατης και Ζηνων και Παρμενιδης διελεχθησαν ποτε, πολλαις ακουσας

from Pythodoros.

3. του Πυθοδωρου.

**Adei:** You speak the truth.

4. λεγεις Αληθη.

**Ceph:** Now then, we are in need of hearing these Logos’.

5. τοινυν, δεομεθα διακουσαι Τουτων.

**Adei:** But this is no difficult matter to accomplish: for the young man has made Selves

6. Αλλ’ ου χαλεπον, γαρ μειρακιον ον αυτους

the subject of quite focused attention; and indeed after that, he now applies himself very

7. εω μαλα διεμελησεν, γε επει νυν διατριβει πολλα

closely to horsemanship with his grandfather who also has the same name. Then if we must,

8. προς τα ιππικη κατα τον παππον τε και ομονομον. αλλ’ ει δει,

let us go to self; for he just now went home from here; for he lives very near, in Melita.

9. ιομεν παρ’ αυτον: γαρ αρτι οιχεται οικαδε ενθενδε, δε οικε εγγος εν Μελιτη.

**Ceph:** After we had thus spoken, we proceeded to the house of Antiphon; and we found him

127A (1) Ταυτα ειποντες εβαδιζομεν τον Αντιφωντα και καταλαβομεν

at home, handing a bridle to a coppersmith to be prepared in a certain way; but as soon as

(2) οικοι εκδιδοντα χαλινον χαλκει σκευασαι τινα: δε επειδη

the smith was gone, and his brother had told self the reason for which we had arrived, he also

(3) εκεινου απηλαγη τε οι αδελφοι έλεγον αυτω ενεκα ουν παρειμεν, τε

recognized me, in consequence of my former journey to this place, and he greeted us kindly;

(4) ανεγνωρισε με, εκ της προτερας επιδημιας και ηπαζετο,

and upon our pleading with him to relate The Logos’ Discourses, at first, he hesitated

(5) και ημον δεομενον διελθειν τους λογους, το μεν πρωτον οκνειν(οκνεω)

–for he said it was a great deal of work– but afterwards, he most certainly set it out in detail.

(6) γαρ εφη ειναι πολυ εργον– επειτα μεντοι διηγειτο.

Therefore, Antiphon said indeed, that Pythodoros spoke to say …

(7) δε τον Αντιφων εφη δη οτι τον Πυθοδωρον λεγειν . . .

**Anti:** At that time, Zeno and Parmenides arrived to celebrate The Great Panathenaea.

127B (1) ποτε Ζηνων τε και Παρμενιδης αφικοιντο εις τα μεγαλα Παναθηναια.
Thus on the one hand, Parmenides was already quite well advanced in years, very gray-haired, but of a beautiful and good appearance, most nearly about sixty-five years of age; but that on the other hand, at that time, Zeno was nearly forty years old, but very tall and graceful to see; and self was said to have come to be the dear friend of Parmenides. Then Pythodoros said that selves (5) αυτον λεγεσθαι γεγονεναι παιδικα του Παρμενιδου: δε Ποθοδορος εφι αυτους lodged with him, in the Ceramicus, outside the walls; where indeed Socrates also arrived, 127C (1) καταλειψαν παρα τω, εν Κεραμεικω εκτοσ τειχους: οι δη τον Σωκρατη και αφικεσθαι and many certain others with Self, who had set their heart upon hearing the written discourses (2) τε και πολλους τινας αλλους μετ’ αυτου, επιθυμουντας ακουσαι των γραμματων of Zeno; for at that time, selves first began to pay attention to his writings; since Socrates was (3) του Ζηνωνος: γαρ τοτε αυτα πρωτον κοιμισθηναι υπ’ εκεινων: δε Σωκρατη ειναι very young at that time. Therefore, Zeno himself read to selves, while Parmenides (4) φυδρα νεον τοτε ουν τον Ζηνωνα αυτων αναγινωσκειν αυτους, δε τον Παρμενιδην happened to be outside; so that only a small part of The Logos’ still remained to be read, (5) τυχειν οντα εξω: και ειναι παντω βραχυ των λογων ετι λοιπων αναγινωσκομενων, when Pythodoros him self, together with Parmenides came in from outside, and also 127D (1) ηνικα ο Ποθοδορος αυτος τε μετ’ τον Παρμενιδην επεισελθειν εξωθειν και Aristotle who him self became one of the thirty tyrants. So that they still had to hear (2) Αριστοτελες αυτου γενομενον τον των τριακοντα, και ετι επακουσαι some small part of the writings; not however Pythodoros him Self, since he had indeed heard (3) αττα σμικρ’ των γραμματων: ου μην αυτος αλλα γε ακηκοεναι the discourses of Zeno before. (4) του Ζηνωνος προτερον.

2 Therefore, Socrates having listened, he then urged him to read again the first hypothesis (5) ουν Τον Σωκρατη ακουσαντα τε κελευσαι αναγινωσαι παλιν την πρωτον υποθεσιν of the first Logos, and having been read; Socrates said … (6) του πρωτου λογου, και αναγινωσθεις: φαναι

Socrates: In what way do you mean this, O Zeno? If The Beings are Many, is it then 127E (1) Πως λεγεις τουτο, ο Ζηνων; ει τα οντα εστι πολλα, αρα necessary that Selves be both Like and Unlike? But this is certainly impossible. (2) δει ως αυτα ειναι τε ομοια και ανομοια, δε τοιο ει τη αδυνατον:

For it is not possible for The Unlike to be Like nor for The Like to be Unlike? (3) γαρ ουτε ειναι οιον τα ανομοια ομοια ουτε τα ομοια ανομοια;

You do not mean it in this way, do you? (4) ουχ λεγεις ουτω. (For Socrates believes that The Ideas are Separate from Each Other and are not “Woven-together”)
Soc: Is it not the case then, that if it is indeed impossible that both The Unlike be Like
and The Like be Unlike, it is certainly impossible that many should also exist. For if many
were to exist, then they would undergo impossibilities. Is this then, the intention of Thine
logos, and no other one, than to struggle through all arguments, to show that many
do not exist? And does Thou consider each of thine Logos to be a positive proof
of this Self; so that Thou are also led to think that Thou has produced as many
positive proofs, as you have composed Logos', to show that many do not exist?
Does Thou mean it in this way, or do I not understand correctly?

Zeno: No other way. Thou has understood quite well the intent of the whole work.

Soc: I understand, O Parmenides, that Zeno does not only wish to be situated
in the other close bonds of friendship with Thee, but also to agree with thee in the following
writings. For he has written in the very same direction as thou, although, by changing
certain particulars, he endeavors to deceive us that he asserts something different. For on the one
hand, thou says in thine poems that The All Is One, and Thou produces sound proofs
in a beautiful and good way in support of these hypotheses: but on the other hand, he says
in turn, the following: that many is not, and then Self produced very-many and very-mighty
positive proofs. Therefore, on the one hand, Thou affirms that The All Is One, but on the other
hand, he denies that The All is many; and in this way, almost saying the same thing, each one
speaks, so as to appear not to have said the same things. Thus the latter Logos' are revealed
in a way that is above and beyond our way of speaking/understanding.
Zeno: Yes, O Socrates. So it is, but Thou has not perfectly perceived The Truth of my words;
although, just as Spartan hounds, Thou has indeed well pursued and tracked their intent.

But in the first place, this, remains unnoticed by Thee, that the written words are not 

(2) αλλα πρωτον μεν τουτο λανθανει σε , στι το γραμμα ου in every way so venerable, so that it was written, as you say then, with the intention 

(3) πανταπασιν ουτω σεμινυνεται , ωστε γραφηναι απερ συ λεγεις δε διανοηθην 
of hiding from humans, as if I was doing something of great importance; but on the one hand, 

(4) επικρυπτομενον τους ανθρωπους, ως διαπραττομενον τι μεγα : αλλα μεν 

thou has spoken something of those things which happen to be the case, but on the other hand, 

(5) συ ειπες τι των συμβεβηκτων , δε 

The Truth of the matter is indeed that these writings were composed for the purpose of providing 

(6) το αληθες εστι γε ταυτα τα γραμματα 
a certain assistance to The Logos of Parmenides, against those who try their hand at 

(7) τις βοηθεια τω λογω Παρμενιδου προς τους επιχειρουντας 

comically representing Self; by asserting that if One Is, many ridiculous and opposite results 

128D (1) κοιμοδειν αυτων ως ει εν εστι , πολλα και γελοια και εναντια συμβαινει 

happen to The Self Logos. 

(2) πασχειν τω αυτω λογω . 

Truly then, this writing, contradicts the advocates of the many, and 

(3) δε ουν τουτο το γραμμα αντιλεγει τους λεγοντας προς τα πολλα , και 

opposes this and many other such opinions; by being willing to make clear that the hypothesis 

(4) ανταποδιδωσι τουτο και πλειο ταυτα , βουλομενον δηλοντι δε η υποθεσις 

that asserts that many is, will undergo/experience even more absurd consequences, than that 

(5) ει πολλα εστιν , αν πασχοι ετι γελοιοτερα 

which asserts that The One Is; if anyone of SELVES is sufficiently gone through in detail. 

(6) του εν ειναι , ει τις αυτων ικανως επεξειμι (επεξειμι). 

Therefore, it has escaped thine notice, O Socrates, that this Logos, which was composed 

128E (1) ουν λανθανει σε , οι Σωκρατες , στι ταυτη , γεγραφθαι 

by me when I was a youth, through such a thing indeed as the love of contention, and the writing 

(2) εμου υπο οντος νεου , δια τοιαυτην δη 

it Self was stolen by someone, so that I was not able to consult if Self should be brought out 

(3) αυτο εκλεψε (κλεψω) τις , στις ουδε βουλευσαιθα αιτ' αυτο εξοιστεον 

or led into The Light or not. It has escaped Thine notice, I say, that it was not composed by 

(4) εξεγενοτε εις το φως ειτε μη . 

(5) φιλοτιμιας πρεσβυτερου , αλλ' υπο νεου love of contention; although, just as I have said indeed, thou does not conjecture amiss. 

(6) φιλονεικιαις ; επει , οπερ ειπον γ', ου απεικασας κακως.
Soc: 3 I admit it then, and I am Led to believe that the case is just as thou has stated it.
(7) ἀποδεχόμαι Ἀλλ’, καὶ ἡγομαί ως εχειν λεγεις.
But explain to me about the following particulars: Does thou not consider that there is a certain
(8) δε ειπε μοι τοδε : ου νομιζεις ειναι τι
Idea/Species of Likeness, Self According to Self, and another one such as this but opposite,
129A (1) ειδος ομοιοτητος αυτο καθ’ αυτο , και τω αλλο τι τοιουτω εναντιον ,
that is in turn, an Unlike Idea/Species. But that thou and myself, and all the other beings
(2) εστιν αυ ανομοιον ο : δε σε και εμε και ταλλα
which we surely call many, have a Share of These Two Beings? And that on the one hand,
(3) α δη καλουμεν πολλα μεταλαμβανειν τουτοι δυοι οντοι ; και μεν
those that Share of Likeness become like, and according that the degree that such beings may
(4) τα μεταλαμβανοντα της ομοιοτητος γινεσθαι ομοια , και κατα οσον τοσουτω αν
Share in This; but those that Share of Unlikeness become unlike; but that those that Share
(5) μεταλαμβανη ταυτη , δε τα της ανομοιοτητος ανομοια , δε τα
of Both become both? Therefore, if All also Share of both opposite Beings,
(6) αμφοτερων αμφοτερα ; δε ει παντα και μεταλαμβανει αμφοτερων εναντιων οντων ,
and are both like and unlike their Selves by Participating in both; then, what is wonderful?
129B (1) και εστι ομοια τε και ανομοια αυτοις αυτα τω μεταχειν αμφοιν, τι θαυμαστον ;
For if, on the one hand, anyone brings to Light that The Like Selves become Unlike,
(2) γαρ ει μεν τις απεφαινεν τα ομοια αυτα γινομενα ανομοια
or The Unlike Selves become Like, then I think, that it would be monstrously absurd; but if
(3) η τα ανομοια ομοια , ομαι , αν ην , τερας : ει
on the other hand, someone were to bring to Light that those that Participate of Both
(4) δε αποφαινει τα μεταχοντα αμφοτερων
of These Ideas, undergo both of these conditions, then as far as I’m concerned, O Zeno,
(5) τουτων πεπονθοτα αμφοτερα , εμοιγε , ω Ζηνον ,
it does not appear to be out of the ordinary; nor indeed, if anyone would show that All
(6) ουδεν δοκει ειναι ατοπον , ουδε γε ει τις αποφαινει απαντα
are one, by Their Participation of The One, and that these Same Selves are many, in turn,
(7) εν το μετεχειν του ενου και ταυτα ταυτα πολλα αυ
by their Partaking of Multitude/Plurality. But if someone were to show, that This Self which
(8) τω μετεχειν πληθος : αλλ’ ει αποδιαξει τουτο αυτο ο
Is One, is many, and in turn that the many are indeed One; I shall immediately wonder at this.
(9) εστιν εν πολλα και αυ τα πολλα δη εν , ηδη θαυμασομαι τουτο.
And similarly in All the other cases: if on the one hand, someone could bring to Light an
129C (1) και ωσαυτως περι απαντων των αλλων : ει μεν αποφαινοι
argument worthy of admiration; by showing that both the Generic and Ideal Selves undergo
(2) αξιον θαυμαζειν , τε τα γενη και ειδη αυτα πασχοντα
these opposite experiences to Selves. But if on the other hand, someone demonstrates that
(3) ταυτα ταναντια παθην αυτοις: ει δ’ τις αποδειξει
I am both one and many, what would be wondrous about this? And demonstrate this assertion.
(4) εμε οντα εν και πολλα, τι θαυμαστον,
by saying, on the one hand, that when he wishes to bring to Light that I am many, that the parts
(5) λεγον, μεν οταν βουληται αποφαινειν πολλα, ως μεν τα
on the right side of me are other, from those parts on the left, and that the front parts are other,
(6) επι δεξια μου εστιν ετερα, δε τα ετερα επ’ αριστερα, και μεν τα προσωπον ετερα,
from the back parts, and in like manner, the upper from the lower; for I think that I Partake
(7) δε τα οπισθον ετερα, και ωσαυτως ανω και κατω: χαρ οιμαι μετεχω
of Plurality/Multitude. But on the other hand, when he brings to Light that I am one,
129D (1) πληθους: δε οταν εν
he should say that since there are Seven of us, I am one man and Participate of The One,
(2) ερει ος οντον επι το ημον εγω ειμι εις ευθροσπος και μετεχον του ενος
so that in this way he would bring to Light The Truth of both these assertions. Thus if anyone,
(3) ωστε αποφαινει αληθη αμφοτερα: ουν εαν τις
should try to bring to Light that stones and wood and such particulars, are both many and one,
(4) επεξεργασθη αποφαινειν λιθους και ξυλα και τα τοιαυτα, πολλα και εν,
we would say that self exhibits to our view such things as are many and one, but that he does not
(5) εν φισομεν αυτον αποδεικνυαι ταυτα τοιαυτα πολλα και εν,
ou show that The One is Many, nor The Many, One; nor speak of anything wonderful, but we
(6) το εν πολλα υουδε τα πολλα εν, ουδε λεγειν τι θαυμαστον, αλλα’
would agree to that which is affirmed by all. But if on the one hand, anyone would first
(7) ομολογοιμεν απερ παντες: δε εαν μεν τις πρωτον
divide/separate The Ideas apart/separate, Those of which I have just now been speaking, Selves
129E (1) διαπαρειται τα ειδη χωρις, ο εγω δη νυν ελεγον, αυτα
according to Selves, such as Likeness and Unlikeness and Multitude/Plurality and The One,
(2) καθος αυτα, οιον ομοιοιτα τε και ανομοιοιτα και πληθος και το εν
Rest and Motion and all such as These, then reveal himself as being able to Blend-together and
(3) και στασιν και κινησι και παντα τα τοιαυτα, ειτα αποφαινη δυναμενα συγκεραννυσθαι και
Separate-Apart Selves In Them Selves, then I will indeed be in wondrous admiration, Ο Zeno.
(4) διαιρεινσθαι ταυτα εν εαυτοις, εγωσ’ αν θαυμαστος αραμιν, εω Ζηνο.
Thus on the one hand, I am Led to think that we should strenuously labor in the investigation of
(5) δε μεν ηγουμαι πανο ανθρωπος πεπραγματευσαί
these particulars; on the other hand, it would be deserving of much more admiration, if anyone
(6) ταυτα: μεντι’ αν πολυ μαλλον, αγαθειν, ει τις
could solve the following puzzle, as I said, about This (Ousia) Self that is woven-together
(7) αν εψι οδε αποριαι, ως λεγο, την ταυτην αυτην πλεκομενην
Into The Ideal Selves, in-a-manifold-way; just as Thou demonstrated in detail about
130A (1) εν τοις ειδει αυτοις πανοδαπος, ωσπερ επιδειξα δηλθετε
objects we see by the faculty of sight, if Thou could also in the same way, demonstrate in detail
about *The Ideas* which we grasp by *The Activity of The Logos*.

**Antiphon:** 4 Pythodorus said, that on the one hand, when Socrates had said these particulars,
and frequently looked at each other, smiling, as if in admiration of Socrates.

Self believed that both Parmenides and Zeno would be annoyed at each one of them,
whereas on the other hand, They *Offered-up Their Mind* entirely to what Self said,
and that once Self ceased to speak, Parmenides then spoke, saying . . .

**Parmenides:** O Socrates, how worthy of admiration is *Thine Impulse* in *The Pursuit* of
130B (1) οι Σωκράτες, ως αξίως αγαθάθες ει (εμι-Pre-Act) της ορμής επι της

*The Logos*! And tell me, has *Thine Self* thus *Separated* certain *Ideas apart* from *Selves*,
as thou says, on the one hand, and in turn on the other hand, in the same way, *Set apart*
*those that Participate of These*? And does there appear to thee, to be a *Certain likeness* that is
(4) τα μετέχοντα τουτων; και δοκεί σοι ειναι τι ομοιότητος

*Separate* from *Self Likeness*, and indeed a *Certain One/Unity* and Many/Plurality and all other
(such Particulars), which we possess, and of which, thou has just now heard of from Zeno?

(6) οσα ης ημεις εχομεν, δη νυν ηκους Ζηνωνος;

**Socrates:** It does to me indeed.

**Par:** And how about the following ones; is there a *Certain Idea*, like That of *Justice*,
(8) Η και τα τοιαδε, τι ειδος οιον δικαιου

(Eternally) *Self by Self* and also of *Beauty* and of *Good* and all such *Ideas* (by *Selves*)?
(9) αυτο καθ’ αυτο και αυ καλου και αγαθου και παντων τοιουτων;

**Soc:** Yes. (Ναι.)

**Par:** What next then? Is there also an *Idea* of Humans and of *All* The Elements such as
130C (1) Τι δ’; ειδος ανθρωπου και των παντων οιοι

we are composed of; and a *Certain Ideal* Human *Self* and *One* of Fire and *One* of Water
(2) ημεις εσμεν, και τι ειδος ανθρωπου αυτο η πυρος η υδατος

(3) χωρις ημων;

**Soc:** I have certainly often been in dire-straights/puzzled/at-a-loss, O Parmenides,
(4) δη πολλακις γεγονοι Εν απορία, ο Παρμενιδη,
concerning whether it is necessary to speak of Selves, just as we did about Those Ideas,
(5) peri poteron chrē fanei autou, oswper peri ekeinwn
or in another way.
(6) h állous.
Par: And are thou also at-a-loss/puzzled, about the following particulars, O Socrates?
(7) H kai aporete peri tonde o Sókrates,
Whether it is necessary to affirm that there is a Separate Idea/Form/Species of each one of these
(8) eite chrē fanei einai chorfi eidos ekastou touton
which may also appear to be ridiculous, such as of hair and clay and dust, or of anything else
(9) wv kai doxei eina geïolia, oion thri kai pitlos kai rupos h ti allo
which may also appear to be quite without honor and most worthless, by Being Different
(10) atimaton te kai fainoaton, on allo
in turn than those particulars with which we are familiar, or whether it is not necessary?
130D (1) aw toin on omeis metaxhriçometha, eite kai mē;
Soc: On the one hand, I do not affirm that these exist in any other way from these which
(2) men tauta einai Oudaimos alla aper tauta
we do indeed also see; whereas on the other hand, is it not the height of absurdity, insofar as
(3) ouchi toumein einai ti eidos auton. meintoi pote kai hē
troubles me; in regards to whether or not the very same thing, can be affirmed of everything.
(4) ethraze me peri mē tauton ti h pante:
But thereafter, having been fixed in this opinion, I then run-away fleeing, in fear of falling
(5) mē epita ston stw tautē, oichoumi phenon, deiou epeswv
at that time, into a certain abyss of nonsense, and utterly perish. But then, I reach up from
(6) pote eis tina bothon phlariai diapharw. di ouw afikomenvos
those considerations, and again I seriously apply myself to those considerations, concerning
(7) ekseis, pragmatiçemenvos diatribw eis ekeina peri
which, we have just now asserted, whether such Ideas/Forms/Species have to exist.
(8) a dh voun elogomev eidei echin.
Par: That is because Thou are still young, O Socrates, and Philosophy has not as of yet,
130E (1) ei gar eti Neos, o Sókrates, kaifilosofia oups wv eti,
received Thee into Her Embraces. For in my opinion, when Thou are received by Her,
(2) sou antelipetai kata emin douxan, ote antilipetai
Thou will not dishonor any of these Selves; but now since Thou are still young,
(3) oudein atimisseis auton: dé vyn dia eti tin hlikian
Thou looks toward the opinions of human-beings.
(4) apoblepeis pros doxas anérfospov.

～～Are The Ideas Related to Wholes/Parts and Genera/Species ?～～
5 Tell me then, the following. Does it appear to thee, as thou says, that there exist Certain
(5) eite mou sun Tode. dokei sou, wv phs, einai atta
Ideas/Species, of which the other things have a Share, thus keeping The Names of Selves; such as, on the one hand, those that have a Share of Likeness are like; therefore, those that have a Share of Greatness/Magnanimity/Generosity/Magnitude are great/generous/big, whereas on the other hand, those that Share of Righteousness and Beauty come-to-be just and beautiful?

Soc: Entirely so indeed. (Παντὸς γε.)
Par: Now surely, is it not the case then, that each thing which has a Share, either has a Share of The Whole (Genera) Idea or of only a Part (Species)? Or, can there be some other way of Participation/Transference/Succession apart from these Two ways?

Soc: And how could there be? (Καὶ πῶς αὖ;)
Par: Therefore, does it appear to thee, that The Whole Idea, Being One, exists in each of the many, or in what way?

Soc: What is there to prevent The Whole Idea, O Parmenides, to exist in each of them?

Par: Accordingly then, by Being One and The Same in many separate existents, then The Whole is in each at the same time, and in this way Self will be separate from Self.

Soc: It cannot be in this way; but if This Idea were indeed such as The Self is to Daytime, by Being One, It is at-once present in many places and yet Self is in no way more separate from Self; if then in this way, every Idea may also be At-One and The Same in all.

Par: Thou has made, O Socrates, One and The Same aspect present at The Same time, in many places, in a very pleasant way; just as if thou covered-over many humans with a sail. Thus thou says, that there is One Whole, over many.

Or is it not something such as this that thou are Led to say?

Soc: Perhaps. (Ἰσως.)
Par: Then either, will the whole sail exist over each individual, or will one part of the whole self exist over each individual?

Soc: The part. (Μέρος.)

Par: Accordingly then, O Socrates, “these ideal selves” are divisible,

and those that participate can only participate of “parts of selves”; and hence there will no longer be one whole in each individual, but only one part of each.

Soc: It has come to Light in this way indeed.

Par: Or are thou willing then, O Socrates, to affirm to us The Truth, that One “idea”
is susceptible of being divided, and yet “it” will still be One?

Soc: By no means. (Οὐδέποτε.)

Par: For see, that if thou attempts to divide The Great Self, then in that case would it not be revealed to be without-Logos, and that each of The Many that are Great, will be great/big by a “part” (like The Day/sail) of “greatness” that is less than The Greatness of Self?

Soc: Very much so. (Πάνιν γ.’.)

Par: What then? Will each thing, by possessing some “small part” of “the equal”

which is less than The Equality of Self, be equal to another thing by having the part received?

Soc: Impossible. (Ἄδυνατον.)

Par: Then if one of us has a “part of the small”, then in that case The Small of Self will be “bigger” than this, since it is a part of Itself, and thus The Small Self will then be that which is “bigger”; but then on the other hand, this to which the part of The Small will be added and then subtracted, will be smaller, but not greater, than before.

Par: To thee then, O Socrates, in what way are the other existents able to have a Share

(1) προστεθή αφαίρεθη εστάι σιμπροτερον αλλ’ ου μειζόν τη πριν.

Soc: This most certainly cannot come to pass.

(2) τουτο γε ἄν οὐκ γενοῖτο.

Par: σοι οὖν, ὦ Σωκράτες, Τίνα τροπον τα ἀλλα δυναμένα μεταλαμβανειν.
of *The Ideas*, since they are *unable* to do so according to *Parts*, nor according to *Wholes*?

(4) τὸν εἰδόν, μητε κατα μερη μητε κατα ὅλα;

**Soc:** No by *Zeus*, it does not *appear* to me, to be in any way easy to define this in this way.

(5) Οὐ μά τὸν Διά, τὸ οὐ δοκεῖ μοι, εἰναι οὐδαμος ευκολον διορισσασθαι το τοιουτον.

**Par:** What next then? What do you say to this?

(6) Τί δὴ δε; πος εχεις προς τοδε;

**Soc:** To what? (To ποιον ;)

**Par:** I suspect that thou believes each *Idea* to be One from something such as this.

132A (1) Ὑμαι σε οιεισθαι εκαστον ειδος ειναι εν εκ του τοιουτε:

When many particulars *appear* to thee to be great, thou may opine, that by looking

(2) οταν πόλλ’ αττα δοκει σοι ειναι μεγαλα, δοξη ιδοντι

at all of them, One Certain (Common) Ideal Self is found to be *Equally* in their case,

(3) παντα μια τις η ιδεα αυτη ειναι ίσως επι

from whence thou are *Led* to believe *The Great* to be One. (Inferred concept, not *Idea*. PG)

(4) οθεν ήγει το μεγα ειναι εν.

**Soc:** You speak *The Truth* (λεγεις Αληθη .)

**Par:** What then if when thou Sees The Great Self with *The Soul*, and *All*

(5) Τι δ’ εαν επι ιδης το μεγα αυτο τη ψυχη και παντα

The *Other Ideas* that are Great *in a similar way*. Then in turn, will not a Certain Great One,

(6) τα αλλα μεγαλα ωσαντως, αυ ουχι τι μεγα εν

necessarily come to *Light*, through which, *All These come to Light as Great*?

(7) αναγκη φανεσται, ο παντα ταυτα φαινεσθαι μεγαλα;

**Soc:** It seems so. (Εοικεν .)

**Par:** Accordingly then, another offspring idea of *Greatness* will appear, besides

(8) αρα Αλλο γεγονος ειδος μεγεθους αναφανησται, παρ’

*The Great Self*, and also of those that Partake of Self; and besides *all these*, yet another

(9) το μεγεθος αυτο τε και τα μετεχοντα αυτου: και επι πασιν τουτοις ετερον

in turn, through which, all these will appear to be great. And surely then, each of

132B (1) αυ ο παντα ταυτα εσται μεγαλα: και δη εκαστον

thine “ideas”, will no longer be One, but an infinite multitude/plurality.

(2) σοι τον ειδον ουκετι εσται εν, αλλ’ το απειρα πληθος.

~~Socrates the empiricist ?!~~

**Soc:** 6 Then, O *Parmenides*, each one of these ideas is *nothing more than* a conception,

(3) Αλλα, αι Παρμενιδη, εκαστον τουτων τον ειδον μη η νοημα,

and will not *subsist in any place other than* in the proper *Self* in *Souls*; for in this way, each

(4) και εγγινεσθαι ουδαμου αλλοθι η εν προσηκη αυτω ψυχαις: γαρ ουτω εκαστον

will indeed be one; and that which was just now mentioned will not still happen.

(5) αν γε ειτ εν και α δη νυν ελεγετο αν ουκ ειτ πασχοι.

**Par:** What then? Is Each One of These *Intellections/conceptions* One,

(6) Τι ουν; εστι εκαστον τον νοηματων εν

whereas on the other hand, *It Is* an *Intellection/conception of nothing*?

(7) δε νοημα ουδενος;
Soc: But this is impossible.

Par: Hence, It Is a Intellation, of a certain something?

Soc: Yes. (Ναι.)

Par: Of Being or of non-being?

Soc: Of being. (Οντος.)

Par: Will It not Be of One Certain Entity, which that Intellation Intellects

Soc: Yes. (Ναι.)

Par: Then will not This Idea that Is Being Intellected Be One,

Soc: But this possesses no Logos! Nevertheless, O Parmenides, it seems to me indeed,

Par: Furthermore, it is a certain something, or of a certain Idea?

Soc: Of being. (Οντος.)

Par: Will It not Be of One Certain Entity, which that Intellation Intellects

Soc: Of being. (Οντος.)

Par: Of Being or of non-being?

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Par: Then will not This Idea that Is Being Intellected Be One,

Soc: But this possesses no Logos! Nevertheless, O Parmenides, it seems to me indeed,

Par: Furthermore, it is a certain something, or of a certain Idea?

Soc: Of being. (Οντος.)

Par: Of Being or of non-being?

Soc: Of being. (Οντος.)

Par: Will It not Be of One Certain Entity, which that Intellation Intellects

Soc: Of being. (Οντος.)

Par: Of Being or of non-being?
Soc: There is not. (οὐκ ὡς)
Par: Accordingly then, is there not a Great Necessity, that The Relationship
(9) αρ’ δε οὐ μεγάλη ἀναγκή. Τὸ
of like to Like should Participate of One Idea/Species/Paradigm of The Self?
132E (1) ομοιὸν τῷ ομοίῳ μετεχεῖν ενὸς εἰδοὺς τοῦ αὐτοῦ;
Soc: Necessarily. (Ἀναγκη.)
Par: But will not That, through The Participation of which, likes are like
(2) δ’ οὐκ εκεῖνο μετεχοντα. Όν τὰ ομοία ἡ ομοία be The Ideal Self?
(3) τὸ εἰδὸς αὐτὸ;
Soc: Yes, entirely so.(μὲν Πανταπασι οὖν.)
Par: Hence, neither can a (partible) thing Be Like The (Impartible) Idea/Species, nor
(4) αρα τε ὅσιο οἰον τι εἶναι ομοίον τῷ εἴδει, οὐδὲ
The Species Be Like the thing. For if this were not the case, another species will always appear
(5) τὸ εἰδὸς ἀλλὰ. δὲ εἰ μὴ, ἀλλὸ εἰδὸς αἰει ἀναφανησται besides that species; and that species will again become like another; and so a new species
133A (1) παρὰ εκεῖνον αἰαν αὐ τῇ ομοίων τὸ ετερον, καὶ καίνῳ εἰδός would never cease to always come to be, as long as any species becomes like its participant.
(2) οὐδέποτε παυσται αἰει γιγνηται, εἀν τὸ εἰδὸς γιγνηταί ομοίοιο τῷ εαυτῷ μετεχοντι.
Soc: You speak most truly. (λέγεις Ἀλήθεστατα.)
Par: So if the other things do not have a Share of The Ideas/Species through Likeness;
(3) αρα τὰλα. Όσι μεταλαμβανεῖ τὸν εἴδων ομοιοτητι, then it is necessary to seek after something else through which they may have a Share.
(4) ἀλλὰ δεὶ ζητεῖν τι ἀλλὸ ω μεταλαμβανεί.
Soc: So it seems.(Εἰςκεῖν.)
Par: Do you see then, O Socrates, what a great a puzzle arises,
(5) ὅρας οὖν, ὡς Ὑπαρκτεῖς, σοί ἡ ἀπορία if any one defines/delimits/separates The Ideas, as Being Selves according to/by Selves?
(6) εἀν τις διορίζῃ τα ἐιδή ὡς οντα αὐτα καθ’ αὐτα;
Soc: I do, very much so.
(7) Και μαλα.
Par: Now then, know well that thou does not yet grasp how great the puzzle is
(8) τοινυν ισθι ἐν οἴ οὐδεπώ απτει σοί ἡ ἀπορία of Self, as the saying goes, if thou should place Each One Idea of The Real Beings
133B (1) αὐτῆς ὡς ἐπος ειτεῖν εἰ θησίης εκαστον εν εἴδῳ τῶν οντων as always being something that is separate/set-apart.
(2) αἰει τι ἀφοριζομενος.
Soc: What do you mean then? (Πος δὴ);
Par: On the one hand, there are many other puzzles indeed, but on the other hand,
(3) μεν Πολλα ἀλλα και δε the following one, is the greatest. If anyone should say that The Ideas cannot be properly
(4) τοδὲ μεγίστον. εἰ τις φαίη τα εἰδή μηδὲ προσηκειν
known by Self, being Such as we have said They Must Be. It could not even be proven (5) γιγνωσκέσθαι αυτή οντα τοιαυτα οια φαμεν δειν ειναι, αν ουκ εχοι εινδειξασθαι
to anyone, that he is mistaken, if it were not the case, on the one hand, that he who argues that (6) τις οτι ψευδεται, ει μη μεν ο αμφισβητων
it could be proven, happened to be experienced/practiced in a multitude of particulars and who is (7) του ενδεικνυμενου τυχοι εμπειρος πολλων και ουν
not without natural talent, and on the other hand, he should also be willing to follow the proof (8) μη αφυνης δε εθελοι επεσθαι
through many long and elaborate details; but even then, he who contends that Selvses (9) πολλα πανυ και παρρωθεν πραγματευομενου, αλλ’ ο αναγκαζων αυτα
are unknowable, may still remain un-persuaded.
133C (1) ειναι αγνοστα ειη σπιθανος.

Soc: In what way then, O Parmenides?
(2) Πη δη, ο Παρμενιδη;

Par: In a way that I think both thou and any other person, O Socrates, who would (3) τινα Οτι οιμαι και σε και αλλων, ο Σωκρατες, σοις αν
set-up The Ousia of each Idea as Subsisting Self by Self; you must agree (4) τιθεται ουσιαν εκαστου ειναι αυτην καθ’ αυτην, αν ομολογησαι
in the first place, that None of Selvses, Subsist in us.
(5) προτον μεν μηδεμιαν αυτων ειναι εν ημιν.

Soc: For if They did, then how could Their Ousia still Subsist Self by Self?
(6) γαρ Πος αν οτι ειη αυτη καθ’ αυτην;

Par: You speak Well. Is it not also the case, that of The Ideas that exist in relation to (7) λεγεις Καλως. Ουκουν και των ιδεων εισιν προς
Each Other, however many They Are, Maintain Their Self Ousia in relation to Selvses, (8) αλληλας αι οσαι εισιν, εχουσιν την αυται ουσιαν προς αυταις,
but not in relation to Those existing among us; whether in relation to Certain Likenesses, 133D (1) αλλ’ ου προς τα ημιν ειτε ομοιωματα
or in whatever way one may then set Selvses up; and we do Participate of each and every Self, (2) ειτε οτι τις δη τιθ—αυτα—εται, ημεις ειναι μετεχοντες εκαστα
to which we apply some particular name; but on the other hand, that Those Beings that exist (3) ον επονομαζομεθα: δε τα οντα
among us bear the same name as Those, and again Selvses also exist in relation to our selves, (4) παρ’ ημιν ταυτα ομοιωμα αυ αυτα εστιν προς αυτα
but not in relation to Those Ideas; and again Selvses exist in relation to Them Selvses, but not (5) αλλ’ ου προς εκεινως τα ειδη, αυ εαυτων, αλλ’ ουκ
in relation to Those with whom they thus only Share Their Name.
(6) εκεινων οσα ουτως ονομαζεται.

Soc: How do you mean this?
(7) Πος λεγεις;
The LORD-Master-tyrant-δισποτής / SERVANT-Student-slave-δουλὸς Relationship
(Or the lack of It)

Stewardship: Lordship: Good-Steward: Good King Relationship
: : Adapt-Student: Able-Master Relationship
Compared to a deficient copy : : slave : : tyrant

LORD: SERVANT: APOLLO: Socrates
Master: Student: Diotima: Socrates
tyrant: slave: non-lover: victim

Par: Such as, if one of us were The Lord or the servant of any one; then, the one who is
a servant, is certainly not in any way, the servant of That Selfhood of Lordship
of The Lord, nor is The One who is Lord, The Lord of The Selfhood of the servant; but by
being human, they Share in both these human relations. On the other hand, Self Mastership
is That which Is, from Its Relation to Self Stewardship; and Self Stewardship,
in the same way, is Stewardship in Relation to Lordship. Thus the relationships in us
exercise none of Their Power in relation to Those Ideas nor Those in relation to us. Thus
I say that They both Subsist by Selves and also Selves in Relation to Selves; and in a
similar way, Those in us in relation to Them Selves. Or does thou not understand what I say?
Soc: I understand quite well indeed.
(4) μανθάνω Πάνυ γ’.

Mastership: Stewardship: Self Mastership: Self Stewardship

Par: 7 On the one hand, is it not also the case, that if Self Knowledge is
μν καὶ Ποικοῦν αὐτὴ επιστήμη ἐστιν
The Knowledge of That which Is True, then Knowledge would be of That Self?
(6) επιστήμη ὁ ἑστιν αληθεία επιστήμη αν εἰπ τῆς εἴκεινς αὐτῆς
Soc: Perfectly so. (Πάνυ γ’.)
Par: But on the other hand, will every Knowledge, which Is, then in turn,
(7) ἃς τέρον Εκαστὴ τῶν επιστήμων, ὁ ἑστιν, αὐτ’,
Be The Knowledge of Each-one of The Real Beings that Exist; or not?
(8) εἰπ επιστήμη ἑστιν ὁντῶν ἑστιν ἡ οὐ;
Soc: Yes, it will. (Ναὶ.)
Par: But will not The Knowledge among us, be The Truth which exists among us?
(9) δὲ αν οὐ ἡ επιστήμη παρ’ ἑμῖν εἰπ τῆς αληθείας παρ’ ἑμῖν,
And in turn, would not Each Knowledge among us, be a Knowledge of Each of Those Beings/Reason Principles/Relationships that happen to exist among us?

(1) 

οντον συμβανοι παρ’ ηµιν?

Soc: Necessarily so. (Ἀναγκη.)

Par: But certainly, The Ideal SELves, as you indeed agree, we neither possess,

(2) Άλλα µην, τα ειδή αυτα, ως γε οµολογεις, ουτε εχοµεν nor can They exist As Such among us.

(3) ουτε τε ειναι οιον παρ’ ηµιν.

Soc: Certainly not then. (Ὅυ γαρ ουν.)

Par: But Every Genus/Class/Whole of Self is somehow Recognized to be /Known to be

(4) δε τα εκαστα γενη αυτη που Γιγνωσκεται

That which It Is indeed, by means of The Idea of The Knowledge of The Self?

(5) α εστιν γε, υπ’ του ειδους της επιστηµης του αυτου;

Soc: Yes. (Ναι.)

Par: Which Ideal Real Being, we do not indeed possess.

(6) Ο ηµις ουκ γε εχοµεν.

Soc: We do not. (Ου γαρ.)

Par: Accordingly then, not a Single One of The Ideas are Recognized/Known by us,

(7) ορα ουκ γε ουδεν των ειδων γιγνωσκεται υπο ηµιν,

seeing that we do not Participate of Self Knowledge!

Soc: It does not seem likely. (Ουκ εοικεν.)

Par: Therefore, The Beautiful Self, which is also The Good Self and All The SELves

(8) ορα το καλον αυτο ο εστι και το αγαθον και παντα αυτας

which we have surely taken-up as Being Ideas, are also Un-Known by us?

Soc: I am afraid they are. (Κινδυνευει.)

Par: Behold then, this even more fearful consequence.

(9) Ορα δη τουτου επι δεινοτερον τοδε.

Soc: What is it? (Το ποιον.)

Par: Thou will say perhaps, that if indeed there is a Certain Genus/Class of Knowledge,

(10) αν Φαινης που ειπερ εστιν τι γενος επιστηµης

then Self Is much more-Perfect than the knowledge which exists among us; and the same goes

(11) αυτο ειναι πολυ ακριβεστερον η την επιστηµην παρ’ ηµιν, ουτος

for Beauty, and all the other Genera/Classes/Kinds/Wholes.

(12) και καλλος και παντα ταλλα.

Soc: Yes. (Ναι.)

Par: Is it not the case, that if indeed anyone else Partakes of Self Knowledge,

(13) ουκουν ειπερ τι αλλο μετεχει αυτης επιστηµης,

then you will not affirm that anyone Possesses That Most Perfect Knowledge more than God?

(14) αν ουκ φαινης τινα εχειν την ακριβεστατην επιστηµην μαλλον η θεον;

Soc: Necessarily not.

(15) Αναγκη.

Par: Take notice then; is it possible in turn, that The God, can Know of our affairs,

134D (1) Αρ’ ουν εσται οιος αυ τε ο θεος γιγνωσκειν παρ’ ηµιν τα
by Possessing Self Knowledge?
(2) εχον αυτην επιστημην;
Soc: Why not? (Τι γαρ ου);
Par: Since it has been agreed by us, O Socrates, that neither do Those Ideas Have
(3) ουτε εις την ημεραν ημιν, οι Σωκρατες, μητε εκεινα τα ειδη εχειν

The Power which They Possess in relation to Those among us, nor Those among us, in relation
to Those; but that Selves exist in relation to Selves in each realm.
(5) εκεινα, αλλ’ αυτα προς αυτα εκατερα.
Soc: It was so agreed.
(6) γαρ Ωμολογηται.
Par: Is it not so, that if there Is The Most Perfect Mastership among Divinity, and
(7) ουκουν ει εστιν η ακριβεστατη δεσποτεια παρα τω θεω και

The Most Perfect Self Knowledge, then neither will The Mastership of Those Gods Rule
(8) η ακριβεστατη αυτη επιστημη, ουτ’ αν η δεσποτεια εκεινων δεσποσειν
over us at any time, nor Their Knowledge Know of us, nor of any other of our concerns,
(134E) (1) αν ημιν ποτε, ουτ’ αν η επιστημη γνοη ημας ουδε τι αλλο παρ’ ημιν τον,
and in a similar way, we cannot rule over Them by our rule, nor can we Know/Recognize
(2) αλλα ομοιως, ημεις ουκ αρχομεν τ’ εκεινων παρ ημιν τη αρχη ουδε γιγνοσκομεν

That which Is Divine, in any way, through the assistance of our knowledge. And again,
(3) τον θειου ουδεν τη ημετρα επιστημη, αυ
according to The Self/Same Logos, They will neither, be our (Immediate-IFB, Sym 202e-203a)
(4) κατα τον αυτον λογον εκεινοι τε ουτε εισιν ημιν

Rulers (Apology 31a, Phaedo 62b) nor have any Cognition of human affairs (by Self-Knowledge).
(5) δεσποσει τοι νοειν γιγνοσκουσι τα ανθρωπεια πραγματα.

Soc: But then would not The Logos, be wondrous in the extreme,
(6) Αλλα μη ο λογος Αλλα θαυμαστος λιαν
insofar as one were to deprive Divinity of knowing?
(7) η της ει αποστηριησε τον θεον του ειδετε.

Par: Nevertheless, O Socrates, these and very many other consequences besides these,
(135A) (1) μεντοι, οι Σωκρατες, Ταυτα και πανυ πολλα αλλα ετι τουτοις
must be so in relation to The Ideas, if The Ideal Selves of The Real Beings Exist, and if one
(2) αναγκαιον εχειν προς τα ειδη, ει αι ιδεα αυται τον ουνος εισιν και τις
determines that Each One is a Certain Ideal Self; so that one who hears these words is puzzled
(3) οριεται εκαστον τι ειδος αυτο: οστε τον ακουοντα απορειν
and questions whether Selves do exist; or if They do Exist, that They Exist in The Highest
(4) τε και αμφισβητειν ως ταυτα ουτε εστι, τε ει ουτι ειη μαλιστα
Degree, so that it appears abundantly necessary that Selves must be unknown by human nature.
(5) πολλη αναγκη αυτα ειναι αγνωστα τη ανθρωπινη φυσι:
And whosoever speaks in this way, may appear to say something important; and, which
(6) και λεγοντα ταυτα δοκειν λεγειν τε τι, και, ο
we just now said, may be thought of as being an extraordinary statement, by remaining unable to be persuaded. And yet on the one hand, as it falls to The Ability of an Individual of a Very Good Natural Disposition, to be able to learn that there is a Certain Genus of Each Idea, and That of Self Ousia According to/or/In-and-Of Self, so on the other hand, they will deserve - even greater admiration, who having made this Discovery, shall be able to teach yet another person how to thoroughly-well-distinguish all these particulars, in a Sufficiently-Efficient Way.

Soc: I agree with you entirely, O Parmenides, for you speak According to my Intellect.

Par: But nevertheless in turn, O Socrates, if anyone indeed, does not permit The Ideas of Real-Beings to be, by not Keeping their Mind Fixed upon all these recent objections and others like them, and does not Define One of Each Particular/Certain Idea/Genus/Model, surely then, they will have no where to turn their understanding, while they do not allow that The Idea of Each One of The Real Beings Is Always of The Self, and in this way, entirely destroy The Power of Dialectics.

Therefore, in such a way, you also appear to perceive much According to my Mind.

Soc: You speak The Truth.

Par: What then will you do in relation to Philosophy?

In what way will thou Turn thine Mind, if you are ignorant of these Particular/Certain Ideas?

Soc: At the present time, I do indeed appear, not to see in what way at all.

Par: For Prior to Exercising Thyself, O Socrates, Thou should endeavor beforehand to Define what is Beautiful and Just and Good, and Each One of The Ideas. For just now orιζεσθαι τι τε καλον και δικαιον και αγαθον και εκαστον τον ειδον. γαρ πρωην
the following also came to my Mind while hearing Thee Dialoging with Aristotle here. 

Therefore on the one hand, The Impulse, by which Thou are impelled towards The Logos is

Beautiful and Divine -Thou may be sure of that- whereas on the other hand, Thou must also (3) καλή και θεία , ευ ισθι : δε και 

to the multitude, and is called by them ‘empty talk’; for if Thou does not, 

while Thou are still young, The Truth will utterly-elude Thee.

Soc: What then, O Parmenides, is The Way of this exercise?

Par: The Way is just That which thou heard Zeno practicing. Except that I was also 

quite pleased with this that Thou said to him, because Thou would not allow him to look upon 

the wandering that exists among the objects of sight nor upon the wandering that exists

(3) την πλανην εν τοις φρομενοις ουδε 

in relation to them, but to consider according to Those which one can Grasp Especially

by The Logos, and in This Way, one would be Led to See The Ideas.

Soc: For it appears to me, that in this way it may indeed be shown without difficulty,

that The Beings experience both Like and Unlike, and anything else that exists.

Par: Quite rightly indeed. But it is also necessary that, besides this, you should still 

also suppose the following; to consider not only the consequences resulting from the hypothesis, 

whether Each Ideal-Self being hypothesized exists, but also the consequences resulting from

hypothesizing if This Ideal-Self does not exist, if you wish to be more exercised in This Way.

Soc: In what way does thou mean? (Πως λεγεις ;)

Par: Such as, if you should wish to exercise Thy-Self in this same Hypotheses, which

(3) Οιον , ει βουλει περι ταυτης της υποθεσεως ην
Zeno Hypothesized; (1) that if Many (Beings 127E) Exist, what must result both to The Many
(4) Ζήνων ὑπεθέτο, εἰ πολλά εστί, τι χρη συμβαινειν καὶ τοις πολλοῖς
Selves in relation to Selves and in relation to The One, and again if Many (Beings) Exist,
(5) αυτοὶς προς αὐτὰ καὶ προς τὸ εὖ καὶ
what must result for The One in relation to Self and in relation to The Many; and in turn,
(6) τὸ εὖ προς αὐτὸ καὶ προς τὰ πολλὰ: καὶ αὐ
definition if Many do not Exist, to consider what will result both in relation to The One
(7) εἰ πολλὰ μὴ εστὶ, σκοπεῖν παλίν, τὸ ξυμβαίνειν καὶ
to The Many, both in relation to Selves and in relation to Each-Other.
136B (1) καὶ τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ προς αὐτὰ καὶ προς ἀλληλα: And again in turn (2), one should hypothesize, if Likeness Exists, or if It does not exist,
(2) καὶ αὐθὸς αὐς, εἰ ἑαν ὑποθῇ, ἐὰν εἰμι στίς ἡ ἐί, μὴ ἐστὶ,
what will result for each of The Hypothesis, both to The Selves that are being Hypothesized
(3) τὸ ξυμβαίνειν ἐφ’ ἑκατέρας της ὑποθεσάς καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὑποθεθεῖσι
and to The Others, both in relation to Selves and in relation to Each-Other.
(4) καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοίς καὶ προς αὐτὰ καὶ προς ἀλληλα.
And (3) The Self/Same Logos must also be applied to The Unlike, to Motion and Rest,
(5) καὶ ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ αἰτίας καὶ στασέσας
to Generation and Dissolution and to the existence and to the non-existence of Self, and in One
(6) περὶ γενεσεως καὶ φθορας καὶ περὶ του εἶναι καὶ του μη εἶναι αυτου; καὶ εἰν
Logos, concerning That which should be Hypothesized as Always-Being and as not-Being and
(7) λόγῳ (Pro-Tim 168E), περὶ σου εἰ ὑποθῇ ας αἰεὶ συν καὶ ως συν συν καὶ
anything else that undergoes any experience whatsoever, one must consider the consequences
(8) ἄλλο παραχοντος παθος στοιουν, δεί σκοπεῖν τα ξυμβαινοντα
in relation to Self and in relation to each one of The Others being considered, which anyone
136C (1) προς αυτο καὶ προς ἐκαστον εν τοις ἄλλοιν, ὁ τι
to may set-up for this purpose, and in relation to Many, and similarly in relation to Everything.
(2) αν προελη, καὶ προς πλειο καὶ συντως προς ἄλλον ξυμπαντα:
And in turn (4), how The Others are related to Selves and to any Other which one
(3) καὶ αὐ τὰλλα προς αὐτὰ χαὶ καὶ προς τὸ ἄλλο ὁ
may select, whether thou Hypothesizes as the subject of thine Hypothesis That which Always
(4) αν προαιρη, εἀνε ὑποθῇ ας ως ὑπετιθεσο ὁ αἰε ἰ
Is or as non-Being; if you care about being Perfectly exercised to Thoroughly-Behold
(5) ον εἀνε ας μὴ ὁν, ἐι μελλεις τελεος γυμνασαμενος διοψεθαι
The Truth, in a Masterful Way.
(6) το αλληθες κυριως.
Soc: Thou speaks, O Parmenides, of an Extraordinary Study of Realities, and I do not
(7) λεγεις, ο Παρμενιδῆ, Ἀμιχανον πραγματειαν, και ου
quite understand. But why not hypothesize in detail A Certain/Definite Self for me,
(8) σφοδρα μανθανω. ἄλλα το ου υποθεμενος δηλος το αυτος μοι,
in order that I may be more able to understand?
(9) ὅποιον τὸν Ζήνονα γέλασαντα φαναί:

Zeno: We must ask Parmenides him Self, O Socrates. For, as it has been said, it is indeed, no trifling matter. Or does thou not see how great the work is that thou are assigning? Therefore
(5) φανόλον. ἡ σοφίας ἀρχής σοιν ἔργον προστατεῖσις; οὖν
on the one hand, if more of us were present, it would be inopportune to make such a request;
(6) μεν εἰ πλείους ἦμεν ἦν, ἀν οὐκ ἄξιον δεῖσθαι:
for it is inappropriate, and especially for a man of his age, to speak of matters such as these
(7) γαρ ἀπερτίς τε καὶ ἀλλος τῆλικουτω λεγείν τα τοιαῦτα
in the presence of many people. For the many are ignorant that, without This Discursive
Procession and Wandering through All Beings/Cities (Poem-Frag 1), it happens to be impossible
(2) ὁδόν τε καὶ πλανής διὰ παντων εντυχόντα αὖνατον
for Intellect to Hold-on to The Truth (Meno 85C-D). Thus on the one hand, O Parmenides, I
(3) νον σχεῖν τω αληθεί. οὖν μεν, ὁ Παρμενίδη, εγώ
ask in conjunction with Socrates, that Self take-up The Logos, in order that I may also
(4) συνδέομαι Σωκρατεί, αὐτος ἵνα καὶ
thoroughly-hear, which I have heard some time ago.
(5) διάκουσα διὰ χρόνου. Antiphon: 9 Then when Zeno asked this, Pythodorus said, that Self also, and Aristotle,
(6) δὴ Ζήνωνος τοῦ εἰποντος Ταύτα, τὸν Πυθοδώρον φαναί αὐτον τε και τον Ἀριστοτέλη
and the others asked Parmenides, to demonstrate that which he spoke of and not do otherwise.
(7) καὶ τους ἀλλους δείσθαι τοῦ Παρμενίδου, ενδείξασθαι ο λεγει καὶ μη ποιεῖν αλλοσ.

Par: It is necessary to comply with thine request. And yet, I appear to my Self
137A (1) αναγικ πειθεσθαι. καὶ τοι δοκο μοι
to sympathize with the fate of the horse of Ibys, which being a race-horse, and being advanced
(2) πεπονθεναι το του ἐποι Ιβυκείου, ὁ οντι εκεινος αθλήτη και πρεσ-–
in years, when being about to contend in the chariot races, and by knowing the experience,
(3) ὁμερο, μελλόντι ψφ αγονισθαι αρματί και δι εμπειριαν
trembled with fear at the forthcoming event, and to whom, Ibys, comparing him Self, said
(4) τρεμοντ το μελλόν, απεικαζον εαυτον εφή

- And Self being so old is Involuntarily Compelled to Return to The Object of My Love-
(5) καὶ αὐτος ὁν ουτω πρεσβυτης ακον αναγκαζεσθαι εναι εις τον ἐρωτα:
And I also, being as old as I am appear to myself to exceedingly dread the present undertaking,
remembering in what way it is required to swim through such and so great A Sea of Logos’.

For thus it is necessary to take this task in hand, seeing that, it is at the request of Zeno,
and in any case, we are by Selves.

IBYCUS

6th Century B.C.

Eros,

Even now
Looks at me,
From Under Dark Eyelids
With Tenderness
And Casts me
Spellbound
Into Aphrodite’s Nets
Where I lie
Inextricably Caught,

For I Swear
His Mere Approach
Makes me tremble

EROS : Ibycus

Like :

Race : Chariot-horse

An Old Champion Chariot Horse
As he draws
A swift cart/chariot
Unwillingly
To The Race.

Translated by Willis Barnstone
The Norton Book of Classical Literature
W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.
The First Hypothesis

Mindfulness

Experience

Logos

Bridle

Experience

Instruments

Chariot

Wheels/axle

Black

White

Phaedrus 246

Therefore, from where then shall we begin, and what shall we Hypothesize first?

Or if thou wishes, seeing that it certainly appears that we must Play A Reality-Based Game, I must begin from my Self and The Hypothesis of my Self; by Hypothesizing about The One Self, whether One Is, or whether One is not, what must the result be?

For the labor will be very much less, should he answer what he thinks; and his answer, at the same time, will afford me a time for resting from that arduous investigation.

Aristotle: I will attend Thee in this, O Parmenides, for Thou may call upon me.

Par: 10 Well then, if One Is, could not The One Be Many in Some Other Way?

Ari: How could it be many? (πως αν γαρ;) 

Par: Accordingly then, neither Can any Part Belong to Self nor Can Self Be Whole.

Ari: Why not then? (τι δή;) 

Par: Because The Part Is in some way a Part of a Whole.

Ari: Yes. (Ναι.) 

Par: What then of The Whole? Would not That from which no Part Is absent Be Whole?

(3) ουν ποθὲν δὴ αρξέωμεθα καὶ τι υποθησομέθα πρῶτον; 

(4) η βουλέσθε, επειδήπερ δοκεῖ παιζείν πραγματειώδη παιδιάν, 

(5) αρξόμαι απ’ εμαυτού και της υποθησεως εμαυτού, υποθεμένος περι 

(6) τοῦ ενοῦ αυτοῦ, εἰτε εν εστίν εἰτε εν μὴ, τι χρή συμβαίνειν; 

(7) Τις ουν αποκρινεῖται μοι; η ὁ νεωτάτος; 

(8) γαρ αν μᾶλιστ’ πολυπραγμονοι ηκιστα αν αποκρινοῖτο α οιται, καὶ αποκρισις 

(9) αμα αν ειπ εμοι αναπαυλα εκεινω η. 

(10) Εἰκον κτηαίος έναν εν εστίν, αν ουκ το εν ειπ πολλα τι αλλο; 

(4) αρα ουτε δει μερος αυτου ουτε αυτο ειναι ολον. 

(5) το μερος εστιν που μερος ολον. 

(6) Τι δε το ολον; αν ουχι ου μηδεν μερος αν ατη ειπ ολον;
Ari: Entirely so. (πανο γε.)
Par: Therefore from both these consequences The One would Be Composed of Parts.
(7) αρα αμφότερος το εν αν ειη εκ μερων, by Being Whole and by Possessing Parts.
(8) ον ολον τε και εχον μερη.
Ari: Necessarily. (αναγκη.)
Par: Accordingly then, in both ways, The One will Be Many, but Not-One.
137D (1) αρα αμφότερος το εν αν ειη πολλα, αλλα ουχ εν.
Ari: True. (αληθη.)
Par: But It Must indeed, not Be Many, but One Self. (See 142A)
(2) δε Δει γε μη ειναι πολλα αλλα εν αυτο.
Ari: It must. (δει.)
Par: Accordingly then It will neither Be Whole nor Possess Parts, if The One “Is to Be” One.
(3) αρα ουτε εσται ολον ουτε εξει μερη, ει το εν εσται εν.
Ari: It will not. (ου γαρ.)
Par: Is it not so then, that if It Possesses No Part, then neither Can It Possess a Beginning
(4) ουκουν ει εχει μηδεν μερος, ουτ' αν εχοι αρχην nor Middle nor End; for those such as these would already Be Parts of Self?
(5) ουτε μεσον ουτε τελευτην: γαρ τα τοιαυτα αν ηθη ειη μερη αυτον.
Ari: Rightly so. (ορθους.)
Par: And certainly The Beginning and End Are indeed The Limit of Each Part?
(6) και μην αρχη και τελευτη γε περας εκαστου.
Ari: How could they not? (πος δ' ου;)  
Par: Accordingly then, The One is Unlimited, if It Possesses either Beginning or End?
(7) αρα το εν απειρον, ει εχει μητε αρχην μητε τελευτην.
Ari: Unlimited. (απειρου.)
Par: Accordingly then, It Must also “Be” without Figure/Form/Shape,
(8) αρα και ανευ σχηματος:
for It Can neither Participate of The Circular nor of The Straight/Rectilinear.
137E (1) γαρ αν ουτε μετεχει στρογγυλου ουτε ευθεος.
Ari: How is this the case? (πος;)  
Par: For The Circular Is indeed that in which The Extremities Must Be
(2) στρογγυλον εστι γε τουτο ου τα εσχατα αν in every way Equally distant from The Middle.
(3) πανταχ' που ισον απεχει απο του μεσου.
Ari: Yes. (Ναι.)
Par: And The Straight Is indeed that in which The Middle
(4) και ευθυ γε μην η ου το μεσον Is situated in line with both The Extremes?
(5) πιπροσθεν αμφοι τοιν εσχατοιν.
Ari: It is so. (ουτως.)
Par: It is not the case then, that The One will then Possess Parts and Be Many,
(6) ουκουν το εν αν εχοι μερη και αν ειη πολλ' by Participating of either a Straight or of a Round Figure?
(7) μετεχει ειτε ευθεος ειτε περιφερους σχηματος.
Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ μεν ουν.)
Par: Accordingly then, It is neither Straight nor Round, seeing that It Possesses No Part.
138A (1) αρα εστιν ουτε ευθυ ουτε περιφερες, επειπερ εχει ουδε μερη.
Ari: Rightly so. (ορθος.)
Par: And certainly, by “Being” Such, It will indeed exist in-no-way-whatsoever,
(2) Kαὶ μὴν ὁν τοιουτον ἀν γε εἰῃ οὐδάμου: for It will neither exist In-Another, nor In-It-Self.
(3) γαρ αν ουτε εἰῃ αν αλλάο ουτε εν εαυτῳ.
Ari: How so? (πως δῆ;) Par: For on the one hand, by Being In-Another, It would somehow Be Circularly
(4) γαρ μὲν ὁν εν αλλα αν που κυκλω
Comprehended by That in which It Is, and would Be touched by Self in many places.
(5) περιεχοτο ὑπ’ εκεινον εν ω ενειν, και αν απτοτο αυτου πολλοις πολλαχου:
Thus on the other hand, it is also Impossible, that The One which “Is” also Partless, and
(6) δε και αδυνατον του ενος τε και αμερους και
which does not Participate of The Circle, to Be touched in a circular way, in many places.
(7) μη μετέχοντος κυκλου απετσθαι κυκλω πολλαχη.
Ari: Impossible. (αδυνατον.) Par: But surely, if Self were indeed In-It-Self, then Self would also Contain It-Self,
138B (1) αλλα μην αυτο ειῃ εν εαυτω και περιεχον εαυτω
and if indeed, by Being no other than Self, Self would Be In-It-Self;
(2) και ειπερ ον ουκ αλλο η αυτο, ειῃ εν εαυτω:
for it is Impossible that anything not be Contained by That in which it is.
(3) γαρ αδυνατον τι μη περιεχοντι τω εν ειναι.
Ari: For it is impossible. (γαρ αδυνατον.) Par: Is it not so then, that on the one hand, The Self that Contains Is One Certain Aspect,
(4) ουκουν αν μεν το αυτο περιεχον ειῃ ετερον τι,
while on the other hand, That which is Being Contained is Another? For The Same Whole
(5) δε το περιεχομενον ετερον: γαρ ταυτον ολον
can indeed not, be both acted upon (Passive) and also be The Creative Principle (Active),
(6) γε ου αμφω πεισται και ποιησει
and in this way, The One would no longer be One, but Two At-One.
(7) και ουτω το εν αν ετι ειῃ εν αλλα δυο αμα.
Ari: For then it would not. (γαρ ουν ου.) Par: Therefore, The One Is Not Anywhere, by Being Neither In-It-Self nor In-Another.
(8) αρα το εν εστιν ουκ που ενον μητε εν εαυτω μητε εν αλλω.
Ari: It is not. (ουκ εστιν.) Par: 11 Observe then, if It Has to Be Understood in such a way as this;
(9) Ὑπ’ δη ει εχον οιον ουτως
then It Is either Remaining-Stationary or Being-Moved.
(10) εστιν τε εσταιναι η κινησθαι.
Ari: Why then could it not? (τι δη γαρ ου;) Par: Because indeed That which is Moving, will either Move-in-place or
138C (1) στι γε κινουμενον αν η φεροιτο η change-from-place-to-place; for these alone, are the types of Motion.
(2) αλλοιοιτο: γαρ αυται μοναι κινησεις.
Ari: Yes. (ναι.) Par: But if The One were to in any way undergo alteration of-or-from-It-Self,
(3) δε το εν που αλλοιουμενον εαυτου
then it is **Impossible** that It could still **Remain One**.

(4) αδυνατον ετι εν.

**Ari:** Impossible. (αδυνατον.)

**Par:** Accordingly then, It will indeed not Be **Moved** according to alteration.

(5) αρα γε ουκ κινεται κατ’ αλλοιωσιν.

**Ari:** It has come to Light that it will not (.φαινεται ου.)

**Par:** But will It then Be **Moved in-place**?

(6) αλλ’ αρα φερεσθαι τω;

**Ari:** Perhaps (.ισαω .)

**Par:** And certainly, if The One Is **Moved in-place**, then Self will either

(7) και μην ει το εν φεροιτο, αυτω αν ητοι

Be Carried around in-a-circle, or It will Change from-one-place-to-another.

(8) περιφεροιτο εν τω κυκλω η μεταλλαττοι εξ ετεραι χωραι ετεραις.

**Ari:** Necessarily so. (αναγκη.)

**Par:** Therefore on the one hand, That which is Being Carried around in-a-circle, must

(9) ουκουν μεν περιφερομενον κυκλω αναγκη

**Stand-firm** in The Middle, and have the other Parts of It-Self Carried around The Middle.

(10) βεβηκεναι επι μεσου, και εχειν τα αλλα μερη εαυτου φερομενα το μεσον.

But on the other hand, by what device would it Be fitting for That which has neither Middle

138D (1) δε τες μηκανη προσηκει τουτο ω μητε μεσου nor Parts to ever Be Carried in-a-circle about The Middle?

(2) μητε μερον ποτενεχθηκαν κυκλω επι του μεσου; 

**Ari:** By none at all. (ουδεμια .)

**Par:** But surely then, by changing place, It would become situated elsewhere, 

(3) αλλα δη αμειβον χωραι γινεται αλλοτ’ αλλοθι and Be Moved in this way?

(4) και κινεται ουτω;

**Ari:** In this case it would most certainly indeed. (ειπερ γε δη.)

**Par:** Is it not the case then, that it has been declared Impossible, on the one hand,

(5) ουκουν εφανη αδυνατον μεν for Self, to Be, in-anything at all (@138B)?

(6) αυτω ειναι εν τινι που;

**Ari:** Yes. (ναι .)

**Par:** Take notice then, is it not still even more Impossible that It become in-anything?

(7) Αρ’ ουν ετι αδυνατωτερον γιγνεται ;

**Ari:** I do not grasp in what way, you mean this. (ουκ εννοοω οτη.)

**Par:** If anything comes to Be in-anything, is it not Necessary

(8) ει τι γιγνεται εν τω, ουκ αναγκη

that it should neither yet Be in-that, since it is still coming to Be;

(9) μητε πο εν εκεινω ειναι ετι εγχινουμενων, 

nor yet can it Be entirely out-of-that, since then, it would already have come to Be?

(10) μητ’ ετι πανταπασιν εξω εκεινου, επερ ηδη εγχινουμενων;

**Ari:** Necessarily. (αναγκη.)

**Par:** Then if this can take place in something else, then it Must Only happen to That which

138E (1) αρα ει τοτε αν πεισεται τι αλλο, μονον πασχοι εκεινο ου

has Parts; for One Part of Self will already Be in-That Whole, but Another Part will Be

(2) ειτη μερη: γαρ το μεν αυτου αν ηδη εν εκεινω τι, δε το ειτη
At-Once, out-of-That Whole, whereas That which has No Parts Cannot in any way Be Wholly-within, nor again, Wholly-without anything, at the same time.

At-Once, out-of-That Whole, whereas That which has No Parts Cannot in any way Be Wholly-within, nor again, Wholly-without anything, at the same time.

Par: But is it not even much more Impossible that That which has neither Parts nor happens to Be Whole to become in any way; since It can neither exist in a state of becoming according to Parts, nor according to a Whole?

Ari: True. (αλήθη .)

Par: Therefore, The One does not Change place by going Anywhere and by becoming in-anything, nor by Being Carried around in-that which Is Self, nor by undergoing any Alteration.

Ari: It does not seem likely. (οὐκ εοικεν.)

Par: Accordingly then, The One “Is” Immoveable according to every kind of Motion.

Ari: Immoveable. (ακινητὸν.)

Par: But we have certainly indeed also said that it is Impossible for Self to Be in-anything. (γάρ φαμέν .)

Ari: We have said so. (γὰρ φαμέν .)

Par: Accordingly then, It cannot ever Be in-That which Is Self.

Ari: Why then? (τί δή .)

Par: Because then Self would already Be in-That, in which Self Is.

Ari: Entirely so. (παν υπεν οὐν.)

Par: But Self was also found to Be such that It Can neither Be in-It-Self nor in-Another.

Ari: It cannot. (οὐ γάρ οὐν .)

Par: Accordingly then, The One Is never in The Self.

Ari: It does not seem likely. (οὐκ εοικεν.)

Par: But most certainly, since It can never Be in The Self,

Ari: For it is not such that it can be. (γὰρ τε οὐ οἰον .)

Par: Accordingly then, The One, as it is likely, neither Stands-still nor Is Moved.

Ari: It certainly does not appear to be so. (γε οὐκουν φαίνεται δὴ .)

Par: It will certainly not indeed Be The Same, neither with-The Other
nor with It-Self, nor in turn will It Be Other, neither from-Self nor from-Another.
(6) οὐτε εαυτῷ, οὐδ’ αὐτόν εἰς ετερον οὔτε αὐτοῦ οὔτε ετερῷ.
Ari: In what way then? (πη δῆ;)
Par: For if on the one hand, by Being in any way Other than It-Self,
(7) μέν αὐτόν οὐτε αὐτοῦ οὔτε ετερόν εαυτῷ
then It would Be Other than One, and so It would Be Not-One.
(8) αὐτόν οὔτε ετερόν ενός καί αὐτόν οὔτε ετερόν εαυτῷ.
Ari: True. (ἀληθῆ;)
Par: And most certainly by Being The Same with-Another, It would Be That;
139C (1) καὶ γε μην οὖν ταὐτον ετερόν αὐτόν ἐν εἰς εκεῖνον,
thus It could not Be Self; so that neither in this way could It “Be” just as It “Is”, One,
(2) δ’ αὖ οὖν εἰς αὐτόν: ὡστε οὐδ’ οὕτως αὖ ἐνοίκατε επερ εστίν, εὖ,
but Another One. (ἀλλ’ ετερον ενός.)
Ari: It could not. (οὐ γαρ οὖν.)
Par: Accordingly then, on the one hand, It will not Be The Same with-Another, or
(3) αὖ οὖν εἰς ταὐτον ετερῷ η Ε autre than It-Self. (ετερον εαυτου.)
Ari: For It could not. (γαρ οὖν.)
Par: But on the other hand, surely It will not Be Other from-Another, so long as
(4) δὲ γε αὖ οὖν εἰς ταὐτον ετερόν ετερῷ, εὖς
and in so far as It “Is” One. For it is not Proper for One to Be Other than anything,
(5) η εὖ. γαρ οὐ προσηκεῖ ην εἰς ετερῳ τινὸς,
but Simply Other, but not in any way Other from-Another.
(6) αὖ οὖν τοῖς επερ ην οὐδενί αὖ οὖν ετερῷ.
Ari: Properly so. (ορθῶς.)
Par: Thus on the one hand, It will not Be Other since It “Is” One; or what do you think?
(7) αὖ οὖν εἰς ταὐτον ετερῷ ην οὐδενί η εἰς οἷον;
Ari: Not in any way at all. (οὐ δήτα.)
Par: But surely if not by reason of this, then It will not Be Other from-It-Self; but if Self
139D (1) αὖ οὖν εἰς ταὐτον, οὖν εἰς ταὐτον ετερον: δὲ εἰ αὐτό
is not at all Other from-Self, then by Being in no way Other, Self will Be Other than-Nothing.
(2) οὐδὲ μην αὐτῷ: δὲ οὖν μηδαμίη ετερον αὐτῷ ετερον οὐδενός.
Ari: Rightly so. (ορθῶς.)
Par: Nor yet will It Be The Same with-It Self.
(3) οὐδὲ μην εἰς ταὐτον εαυτῷ.
Ari: Why not then? (ποις οὐ δή;) Par: Surely The Nature of The One is not in the same way as Self and of The Same.
(4) δῆτοι φύσει τοι ενός οὖ ταῖς ηπερ αὐτῇ καὶ τοι ταὐτῷ.
Ari: Why then? (τι δή;) Par: Since when anything Comes to Be The Same with-anything it does not Become One.
(5) οτι επειδὴ τίς ἑνητίκη ταὐτῷ τῷ εἰς οὐκ ὑγνεῖται εὖ.
Ari: But what then indeed? (αὖλα τί μην;) Par: What Becomes The Same with-The Many Must Come to Be Many but not One.
(6) γενομένον ταὐτον τοῖς πολλοῖς αναγκή γινεσθαι πολλὰ, ἀλλ’ οὐχ εὖ.
Ari: True. (ἀληθῆ;) Par: But if The One and The Same Differ in no way, then when anything Becomes
(7) αὖ οὖν εἰς το εὖ καὶ τοι ταὐτον διαφέρει μηδαμίη, οποτε τί εἰγνετο
The Same, it will always Become One, and when it Becomes One, it will Be The Same.
(8) ταὐτον, εἰς εἰς εἰγνετο εὖ, καὶ οποτε εὖ, ταὐτον.
Ari: Entirely so indeed. (πανύ γε.)

Par: Accordingly then, if The One Is to Be The Same with-It-Self, then It will Be,

139E (1) αρα ει το εν εσται ταυτον εαυτω, εσται
That which is Not-One with-It-Self. And in this way One Being will Be Not-One;
(2) ουχ εν εαυτω και ουτω εν ου εσται ουχ εν:
but certainly, this is indeed Impossible. Accordingly then, it is also Impossible for The One
(3) αλλα μην τουτο γε αδυνατον: αρα και αδυνατον το ενι
to Be either, Other from-The Other or The Same with-It-Self.
(4) ειναι η ετερον ετερον η ταυτον εαυτω.
Ari: Impossible. (αδυνατον.)

Par: So in this way The One will not Be Other or The Same with-Self nor with-Another.
(5) δι ουτω το εν αν γε ουτε ειναι η ταυτον αυτο εντεν αν ετερω.
Ari: For thus it could not. (γαρ ουν ου.)

Par: Surely then, The One will neither Be Like nor Unlike anything,
(6) μην ουδε εσται ομοιον ουδε ινομοιον τινι
neither in relation to It-Self nor in relation to Another.
(7) ουεν εαυτω ουθ ετερω.
Ari: Why not then. (τι διη;) 

Par: Because The Like Is That which Is affected in some way by The Same.
(8) στι ομοιον πεπονθος που το ταυτον.
Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: But it was shown that The Nature of The Same Is indeed Separate from The One.
(9) δε εφανη την φυσιν το ταυτον γε χωρις του ενος.
Ari: It was so shown. (γαρ εφανη.)

Par: But certainly, if The One would experience/undergo anything Apart from Being One,
(1) αλλα μην ει το εν πεπονθε τε χωρις του ειναι εν,
then It would experience to Be More than One, but this, is Impossible.
(2) αυτε πεπονθοι ειναι πλειω η εν, δε τουτο αδυνατον.
Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: Accordingly then, it is not in any way possible for The One to experience
(3) αρα εστιν ουδαμος το εν πεπονθος
Being The Same; neither with-Another nor with-It-Self.
(4) ειναι ταυτον, ουτε αλλω ουθ εαυτω.
Ari: It has not come to Light.
(5) ου φαινεται.

Par: Therefore, it Is Not Possible for Self to be Like, neither to-Another nor to-It-Self.
(6) αρα ουδε δυνατον αυτο ειναι ομοιον ουτε αλλω ουθ εαυτω.
Ari: It does not seem likely. (ουκ εοικεν.)

Par: Most certainly then, neither can The One experience Being Another;
(7) γε μην ουδε το εν πεπονθεν ειναι ετερον:
for in this way, It would also experience to Be More than One.
(8) γαρ ουτω αν και πεπονθοι ειναι πλειω η εν.
Ari: For then It would be more. (γαρ πλειον.)

Par: Most certainly then that which undergoes Being Other than-It-Self or Another,
(1) μην γε το πεπονθος ετερον η εαυτον η αλλου
will Be Unlike either It-Self or Another, if indeed That which experiences The Same Is Like.
(2) αυτε αν ειναι ομοιοιν η εαυτω αλλω ειπερ το πεπονθος ταυτον ομοιον.
Ari: Rightly so.

ορθος. 

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Par: But The One, as it is indeed likely, *by not experiencing in any way*

(3) δὲ τὸ εὖ ὡς γε εἰσικυν, οὐ— πεπονθὸς—δὰμος

*Being Other*, “Is” neither *Unlike It-Self* nor *Another*.

(4) ἐπερεν ἐστὶν οὐθ’ ἀνομίοιον εαυτῷ οὐθ’ ετέρῳ.

Ari: For thus it cannot. (γὰρ οὐν οὐ .)

Par: Accordingly then, *The One* will neither *Be Like* nor *Unlike*.

(5) ἀρα ἐν αν οὔτε εἰ ομοιον οὔτε ἀνομίοιον

neither *to-Another* nor *to-It-Self*.

(6) οὐθ’ ετέρῳ οὔτε εαυτῷ.

Ari: It has not come to *Light*. (οὐ φαίνεται.)

Par: And most certainly then, by “Being” *Such*, It will neither *Be Equal* nor *Unequal*.

(7) Καὶ γε μην ον τοιοτον οὔτε εσται ισον οὔτε ανισον

neither *to-It-Self* nor *to-Another*.

(8) οὔτε εαυτῳ οὔτε ἀλλῳ .

Ari: In what way? (πτ ?)

Par: For on the one hand, if *It* were *Equal*, *It* would *Be of The Same/Self Measures*

(9) μὴν ἡ ἰσον αν εσται των αυτων μετρων

*with-that-to-which* *It Is Being Equal*.

(10) εκαίνω ω ον ίσον.

Ari: Yes. (ναι .)

Par: But on the other hand, by *Being* in some way *Greater* or *Lesser* than *that-to-which*

140C (1) δὲ ον που μειζον η ελαττον μεν οις

*It Is Commensurate*, *It* will have *more Measures* than the *lesser*, but *fewer* than the *greater*.

(2) αν ξυμμετρον, μην εξει πλειω μετρα των ελαττονων, δε ελαττω των μειζονων .

Ari: Yes. (ναι .)

Par: But to *those-to-which* *It would not be Commensurable*, on the one hand, *It* will have

(3) δ’ οις αν μη συμμετρον, μην εσται

smaller Measures than some, but on the other hand, *greater Measures* than others.

(4) σμικροτερον των δε μειζων μετρων των .

Ari: How could it not. (πως γαρ ου ;)

Par: Is it not *Impossible* then, for *That* which does *not Participate* of *The Self*

(5) ουκουν αδυνατον το μη μετεχον του αυτου to either *Be of The Same/Self Measures*, or *of anything else* of *The Same/Selves*?

(6) η ειναι των αυτων μετρων η αλλων εντινωνου των αυτων ;

Ari: It is impossible . (αδυνατον .)

Par: Accordingly then, on the one hand, *It will neither Be Equal to-It-Self*,

(7) αρα μην αν ουτε ειη ισον εαυτω

nor *to-Another*, by not *Being of The Same/Self Measures*.

(8) οὔτε ἀλλῳ, μη ον των αυτων μετρων .

Ari: It does indeed not appear to be so. (ουκουν γε φαίνεται .)

Par: But most certainly then, by *Being of more* or *fewer Measures* *It will also Be*

(9) ἀλλα γε μην ον πλειονοιν η ελαττονοιν μετρον, αν και ειη

of as many *Parts* as there are *Measures*; and in this way it will again, no longer “Be” *One*,

140D (1) τοσαυτων μερων, οσονπερ μετρον, και ουτως αν ουκετι εσται εν ,

but *Be as many as there are also Measures*.

(2) ἀλλα τοσαιτα οσαιτα και τα μετρα .

Ari: Rightly so. (ὁρθως .)

Par: But if indeed *It* would *Be of One Measure, It would Become Equal to That Measure*.

(3) δε ει γε ειη ενος μετρου, αν γιγνοιτο ισον τω μετρω :
But this has come to Light that it is impossible; that Self be equal to anything.

(4) δὲ τοῦτο ἐφανῇ ἀδύνατον, αὐτὸ εἶναι ἰσὸν τῷ.

Ari: It has so come to Light. (γὰρ ἐφανῇ .)

Par: Accordingly then, it will neither participate of one measure, nor of a

(5) ἀρὰ ὑπὸ μέτρου εὐς μὲ τὸν πολὺν ὄντε ὑπὸ few; for that which in no way participates of the self, can ever be equal, as it is likely,

(6) ὅλγον τοῦ ὑπὸ παραπάν μέτρου τοῦ αὐτοῦ ποτὲ εἰσίν ἰσον, ὡς εἰσίν, to-It-Self nor to-Another, nor in turn be greater or lesser than-It-Self nor than-Another.

(7) εἰς τὸ ὑπὸ ἀλλὰ: οὐδὲν μὴν ὑπὸ ἐπάντων ὑπὸ εἶναι εὐτέρου ἐπὶ ἐπτέρου.

Ari: It is thus said in every way. (μὲν οὖν ὑπὸ πανταπασί.)

Par: 12 What next then? Do you believe that The One has to possess the power

140E (1) Τι δὲ; ὁ δὲ τὸν ἐχεῖν δύνατον to be older or younger or of the Self/same age?

(2) εἰς τὸ προσβῆτερον η ὑπὸ τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν;

Ari: Is there any reason why not? (δή γὰρ τί οὐ;) 

Par: Since on the one hand, if it somehow has the Self/same age as self, or as another,

(3) οὐ τὸ μὲν που ἐχον τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν τὴν αὐτή, η ἀλλὰ then, it will participate of the equality and likeness of time; of which we said,

(4) μὲθέξην ἰσότητας καὶ ὁμοιότητας χρόνου, ὅσον εὐκρόμεν

The One, did not participate; that is, of neither likeness nor equality.

(5) τὸ εἰς υἱὸ μετείην οὐθὲ ὁμοιότητας ὑπὸ ἰσότητας.

Ari: Yes, we said that. (οὐν γὰρ εὐγρόμεν.)

Par: We also said, that it certainly does not participate of unlikeness nor inequality.

(6) καὶ εὐκρόμεν καὶ μὴν καὶ στὶς τοῦτον οὐ μετείην ἀνωμοιοτήτας τὸ καὶ ἀνισότητας.

Ari: By all means. (παντὸς μὲν οὐν.)

Par: How then, by “Being” of such a nature, can it be either older

141A (1) πῶς οὖν εἶναι ὑπὸ τὴν πολὺς οὐν εἰστὶν ἡ προσβῆτερον or younger or of the Self/same age as such a thing that has to be?

(2) η νεώτερον τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐχεῖν;

Ari: In no way, whatsoever! (οὐδαμῶς.)

Par: Accordingly then, the One, could not indeed be younger nor older

(3) ἀρ’ τὸ εἰς αὐτὸ γῆς νεώτερον οὐδὲ προσβῆτερον nor have to be of the self/same age as self or another.

(4) οὐδὲ ἐχον τὴν αὐτὴν ἡλικίαν αὐτὸ ὑπὸ ἀλλὰ.

Ari: It has not come to Light. (οὐ φαινεῖται.)

Par: Take notice then, neither can it be possible for the One to be in time, at all,

(5) αρ’ οὖν οὐδὲ αὐτὸ δύνατ’ τὸ εἰς αὐτὸ γῆς νεώτερον to the One to be in time, then in that case,

(6) εἰ εἶναι τοιοῦτον; εἶναι τι η ἐν χρόνῳ

Must not self, necessarily, for all time be growing older than self.

(7) οὐκ αὐτὸ αὐτὸ αὐτὸν αἰεὶ γινεῖσθαι προσβῆτερον αὐτοῦ;

Ari: Necessarily. (αὐτὸν.)

Par: Is it not so then, that the older is indeed always growing older than the younger?

(8) οὐκ οὖν προσβῆτερον γῆς αὐτὸ προσβῆτερον νεώτερον;

Ari: Certainly. What next? (μὴ τι;) 

Par: Therefore, that which is growing older than it self, is also at the same time

141B (1) αρὰ το γιγνόμενον προσβῆτερον εἰς τοιοῦτον καὶ ομα growing younger than it self, if indeed it must possess that which it grows older than.

(2) γιγνεῖται νεώτερον εὐτέρου, εἰπερ μελλεῖ ἐχεῖν οὕτω γιγνεῖται προσβῆτερον.
Ari: What do you mean? (πως λέγεις.)
Par: The following; it is in no way necessary for One which is Different from another
(3) οὐδὲ: οὐδὲν δὲι εṭερὸν διαφορὸν ετεροῦ
to Become Different, by Being already Different. Thus on the one hand, by Being already
(4) γιγνέσθαι οντὸς ἡδή διαφοροῦ, ἀλλὰ μὲν οντὸς ἡδή
Different from that which Is already Different. Whereas, on the other hand, it will have
(5) τοῦ εἶναι ἡδή, δὲ γε-
Become Different from that which has Become Different, and furthermore it Is going to Be
(6) γόνεναι του γεγονοῦς δὲ μελλόντος
Different from that which will come to Be Different; whereas that which Is in the process of
(7) τοῦ μελλέντος δὲ τοῦ γε-
Coming to Be Different, can neither have Become Different, nor Be about to Be Different,
(8) νομενου ουτε γεγονεναι ουτε μελλειν
nor Be at all Different, but it must simply Come to Be Different, and not Be in another way.
(9) ουτε εἶναι πο διαφορον, ἀλλὰ γιγνεσθαι οὐκ εἶναι ἀλλος.
Ari: Necessarily so. (αναγκή γαρ.)
Par: But certainly, That which Is Older is simply a Difference/Distinction/Otherness
141C (1) ἀλλὰ μὴν το πρεβυτέρον εστὶ γε διαφοροτης
in relation to the Younger, and to nothing else.
(2) νεωτέρου καὶ οὐδένος ἀλλου.
Ari: So it is. (γαρ εστι.)
Par: Accordingly then, That which Is Becoming Older than It-Self, Must Necessarily,
(3) αρα το γεγομενον πρεβυτερον εαυτου αναγκη
at the same time, also Become Younger than It-Self.
(4) αμα και γιγνεσθαι νεωτερον εαυτον.
Ari: It seems likely. (εοικεν.)
Par: But surely neither can It also Come to Be in more nor less Time than It-Self; whereas
(5) αλλα μην μπητε και γιγνεσθαι πλειω μητ’ ελαττω χρονον εαυτου, ἀλλα
It Must Be and Become and have Become and Be about to Be for an Equal Time with It-Self.
(6) ειναι και γιγνεσθαι και γεγονεναι και μελλειν εσεθαι τον ισον χρονον εαυτω.
Ari: For this is also necessarily the case. (γαρ ταυτα και αναγκη ουν.)
Par: Therefore, it Is Necessary, as it is Reasonable, that Each Self that Exists in Time
141D (1) αρα εστιν αναγκη, ας εοικεν, οσα εκαστον αυτο εστι εν χρονω
and which indeed Participates of such an Existence, has to Be of The Self/Same Age
(2) και γε μεταχει του τοιουτου, ειχει την αυτην ηλικιαν
as Self, and at the same time, also comes to Be Older and Younger than Self.
(3) αυτω τε αμα και γιγνεσθαι πρεβυτερον και νεωτερον αυτου.
Ari: That is likely to be the case.
(4) κινδυνευει.
Par: But surely, The One, Cannot indeed, Participate of such experiences.
(5) αλλα μην το ενι ουδεν γε μετην των τοιουτων παθηματων.
Ari: It cannot so participate. (ου γαρ μετην.)

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Par: Accordingly then, Self does not Participate in Time, nor does It Exist in any Time.

Ari: Surely then, such cannot be the case, as The Logos surely proves.

Par: What then? Does it appear that “Was” and “has Become” and “Was Becoming”,
not signify the Participation of Time at some period that has come to Be in The Past?

Ari: Indeed it does.

Par: What then? Does “Will Be” and “Will come to Be” and “Will Be coming to Be”,
not signify Time hereafter, at some period in The Future?

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: But surely then, does not That which “Is” and That which “Is Becoming” signify
Time which Is Now, Present?

Ari: By all means. (παντως μεν ουν.)

Par: Accordingly then, if The One, does not Ever Participate of Time in any way at all,
then neither has It ever come to Be, nor was coming to Be, nor was,
not have come to Be, nor will have come to Be, nor will It ever Be.

Ari: Most True!

Par: Therefore, is it possible for It to Participate of Ousia,
in any other way other than according to any one of those ways?

Ari: It is not possible.

Par: Accordingly then, The One in no way whatsoever Participates of Ousia.

Ari: It is not likely.

Par: Accordingly then, The One, in no way whatsoever, Is.

Ari: It has not come to Light.

Par: Accordingly then, neither Is It, in such a way, so as “To Be” One,
for It would already Be, by Being and by Participating of Ousia; whereas According
to The Logos, The One Is neither One nor Is, if one Must Trust in such a Logos.
(15) εοίκε το εν εστίν ουτε εν ουτε εστίν, ει δει πιστεύειν τοιοθε δογμά.
Ari: I dare say so.
κινδύνευει.
Par: But, could any non-Being Be of Self, of The One which Is Not,
142A (1) δε, αν τι μη οντι ειη αυτου, ο εστι μη,
or could any non-Being Belong to This Self? (Not According to 137D : Pierre Grimes
(2) η το τουτω αυτω; “Self must Be One”)
Ari: And how could it?
και πως;
Par: Accordingly then, there Is neither Name, nor Logos, nor any Knowledge
(3) αρα εστιν ουδ’ ονομα ουδε λογος ουδε τις επιστημη
nor perception, nor opinion, that can be attributed to Self.
(4) ουδε αισθησις ουδε δογμα αυτω.
Ari: It has not come to Light.
ου φαινεται.
Par: Accordingly then, neither can It Be named, nor Be spoken of, nor Be opined of
(5) αρα ουδ’ ονομαζεται, ουδε λεγεται ουδε δοζαζεται
nor Be The Object of Knowledge, nor do The Real Beings have a perception of Self.
(6) ουδε γινομενοιται ουδε των ουνων τι αισθανεται αυτου.
Ari: It is not likely.
ουκ εοίκεν.
Par: Therefore Is it Possible that these conclusions have to Be in this way about The One?
(7) ουν δυνατον ταυθ’ εχειν ουτως περι το εν;
Ari: To me at least, it certainly does not appear to be in this way.
(8) εμοιγε ουκουν δοκει.
On the one hand, it appears that Aristotle is indeed following
The Reasoned Account/Logos of Parmenides,
but on the other hand, he refuses to believe, let alone Trust The Same Reasoned Account!
For how can anything possess anything, if first of all it does not possess Being nor existence???

How about, THE VERY CAUSE of Ousia Her Self;
“TRANSCENDANT IN DIGNITY AND POWER” -Republic 509b-
The Second Hypothesis

The One That Is

The Book of TAO

XV. The Wise Ones of Old

had Subtle Wisdom and Depth of Understanding;

They were so Profound that They could not be Understood;

And since They could not be Understood,

then They must necessarily be Described in the following way:

Cautious; Like crossing a Wintry Stream . . .

Lin Yutang, The Wisdom of China and India, edited by JFB

Par: 13 Does thou wish then, that we Return again to The Hypothesis from The Beginning, 142B (1) Βουλεῖ οὖν επανελθομεν πάλιν επὶ τὴν υποθέσιν εξ αρχῆς, to See if anything of Another Kind may come to Light for us who are Returning?

(2) εαν τι αλλοιον φανη ήμιν επανιουσιν;

Ari: By all means then, I do so wish.

πανυ μεν ουν ’ουλομαι.

Par: Is it not the case, that if we say “One Is”, then we must go through The Same Logos

(3) ουκουν ει φαμεν εν εστιν, διομολογητέα

about these following conclusions about/of Self, whatever they happen to Be; or is it not so?

(4) περι ταυτα τα συμβαίνοντα αυτου, ποια τυχανει οντα, ουχ ουτω;

Ari: Yes it is so, (Ναι.)

Par: See then from The Beginning. Accordingly then on the one hand, if One Is,

(5) ορα δη εξ αρχης. αρα μεν ει εν εστιν,

Can Self Be such as It Is, while on the other hand, It does not Participate of Ousia?

(6) αυτο ειναι οιον τε, δε μη μετεχειν ουσιας;

Ari: It could not be so. (ουχ οιον τε.)

Par: And is it not the case, that The Ousia of The One Could Not Be The Same Being

(7) και ουκουν η ουσια του ενος αν ου ειη ταυτον ουσα

as The One; for if That Were Not The Ousia of That One, then neither Could This One

(8) τω ενι, γαρ εκεινη αν ην ου ουσια εκεινου, ουδ’ αν εκεινο το εν

Participate of That, for then to say “One is” would also be like saying “One One”, 142C (1) μετεχειν εκεινης αλλ’ λεγειν εν ειναι αν τε και ην ομοιον εν εν .

Whereas our Present Hypothesis is not This (First) One; that is; “What Must “Be” the result

(2) δε νυν η υποθεσις εστιν ουχ αυτη, τι χρη εμβαίνειν
ti χρη ξυμβαίνειν

if One “is” One?” but “What Must Be the result, if One Is”. Is it not so?

(3) ει εν εν, αλλ’ ει εν εστιν, ουχ ουτω ?
Ari: It certainly is so.

Par: Is it not the case, that That which Is, signifies Something Different than The One?

Ari: Necessarily. (αναγκη.)

(From the 1st Intelligible Triad, 1246 (P6) Proclus Commentary on The Parmenides Book 8)

Par: Take notice then, that whenever anyone says that One Is, that another way

142C (6) αρα ουν στι επειδαι τις ειπη στι εν εστιν, αλλα η
to say this concisely, would be; “The One Participates of Ousia”.

(7) το λεγομενον του τυληβηδην αν ειη το εν μετεχει ουσιαζ.

Ari: By all means indeed, (πανυ γε.)

Par: Surely then, let us say again, what will happen “If One Is”. Consider then,

(8) δη λεγομεν παλιν τι συμπεςται, ει εν εστι. σκοπει ουν
if it is not Necessarily the case, that This Hypothesis signifies The One Being,

(9) ει ουκ αναγκη ταυτην την υποθεσιν σημαινειν το εν ον
in such a way, as to Possess/Contain Parts/Members (Whole Parts such as Head, Torso . . .)!

(10) τιουτον οιον εχειν μερη;

Ari: How? (πως ;)

Par: In the following way. If That which Is, is said to Belong to The One Being,

142D (1) οδε : ει το εστι λεγεται του ενος οντος
it will also mean that, The One Belongs to The Being of The One. Whereas, it is not the case

(2) και το εν του οντος ενος, δε εστι ου
that both The Ousia and The One Are The Self, since both Belong to That Self which

(3) τε η ουσια και το εν το αυτο, δε του εκεινου αυτου ου
we hypothesized; such as The One Being. Accordingly then, on the one hand, Must not

(4) υπεθημεθα , του ενος οντος, αρα μεν ουκ
The One Being, Necessarily Be The Whole Self, whereas on the other hand,

(5) εν ον αναγκη ειναι το ολον αυτο δε
The One and That which Is Have Come into Being as Parts of This Whole (ET 116, 152)?

(6) το εν τε και το ειναι γινεσθαι μορια τουτου;

Ari: Necessarily. (αναγκη.)

Par: Then shall we call Each of These Parts, simply a piece, or Must The Part

(7) ουν ποτερον προσερωμεν εκατερον τουτων των μοριων μονον μοριον ,η μοριον
be called, at the very least, a Member/Part of The Whole?

(8) προσρητεγου το γε μοριον του ολου;

Ari: Of The Whole. (του ολου .)

“Snatch All The Wine-Members, and Lead Them to Me!” -Orpheus-

(From the 2nd Intelligible Triad, 1247 (P8) Proclus Commentary on The Parmenides Book 8)

Par: And since It Is One which Is also a Whole, It will Contain a Part.

142D (9) και αρα εστιν εν , η και ολον αν εχει μοριον.

Ari: By all means indeed. (πανυ γε .)

Par: What then? Can each of These Parts of The One Being; both The One

(10) το ουν ; αρα εκατερον τουτων των μοριων του ενος οντος , τε το εν and
and The Being abandon each other, so that neither The One be a Part of The Being, nor

142E (1) και το αν απολειπεσθον , η το εν ειναι μοριον του . η
The Being be a Part of The One ?

Ari: That could not be. (ουκ ἂν εἰη)

Par: Therefore, once again, Each of These Members, Maintains/Has both The One
The Being, so that The Least Part in turn becomes a Part composed of The Two,
and The Self/Same Logos Is Always According to This Way, so that whenever
a Part comes to be, This Relationship Is Always Maintained with The Part: For it Is Always

So that it is Necessary that The Two Members Always Come to Be, but Never only one.

Ari: By all means, it is so!

(2) πανταπασι μεν ουν.

(The 3rd Intelligible Triad, 1248 (P12) Proclus Commentary on The Parmenides Book 8)

Par: Is it not the case, that in This Way The One Being will be Unlimited Multitude?

Ari: It is likely.

(4) εοικεν.

(The 1st Intelligible & Intellectual Triad of Gods, 1250 (P29) Proclus Commentary Book 8)

Par: Surely then, let us proceed again in the following way, even further.

Ari: In what way? (πη ;)

Par: We say that The One Participates of Ousia, on which account, One Is?

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: And because of this, it was indeed brought to Light that The One Being is Many.

Ari: It is so. (ουτως ;)

Par: What next? What of The One Self, which we surely say Participates of Ousia.

Ari: One, at least, I think. (one or two, three, four or five? compare to 155E 3rd Hypo)

Par: Surely then let us See. On the one hand, must not The Ousia of Self Be/Exist

In-One-Certain-Way, whereas on the other hand, Self Is Different, if indeed

(2) τι ἀλλο δὲ αυτο ετερον, εἰπερ
The One Is Not Ousia, but is Seen as Being One, by Participating of Ousia.

Par: Is it not the case, that if on the one hand, The Ousia Is Different, then in that case, the Ousia is neither by The One of The Ousia that The One Is Different, nor by The Ousia of The One that Is, that The Ousia is Other, but by That which is Different and also Other, that They are Different from Each Other.

Ari: By all means so. (πάντα μὲν οὖν)

Par: So that That which Is Different Is not The Same with either The One nor The Ousia.

Ari: How is this the case? (πῶς γὰρ;) Par: How then you ask? If you wish that we make a Selection of Selves; such as either

143C (1) Τὸ οὖν; εἰκὸν ουσίαν εἰτε of The Ousia and The Other/Different, or, of The Ousia and The One, or (2) τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ εἴτε τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸ εἴτε of The One and The Other, accordingly then, is it not the case, that in either way that (3) εἴτε τὸ εἴτε τὸ εἴτε, ἀρ’ οὐκ ἐν τῇ εἰκόσι we may choose, we are choosing a certain Duality, which can Correctly be called, Both?

(4) προσαρρεσθείς προσαρρεσθείς τὸν (dual) ὦ εἴκει οὕτως καλεῖσθαι αμφοτέρω; Ari: How? (πῶς;) Par: In the following way. Is it possible to say Ousia?

(5) οὐδὲ: εἴτειν εἰκόσιαν; Ari: It is. (ἔστιν.)

Par: And in turn, is it possible to say One?

(6) καὶ αὐθικὴν εἰκόσιαν εἰκόσια;

Ari: This also. (τοῦτο καὶ.)

Par: Take notice then, have we not spoken of Each One of The Two Selves?

(7) ἀρ’ οὖν οὐχ εἰρηστεί εἴκατερον [dual] αὐτοῖν; Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: What about when I say Ousia and One, have I not accordingly mentioned Both?

(8) τὰ δ’ οὖν εἰκόσια τὸ εἴτε καὶ εἴτε, οὐκ ἀρα αμφοτέρω; Ari: By all means indeed. (πάντα γε.)

Par: Is it not the case then, that if there is Both Ousia and Other, or Both

(9) οὐκοῦν εἶχον καὶ οὐσία τε καὶ εἴτε καὶ εἴτε Ousia and One, then in this way, I speak of Each Pair, in every way, as Both?

(10) εἴτε καὶ εἴτε, καὶ οὕτω λέγω ἐφ’ εἴκατερον πανταχως αμφότερος; Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: If Both of which have been Named Correctly; then on the one hand, can it

143D (1) ἀν αμφότερον προσαρρεσθείς οὕτως, δ’ μὲν αρα possibly be the case, for Self to be Both, and on the other hand, not be Two?

(2) οὖν τε αὐτοὶ εκάκοι αμφότερος, δὲ μὴ δύο; Ari: It cannot exist in such a way.

οὐχ οὖν τε.
Par: Concerning which, if Two should exist [ητον-subj.dual for ειμι], then could Each One
of The Two Selves Exist by some (Divine) Resource/Efficacy/Design and not be One?

Ari: Not in any way! (ουδεμιστε.

Par: Accordingly then, seeing that Each of These Pairs turns-out to be a Couple,
so that Each Pair would also be One Couple.

Ari: It has so come to Light, (φαινεται.

Par: But if Each of The Selves, Is One, by Adding-together [from συντιθημι] whatsoever
Yoked-Pair (Phaedo 71c) to any One, would not All The Yoked-Pairs Become Three?

Ari: Yes. (ναι.).

Par: But is not Three an Odd Number and Two an Even Number? 1

Ari: How could they not be; (πως δ’ ου);

Par: What next then? By Being Two, 4

143E (1) τι δε; οντον δυοιν 6

is it not Necessary, that Twice, also Exists, 8

(2) ουκ αναγκη δις και ειναι 9

and by Being Three, Thrice, if indeed Two, First-Arises from Twice The One
(3) και οντον τριον τρις ειπερ τω δυο υπαρχει τε δις το εν
and Three, First-Arises from Thrice The One?
(4) και τω τρια τρις το εν;

Ari: Necessarily. (αναγκη.)

Par: Then, by Being Two and Twice, is it not also Necessary that Twice-Two Exist?
(5) δε οντιν δυοιν και δις ουκ αναγκη δις δυο ειναι;

and in turn by Being Three and Thrice, is it not Necessary that Thrice-Two also Exist?
(6) και αυ τριον και τρις ουκ αναγκη τρις τρια ειναι;

Ari: How could they not? (πως δ’ ου;) 1

Par: What next then? By Being Three and Twice and by Being Two and Thrice,
(7) τι δε; οντιν τριον και φιλων δις και οντιν δυοιν και οντιν τρις;
is it not Necessary, that Twice-Three and Thrice-Two Exist;
(8) ουκ αναγκη δις τρια τε και τρις δυο ειναι;

Ari: It is altogether so indeed. (πολλη γε.)

Par: Accordingly then, there would also Exist Even-Times Even and Odd-Times Odd
144A (1) αρα αν τε ει αρτιας αρτια και περιτταις περιττα
and Odd-Times Even and Even-Times Odd.
(2) και περιτταις αρτια και αρτιας περιττα.

Ari: It is so. (εστιν αυτω.)

Par: Therefore, if These Aspects have to Be in this way, can you think of any Number
(3) ουν ει ταυτα εξει ουτως, οιει τινα αριθμον
that has been left out, which does not Necessarily Exist?

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Ari: Not in any way indeed. (ουδαμως γε.)

Par: Accordingly then, if One Is, then also, Number has to Necessarily Exist.

Ari: Necessarily. (αναγκη.)

Par: Then certainly, if Number Is, then Many would also Exist,

Ari: By all means indeed! (και παντω γε.)

Par: Is it not the case then, that if All Number Participates of Ousia,

Ari: Yes! (ναι.)

Par: Accordingly then, The Ousia has been Distributed to All Beings

144B (1) αρα η ουσια νενεμηται (νεμω) Επι παντον οντα

which are Many, and will not abandon a Single One of The Real-Beings, neither The Least

(2) πολλα και αποστατει ουδενος των οντων, ουτε του σιμικροτατου

Ari: It has to be so. (εξει ουτω.)

Par: Accordingly then, The Parts/pieces of Her Self Are very Many.

Ari: Very many indeed. (πλειστα μεντοι.)

Par: What follows then? Is there any one of These Selves which Exists, on the one hand,

Ari: And how can this come to be? (και πος αν τουτο γενοιτο;)!

Par: But surely if it is indeed the case, then I suspect, that it Must Always Be the case, that

Ari: as long as Self is such as It Is, It Must Indeed Be a Certain One; and so It cannot be nothing.

[The Second Member of The Yoked-Pair/Couple : The Dividing Power of Number. Pierre Grimes]
Ari: Necessarily. (αναγκη.)
Par: Therefore, The One, Is Present with Each and Every Part/piece of The Ousia
(7) αρα το εν προεστι προς τω εκαστω απαντι μερει της ουσιας
by not abandoning any Part/piece, neither small nor Great, nor any other Singular Part.
(8) ουκ απολειπομενον μερους ουτε σμικρουτερου ουτε μειζονος ουτε αλλοι ουδενος.
Ari: It is so. (ουτω.)
Par: Therefore, can One Being Be a Whole that Exists in Many Ways/Places At-Once?
144D (1) ουν αρα εν ον ολον εστι πολλαχου αμα;
(2) Consider this. (αθρει τουτο.)
Ari: But I do consider it and I “see” that it is impossible.
αλλ' αθρω και ορω στι αδυνατον.
Par: Accordingly then, One Being has been cut-up in pieces. if indeed It Is not Whole
(3) αρα μειρεσιμενον ειπερ μη ολον:
for in no other way at all, can It Be Present with All The Parts/pieces of The Ousia
(4) γαρ ουδαμοι αλλος που παρεστι απασι τοις μερεσιν της ουσιας
other than by existing in a cut-up/scattered state. (At-Once like The Harmonic Inter-dependant)
(5) η μειρεσιμενον. Parts in a Homogeneous Whole and in the pieces of
Ari: Yes. (ναι.)
mud, hair, dust in The Living-Body of The All. jfb)

~~~ Indivisible Beings/Parts as opposed to divisible pieces~~~
Par: And most certainly then, that which is partible Must Be as many as its pieces.
(6) και γε μην το μεριστον αναγκη ειναι οσαπερ πολλη τοσαυτα μερη.
Ari: Necessarily. (αναγκη.)
Par: Therefore we did not just now speak The Truth, when we said that The Ousia was
(7) αρα ουν αρτι λεγοντες αληθη ελεγομεν ως η ουσια
Distributed into very many Parts. For She is not Distributed into more Parts than The One is,
144E (1) εινε μειρεσμενη πλειστα μερη. γαρ ουδε μειρεσται πλειο του ενος,
but as it is likely, She Is Equal to The One. For The Being does not abandon The One, nor
(2) αλλ' ως εοικε, τοσα το ενι. γαρ το ον ουτε απολειπεται του ενος ουτε
does The One abandon The Being; but Always Subsist as Two Parts Equalized Through All.
(3) το εν του οντος, αλλ' αει οντε δυο εξισουσθον παρα παντα.
Ari: It has come to Light entirely in this way. (φαινεται πανταπασιν ουτω.)
Par: Accordingly then, The One Self, has been Distributed by The Ousia
(4) αρα το εν αυτο κιεκερματισμενον υπο της ουσιας
which is both Many and also Unlimited Multitude.
(5) εστιν τε πολλα και απειρα πληθος.
Ari: So it has come to Light. (φαινεται.)
Par: Accordingly then, not only Is The One Being Many, but it is also Necessary
(6) αρα ου μονον εστιν το εν ον πολλα, αλλα και αναγκη
that The One Self which is Distributed by The Being to Be Many.
(7) το εν αυτο διανειμεσμενον υπο του οντος ειναι πολλα.
Ari: Entirely so. (πανταπασι μεν ουν.)
Par: 15 And certainly, since The Parts Are indeed Parts of a Whole, in that case
(8) Και μην οτι τα μορια γε μορια όλου
The One will Be Limited by The Whole; or are not The Parts Contained by The Whole?
145A (1) το εν αν ειη πεπερασμενον κατα το ολον: η ου τα μορια περιεχεται υπο του ολου.
Ari: Necessarily so. (αναγκη.)
Par: Then certainly, That which Contains will indeed Be The Limit.
(2) αλλα μην το περιεχον αν γε ειη περας.
Ari: How could it not be? (πως δ’ ου:)

(The 2nd Intelligible & Intellectual Triad of Gods, 1251 (P31) Proclus Commentary Book 8)

Par: Accordingly then, The One Being, Is in some way, both One and Many,
145A (3) αρα το εν ον εστι που τε εν και πολλα,
both Whole and Parts, and Limited/finite and Unlimited/infinite Multitude.
(4) και ολον και μορια, και πεπερασμενον και απειρον πληθει.
Ari: So it has come to Light. (φαινεται.) (Nicomachos Intro to Arith Book 1 Chap 7)

(The 3rd Intellectual Triad of The Perfective-Preservative Gods, 1252 (P34) Proclus Book 8)

Par: Take notice then, if It Has indeed been Limited then Must It not also have Extremes?
145A (5) αρ’ ουν επειπερ πεπερασμενον, ουκ και εχον εσχατα;
Ari: It must. (αναγκη.)
Par: What then? If The One Being Is a Whole, then will It not also Possess a Beginning,
(6) τι δι’; ει ολον, αν ου και εχοι και αρχην
a Middle and an End? Or is it possible for any Whole to Exist without These Three? And if
(7) και μεσον και τελευτην; η οιον τε τι ολον ειναι ανευ τουτον τριον; και στιουν
any one of These Selves is absent, then will It be Disposed to Exist any longer as a Whole?
(8) του εν αυτων αποστατη, εθελησε ουκ ειναι ετη ολον;
Ari: It will not be so disposed. (ουκ εθελησει.)
Par: And then as it is Reasonable, The One will Possess a Beginning, End and Middle.
145B (1) και δι ος εοικεν, το εν αν εχοι αρχην και τελευτην και μεσον.
Ari: It will possess these.
(2) εχοι. (Inherent Overall Symmetry)
Par: Then The Middle will most certainly Be Equally Distant from The Extremes;
(3) αλλα το μεσον μην γε ισον επεχε των εσχατων:
for It could not be The Middle in any other way. (Parmenides Poem, Fragment 8 42-44)
(4) γαρ αν ου ειη μεσον αλλως .
Ari: It could not. (γαρ ου.)
Par: And certainly, as it Reasonable, by Being So Disposed, The One will Participate
(5) και δι, ως εοικε, ον τοιουτον το εν αν μετεχοι
of a Certain Figure, whether Straight or Round, or of a Certain Mixture from both.
(6) τινος σχηματος ητοι ευθεος η στρογγυλου η τινος μικτου εξ αμφοι.
Ari: For it will so participate.
(7) γαρ αν μετεχοι.

(Kronos: The Monad of The Intellectual Gods/Hebdomad, 1253 (P40) Proclus Book 8)

Par: Take notice then, by Being Maintained in this way, will Self not Subsist
145B (8) Αρ’ ουν εχοι ουτως αυτο ουκ εσται
both In-It-Self and In-Another?
(9) τε εν εαυτω και εν αλλω;
Ari: How? (πως;)  
Par: For each one of the (beginning-middle-end/future-present-past) parts is,  
(10) εκαστὸν τὸν μερὶν εστὶ in some way, *In The Whole*, and is not in any way *Outside* of The Whole.  
(11) ποῦ εὐ τὸ οἶλῳ καὶ οὐδὲν εκτὸς τοῦ οἶλου.  
Ari: It is so. (οὕτως;)  
Par: Thus *All The Parts Are Comprehended/Contained* by The Whole?  
145C (1) δὲ παντὰ τὰ μερὶ ἐπερεῖχεται ὑπὸ τοῦ οἶλου;  
Ari: Yes. (ναι;)  
Par: And certainly, *The One Is* indeed *All The Parts of Self*;  
(2) καὶ μὴν τὸ εὖ εστὶ γε παντὰ τὰ μερὶ αὐτοῦ,  
and is *neither* any more, nor any less than All.  
(3) καὶ οὐτε τί πλέον οὔτε ἐλάττων η παντᾶ.  
Ari: How could it not be. (γὰρ οὕ;)  
Par: Is it not the case then, that *The One*, *Is also The Whole*?  
(4) οὐκοῦν τὸ εὖ εστὶν καὶ τὸ οἶλον;  
Ari: How could it not be so? (πῶς δ’ οὐ;)  
Par: Accordingly then, if *All The Parts* happen to be *In The Whole*, since *All*  
(5) ἀρὰ εἰ παντὰ τὰ μερὶ τυγχάνει εὐ ὀἶλῳ, δὲ παντὰ *The Parts Are* both *The One and It Is The Whole Self*, then since *All The Parts*  
(6) τὰ οὐντα τὲ τὸ εὖ καὶ εστὶ τὸ οἶλον αὐτῷ, δὲ παντὰ τὰ *Are Comprehended by The Whole*, then *The One will Be Comprehended by The One*,  
(7) περείχεται ὑπὸ τοῦ οἶλου, τὸ εὖ αὐτὸν περείχεται ὑπὸ τοῦ οἶλου,  
and in this way, *The One Self will already Be In-It-Self*.  
(8) καὶ οὕτως τὸ εὖ αὐτὸ αν ἡδίν εἰπεν εὔαυτῶ.  
Ari: It has so come to *Light*. (φαίνεται;)  
Par: But certainly in turn, *The Whole Is* indeed *not In The Parts*; *neither In All*,  
145D (1) ἀλλὰ μεντόι ἄν τὸ οἶλον εστὶν γε οὐκ ἐν τοῖς μερεσίν, οὔτε εὖ πασίν  
*nor In a Certain One*. For if *It Were In All*, then *It* would *Necessarily* also *Be In One*: for if  
(2) οὔτε εὖ τινὶ γὰρ εἰ καὶ πασίν,  
Ari: No way at all. (οὐδαμῶς;)  
Par: Surely then, *It* cannot *Be In Any of The Parts*. For if *The Whole Were In Any*  
(6) μὴν οὕτε εὖ τινὶ τῶν μεροῦν. γὰρ εἰ τὸ οἶλον εἰπὲν εὖ τισὶν  
of The Parts, then *The Greater would Be In The Less*, which is *Impossible*.  
(7) τὸ πλέον ἄν εἰπεν εὐ τὸ ἐλάττων, ο εὐστὶν αὐτοῖν.  
Ari: It is impossible. (γὰρ αὐτοῖν.)  
Par: Then by not *Being In Many*, nor *In One*, nor *In All* of The Parts, then *Must not*  
(8) δὲ μὴ οὖν εὐ πλέοσι μὴδ’ εὖ εἰπεν μηδ’ εὖ αὐστὶ τοῖς μερεσί οὐκ  
The Whole *Necessarily Be*, *In some other way*, or cease to *Be* in any way at all?  
(9) τὸ οἶλον ἁναγκή εἰναι εὐ τινὶ ἑτέρῳ ἡ ἑτερὶ εἰναι μηδαμός;  
Ari: Necessarily. (ἀναγκη;)
Par: Is it not the case then, that on the one hand, by Being in no way at all, It would
be nothing, but on the other hand, by Being Whole, if indeed It is not In-Self, then It Must Necessarily Be In-Another?

Ari: By all means indeed. (πάνυ γε.)

Par: Therefore on the one hand, inasmuch as The One Is Whole, It Is In-Another, whereas on the other hand, by Self Being In-Itself, It happens to Be All The Parts, and in this way The One Self Must Necessarily Be both In-Itself and In-Another.

Ari: It must be so. (ἀναγκῇ.)

Par: Surely then, since The One Disposition Is-Established in this way, is it not then Necessary that It should also Be Moved (In-Another) and Remain-Still (In-Itself)?

Ari: In what way? (πῇ?)

Par: On the one hand, It must somehow Stand-still, if indeed Self Is In-Itself. For
by Being In One and by not departing from This, It will Be In-The Self; that is, In-Itself.

Ari: It is so. (ἐστὶ γὰρ.)

Par: But That which is indeed Always In The Self, without a doubt, Must Necessarily Always Be At-Rest.

Ari: Entirely so. (πάνυ γε.)

Par: What follows then? On the contrary, is it not Necessary that That which Is
Always In-Another Must Never Be In The Self? But if It Never Is In The Self, then neither Can It Stand-still. But if It Cannot Stand-still, then It Must Be In-Motion?

Ari: It must be so. (οὕτως.)

(Rhea: The Monad of The 1st Triad of The Intellectual Hebdomad, 1254 (P45) Proclus Book 8)

Par: Accordingly then, by The Self Always Being both In-Itself and In-Another, then The One Must Necessarily Always Be In-Motion, and also Always Be At-Rest.

Ari: So it has come to Light. (φαίνεται.)

(Zeus: The Monad of The 2nd Triad of The Intellectual Hebdomad, 1255 (P50) Proclus Book 8)

Par: And Self Must certainly Be The Same With-It-Self and Other Than-It-Self; and similarly Be The Same and also Other Than-The Others, if indeed It also Experiences καὶ ὦσματος εἰναὶ ταύτων τοῖς ἀλλοῖς, εἰπέρ καὶ πεπονθέν
The Prior Relationships/Dispositions .

Ari: How? (πως ;)

Par: Somehow Everything Has to Be in this way in Relation to Everything . For Everything (3) που παν εχει οδε προς απαν .
Is either The Self/Same with or Other than something : or if It Is not The Same nor Other ,
(4) εστιν η ταυτον η ετερον ; η εαν μη ταυτον μηδ’ η ετερον then It will have The Same Dynamic that a Part Has to a Whole or that a Whole Has to a Part .
(5) αν ει πο ουτως μερος εχει προς τουτο , η ως ολον αν ει προς μερος .
Ari: It has so come to Light . (φαινεται .)
Par: Take notice then , Is The One Self a Part of Self ?
(6) αρ’ ουν εστιν το εν αυτο μερος αυτου ;
Ari: Not at all . (ουδαμως ;)
Par: Accordingly then , Self will not Have a Whole to Part Relationship with It-Self ,
(7) αρα αυτο αν ουδ’ ειπ ολον προς μερος προς εαυτου as if It were a Part of Self .
(8) ως ον μερος αυτου .
Ari: That is not possible . (γαρ ου οιον τε .)
Par: But accordingly then , Oneness/Unity is Other than The One ?
(9) αλλ’ αρα ενος(Genitive of εις) εστιν ετερον το εν ;
Ari: Without a doubt . (ου δηται .)

(Ocean : The Seventh Intellectual Monad , 1255 (P53) Proclus Book 8)

Par: Accordingly then , nor can Unity/Oneness indeed be Other than It-Self .
146C (1) αρα ουδ’ αν γε ειπ ετερον εαυτου .
Ari: Certainly not . (μεντοι ου .)
Par: Therefore , if Self Is neither Other nor a Whole nor a Part in Relation to It-Self ,
(2) ουν ει αυτο εστιν μητε ετερον μηθ’ ολον μητε μερος προς εαυτο ,
then Self Must Necessarily not already Be , The Same with It-Self ?
(3) αυτο αναγκη ουκ ηδη ειναι ταυτο εαυτω ;
Ari: It must . (αναγκη ;)
Par: What then? By Self Being In The Self is not That which Is elsewhere than with It-Self
(4) τι δε ; αυτο οντος εν το αυτω ουκ το ον ετερωθη εαυτω Necessarily Be Other than It-Self , if indeed Self will also Be elsewhere than It-Self ?
(5) αναγκη ειναι ετερον εαυτου , ειπερ αυτο και εσται ετερωθη εαυτου ;
Ari: It so appears to me at least . (δοκει εμοιγε .)
Par: In this way , as it has come to Light , The One Being certainly Has to Be At-Once ,
(6) ουτο εφανη το εν εν ον μην εχον αμα both In-It-Self and In-Another ?
(7) τε εν εαυτου και εν ετερου ;
Ari: For it has come to Light . (γαρ εφανη .)
Par: Then , as it is Reasonable , from this Logos The One will Be Other than It-Self .
(8) αρα , ως εοικεν , ταυτη το εν εν αν ειπ ετερον εαυτου .
Ari: It is reasonable . (εοικεν .)
Par: What follows then ? If Anything Is Other from Another ,
146D (1) τι ουν ; ει τι εστιν ετερον του ,
will It not Be Other from That to which It Is Being Other ?
(2) εσται ουχ ετερον οντος ετερου ;
Ari: Necessarily . (αναγκη .)
Is it not the case then, that As many as Are Not-One, so are not the One? for in this way, accordingly then, the One will be Other than the Others. It is other. Therefore, will the Self/Same ever Be Truly Disposed In The Other, or The Other? It would be so. Then They will not Be Other than Each Other by not Participating of The Other. They must flee (εκφευγοι.) Most certainly then, neither will Those that are Not-One Participate of The One; for if They did, then They would no longer Be Not-One, but in a certain way Be One. They not Already Entirely Flee from (Phaedo 104c) That which Is Other from Each Other? They must flee (εκφευγοι.) But if They are neither Other from-Selves, nor from The Other, then Must 147A (1) δε εις εστις ετερα αυτοις μη σε του ετερω, αν μη They not Alreadely Entirely Flee from (Phaedo 104c) That which Is Other from Each Other? (4) γαρ αν αν αν αν αν ην μη εν αλλα πη εν. True. (αληθη.) Accordingly then, Those that are Not-One will not Be Number; for in this way, (5) αρα τα μη εν αν ως εις αριθμοι γαρ ουτω.
by indeed Possessing Number, They could not entirely Be, Not-One.

Ari: Certainly not. (γαρ οὐν οὐ.)

Par: What then? Are Those that are Not-One, Parts of The One? Or would Those

(7) ti δὲ ἐστιν τὰ μὴ εν μορία του ἐνος; ἢ καὶ τὰ that are Not-One, by Possessing Number in this (Negative) way, Partake of The One?

(8) μὴ εν ἀρα οὔτω μετείχε τοῦ ἐνος;

Ari: They would not participate. (μετείχεν.)

Par: Accordingly then on the one hand, if The (Positive) One Is entirely One, then

147B (1) ἀρα μὲν εἰ τὸ εν εστὶ παντὶ δὲ in relation to Those that are Not-One; The One will not Be a Part of Those that are Not-One,

(2) τὰ μὴ εν, το εν αὐτῷ εἰ ἡ μορία τῶν μὴ εν nor could The One Be a Whole in relation to Them, as if They were Parts; nor in turn, will

(3) οὔτε οἷον οἷον ὡς μορίων: οὔτε αὐτὸ Those that are Not-One Be Parts of The One, nor Wholes, just as if The One Were a Part.

(4) τα μη εν μορία του ενος, οὔτε ολα ὡς το ενι μοριω.

Ari: They will not. (γαρ οὐ.)

Par: But we have certainly said that Those that Are neither Parts nor Wholes,

(5) ἀλλὰ μην ἔφαμεν τα μητε μορία μητε ολα nor Other from Each Other, will have to Be The Same with Each Other.

(6) μητε επερα ἀλλῃλῳ εσπευσα Ταύτα ἀλλῃλοις.

Ari: For we have said so. (γαρ ἔφαμεν.)

Par: Accordingly then, shall we also say that The One Has The Relationship to

(7) ἀρα καὶ φωμεν το εν εχον προς Those that Are Not-One, in the same way as The Self Has to Be to Selves?

(8) τα μη εν οὔτως το αὐτο εἶναι αὐτοῖς;

Ari: We must say so. (φωμεν.)

Par: Accordingly then, The One, as it is Reasonable, Is both Other/Different

(9) ἀρα το εν, ὡς εὑσκεν, εστὶν τε ετερν from The Others and from It Self and The Self/Same as Those and with It Self.

(10) τον ἀλλων και εναυτου και ταυτων εκεινως τε και εαυτω.

Ari: It has indeed come to Light from this Logos to venture saying it.

147C (1) γε φανερεσθαι ἐκ του λόγου κινδύνευει.

(The Assimilative/Leading/Super-Kosmic Gods, 1255 (P55) Proclus Book 8)

Par: Take notice then Is It also Like and Unlike It-Self and Like and Unlike The Others?

147C (2) Ἄρ’ οὖν και ὁμιον τε και ανομιον εαυτω τε και τοις ἀλλοις;

Ari: Perhaps. (ἰσος.)

Par: Seeing that The One Has come to Light Other/Different from The Others,

(3) ἐπειδή ἐφανη ετερν των ἀλλων, then surely The Others will also Be Other/Different in some (indefinite) way from That.

(4) γουν ταλλα, αν και ειτ ἐτερ’, που εκεινου.

Ari: What next then? (τι μην ;)

Par: In the same way, will not The One Be Other/Different from The Others, just as

(5) οὔτως οὐκουν ετερν των ἀλλων, ὡστε The Others Are also Different from That, and It is neither more nor less (in this Difference)?

(6) ταλλα και εκεινου, και οὔτε μαλλον οὔτε ηττον;

Ari: How could it not be so?

τι αν γαρ;
Par: Therefore, if it is neither more nor less, They Are Different in a similar way.
(7) αρα ει μητε μαλλων μητε ηττον, ομοιος.
Ari: Yes. (ναι.)
Par: Is it not so that inasmuch as The One experiences Being Different than The Others,
(8) ουκουν η πεπνοθεν ειναι ετερον των αλλων
and The Others also than The One, then in this way The One will also experience Being
(9) και ταλλα οσαυτως εκεινου ταυτη αν πεπνοθοτα ειεν
The Self/Same both in relation to The Others and The Others in relation to The One.
147D (1) ταυτον τε εν τοις αλλοις και ταλλα το ενι.
Ari: What do you mean? (ποις λεγεις;) 
Par: The following. Do you not assign every Name to something?
(2) ουδε. ουκ καλεις εκαστον των ονοματων επι τινι; 
Ari: I do at least. (εγωγε.) 
Par: What follows then? Can you pronounce The Self/Same Name either often or once?
(3) τι ουν; αν ειποι το αυτο ονομα πλεονακις η απαξ; 
Aris I can at least. (εγωγε.) 
Par: Thus on the one hand, do you Name That to which the name belongs, when
(4) ουν μεν πτερον ειπης ουπερ τουνομα εστι εαν
you say It once; but not on the other hand, when you say that Name often? Or rather,
(5) προσαγορευεις απαξ, ουκ δε εαν εκεινο πολλακις: η πολλη
must you always mean The Same Name whether you utter The Same Name once or often?
(6) αναγκης σε αει λεγειν ταυτον ονομα εαντε φθεγξη ταυτον απαξ εαντε πολλακις; 
Ari: Of course, what follows then? (μην τι;) 
Par: Is it not the case then, that Another Name also belongs to some particular?
(7) ουκουν το ετερον ονομα και εστιν επι τινι.
Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ γε.) 
Par: Therefore, when you utter Self whether once or often, you do not apply the Name
147E (1) αρα οταν θεληη ουτο, εαντε απαξ εαντε πολλακις, ουκ ονομαξεις
to nothing else, nor mean anything else, than That to which the Name belongs.
(2) επ’ αλλω ουδε αλλο τι η εκεινο ουπερ ονομα ην.
Ari: Necessarily so. (αναγκη;) 
Par: But when we say, on the one hand, that The Others Are Other from The One,
(3) δη οταν λεγονει μεν οτι ταλλα ετερον του ενος,
and on the other hand, that The One Is Other from The Others, by saying Other Twice,
(4) δε το εν ετερον των αλλων, ειποντες το ετερον διε
we still signify nothing else, but That Nature of which This Name is Always The Self/Same.
(5) μαλλων λεγομεν ουδεν τι επ’αλλη, αλλ’ τη φυσε ηπειρε επ’εκεινη τουνομα ην αει αυτο.
Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ μεν ουν.) 
Par: Therefore, inasmuch as The One Is Other from The Others, and The Others
148A (1) αρα η το εν ετερον των αλλων και ταλλα
from The One, by having experienced The Other Self, otherwise, The One will not
(2) του ενος, κατ’ πεπνοθεναι το ετερον αυτο αλλα το εν αν ουκ
experience Being Other, but Be The Self/Same as The Others. But Is not That which
(3) πεπνοθες αλλο ειη το αυτο τοις αλλοις: δε ουχι το
experiences The Self/Same in some way Similar?
(4) πεπνοθες ταυτον πολ λαμοιον;
Ari: Yes. (ναι.)
Par: But inasmuch as The One experiences That which Is Other from All The Others,
(5) δη η το εν πεπνοθεν ειναι ετερον των αλλων.
then Absolutely All The Others will Be Similar to This Self; for All Are Other from All.

Ari: It is Reasonable. (εοικεν.)
Par: 17 But surely then, The Like Is indeed contrary to The Unlike.

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)
Par: Is it not also the case, that The Other/Different Is contrary to The Self/Same?
Ari: And this also. (και ταυτω.)
Par: But certainly this was indeed also shown; that in an according way,

The One Is The Self/Same with The Others.

Ari: For it has come to Light. (γαρ εφανη.)
Par: But to Be The Self/Same with The Others is indeed the opposite experience

148B (1) δε ειναι το ταυτων τους αλλοις εστι γε τουναντιον παθος
from that to Be Other from The Others.
(2) το ειναι ετερον των αλλων.
Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ γε.)
Par: Most certainly, insofar as The One Is Other, It has come to Light to Be Like.
Ari: Yes. (ναι.)
Par: Accordingly then, insofar as It Is The Self/Same, It will Be Unlike.

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)
Par: Accordingly then, That which Is The Self/Same will make It Unlike;

Ari: It is reasonable. (εοικεν.)
Par: Therefore, The One will Be both Like and Unlike The Others. On the one hand,

Ari: As it is Reasonable, and according to This Logos, it surely has to be so.
Par: For The One also has to Be in the following way.
Ari: In what way? (τινα;)
so that by Being altered It Is Unlike.

(7) δὲ ὀν ἀλλοιον εἶναι αὐνομοιοιν.

Ari: You speak The Truth. (λεγεις αληθη.)

Par: Then since The One Being Is both The Same and Other from The Others,
(8) αρα στι το εν ὑν εστι τε ταυτον και ετερον τοις ἀλλοιοις, according to both and according to each, thus, It will Be both Like and Unlike The Others.

148D (1) κατ᾽ αμφοτερα και καθ᾽ εκατερον, αν ειν τε ομοιοι και ανομοιον τοις ἀλλοιοι.

Ari: Entirely so. (πανε γε.)

Par: And in a similar way, is This not the case, in relation to-Itself, Seeing that The One (2) και ὁσαυτως ουκουν εαυτω επειπερ Being has come to Light both Other from-It-Self and The Same with-It-Self;

(3) εφανη τε ετερον εαυτου και ταυτον εαυτω, according to both and according to each, thus, It will come to Light both Like and Unlike?

(4) κατ᾽ αμφοτερα και κατα εκατερον φανησεται τε ομοιοι και ανομοιον;

Ari: Necessarily so.

(5) αναγκη.

(The Unpolluted/Liberated/Super-Kosmic & Kosmic Middle Order of Gods, (P58) Proclus)

Par: What then? Consider how The One Has to Be in relation to Grasping/Touching,

148D (6) Τι δη δε σκοπει, πως το εν εχει περι απεσθαι according to The Self and to The Others, and then in relation to not Grasping/Touching.

(7) περι του αυτου και των αλλων και του μη απεσθαι.

Ari: I so consider. (σκοπω.)

Par: For The One Being has come to Light in some way In The Whole It-Self.

(8) γαι το εν ον εφανη που εν ολω εαυτω.

Ari: Rightly so. (ορθως.)

Par: Is it not the case then, that The One Is also In The Others?

(9) ουκουν το εν και εν τοις αλλοιοις;

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: Thus on the one hand insofar as The One Is In Others, It will Grasp The Others;

148E (1) αρα μεν η εν τοις αλλοιοις αν απτοιτο τοις αλλων: but insofar as Self Is In It-Self, on the one hand, It will be kept from Grasping The Others,

(2) δε η αυτο εν εαυτω μεν απειροιοτο απεσθαι των αλλων, whereas on the other hand, Self will Grasp Self, by Being In It-Self.

(3) δε αυτο αν απτοιτο αυτου ον εν εαυτω.

Ari: So it has come to Light. (φαινεται.)

Par: In this way then, on the one hand, The One will Grasp both Self and The Others.

(4) ουτο δη μεν το εν αν απτοιτο τε αυτου και των αλλων.

Ari: It will so grasp. (απτοιτο.)

Par: On the other hand, what about the following? Must not Everything that is about (5) δε τι τηδε; αρ δει ου παν το μελλον to Grasp Anything, be situated next to That which It is about to Grasp, by Filling-up

(6) αψεθαι τινος κεισθαι εφεξης εκεινω ου μελλει απεσθαι, κατεχον That Same Place, which lies Besides That, so as to Grasp It? (Direct Contact,

(7) την ταυτιν εδραν η αν κεισται μετ’ η εκεινην, η απεσθαι; (No Intermediary)

Ari: It must. (ανογκη.)

Par: Then if The One Self were also about to Grasp Self, then It must be situated

(8) αρα ει το εν αυτο και μελλει αψεθαι αυτου, δει κεισθαι
Immediately Next to It-Self; by Filling-up That Neighboring Place, In-which, Self Is.

The Self/Same Necessity Applies to The One.

Ari: The Self/Same necessity. (η αυτη.)

Par: Accordingly then, It will not Grasp The Others.

Ari: Why then? (τι δη;) 

Par: We say that, That which is about to Grasp, must be Separate from That, by Being

Ari: It is necessary. (δει.)

Par: But if on the one hand, a Third Term is added right after The Two, then

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Introduction to Arithmetic

Par: And then in this way, whenever One Term is added, One Contact is also added,

and the amount of all the Contacts will Always Be One less than The Number of Terms. For

every succeeding Number of Terms exceeds the amount of all Contacts, by just as much as,

The Number of their Contacts was exceeded by The Number of the first Two Terms. For the
rest, One Term is immediately added to both The Number of Terms and at the same time One

Par: Accordingly then, whatever The Number of Terms there Are of Selves,

Ari: Rightly so. (ορθως.)
Their Contacts will Always Be less, by One.

(4) αι αψεις αει εισιν ἐλαττους μια.

Ari: True. (ἀληθῆ.)

Par: But if Only One Term Exists, but Two Are not, then there can Be no Contact.

(5) δε ει γε μονον εν εστι, δε δυσς εστιν μη, αν ειη ουκ αψις.

Ari: How could there be? (πως γαρ;)

Par: Have we not said that, Those that Are Other than The One Are Not-One,

(6) ουκουν, φαμεν, τα ἀλλα του ενος εστιν ουτε εν nor do They Participate of Self, if indeed They Are Other?

(7) ουτε μετεχει αυτου, ειπερ εστιν αλλα.

Ari: Neither. (γαρ ου.)

Par: Accordingly then, there Is no Number that Is Inherent In The Others,

(8) αρα ουκ αριθμος ενεστιν εν τοις ἀλλοις, since One/Unity Is not Inherent In Selves.

(9) ενος μη ενοντος εν αυτοις.

Ari: How could it? (πως γαρ;)

Par: Accordingly then, The Others Are neither One nor Two,

149D (1) αρα τα αλλα εστι ουτ’ εν ουτε δυο

nor do They Possess The Name of any other Number.

(2) ουτε εχοντα ονομα ουδεν αλλου αριθμον.

Ari: They do not. (ου).

Par: Accordingly then, The One Is One, Alone, and It will not Be Two.

(3) αρα το εν εστιν εν μονον, και αν ουκ ειη δυας.

Ari: It will not so come to Light. (ου φαινεται.)

Par: Therefore there is no Contact; since there are no Two Terms/Beings/Selves.

(4) αρα εστι ουκ αψις οντοιν μη δυοιν.

Ari: There are not. (εστιν ουκ.)

Par: Accordingly then, The One will neither Grasp The Others,

(5) αρα το εν ουτ’ απτεται τοιν αλλων

nor will The Others Grasp The One, if indeed there Is no Contact.

(6) ουτε τα αλλα του ενος, επειπερ εστιν ουκ αψις.

Ari: Certainly not. (γαρ ουν ου.)

Par: Surely then in this way, according to all these statements, The One will both

(7) δη ουτω κατα παντα ταυτα το εν τε Grasp and not Grasp The Others and It-Self.

(8) απτεται και ουκ απτεται των αλλων και εαυτου.

Ari: It is Reasonable.

(9) εοικεν.

(The Kosmik/Sublunary Gods, 1201 (P 63) Proclus Book 8)

Par: 18 Take notice then, Is The One Equal and Unequal to Self and to The Others?

149D (10) Αρ’ ουν εστι ισον και ανισον και αυτω τε και τοις αλλοις;

Ari: How? (πως;)

Par: If The One were bigger or smaller than The Others, or if The Others were bigger

149E (1) ει το εν ειη μειζον η ελαττων η ταλλα, η αυ ταλλα μειζω or smaller than The One, would it not follow that on the one hand, neither The One by Being

(2) η ελαττω η του ενος, αν ουκ αρα και μεν ουτε το εν το ειναι One, nor The Others by Being Other than The One would Be something bigger nor something

(3) εν ουτε τα αλλα αλλα του ενος αν ειη τι μειζω ουτε τι
smaller than Each Other, by Virtue of The Selfhood of Their Ousias. But if Each One,
besides Being Such as They Are, would also Possess Equality, then They would Be Equal to
Each Other. But if, The Others Possessed Bigness but The One Smallness, or The One
Bigness but The Others Smallness, then on the one hand, wherever The Idea of Bigness would
Be Present, One would Be bigger; but The One in which Smallness Exists would Be smaller?

Ari: Necessarily. (αναγκη.)
Par: Is it not the case, that both These Certain Ideas; Bigness and Smallness,
do indeed Exist? For if They did not Subsist in some way, then They would certainly never
oppose Each Other and They would never have Come to Be among The Real Beings.

Ari: How could they? (ποις αν γαρ ;)
Par: Accordingly then if Smallness Comes to Be In The One, then It will either Be Present

In The Whole of Self or In a Part of Self.

Ari: Necessarily. (αναγκη.)
Par: What then, if Smallness would Come to Be In The Whole? Will It not either Be
extended Equally throughout The Whole of The One Self or Encompass/Contain Self?

Ari: Manifestly so. (δηλα δη.)
Par: Take notice, if on the one hand, Smallness Is extended Equally to The One, then It
will Be Equal to Self; whereas, if It Encompasses The One, then Smallness will be bigger?

Ari: How could it not be so? (ποις ου δε’ ;)
Par: Then Is it indeed Possible for Smallness to Be Equal or bigger than anything, and to
do the functions of Bigness/Magnitude and Equality, but not perform the functions of It-Self?

Ari: Impossible. (αδυνατον.)
Par: Accordingly then, on the one hand, Smallness will not Be extended throughout
the Whole of The One, but in a Part, if indeed at all.

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)
Par: Nor in turn, In The Whole Part; for if It did, then would not these Be functions

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of The Whole Part, just as it happened in relation to The Whole; in which case, It will
(4) τοῦ μέρους απερ προς το ολον : εν ω
Always Be either Equal or bigger than that in which Smallness happens to Be extended.
(5) αει εσται ιση η μειζων ενη.
Ari: Necessarily. (αναγκη.)
Par: Therefore, Smallness will never Exist in any of The Real Beings, since It cannot
(6) αρα σμικροτης ποτε ενεσται ουδειν των οντων , μητ’
Exist in a Part nor in a Whole; nor will there Be anything small except The Smallness of Self.
(7) εγγινονενε εν μερει μητ’ εν ολω : ουδε εσται τι σμικρον πλην σμικροτητος αυτης.
Ari: It does not seem likely. (ουκ εοικεν.)
Par: Accordingly then, neither will Magnitude Be Inherent in Self. For then there will Be
150C (1) αρα ουδ’ μεγεθος ενεσται εν αυτω . γαρ αν ειη
some other big aspect besides The Magnitude of Self; That in which Bigness Is Inherent;
(2) τι αλλο μειζον και πλην μεγεθος αυτου , εκεινο εν ω το μεγεθος ενειη ,
even if The Being of Smallness is not ; these which Self Must surpass by whatever Is big ;
(3) και οντος σμικρου ουκ , ταυτα ου αυτω αναγκη υπερχειν εανεπρ η μεγα ;
but this, Is Impossible, seeing that Smallness cannot ever Be Inherent in any being .
(4) δε τουτο ουδαντον , επειδη σμικροτης ουδαμου ενι .
Ari: True. (αληθη.)
Par: But then, Self Magnitude will not be bigger than another, except Self Smallness,
(5) αλλα μην αυτο μεγεθος (genitive) ουκ μειζον τη αλλου αυτης σμικροτητος
nor will Smallness Be smaller than another, except Self Magnitude .
(6) ουδε σμικροτης ελαττον η αλλου αυτου μεγεθος.
Ari: It will not. (γαρ ου.)
Par: Accordingly then, neither will The Others Be bigger nor smaller than The One, since
150D (1) μητε εχοντα μεγεθος μητε σμικροτητα , ουτε τουτω αυτω εχον την δυναμιν
in relation to The One, of either surpassing or of being surpassed, but this will only be the case
(2) του την υπερχειν και υπερεχεθαι , αλλα
in relation to Each Other; nor in turn will The One Be either bigger nor smaller than These
(3) προς αλληλω , ουτε αυ αν το εν ειη μειζον ουδε ελαττον τουτων
nor The Others, since It neither Possesses Bigness nor Smallness .
(4) ουδε των αλλων , μητε εχον μεγεθος μητε σμικροτητα.
Ari: It has not indeed come to Light. (ουκουν γε δαινεται.)
Par: Take notice then, if The One is neither bigger nor smaller than The Others ,
(5) αρ’ ουν , ει το εν μητε μειζον μητε ελαττον των αλλων ,
then Self Must Necessarily neither surpass or Be surpassed by Them ?
(6) αυτο αναγκη μητε υπερχειν μητε υπερεχεθαι εκεινων ;
Ari: It is necessary. (αναγκη.)
Par: Is it not Abundantly Necessary Indeed, for That which neither surpasses
(7) ουκουν πολλη αναγκη γε το μητε υπερχον
nor Is surpassed to Be Equally extended; for by Being Equally extended It Must Be Equal.
(8) μητε υπερεχομενον ειναι ισου εξ , δε ον ισου εξ ειναι ισων .
Ari: How could it not? (πως γαρ ου;) (Nicomachus Book I Chapter 17-3, Intro. to Arith.)
Par: And certainly, The One Self will also have to *Be in The Same relation to It-Self*; by neither Possessing Bigness nor Smallness in It-Self, nor will *It surpass* nor will *It Be surpassed by It-Self*; but by Being Equally extended, *It will Be Equal to It-Self*. (4)  

Ari: Entirely so. (πανύ μεν ουν.)  

Par: Accordingly then, The One will Be Equal both to It-Self and to The Others.  

(4)  

Ari: So it has come to *Light*. (φαίνεται.)  

Par: And certainly if Self were in It-Self, then It would also be *Outside About It-Self*, and indeed on the one hand, by Containing It-Self, It would Be *bigger than It-Self*; but on the other hand, by Being Contained, It would Be *smaller than It-Self*; and in this way The One Self would be bigger and smaller than It-Self.  

(2)  

Ari: It would be so. (αν ειη γαρ.)  

Par: Must not this also be so; that there Is nothing at all Outside of The One and The Others?  

(3)  

Ari: How could it not be in this way? (πος ου γαρ;)  

Par: But it Must Be the case that, That which Is, Must Always Be somewhere.  

(4)  

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)  

Par: Is it not indeed the case that, That which Is in anything, will Subsist by *Being* the smaller in the bigger? For otherwise, One cannot Subsist in The Other.  

(6)  

Ari: It cannot. (γαρ ου.)  

Par: But since there Is no Other, apart from The One and The Others, then Selves Must Be in something. Then is it not also Necessary that since Selves Are already in Each-Other, then The Others also Subsist in The One and The One also Subsist in (9) all other, τα αλλα τε εν τω ενι και το εν The Others, or else Selves Exist in no way whatsoever?  

151B (1) τοις αλλοις, η ειναι μηδαμου;  

Ari: So it has come to *Light*. (φαίνεται.)  

Par: Accordingly then, on the one hand, since The One Is Inherent in The Others, then The Others will Be bigger than The One, by Comprehending/Containing Self;  

(3)  

whereas on the other hand, The One will Be smaller than The Others by Being Contained; (4)  

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but since The Others Are Inherent in The One, then by The Self/Same Logos, The One
(5) δέ στι τα ἄλλα εν τῷ είναι, κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον τὸ εν
will Be bigger than The Others; and thus, The Other Beings will be smaller than The One.
(2) αν εἰς μείζον τόν ἄλλον, δέ τα ἄλλα ελάττω τοῦ ενος.
Ari: As it is Reasonable. (εἰσίν ἔννοιαν.)
Par: Accordingly then, The One Self, Is Equal to, and bigger and smaller than,
(3) αρά το εν αὐτῷ εστὶν ἰσον τέ και μείζον καὶ ελάττων
both Self and The Others.
(4) τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
Ari: So it has come to Light. (φαίνεται.)
Par: And then, if indeed It Is bigger, smaller and Equal, then It will Be of Equal, more
151C (1) καὶ μην εἰπέρ μείζον καὶ ελάττων καὶ ἰσον, καὶ αν εἰς ἰσον πλειονῶν
and less Measures than Self and The Others; whereas if of Measures, then also of Parts.
(2) καὶ ελάττων καὶ μετρῶν αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, δε επειδή μετρῶν, καὶ μερῶν.
Ari: How could it not be? (πώς δ’ εὐθεῖα.)
Par: Accordingly then, on the one hand, by Being of Equal, more and lesser Measures,
(3) αρά μεν ον ἰσον καὶ πλειονων καὶ ελαττων μετρων,
then It will also Be less and more in Number, both in relation to Self and The Others.
(4) αν καὶ εἰς ελαττον καὶ πλεον αριθμο τε αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
and also, according to The Same Logos, It will Be Equal to Self and to The Others.
(5) και τε κατὰ ταυτα ἰσον αὐτῷ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις.
Ari: How? (πώς;) Par: Whatever Is big, will also Be in some way of more Measures than Selves, whereas
(6) ονπερ εστι μειζον, αν καὶ εις που πλειονων μετρον αυτου: δε
it will also Be of as many Measures as Parts; and in the same way for that which Is small,
(7) οσον μετρων, μερων και οσαυτως ον ελαττων,
and according to The Same Logos for that which Is equal.
(8) κατα ταυτα οις ἰσον.
Ari: In the same way. (οὕτως.)
Par: Is it not the case then, that by Being big and small and Equal to It-Self,
151D (1) ουκουν ον μειζον καὶ ελαττον καὶ ἰσον εαυτου,
It will also Be of Equal Measures, and of more and of less Measures than Self?
(2) αν καὶ εις ἰσον μετρων πλειονων καὶ ελαττων αυτω,
But if this is indeed the case of Measures, then will it not also Be the case for Parts?
(3) δε επειδη μετρων και μερων;
Ari: How could it not be? (πώς ου δε;) Par: Accordingly then, on the one hand, by Being of Equal Parts to Self,
(4) αρα μεν ον ἰσον μερων αυτω
It will Be Equal in Multitude to Self; but on the other hand, if of more, then more.
(5) αν εις ἰσον το πληθος αυτω, δε πλειονων πλεον,
but if of less, then less in Number, than Self.
(6) δε ελαττων ελαττων τον αριθμον αυτου.
Ari: So it has come to Light. (φαίνεται.)
Par: Is it not the case, that The One Has to Be Related in the same way to The Others?
(7) ουκουν το εν εξει οσαυτως προς ταλλα;
For on the one hand, It has come to Light bigger than Them Selves, and so It must Be more
(8) οτι μεν φαινεται μεζων αυτων, και αναγκη ειναι πλεον in Number than Selves. But, since It is smaller, then must It not also Be less in Number?
(9) τον αριθμον αυτων: δε οτι σιμκροτερον, ελαττον:
And since It Is Equal in Magnitude, Must It not also Be Equal in Multitude to The Others?
(10) δε οτι ισον μεγεθει, και ειναι ισον το πληθος τοις αλλοις;
Ari: Necessarily. (αναγκη.)
Par: Surely then, in this way in turn, as it is Reasonable, The One Self will Be Equal,
151E (1) δη ουτω αυ, ως εοικε, το εν αυτο εσται και ισον and more and less in Number, than both Self and The Others.
(2) και πλεον και ελαττον τον αριθμον τε αυτου και των αλλων.
Ari: It will be so. (εσται.)

(Time: Kosmic Souls, (P68, P92) Proclus Book 8)

Par: 19 Take notice then, will The One also Participate of Time? And does Self
(3) Αρ’ ουν το εν και μετεχει χρονου, και εστι αυτο also become younger and older, both than It-Self and The Others, and also
(4) τε και γιγνεται νεωτερον τε και πρεσβυτερον τε εαυτου και των αλλων, και neither younger nor older than It-Self nor The Others, by Participating of Time?
(5) ουτε νεωτερον ουτε πρεσβυτερον ουτε εαυτου ουτε των αλλων, μετεχον χρονον;
Ari: How? (πως;) Par: On the one hand, To Be, Is Present in some way with Self, if indeed It Is One.
(6) μεν ειναι υπαρχει που αυτω ειπερ εστιν εν.
Ari: Yes. (ναι.)
(compare This to 160d4)

(Present-Past-Future/Angels-Spirits-Heroes, (P68, P97) Proclus Book 8)

Par: On the other hand, what else Is The To Be, than The Participation of Ousia with
(7) δε τι αλλο εστιν το ειναι η μεθεξις ουσιας μετα The Present of Time?
Just as, The Was Is The Participation of Ousia with
152A (1) του παροντος χρονου, ωσπερ το ην μετα
The Past, and in turn, The Will be Is The Communion of Ousia with The Future?
(2) του παρεληλυθοτος και αυ το εσται εστι κοινωνια ουσιας μετα του μελλοντος;
Ari: It is so. (εστι γαρ.)
Par: Accordingly then It Participates of Time, if indeed It also Participates of The To Be.
(3) αρα μεν μετεχει χρονου, ειπερ και του ειναι.
Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ γε.)
Par: Will not then, The Time of which It Participates, Be in a state of Procession?
(4) ουκουν του χρονου πορευομενου;
Ari: Yes. (ναι.)
Par: Accordingly then, It Is Always becoming older than It-Self,
(5) αρα αις γιγνετα πρεσβυτερον εαυτου, if indeed It Proceeds according to Time. (As opposed to Abiding in The Eternal)
(6) ειπερ προερχεται κατα χρονον.
Ari: Necessarily. (αναγκη.)
Par: Take notice then, do we remember (141a) that whatever becomes younger does so,
(7) αρ’ ουν μεμνημεθα γιγνομενου νεωτερου
because the *older becomes older* (than *it*)?

(8) στι ο πρεσβυτέρον γηγεται πρεσβυτέρον;

Ari: We do remember. (μεμνημένα.)

Par: Is it not the case then, that while *The One*, *becomes older than It-Self*,

(9) ουκουν επειδή το εν γηγεται πρεσβυτέρον αυτου,

that *It is becoming older* than *It-Self*, while *It is becoming younger* than *It-Self*?

152B (1) γιγνομενον πρεσβυτέρον αυτου αν γηγοιτο νεωτέρον;

Ari: Necessarily. (αναγκη.)

Par: Surely then in this way, on the one hand, *It will become younger* and *older* than *Self*.

(2) δή ουτως μεν γηγεται νεωτέρον τε και πρεσβυτέρον αυτου.

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: But accordingly, on the other hand, *It Is not in any way* older, when *Coming-to-Be*

(3) αρ’ δε εστι ουχ η πρεσβυτέρον οταν γιγνομενον according to *The Present Time*; That which *Is between The Was* and *The Will Be*? For

(4) κατα τον νυν χρονον τον μεταξ’ του ην τε και εσται; γαρ

by *Proceeding* from *The Past* to *The Future*, *It will not somehow go-beyond The Present*?

(5) πορευομενον εκ του ποτε εις το επειτα γε ου που υπερβησεται το νυν.

Ari: How could it. (γαρ ου.)

Par: Take notice then, will *It not at that time cease to become older*, since *It arrives at*

152C (1) αρ’ ουν ουκ τοτε επισχει του γιγνεσθαι πρεσβυτερον, επειδαι εντυχη

*The Now* is no longer becoming, but *at that time It Is already older*? For when *It Proceeds*

(2) τω νυν και ου γηγεται, αλλ’ τοτ’ εστι ηδη πρεσβυτερον; γαρ ποτε προιον

*It will not Be Grasped* by *The Now*. For *That* which *Proceeds Has To Be in such a way as*

(3) αν ουκ ληφθει ουπο τον νυν. γαρ το προιον εχεi ουτως οις
to *Grasp both The Now and The Future*; on the one hand, *by Departing from The Now*, while

(4) εφαπτεσθαι αμφοτερων, του νυν τε και του επειτα, μεν αφιεμενον του νυν, δ’

also *Apprehending The Future*, by *Coming-to-Be Between* both *The Future* and *The Now*.

(5) επιλαμβανομενον του επειτα, γιγνομενον μεταξ’ αμφοτερων, του επειτα τε και του νυν.

Ari: *True*. (αληθη.)

Par: But if it is indeed Necessary that *All* that *Is becoming* should not by-pass

(6) δε ει γε αναγκη παν το γιγνομενον μη παρελθειν

*The Now*; since, *as soon as it arrives at This Now*, *That/Ousia* will *Always cease becoming*,

(7) το νυν, επειδαι η κατα τουτο, του αει επισχει γιγνεσθαι and *Is, at that time, That* which *It was Aiming to become*.

152D (1) και εστι τοτε τουτο ο τι αν τυχη γιγνομενον.

Ari: So it has come to *Light*. (φαινεται.)

Par: Accordingly then *The One*, also, *in Aiming at becoming older*, when *It Hits-upon*

(2) αρα το εν και γιγνομενον πρεσβυτερον οταν εντυχη

*The Now*, *It will also cease becoming at that time* that *It Is older*.

(3) το νυν και επεσχεν του γιγνεσθαι τοτε εστι πρεσβυτερον.

Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ γε.)

Par: Is it not the case then, that *It is also older* than *that*, in relation to which

(4) ουκουν εστιν και πρεσβυτερον τοντου ουπερ

*It has become older*, when it was thus *becoming older* than *Self*?

(5) εγιγνετο δε εγιγνετο αυτου;
Ari: Yes. (ναι)
Par: But the older is older than the younger?
Ari: It is. (εστι)
Par: Accordingly then, at that time, The One is younger than Self,
Ari: How could it not be? (πως γαρ ού)
Par: Accordingly then The One Always Is and also becomes older and younger than It-Self.
Ari: It is Reasonable. (εοικεν.)
Par: But Is or does Self become in a more-extended or Equal Period of Time to It-Self?
Ari: In an equal period of time. (τον ίσον.)
Par: But that which either Is or becomes in an Equal Period of Time,
Ari: It is not. (γαρ ού.)
Par: Accordingly then, since The One Self both becomes and Is in a Period of Time that
Ari: I know not what to say. (ούκ εχω λεγειν.)
Par: You may certainly say the following; that Those Other than The One,
Ari: They will possess Multitude.
Par: But by Being Many They will Participate of a greater Number than The One.
Ari: How could they not? (πως δ’ ού.)
Par: What then? Do we say that Those that are more in Number are generated, and have also been generated before or do we say that The Few were generated before/Prior?

(6) τι οὖν; φησομέν τα πλειω αριθμοι γιγνεσθαι τε

Ari: The few. (τα ελαττω.)

Par: Accordingly then, That which Is Least Is First. But This Is The One. Can it be so?

(7) και γεγονει απερ η τα ελαττω;

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: Accordingly then, The One has become The First of All Those Possessing Number:

153B (1) αρα το εν γεγονε πρωτον παντον των εχοντων αριθμον. 

But All The Others also Possess Number, if indeed They are Others and not Another.

(2) δε παντα ταλλα και εχει αριθμον, ειπερ εστιν αλλα και μη αλλο.

Ari: They have to be. (γαρ εχει.)

Par: But indeed, by having-come-to-be First, I think, It came-to-be Before,

(3) δε γε γεγονος πρωτον, οιμαι, γεγονε πρωτον, but The Others came-to-be Later. But Those that have-come-to-be Later are younger

(4) δε τα αλλα υστερον δε τα γεγονοτα υστερον νεωτερα than That which has come-to-be Before: and thus, The Others will Be younger

(5) του γεγονοτος πρωτον και ουτως ταλλα αν ειναι νεωτερα than The One, but The One will be Older than The Others.

(6) του ενος, δε το εν πρεσβυτερον των αλλων.

Ari: For it will be. (γαρ ειναι.)

Par: 20 But what about the following? Could it Be the case, that The One

(7) δε τι τοδε; αρ’ αν ει η το εν has come-to-be, contrary to The Nature of Self, or is this Impossible?

(8) γεγονος παρα την ψυσιν αυτου, η αδυνατον;

Ari: Impossible. (αδυνατον.)

Par: Surely then The One has indeed come to Light having of Parts (Older, Same, Younger);

153C (1) μην αλλα το εν γε εφανε εχον μερη, but if of Parts, then also of a Beginning, End and Middle.

(2) δε ει μερη και αρχην και τελευτην και μεσον.

Ari: Yes. (ναι.)

Par: Is it not so that The Beginning (HYPARXIS) Is The First of All to come to Light,

(3) ουκουν αρχην πρωτον παντον γιγνεται, of both The One Self and of Each of The Others; and after that, The Beginning

(4) και του ενος αυτου και εκαστου των αλλων, και μετα την αρχην of All the others as far as to the end?

(5) παντα ταλλα μεχρι του τελους;

Ari: What follows then? (τι μην.)

Par: And we shall certainly say that All these Others, Are Parts of The Whole and of both The One Self and of Each of The Others; and after that, The Beginning

(6) και ει μην φησομεν παντα ταυτ’ ταλλα ειναι μορια του ολου τε of The One; but That Self has come-to-Be At-Once with The End, One-and-Whole.

Ari: We shall say so. (γαρ φησομεν.)

Par: But The End I suspect, comes-to-Be the very last of all. Thus The One Naturally

(7) και ενος, δε εκεινο αυτο γεγονειν αιμα τη τελευτη εν τε και ολον.

Ari: We shall say so. (γαρ ειναι.)

Par: But The End I suspect, comes-to-Be the very last of all. Thus The One Naturally

(8) δε τελευτη, οιμαι, γιγνεται γε υστατον δε το εν πεφυκε comes-to-Be in this way At-Once; so that, if indeed it Is Necessary that The One Self

153D (1) γιγνεσθαι ουτω αιμα: οστε ειπερ αναγκη το εν αυτο
come-to-Be contrary to Nature, in that The One would have-come-to-Be, At-Once
(2) μὴ γινεσθαι παρὰ φύσιν, ἀν γεγονός αμα with The End; which will Be Naturally Generated Last of The Others.
(3) τελευτή αν εἰπη περικος γινεσθαι υστατον των ἀλλων.
Ari: So it has come to Light. (φαινεται.)
Par: Accordingly then, The One Is younger than The Others;
(4) αρα το εν εστι νεωτερον των ἀλλων, while The Others are older than The One.
(5) δ’ τα ἀλλα πρεσβυτερα του ενος.
Ari: To me, it has come to Light in this way in turn.
μοι φαινεται ουτως αυ.
Par: But what then? Must not The Beginning or any other Part whatsoever
of The One, or of anything else, if indeed and inasmuch as it Is a Part (singular),
(7) του ενος η οτουουν αλλου, εανπερ η μερος
but not Parts (plural), Necessarily be One, if it Is indeed a Part?
(8) αλλα μη μερη, αναγκαιον ειναι εν, ον γε μερος;
Ari: Necessarily. (αναγκη.)
Par: Is it not the case that The One Has-come-to-Be At-Once with both The First Part,
153E (1) ουκουν το εν γιγνομενω αμα τε τω πρωτω
and also Will come-to-Be At-Once with The Second Part; and It does not abandon a single one
(2) και αν γιγνοιτ’ αμα τω δευτερω, και απολειπεται ουδενος
of The Others that are coming-to-Be, nor any Part to which It Can Be Attached; until
(3) των ἀλλων γιγνομενων, στηπερ οτουουν αν προσγιγηται, εως
Arriving at The Extreme Part, It Becomes One Whole; by neither Being excluded
(4) διελθον προς το εσχατον γενηται εν ολοιν, ουτε απολειψθεν
of The Middle nor of The First nor of The Last, nor of any other Part in Its coming-to-Be.
(5) μεσου ουτε πρωτου ουτε εσχατου ουτε ουδενος αλλου εν τη γενεσι.
Ari: True. (αληθη.)
Par: Accordingly then, The One, will Possess The Self/Same Age with All The Others.
(6) αρα το εν ισχει την αυτην ηλικιαν πασιν τοις αλλοις.
So that if The One was not Produced contrary to Its Self Nature, then It has come-to-Be
(7) ωστε’ ει το εν ειη μη πεφυκεν παρα αυτο φυσιν, αν γεγονος
neither Before nor Later than The Others, but at-the-same-time with Them. And by This
154A (1) ουτε προτερον ουτε υστερον των αλλων, αλλ’ αμα . και κατα τουτον
Logos/Relationship, The One will not be older nor younger than The Others nor The Others
(2) τον λογον, το εν αν ουτε ει πρεσβυτερον ουτε νεωτεραν των αλλων ουδε ταλλα
than The One. Whereas, according to the former Relationship, The One was both older
(3) του ενος : δε κατα τον προσθεν τε πρεσβυτερον and younger than The Others, and The Others, in a similar way, than That.
(4) και νεωτερον , και ταλλα οσαυτως εκεινων.
Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ μεν ουν.)
Par: Surely then on the one hand, The One Is and Has-to-Be and Has-come-to-Be in this way
(5) δη μεν εστι τε εχον και γεγονος ουτως
also. But then in turn, what shall we say about Self coming-to-Be older and also younger
(6) καὶ ἄλλα ἀν τι περὶ αὐτὸ γιγνεσθαι πρεσβύτερον τε καὶ νεώτερον than The Others, and The Others than The One; and again, that It neither comes-to-Be
(7) τον ἄλλον καὶ ταλλα τού ενος καὶ μητε γιγνεσθαι younger nor older? Therefore does It Have-to-Be in the same way with That which Is
(8) νεώτερον μητε πρεσβύτερον ἄρα εχει ουτω περὶ του ειναι just as It also does with That which Is coming-to-Be, or otherwise?
(9) οσσερ και περι του γιγνεσθαι, η ετερως;
Ari: I am not able to say. (εχω ουκ λεγειν.)
Par: But I am indeed able to affirm the following, that if One Member Is also older
154B (1) ἀλλ’ εγὼ γε τοςονδε, οτι ει ετερων εστιν και πρεσβύτερον than Another Member, Self cannot still become even older, other than by the age difference
(2) ετερων, αυτο αν ουκ δυναιτο ετι γιγνεσθαι ετι πρεσβύτερον, η τη ηλικια διηνεγκε which Self First possessed as soon as Self came-to-Be; nor in turn that by Being younger can It
(3) ος το πρωτον ευθυς γενομενον, ουδ’ αυ το ον νεωτερον become still younger; for if Equals are added to un-equals -whether Time is added or anything
(4) γιγνεσθαι ετι: γαρ ισα προσπιθεμενα ανισοις, χρονο τε και ἄλλο whatsoever. It will always make them differ Equally by just as much as they differed at First.
(5) στοιουν, αν αε ποιει διαφερειν ισο οσσερ διενεκη το πρωτον.
Ari: How could it be otherwise? (πως γαρ ου;) Par: Accordingly then, The Being Cannot indeed come-to-Be older nor younger
154C (1) αρα το ον αν ουκ γε γιγνοντ‘ πρεσβύτερον ουδε νεωτερον than The One, at any time, if indeed It Is Always Equally different in age; whereas
(2) (του ενος ΒΤ) ποτε ειπερ αει ισο διαφερει την ηλικιαν: άλλ.
It Is and Has Come-to-Be older, but then That which Is younger, does not come-to-Be.
(3) εστι και γεγονε πρεσβυτερον, δε δ’ το νεωτερον, ου γιγνεται. Ari: True. (αληθη;) Par: And therefore, The One Being, will not at any time become older nor younger,
(4) και αρα το εν ον ουτε ποτε γιγνεται πρεσβυτερον ουτε νεωτερον than The Others Beings.
(5) τον ἄλλον οντον.
Ari: It will not. (γαρ ουν ου;) Par: Then See if The One Being becomes older and younger in this way.
(6) δε ορα ει γιγνεται πρεσβυτερον και νεωτερον τιδε.
Ari: In what way then? (πη δη;) Par: Insofar as The One has come to Light older than The Other Beings,
(7) η το εν εφανη πρεσβυτερον τον αλλον and The Others than The One.
(8) τε καὶ ταλλα του ενος.
Ari: What follows then? (τι ουν;) Par: When The One has come to Light older than The Others, It has-come-to-be
154D (1) οταν το εν η πρεσβυτερον τον αλλον, γεγονεν in some way for a longer Period of Time than The Others.
(2) που πλειω χρονον η τα αλλαι.
Ari: Yes. (ναι.) Par: Surely then consider again. If we add an Equal Time to a longer and shorter Period
(3) δη σκοπει παλιν: εαν προσπιθωμεν τον ισον χρονον πλεοι και ελαττοι
of Time, then will the longer differ from the shorter by an Equal or by a smaller Part?

Ari: By a smaller part.

Par: Therefore The One will not be different in age from The Others by as much as

This Time and in The Future, as It Was at First (longer); but by receiving an Equal Time

along with The Others, It will Always differ by a less age than Theirs than before. Or not?

Ari: Yes, this is the case.

Par: Is it not the case indeed, that Whatever Differs less in age, in relation to anything,

than It did before, It will become younger than in the past, in relation to Those to which

It was older before?

Ari: Younger.

Par: But if in turn, That Is younger, will not The Others Be older than before,

in relation to The One?

Ari: Entirely so.

Par: Accordingly then, on the one hand, That which has-come-to-be younger,

will become older, in relation to That which has-come-to-be before and by Being older; but on

the other hand, It never (really) Is older, for It Is Always becoming older than That; for on the

one hand, That advances to a younger state, but on the other hand, The Other to an older state.

But in turn, in the same way, That which Is older is becoming younger than The younger.

For by both Selves tending to that which is opposite, They become opposite to Each other;

on the one hand, The younger become older than The older, but on the other hand, The older

become younger than The younger; but they will not Be able to Be such. For if They

would-have-become, then They would no longer be-coming-to-be, but would Be. But now,
They are becoming both older and younger than Each other. On the one hand, The One 
(7) γιγνονται μεν πρεσβύτερα και νεώτερα ἀλλήλων: μεν το εν 
becomes younger than The Others, because It came to Light Being older, and would-have-
(8) γιγνεται νεώτερον τοις ἀλλοις, οτι εφανη ον πρεσβύτερον και 
come-to-Be before; whereas on the other hand, The Others have-come-to-be older than 
155B (1) γεγονος προτερον, δε τα αλλα πρεσβύτερα

The One since They have-come-to-be later. According to The Self Logos, The Others 
(2) του ενος οτι γεγονε υστερα κατα τον αυτον λογον ταλλα 
will also be related in the same way in relation to The One, inasmuch as They also came-to-
(3) και ισχει ουτω προς το εν, επειδήπερ και ε—

Light older than Self, and to-have-come-to-be before.

(4) —φανη πρεσβύτερα αυτου και γεγονοτα προτερα.
Ari: For It has thus come to Light in this way.

γαρ ουν φαίνεται ουτως.
Par: Is it not always the case that, on the one hand, insofar as One Member does not 
(5) αει ουκουν μεν η ετερον ουδεν

become older nor younger than Another, by differing from Each Other by an Equal Number,
(6) γιγνεται πρεσβυτερον ουδε νεωτερον ετερον το διαφερειν ἀλληλων κατα ισο αριθμοι,
then neither will The One become older nor younger than The Others, nor The Others than 
(7) ουτε αν το εν γιγνοιτ’ πρεσβυτερον ουδε νεωτερον των ἀλλων, ουτε ταλλα

The One; but on the other hand, insofar as Those that are Prior must Necessarily Always 
(8) του ενος: δε η τα προτερα αναγκη αει
differ by a different part from Those that come-to-be later, and The Later from The Prior.

155C (1) διαφερειν ἀλλω μοριω των γενομενα υστερον, και τα υστερα των προτερων,
Then, in this way, it is Necessary that They must become older and younger than Each Other;
(2) δη ταυτη αναγκη γιγνεσθαι πρεσβυτερα τε και νεωτερα αλληλων
both The Others than The One and The One than The Others?

(3) τε τα αλλα του ενος και το εν των αλλων;
Ari: Entirely so.

πανυ μεν ουν.
Par: Surely then, according to all these accounts, The One Self, both Is, and 
(4) δη κατα παντα ταυτα το εν αυτο τε εστι και

becomes older and younger than Self and The Others; and in turn, neither Is, nor 
(5) γιγνεται πρεσβυτερον και νεωτερον αυτου και των αλλων, και ουτ’ εστιν ουτε

becomes neither older nor younger than Self nor than The Others.

(6) γιγνεται ουτε πρεσβυτερον ουτε νεωτερον αυτου ουτε των αλλων.
Ari: That is perfectly so.

μεν παντελως ουν.
Par: But since The One Participates of Time, and of becoming older and younger,

155D (1) δε επειδη το εν μετεχει χρονου και του γιγνεσθαι πρεσβυτερον τε και νεωτερον,
is it not Necessary that It should also Participate of The Past, The Future and The Present,
(2) αρ’ ουκ αναγκη και μετεχειν του ποτε και του επειτα και του νυν,
if indeed \textbf{It Participates of Time}?
(3) εἰπερ μετέχει χρόνου;

\textbf{Ari}: It is necessary.

\textbf{Par}: Accordingly then, \textbf{The One Was}, and \textbf{Is}, and \textbf{Will be}; and \textbf{was-coming-into-Being}
(4) ἀρα τὸ εὖ ἡν καὶ ἐστὶ καὶ ἐσταὶ καὶ ἐγγενετο
and \textbf{Is-coming-into-Being}, and \textbf{will-come-into-Being}.
(5) καὶ γενεται καὶ γενησεται.

\textbf{Ari}: What follows then?

τι μην;

\textbf{Par}: And there \textbf{Should/Can/Must/Will Be Something (Ousia, 152a)} in \textbf{relation to That},
(6) καὶ αὖ εἰν τι εκεῖνω
that also \textbf{Belongs to That}; which \textbf{Was}, and \textbf{Is}, and \textbf{Will be}.
(7) καὶ καὶ εκεῖνω ἡν καὶ ἐστιν καὶ ἐσταὶ.

\textbf{Ari}: Entirely so.

πανυ γε.

\textbf{Par}: Surely then, there \textbf{Can/Must/Will Be Knowledge}, and \textbf{opinion}, and \textbf{perception}
(8) δὴ αὖ εἰν ἐπιστήμη καὶ δόξα καὶ αἰσθήσεις
of \textbf{Self}, since we have now dealt with all these aspects concerning \textbf{Self}.
(9) αὐτοῦ, εἰπερ ἡμεῖς νῦν πραττόμεν παντα ταυτα περὶ αὐτου.

\textbf{Ari}: You speak rightly.

λέγεις ὅρθως.

\textbf{Par}: Surely then, there \textbf{Is} a \textbf{Name} and a \textbf{Logos in relation to Self}, and so \textbf{It is Named}
(10) δὴ καὶ ἐστιν ονομα καὶ λογος αὐτω καὶ ονομαζεται
and accounted for; and whatsoever happens to such aspects concerning \textbf{The Other Beings},
155E (1) καὶ λεγεται: καὶ σαπέρ τυγχανει των τοιουτων περι τα αλλα οντα,
is also the case concerning \textbf{The One}.
(2) ἐστιν καὶ περὶ το εὖ.

\textbf{Ari}: Therefore, it has to be entirely in this way.

οὖν μεν εχει παντελως ουτως.
The Third Hypothesis

The Eternal Yoked-Ideas
Perfection-imperfection-Equality-inequality

Like-Unlike,
Great-Small, Rest-Motion

Time
Participates & does not Participate
of OUSIA
Past The Gap The Now The Gap Future
The Sudden

Par: 21 Surely then in the third place, let us still relate, that if The One Is such as

and Neither One Nor Many and Participates of Time, because on the one hand, It Is One,
then at that Time, It Participates of Ousia; but on the other hand, because It Is Not,

then in turn, It does not, at that Time Participate of Ousia?

Par: Take notice then, is it possible, that It will Participate at the Time that It does not

Participate; or that It will not Participate at the Time when It does Participate?

Par: Accordingly then, It Participates at one Time, and does not Participate at another Time.

For only thus, will it be possible for It to Participate and not Participate of The Self.

Par: Is there not also such a Time, when It Shares of That which Is and when It takes-leave

of Self? Or how can it be possible, that It Will on the one hand, Possess The Self at one Time,

but at another Time Not Possess It, unless if It both Receives-and-loses Self?

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Ari: No other way. (οὐδ' ἄλλο)
Par: Surely then, do you not call The Receiving/Sharing of Ousia coming-to-Be? 
(5) γε δὴ αρα ὡς καλείς τὸ μεταλαμβάνειν οὐσίας γιγνέσθαι;
Ari: I do at least. (εἰγώγε.)
Par: But accordingly then, is not the loss of Ousia, to perish/to dissolve? 
(6) δὲ αρὰ ὡς τὸ απαλλαττεσθαι οὐσίας ἀπολύσθαι;
Ari: Entirely so. (καὶ πάνυ γε.)
Par: Surely then, The One, as it is Reasonable, comes-to-Be and dissolves, 
(7) δὴ τὸ ἐν, ὡς εἰοίκε, γιγνέται τε καὶ ἀπολύται,
by receiving/grasping/taking/seizing and by letting-go/discharging/losing Ousia,
156B (1) λαμβανον τε καὶ αφιεν οὐσιαν.
Ari: It is necessary. (ἀναγκή.)
Par: Then by Being One and Many and by coming-to-Be and by letting-go-of-Being,
(2) δὲ ὡς εἰ ὑπὶ πολλὰ καὶ γιγνομενὸν καὶ ἀπολύμενον
accordingly on the one hand, when It comes-to-Be One, does It not cease to Be Many,
(3) αρ’ μὲν ὡς οποῖον γιγνήται ἐν, τὸ οὐχ ἀπολύται ειναι πολλά,
but on the other hand, when It comes-to-Be Many, does It not cease to Be The One? 
(4) δὲ ὡς οποῖον πολλά, ἀπολύται ειναι τὸ ἐν;
Ari: Entirely so. (πάνυ γε.)
Par: But accordingly then, by coming-to-Be One and Many,
(5) δὲ αρ’ γιγνομενὸν ἐν καὶ πολλὰ
must It not Necessarily Be both Dispersed/Scattered-apart and Collected-together? 
(6) ὡς ἀναγκή τε διακρινεσθαι καὶ συγκρινεσθαι;
Ari: Very much so indeed. (πολλὴ γε.)
Par: And most certainly, when It comes-to-Be Unlike and Like,
(7) καὶ γε μὴν ὡς οποῖον γιγνήται ανυμοιον καὶ ομοιον,
It then also comes-to-Be Assimilated and Dissimilated? 
(8) τε ομοιουσθαι καὶ ανυμοιουσθαι;
Ari: Yes. (ναι.)
Par: And when It comes-to-Be more, less, and Equal,
(9) καὶ ὡς μείζον καὶ ἐλαστὸν καὶ ἰσον,
then It also Becomes-increased and Becomes-decreased and also Becomes-Equalized? 
156C (1) τε αὐξάνεσθαι καὶ φθεινει καὶ ἰσσοῦσθαι;
Ari: It becomes in this way. (οὕτως.)
Par: But when It Is Standing-Still, from-Being-in-the-state-of-motion,
(2) δὲ ὡς οποῖον ἰστηθαι κινοῦμενον
and in turn when It Is At-Rest, It Is then changed into That which Is In-Motion, then surely 
(3) ὡς τὸ ἐστος μεταβαλλη ἐπι το κινεσθαι δὴ
it is necessary that Self must indeed not Be in Any/Some Singular Period in Time. 
(4) δὴ τοῦτο γε μὴν ἐνι που ἐνι ἐν χρονῳ.
Ari: How could it indeed? (πῶς δὴ;) 
Par: But that which was formerly At-Rest, and later-on Moves, and that which 
(5) προτερον ἐστος τε υπερον κινεσθαι καὶ
was-Moving before and later-on Stands-still; on the one hand, will not Be Able to experience 
(6) κινουμενον προτερον υπερον εσταναι, μὲν ἐσται οὐχ οιον τε πασχειν 
these experiences without Transformation/Mutation/Alteration.
(7) ταυτα ανευ του μεταβαλλειν.
Ari: How could it? (πος γαρ ;)
Par: On the other hand, there is indeed No-Time (The Gap), in which Anything can
(8) δε εστιν γε ουδεις χρονος, εν ω τι Transform At-That-Same-Time; that is, neither when Moving nor when Standing-still.
(9) τε αμα οιον μητε κινεσθαι μητε εσταναι.
Ari: There is not. (γαρ ουν ου .)
Par: Certainly then, Nothing Can Be Transformed without That which Transforms.
(10) μην αλλ’ ουδε μεταβαλλειν ανευ του μεταβαλλει.
Ari: It is not likely that it can. (ουκ εικος.)
Par: Then at what Time will Anything Transform/Change/Mutate/Alter? For Nothing
(11) ουν ποτ’ μεταβαλλει; γαρ ουτε Is Transformed while Being At-Rest, nor while Being In-Motion, nor while Being in Time.

156D (1) μεταβαλλει ον εστος ουτε κινομενον , ουτε ον εν χρονω.
Ari: It will not. (ου γαρ ουν .)
Par: Take notice then, Is This, That which Is Outside of the ordinary, (2) αρ’ ουν εστι τουτο το αποπο 
In Which, It will Be, at the (No)-Time when It Transforms/Changes?
(3) εν ω αν ειη τοτ’ οτε μεταβαλλει; 
Ari: What kind of state is that then? (το ποιον δε ;)
Par: The Sudden. For The Sudden Is Likely to signify something Like This, such as (4) το εξαιρετις, γαρ το εξαιρετις ειοκε σημαινειν τι τοιονδε, ως That from which It changes into each of these conditions. For while It Stands-still, It will (5) εκεινον εξ μεταβαλλο εις εκεινον, γαρ ετι του εσταναι γε not Be changed from standing-still, nor while in motion will It Be changed out of the motion: (6) ου μεταβαλλει εκ εστοτος ὁμω ετι κινομενης μεταβαλλει εκ της κινησεως: but That Nature which Is Outside of the ordinary, The Sudden Her-Self, is Something situated (7) αλλα φυσις απο 
Between (The Gap) Motion and The Stationary, by Being in No-Time, and certainly into This 156E (1) μεταξου κινησεως τε και της στασεως, ουσα εν ουδενι χρονω, και δι εις ταυτην and also from This, That which moves, Transforms to That which Stands-Still, (2) τε και εκ ταυτης το κινομενον μεταβαλλει επι το εσταναι and in turn That which is At-Rest, Transforms to That which is Moved.
(3) και το εστος επι το κινεσθαι.
Ari: I dare say. (κινδυνευει.)
Par: And surely, if indeed The One Stands-still and Is Moved, It will Be Transformed (4) και δι ειπε το εν εστηκε τε και κινειται, αν μεταβαλλοι into Each. For only in this way will It create both of these conditions. But when It Is Changing (5) εφ’ εκατερα γαρ μονος ουτος αν ποιοι αμφοτερα; δ’ μεταβαλλον It will Be Changed by The Sudden Turn-About; and when It Transforms, It Will Be in (6) μεταβαλλει εξαιρετις και οτε μεταβαλλει, αν ειη εν No-Time, for At That Time, It will neither be Moved, nor Stand-still.
(7) ουδενι χρονω, τοτε αν ουδε κινοιτ’, ουδ’ αν σται.
Ari: For it will not.
γαρ ου.
Par: Take notice then, does The One also have to Be in this way, in relation to the other
(8) ἀρ’ οὖν καὶ εξείη οὔτω πρὸς τὰς ἀλλὰς
Transformations? And when It Is changed from That which Is, into that which dissolves,
(9) μεταβολὰς, όταν μεταβάλλῃ εκ τοῦ εἶναι εἰς τὸ ἀπολλυσθαι
or from that which Is not, to that which comes-to-Be; does It Become at that Time,
157A (1) η εκ τοῦ εἶναι μὴ εἰς τὸ γίγνεσθαι, γίγνεται τοτὲ
Between (The Gap) certain states of moving and of standing-still? And At That Time, It neither
(2) μεταξὺ τινῶν κινήσεων τε καὶ στασεων, καὶ τοτὲ οὔτε
Exists, nor does not Exist, nor Becomes nor dissolves?
(3) εστὶ οὔτε οὐκ εστὶ, οὔτε γίγνεται οὔτε ἀπολύτταί;
Ari: It certainly does appear to be likely.
γοῦν εἰσκε.
Par: And surely then by The Self/Same Logos (Rep 511B-C), when It Passes from One
(4) καὶ δὴ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ἵνα εξ ἐνος
into Many and from Many into One, It is neither One nor Many, neither is It dispersed
(5) επὶ πολλὰ καὶ εκ πολλῶν εφ’ εν εστιν οὔτε εν οὔτε πολλὰ, οὔτε διακρίνεται
nor gathered-together. And in Passing from Like to Unlike, and from Unlike to Like,
(6) οὔτε συγκρίνεται. καὶ οἱν εξ ὁμοίων επί ανωμοίων καὶ επὶ ανωμοίων επὶ ὁμοίων
It is neither Like nor Unlike, nor is Assimilated nor Dissimilated. And while It Passes from
157B (1) οὔτε ὁμοίων οὔτε ανωμοίων, οὔτε ὁμοιομοιηθηκέν οὔτε ανωμοιομοιηθηκέν: καὶ οἱν ἐκ
Small into Big, and into Equal and into Its contraries, It will neither be Small nor Big,
(2) σμικρὰν επὶ μεγα καὶ επὶ ισον καὶ εἰς τὰ οὐσίαν αν οὔτε εἰς σμικρὸν οὔτε μεγά
nor Equal, nor increasing, nor decreasing, nor Equalized.
(3) οὔτε ισον οὔτε ανεξανομηθηκέν οὔτε φθίνον οὔτε ἰσομερηθηκέν.
Ari: It does not appear that it can.
οὐκ εἰσκε.
Par: Surely then, if The One Is, It will undergo all these experiences.
(4) δὴ εἰ τὸ εν εστὶν ἀν πασχοι παντ’ ταῦτα τὰ παθηματα.
Ari: How could it not?
πῶς δ’ οὖν;
The Fourth Hypothesis

(\textit{passively})

\textbf{Par}: 22 Then must we not consider what \textit{The Others} will properly undergo if \textit{One Is} ?

\textbf{Ari}: We must so consider. (σκεπτεον.)

\textbf{Par}: Surely then let us say, if \textit{One Is}, what \textit{Those Other} than \textit{The One Must undergo} ?

\textbf{Par}: If it not the case then, if indeed \textit{The Others Are Otherwise/Different} than \textit{The One},

\textbf{Ari}: In such a case, we may say, if \textit{One Is}, what \textit{Those Other} than \textit{The One Must undergo} ?

\textbf{Par}: Yet certainly, \textit{The Others Are not entirely deprived/sterile} of \textit{The One},

\textbf{Ari}: In such a case, we may say, if \textit{One Is}, what \textit{Those Other} than \textit{The One Must undergo} ?

\textbf{Par}: Since \textit{The Others Are Different} than \textit{The One in some (indefinite) way}

\textbf{Ari}: Rightly so. (ορθως.)

\textbf{Par}: But we said that since \textit{They have Parts, They will Belong to That} which \textit{Is Whole}.

\textbf{Ari}: We have so affirmed. (γαρ φαμεν.)

\textbf{Par}: But certainly, it is indeed \textit{Necessary} that \textit{The Whole} will \textit{Be One} composed of \textit{Many},

\textbf{Ari}: We have so affirmed. (γαρ φαμεν.)
must not be a piece/fragment of many, but a Whole-Part of The Whole.

(8) ἔρη οὐ εἶναι πολλῶν, ἀλλὰ μορίων ὅλου.

Ari: How is this so? (πῶς τούτο ;)

Par: If anything would be a piece of many, among which it would exist, surely then somehow

Self would also be a piece of itself, and of each one of the others, which is surely impossible,

if indeed it is also a piece of all. For by not being a piece of one of these, it will be a piece of

the others, except of this, and thus it will not be a piece of each one. Then by not being a piece

of each, it will not in any way be piece of the many. But anything that does not-exist-in-one,

cannot exist in all of those of which it belongs to none, neither as a piece or anything else at all.

Ari: Surely then it has indeed come to Light. (δὴ γε φαίνεται.)

Par: Accordingly then, The Part Is not A Part of The Many nor of all;

but of One Undefined Idea, and of Some Unity, which we call Whole, which has-come-to-Be

One Perfect Idea composed from All; of That which The Part will be a Part.

Ari: Entirely so. (πάντα πασί μεν οὖν.)

Par: Accordingly then, if The Others have Parts, then they will also Participate

of The Whole and also of One/Unity/Oneness.

Ari: Very much so. (πάντα γὲ.)

Par: Accordingly then, Those that Are Other than The One, Must Be One Perfect

Whole which has Parts.

Ari: They must be. (ἀναγκη.)

Par: And most certainly, The Self/Same Logos, also applies to each Part. For

The Part Must Participate of The One. For if each of These Parts Is a Part, then “each”

without a doubt, indeed signifies to Be “One”; by first Being Distinct from the others,

then by Being “According to Self”, if indeed It will be that which Is called, “Each Part”.

(2) δὲ οὖν καθ’ αὐτὸ, εἰπὲρ ἐσταὶ ἐκαστὸν.
Ari: Rightly so. (ορθῶς.)
Par: But It will indeed Participate of The One, since this Is clear by Being Different
(3) δὲ αν γε μετέχοι του ενος οτι δηλον ον καθ' άλλο
than One; for otherwise It would not Participate, but It would Be One Self; but now
(4) η εν: γαρ ου μετειχεν, αλλ' ον εν αυτο: δε νυν
on the one hand, it Is Impossible that some Part to Be One, except by The One Self.
(5) μεν αδύνατον που ειναι ενι πλην τω ενι αυτω.
Ari: Impossible. (αδύνατον.)
Par: Whereas, it is quite Necessary that both The Whole and The Part Participate
(6) δε γε αναγκη τη τω ολω και τω μοριω μετεχειν
of The One; for on the one hand, The Whole of which The Parts Are Parts, will Be One, but
(7) η ενος: γαρ μεν το ολον ου τα μορια μορια εσται εν: δι'
then in turn, Each Singular Part of The Whole, Is That which will Be a Part of The Whole.
(8) αυ εκαστον εν μοριον του ολου, ο αν αν μοριον το ολου.
Ari: It is so. (ουτως.)
Par: Is it not the case then, that The Beings which Participate of The One,
158B (1) ουκουν τα οντα μεθεξει του ενος
Participate of Self, by Being Other (as in 148b)?
(2) μετεχοντα αυτου ετερα ;
Ari: How could they not? (πως δ' ου:) 
Par: But Those that Are Other than The One will Be Many in some indefinite way.
(3) δι' τα ετερα του ενος αν ειη πολλα
For if Those that Are Other than The One Were neither One nor More than One,
(4) γαρ ει ταλλα του ενος ειη μητε εν μητε πλειω ενος ,
then They would be nothing.
(5) αν ειη ουδεν.
Ari: They would be nothing then. (ου γαρ ουν.)
Par: Since The Beings that Participate both of a Part of One, and
(6) Επει τα μετεχοντα τε του μοριου ενος και
The Beings that Participate of The One Whole, Are indeed More than One, then Must not
(7) τα του ενος ολου εστι γε πλειω ενος, δε αναγκη ουκ
These Beings which Participate of The One already Be Unlimited Multitude?
(8) εσκεινα τα μεταλαμβανοντα του ενος ηδη ειναι απειρα πληθει;
Ari: How? (πως ?) 
Par: Let us See in this way. At the Time when They Partake of Something other
(9) ιδομεν οδε. τοτε οτε οντα μεταλαμβανει τι αλλο
than The One, do They Participate of Not-One, and do not Participate of Self?
(10) του ενος μετεχοντα ουχ εν, ουδε μεταλαμβανει αυτου;
Ari: Clearly so. (δηλα δη.)
Par: Is it not the case then, that They are Multitudes, in which The One Is Not?
158C (1) ουκουν οντα πληθη εν οις το εν ενι ουκ;
Ari: Multitudes, certainly.
πληθη μεντοι.
Par: What then? If we would be willing to take away through our Understanding, the least possible Quantity from These, then is it not Necessary that This Very Quantity which is taken away, Must Be a Multitude and also Not-One, if indeed, It does Not Participate of The One?

Ari: It is necessary. (αναγκη.)
Par: By Always Considering That Other (Ousia) Nature of The Ideas/Kinds/Genera in this way, as Subsisting Self by Self, will not then, such a Quantity of Self, which we may behold, Will Always Be, Unlimited Multitude?

Ari: Entirely so indeed. (πανταπασι μεν ουν.)
Par: And most certainly, whenever Each Part becomes One, Each Part Will Already Possess Limit, in relation to Each Other, and in relation to The Whole, and The Whole in relation to The Parts.

Ari: Exactly so then. (κομιδη μεν ουν.)
Par: Surely then, on the one hand, it then results for Those Other than The One, as it Is Reasonable, both from Their Sharing-a-Commonness with Each Other and from The One, that Something Other Will Come-to-Be within Them-Selves; which certainly Provides Them, that The Limit in relation to Each Other; but on the other hand, by The Nature of Them-Selves, according to Them-Selves (Other/Many), The Unlimited Comes-to-Be.

Ari: So it has come to Light. (φαινεται.)
Par: Surely then in this way, Those Other than The One, according to both Wholes and Parts, are Unlimited and also Participate of Limit.

Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ γε.)
Par: Is it not the case then, that They are Like and Unlike, to Each Other and to Themselves?
Ari: in what way then? (πὴ δὴ;) 
Par: Since on the one hand, according to Their Own Nature, All of Them will be, 
(2) η μὲν κατὰ εαυτῶν τὴν φύσιν παντὰ αν εἰη
in some way Unlimited; and in This Way, They are (passively) affected by The Same.
(3) που απειρα ταυτη εστι πεπονθοτα ταυτον.
Ari: Entirely so. (πανο γε.)
Par: And certainly, insofar as They All indeed Participate of Limit,
(4) και μην η απαντα γε μετεχει περατος,
and by Experiencing in This Way, They will All be The Same.
(5) και πεπονθοτα ταυτη αν ειη ταυτον.
Ari: How could they not; (πως δ’ου.)
Par: But on the other hand, inasmuch as They have been so affected so as to be both
Limited and Unlimited, they are affected by experiences that are opposite to one another.
(7) πεπερασμενα και απειρα, πεπονθεν παθη εναντια αλληλοις.
Ari: Yes. (ναι.)
Par: But opposites are indeed as most Unlike as it is possible.
159A (1) δ’ τα εναντια γε ως ανομοιοτατα οιον τε.
Ari: Of course, what then?
τι μην;
Par: Therefore on the one hand, each of these experiences, will be both Like Selves
(2) αρα μην εκατερον το παθος αν ειη τε ομοια αυτοις
and Like each other; but on the other hand, according to both affections,
(3) και αλληλοις, δ’ κατα αμφοτερα
Selves are in both ways, most opposite and most Unlike.
(4) αυτα αμφοτερως εναντιωτατα τε και ανομοιοτατα.
Ari: I dare say so.
κινδυνουνει.
Par: Surely then, in this way, The Other Selves will be both
(5) δη ουτω τα αλλα αυτα αν ειη τε
Like and Unlike Selves and Each-other.
(6) ομοια τε και ανομοια αυτοις και αλληλοις.
Ari: It is so.
ουτως.
Par: Surely then, They will be both The Same and Other from Each Other, and
(7) δη και ταυτα και ετερα αλληλων, και
will be In-Motion and Standing-still, and it will not in any way be difficult for us to discover
(8) κινουμενα και εστοτα, και ουκετι χαλεπως ευρησομεν
that all kinds of contrary experiences are undergone by Those that are Other than The One,
159B (1) παντα εναντια τα παθη πεπονθοτα ταλλα του ενος,
seeing that They appear to have been so affected.
(2) επειπερ ταυτα εφανη πεπονθοτα.
Ari: You speak correctly.
λεγεις ορθως.
The Fifth Hypothesis

Parallel / Non-Relational

Par: 23 Is it not so then, that if on the one hand, we presently let these matters Be

as Openly Clear, so then in turn, we can consider, if One Is, whether Those Other than

The One, do not Have to Be in This Way, or if they Have to be solely in the following way?

Ari: Entirely so.

Par: Surely then, let us state from the beginning, if One Is,

what those other than The One must undergo/experience/suffer.

Ari: Let us say so.

Par: Take notice then, on the one hand, is not The One Separate/Apart/Distinct

from the others, and on the other hand, the others Separate/Distinct/Parallel to The One?

Ari: Why do you ask?

Par: Because nothing exists in some other way besides these ways. One which exists

by being other than The One, then the other; which exists by being other than the others.

For that is all that can be specified, when we say, The One and the others.

Ari: All indeed.

Par: Accordingly then, there is no other way besides these, in which both The One

and the others can subsist in The Self (Parallel) Existence. (Odyssey 602 on Heracles)

Ari: For there is none.

Par: Accordingly then, The One and the others, never subsist in The Same.

(Since They are Parallel)
Ari: It does not appear that they do.

Par: Are They Separate then?

Ari: Yes, they are separate.

Par: We most certainly affirmed that That which Is Truly One, has no Parts (137C).

Par: Accordingly then, neither will The Whole One be in the others, nor The Parts of Self, if It is both Separate from the others, and also, if It has no Parts.

Ari: How could it not be so?

Par: Accordingly then, in no way will the others Participate of The One, since they Participate according to a certain Part of Self, nor according to The Whole.

Ari: It does not appear to be likely.

Par: Therefore, in no way are the others One, nor have/maintain any One in themselves.

Ari: For they have not then.

Par: Therefore, neither are the others Many. For if they were Many, then Each One of Selves would be One by being a Part of The Whole; but now, those other than The One are neither One nor Many, nor a Whole, nor Parts, since they in no way Participate of Self.

Ari: Rightly so.

Par: Accordingly then, the others are neither Two nor Three, nor are These Numbers contained in them, since they are entirely deprived of The One.

Ari: So it is.

Par: Accordingly then, the others are neither Like nor Unlike.

Ari: The Same/Selves with The One, nor are Likeness and Unlikeness inherent in selves.

Par: Accordingly then, the others are neither Like nor Unlike, or Contained Likeness and Unlikeness in themselves, then

For if selves were Like and Unlike, they have no resemblance to each other, and resemble one another not in any way.
those other than The One would somehow Contain in themselves, Two Opposite Ideas.

Ari: So it has come to Light.

Par: But it was indeed impossible for anything to Participate of Two Opposite Ideas, which do not in any way Participate of The One.

Ari: Impossible.

Par: Accordingly then, the others are neither Like nor Unlike, nor Both.

For on the one hand, if they were Like or Unlike, then They would Participate of One Different Idea; but on the other hand, if they were Both Like and Unlike, then they would also Participate of Two Opposite Ideas; but this has been shown to be impossible.

Ari: This is true.

Par: Accordingly then, they are neither selves nor others, nor In-motion nor Standing-still, nor generated nor dissolved, nor are greater nor less, nor Equal; nor do they undergo anything else of this kind. For if they could sustain undergoing any such experience, then They would also Participate of One and Two and Three, and of Even and of Odd; all of which, have indeed been shown to be impossible for selves to Participate, by being entirely deprived of The One.

Ari: All this is most true.

Par: Surely then in this way, if One Is, then The One Is All, and also, nothing at all; and so also in relation to It-Self and in the (non) relation to the others.

Ari: This is entirely so.
The Sixth Hypothesis

Fanaticism

If X is not,  
You are either with us  
then X must be other or against us  
Thucydides 5-116

Par: 24 Very well. Surely then, after this, should we not consider,
160B (5) Εἰπέν: δή δε μετὰ τὸντο αρ’ οὐ σκέπτεον,
what must be the result, if The One is not?
(6) τι χρὴ συμβαίνειν εἰ τὸ εὖ εστὶ μή;
Ari: We must so consider.

Par: Therefore what, will be the self hypothesis, if One is not? (The Word Hypothesis
(7) οὖν τις ἂν εἰπῃ η αὐτὴ ὑποθέσεις, εἰ εὐν εστὶν μή; has The Feminine Form)
Will she then differ in any way from the following hypothesis: If Not-One is not?
(8) ἀρα διαφερεῖ τι τησδὲ, εἰ μὴ εὖ εστὶν μή;

[[Pierre: Consider 151E8:
“On the one hand, To Be, is in some way Present with It, if indeed It Is One. But what else is To Be, than The Participation of Ousia with The Present, The Past and The Future?]]

Ari: It will indeed differ.

μεντοὶ διαφερεὶ.

Par: Will she merely differ, or is the expression, if Not-One Is not,
160C (1) μονὸν διαφερεὶ, η εστὶν εἰπεὶν εἰ μή εὖ εστὶ μή
Entirely Opposite to the hypothesis, if One is not?
(2) παῦ τοῦνατιον τοῦ εἰ εὖ εστὶν μή;
Ari: Entirely opposite.

παῦ τοῦνατιον.

Par: But what if anyone were to say, ‘if Greatness Is not’ or ‘Smallness Is not’,
(3) δ’ τι εἰ τις λεγοὶ, εἰ μεγέθος εστὶν μή ἡ σμικροτὶς εστὶν μή or anything else of this kind, then they should make it clear in each of these cases,
(4) η τι αὖλο των τοιούτων, αρα ἂν δὴλοι εὖ’ εκαστοι
that they speak of The Non-Being, as something Other? (The Principle
(5) οτι λεγοὶ το μὴ οὐν τι εὕρουν; of The 6th.PG)
Ari: Entirely so.

παῦν γε.

Par: Is it not the case then, that now they also make it clear what they mean when they
(6) οὐκουν νῦν καὶ δὴλοι λεγεὶ οταν say, if One is not, that The Non-Being Is Other from The Others,
(7) εἰπη εἰ εὐν εστὶ μή, οτι το μὴ οὐν εὕρουν των αὖλων and so we will know, That which they mean?
(8) καὶ ιςμεν ο λεγεὶ;
Ari: We will know.

ιςμεν [εἰδομαι].
Par: On the one hand, when they say One, first of all, do they speak of something
that Is Knowable, and secondly, of something Other from The Others, whether they add
existence to Self or non-existence; for what they call non-existence, will be no less
recognized/known, and that non-existence is Different from The Others; or is it not so?
Ari: Rightly said.
Par: Accordingly then, we must affirm from the beginning, what Must Be, if One Is not,
in the following way. Thus on the one hand, as it is Reasonable, This Must Belong to Self;
first of all, there Must Be Knowledge of Self, or else, nothing which is said
Will Be Recognized/Known, when anyone says, if One Is not.
Ari: True. (αληθής.)
Par: Is this not also the case then, that The Others Must Be Other from Self,
or else That would not Be said to Be Other from The Others?
Ari: Entirely so. (πάνυ γε.)
Par: Accordingly then, Difference-in-Kind, besides The Knowledge, Is Present in Self.
so that when it is said that The One Is Other than The Others, they will not speak of
the Difference-in-Kind of The Others, but of The Difference of That.
Ari: So it has come to Light.
Par: Certainly, The Being that Is Not-One, Must Participate of That and of a Certain
One and of This and in relation to This and of These and All such as These. For then
neither could The One Be spoken of, nor of Those Other than The One, nor would
anything of That Be Present with That, nor could anything Be said about Self,
if It neither Participated of Some nor of Those Others.
Ari: Rightly said. (ορθος.)
Par: Then on the one hand, it is not possible for to be, to be present with The One,  
161A (1) δή μεν τε ουχ οιον ειναι τω ενι,  
if indeed It does not exist; but on the other hand, nothing prevents it to participate of many,  
(2) ειπερ γε μη εστι, δε ουδεν κωλυει μετεχειν πολλων,  
But it must even do so, if indeed The One is not, and Is not something else than that.  
(3) αλλα αναγκη και, ειπερ γε το εν εστιν μη και μη αλλο εκεινο.  
Certainly then, if neither The One nor that exists, then nothing will exist. But if  
(4) μεντοι ει μητε το εν μιτ εκεινο μη εσται, αλλα  
The Logos is about something else, then there is nothing that can be spoken of.  
(5) ο λογος περι του αλλου, ουδεν ουδε δει φθεγγεσθαι:  
But if non-existence underlies That One and Is not something else, then it is also Necessary  
(6) ει μη ειναι υποκειται εκεινο εν και μη το αλλο, και αναγκη for Self to also have a Share of that non-existence and of many others.  
(7) αυτω μετειναι τοι εκεινο και πολλων αλλων.  
Ari: Entirely so.  
πανυ γε.  
Par: Accordingly then, Unlikeness Is also Present with Self in relation to the others.  
(8) αρα αναμοιοιτης εστιν Και αυτω προς τα αλλα.  
For the others, by being other than The One, will also be of a different kind/genus.  
(9) γαρ τα αλλα οντα ετερα του ενος αν και ειη ετεροια.  
Ari: Yes. (ναι.)  
Par: But are not those of another kind, various?  
(10) δ’ ουκ τα ετεροια αλλαια;  
Ari: How then could they not be?  
πος δ’ ου;  
Par: But are not the various, Unlike?  
(11) δ’ ουκ τα αλλαια ανομοια;  
Ari: They are indeed unlike.  
μεν ουν ανομοια.  
Par: Is it not the case then, that if indeed they are unlike The One,  
161B (1) ουκουν ειπερ εστι ανομοια τω ενι,  
it is evident that they will indeed be unlike That which Is Unlike.  
(2) δηλον στι τα αν γε ειη ανομοια ανομοιω.  
Ari: It is evident. (δηλον.)  
Par: Surely then, Unlikeness will also Be in The One,  
(3) δη ανομοιοτης αν και ειη τω ενι,  
according to which, The Others will Be Unlike in relation to Self.  
(4) ην τα αλλα εστιν ανομοια προς αυτο.  
Ari: So it is reasonable.  
εοικεν.  
Par: But certainly, if Self is Unlike The Others,  
(5) δε δη ει αυτω εστιν ανομοιοτης τον αλλων,  
then must not Self Be The Likeness of It-Self?  
(6) αραναγκη ουκ αυτω ειναι ομοιοτητα εαυτου;  
Ari: How? (πως;)
Par: If *Unity* were *Unlike The One*, then *The Logos*, would somehow not *Be Possible* about *The One*, nor about *That* which is *Like It*; nor would there *Be* the hypothesis about *One*, but about *something other* than *One*. (7) εἰ ενὸς εστὶ αὐνομοιοτήτις τῷ ενὶ, ὁ λόγος αὐν που
Ari: Entirely so. (πανυ γε.)
Par: But that must not indeed be the case.

Ari: It is so. (ενὸς γε.)
Par: Therefore, can you assign anything else between Them-Selves, except Equality?

Ari: Nothing else but this.

Par: Accordingly then, in whatsoever, there Is Bigness and Smallness,

Equality Is also Present, by Being Between These.

Ari: So it has come to Light.

Non let

Par: Surely then, as it is Reasonable, The One that does not Truly exist,

161Ε (1) δή, ὡς εἰοικε, τῷ εὐν μὴ οὖντι,

will also have a Share of Equality, Bigness and Smallness.

Ari: So it is reasonable.

Par: And certainly, Self Must also Participate of Ousia in a Definite way.

Ari: How so?

Par: Self Must Possess Ousia in This way that we have described. For otherwise,

we shall not speak Truly when we say, The One is not; but if we do speak Truly,

then it is clear that we have affirmed that Selves Are Beings: or is it not in this way?

Par: Seeing that, we affirm that we speak The Truth, then it Is also Necessary

162Α (1) επείδη φαμεν λέγειν ἀληθῆ δὲ καὶ ἀναγκή
to affirm that we speak of Beings.

Ari: It is necessary.

Par: Accordingly then, as it is Reasonable, The One which Has no Being, exists.

(3) ἀρα, ὡς εἰοικε, τῷ εὐν οὐκ ὦν, εστίν.

For if it were not the case that there will be non-Being, then That which Is would

(4) γὰρ εἰ μὴ εσται μὴ οὖν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ εἰναι

let something go to non-Being, and it (non-Being) would immediately be Being.

(5) ἀνθὴς(ἀνιήμη) τῷ πρὸς τῷ μῆ εἰναι, ἐυθὺς εσται οὖν.

Ari: Altogether so.

Par: Accordingly then, Self Must Possess The Bond of That which Is not, in order to be

(6) ἀρα αὐτῷ δει εχεῖν τὸ δέσμιον τοῦ εἰναι μὴ, εἰναι

non-Being, if It is going to not Be; just as, in a similar way, The Being Must Possess

(7) μὴ οὖν, εἰ μελέτη μὴ εἰναι, ὥσπερ ὁμοιώς το οὖ εχεῖν
The Bond to not Be non-Being, in order that It may in turn Perfectly Be such as It Is.

(8) τοι μὴ εἰναι μὴ οὖν, εἰνα αὐ τελεως εἰναι(BT) η.

For in this way, especially, both, The Being will Be, and the non-Being will not Be; on the
(9) γαρ οὕτως μᾶλλον τοι οὐν αὖ εἰη καὶ τοι μὴ οὖν αὖ οὐκ εἰη:

one hand, The Being Participates of Ousia in order that The Being Be; but on the other hand,
(10) μεν τοι οὖν μετεξεχοντα οὐσιας τοι οὐν εἰναι, δὲ

The Being Participates of non-Ousia, in order that It may be, non-Being, (The
162B (1) μη οὐσιας του ειναι μη ον, Patho-logos)

if It is going to Perfectly Be. Furthermore, on the one hand, the non-Being Participates
(2) ει μελλει τελεως ειναι, δε μεν τοι μη ον

non-Ousia, in order that it may be non-Being; whereas on the other hand, non-Being
(3) μη ουσιας του ειναι μη ον δε

Participates of Ousia, in order that it may be, non-Being, if in tum,
(4) ουσιας του ειναι μη ον, ει αυ it will also Perfectly not Be, the non-Being.
(5) και τελεως μη εσται τοι μη ον.

Ari: Most truly.

αληθεστατα.

Par: Is it not the case then, seeing that both non-Being is present with Real-Being,
(6) ουκουν επειπερ τε του μη ειναι μετεστι τω οντι

and That which Is, is present with non-Real-Being, is it not also the case that The One,
(7) και του ειναι μη τοι οντι, και τοι ενι,

since indeed It Is not, Must Necessarily Share of existence, in order that It may not Be.
(8) επειδη εστι ουκ αναγκη μετειναι του ειναι εις τοι ειναι.

Ari: It is necessary.

αναγκη.

Par: Surely then, Ousia will also Manifestly Be with The One, if It Is not.
(9) δη ουσια και φαινεται τω ενι, ει εστιν μη.

Ari: It will so appear.

φαινεται.

Par: Accordingly then, so also the non-Ousia, if indeed She Is not.
(10) αρα και μη ουσια, ειπερ εστιν μη.

Ari: How could it not?

πως δ’ ου;

Par: Therefore, is it also Possible that that which is maintained/kept in some way,
(11) οουν τε οιουν το εχον πως

is not so maintained, when it is not changed from this condition (passive) by habit?
(12) μη ουτω εχειν, μη μεταβαλλον εκ ταυτης της εξως;

Ari: It cannot. (τε οιουν ουχ.)

Par: Accordingly then, everything which can be kept in this way, and in turn
162C (1) αρα παν ο αν εχη ουτω τε και
not kept in this (indefinite) way, signifies, that which can be changed in such a way.
(2) μη ουτως, σημαινει το μεταβολην τοιοτουν.
Ari: How could it not? (πως δ’ οὐ;) 
Par: But is Alteration a Motion; or what else should we call it? 
(3) δὲ μεταβολὴ κινήσεις: η τι φισομεν; 
Ari: It is a motion. (κινήσεις.) 
Par: Is it not the case, that The One has been shown to be both Being and non-Being? 
(4) ουκουν το εν εφανη τε ον και ουκ ον; 
Ari: Yes. (ναι.) 
Par: Accordingly then, It has been shown to be kept in this way and not kept in this way. 
(5) αρα φαινεται εχον ουτως και ουχ ουτως. 
Ari: It has so appeared. (εικεν.) 
Par: Accordingly then, has not The One Being also been shown to be in Motion, 
(6) αρα ουκ το εν ον και πεφαναι κινουμενον, 
seeing that It also has to be altered from Being into non-Being. 
(7) επειπερ και εχον μεταβολην εκ του ειναι επι το μη ειναι. 
Ari: I dare say. (κινδυνευει.) 
Par: But certainly, if indeed It in no way Is among The Real Beings, since It Is not, 
(8) αλλα μην ει γε μηδειμου εστι τον ουνων, ος εστιν ουκ, 
then if indeed It Is not, It will not alternate from one place to another. 
(9) επειρ εστιν μη, αν ουδ’ μεθισταιο(μεθιστημι) ποθεν ποι. 
Ari: How is that the case? 
πως γαρ; 
Par: Accordingly then, It will indeed not be moved by Alteration. 
(10) αρα αν γε ουκ κινοιτ’ το μεταβαινειν. 
Ari: It will not. (γαρ ου.) 
Par: Certainly then, neither will It Turn-about in The Self; 
162D (1) μην ουδε αν στρεφοιτο εν τω αυτω 
for It will not Grasp The Self/Same in any way. For The Being Is The Self/Same. 
(2) γαρ απεται ταυτου ουδαμου. γαρ το ον εστι ταυτον: 

Therefore it Is Impossible for non-Being to Reside in any of The Real Beings. 
(3) δε ειναι αδυνατου το μη ον εν τω των ουνων. 
Ari: For it is impossible. (γαρ αδυνατου.) 
Par: Therefore The One which Is not, cannot Turn-about in That in which It Is not. 
(4) αρα το εν ον μη, αν δυνατο ουκ στρεφεσθαι εν εκεινω εν ω εστιν μη. 
Ari: It cannot. 
γαρ ουν ου. 
Par: Certainly then, The One, whether The One that Is, or The One that Is not, 
(5) μην το εν ουτε το ον ουτε το ον μη 
cannot in any way be altered into something other than It-Self. For then The Logos would 
(6) ουδε που αλλοιουται εαυτου. γαρ ο λογος αν 
no longer be about The One, but about something else, if indeed It was altered from It-Self. 
(7) ου ετι ην περι του ενος, αλλα περι τινος αλλου. επερ αυτο ηλλοιουτο εαυτου. 
Ari: Rightly so. 
ορθος. 
Par: But if It does not alter, nor turn-about in The Same, nor undergoes transition, 
162E (1) δε ει μητ’ αλλοιουται μητε στρεφεται εν ταυτω μητε μεταβαινει 
is there any way in which It can still be moved? 
(2) αρ αν πη ετι κινοιτο;
Ari: How could there be? (πως γαρ ;)
Par: Most certainly then, That which is Immovable must necessarily be kept at Rest;
(3) γε μην το ακινητον αναγκη αγειν ησυχιαν, but That which is at Rest/Peace/Quiet must Abide/Stand-still.
(4) δε το ησυχαζον εσται .
Ari: It is necessary . (αναγκη .)
Par: Therefore The One that Is not, as it was shown, both stands-still and is moved.
(5) αρα το εν ουκ, ουκ εοικεν, τε εστηκε και κινεται .
Ari: as it is Reasonable . (εοικεν .)
Par: And most certainly, if indeed It were moved, there is a Great Necessity that Self
163A (1) και γε μην ειπερ κινεται μεγαλη αναγκη αυτο
must be altered . For in so far as anything may be moved, it is no longer kept in the same way
(2) αλλοιουσθαι . γαρ οπη τι αν κινηθη, ουκεθε εχει οσιαιος τοσοτον such as it was before, but in another way.
(3) κατα ως ειχεν, αλλ’ ετερως .
Ari: In this way . (ουτος .)
Par: Surely then, since The One moves, It is also altered.
(4) δη το εν κινουμενον και αλλοιουται .
Ari: Yes . (ναι .)
Par: And most certainly, by Being in no way moved, It will Be in no way altered.
(5) και γε μην μηδαμη κινουμενον αν ουδαμη αλλοιοτο .
Ari: It will not . (γαρ ου .)
Par: Accordingly then on the one hand, in so far as The One that Is not moves,
(6) αρα μην η το εν ουκ κινεται ,
It is altered, but on the other hand, in so far as It is not moved, It is not altered.
αλλοιουται , δε
Ari: It is not . (γαρ ου .)
Par: Accordingly then, The One which Is not, is both altered and not altered.
(7) αρα το εν ου και αλλοιουται και ουκ αλλοιουται .
Ari: Apparently . (φαινεται .)
Par: Thus on the one hand, is it not Necessary that That which is altered must become
(8) δη μην αρα ουκ αναγκη το αλλοιουμενον γινεσθαι
other than before, and on the other hand, that It Must undergo a dissolution from Its former
habit/condition ; but That which Is not altered, can neither come-to-be generated nor dissolved?
163B (1) εξεως : δε το μη αλλοιουμενον μητε γινεσθαι μητε απολλυσθαι ;
Ari: It is necessary . (αναγκη .)
Par: And accordingly then, on the one hand, The One which Is not, by being altered,
(2) και αρα μην το εν ου και αλλοιουμενον
will be generated and dissolved; but on the other hand, by not undergoing alteration,
(3) γινεσθαι τε και απολλυσθαι , δε μη αλλοιουμενον
It will not be subject to either generation nor dissolution. And thus, The One that Is not,
(4) ουτε γινεσθαι ουτε απολλυσθαι : και ουτω το εν ου will be generated and dissolved, and will not be generated nor dissolved.
(5) γινεσθαι τε και απολλυσθαι , και ουτε γινεσθαι ουτ’ απολλυσθαι .
Ari: For thus it will not .
γαρ ουν ου .
The Seventh Hypothesis

The Absence of Ousia

Par: 25 Surely then, let us again return to The Beginning, to See if
163B (6) δὴ ομοίως Αὔσις παλίν επι τὴν αρχὴν οὐσομενοι εἰ these conclusions will come to Light for us just as they do now, or otherwise.
(7) ταῦτα φανερῶς ημῖν απερ καὶ νυν, ἡ ἑτέρα.
Ari: Then we must. (ἀλλὰ χρη.)
Par: Is it not the case then, that we have already said,
163C (1) οὐκοῦν, φαμέν, what must result in relation to Self, if One Is not?
(2) τί χρῆ ξυμβαίνειν περὶ αὐτοῦ, εἰ εν εστὶ μη;
Ari: Yes. (ναι)
Par: But when we say That which Is not, do we not then signify anything else,
(3) δὲ οταν λεγόμεν το εστин μη, αν μη αρα σημαίνει τι ἀλλὸ than the absence of Ousia from That which we say, Is not? (The Principle of The 7th)
(4) η απουσίαν οὐσίας τοτεω ω φομεν εἰναι μη;
Ari: Nothing else. (οὐδὲν ἀλλό.)
Par: Therefore, when we say that anything is not, do we say that Self is not
(5) οὐν οταν φομεν τι εἰναι μη, ποτέρον φομεν αυτο εἰναι ουκ in some way, but that in some way It is? Or does the term ‘is not’, simply signify this;
(6) πως, δὲ πως εἰναι; η το λεγόμενον εστι μη απλος σημαινε τοτο that It is in no way, anywhere, since It does not Participate in a certain definite way
(7) στι εστιν ουδαμος ουδα, οὐδὲ μετέχει πη of Ousia since indeed It is, the non Being (162A-B) ?
(8) ουσίας γε το μη ουν;
Ari: It signifies this, most simply.

μεν ουν απλοῦστατα.
Par: Accordingly then, neither will the non Being, Be Able to Be,
163D (1) αρα ουτε αν το μη ουν δυνατο ειναι nor ever Participate in any other way of Ousia.
(2) ουτε μετέχει ουδαμος αλλος ουσιας.
Ari: For it cannot. (γαρ ου.)
Par: But that which becomes and that which dissolves, are not anything else than
(3) δε το γιγνεσθαι και το απολυσθαι ην μη τι αλλο η the one to have a Share of Ousia, but the other to lose Ousia?
(4) το μεν μεταλαμβάνειν ουσιας, το δ’ απολύναι ουσιαν;
Ari: Nothing else.

Par: Then *that which has* indeed *no Share* of This, *can neither* receive *nor* lose Self.

Ari: How could it?

Par: Accordingly then, seeing that The One *in no way* Is,

Ari: That is reasonable.

Par: Accordingly then, *The One* which *Is not*, *can neither* be dissolved *nor* generated,

Ari: This is true.

Par: But if *It is not* altered, then *Is* it not *Necessary* that *It can not* be moved?

Ari: It is necessary.

Par: Certainly then, *The Being* which *exists in no way at all*, we shall say, *can not*

Ari: In the self; how could it not?

Par: Surely then, we must say in turn, that *in this way, the non Being*,

Par: Accordingly then, neither *Bigness* nor *Smallness*, nor *Equality*, *Belongs* to Self.

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163E (1) ἀρ’ οὐδ’ ἀλλοιοῦται οὐδαμῇ: γὰρ ἀν
to experience This Participation, then It would already Be generated and dissolved.

164A (1) ἀρ’ οὐδ’ τὸν οὐδαμὸν θείσαν σὺν αὐτῶ.
Ari: It does not.
γαρ οὐ.

Par: Most certainly then, neither Likeness nor Unlikeness,
(2) ἐνυὴ οὐδε ομοιοτης οὐδε ετεροιοτης
neither in relation to Self nor in relation to the others, will Be with Self.
(3) οὔτε προς αυτο οὔτε προς ταλλα ἀν εἰη αυτω.

Ari: It does not appear that it will.
οὐ φαίνεται.

Par: What follows then? Can The Other Beings Be in any way Present with Self,
(4) τι δε; ἀν ταλλα εἰη ὀπως εσθ' αυτω,
if None Can Be Present with Self?
(5) ει μηδεν δει ειναι αυτω;

Ari: They cannot.
estin ouk.

Par: Accordingly then, the others are neither Like nor Unlike,
(6) ἀρα τα αλλα ουτε ομοια ουτε ανομοια
nor The Same/Selves nor Other, from Self.
(7) οὔτε ταυτα ουθ’ ετερα αυτω.

Ari: They are not.
γαρ ου.

Par: What then? Can anything be of That, or with That, or with anything, or of another,
(8) τι δε; το εσται εκεινου η το εκεινω η το τι η αλλου
or with another, or at some time Past, or at some time in the Future, or Now.
164B (1) η αλλω η ποτε η επειτα η νυν
Or Can there be knowledge, or opinion, or perception, or Logos, or name,
(2) η επιστημη η δοξα η αισθησις η λογος η ομοιομα
or anything else whatsoever of The Real Beings, where the non Being is concerned?
(3) η αλλο στηουν των οντων το μη ον περι;

Ari: There can not.
estαι ουκ.

Par: Surely then, in this way, One Being Is not, not can exist in any way at all.
(4) δη ουτω εν ον ουκ ουκ εχει πος ουδαμη.

Ari: Surely then, it is indeed not likely to be the case, that it can exist anywhere.
δη γε ουκουν εοικεν εχειν ουδαμη.
The Eighth Hypothesis

Par: 26 Surely then, let us yet declare, what must happen to the others, if One is not.

Ari: For we say so.

Par: Then on the one hand, selves must exist in some (indefinite) way; (The Principle of The 8th PG)

(6) ἀλλὰ μὲν αὐτὰ δεῖ εἰναὶ ποῦ:

for if others do not at all exist, we could not discourse about the others.

(7) γὰρ εἰ ἄλλα μὴ δέ εἶστιν, ἀν οὐκ ἔγορτο περὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

Ari: So it is.

Par: But if The Logos is about the others, then the others are indeed other.

(8) δὲ εἰ ὁ λόγος περὶ τῶν ἄλλων, τὰ ἄλλα εἰστὶν γε ἑτέρα.

Or do you not require that both another and the other be applied to the self?

(9) η ὥσπερ καλέσει τὸ τὸ ἄλλο καὶ τὸ ἑτέρον εἶπὲ τῷ αὐτῷ;

Ari: I do indeed.

Par: But do we indeed say that the other is in some (indefinite) way other from the other, and certainly that which is other is other than another?

(2) καὶ δὴ τὸ ἄλλο εἰναὶ ἄλλο ἄλλου;

Ari: Yes.

Par: Accordingly then, if they are also about to be other, to the others,

(3) ἀρα, εἰ καὶ μελλεῖ εἰναὶ ἄλλα, τοῖς ἄλλοις

then there is something from which they will be other.

(4) εἰστὶ τὶ οὐ εἴσται ἄλλα.

Ari: It is necessary.

Par: Certainly then, what will this be? For they will indeed not be other than The One, by non Being.

(5) δὴ οὐν τὶ αὐτὴ; μὲν γε οὐκ εἴσται ἄλλα

Ari: They will not.

γὰρ οὐ.
Par: Accordingly then, they are other from each other; for this still remains for selves;
(7) αρα εστι αλληλων : γαρ τουτο ετι λειπεται αυτοις, or else to be other from nothing.
(8) η ειναι αλλοις μηδενος.
Ari: Rightly so.

Par: Accordingly then, each is other from the others, according to multitude. For they
(9) αρα εκαστα εστι αλλα αλληλων κατα πληθη. γαρ
cannot be so according to One, and by the non Being of One. But each mass of selves
(10) αν ουκ ειη οια κατα εν, τε μη οντος ενος: αλλα εκαστος ο ονκος αυτων
as it appears, is infinite multitude; and even if anyone should take that which appears to be
the smallest piece, just as a dream in sleep, it then suddenly appears to be opposite to that
(2) το σμικροτατον εωσερ οναρ εν απω εξαφνης φαινεται αντι
which appeared to be one, and instead of that which appeared to be the smallest, it would now
(3) δοξαντος ενος, και αντι σμικροτατον ειναι
be many; that is, an immensely great mass, in relation to the minute fragments of self.
(4) ειναι πολλα, παμμεγεθες προς τα κερασιζομενα εξ αυτου.

Ari: Most rightly.

Par: Surely then, among such masses, the others will be other from one another,
(5) δη τοιουτων ογκων ταλλα αν ειη αλλα αλληλων,
if One has no Being and others exist.
(6) ει ενος μη οντος αλλα εστιν.

Ari: Perfectly so.

Par: Is it not the case then, that there will be many masses/heaps,
(7) ουκουν εσονται πολλοι ογκοι
each of which, will appear to be one, but which is not so, if indeed One will not be at all?
(8) εκαστος φαινομενος εις, δε ουν ου, ειπερ εν εσται μη

Ari: It will be so.

Par: Thus, there will also appear to be a number of selves,
164E (1) δε και δοξει ειναι αριθμος αυτων,
if indeed each of these heaps, being many, also appear to be one.
(2) ειπερ εκαστο ν, οντων πολλων, και εν
Ari: Entirely so.

Par: And certainly, some which are among the selves will appear to be even
(3) και δη μεν οντα εν αυτοις φαινεται τα αρτια
and others odd, although not truly, if indeed One will not exist at all.
(4) δε τα περιττα ουκ αληθως, ειπερ εν εσται μη.
Ari: They will not be so.

Par: And most certainly, that which is smallest, as we have said,
(5) καὶ μὴ σμικροτάτον, φαμέν,
will also appear to be in selves, but this will appear to be many and big,
(6) καὶ δοξεῖ εἶναι εν αὐτοῖς, δὲ τοῦτο φαίνεται πολλά καὶ μεγάλα
in relation to each of the many, since they are small.

Ari: How could it not?

Par: And certainly each mass will seem to the eye of opinion to be equal to the many
(2) καὶ μὴ εκαστὸς ὁγκὸς δοξασθήσεται εἶναι ἵσος τοῖς πολλοῖς
and small masses. For it will not appear to change from a more into a lesser quantity,
(3) καὶ σμικροῖς. γὰρ αὐτὸν φαινομένος μετεβαίνειν εκ μειζόνος εἰς ἑλλαττον,
before it appears to arrive at something between; but this will be a phantasm of equality.
(4) πρὶν δοξεῖν εὖθειν εἰς τὸ μεταξὺ; δ’ τοῦτο αὐτὸ εἶναι φαντασμα ἵσος τοῦ.

Ari: It is likely.

Par: Is it not the case, that although it appears to have a limit, in relation to
(5) οὐκοῦν καὶ εἶχον περὰς προς
another mass, and self in relation to self, it neither has a
(6) ἄλλον ὁγκὸν, τε αὐτὸς προς αὐτὸν οὔτε εἶχον

Beginning nor End nor Middle?

Ari: In what way then?

Par: Because when anyone grasps something of These through the empirical mind, as if
(8) ὅτι οὖν τις λαβή τι τουτευ ὑπὸ διάνοια ὡς
it were existing, then another “beginning” will also always appear to be prior to ‘the beginning’,

165B (1) οὖν, ἀλλη ἀρχη τε αεὶ φαίνεται προ τῆς ἀρχῆς,
and after the end, another “end” will always still remain; and in “the middle” there will
(2) τε μετὰ τὴν τελευτὴν τε ἐτερα τελευτὴν ὑπολειπομενη, τε ἐν τῷ μεσῳ τε
always be, others more inward than “the middle”; but smaller, because each of the selves
(3) ἄλλα μεσαιτηρα του μεσου, δε σμικροτερα, δια εκαστου αὐτων
is not Capable of receiving The One, and inasmuch as by The One not Being.

Ari: This is most true.

Par: Surely then, all The Being, which anyone may grasp through the empirical mind,
(5) δὴ παν το οὖν, ο τις αὐτων λαβη τη διανοια,
I think, must necessarily be broken-up into minute pieces. For the masses will, in some way
(6) οἰμαι, ἀναγκὴ ἤρπετεσθαι κερματιζόμενον. γὰρ ὁγκος αὐτὸ που
always be apprehended without One/Unity.

(7) ἀει λαμβάνοιτο ἄνευ ενος.

Ari: Entirely so.

(8) γε οὐκοῦν τοιούτου μεν το

Par: Is it not indeed the case then, that such a mass, on the one hand, to those who

behold it from afar and with a dull eye, it will necessarily appear to be one; whereas on the

other hand, to those who See it with an Intellectual Eye, closely and acutely, then in that case

will not each “one” be revealed to be infinite in multitude, if indeed each “one” is deprived of

(3) εκαστὸν ἐν φανεραὶ απειρον πληθεί, εἰπερ στερεται

The One, by not Being?

(4) τοῦ ἐνος μὴ οντος;

Ari: Most necessarily so.

μὲν αναγκαίοτατον οὐν.

Par: Surely then, in this way each of the others must appear to be Unlimited and

(5) δὴ ουτὼ εκαστὰ ταλλὰ δὲι φανεραὶ απειρα τε και

Limited, and One and many, if One is not at all, but those other than The One exist.

(6) περαὶ καὶ ἐν καὶ πολλὰ, εἰ ἐν μή, δὲ ταλλὰ τοῦ ἐνος ἐστίν.

Ari: It must be so.

γὰρ δὲι.

Par: Is it not the case then, that they will appear to be both like and unlike?

(7) οὐκοῦν δοξεὶ εἰναι καὶ ὁμοῖα τε καὶ ἀνομοῖα;

Ari: In what way, then?

πὴ δῆ;

Par: On the one hand, in such a way as, to those who behold others from afar,

(8) μὲν οἰον αποσταντὶ
everything appears to be one, as in a shadow painting, by appearing to have experienced

(9) παντὰ φανεραὶ εἰν εἰκοσιγραφήμενα φανομενα πεπονθεναι

The Same and by appearing to be like.

(10) ταυτὸν καὶ εἰναι ὁμοῖα.

Ari: Entirely so.

(8) παντὶ γε.

Par: But on the other hand, as they approach closely, they will appear to be many and

other, and diverse from and unlike themselves, through the phantom appearance of the other.

(2) ετερα καὶ ετεροὶ καὶ ἀνομοῖα εαυτοῖς τὸ φαντασματι τοῦ ετεροῦ.

Ari: It is so.

ουτὼ.

Par: Certainly then, the massive selves will necessarily appear to be

(3) δὴ τοὺς οὕκους αὐτοὺς ἀναγκη ἑφανεροὶ
both like and unlike themselves, and to each other.

(4) καὶ ομοίους καὶ ανωμοίους εαυτοῖς τε καὶ ἀλλήλοις.

Ari: Entirely so.

πάνυ μεν οὖν.

Par: Is it not so then, that these are both selves and others from each other,

(5) οὐκοῦν τοὺς καὶ αὐτούς καὶ ετεροὺς ἀλλήλων,

and have contact and are separate from themselves, and are moved with every possible motion,

(6) καὶ απτομένους καὶ χωρίς εαυτῶν, καὶ κινομένους πασάς κινήσεις

and are stationary in every way, and are generated and dissolved, and are neither of these,

(7) καὶ εστώτας παντὶ, καὶ γιγνομένους καὶ απολλυμένους καὶ μηδέτερα,

and all such things possible, which we can at this time easily go through in detail, that is

(8) καὶ παντα τα τοιαῦτα ποὺ, α ἡμιν ἥδη εὑπετες διελθεῖν,

of course, if One has no Being and many exist?

Ari: Most true then.

αληθεστατα μεν οὖν.
The Ninth Hypothesis

Par: 27 Surely then, let us return again to The Beginning one more time, and relate, what must then be, for those other than The One, if One Is not.

(3) εἰπομεν, τι χρη δε ειναι, ταλλα του ενος, ει εν εστι μη.

Ari: Let us so relate.

γαρ ειπομεν ουν.

Par: Is it not the case then, that on the one hand, the others will not be one.

(4) ουκουν μεν ταλλα ουκ εσται εν.

Ari: How could they? (πως γαρ ;)

Par: Nor indeed will they be many; for one would also be present in many.

(5) ουδε μην γε πολλα: γαρ εν αν και ουσιν ενει εν πολλοις.

For if none of them are one, then all of them are nothing; so that neither can many exist.

(6) γαρ ει μηδεν αυτων εστιν εν, απαντα εστιν ουδεν, οστε ουδεν αν πολλα ειη.

Ari: True. (αληθη.)

Par: Then, by One not being present in the others, neither are others many nor one.

(7) δε ενος μη ενοντος εν τοις αλλοις, ουτε εστι ταλλα πολλα ουτε εν.

Ari: They are not.

γαρ ου.

Par: Nor will they indeed appear to be one nor many.

166A (1) ουδε γε φαινεται εν ουδε πολλα.

Ari: Why then? (τι δη :)

Par: Since the others cannot in any way ever have any Communion with The Real Beings,

(2) οτι ταλλα μη ουδαμη ουδαμος εχει ουδενιν κοινονιαν των οντων

nor can any Part of The Beings be Present with the others; for no Part exists with non-Beings.

(3) ουδε μη τι τω των υντων εστιν παρα των αλλων γαρ ουδεν μερος εστι μη τοις ουσιν.

Ari: True. (αληθη.)

Par: So then, neither is there any opinion about that which is not present in others, nor

(4) αρα ουδε εστιν δοξα του οντος μη παρα τως αλλοις ουδε

any phantasm; nor can that which is not in any way whatsoever be opined about the others.

(5) τι φαντασμα, ουδε το ον μη ουδαμως ουδαμη δοξαζεται επι των αλλων.

Ari: It cannot. (γαρ ουν ου.)

Par: Accordingly then, if One Is not, then It cannot be opined to be any one particular aspect

166B (1) αρα ει εν εστιν μη, ουδε δοξαζεται ειναι τι εν

of the others, nor yet of many; for it is Impossible to form an opinion of many without One.

(2) των αλλων ουδε πολλα: γαρ αδυνατον δοξαζαί πολλα ανευ ενος.
Ari: It is impossible.

Par: Accordingly then, If One Is not, then neither will the others exist;
(3) αρα ει εν εστι μη, ουτε ταλλα εστιν
nor can one, nor many, be opined.
(4) ουτε εν ουδε πολλα δοξαζεται.

Ari: It is not likely.

Par: Accordingly then, neither do like nor unlike exist.
(5) αρα ουδε ομοια ουδε ανομοια.

Ari: They do not. (γαρ ου .)

Par: Most certainly then, nor the same nor the other, nor those who grasp, nor those
(6) γε μην ουδε τα αυτα ουδε ετερα, ουδε απομενα ουδε
that are separate, nor others such as those we have before described in detail as having an
(7) χωρις, ουδε αλλα σας τοις αυτα προσθεν εν δηλθομεν ως appearance of existing; for no particular of these will exist, nor will the others appear to be
(8) φαινομενα, ουτε τι τουτων εστιν ουτε ταλλα φαίνεται
if One Is not.
(9) ει εν εστιν μη.

Ari: True. (αληθη .)

Par: Is it not the case then, if we must summarily say, that
166C (1) ουκουν ει συλληβδην ειπομεν
if One is not, and nothing exists; then will our assertion be Correctly stated?
(2) ει εν εστιν μη, και ουδεν εστιν, αν ειπομεν ορθος;

Ari: Altogether so.

πανταπασι μεν ουν.

Par: Now then, let this then be affirmed by you and me; and we may add this also:
(3) τοινυν ειρησθω τε τουτο και That if One is, or Is not, then as it is likely/reasonable, both in relation to Self
(4) ειτε εν εστιν ειτε εστιν μη, ως εοικεν, τε αυτο
and in relation to the others, and also in relation to selves and to each other,
(5) και ταλλα και προς αυτα και προς αλληλα
that All exist in every way, and also, All do not exist in every way,
(6) παντα εστι παντως τε και ουκ εστι
and appear to be, and also, do not appear to be.
(7) και φαίνεται τε και ου φαίνεται.

Ari: Most true.

αληθεστατα.

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